2 * Syncookies implementation for the Linux kernel
4 * Copyright (C) 1997 Andi Kleen
5 * Based on ideas by D.J.Bernstein and Eric Schenk.
7 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
8 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
9 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
10 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
13 #include <linux/tcp.h>
14 #include <linux/slab.h>
15 #include <linux/random.h>
16 #include <linux/cryptohash.h>
17 #include <linux/kernel.h>
19 #include <net/route.h>
21 /* Timestamps: lowest bits store TCP options */
23 #define TSMASK (((__u32)1 << TSBITS) - 1)
25 extern int sysctl_tcp_syncookies
;
27 __u32 syncookie_secret
[2][16-4+SHA_DIGEST_WORDS
];
28 EXPORT_SYMBOL(syncookie_secret
);
30 static __init
int init_syncookies(void)
32 get_random_bytes(syncookie_secret
, sizeof(syncookie_secret
));
35 __initcall(init_syncookies
);
37 #define COOKIEBITS 24 /* Upper bits store count */
38 #define COOKIEMASK (((__u32)1 << COOKIEBITS) - 1)
40 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32
[16 + 5 + SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS
],
43 static u32
cookie_hash(__be32 saddr
, __be32 daddr
, __be16 sport
, __be16 dport
,
46 __u32
*tmp
= __get_cpu_var(ipv4_cookie_scratch
);
48 memcpy(tmp
+ 4, syncookie_secret
[c
], sizeof(syncookie_secret
[c
]));
49 tmp
[0] = (__force u32
)saddr
;
50 tmp
[1] = (__force u32
)daddr
;
51 tmp
[2] = ((__force u32
)sport
<< 16) + (__force u32
)dport
;
53 sha_transform(tmp
+ 16, (__u8
*)tmp
, tmp
+ 16 + 5);
60 * when syncookies are in effect and tcp timestamps are enabled we encode
61 * tcp options in the lower bits of the timestamp value that will be
62 * sent in the syn-ack.
63 * Since subsequent timestamps use the normal tcp_time_stamp value, we
64 * must make sure that the resulting initial timestamp is <= tcp_time_stamp.
66 __u32
cookie_init_timestamp(struct request_sock
*req
)
68 struct inet_request_sock
*ireq
;
69 u32 ts
, ts_now
= tcp_time_stamp
;
74 options
= ireq
->wscale_ok
? ireq
->snd_wscale
: 0xf;
75 options
|= ireq
->sack_ok
<< 4;
76 options
|= ireq
->ecn_ok
<< 5;
78 ts
= ts_now
& ~TSMASK
;
90 static __u32
secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__be32 saddr
, __be32 daddr
, __be16 sport
,
91 __be16 dport
, __u32 sseq
, __u32 count
,
95 * Compute the secure sequence number.
96 * The output should be:
97 * HASH(sec1,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,sec1) + sseq + (count * 2^24)
98 * + (HASH(sec2,saddr,sport,daddr,dport,count,sec2) % 2^24).
99 * Where sseq is their sequence number and count increases every
101 * As an extra hack, we add a small "data" value that encodes the
102 * MSS into the second hash value.
105 return (cookie_hash(saddr
, daddr
, sport
, dport
, 0, 0) +
106 sseq
+ (count
<< COOKIEBITS
) +
107 ((cookie_hash(saddr
, daddr
, sport
, dport
, count
, 1) + data
)
112 * This retrieves the small "data" value from the syncookie.
113 * If the syncookie is bad, the data returned will be out of
114 * range. This must be checked by the caller.
116 * The count value used to generate the cookie must be within
117 * "maxdiff" if the current (passed-in) "count". The return value
118 * is (__u32)-1 if this test fails.
