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consitify do_mount() arguments
[linux-2.6/libata-dev.git] / security / selinux / hooks.c
blob24ab4148547c2ba925042126ca9350a25a9969f8
1 /*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
20 *
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
24 */
25
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kd.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/security.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mm.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
52 #include <net/icmp.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
54 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
55 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
56 #include <net/netlabel.h>
57 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
58 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
59 #include <linux/atomic.h>
60 #include <linux/bitops.h>
61 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
62 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
63 #include <linux/netlink.h>
64 #include <linux/tcp.h>
65 #include <linux/udp.h>
66 #include <linux/dccp.h>
67 #include <linux/quota.h>
68 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
69 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <linux/parser.h>
71 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
72 #include <net/ipv6.h>
73 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
74 #include <linux/personality.h>
75 #include <linux/audit.h>
76 #include <linux/string.h>
77 #include <linux/selinux.h>
78 #include <linux/mutex.h>
79 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
80 #include <linux/syslog.h>
81 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
82 #include <linux/export.h>
83 #include <linux/msg.h>
84 #include <linux/shm.h>
85
86 #include "avc.h"
87 #include "objsec.h"
88 #include "netif.h"
89 #include "netnode.h"
90 #include "netport.h"
91 #include "xfrm.h"
92 #include "netlabel.h"
93 #include "audit.h"
94 #include "avc_ss.h"
95
96 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
97
98 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
99
100 /* SECMARK reference count */
101 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
102
103 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
104 int selinux_enforcing;
105
106 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
107 {
108 unsigned long enforcing;
109 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
110 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
111 return 1;
112 }
113 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
114 #endif
115
116 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
117 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
118
119 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
120 {
121 unsigned long enabled;
122 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
123 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
124 return 1;
125 }
126 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
127 #else
128 int selinux_enabled = 1;
129 #endif
130
131 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
132
133 /**
134 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
135 *
136 * Description:
137 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
138 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
139 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
140 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
141 *
142 */
143 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
144 {
145 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
146 }
147
148 /*
149 * initialise the security for the init task
150 */
151 static void cred_init_security(void)
152 {
153 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
154 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
155
156 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
157 if (!tsec)
158 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
159
160 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
161 cred->security = tsec;
162 }
163
164 /*
165 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
166 */
167 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
168 {
169 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
170
171 tsec = cred->security;
172 return tsec->sid;
173 }
174
175 /*
176 * get the objective security ID of a task
177 */
178 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
179 {
180 u32 sid;
181
182 rcu_read_lock();
183 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
184 rcu_read_unlock();
185 return sid;
186 }
187
188 /*
189 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
190 */
191 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
192 {
193 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
194
195 return tsec->sid;
196 }
197
198 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
199
200 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
201 {
202 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
203 u32 sid = current_sid();
204
205 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
206 if (!isec)
207 return -ENOMEM;
208
209 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
210 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
211 isec->inode = inode;
212 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
213 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
214 isec->task_sid = sid;
215 inode->i_security = isec;
216
217 return 0;
218 }
219
220 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
221 {
222 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
223 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
224
225 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
226 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
227 list_del_init(&isec->list);
228 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
229
230 inode->i_security = NULL;
231 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
232 }
233
234 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
235 {
236 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
237 u32 sid = current_sid();
238
239 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
240 if (!fsec)
241 return -ENOMEM;
242
243 fsec->sid = sid;
244 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
245 file->f_security = fsec;
246
247 return 0;
248 }
249
250 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
251 {
252 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
253 file->f_security = NULL;
254 kfree(fsec);
255 }
256
257 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
258 {
259 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
260
261 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
262 if (!sbsec)
263 return -ENOMEM;
264
265 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
266 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
267 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
268 sbsec->sb = sb;
269 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
270 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
271 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
272 sb->s_security = sbsec;
273
274 return 0;
275 }
276
277 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
278 {
279 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
280 sb->s_security = NULL;
281 kfree(sbsec);
282 }
283
284 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
285
286 static const char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
287 "uses xattr",
288 "uses transition SIDs",
289 "uses task SIDs",
290 "uses genfs_contexts",
291 "not configured for labeling",
292 "uses mountpoint labeling",
293 };
294
295 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
296
297 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
298 {
299 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
300 }
301
302 enum {
303 Opt_error = -1,
304 Opt_context = 1,
305 Opt_fscontext = 2,
306 Opt_defcontext = 3,
307 Opt_rootcontext = 4,
308 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
309 };
310
311 static const match_table_t tokens = {
312 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
313 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
314 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
315 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
316 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
317 {Opt_error, NULL},
318 };
319
320 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
321
322 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
323 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
324 const struct cred *cred)
325 {
326 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
327 int rc;
328
329 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
330 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
331 if (rc)
332 return rc;
333
334 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
335 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
336 return rc;
337 }
338
339 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
340 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
341 const struct cred *cred)
342 {
343 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
344 int rc;
345 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
346 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
347 if (rc)
348 return rc;
349
350 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
351 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
352 return rc;
353 }
354
355 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
356 {
357 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
358 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
359 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
360 int rc = 0;
361
362 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
363 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
364 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
365 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
366 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
367 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
368 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
369 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
370 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
371 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
372 goto out;
373 }
374 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
375 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
376 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
377 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
378 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
379 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
380 else
381 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
382 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
383 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
384 goto out;
385 }
386 }
387
388 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
389
390 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
391 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
392 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
393 else
394 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
395 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
396 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
397
398 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
399 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
400 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
401 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
402 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
403
404 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
405 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
406 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
407
408 /* Initialize the root inode. */
409 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
410
411 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
412 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
413 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
414 populates itself. */
415 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
416 next_inode:
417 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
418 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
419 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
420 struct inode_security_struct, list);
421 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
422 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
423 inode = igrab(inode);
424 if (inode) {
425 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
426 inode_doinit(inode);
427 iput(inode);
428 }
429 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
430 list_del_init(&isec->list);
431 goto next_inode;
432 }
433 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
434 out:
435 return rc;
436 }
437
438 /*
439 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
440 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
441 * mount options, or whatever.
