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[NETNS]: Clean out the ipv6-related sysctls creation/destruction
[linux-2.6/linux-2.6-openrd.git] / security / selinux / hooks.c
blob64d414efb404e67d614d5279c8b44fac9431d1f4
1 /*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
14 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
16 * Paul Moore, <paul.moore@hp.com>
17 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
18 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
19 *
20 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
21 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
22 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
23 */
24
25 #include <linux/init.h>
26 #include <linux/kernel.h>
27 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
28 #include <linux/errno.h>
29 #include <linux/sched.h>
30 #include <linux/security.h>
31 #include <linux/xattr.h>
32 #include <linux/capability.h>
33 #include <linux/unistd.h>
34 #include <linux/mm.h>
35 #include <linux/mman.h>
36 #include <linux/slab.h>
37 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
38 #include <linux/swap.h>
39 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
40 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
41 #include <linux/file.h>
42 #include <linux/namei.h>
43 #include <linux/mount.h>
44 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
45 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
46 #include <linux/kd.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
50 #include <net/icmp.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
54 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
55 #include <linux/bitops.h>
56 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
57 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
59 #include <linux/tcp.h>
60 #include <linux/udp.h>
61 #include <linux/dccp.h>
62 #include <linux/quota.h>
63 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
64 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
65 #include <linux/parser.h>
66 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
67 #include <net/ipv6.h>
68 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
69 #include <linux/personality.h>
70 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
71 #include <linux/audit.h>
72 #include <linux/string.h>
73 #include <linux/selinux.h>
74 #include <linux/mutex.h>
75
76 #include "avc.h"
77 #include "objsec.h"
78 #include "netif.h"
79 #include "xfrm.h"
80 #include "netlabel.h"
81
82 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
83 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
84
85 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
86
87 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
88 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
89 extern int selinux_compat_net;
90 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
91
92 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
93 int selinux_enforcing = 0;
94
95 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
96 {
97 selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0);
98 return 1;
99 }
100 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
101 #endif
102
103 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
104 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
105
106 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
107 {
108 selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
109 return 1;
110 }
111 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
112 #else
113 int selinux_enabled = 1;
114 #endif
115
116 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
117 static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL;
118
119 /* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
120 just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
121 The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
122 module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
123 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
124
125 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
126 before the policy was loaded. */
127 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
128 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
129
130 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
131
132 /* Return security context for a given sid or just the context
133 length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */
134 static int selinux_getsecurity(u32 sid, void *buffer, size_t size)
135 {
136 char *context;
137 unsigned len;
138 int rc;
139
140 rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
141 if (rc)
142 return rc;
143
144 if (!buffer || !size)
145 goto getsecurity_exit;
146
147 if (size < len) {
148 len = -ERANGE;
149 goto getsecurity_exit;
150 }
151 memcpy(buffer, context, len);
152
153 getsecurity_exit:
154 kfree(context);
155 return len;
156 }
157
158 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
159
160 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
161 {
162 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
163
164 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
165 if (!tsec)
166 return -ENOMEM;
167
168 tsec->task = task;
169 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
170 task->security = tsec;
171
172 return 0;
173 }
174
175 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
176 {
177 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
178 task->security = NULL;
179 kfree(tsec);
180 }
181
182 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
183 {
184 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
185 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
186
187 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
188 if (!isec)
189 return -ENOMEM;
190
191 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
192 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
193 isec->inode = inode;
194 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
195 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
196 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
197 inode->i_security = isec;
198
199 return 0;
200 }
201
202 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
203 {
204 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
205 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
206
207 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
208 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
209 list_del_init(&isec->list);
210 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
211
212 inode->i_security = NULL;
213 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
214 }
215
216 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
217 {
218 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
219 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
220
221 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
222 if (!fsec)
223 return -ENOMEM;
224
225 fsec->file = file;
226 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
227 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
228 file->f_security = fsec;
229
230 return 0;
231 }
232
233 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
234 {
235 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
236 file->f_security = NULL;
237 kfree(fsec);
238 }
239
240 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
241 {
242 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
243
244 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
245 if (!sbsec)
246 return -ENOMEM;
247
248 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
249 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
250 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
251 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
252 sbsec->sb = sb;
253 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
254 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
255 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
256 sb->s_security = sbsec;
257
258 return 0;
259 }
260
261 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
262 {
263 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
264
265 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
266 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
267 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
268 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
269
270 sb->s_security = NULL;
271 kfree(sbsec);
272 }
273
274 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
275 {
276 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
277
278 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
279 if (!ssec)
280 return -ENOMEM;
281
282 ssec->sk = sk;
283 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
284 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
285 sk->sk_security = ssec;
286
287 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(ssec, family);
288
289 return 0;
290 }
291
292 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
293 {
294 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
295
296 sk->sk_security = NULL;
297 kfree(ssec);
298 }
299
300 /* The security server must be initialized before
301 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
302 extern int ss_initialized;
303
304 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
305
306 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
307 "uses xattr",
308 "uses transition SIDs",
309 "uses task SIDs",
310 "uses genfs_contexts",
311 "not configured for labeling",
312 "uses mountpoint labeling",
313 };
314
315 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
316
317 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
318 {
319 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
320 }
321
322 enum {
323 Opt_error = -1,
324 Opt_context = 1,
325 Opt_fscontext = 2,
326 Opt_defcontext = 3,
327 Opt_rootcontext = 4,
328 };
329
330 static match_table_t tokens = {
331 {Opt_context, "context=%s"},
332 {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
333 {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
334 {Opt_rootcontext, "rootcontext=%s"},
335 {Opt_error, NULL},
336 };
337
338 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
339
340 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
341 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
342 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
343 {
344 int rc;
345
346 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
347 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
348 if (rc)
349 return rc;
350
351 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
352 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
353 return rc;
354 }
355
356 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
357 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
358 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
359 {
360 int rc;
361 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
362 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
363 if (rc)
364 return rc;
365
366 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
367 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
368 return rc;
369 }
370
371 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
372 {
373 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
374 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
375 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
376 int rc = 0;
377
378 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
379 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
380 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
381 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
382 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
383 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
384 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
385 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
386 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
387 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
388 goto out;
389 }
390 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
391 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
392 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
393 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
394 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
395 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
396 else
397 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
398 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
399 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
400 goto out;
401 }
402 }
403
404 sbsec->initialized = 1;
405
406 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
407 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
408 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
409 else
410 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
411 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
412 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
413
414 /* Initialize the root inode. */
415 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
416
417 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
418 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
419 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
420 populates itself. */
421 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
422 next_inode:
423 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
424 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
425 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
426 struct inode_security_struct, list);
427 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
428 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
429 inode = igrab(inode);
430 if (inode) {
431 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
432 inode_doinit(inode);
433 iput(inode);
434 }
435 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
436 list_del_init(&isec->list);
437 goto next_inode;
438 }
439 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
440 out:
441 return rc;
442 }
443
444 /*
445 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
446 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
447 * mount options, or whatever.
448 */
449 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
450 char ***mount_options, int **mnt_opts_flags,
451 int *num_opts)
452 {
453 int rc = 0, i;
454 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
455 char *context = NULL;
456 u32 len;
457 char tmp;
458
459 *num_opts = 0;
460 *mount_options = NULL;
461 *mnt_opts_flags = NULL;
462
463 if (!sbsec->initialized)
464 return -EINVAL;
465
466 if (!ss_initialized)
467 return -EINVAL;
468
469 /*
470 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
471 * settings this is going to need a mask
472 */
473 tmp = sbsec->flags;
474 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
475 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
476 if (tmp & 0x01)
477 (*num_opts)++;
478 tmp >>= 1;
479 }
480
481 *mount_options = kcalloc(*num_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
482 if (!*mount_options) {
483 rc = -ENOMEM;
484 goto out_free;
485 }
486
487 *mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(*num_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
488 if (!*mnt_opts_flags) {
489 rc = -ENOMEM;
490 goto out_free;
491 }
492
493 i = 0;
494 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
495 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
496 if (rc)
497 goto out_free;
498 (*mount_options)[i] = context;
499 (*mnt_opts_flags)[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
500 }
501 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
502 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
503 if (rc)
504 goto out_free;
505 (*mount_options)[i] = context;
506 (*mnt_opts_flags)[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
507 }
508 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
509 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
510 if (rc)
511 goto out_free;
512 (*mount_options)[i] = context;
513 (*mnt_opts_flags)[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
514 }
515 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
516 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
517 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
518
519 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
520 if (rc)
521 goto out_free;
522 (*mount_options)[i] = context;
523 (*mnt_opts_flags)[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
524 }
525
526 BUG_ON(i != *num_opts);
527
528 return 0;
529
530 out_free:
531 /* don't leak context string if security_sid_to_context had an error */
532 if (*mount_options && i)
533 for (; i > 0; i--)
534 kfree((*mount_options)[i-1]);
535 kfree(*mount_options);
536 *mount_options = NULL;
537 kfree(*mnt_opts_flags);
538 *mnt_opts_flags = NULL;
539 *num_opts = 0;
540 return rc;
541 }
542
543 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
544 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
545 {
546 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
547 if (sbsec->initialized)
548 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
549 (old_sid != new_sid))
550 return 1;
551
552 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
553 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
554 */
555 if (!sbsec->initialized)
556 if (sbsec->flags & flag)
557 return 1;
558 return 0;
559 }
560 /*
561 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
562 * labeling information.
563 */
564 int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, char **mount_options,
565 int *flags, int num_opts)
566 {
567 int rc = 0, i;
568 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
569 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
570 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
571 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
572 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
573 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
574 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
575
576 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
577
578 if (!ss_initialized) {
579 if (!num_opts) {
580 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
581 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
582 server is ready to handle calls. */
583 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
584 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
585 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
586 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
587 goto out;
588 }
589 rc = -EINVAL;
590 printk(KERN_WARNING "Unable to set superblock options before "
591 "the security server is initialized\n");
592 goto out;
593 }
594
595 /*
596 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
597 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
598 * than once with different security options.