120 static __u32
check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie
, __be32 saddr
, __be32 daddr
,
121 __be16 sport
, __be16 dport
, __u32 sseq
,
122 __u32 count
, __u32 maxdiff
)
126 /* Strip away the layers from the cookie */
127 cookie
-= cookie_hash(saddr
, daddr
, sport
, dport
, 0, 0) + sseq
;
129 /* Cookie is now reduced to (count * 2^24) ^ (hash % 2^24) */
130 diff
= (count
- (cookie
>> COOKIEBITS
)) & ((__u32
) - 1 >> COOKIEBITS
);
135 cookie_hash(saddr
, daddr
, sport
, dport
, count
- diff
, 1))
136 & COOKIEMASK
; /* Leaving the data behind */
140 * MSS Values are taken from the 2009 paper
141 * 'Measuring TCP Maximum Segment Size' by S. Alcock and R. Nelson:
142 * - values 1440 to 1460 accounted for 80% of observed mss values
143 * - values outside the 536-1460 range are rare (<0.2%).
145 * Table must be sorted.
147 static __u16
const msstab
[] = {
159 * Generate a syncookie. mssp points to the mss, which is returned
160 * rounded down to the value encoded in the cookie.
162 __u32
cookie_v4_init_sequence(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
, __u16
*mssp
)
164 const struct iphdr
*iph
= ip_hdr(skb
);
165 const struct tcphdr
*th
= tcp_hdr(skb
);
167 const __u16 mss
= *mssp
;
169 tcp_synq_overflow(sk
);
171 for (mssind
= ARRAY_SIZE(msstab
) - 1; mssind
; mssind
--)
172 if (mss
>= msstab
[mssind
])
174 *mssp
= msstab
[mssind
];
176 NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk
), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESSENT
);
178 return secure_tcp_syn_cookie(iph
->saddr
, iph
->daddr
,
179 th
->source
, th
->dest
, ntohl(th
->seq
),
180 jiffies
/ (HZ
* 60), mssind
);
184 * This (misnamed) value is the age of syncookie which is permitted.
185 * Its ideal value should be dependent on TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT and
186 * sysctl_tcp_retries1. It's a rather complicated formula (exponential
187 * backoff) to compute at runtime so it's currently hardcoded here.
189 #define COUNTER_TRIES 4
191 * Check if a ack sequence number is a valid syncookie.
192 * Return the decoded mss if it is, or 0 if not.
194 static inline int cookie_check(struct sk_buff
*skb
, __u32 cookie
)
196 const struct iphdr
*iph
= ip_hdr(skb
);
197 const struct tcphdr
*th
= tcp_hdr(skb
);
198 __u32 seq
= ntohl(th
->seq
) - 1;
199 __u32 mssind
= check_tcp_syn_cookie(cookie
, iph
->saddr
, iph
->daddr
,
200 th
->source
, th
->dest
, seq
,
204 return mssind
< ARRAY_SIZE(msstab
) ? msstab
[mssind
] : 0;
207 static inline struct sock
*get_cookie_sock(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
208 struct request_sock
*req
,
209 struct dst_entry
*dst
)
211 struct inet_connection_sock
*icsk
= inet_csk(sk
);
214 child
= icsk
->icsk_af_ops
->syn_recv_sock(sk
, skb
, req
, dst
);
216 inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(sk
, req
, child
);
225 * when syncookies are in effect and tcp timestamps are enabled we stored
226 * additional tcp options in the timestamp.
227 * This extracts these options from the timestamp echo.
229 * The lowest 4 bits store snd_wscale.
230 * next 2 bits indicate SACK and ECN support.
232 * return false if we decode an option that should not be.