442 */
443 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
444 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
445 {
446 int rc = 0, i;
447 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
448 char *context = NULL;
449 u32 len;
450 char tmp;
451
452 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
453
454 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
455 return -EINVAL;
456
457 if (!ss_initialized)
458 return -EINVAL;
459
460 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
461 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
462 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
463 if (tmp & 0x01)
464 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
465 tmp >>= 1;
466 }
467 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
468 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
469 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
470
471 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
472 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
473 rc = -ENOMEM;
474 goto out_free;
475 }
476
477 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
478 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
479 rc = -ENOMEM;
480 goto out_free;
481 }
482
483 i = 0;
484 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
485 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
486 if (rc)
487 goto out_free;
488 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
489 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
490 }
491 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
492 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
493 if (rc)
494 goto out_free;
495 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
496 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
497 }
498 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
499 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
500 if (rc)
501 goto out_free;
502 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
503 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
504 }
505 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
506 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
507 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
508
509 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
510 if (rc)
511 goto out_free;
512 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
513 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
514 }
515 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
516 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
517 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
518 }
519
520 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
521
522 return 0;
523
524 out_free:
525 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
526 return rc;
527 }
528
529 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
530 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
531 {
532 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
533
534 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
535 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
536 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
537 (old_sid != new_sid))
538 return 1;
539
540 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
541 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
542 */
543 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
544 if (mnt_flags & flag)
545 return 1;
546 return 0;
547 }
548
549 /*
550 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
551 * labeling information.
552 */
553 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
554 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
555 {
556 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
557 int rc = 0, i;
558 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
559 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
560 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
561 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
562 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
563 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
564 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
565 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
566 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
567
568 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
569
570 if (!ss_initialized) {
571 if (!num_opts) {
572 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
573 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
574 server is ready to handle calls. */
575 goto out;
576 }
577 rc = -EINVAL;
578 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
579 "before the security server is initialized\n");
580 goto out;
581 }
582
583 /*
584 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
585 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
586 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
587 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
588 *
589 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
590 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
591 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
592 * will be used for both mounts)
593 */
594 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
595 && (num_opts == 0))
596 goto out;
597
598 /*
599 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
600 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
601 * than once with different security options.
602 */
603 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
604 u32 sid;
605
606 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
607 continue;
608 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
609 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
610 if (rc) {
611 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
612 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
613 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
614 goto out;
615 }
616 switch (flags[i]) {
617 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
618 fscontext_sid = sid;
619
620 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
621 fscontext_sid))
622 goto out_double_mount;
623
624 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
625 break;
626 case CONTEXT_MNT:
627 context_sid = sid;
628
629 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
630 context_sid))
631 goto out_double_mount;
632
633 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
634 break;
635 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
636 rootcontext_sid = sid;
637
638 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
639 rootcontext_sid))
640 goto out_double_mount;
641
642 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
643
644 break;
645 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
646 defcontext_sid = sid;
647
648 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
649 defcontext_sid))
650 goto out_double_mount;
651
652 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
653
654 break;
655 default:
656 rc = -EINVAL;
657 goto out;
658 }
659 }
660
661 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
662 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
663 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
664 goto out_double_mount;
665 rc = 0;
666 goto out;
667 }
668
669 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
670 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
671
672 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
673 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
674 if (rc) {
675 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
676 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
677 goto out;
678 }
679
680 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
681 if (fscontext_sid) {
682 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
683 if (rc)
684 goto out;
685
686 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
687 }
688
689 /*
690 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
691 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
692 * the superblock context if not already set.
693 */
694 if (context_sid) {
695 if (!fscontext_sid) {
696 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
697 cred);
698 if (rc)
699 goto out;
700 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
701 } else {
702 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
703 cred);
704 if (rc)
705 goto out;
706 }
707 if (!rootcontext_sid)
708 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
709
710 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
711 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
712 }
713
714 if (rootcontext_sid) {
715 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
716 cred);
717 if (rc)
718 goto out;
719
720 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
721 root_isec->initialized = 1;
722 }
723
724 if (defcontext_sid) {
725 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
726 rc = -EINVAL;
727 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
728 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
729 goto out;
730 }
731
732 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
733 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
734 sbsec, cred);
735 if (rc)
736 goto out;
737 }
738
739 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
740 }
741
742 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
743 out:
744 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
745 return rc;
746 out_double_mount:
747 rc = -EINVAL;
748 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
749 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
750 goto out;
751 }
752
753 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
754 struct super_block *newsb)
755 {
756 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
757 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
758
759 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
760 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
761 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
762
763 /*
764 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
765 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
766 */
767 if (!ss_initialized)
768 return;
769
770 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
771 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
772
773 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
774 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
775 return;
776
777 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
778
779 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
780
781 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
782 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
783 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
784
785 if (set_context) {
786 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
787
788 if (!set_fscontext)
789 newsbsec->sid = sid;
790 if (!set_rootcontext) {
791 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
792 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
793 newisec->sid = sid;
794 }
795 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
796 }
797 if (set_rootcontext) {
798 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
799 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
800 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
801 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
802
803 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
804 }
805
806 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
807 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
808 }
809
810 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
811 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
812 {
813 char *p;
814 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
815 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
816 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
817
818 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
819
820 /* Standard string-based options. */
821 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