599 */
600 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
601 u32 sid;
602 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
603 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
604 if (rc) {
605 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
606 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
607 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
608 goto out;
609 }
610 switch (flags[i]) {
611 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
612 fscontext_sid = sid;
613
614 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
615 fscontext_sid))
616 goto out_double_mount;
617
618 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
619 break;
620 case CONTEXT_MNT:
621 context_sid = sid;
622
623 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
624 context_sid))
625 goto out_double_mount;
626
627 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
628 break;
629 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
630 rootcontext_sid = sid;
631
632 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
633 rootcontext_sid))
634 goto out_double_mount;
635
636 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
637
638 break;
639 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
640 defcontext_sid = sid;
641
642 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
643 defcontext_sid))
644 goto out_double_mount;
645
646 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
647
648 break;
649 default:
650 rc = -EINVAL;
651 goto out;
652 }
653 }
654
655 if (sbsec->initialized) {
656 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
657 if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
658 goto out_double_mount;
659 rc = 0;
660 goto out;
661 }
662
663 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
664 sbsec->proc = 1;
665
666 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
667 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
668 if (rc) {
669 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
670 __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
671 goto out;
672 }
673
674 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
675 if (fscontext_sid) {
676
677 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
678 if (rc)
679 goto out;
680
681 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
682 }
683
684 /*
685 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
686 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
687 * the superblock context if not already set.
688 */
689 if (context_sid) {
690 if (!fscontext_sid) {
691 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
692 if (rc)
693 goto out;
694 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
695 } else {
696 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
697 if (rc)
698 goto out;
699 }
700 if (!rootcontext_sid)
701 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
702
703 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
704 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
705 }
706
707 if (rootcontext_sid) {
708 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
709 if (rc)
710 goto out;
711
712 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
713 root_isec->initialized = 1;
714 }
715
716 if (defcontext_sid) {
717 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
718 rc = -EINVAL;
719 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
720 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
721 goto out;
722 }
723
724 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
725 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
726 sbsec, tsec);
727 if (rc)
728 goto out;
729 }
730
731 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
732 }
733
734 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
735 out:
736 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
737 return rc;
738 out_double_mount:
739 rc = -EINVAL;
740 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
741 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
742 goto out;
743 }
744
745 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
746 struct super_block *newsb)
747 {
748 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
749 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
750
751 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
752 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
753 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
754
755 /* we can't error, we can't save the info, this shouldn't get called
756 * this early in the boot process. */
757 BUG_ON(!ss_initialized);
758
759 /* this might go away sometime down the line if there is a new user
760 * of clone, but for now, nfs better not get here... */
761 BUG_ON(newsbsec->initialized);
762
763 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
764 BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
765
766 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
767
768 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
769
770 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
771 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
772 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
773
774 if (set_context) {
775 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
776
777 if (!set_fscontext)
778 newsbsec->sid = sid;
779 if (!set_rootcontext) {
780 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
781 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
782 newisec->sid = sid;
783 }
784 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
785 }
786 if (set_rootcontext) {
787 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
788 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
789 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
790 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
791
792 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
793 }
794
795 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
796 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
797 }
798
799 /*
800 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
801 */
802 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
803 {
804 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
805 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
806 int rc = 0;
807 char *p, *options = data;
808 /* selinux only know about a fixed number of mount options */
809 char *mnt_opts[NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS];
810 int mnt_opts_flags[NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS], num_mnt_opts = 0;
811
812 if (!data)
813 goto out;
814
815 /* with the nfs patch this will become a goto out; */
816 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
817 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
818 /* NFS we understand. */
819 if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) {
820 struct nfs_mount_data *d = data;
821
822 if (d->version != NFS_MOUNT_VERSION)
823 goto out;
824
825 if (d->context[0]) {
826 context = kstrdup(d->context, GFP_KERNEL);
827 if (!context) {
828 rc = -ENOMEM;
829 goto out;
830 }
831 }
832 goto build_flags;
833 } else
834 goto out;
835 }
836
837 /* Standard string-based options. */
838 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
839 int token;
840 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
841
842 if (!*p)
843 continue;
844
845 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
846
847 switch (token) {
848 case Opt_context:
849 if (context || defcontext) {
850 rc = -EINVAL;
851 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
852 goto out_err;
853 }
854 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
855 if (!context) {
856 rc = -ENOMEM;
857 goto out_err;
858 }
859 break;
860
861 case Opt_fscontext:
862 if (fscontext) {
863 rc = -EINVAL;
864 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
865 goto out_err;
866 }
867 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
868 if (!fscontext) {
869 rc = -ENOMEM;
870 goto out_err;
871 }
872 break;
873
874 case Opt_rootcontext:
875 if (rootcontext) {
876 rc = -EINVAL;
877 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
878 goto out_err;
879 }
880 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
881 if (!rootcontext) {
882 rc = -ENOMEM;
883 goto out_err;
884 }
885 break;
886
887 case Opt_defcontext:
888 if (context || defcontext) {
889 rc = -EINVAL;
890 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
891 goto out_err;
892 }
893 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
894 if (!defcontext) {
895 rc = -ENOMEM;
896 goto out_err;
897 }
898 break;
899
900 default:
901 rc = -EINVAL;
902 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
903 goto out_err;
904
905 }
906 }
907
908 build_flags:
909 if (fscontext) {
910 mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
911 mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
912 }
913 if (context) {
914 mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
915 mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
916 }
917 if (rootcontext) {
918 mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
919 mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
920 }
921 if (defcontext) {
922 mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
923 mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
924 }
925
926 out:
927 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, mnt_opts, mnt_opts_flags, num_mnt_opts);
928 out_err:
929 kfree(context);
930 kfree(defcontext);
931 kfree(fscontext);
932 kfree(rootcontext);
933 return rc;
934 }
935
936 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
937 {
938 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
939 case S_IFSOCK:
940 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
941 case S_IFLNK:
942 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
943 case S_IFREG:
944 return SECCLASS_FILE;
945 case S_IFBLK:
946 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
947 case S_IFDIR:
948 return SECCLASS_DIR;
949 case S_IFCHR:
950 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
951 case S_IFIFO:
952 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
953
954 }
955
956 return SECCLASS_FILE;
957 }
958
959 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
960 {
961 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
962 }
963
964 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
965 {
966 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
967 }
968
969 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
970 {
971 switch (family) {
972 case PF_UNIX:
973 switch (type) {
974 case SOCK_STREAM:
975 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
976 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
977 case SOCK_DGRAM:
978 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
979 }
980 break;
981 case PF_INET:
982 case PF_INET6:
983 switch (type) {
984 case SOCK_STREAM:
985 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
986 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
987 else
988 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
989 case SOCK_DGRAM:
990 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
991 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
992 else
993 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
994 case SOCK_DCCP:
995 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
996 default:
997 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
998 }
999 break;
1000 case PF_NETLINK:
1001 switch (protocol) {
1002 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1003 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1004 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1005 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1006 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1007 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1008 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1009 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1010 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1011 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1012 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1013 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1014 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1015 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1016 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1017 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1018 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1019 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1020 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1021 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1022 default:
1023 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1024 }
1025 case PF_PACKET:
1026 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1027 case PF_KEY:
1028 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1029 case PF_APPLETALK:
1030 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1031 }
1032
1033 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1034 }
1035
1036 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1037 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1038 u16 tclass,
1039 u32 *sid)
1040 {
1041 int buflen, rc;
1042 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1043
1044 buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1045 if (!buffer)
1046 return -ENOMEM;
1047
1048 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1049 end = buffer+buflen;
1050 *--end = '\0';
1051 buflen--;
1052 path = end-1;
1053 *path = '/';
1054 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1055 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1056 if (buflen < 0)
1057 break;
1058 end -= de->namelen;
1059 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1060 *--end = '/';
1061 path = end;
1062 de = de->parent;
1063 }
1064 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1065 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1066 return rc;
1067 }
1068 #else
1069 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1070 u16 tclass,
1071 u32 *sid)
1072 {
1073 return -EINVAL;
1074 }
1075 #endif
1076
1077 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1078 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1079 {
1080 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1081 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1082 u32 sid;
1083 struct dentry *dentry;
1084 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1085 char *context = NULL;
1086 unsigned len = 0;
1087 int rc = 0;
1088
1089 if (isec->initialized)
1090 goto out;
1091
1092 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1093 if (isec->initialized)
1094 goto out_unlock;
1095
1096 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1097 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1098 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1099 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1100 server is ready to handle calls. */
1101 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1102 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1103 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1104 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1105 goto out_unlock;
1106 }
1107
1108 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1109 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1110 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1111 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1112 break;
1113 }
1114
1115 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1116 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1117 if (opt_dentry) {
1118 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1119 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1120 } else {
1121 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1122 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1123 }
1124 if (!dentry) {
1125 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1126 "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1127 inode->i_ino);
1128 goto out_unlock;
1129 }
1130
1131 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1132 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
1133 if (!context) {
1134 rc = -ENOMEM;
1135 dput(dentry);
1136 goto out_unlock;
1137 }
1138 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1139 context, len);
1140 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1141 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1142 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1143 NULL, 0);
1144 if (rc < 0) {
1145 dput(dentry);
1146 goto out_unlock;
1147 }
1148 kfree(context);
1149 len = rc;
1150 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
1151 if (!context) {
1152 rc = -ENOMEM;
1153 dput(dentry);
1154 goto out_unlock;
1155 }
1156 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1157 XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1158 context, len);
1159 }
1160 dput(dentry);
1161 if (rc < 0) {
1162 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1163 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: getxattr returned "
1164 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
1165 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1166 kfree(context);
1167 goto out_unlock;
1168 }
1169 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1170 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1171 rc = 0;
1172 } else {
1173 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1174 sbsec->def_sid);
1175 if (rc) {
1176 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1177 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1178 __FUNCTION__, context, -rc,
1179 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1180 kfree(context);
1181 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1182 rc = 0;
1183 break;
1184 }
1185 }
1186 kfree(context);
1187 isec->sid = sid;
1188 break;
1189 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1190 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1191 break;
1192 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1193 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1194 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1195
1196 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1197 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1198 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1199 sbsec->sid,
1200 isec->sclass,
1201 &sid);
1202 if (rc)
1203 goto out_unlock;
1204 isec->sid = sid;
1205 break;
1206 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1207 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1208 break;
1209 default:
1210 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1211 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1212
1213 if (sbsec->proc) {
1214 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1215 if (proci->pde) {
1216 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1217 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1218 isec->sclass,
1219 &sid);
1220 if (rc)
1221 goto out_unlock;
1222 isec->sid = sid;
1223 }
1224 }
1225 break;
1226 }
1227
1228 isec->initialized = 1;
1229
1230 out_unlock:
1231 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1232 out:
1233 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1234 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1235 return rc;
1236 }
1237
1238 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1239 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1240 {
1241 u32 perm = 0;
1242
1243 switch (sig) {
1244 case SIGCHLD:
1245 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1246 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1247 break;
1248 case SIGKILL:
1249 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1250 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1251 break;
1252 case SIGSTOP:
1253 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1254 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1255 break;
1256 default:
1257 /* All other signals. */
1258 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1259 break;
1260 }
1261
1262 return perm;
1263 }
1264
1265 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1266 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1267 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1268 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1269 u32 perms)
1270 {
1271 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1272
1273 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1274 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1275 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1276 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1277 }
1278
1279 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1280 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1281 int cap)
1282 {
1283 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1284 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1285
1286 tsec = tsk->security;
1287
1288 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP);
1289 ad.tsk = tsk;
1290 ad.u.cap = cap;
1291
1292 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1293 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad);
1294 }
1295
1296 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1297 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1298 u32 perms)
1299 {
1300 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1301
1302 tsec = tsk->security;
1303
1304 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1305 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1306 }
1307
1308 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1309 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1310 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1311 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1312 struct inode *inode,
1313 u32 perms,
1314 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1315 {
1316 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1317 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1318 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1319
1320 if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (inode)))
1321 return 0;
1322
1323 tsec = tsk->security;
1324 isec = inode->i_security;
1325
1326 if (!adp) {
1327 adp = &ad;
1328 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1329 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1330 }
1331
1332 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1333 }
1334
1335 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1336 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1337 pathname if needed. */
1338 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1339 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1340 struct dentry *dentry,
1341 u32 av)
1342 {
1343 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1344 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1345 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1346 ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
1347 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1348 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1349 }
1350
1351 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1352 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1353 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1354 check a particular permission to the file.