234 bool cookie_check_timestamp(struct tcp_options_received
*tcp_opt
, bool *ecn_ok
)
236 /* echoed timestamp, lowest bits contain options */
237 u32 options
= tcp_opt
->rcv_tsecr
& TSMASK
;
239 if (!tcp_opt
->saw_tstamp
) {
240 tcp_clear_options(tcp_opt
);
244 if (!sysctl_tcp_timestamps
)
247 tcp_opt
->sack_ok
= (options
>> 4) & 0x1;
248 *ecn_ok
= (options
>> 5) & 1;
249 if (*ecn_ok
&& !sysctl_tcp_ecn
)
252 if (tcp_opt
->sack_ok
&& !sysctl_tcp_sack
)
255 if ((options
& 0xf) == 0xf)
256 return true; /* no window scaling */
258 tcp_opt
->wscale_ok
= 1;
259 tcp_opt
->snd_wscale
= options
& 0xf;
260 return sysctl_tcp_window_scaling
!= 0;
262 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cookie_check_timestamp
);
264 struct sock
*cookie_v4_check(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
265 struct ip_options
*opt
)
267 struct tcp_options_received tcp_opt
;
269 struct inet_request_sock
*ireq
;
270 struct tcp_request_sock
*treq
;
271 struct tcp_sock
*tp
= tcp_sk(sk
);
272 const struct tcphdr
*th
= tcp_hdr(skb
);
273 __u32 cookie
= ntohl(th
->ack_seq
) - 1;
274 struct sock
*ret
= sk
;
275 struct request_sock
*req
;
281 if (!sysctl_tcp_syncookies
|| !th
->ack
|| th
->rst
)
284 if (tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow(sk
) ||
285 (mss
= cookie_check(skb
, cookie
)) == 0) {
286 NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk
), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESFAILED
);
290 NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk
), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESRECV
);
292 /* check for timestamp cookie support */
293 memset(&tcp_opt
, 0, sizeof(tcp_opt
));
294 tcp_parse_options(skb
, &tcp_opt
, &hash_location
, 0);
296 if (!cookie_check_timestamp(&tcp_opt
, &ecn_ok
))
300 req
= inet_reqsk_alloc(&tcp_request_sock_ops
); /* for safety */
304 ireq
= inet_rsk(req
);
306 treq
->rcv_isn
= ntohl(th
->seq
) - 1;
307 treq
->snt_isn
= cookie
;
309 ireq
->loc_port
= th
->dest
;
310 ireq
->rmt_port
= th
->source
;
311 ireq
->loc_addr
= ip_hdr(skb
)->daddr
;
312 ireq
->rmt_addr
= ip_hdr(skb
)->saddr
;
313 ireq
->ecn_ok
= ecn_ok
;
314 ireq
->snd_wscale
= tcp_opt
.snd_wscale
;
315 ireq
->sack_ok
= tcp_opt
.sack_ok
;
316 ireq
->wscale_ok
= tcp_opt
.wscale_ok
;
317 ireq
->tstamp_ok
= tcp_opt
.saw_tstamp
;
318 req
->ts_recent
= tcp_opt
.saw_tstamp
? tcp_opt
.rcv_tsval
: 0;
319 treq
->snt_synack
= tcp_opt
.saw_tstamp
? tcp_opt
.rcv_tsecr
: 0;
321 /* We throwed the options of the initial SYN away, so we hope
322 * the ACK carries the same options again (see RFC1122 4.2.3.8)
324 if (opt
&& opt
->optlen
) {
325 int opt_size
= sizeof(struct ip_options_rcu
) + opt
->optlen
;
327 ireq
->opt
= kmalloc(opt_size
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
328 if (ireq
->opt
!= NULL
&& ip_options_echo(&ireq
->opt
->opt
, skb
)) {
334 if (security_inet_conn_request(sk
, skb
, req
)) {
343 * We need to lookup the route here to get at the correct
344 * window size. We should better make sure that the window size
345 * hasn't changed since we received the original syn, but I see
346 * no easy way to do this.
351 flowi4_init_output(&fl4
, 0, sk
->sk_mark
, RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk
),
352 RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE
, IPPROTO_TCP
,
353 inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk
),
354 (opt
&& opt
->srr
) ? opt
->faddr
: ireq
->rmt_addr
,
355 ireq
->loc_addr
, th
->source
, th
->dest
);
356 security_req_classify_flow(req
, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4
));
357 rt
= ip_route_output_key(sock_net(sk
), &fl4
);
364 /* Try to redo what tcp_v4_send_synack did. */
365 req
->window_clamp
= tp
->window_clamp
? :dst_metric(&rt
->dst
, RTAX_WINDOW
);
367 tcp_select_initial_window(tcp_full_space(sk
), req
->mss
,
368 &req
->rcv_wnd
, &req
->window_clamp
,
369 ireq
->wscale_ok
, &rcv_wscale
,
370 dst_metric(&rt
->dst
, RTAX_INITRWND
));
372 ireq
->rcv_wscale
= rcv_wscale
;
374 ret
= get_cookie_sock(sk
, skb
, req
, &rt
->dst
);