822 int token;
823 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
824
825 if (!*p)
826 continue;
827
828 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
829
830 switch (token) {
831 case Opt_context:
832 if (context || defcontext) {
833 rc = -EINVAL;
834 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
835 goto out_err;
836 }
837 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
838 if (!context) {
839 rc = -ENOMEM;
840 goto out_err;
841 }
842 break;
843
844 case Opt_fscontext:
845 if (fscontext) {
846 rc = -EINVAL;
847 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
848 goto out_err;
849 }
850 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
851 if (!fscontext) {
852 rc = -ENOMEM;
853 goto out_err;
854 }
855 break;
856
857 case Opt_rootcontext:
858 if (rootcontext) {
859 rc = -EINVAL;
860 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
861 goto out_err;
862 }
863 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
864 if (!rootcontext) {
865 rc = -ENOMEM;
866 goto out_err;
867 }
868 break;
869
870 case Opt_defcontext:
871 if (context || defcontext) {
872 rc = -EINVAL;
873 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
874 goto out_err;
875 }
876 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
877 if (!defcontext) {
878 rc = -ENOMEM;
879 goto out_err;
880 }
881 break;
882 case Opt_labelsupport:
883 break;
884 default:
885 rc = -EINVAL;
886 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
887 goto out_err;
888
889 }
890 }
891
892 rc = -ENOMEM;
893 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
894 if (!opts->mnt_opts)
895 goto out_err;
896
897 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
898 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
899 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
900 goto out_err;
901 }
902
903 if (fscontext) {
904 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
905 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
906 }
907 if (context) {
908 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
909 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
910 }
911 if (rootcontext) {
912 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
913 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
914 }
915 if (defcontext) {
916 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
917 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
918 }
919
920 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
921 return 0;
922
923 out_err:
924 kfree(context);
925 kfree(defcontext);
926 kfree(fscontext);
927 kfree(rootcontext);
928 return rc;
929 }
930 /*
931 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
932 */
933 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
934 {
935 int rc = 0;
936 char *options = data;
937 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
938
939 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
940
941 if (!data)
942 goto out;
943
944 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
945
946 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
947 if (rc)
948 goto out_err;
949
950 out:
951 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
952
953 out_err:
954 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
955 return rc;
956 }
957
958 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
959 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
960 {
961 int i;
962 char *prefix;
963
964 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
965 char *has_comma;
966
967 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
968 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
969 else
970 has_comma = NULL;
971
972 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
973 case CONTEXT_MNT:
974 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
975 break;
976 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
977 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
978 break;
979 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
980 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
981 break;
982 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
983 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
984 break;
985 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
986 seq_putc(m, ',');
987 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
988 continue;
989 default:
990 BUG();
991 return;
992 };
993 /* we need a comma before each option */
994 seq_putc(m, ',');
995 seq_puts(m, prefix);
996 if (has_comma)
997 seq_putc(m, '\"');
998 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
999 if (has_comma)
1000 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1001 }
1002 }
1003
1004 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1005 {
1006 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1007 int rc;
1008
1009 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1010 if (rc) {
1011 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1012 if (rc == -EINVAL)
1013 rc = 0;
1014 return rc;
1015 }
1016
1017 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1018
1019 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1020
1021 return rc;
1022 }
1023
1024 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1025 {
1026 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1027 case S_IFSOCK:
1028 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1029 case S_IFLNK:
1030 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1031 case S_IFREG:
1032 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1033 case S_IFBLK:
1034 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1035 case S_IFDIR:
1036 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1037 case S_IFCHR:
1038 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1039 case S_IFIFO:
1040 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1041
1042 }
1043
1044 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1045 }
1046
1047 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1048 {
1049 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1050 }
1051
1052 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1053 {
1054 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1055 }
1056
1057 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1058 {
1059 switch (family) {
1060 case PF_UNIX:
1061 switch (type) {
1062 case SOCK_STREAM:
1063 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1064 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1065 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1066 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1067 }
1068 break;
1069 case PF_INET:
1070 case PF_INET6:
1071 switch (type) {
1072 case SOCK_STREAM:
1073 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1074 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1075 else
1076 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1077 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1078 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1079 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1080 else
1081 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1082 case SOCK_DCCP:
1083 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1084 default:
1085 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1086 }
1087 break;
1088 case PF_NETLINK:
1089 switch (protocol) {
1090 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1091 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1092 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1093 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1094 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1095 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1096 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1097 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1098 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1099 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1100 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1101 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1102 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1103 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1104 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1105 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1106 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1107 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1108 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1109 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1110 default:
1111 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1112 }
1113 case PF_PACKET:
1114 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1115 case PF_KEY:
1116 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1117 case PF_APPLETALK:
1118 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1119 }
1120
1121 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1122 }
1123
1124 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1125 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1126 u16 tclass,
1127 u32 *sid)
1128 {
1129 int rc;
1130 char *buffer, *path;
1131
1132 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1133 if (!buffer)
1134 return -ENOMEM;
1135
1136 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1137 if (IS_ERR(path))
1138 rc = PTR_ERR(path);
1139 else {
1140 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1141 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1142 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1143 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1144 path[1] = '/';
1145 path++;
1146 }
1147 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1148 }
1149 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1150 return rc;
1151 }
1152 #else
1153 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1154 u16 tclass,
1155 u32 *sid)
1156 {
1157 return -EINVAL;
1158 }
1159 #endif
1160
1161 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1162 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1163 {
1164 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1165 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1166 u32 sid;
1167 struct dentry *dentry;
1168 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1169 char *context = NULL;
1170 unsigned len = 0;
1171 int rc = 0;
1172
1173 if (isec->initialized)
1174 goto out;
1175
1176 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1177 if (isec->initialized)
1178 goto out_unlock;
1179
1180 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1181 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1182 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1183 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1184 server is ready to handle calls. */
1185 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1186 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1187 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1188 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1189 goto out_unlock;
1190 }
1191
1192 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1193 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1194 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1195 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1196 break;
1197 }
1198
1199 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1200 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1201 if (opt_dentry) {
1202 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1203 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1204 } else {
1205 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1206 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1207 }
1208 if (!dentry) {
1209 /*
1210 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1211 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1212 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1213 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1214 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1215 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1216 * be used again by userspace.