1355 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1356 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1357 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1358 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1359 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1360 struct file *file,
1361 u32 av)
1362 {
1363 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1364 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1365 struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_path.mnt;
1366 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
1367 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1368 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1369 int rc;
1370
1371 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1372 ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
1373 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1374
1375 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1376 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1377 SECCLASS_FD,
1378 FD__USE,
1379 &ad);
1380 if (rc)
1381 return rc;
1382 }
1383
1384 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1385 if (av)
1386 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1387
1388 return 0;
1389 }
1390
1391 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1392 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1393 struct dentry *dentry,
1394 u16 tclass)
1395 {
1396 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1397 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1398 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1399 u32 newsid;
1400 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1401 int rc;
1402
1403 tsec = current->security;
1404 dsec = dir->i_security;
1405 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1406
1407 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1408 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1409
1410 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1411 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1412 &ad);
1413 if (rc)
1414 return rc;
1415
1416 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1417 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1418 } else {
1419 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1420 &newsid);
1421 if (rc)
1422 return rc;
1423 }
1424
1425 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1426 if (rc)
1427 return rc;
1428
1429 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1430 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1431 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1432 }
1433
1434 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1435 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1436 struct task_struct *ctx)
1437 {
1438 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1439
1440 tsec = ctx->security;
1441
1442 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1443 }
1444
1445 #define MAY_LINK 0
1446 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1447 #define MAY_RMDIR 2
1448
1449 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1450 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1451 struct dentry *dentry,
1452 int kind)
1453
1454 {
1455 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1456 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1457 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1458 u32 av;
1459 int rc;
1460
1461 tsec = current->security;
1462 dsec = dir->i_security;
1463 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1464
1465 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1466 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1467
1468 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1469 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1470 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1471 if (rc)
1472 return rc;
1473
1474 switch (kind) {
1475 case MAY_LINK:
1476 av = FILE__LINK;
1477 break;
1478 case MAY_UNLINK:
1479 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1480 break;
1481 case MAY_RMDIR:
1482 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1483 break;
1484 default:
1485 printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link: unrecognized kind %d\n", kind);
1486 return 0;
1487 }
1488
1489 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1490 return rc;
1491 }
1492
1493 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1494 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1495 struct inode *new_dir,
1496 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1497 {
1498 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1499 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1500 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1501 u32 av;
1502 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1503 int rc;
1504
1505 tsec = current->security;
1506 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1507 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1508 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1509 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1510
1511 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1512
1513 ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry;
1514 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1515 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1516 if (rc)
1517 return rc;
1518 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1519 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1520 if (rc)
1521 return rc;
1522 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1523 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1524 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1525 if (rc)
1526 return rc;
1527 }
1528
1529 ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry;
1530 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1531 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1532 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1533 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1534 if (rc)
1535 return rc;
1536 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1537 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1538 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1539 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1540 new_isec->sclass,
1541 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1542 if (rc)
1543 return rc;
1544 }
1545
1546 return 0;
1547 }
1548
1549 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1550 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1551 struct super_block *sb,
1552 u32 perms,
1553 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1554 {
1555 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1556 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1557
1558 tsec = tsk->security;
1559 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1560 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1561 perms, ad);
1562 }
1563
1564 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1565 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1566 {
1567 u32 av = 0;
1568
1569 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1570 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1571 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1572 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1573 av |= FILE__READ;
1574
1575 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1576 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1577 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1578 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1579
1580 } else {
1581 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1582 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1583 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1584 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1585 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1586 av |= DIR__READ;
1587 }
1588
1589 return av;
1590 }
1591
1592 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1593 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1594 {
1595 u32 av = 0;
1596
1597 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1598 av |= FILE__READ;
1599 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1600 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1601 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1602 else
1603 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1604 }
1605
1606 return av;
1607 }
1608
1609 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1610
1611 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
1612 {
1613 struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security;
1614 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1615 int rc;
1616
1617 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
1618 if (rc)
1619 return rc;
1620
1621 rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1622 /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */
1623 if (!(child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !rc)
1624 csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid;
1625 return rc;
1626 }
1627
1628 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1629 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1630 {
1631 int error;
1632
1633 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1634 if (error)
1635 return error;
1636
1637 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1638 }
1639
1640 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1641 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1642 {
1643 int error;
1644
1645 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1646 if (error)
1647 return error;
1648
1649 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1650 }
1651
1652 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1653 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1654 {
1655 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1656 }
1657
1658 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1659 {
1660 int rc;
1661
1662 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1663 if (rc)
1664 return rc;
1665
1666 return task_has_capability(tsk,cap);
1667 }
1668
1669 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1670 {
1671 int buflen, rc;
1672 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1673
1674 rc = -ENOMEM;
1675 buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1676 if (!buffer)
1677 goto out;
1678
1679 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1680 end = buffer+buflen;
1681 *--end = '\0';
1682 buflen--;
1683 path = end-1;
1684 *path = '/';
1685 while (table) {
1686 const char *name = table->procname;
1687 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1688 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1689 if (buflen < 0)
1690 goto out_free;
1691 end -= namelen;
1692 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1693 *--end = '/';
1694 path = end;
1695 table = table->parent;
1696 }
1697 buflen -= 4;
1698 if (buflen < 0)
1699 goto out_free;
1700 end -= 4;
1701 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1702 path = end;
1703 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1704 out_free:
1705 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1706 out:
1707 return rc;
1708 }
1709
1710 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1711 {
1712 int error = 0;
1713 u32 av;
1714 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1715 u32 tsid;
1716 int rc;
1717
1718 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1719 if (rc)
1720 return rc;
1721
1722 tsec = current->security;
1723
1724 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1725 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1726 if (rc) {
1727 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1728 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1729 }
1730
1731 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1732 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1733 if(op == 001) {
1734 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1735 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1736 } else {
1737 av = 0;
1738 if (op & 004)
1739 av |= FILE__READ;
1740 if (op & 002)
1741 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1742 if (av)
1743 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1744 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1745 }
1746
1747 return error;
1748 }
1749
1750 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1751 {
1752 int rc = 0;
1753
1754 if (!sb)
1755 return 0;
1756
1757 switch (cmds) {
1758 case Q_SYNC:
1759 case Q_QUOTAON:
1760 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
1761 case Q_SETINFO:
1762 case Q_SETQUOTA:
1763 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1764 sb,
1765 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1766 break;
1767 case Q_GETFMT:
1768 case Q_GETINFO:
1769 case Q_GETQUOTA:
1770 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1771 sb,
1772 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1773 break;
1774 default:
1775 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1776 break;
1777 }
1778 return rc;
1779 }
1780
1781 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1782 {
1783 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1784 }
1785
1786 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1787 {
1788 int rc;
1789
1790 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1791 if (rc)
1792 return rc;
1793
1794 switch (type) {
1795 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1796 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1797 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1798 break;
1799 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1800 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1801 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1802 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1803 break;
1804 case 0: /* Close log */
1805 case 1: /* Open log */
1806 case 2: /* Read from log */
1807 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1808 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1809 default:
1810 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1811 break;
1812 }
1813 return rc;
1814 }
1815
1816 /*
1817 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1818 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1819 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1820 *
1821 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1822 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1823 * the capability is granted.
1824 *
1825 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1826 * processes that allocate mappings.