1217 */
1218 goto out_unlock;
1219 }
1220
1221 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1222 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1223 if (!context) {
1224 rc = -ENOMEM;
1225 dput(dentry);
1226 goto out_unlock;
1227 }
1228 context[len] = '\0';
1229 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1230 context, len);
1231 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1232 kfree(context);
1233
1234 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1235 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1236 NULL, 0);
1237 if (rc < 0) {
1238 dput(dentry);
1239 goto out_unlock;
1240 }
1241 len = rc;
1242 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1243 if (!context) {
1244 rc = -ENOMEM;
1245 dput(dentry);
1246 goto out_unlock;
1247 }
1248 context[len] = '\0';
1249 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1250 XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1251 context, len);
1252 }
1253 dput(dentry);
1254 if (rc < 0) {
1255 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1256 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1257 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1258 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1259 kfree(context);
1260 goto out_unlock;
1261 }
1262 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1263 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1264 rc = 0;
1265 } else {
1266 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1267 sbsec->def_sid,
1268 GFP_NOFS);
1269 if (rc) {
1270 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1271 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1272
1273 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1274 if (printk_ratelimit())
1275 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1276 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1277 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1278 } else {
1279 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1280 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1281 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1282 }
1283 kfree(context);
1284 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1285 rc = 0;
1286 break;
1287 }
1288 }
1289 kfree(context);
1290 isec->sid = sid;
1291 break;
1292 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1293 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1294 break;
1295 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1296 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1297 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1298
1299 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1300 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1301 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1302 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1303 if (rc)
1304 goto out_unlock;
1305 isec->sid = sid;
1306 break;
1307 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1308 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1309 break;
1310 default:
1311 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1312 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1313
1314 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1315 if (opt_dentry) {
1316 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1317 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
1318 isec->sclass,
1319 &sid);
1320 if (rc)
1321 goto out_unlock;
1322 isec->sid = sid;
1323 }
1324 }
1325 break;
1326 }
1327
1328 isec->initialized = 1;
1329
1330 out_unlock:
1331 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1332 out:
1333 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1334 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1335 return rc;
1336 }
1337
1338 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1339 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1340 {
1341 u32 perm = 0;
1342
1343 switch (sig) {
1344 case SIGCHLD:
1345 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1346 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1347 break;
1348 case SIGKILL:
1349 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1350 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1351 break;
1352 case SIGSTOP:
1353 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1354 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1355 break;
1356 default:
1357 /* All other signals. */
1358 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1359 break;
1360 }
1361
1362 return perm;
1363 }
1364
1365 /*
1366 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1367 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1368 */
1369 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1370 const struct cred *target,
1371 u32 perms)
1372 {
1373 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1374
1375 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1376 }
1377
1378 /*
1379 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1380 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1381 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1382 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1383 */
1384 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1385 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1386 u32 perms)
1387 {
1388 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1389 u32 sid1, sid2;
1390
1391 rcu_read_lock();
1392 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1393 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1394 rcu_read_unlock();
1395 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1396 }
1397
1398 /*
1399 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1400 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1401 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1402 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1403 */
1404 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1405 u32 perms)
1406 {
1407 u32 sid, tsid;
1408
1409 sid = current_sid();
1410 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1411 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1412 }
1413
1414 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1415 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1416 #endif
1417
1418 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1419 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1420 int cap, int audit)
1421 {
1422 struct common_audit_data ad;
1423 struct av_decision avd;
1424 u16 sclass;
1425 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1426 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1427 int rc;
1428
1429 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1430 ad.u.cap = cap;
1431
1432 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1433 case 0:
1434 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1435 break;
1436 case 1:
1437 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1438 break;
1439 default:
1440 printk(KERN_ERR
1441 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1442 BUG();
1443 return -EINVAL;
1444 }
1445
1446 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1447 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1448 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1449 if (rc2)
1450 return rc2;
1451 }
1452 return rc;
1453 }
1454
1455 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1456 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1457 u32 perms)
1458 {
1459 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1460
1461 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1462 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1463 }
1464
1465 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1466 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1467 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1468 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1469 struct inode *inode,
1470 u32 perms,
1471 struct common_audit_data *adp,
1472 unsigned flags)
1473 {
1474 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1475 u32 sid;
1476
1477 validate_creds(cred);
1478
1479 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1480 return 0;
1481
1482 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1483 isec = inode->i_security;
1484
1485 return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
1486 }
1487
1488 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1489 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1490 pathname if needed. */
1491 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1492 struct dentry *dentry,
1493 u32 av)
1494 {
1495 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1496 struct common_audit_data ad;
1497
1498 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1499 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1500 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1501 }
1502
1503 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1504 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1505 pathname if needed. */
1506 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1507 struct path *path,
1508 u32 av)
1509 {
1510 struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
1511 struct common_audit_data ad;
1512
1513 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1514 ad.u.path = *path;
1515 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1516 }
1517
1518 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1519 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1520 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1521 check a particular permission to the file.
1522 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1523 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1524 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1525 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1526 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1527 struct file *file,
1528 u32 av)
1529 {
1530 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1531 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1532 struct common_audit_data ad;
1533 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1534 int rc;
1535
1536 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1537 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1538
1539 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1540 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1541 SECCLASS_FD,
1542 FD__USE,
1543 &ad);
1544 if (rc)
1545 goto out;
1546 }
1547
1548 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1549 rc = 0;
1550 if (av)
1551 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1552
1553 out:
1554 return rc;
1555 }
1556
1557 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1558 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1559 struct dentry *dentry,
1560 u16 tclass)
1561 {
1562 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1563 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1564 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1565 u32 sid, newsid;
1566 struct common_audit_data ad;
1567 int rc;
1568
1569 dsec = dir->i_security;
1570 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1571
1572 sid = tsec->sid;
1573 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1574
1575 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1576 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1577
1578 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1579 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1580 &ad);
1581 if (rc)
1582 return rc;
1583
1584 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1585 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1586 &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
1587 if (rc)
1588 return rc;
1589 }
1590
1591 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1592 if (rc)
1593 return rc;
1594
1595 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1596 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1597 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1598 }
1599
1600 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1601 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1602 struct task_struct *ctx)
1603 {
1604 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1605
1606 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1607 }
1608
1609 #define MAY_LINK 0
1610 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1611 #define MAY_RMDIR 2
1612
1613 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1614 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1615 struct dentry *dentry,
1616 int kind)
1617
1618 {
1619 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1620 struct common_audit_data ad;
1621 u32 sid = current_sid();
1622 u32 av;
1623 int rc;
1624
1625 dsec = dir->i_security;
1626 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1627
1628 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1629 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1630
1631 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1632 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1633 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1634 if (rc)
1635 return rc;
1636
1637 switch (kind) {
1638 case MAY_LINK:
1639 av = FILE__LINK;
1640 break;
1641 case MAY_UNLINK:
1642 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1643 break;
1644 case MAY_RMDIR:
1645 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1646 break;
1647 default:
1648 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1649 __func__, kind);
1650 return 0;
1651 }
1652
1653 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1654 return rc;
1655 }
1656
1657 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1658 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1659 struct inode *new_dir,
1660 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1661 {
1662 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1663 struct common_audit_data ad;
1664 u32 sid = current_sid();
1665 u32 av;
1666 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1667 int rc;
1668
1669 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1670 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1671 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1672 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1673
1674 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1675
1676 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1677 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1678 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1679 if (rc)
1680 return rc;
1681 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1682 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1683 if (rc)
1684 return rc;
1685 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1686 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1687 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1688 if (rc)
1689 return rc;
1690 }
1691
1692 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1693 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1694 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1695 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1696 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1697 if (rc)
1698 return rc;
1699 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1700 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1701 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1702 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1703 new_isec->sclass,
1704 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1705 if (rc)
1706 return rc;
1707 }
1708
1709 return 0;
1710 }
1711
1712 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1713 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1714 struct super_block *sb,
1715 u32 perms,
1716 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1717 {
1718 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1719 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1720
1721 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1722 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1723 }
1724
1725 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1726 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1727 {
1728 u32 av = 0;
1729
1730 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1731 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1732 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1733 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1734 av |= FILE__READ;
1735
1736 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1737 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1738 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1739 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1740
1741 } else {
1742 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1743 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1744 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1745 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1746 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1747 av |= DIR__READ;
1748 }
1749
1750 return av;
1751 }
1752
1753 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1754 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1755 {
1756 u32 av = 0;
1757
1758 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1759 av |= FILE__READ;
1760 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1761 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1762 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1763 else
1764 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1765 }
1766 if (!av) {
1767 /*
1768 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1769 */
1770 av = FILE__IOCTL;
1771 }
1772
1773 return av;
1774 }
1775
1776 /*
1777 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1778 * open permission.
1779 */
1780 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1781 {
1782 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1783
1784 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1785 av |= FILE__OPEN;
1786
1787 return av;
1788 }
1789
1790 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1791
1792 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1793 unsigned int mode)
1794 {
1795 int rc;
1796
1797 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1798 if (rc)
1799 return rc;
1800
1801 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1802 u32 sid = current_sid();
1803 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1804 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1805 }
1806
1807 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1808 }
1809
1810 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1811 {
1812 int rc;
1813
1814 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1815 if (rc)
1816 return rc;
1817
1818 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1819 }
1820
1821 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1822 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1823 {
1824 int error;
1825
1826 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1827 if (error)
1828 return error;
1829
1830 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1831 }
1832
1833 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1834 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1835 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1836 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1837 {
1838 int error;
1839
1840 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1841 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1842 if (error)
1843 return error;
1844
1845 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1846 }
1847
1848 /*
1849 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1850 * which was removed).
1851 *
1852 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1853 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1854 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1855 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1856 */
1857
1858 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
1859 int cap, int audit)
1860 {
1861 int rc;
1862
1863 rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
1864 if (rc)
1865 return rc;
1866
1867 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
1868 }
1869
1870 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1871 {
1872 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1873 int rc = 0;
1874
1875 if (!sb)
1876 return 0;
1877
1878 switch (cmds) {
1879 case Q_SYNC:
1880 case Q_QUOTAON:
1881 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
1882 case Q_SETINFO:
1883 case Q_SETQUOTA:
1884 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1885 break;
1886 case Q_GETFMT:
1887 case Q_GETINFO:
1888 case Q_GETQUOTA:
1889 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1890 break;
1891 default:
1892 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1893 break;
1894 }
1895 return rc;
1896 }
1897
1898 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1899 {
1900 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1901
1902 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1903 }
1904
1905 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1906 {
1907 int rc;
1908
1909 switch (type) {
1910 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
1911 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1912 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1913 break;
1914 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
1915 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
1916 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1917 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
1918 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1919 break;
1920 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
1921 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
1922 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
1923 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1924 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
1925 default:
1926 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1927 break;
1928 }
1929 return rc;
1930 }
1931
1932 /*
1933 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1934 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1935 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1936 *
1937 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1938 * processes that allocate mappings.
1939 */
1940 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1941 {
1942 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1943
1944 rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
1945 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
1946 if (rc == 0)
1947 cap_sys_admin = 1;
1948
1949 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1950 }
1951
1952 /* binprm security operations */
1953
1954 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1955 {
1956 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
1957 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
1958 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1959 struct common_audit_data ad;
1960 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1961 int rc;
1962
1963 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
1964 if (rc)
1965 return rc;
1966
1967 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
1968 * the script interpreter */
1969 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
1970 return 0;
1971
1972 old_tsec = current_security();
1973 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
1974 isec = inode->i_security;
1975
1976 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1977 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
1978 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
1979
1980 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1981 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
1982 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1983 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1984
1985 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
1986 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
1987 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1988 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
1989
1990 /*
1991 * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs and a transition is
1992 * explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
1993 */
1994 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)
1995 return -EPERM;
1996 } else {
1997 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1998 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1999 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2000 &new_tsec->sid);
2001 if (rc)
2002 return rc;
2003 }
2004
2005 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2006 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2007
2008 if ((bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) ||
2009 (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS))
2010 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2011
2012 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2013 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2014 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2015 if (rc)
2016 return rc;
2017 } else {
2018 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2019 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2020 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2021 if (rc)
2022 return rc;
2023
2024 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2025 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2026 if (rc)
2027 return rc;
2028
2029 /* Check for shared state */
2030 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2031 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2032 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2033 NULL);
2034 if (rc)
2035 return -EPERM;
2036 }
2037
2038 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2039 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2040 if (bprm->unsafe &
2041 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2042 struct task_struct *tracer;
2043 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2044 u32 ptsid = 0;
2045
2046 rcu_read_lock();
2047 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2048 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2049 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2050 ptsid = sec->sid;
2051 }
2052 rcu_read_unlock();
2053
2054 if (ptsid != 0) {
2055 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2056 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2057 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2058 if (rc)
2059 return -EPERM;
2060 }
2061 }
2062
2063 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2064 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2065 }
2066
2067 return 0;
2068 }
2069
2070 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2071 {
2072 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2073 u32 sid, osid;
2074 int atsecure = 0;
2075
2076 sid = tsec->sid;
2077 osid = tsec->osid;
2078
2079 if (osid != sid) {
2080 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2081 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2082 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2083 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2084 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2085 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2086 }
2087
2088 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2089 }
2090
2091 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2092 {
2093 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2094 }
2095
2096 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2097 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2098 struct files_struct *files)
2099 {
2100 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2101 struct tty_struct *tty;
2102 int drop_tty = 0;
2103 unsigned n;
2104
2105 tty = get_current_tty();
2106 if (tty) {
2107 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2108 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2109 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2110
2111 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2112 Use path_has_perm on the tty path directly rather
2113 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2114 file may belong to another process and we are only
2115 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2116 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2117 struct tty_file_private, list);
2118 file = file_priv->file;
2119 if (path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2120 drop_tty = 1;
2121 }
2122 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2123 tty_kref_put(tty);
2124 }
2125 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2126 if (drop_tty)
2127 no_tty();
2128
2129 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2130 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2131 if (!n) /* none found? */
2132 return;
2133
2134 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2135 if (!IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2136 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2137 do {
2138 replace_fd(n - 1, get_file(devnull), 0);
2139 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2140 fput(devnull);
2141 } else {
2142 /* just close all the matching ones */
2143 do {
2144 replace_fd(n - 1, NULL, 0);
2145 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2146 }
2147 }
2148
2149 /*
2150 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2151 */
2152 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2153 {
2154 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2155 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2156 int rc, i;
2157
2158 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2159 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2160 return;
2161
2162 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2163 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2164
2165 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2166 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2167
2168 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2169 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2170 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2171 *
2172 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2173 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2174 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2175 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2176 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2177 */
2178 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2179 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2180 if (rc) {
2181 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2182 task_lock(current);
2183 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2184 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2185 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2186 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2187 }
2188 task_unlock(current);
2189 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2190 }
2191 }
2192
2193 /*
2194 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2195 * due to exec
2196 */
2197 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2198 {
2199 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2200 struct itimerval itimer;
2201 u32 osid, sid;
2202 int rc, i;
2203
2204 osid = tsec->osid;
2205 sid = tsec->sid;
2206
2207 if (sid == osid)
2208 return;
2209
2210 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2211 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2212 * flush and unblock signals.