1827 */
1828 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1829 {
1830 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1831 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1832
1833 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1834 if (rc == 0)
1835 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1836 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1837 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1838 0,
1839 NULL);
1840
1841 if (rc == 0)
1842 cap_sys_admin = 1;
1843
1844 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1845 }
1846
1847 /* binprm security operations */
1848
1849 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1850 {
1851 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1852
1853 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1854 if (!bsec)
1855 return -ENOMEM;
1856
1857 bsec->bprm = bprm;
1858 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1859 bsec->set = 0;
1860
1861 bprm->security = bsec;
1862 return 0;
1863 }
1864
1865 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1866 {
1867 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1868 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1869 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1870 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1871 u32 newsid;
1872 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1873 int rc;
1874
1875 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1876 if (rc)
1877 return rc;
1878
1879 bsec = bprm->security;
1880
1881 if (bsec->set)
1882 return 0;
1883
1884 tsec = current->security;
1885 isec = inode->i_security;
1886
1887 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1888 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1889
1890 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1891 tsec->create_sid = 0;
1892 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1893 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1894
1895 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1896 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1897 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1898 tsec->exec_sid = 0;
1899 } else {
1900 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1901 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1902 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1903 if (rc)
1904 return rc;
1905 }
1906
1907 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1908 ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_path.mnt;
1909 ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_path.dentry;
1910
1911 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1912 newsid = tsec->sid;
1913
1914 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1915 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1916 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
1917 if (rc)
1918 return rc;
1919 } else {
1920 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
1921 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
1922 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
1923 if (rc)
1924 return rc;
1925
1926 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
1927 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
1928 if (rc)
1929 return rc;
1930
1931 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
1932 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
1933
1934 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
1935 bsec->sid = newsid;
1936 }
1937
1938 bsec->set = 1;
1939 return 0;
1940 }
1941
1942 static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1943 {
1944 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
1945 }
1946
1947
1948 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1949 {
1950 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1951 int atsecure = 0;
1952
1953 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
1954 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
1955 the noatsecure permission is granted between
1956 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
1957 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
1958 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1959 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
1960 }
1961
1962 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
1963 }
1964
1965 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1966 {
1967 kfree(bprm->security);
1968 bprm->security = NULL;
1969 }
1970
1971 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
1972 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
1973
1974 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
1975 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
1976 {
1977 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1978 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
1979 struct tty_struct *tty;
1980 struct fdtable *fdt;
1981 long j = -1;
1982 int drop_tty = 0;
1983
1984 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
1985 tty = get_current_tty();
1986 if (tty) {
1987 file_list_lock();
1988 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
1989 if (file) {
1990 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
1991 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
1992 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
1993 file may belong to another process and we are only
1994 interested in the inode-based check here. */
1995 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1996 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
1997 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
1998 drop_tty = 1;
1999 }
2000 }
2001 file_list_unlock();
2002 }
2003 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
2004 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2005 if (drop_tty)
2006 no_tty();
2007
2008 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2009
2010 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2011
2012 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2013 for (;;) {
2014 unsigned long set, i;
2015 int fd;
2016
2017 j++;
2018 i = j * __NFDBITS;
2019 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2020 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2021 break;
2022 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2023 if (!set)
2024 continue;
2025 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2026 for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
2027 if (set & 1) {
2028 file = fget(i);
2029 if (!file)
2030 continue;
2031 if (file_has_perm(current,
2032 file,
2033 file_to_av(file))) {
2034 sys_close(i);
2035 fd = get_unused_fd();
2036 if (fd != i) {
2037 if (fd >= 0)
2038 put_unused_fd(fd);
2039 fput(file);
2040 continue;
2041 }
2042 if (devnull) {
2043 get_file(devnull);
2044 } else {
2045 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
2046 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2047 devnull = NULL;
2048 put_unused_fd(fd);
2049 fput(file);
2050 continue;
2051 }
2052 }
2053 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2054 }
2055 fput(file);
2056 }
2057 }
2058 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2059
2060 }
2061 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2062 }
2063
2064 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
2065 {
2066 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2067 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2068 u32 sid;
2069 int rc;
2070
2071 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
2072
2073 tsec = current->security;
2074
2075 bsec = bprm->security;
2076 sid = bsec->sid;
2077
2078 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2079 bsec->unsafe = 0;
2080 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
2081 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
2082 unchanged and kill. */
2083 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2084 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2085 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
2086 if (rc) {
2087 bsec->unsafe = 1;
2088 return;
2089 }
2090 }
2091
2092 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
2093 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
2094 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2095 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
2096 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
2097 NULL);
2098 if (rc) {
2099 bsec->unsafe = 1;
2100 return;
2101 }
2102 }
2103 tsec->sid = sid;
2104 }
2105 }
2106
2107 /*
2108 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
2109 */
2110 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2111 {
2112 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2113 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2114 struct itimerval itimer;
2115 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2116 int rc, i;
2117
2118 tsec = current->security;
2119 bsec = bprm->security;
2120
2121 if (bsec->unsafe) {
2122 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
2123 return;
2124 }
2125 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
2126 return;
2127
2128 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2129 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
2130
2131 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
2132 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
2133 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
2134 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
2135 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
2136 will be checked against the new SID. */
2137 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2138 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2139 if (rc) {
2140 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2141 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2142 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2143 flush_signals(current);
2144 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2145 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2146 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
2147 recalc_sigpending();
2148 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2149 }
2150
2151 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2152 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2153
2154 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
2155 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
2156 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
2157 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
2158 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
2159 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
2160 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
2161 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
2162 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
2163 RLIMIT_STACK.*/
2164 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2165 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2166 if (rc) {
2167 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2168 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2169 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
2170 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur);
2171 }
2172 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
2173 /*
2174 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
2175 * to be refigured.
2176 */
2177 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
2178 }
2179 }
2180
2181 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
2182 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
2183 wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2184 }
2185
2186 /* superblock security operations */
2187
2188 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2189 {
2190 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2191 }
2192
2193 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2194 {
2195 superblock_free_security(sb);
2196 }
2197
2198 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2199 {
2200 if (plen > olen)
2201 return 0;
2202
2203 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2204 }
2205
2206 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2207 {
2208 return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
2209 match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
2210 match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len) ||
2211 match_prefix("rootcontext=", sizeof("rootcontext=")-1, option, len));
2212 }
2213
2214 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2215 {
2216 if (!*first) {
2217 **to = ',';
2218 *to += 1;
2219 } else
2220 *first = 0;
2221 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2222 *to += len;
2223 }
2224
2225 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2226 int len)
2227 {
2228 int current_size = 0;
2229
2230 if (!*first) {
2231 **to = '|';
2232 *to += 1;
2233 }
2234 else
2235 *first = 0;
2236
2237 while (current_size < len) {
2238 if (*from != '"') {
2239 **to = *from;
2240 *to += 1;
2241 }
2242 from += 1;
2243 current_size += 1;
2244 }
2245 }
2246
2247 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy)
2248 {
2249 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2250 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2251 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2252 int open_quote = 0;
2253
2254 in_curr = orig;
2255 sec_curr = copy;
2256
2257 /* Binary mount data: just copy */
2258 if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
2259 copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr);
2260 goto out;
2261 }
2262
2263 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2264 if (!nosec) {
2265 rc = -ENOMEM;
2266 goto out;
2267 }
2268
2269 nosec_save = nosec;
2270 fnosec = fsec = 1;
2271 in_save = in_end = orig;
2272
2273 do {
2274 if (*in_end == '"')
2275 open_quote = !open_quote;
2276 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2277 *in_end == '\0') {
2278 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2279
2280 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2281 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2282 else
2283 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2284
2285 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2286 }
2287 } while (*in_end++);
2288
2289 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2290 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2291 out:
2292 return rc;
2293 }
2294
2295 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2296 {
2297 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2298 int rc;
2299
2300 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2301 if (rc)
2302 return rc;
2303
2304 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2305 ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
2306 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2307 }
2308
2309 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2310 {
2311 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2312
2313 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2314 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2315 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2316 }
2317
2318 static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
2319 struct nameidata *nd,
2320 char * type,
2321 unsigned long flags,
2322 void * data)
2323 {
2324 int rc;
2325
2326 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
2327 if (rc)
2328 return rc;
2329
2330 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2331 return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
2332 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2333 else
2334 return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry,
2335 FILE__MOUNTON);
2336 }
2337
2338 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2339 {
2340 int rc;
2341
2342 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2343 if (rc)
2344 return rc;
2345
2346 return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
2347 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
2348 }
2349
2350 /* inode security operations */
2351
2352 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2353 {
2354 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2355 }
2356
2357 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2358 {
2359 inode_free_security(inode);
2360 }
2361
2362 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2363 char **name, void **value,
2364 size_t *len)
2365 {
2366 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2367 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2368 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2369 u32 newsid, clen;
2370 int rc;
2371 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2372
2373 tsec = current->security;
2374 dsec = dir->i_security;
2375 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2376
2377 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2378 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2379 } else {
2380 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2381 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2382 &newsid);
2383 if (rc) {
2384 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2385 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2386 "ino=%ld)\n",
2387 __FUNCTION__,
2388 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2389 return rc;
2390 }
2391 }
2392
2393 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2394 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2395 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2396 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2397 isec->sid = newsid;
2398 isec->initialized = 1;
2399 }
2400
2401 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2402 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2403
2404 if (name) {
2405 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
2406 if (!namep)
2407 return -ENOMEM;
2408 *name = namep;
2409 }
2410
2411 if (value && len) {
2412 rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen);
2413 if (rc) {
2414 kfree(namep);
2415 return rc;
2416 }
2417 *value = context;
2418 *len = clen;
2419 }
2420
2421 return 0;
2422 }
2423
2424 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2425 {
2426 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2427 }
2428
2429 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2430 {
2431 int rc;
2432
2433 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
2434 if (rc)
2435 return rc;
2436 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2437 }
2438
2439 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2440 {
2441 int rc;
2442
2443 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2444 if (rc)
2445 return rc;
2446 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2447 }
2448
2449 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2450 {
2451 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2452 }
2453
2454 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2455 {
2456 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2457 }
2458
2459 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2460 {
2461 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2462 }
2463
2464 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2465 {
2466 int rc;
2467
2468 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2469 if (rc)
2470 return rc;
2471
2472 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2473 }
2474
2475 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2476 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2477 {
2478 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2479 }
2480
2481 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2482 {
2483 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2484 }
2485
2486 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2487 {
2488 int rc;
2489
2490 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata);
2491 if (rc)
2492 return rc;
2493 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2494 }
2495
2496 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2497 struct nameidata *nd)
2498 {
2499 int rc;
2500
2501 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2502 if (rc)
2503 return rc;
2504
2505 if (!mask) {
2506 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2507 return 0;
2508 }
2509
2510 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2511 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2512 }
2513
2514 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2515 {
2516 int rc;
2517
2518 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2519 if (rc)
2520 return rc;
2521
2522 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2523 return 0;
2524
2525 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2526 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2527 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2528
2529 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2530 }
2531
2532 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2533 {
2534 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2535 }
2536
2537 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2538 {
2539 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2540 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2541 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2542 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2543 return -EPERM;
2544 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2545 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2546 Restrict to administrator. */
2547 return -EPERM;
2548 }
2549 }
2550
2551 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2552 ordinary setattr permission. */
2553 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2554 }
2555
2556 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2557 {
2558 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2559 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2560 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2561 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2562 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2563 u32 newsid;
2564 int rc = 0;
2565
2566 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2567 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2568
2569 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2570 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2571 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2572
2573 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2574 return -EPERM;
2575
2576 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2577 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
2578
2579 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2580 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2581 if (rc)
2582 return rc;
2583
2584 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2585 if (rc)
2586 return rc;
2587
2588 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2589 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2590 if (rc)
2591 return rc;
2592
2593 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2594 isec->sclass);
2595 if (rc)
2596 return rc;
2597
2598 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2599 sbsec->sid,
2600 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2601 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2602 &ad);
2603 }
2604
2605 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
2606 void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2607 {
2608 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2609 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2610 u32 newsid;
2611 int rc;
2612
2613 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2614 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2615 return;
2616 }
2617
2618 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2619 if (rc) {
2620 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unable to obtain SID for context "
2621 "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc);
2622 return;
2623 }
2624
2625 isec->sid = newsid;
2626 return;
2627 }
2628
2629 static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2630 {
2631 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2632 }
2633
2634 static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
2635 {
2636 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2637 }
2638
2639 static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2640 {
2641 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2642 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2643
2644 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2645 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2646 return -EACCES;
2647 }
2648
2649 /*
2650 * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the
2651 * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
2652 * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user.