2213 *
2214 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2215 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2216 */
2217 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2218 if (rc) {
2219 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2220 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2221 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2222 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2223 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2224 __flush_signals(current);
2225 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2226 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
2227 }
2228 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2229 }
2230
2231 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2232 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2233 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2234 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2235 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2236 }
2237
2238 /* superblock security operations */
2239
2240 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2241 {
2242 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2243 }
2244
2245 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2246 {
2247 superblock_free_security(sb);
2248 }
2249
2250 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2251 {
2252 if (plen > olen)
2253 return 0;
2254
2255 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2256 }
2257
2258 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2259 {
2260 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2261 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2262 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2263 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2264 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2265 }
2266
2267 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2268 {
2269 if (!*first) {
2270 **to = ',';
2271 *to += 1;
2272 } else
2273 *first = 0;
2274 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2275 *to += len;
2276 }
2277
2278 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2279 int len)
2280 {
2281 int current_size = 0;
2282
2283 if (!*first) {
2284 **to = '|';
2285 *to += 1;
2286 } else
2287 *first = 0;
2288
2289 while (current_size < len) {
2290 if (*from != '"') {
2291 **to = *from;
2292 *to += 1;
2293 }
2294 from += 1;
2295 current_size += 1;
2296 }
2297 }
2298
2299 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2300 {
2301 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2302 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2303 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2304 int open_quote = 0;
2305
2306 in_curr = orig;
2307 sec_curr = copy;
2308
2309 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2310 if (!nosec) {
2311 rc = -ENOMEM;
2312 goto out;
2313 }
2314
2315 nosec_save = nosec;
2316 fnosec = fsec = 1;
2317 in_save = in_end = orig;
2318
2319 do {
2320 if (*in_end == '"')
2321 open_quote = !open_quote;
2322 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2323 *in_end == '\0') {
2324 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2325
2326 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2327 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2328 else
2329 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2330
2331 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2332 }
2333 } while (*in_end++);
2334
2335 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2336 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2337 out:
2338 return rc;
2339 }
2340
2341 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2342 {
2343 int rc, i, *flags;
2344 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2345 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2346 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2347
2348 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2349 return 0;
2350
2351 if (!data)
2352 return 0;
2353
2354 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2355 return 0;
2356
2357 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2358 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2359 if (!secdata)
2360 return -ENOMEM;
2361 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2362 if (rc)
2363 goto out_free_secdata;
2364
2365 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2366 if (rc)
2367 goto out_free_secdata;
2368
2369 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2370 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2371
2372 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2373 u32 sid;
2374 size_t len;
2375
2376 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
2377 continue;
2378 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2379 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
2380 if (rc) {
2381 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2382 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2383 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2384 goto out_free_opts;
2385 }
2386 rc = -EINVAL;
2387 switch (flags[i]) {
2388 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
2389 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2390 goto out_bad_option;
2391 break;
2392 case CONTEXT_MNT:
2393 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2394 goto out_bad_option;
2395 break;
2396 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2397 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2398 root_isec = sb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
2399
2400 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2401 goto out_bad_option;
2402 break;
2403 }
2404 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2405 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2406 goto out_bad_option;
2407 break;
2408 default:
2409 goto out_free_opts;
2410 }
2411 }
2412
2413 rc = 0;
2414 out_free_opts:
2415 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2416 out_free_secdata:
2417 free_secdata(secdata);
2418 return rc;
2419 out_bad_option:
2420 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2421 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2422 sb->s_type->name);
2423 goto out_free_opts;
2424 }
2425
2426 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2427 {
2428 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2429 struct common_audit_data ad;
2430 int rc;
2431
2432 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2433 if (rc)
2434 return rc;
2435
2436 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2437 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2438 return 0;
2439
2440 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2441 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2442 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2443 }
2444
2445 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2446 {
2447 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2448 struct common_audit_data ad;
2449
2450 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2451 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2452 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2453 }
2454
2455 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2456 struct path *path,
2457 const char *type,
2458 unsigned long flags,
2459 void *data)
2460 {
2461 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2462
2463 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2464 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2465 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2466 else
2467 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2468 }
2469
2470 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2471 {
2472 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2473
2474 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2475 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2476 }
2477
2478 /* inode security operations */
2479
2480 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2481 {
2482 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2483 }
2484
2485 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2486 {
2487 inode_free_security(inode);
2488 }
2489
2490 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2491 const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
2492 void **value, size_t *len)
2493 {
2494 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2495 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2496 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2497 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2498 int rc;
2499 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2500
2501 dsec = dir->i_security;
2502 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2503
2504 sid = tsec->sid;
2505 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2506
2507 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2508 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2509 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2510 else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2511 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2512 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2513 qstr, &newsid);
2514 if (rc) {
2515 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2516 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2517 "ino=%ld)\n",
2518 __func__,
2519 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2520 return rc;
2521 }
2522 }
2523
2524 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2525 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2526 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2527 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2528 isec->sid = newsid;
2529 isec->initialized = 1;
2530 }
2531
2532 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2533 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2534
2535 if (name) {
2536 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2537 if (!namep)
2538 return -ENOMEM;
2539 *name = namep;
2540 }
2541
2542 if (value && len) {
2543 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2544 if (rc) {
2545 kfree(namep);
2546 return rc;
2547 }
2548 *value = context;
2549 *len = clen;
2550 }
2551
2552 return 0;
2553 }
2554
2555 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2556 {
2557 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2558 }
2559
2560 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2561 {
2562 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2563 }
2564
2565 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2566 {
2567 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2568 }
2569
2570 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2571 {
2572 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2573 }
2574
2575 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2576 {
2577 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2578 }
2579
2580 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2581 {
2582 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2583 }
2584
2585 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2586 {
2587 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2588 }
2589
2590 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2591 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2592 {
2593 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2594 }
2595
2596 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2597 {
2598 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2599
2600 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2601 }
2602
2603 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2604 {
2605 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2606
2607 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2608 }
2609
2610 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
2611 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
2612 unsigned flags)
2613 {
2614 struct common_audit_data ad;
2615 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2616 int rc;
2617
2618 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
2619 ad.u.inode = inode;
2620
2621 rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
2622 audited, denied, &ad, flags);
2623 if (rc)
2624 return rc;
2625 return 0;
2626 }
2627
2628 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2629 {
2630 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2631 u32 perms;
2632 bool from_access;
2633 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2634 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2635 u32 sid;
2636 struct av_decision avd;
2637 int rc, rc2;
2638 u32 audited, denied;
2639
2640 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2641 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2642
2643 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2644 if (!mask)
2645 return 0;
2646
2647 validate_creds(cred);
2648
2649 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
2650 return 0;
2651
2652 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2653
2654 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2655 isec = inode->i_security;
2656
2657 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
2658 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
2659 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
2660 &denied);
2661 if (likely(!audited))
2662 return rc;
2663
2664 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, flags);
2665 if (rc2)
2666 return rc2;
2667 return rc;
2668 }
2669
2670 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2671 {
2672 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2673 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2674 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
2675
2676 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2677 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2678 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2679 ATTR_FORCE);
2680 if (!ia_valid)
2681 return 0;
2682 }
2683
2684 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2685 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2686 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2687
2688 if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE))
2689 av |= FILE__OPEN;
2690
2691 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
2692 }
2693
2694 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2695 {
2696 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2697 struct path path;
2698
2699 path.dentry = dentry;
2700 path.mnt = mnt;
2701
2702 return path_has_perm(cred, &path, FILE__GETATTR);
2703 }
2704
2705 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2706 {
2707 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2708
2709 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2710 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2711 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2712 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2713 return -EPERM;
2714 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2715 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2716 Restrict to administrator. */
2717 return -EPERM;
2718 }
2719 }
2720
2721 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2722 ordinary setattr permission. */
2723 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2724 }
2725
2726 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2727 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2728 {
2729 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2730 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2731 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2732 struct common_audit_data ad;
2733 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2734 int rc = 0;
2735
2736 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2737 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2738
2739 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2740 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2741 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2742
2743 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
2744 return -EPERM;
2745
2746 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2747 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2748
2749 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2750 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2751 if (rc)
2752 return rc;
2753
2754 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2755 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2756 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
2757 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2758 size_t audit_size;
2759 const char *str;
2760
2761 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
2762 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
2763 if (value) {
2764 str = value;
2765 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
2766 audit_size = size - 1;
2767 else
2768 audit_size = size;
2769 } else {
2770 str = "";
2771 audit_size = 0;
2772 }
2773 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
2774 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
2775 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
2776 audit_log_end(ab);
2777
2778 return rc;
2779 }
2780 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2781 }
2782 if (rc)
2783 return rc;
2784
2785 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2786 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2787 if (rc)
2788 return rc;
2789
2790 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2791 isec->sclass);
2792 if (rc)
2793 return rc;
2794
2795 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2796 sbsec->sid,
2797 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2798 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2799 &ad);
2800 }
2801
2802 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2803 const void *value, size_t size,
2804 int flags)
2805 {
2806 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2807 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2808 u32 newsid;
2809 int rc;
2810
2811 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2812 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2813 return;
2814 }
2815
2816 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2817 if (rc) {
2818 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2819 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2820 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2821 return;
2822 }
2823
2824 isec->sid = newsid;
2825 return;
2826 }
2827
2828 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2829 {
2830 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2831
2832 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2833 }
2834
2835 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2836 {
2837 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2838
2839 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2840 }
2841
2842 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2843 {
2844 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2845 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2846
2847 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2848 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2849 return -EACCES;
2850 }
2851
2852 /*
2853 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2854 *
2855 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2856 */
2857 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2858 {
2859 u32 size;
2860 int error;
2861 char *context = NULL;
2862 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2863
2864 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2865 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2866
2867 /*
2868 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2869 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2870 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2871 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2872 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2873 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2874 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2875 */
2876 error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2877 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2878 if (!error)
2879 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2880 &size);
2881 else
2882 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2883 if (error)
2884 return error;
2885 error = size;
2886 if (alloc) {
2887 *buffer = context;
2888 goto out_nofree;
2889 }
2890 kfree(context);
2891 out_nofree:
2892 return error;
2893 }
2894
2895 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2896 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2897 {
2898 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2899 u32 newsid;
2900 int rc;
2901
2902 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2903 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2904
2905 if (!value || !size)
2906 return -EACCES;
2907
2908 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2909 if (rc)
2910 return rc;
2911
2912 isec->sid = newsid;
2913 isec->initialized = 1;
2914 return 0;
2915 }
2916
2917 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2918 {
2919 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2920 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2921 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2922 return len;
2923 }
2924
2925 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2926 {
2927 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2928 *secid = isec->sid;
2929 }
2930
2931 /* file security operations */
2932
2933 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2934 {
2935 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2936 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2937
2938 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2939 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2940 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2941
2942 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2943 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2944 }
2945
2946 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2947 {
2948 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2949 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2950 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2951 u32 sid = current_sid();
2952
2953 if (!mask)
2954 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2955 return 0;
2956
2957 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
2958 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2959 /* No change since file_open check. */
2960 return 0;
2961
2962 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2963 }
2964
2965 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2966 {
2967 return file_alloc_security(file);
2968 }
2969
2970 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2971 {
2972 file_free_security(file);
2973 }
2974
2975 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2976 unsigned long arg)
2977 {
2978 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2979 int error = 0;
2980
2981 switch (cmd) {
2982 case FIONREAD:
2983 /* fall through */
2984 case FIBMAP:
2985 /* fall through */
2986 case FIGETBSZ:
2987 /* fall through */
2988 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2989 /* fall through */
2990 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
2991 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2992 break;
2993
2994 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2995 /* fall through */
2996 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
2997 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2998 break;
2999
3000 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3001 case FIONBIO:
3002 /* fall through */
3003 case FIOASYNC:
3004 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3005 break;
3006
3007 case KDSKBENT:
3008 case KDSKBSENT:
3009 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3010 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
3011 break;
3012
3013 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3014 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3015 */
3016 default:
3017 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
3018 }
3019 return error;
3020 }
3021
3022 static int default_noexec;
3023
3024 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3025 {
3026 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3027 int rc = 0;
3028
3029 if (default_noexec &&
3030 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3031 /*
3032 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3033 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3034 * This has an additional check.