2653 *
2654 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2655 */
2656 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
2657 {
2658 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2659
2660 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2661 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2662
2663 return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
2664 }
2665
2666 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2667 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2668 {
2669 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2670 u32 newsid;
2671 int rc;
2672
2673 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2674 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2675
2676 if (!value || !size)
2677 return -EACCES;
2678
2679 rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid);
2680 if (rc)
2681 return rc;
2682
2683 isec->sid = newsid;
2684 return 0;
2685 }
2686
2687 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2688 {
2689 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2690 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2691 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2692 return len;
2693 }
2694
2695 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2696 {
2697 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2698 }
2699
2700 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2701 {
2702 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2703 }
2704
2705 /* file security operations */
2706
2707 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2708 {
2709 int rc;
2710 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2711
2712 if (!mask) {
2713 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2714 return 0;
2715 }
2716
2717 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2718 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2719 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2720
2721 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2722 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2723 if (rc)
2724 return rc;
2725
2726 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2727 }
2728
2729 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2730 {
2731 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2732 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2733 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2734 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2735
2736 if (!mask) {
2737 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2738 return 0;
2739 }
2740
2741 if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2742 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2743 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2744
2745 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2746 }
2747
2748 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2749 {
2750 return file_alloc_security(file);
2751 }
2752
2753 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2754 {
2755 file_free_security(file);
2756 }
2757
2758 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2759 unsigned long arg)
2760 {
2761 int error = 0;
2762
2763 switch (cmd) {
2764 case FIONREAD:
2765 /* fall through */
2766 case FIBMAP:
2767 /* fall through */
2768 case FIGETBSZ:
2769 /* fall through */
2770 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2771 /* fall through */
2772 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2773 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2774 break;
2775
2776 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2777 /* fall through */
2778 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2779 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2780 break;
2781
2782 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2783 case FIONBIO:
2784 /* fall through */
2785 case FIOASYNC:
2786 error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2787 break;
2788
2789 case KDSKBENT:
2790 case KDSKBSENT:
2791 error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
2792 break;
2793
2794 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2795 * to the file's ioctl() function.
2796 */
2797 default:
2798 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2799
2800 }
2801 return error;
2802 }
2803
2804 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2805 {
2806 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2807 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2808 /*
2809 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2810 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2811 * This has an additional check.
2812 */
2813 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2814 if (rc)
2815 return rc;
2816 }
2817 #endif
2818
2819 if (file) {
2820 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2821 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2822
2823 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2824 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2825 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2826
2827 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2828 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2829
2830 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2831 }
2832 return 0;
2833 }
2834
2835 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2836 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2837 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
2838 {
2839 int rc = 0;
2840 u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct*)(current->security))->sid;
2841
2842 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
2843 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
2844 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
2845 if (rc || addr_only)
2846 return rc;
2847
2848 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2849 prot = reqprot;
2850
2851 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2852 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2853 }
2854
2855 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2856 unsigned long reqprot,
2857 unsigned long prot)
2858 {
2859 int rc;
2860
2861 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2862 if (rc)
2863 return rc;
2864
2865 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2866 prot = reqprot;
2867
2868 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2869 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
2870 rc = 0;
2871 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
2872 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
2873 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
2874 PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
2875 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
2876 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
2877 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
2878 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
2879 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
2880 /*
2881 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2882 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
2883 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
2884 * modified content. This typically should only
2885 * occur for text relocations.
2886 */
2887 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
2888 FILE__EXECMOD);
2889 }
2890 if (rc)
2891 return rc;
2892 }
2893 #endif
2894
2895 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
2896 }
2897
2898 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
2899 {
2900 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2901 }
2902
2903 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2904 unsigned long arg)
2905 {
2906 int err = 0;
2907
2908 switch (cmd) {
2909 case F_SETFL:
2910 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
2911 err = -EINVAL;
2912 break;
2913 }
2914
2915 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
2916 err = file_has_perm(current, file,FILE__WRITE);
2917 break;
2918 }
2919 /* fall through */
2920 case F_SETOWN:
2921 case F_SETSIG:
2922 case F_GETFL:
2923 case F_GETOWN:
2924 case F_GETSIG:
2925 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
2926 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2927 break;
2928 case F_GETLK:
2929 case F_SETLK:
2930 case F_SETLKW:
2931 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
2932 case F_GETLK64:
2933 case F_SETLK64:
2934 case F_SETLKW64:
2935 #endif
2936 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
2937 err = -EINVAL;
2938 break;
2939 }
2940 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2941 break;
2942 }
2943
2944 return err;
2945 }
2946
2947 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
2948 {
2949 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2950 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2951
2952 tsec = current->security;
2953 fsec = file->f_security;
2954 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
2955
2956 return 0;
2957 }
2958
2959 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
2960 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
2961 {
2962 struct file *file;
2963 u32 perm;
2964 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2965 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2966
2967 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
2968 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
2969
2970 tsec = tsk->security;
2971 fsec = file->f_security;
2972
2973 if (!signum)
2974 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
2975 else
2976 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
2977
2978 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
2979 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2980 }
2981
2982 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
2983 {
2984 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
2985 }
2986
2987 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
2988 {
2989 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2990 struct inode *inode;
2991 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2992 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2993 fsec = file->f_security;
2994 isec = inode->i_security;
2995 /*
2996 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
2997 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
2998 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
2999 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3000 * struct as its SID.
3001 */
3002 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3003 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3004 /*
3005 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3006 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3007 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3008 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3009 * new inode label or new policy.
3010 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3011 */
3012 return inode_has_perm(current, inode, file_to_av(file), NULL);
3013 }
3014
3015 /* task security operations */
3016
3017 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3018 {
3019 int rc;
3020
3021 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3022 if (rc)
3023 return rc;
3024
3025 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
3026 }
3027
3028 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3029 {
3030 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
3031 int rc;
3032
3033 tsec1 = current->security;
3034
3035 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
3036 if (rc)
3037 return rc;
3038 tsec2 = tsk->security;
3039
3040 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
3041 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
3042
3043 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
3044 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
3045 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
3046 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
3047 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
3048
3049 /* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
3050 This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
3051 subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */
3052 tsec2->ptrace_sid = tsec1->ptrace_sid;
3053
3054 return 0;
3055 }
3056
3057 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3058 {
3059 task_free_security(tsk);
3060 }
3061
3062 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3063 {
3064 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3065 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3066 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3067 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3068 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3069 capable hook. */
3070 return 0;
3071 }
3072
3073 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3074 {
3075 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags);
3076 }
3077
3078 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3079 {
3080 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3081 return 0;
3082 }
3083
3084 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3085 {
3086 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3087 }
3088
3089 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3090 {
3091 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3092 }
3093
3094 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3095 {
3096 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3097 }
3098
3099 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3100 {
3101 selinux_get_task_sid(p, secid);
3102 }
3103
3104 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3105 {
3106 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3107 return 0;
3108 }
3109
3110 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3111 {
3112 int rc;
3113
3114 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3115 if (rc)
3116 return rc;
3117
3118 return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3119 }
3120
3121 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3122 {
3123 int rc;
3124
3125 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3126 if (rc)
3127 return rc;
3128
3129 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3130 }
3131
3132 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3133 {
3134 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3135 }
3136
3137 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3138 {
3139 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3140 int rc;
3141
3142 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3143 if (rc)
3144 return rc;
3145
3146 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3147 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3148 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3149 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
3150 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3151 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3152
3153 return 0;
3154 }
3155
3156 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3157 {
3158 int rc;
3159
3160 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3161 if (rc)
3162 return rc;
3163
3164 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3165 }
3166
3167 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3168 {
3169 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3170 }
3171
3172 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3173 {
3174 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3175 }
3176
3177 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3178 int sig, u32 secid)
3179 {
3180 u32 perm;
3181 int rc;
3182 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3183
3184 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3185 if (rc)
3186 return rc;
3187
3188 if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
3189 return 0;
3190
3191 if (!sig)
3192 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3193 else
3194 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3195 tsec = p->security;
3196 if (secid)
3197 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3198 else
3199 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
3200 return rc;
3201 }
3202
3203 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3204 unsigned long arg2,
3205 unsigned long arg3,
3206 unsigned long arg4,
3207 unsigned long arg5)
3208 {
3209 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3210 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3211 the state of the current process. */
3212 return 0;
3213 }
3214
3215 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3216 {
3217 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3218 }
3219
3220 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
3221 {
3222 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3223
3224 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
3225
3226 tsec = p->security;
3227 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
3228 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3229 return;
3230 }
3231
3232 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3233 struct inode *inode)
3234 {
3235 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3236 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3237
3238 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3239 isec->initialized = 1;
3240 return;
3241 }
3242
3243 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3244 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3245 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3246 {
3247 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3248 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3249
3250 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3251 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3252 if (ih == NULL)
3253 goto out;
3254
3255 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3256 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3257 goto out;
3258
3259 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3260 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3261 ret = 0;
3262
3263 if (proto)
3264 *proto = ih->protocol;
3265
3266 switch (ih->protocol) {
3267 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3268 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3269
3270 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3271 break;
3272
3273 offset += ihlen;
3274 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3275 if (th == NULL)
3276 break;
3277
3278 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3279 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3280 break;
3281 }
3282
3283 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3284 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3285
3286 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3287 break;
3288
3289 offset += ihlen;
3290 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3291 if (uh == NULL)
3292 break;
3293
3294 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3295 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3296 break;
3297 }
3298
3299 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3300 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3301
3302 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3303 break;
3304
3305 offset += ihlen;
3306 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3307 if (dh == NULL)
3308 break;
3309
3310 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3311 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3312 break;
3313 }
3314
3315 default:
3316 break;
3317 }
3318 out:
3319 return ret;
3320 }
3321
3322 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3323
3324 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3325 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3326 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3327 {
3328 u8 nexthdr;
3329 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3330 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3331
3332 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3333 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3334 if (ip6 == NULL)
3335 goto out;
3336
3337 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3338 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3339 ret = 0;
3340
3341 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3342 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3343 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3344 if (offset < 0)
3345 goto out;
3346
3347 if (proto)
3348 *proto = nexthdr;
3349
3350 switch (nexthdr) {
3351 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3352 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3353
3354 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3355 if (th == NULL)
3356 break;
3357
3358 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3359 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3360 break;
3361 }
3362
3363 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3364 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3365
3366 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3367 if (uh == NULL)
3368 break;
3369
3370 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3371 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3372 break;
3373 }
3374
3375 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3376 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3377
3378 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3379 if (dh == NULL)
3380 break;
3381
3382 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3383 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3384 break;
3385 }
3386
3387 /* includes fragments */
3388 default:
3389 break;
3390 }
3391 out:
3392 return ret;
3393 }
3394
3395 #endif /* IPV6 */
3396
3397 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3398 char **addrp, int *len, int src, u8 *proto)
3399 {
3400 int ret = 0;
3401
3402 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3403 case PF_INET:
3404 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3405 if (ret || !addrp)
3406 break;
3407 *len = 4;
3408 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3409 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3410 break;
3411
3412 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3413 case PF_INET6:
3414 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3415 if (ret || !addrp)
3416 break;
3417 *len = 16;
3418 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3419 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3420 break;
3421 #endif /* IPV6 */
3422 default:
3423 break;
3424 }
3425
3426 return ret;
3427 }
3428
3429 /**
3430 * selinux_skb_extlbl_sid - Determine the external label of a packet
3431 * @skb: the packet
3432 * @sid: the packet's SID
3433 *
3434 * Description:
3435 * Check the various different forms of external packet labeling and determine
3436 * the external SID for the packet. If only one form of external labeling is
3437 * present then it is used, if both labeled IPsec and NetLabel labels are
3438 * present then the SELinux type information is taken from the labeled IPsec
3439 * SA and the MLS sensitivity label information is taken from the NetLabel
3440 * security attributes. This bit of "magic" is done in the call to
3441 * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid().
3442 *
3443 */
3444 static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
3445 {
3446 u32 xfrm_sid;
3447 u32 nlbl_sid;
3448
3449 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3450 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
3451 (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL ?
3452 SECINITSID_NETMSG : xfrm_sid),
3453 &nlbl_sid) != 0)
3454 nlbl_sid = SECSID_NULL;
3455 *sid = (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL ? xfrm_sid : nlbl_sid);
3456 }
3457
3458 /* socket security operations */
3459 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3460 u32 perms)
3461 {
3462 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3463 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3464 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3465 int err = 0;
3466
3467 tsec = task->security;
3468 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3469
3470 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3471 goto out;
3472
3473 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3474 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3475 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3476
3477 out:
3478 return err;
3479 }
3480
3481 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3482 int protocol, int kern)
3483 {
3484 int err = 0;
3485 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3486 u32 newsid;
3487
3488 if (kern)
3489 goto out;
3490
3491 tsec = current->security;
3492 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3493 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3494 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3495 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3496
3497 out:
3498 return err;
3499 }
3500
3501 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3502 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3503 {
3504 int err = 0;
3505 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3506 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3507 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3508 u32 newsid;
3509
3510 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3511
3512 tsec = current->security;
3513 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3514 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3515 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3516 isec->initialized = 1;
3517
3518 if (sock->sk) {
3519 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3520 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3521 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3522 }
3523
3524 return err;
3525 }
3526
3527 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3528 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3529 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3530
3531 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3532 {
3533 u16 family;
3534 int err;
3535
3536 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3537 if (err)
3538 goto out;
3539
3540 /*
3541 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3542 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3543 * check the first address now.
3544 */
3545 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3546 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3547 char *addrp;
3548 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3549 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3550 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3551 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3552 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3553 unsigned short snum;
3554 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3555 u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
3556
3557 tsec = current->security;
3558 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3559
3560 if (family == PF_INET) {
3561 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3562 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3563 addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
3564 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3565 } else {
3566 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3567 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3568 addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
3569 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3570 }
3571
3572 if (snum) {
3573 int low, high;
3574
3575 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3576
3577 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3578 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
3579 sk->sk_type,
3580 sk->sk_protocol, snum,
3581 &sid);
3582 if (err)
3583 goto out;
3584 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3585 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3586 ad.u.net.family = family;
3587 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3588 isec->sclass,
3589 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3590 if (err)
3591 goto out;
3592 }
3593 }
3594
3595 switch(isec->sclass) {
3596 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3597 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3598 break;
3599
3600 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3601 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3602 break;
3603
3604 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3605 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3606 break;
3607
3608 default:
3609 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3610 break;
3611 }
3612
3613 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid);
3614 if (err)
3615 goto out;
3616
3617 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3618 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3619 ad.u.net.family = family;
3620
3621 if (family == PF_INET)
3622 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3623 else
3624 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3625
3626 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3627 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3628 if (err)
3629 goto out;
3630 }
3631 out:
3632 return err;
3633 }
3634
3635 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3636 {
3637 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3638 int err;
3639
3640 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3641 if (err)
3642 return err;
3643
3644 /*
3645 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3646 */
3647 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3648 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3649 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3650 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3651 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3652 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3653 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3654 unsigned short snum;
3655 u32 sid, perm;
3656
3657 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3658 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3659 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3660 return -EINVAL;
3661 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3662 } else {
3663 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3664 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3665 return -EINVAL;
3666 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3667 }
3668
3669 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3670 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3671 if (err)
3672 goto out;
3673
3674 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3675 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3676
3677 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3678 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3679 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3680 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3681 if (err)
3682 goto out;
3683 }
3684
3685 out:
3686 return err;
3687 }
3688
3689 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3690 {
3691 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3692 }
3693
3694 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3695 {
3696 int err;
3697 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3698 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3699
3700 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3701 if (err)
3702 return err;
3703
3704 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3705
3706 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3707 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3708 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3709 newisec->initialized = 1;
3710
3711 return 0;
3712 }
3713
3714 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3715 int size)
3716 {
3717 int rc;
3718
3719 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3720 if (rc)
3721 return rc;
3722
3723 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3724 }
3725
3726 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3727 int size, int flags)
3728 {
3729 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3730 }
3731
3732 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3733 {
3734 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3735 }
3736
3737 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3738 {
3739 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3740 }
3741
3742 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname)
3743 {
3744 int err;
3745
3746 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3747 if (err)
3748 return err;
3749
3750 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3751 }
3752
3753 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3754 int optname)
3755 {
3756 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3757 }
3758
3759 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3760 {
3761 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3762 }
3763
3764 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3765 struct socket *other,
3766 struct sock *newsk)
3767 {
3768 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3769 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3770 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3771 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3772 int err;
3773
3774 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3775 if (err)
3776 return err;
3777
3778 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3779 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3780
3781 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3782 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3783
3784 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3785 isec->sclass,
3786 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3787 if (err)
3788 return err;
3789
3790 /* connecting socket */
3791 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3792 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3793
3794 /* server child socket */
3795 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3796 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3797 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3798
3799 return err;
3800 }
3801
3802 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3803 struct socket *other)
3804 {
3805 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3806 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3807 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3808 int err;
3809
3810 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3811 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3812
3813 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3814 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3815
3816 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3817 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3818 if (err)
3819 return err;
3820
3821 return 0;
3822 }
3823
3824 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3825 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
3826 {
3827 int err = 0;
3828 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
3829 struct socket *sock;
3830 u16 sock_class = 0;
3831 u32 sock_sid = 0;
3832
3833 read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3834 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3835 if (sock) {
3836 struct inode *inode;
3837 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3838 if (inode) {
3839 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3840 isec = inode->i_security;
3841 sock_sid = isec->sid;
3842 sock_class = isec->sclass;
3843 }
3844 }
3845 read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3846 if (!sock_sid)
3847 goto out;
3848
3849 if (!skb->dev)
3850 goto out;
3851
3852 err = sel_netif_sids(skb->dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3853 if (err)
3854 goto out;
3855
3856 switch (sock_class) {
3857 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3858 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
3859 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
3860 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3861 break;
3862
3863 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3864 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
3865 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
3866 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3867 break;
3868
3869 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3870 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
3871 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
3872 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3873 break;
3874
3875 default:
3876 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
3877 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
3878 break;
3879 }
3880
3881 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
3882 if (err)
3883 goto out;
3884
3885 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3886 if (err)
3887 goto out;
3888
3889 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
3890 if (err)
3891 goto out;
3892
3893 if (recv_perm) {
3894 u32 port_sid;
3895
3896 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3897 sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.sport),
3898 &port_sid);
3899 if (err)
3900 goto out;
3901
3902 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
3903 sock_class, recv_perm, ad);
3904 }
3905
3906 out:
3907 return err;
3908 }
3909
3910 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3911 {
3912 u16 family;
3913 char *addrp;
3914 int len, err = 0;
3915 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3916 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3917
3918 family = sk->sk_family;
3919 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
3920 goto out;
3921
3922 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
3923 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
3924 family = PF_INET;
3925
3926 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3927 ad.u.net.netif = skb->dev ? skb->dev->name : "[unknown]";
3928 ad.u.net.family = family;
3929
3930 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1, NULL);
3931 if (err)
3932 goto out;
3933
3934 if (selinux_compat_net)
3935 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, family,
3936 addrp, len);
3937 else
3938 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
3939 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
3940 if (err)
3941 goto out;
3942
3943 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, &ad);
3944 if (err)
3945 goto out;
3946
3947 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
3948 out:
3949 return err;
3950 }
3951
3952 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
3953 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
3954 {
3955 int err = 0;
3956 char *scontext;
3957 u32 scontext_len;
3958 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3959 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3960 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
3961
3962 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3963
3964 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
3965 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3966 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3967 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
3968 }
3969 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
3970 err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
3971 goto out;
3972 }
3973
3974 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
3975
3976 if (err)
3977 goto out;
3978
3979 if (scontext_len > len) {
3980 err = -ERANGE;
3981 goto out_len;
3982 }
3983
3984 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
3985 err = -EFAULT;
3986
3987 out_len:
3988 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
3989 err = -EFAULT;
3990
3991 kfree(scontext);
3992 out:
3993 return err;
3994 }
3995
3996 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
3997 {
3998 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
3999 int err = 0;
4000
4001 if (sock && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4002 selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4003 else if (skb)
4004 selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &peer_secid);
4005
4006 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4007 err = -EINVAL;
4008 *secid = peer_secid;
4009
4010 return err;
4011 }
4012
4013 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4014 {
4015 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4016 }
4017
4018 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4019 {
4020 sk_free_security(sk);
4021 }
4022
4023 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4024 {
4025 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4026 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4027
4028 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4029 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4030
4031 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(ssec, newssec);
4032 }
4033
4034 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4035 {
4036 if (!sk)
4037 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4038 else {
4039 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4040
4041 *secid = sksec->sid;
4042 }
4043 }
4044
4045 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock* sk, struct socket *parent)
4046 {
4047 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4048 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4049
4050 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4051 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4052 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4053
4054 selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent);
4055 }
4056
4057 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4058 struct request_sock *req)
4059 {
4060 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4061 int err;
4062 u32 newsid;
4063 u32 peersid;
4064
4065 selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &peersid);
4066 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4067 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4068 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4069 return 0;
4070 }
4071
4072 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4073 if (err)
4074 return err;
4075
4076 req->secid = newsid;
4077 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4078 return 0;
4079 }
4080
4081 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4082 const struct request_sock *req)
4083 {
4084 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4085
4086 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4087 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4088 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4089 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4090 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4091 time it will have been created and available. */
4092
4093 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4094 * thread with access to newsksec */
4095 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4096 }
4097
4098 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
4099 struct sk_buff *skb)
4100 {
4101 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4102
4103 selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &sksec->peer_sid);
4104 }
4105
4106 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4107 struct flowi *fl)
4108 {
4109 fl->secid = req->secid;
4110 }
4111
4112 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4113 {
4114 int err = 0;
4115 u32 perm;
4116 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4117 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4118 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4119
4120 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4121 err = -EINVAL;
4122 goto out;
4123 }
4124 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4125
4126 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4127 if (err) {
4128 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4129 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4130 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4131 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4132 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4133 if (!selinux_enforcing)
4134 err = 0;
4135 }
4136
4137 /* Ignore */
4138 if (err == -ENOENT)
4139 err = 0;
4140 goto out;
4141 }
4142
4143 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4144 out:
4145 return err;
4146 }
4147
4148 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4149
4150 static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev,
4151 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4152 u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
4153 {
4154 int err = 0;
4155 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
4156 struct socket *sock;
4157 struct inode *inode;
4158 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4159
4160 sock = sk->sk_socket;
4161 if (!sock)
4162 goto out;
4163
4164 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
4165 if (!inode)
4166 goto out;
4167
4168 isec = inode->i_security;
4169
4170 err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
4171 if (err)
4172 goto out;
4173
4174 switch (isec->sclass) {
4175 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4176 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4177 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4178 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4179 break;
4180
4181 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4182 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4183 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4184 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4185 break;
4186
4187 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4188 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4189 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4190 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4191 break;
4192
4193 default:
4194 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4195 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4196 break;
4197 }
4198
4199 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4200 if (err)
4201 goto out;
4202
4203 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
4204 if (err)
4205 goto out;
4206
4207 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4208 if (err)
4209 goto out;
4210
4211 if (send_perm) {
4212 u32 port_sid;
4213
4214 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
4215 sk->sk_type,
4216 sk->sk_protocol,
4217 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport),
4218 &port_sid);
4219 if (err)
4220 goto out;
4221
4222 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
4223 send_perm, ad);
4224 }
4225 out:
4226 return err;
4227 }
4228
4229 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
4230 struct sk_buff *skb,
4231 const struct net_device *in,
4232 const struct net_device *out,
4233 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
4234 u16 family)
4235 {
4236 char *addrp;
4237 int len, err = 0;
4238 struct sock *sk;
4239 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4240 struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
4241 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4242 u8 proto;
4243
4244 sk = skb->sk;
4245 if (!sk)
4246 goto out;
4247
4248 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4249
4250 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4251 ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
4252 ad.u.net.family = family;
4253
4254 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0, &proto);
4255 if (err)
4256 goto out;
4257
4258 if (selinux_compat_net)
4259 err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, &ad,
4260 family, addrp, len);
4261 else
4262 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4263 PACKET__SEND, &ad);
4264
4265 if (err)
4266 goto out;
4267
4268 err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto);
4269 out:
4270 return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
4271 }
4272
4273 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
4274 struct sk_buff *skb,
4275 const struct net_device *in,
4276 const struct net_device *out,
4277 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4278 {
4279 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, skb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET);
4280 }
4281
4282 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4283
4284 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
4285 struct sk_buff *skb,
4286 const struct net_device *in,
4287 const struct net_device *out,
4288 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4289 {
4290 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, skb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6);
4291 }
4292
4293 #endif /* IPV6 */
4294
4295 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4296
4297 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4298 {
4299 int err;
4300
4301 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4302 if (err)
4303 return err;
4304
4305 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4306 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4307
4308 return err;
4309 }
4310
4311 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4312 {
4313 int err;
4314 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4315
4316 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4317 if (err)
4318 return err;
4319
4320 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4321 ad.u.cap = capability;
4322
4323 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4324 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4325 }
4326
4327 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4328 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4329 u16 sclass)
4330 {
4331 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
4332 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4333
4334 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4335 if (!isec)
4336 return -ENOMEM;
4337
4338 isec->sclass = sclass;
4339 isec->ipc_perm = perm;
4340 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
4341 perm->security = isec;
4342
4343 return 0;
4344 }
4345
4346 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4347 {
4348 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4349 perm->security = NULL;
4350 kfree(isec);
4351 }
4352
4353 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4354 {
4355 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4356
4357 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4358 if (!msec)
4359 return -ENOMEM;
4360
4361 msec->msg = msg;
4362 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4363 msg->security = msec;
4364
4365 return 0;
4366 }
4367
4368 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4369 {
4370 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4371
4372 msg->security = NULL;
4373 kfree(msec);
4374 }
4375
4376 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4377 u32 perms)
4378 {
4379 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4380 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4381 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4382
4383 tsec = current->security;
4384 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4385
4386 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4387 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4388
4389 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4390 }
4391
4392 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4393 {
4394 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4395 }
4396
4397 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4398 {
4399 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4400 }
4401
4402 /* message queue security operations */
4403 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4404 {
4405 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4406 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4407 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4408 int rc;
4409
4410 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4411 if (rc)
4412 return rc;
4413
4414 tsec = current->security;
4415 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4416
4417 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4418 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4419
4420 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4421 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
4422 if (rc) {
4423 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4424 return rc;
4425 }
4426 return 0;
4427 }
4428
4429 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4430 {
4431 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4432 }
4433
4434 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4435 {
4436 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4437 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4438 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4439
4440 tsec = current->security;
4441 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4442
4443 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4444 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4445
4446 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4447 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4448 }
4449
4450 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4451 {
4452 int err;
4453 int perms;
4454
4455 switch(cmd) {
4456 case IPC_INFO:
4457 case MSG_INFO:
4458 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4459 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4460 case IPC_STAT:
4461 case MSG_STAT:
4462 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4463 break;
4464 case IPC_SET:
4465 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4466 break;
4467 case IPC_RMID:
4468 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4469 break;
4470 default:
4471 return 0;
4472 }
4473
4474 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4475 return err;
4476 }
4477
4478 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4479 {
4480 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4481 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4482 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4483 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4484 int rc;
4485
4486 tsec = current->security;
4487 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4488 msec = msg->security;
4489
4490 /*
4491 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4492 */
4493 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4494 /*
4495 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4496 * message queue this message will be stored in
4497 */
4498 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4499 isec->sid,
4500 SECCLASS_MSG,
4501 &msec->sid);
4502 if (rc)
4503 return rc;
4504 }
4505
4506 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4507 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4508
4509 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4510 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4511 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
4512 if (!rc)
4513 /* Can this process send the message */
4514 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4515 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4516 if (!rc)
4517 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4518 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4519 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4520
4521 return rc;
4522 }
4523
4524 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4525 struct task_struct *target,
4526 long type, int mode)
4527 {
4528 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4529 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4530 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4531 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4532 int rc;
4533
4534 tsec = target->security;
4535 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4536 msec = msg->security;
4537
4538 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4539 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4540
4541 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4542 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4543 if (!rc)
4544 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4545 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4546 return rc;
4547 }
4548
4549 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4550 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4551 {
4552 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4553 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4554 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4555 int rc;
4556
4557 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4558 if (rc)
4559 return rc;
4560
4561 tsec = current->security;
4562 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4563
4564 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4565 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4566
4567 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4568 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
4569 if (rc) {
4570 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4571 return rc;
4572 }
4573 return 0;
4574 }
4575
4576 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4577 {
4578 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4579 }
4580
4581 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4582 {
4583 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4584 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4585 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4586
4587 tsec = current->security;
4588 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4589
4590 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4591 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4592
4593 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4594 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4595 }
4596
4597 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4598 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4599 {
4600 int perms;
4601 int err;
4602
4603 switch(cmd) {
4604 case IPC_INFO:
4605 case SHM_INFO:
4606 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4607 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4608 case IPC_STAT:
4609 case SHM_STAT:
4610 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4611 break;
4612 case IPC_SET:
4613 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4614 break;
4615 case SHM_LOCK:
4616 case SHM_UNLOCK:
4617 perms = SHM__LOCK;
4618 break;
4619 case IPC_RMID:
4620 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4621 break;
4622 default:
4623 return 0;
4624 }
4625
4626 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4627 return err;
4628 }
4629
4630 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4631 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4632 {
4633 u32 perms;
4634 int rc;
4635
4636 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
4637 if (rc)
4638 return rc;
4639
4640 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4641 perms = SHM__READ;
4642 else
4643 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4644
4645 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4646 }
4647
4648 /* Semaphore security operations */
4649 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4650 {
4651 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4652 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4653 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4654 int rc;
4655
4656 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4657 if (rc)
4658 return rc;
4659
4660 tsec = current->security;
4661 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4662
4663 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4664 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4665
4666 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4667 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
4668 if (rc) {
4669 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4670 return rc;
4671 }
4672 return 0;
4673 }
4674
4675 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4676 {
4677 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4678 }
4679
4680 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
4681 {
4682 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4683 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4684 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4685
4686 tsec = current->security;
4687 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4688
4689 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4690 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4691
4692 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4693 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4694 }
4695
4696 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
4697 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
4698 {
4699 int err;
4700 u32 perms;
4701
4702 switch(cmd) {
4703 case IPC_INFO:
4704 case SEM_INFO:
4705 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4706 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4707 case GETPID:
4708 case GETNCNT:
4709 case GETZCNT:
4710 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
4711 break;
4712 case GETVAL:
4713 case GETALL:
4714 perms = SEM__READ;
4715 break;
4716 case SETVAL:
4717 case SETALL:
4718 perms = SEM__WRITE;
4719 break;
4720 case IPC_RMID:
4721 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
4722 break;
4723 case IPC_SET:
4724 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
4725 break;
4726 case IPC_STAT:
4727 case SEM_STAT:
4728 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
4729 break;
4730 default:
4731 return 0;
4732 }
4733
4734 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4735 return err;
4736 }
4737
4738 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
4739 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
4740 {
4741 u32 perms;
4742
4743 if (alter)
4744 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
4745 else
4746 perms = SEM__READ;
4747
4748 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4749 }
4750
4751 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
4752 {
4753 u32 av = 0;
4754
4755 av = 0;
4756 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
4757 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
4758 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
4759 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
4760
4761 if (av == 0)
4762 return 0;
4763
4764 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
4765 }
4766
4767 /* module stacking operations */
4768 static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4769 {
4770 if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
4771 printk(KERN_ERR "%s: There is already a secondary security "
4772 "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4773 return -EINVAL;
4774 }
4775
4776 secondary_ops = ops;
4777
4778 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n",
4779 __FUNCTION__,
4780 name);
4781
4782 return 0;
4783 }
4784
4785 static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
4786 {
4787 if (inode)
4788 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
4789 }
4790
4791 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4792 char *name, char **value)
4793 {
4794 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4795 u32 sid;
4796 int error;
4797 unsigned len;
4798
4799 if (current != p) {
4800 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
4801 if (error)
4802 return error;
4803 }
4804
4805 tsec = p->security;
4806
4807 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4808 sid = tsec->sid;
4809 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
4810 sid = tsec->osid;
4811 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4812 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
4813 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4814 sid = tsec->create_sid;
4815 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
4816 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
4817 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4818 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4819 else
4820 return -EINVAL;
4821
4822 if (!sid)
4823 return 0;
4824
4825 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
4826 if (error)
4827 return error;
4828 return len;
4829 }
4830
4831 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4832 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4833 {
4834 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4835 u32 sid = 0;
4836 int error;
4837 char *str = value;
4838
4839 if (current != p) {
4840 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
4841 security attributes. */
4842 return -EACCES;
4843 }
4844
4845 /*
4846 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
4847 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
4848 * above restriction is ever removed.
4849 */
4850 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4851 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
4852 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4853 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
4854 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
4855 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
4856 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4857 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
4858 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4859 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
4860 else
4861 error = -EINVAL;
4862 if (error)
4863 return error;
4864
4865 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
4866 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
4867 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
4868 str[size-1] = 0;
4869 size--;
4870 }
4871 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
4872 if (error)
4873 return error;
4874 }
4875
4876 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
4877 performed during the actual operation (execve,
4878 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
4879 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
4880 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
4881 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
4882 tsec = p->security;
4883 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4884 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
4885 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4886 tsec->create_sid = sid;
4887 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
4888 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
4889 if (error)
4890 return error;
4891 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
4892 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4893 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
4894 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
4895 struct av_decision avd;
4896
4897 if (sid == 0)
4898 return -EINVAL;
4899
4900 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
4901 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
4902 struct task_struct *g, *t;
4903 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
4904 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
4905 do_each_thread(g, t)
4906 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
4907 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4908 return -EPERM;
4909 }
4910 while_each_thread(g, t);
4911 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4912 }
4913
4914 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
4915 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4916 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
4917 if (error)
4918 return error;
4919
4920 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
4921 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
4922 task_lock(p);
4923 if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
4924 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
4925 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4926 PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
4927 if (!error)
4928 tsec->sid = sid;
4929 task_unlock(p);
4930 avc_audit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4931 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
4932 if (error)
4933 return error;
4934 } else {
4935 tsec->sid = sid;
4936 task_unlock(p);
4937 }
4938 }
4939 else
4940 return -EINVAL;
4941
4942 return size;
4943 }
4944
4945 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
4946 {
4947 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
4948 }
4949
4950 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
4951 {
4952 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
4953 }
4954
4955 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
4956 {
4957 kfree(secdata);
4958 }
4959
4960 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4961
4962 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
4963 unsigned long flags)
4964 {
4965 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
4966 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
4967
4968 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4969 if (!ksec)
4970 return -ENOMEM;
4971
4972 ksec->obj = k;
4973 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
4974 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
4975 else
4976 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
4977 k->security = ksec;
4978
4979 return 0;
4980 }
4981
4982 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
4983 {
4984 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
4985
4986 k->security = NULL;
4987 kfree(ksec);
4988 }
4989
4990 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
4991 struct task_struct *ctx,
4992 key_perm_t perm)
4993 {
4994 struct key *key;
4995 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4996 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
4997
4998 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
4999
5000 tsec = ctx->security;
5001 ksec = key->security;
5002
5003 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5004 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5005 appear to be created. */
5006 if (perm == 0)
5007 return 0;
5008
5009 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
5010 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5011 }
5012
5013 #endif
5014
5015 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5016 .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
5017 .capget = selinux_capget,
5018 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
5019 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
5020 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5021 .capable = selinux_capable,
5022 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5023 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5024 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5025 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5026
5027 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5028 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5029
5030 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
5031 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
5032 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
5033 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
5034 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
5035 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
5036 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5037
5038 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5039 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5040 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5041 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5042 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5043 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5044 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5045 .sb_get_mnt_opts = selinux_get_mnt_opts,
5046 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5047 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5048
5049 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5050 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5051 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5052 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5053 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5054 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5055 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5056 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5057 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5058 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5059 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5060 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5061 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5062 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5063 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5064 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5065 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5066 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5067 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5068 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5069 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5070 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5071 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5072 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5073 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5074 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5075
5076 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5077 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5078 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5079 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5080 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5081 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5082 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5083 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5084 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5085 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5086 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5087
5088 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5089
5090 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5091 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
5092 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
5093 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5094 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
5095 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5096 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5097 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5098 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5099 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5100 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5101 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5102 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5103 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5104 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5105 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5106 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5107 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5108 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5109 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5110 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5111 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
5112 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5113
5114 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5115
5116 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5117 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5118
5119 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5120 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5121 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5122 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5123 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5124 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5125
5126 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5127 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5128 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5129 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5130 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5131
5132 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5133 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5134 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5135 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5136 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5137
5138 .register_security = selinux_register_security,
5139
5140 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5141
5142 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5143 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5144
5145 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5146 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5147 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5148
5149 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5150 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5151
5152 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5153 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5154 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5155 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5156 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5157 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5158 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5159 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5160 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5161 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5162 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5163 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5164 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5165 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5166 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5167 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5168 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5169 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5170 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5171 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5172 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5173 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5174 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5175 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5176 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5177
5178 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5179 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5180 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5181 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5182 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5183 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5184 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5185 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5186 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5187 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5188 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5189 #endif
5190
5191 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5192 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5193 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5194 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5195 #endif
5196 };
5197
5198 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5199 {
5200 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5201
5202 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5203 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5204 return 0;
5205 }
5206
5207 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5208
5209 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5210 if (task_alloc_security(current))
5211 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
5212 tsec = current->security;
5213 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5214
5215 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5216 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5217 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5218 avc_init();
5219
5220 original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
5221 if (!secondary_ops)
5222 panic ("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5223 if (register_security (&selinux_ops))
5224 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5225
5226 if (selinux_enforcing) {
5227 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5228 } else {
5229 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5230 }
5231
5232 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5233 /* Add security information to initial keyrings */
5234 selinux_key_alloc(&root_user_keyring, current,
5235 KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
5236 selinux_key_alloc(&root_session_keyring, current,
5237 KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
5238 #endif
5239
5240 return 0;
5241 }
5242
5243 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5244 {
5245 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5246
5247 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5248 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5249 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5250 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5251 next_sb:
5252 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5253 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5254 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5255 struct superblock_security_struct,
5256 list);
5257 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5258 sb->s_count++;
5259 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5260 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5261 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5262 if (sb->s_root)
5263 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5264 drop_super(sb);
5265 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5266 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5267 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5268 goto next_sb;
5269 }
5270 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5271 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5272 }
5273
5274 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5275 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5276 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5277
5278 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5279
5280 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = {
5281 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute_last,
5282 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5283 .pf = PF_INET,
5284 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5285 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5286 };
5287
5288 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5289
5290 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = {
5291 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute_last,
5292 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5293 .pf = PF_INET6,
5294 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5295 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5296 };
5297
5298 #endif /* IPV6 */
5299
5300 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5301 {
5302 int err = 0;
5303
5304 if (!selinux_enabled)
5305 goto out;
5306
5307 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5308
5309 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
5310 if (err)
5311 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5312
5313 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5314
5315 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
5316 if (err)
5317 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5318
5319 #endif /* IPV6 */
5320
5321 out:
5322 return err;
5323 }
5324
5325 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5326
5327 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5328 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5329 {
5330 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5331
5332 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
5333 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5334 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
5335 #endif /* IPV6 */
5336 }
5337 #endif
5338
5339 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5340
5341 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5342 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5343 #endif
5344
5345 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5346
5347 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5348 int selinux_disable(void)
5349 {
5350 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5351 static int selinux_disabled = 0;
5352
5353 if (ss_initialized) {
5354 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5355 return -EINVAL;
5356 }
5357
5358 if (selinux_disabled) {
5359 /* Only do this once. */
5360 return -EINVAL;
5361 }
5362
5363 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5364
5365 selinux_disabled = 1;
5366 selinux_enabled = 0;
5367
5368 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5369 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5370
5371 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5372 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5373
5374 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
5375 exit_sel_fs();
5376
5377 return 0;
5378 }
5379 #endif
5380
5381
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