3035 */
3036 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3037 if (rc)
3038 goto error;
3039 }
3040
3041 if (file) {
3042 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3043 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3044
3045 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3046 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3047 av |= FILE__WRITE;
3048
3049 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3050 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3051
3052 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3053 }
3054
3055 error:
3056 return rc;
3057 }
3058
3059 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3060 {
3061 int rc = 0;
3062 u32 sid = current_sid();
3063
3064 /*
3065 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
3066 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
3067 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
3068 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3069 */
3070 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3071 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3072 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3073 if (rc)
3074 return rc;
3075 }
3076
3077 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3078 return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
3079 }
3080
3081 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3082 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3083 {
3084 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3085 prot = reqprot;
3086
3087 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3088 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3089 }
3090
3091 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3092 unsigned long reqprot,
3093 unsigned long prot)
3094 {
3095 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3096
3097 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3098 prot = reqprot;
3099
3100 if (default_noexec &&
3101 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3102 int rc = 0;
3103 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3104 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3105 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3106 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3107 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3108 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3109 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3110 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3111 /*
3112 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3113 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3114 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3115 * modified content. This typically should only
3116 * occur for text relocations.
3117 */
3118 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3119 }
3120 if (rc)
3121 return rc;
3122 }
3123
3124 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3125 }
3126
3127 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3128 {
3129 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3130
3131 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3132 }
3133
3134 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3135 unsigned long arg)
3136 {
3137 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3138 int err = 0;
3139
3140 switch (cmd) {
3141 case F_SETFL:
3142 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3143 err = -EINVAL;
3144 break;
3145 }
3146
3147 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3148 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3149 break;
3150 }
3151 /* fall through */
3152 case F_SETOWN:
3153 case F_SETSIG:
3154 case F_GETFL:
3155 case F_GETOWN:
3156 case F_GETSIG:
3157 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3158 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3159 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3160 break;
3161 case F_GETLK:
3162 case F_SETLK:
3163 case F_SETLKW:
3164 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3165 case F_GETLK64:
3166 case F_SETLK64:
3167 case F_SETLKW64:
3168 #endif
3169 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3170 err = -EINVAL;
3171 break;
3172 }
3173 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3174 break;
3175 }
3176
3177 return err;
3178 }
3179
3180 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3181 {
3182 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3183
3184 fsec = file->f_security;
3185 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3186
3187 return 0;
3188 }
3189
3190 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3191 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3192 {
3193 struct file *file;
3194 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3195 u32 perm;
3196 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3197
3198 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3199 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3200
3201 fsec = file->f_security;
3202
3203 if (!signum)
3204 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3205 else
3206 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3207
3208 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3209 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3210 }
3211
3212 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3213 {
3214 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3215
3216 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3217 }
3218
3219 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3220 {
3221 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3222 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3223
3224 fsec = file->f_security;
3225 isec = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_security;
3226 /*
3227 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3228 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3229 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3230 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3231 * struct as its SID.
3232 */
3233 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3234 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3235 /*
3236 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3237 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3238 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3239 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3240 * new inode label or new policy.
3241 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3242 */
3243 return path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, open_file_to_av(file));
3244 }
3245
3246 /* task security operations */
3247
3248 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3249 {
3250 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3251 }
3252
3253 /*
3254 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3255 */
3256 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3257 {
3258 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3259
3260 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3261 if (!tsec)
3262 return -ENOMEM;
3263
3264 cred->security = tsec;
3265 return 0;
3266 }
3267
3268 /*
3269 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3270 */
3271 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3272 {
3273 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3274
3275 /*
3276 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3277 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3278 */
3279 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3280 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3281 kfree(tsec);
3282 }
3283
3284 /*
3285 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3286 */
3287 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3288 gfp_t gfp)
3289 {
3290 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3291 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3292
3293 old_tsec = old->security;
3294
3295 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3296 if (!tsec)
3297 return -ENOMEM;
3298
3299 new->security = tsec;
3300 return 0;
3301 }
3302
3303 /*
3304 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3305 */
3306 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3307 {
3308 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3309 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3310
3311 *tsec = *old_tsec;
3312 }
3313
3314 /*
3315 * set the security data for a kernel service
3316 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3317 */
3318 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3319 {
3320 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3321 u32 sid = current_sid();
3322 int ret;
3323
3324 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3325 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3326 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3327 NULL);
3328 if (ret == 0) {
3329 tsec->sid = secid;
3330 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3331 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3332 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3333 }
3334 return ret;
3335 }
3336
3337 /*
3338 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3339 * objective context of the specified inode
3340 */
3341 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3342 {
3343 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3344 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3345 u32 sid = current_sid();
3346 int ret;
3347
3348 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3349 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3350 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3351 NULL);
3352
3353 if (ret == 0)
3354 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3355 return ret;
3356 }
3357
3358 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3359 {
3360 u32 sid;
3361 struct common_audit_data ad;
3362
3363 sid = task_sid(current);
3364
3365 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3366 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3367
3368 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3369 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3370 }
3371
3372 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3373 {
3374 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3375 }
3376
3377 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3378 {
3379 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3380 }
3381
3382 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3383 {
3384 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3385 }
3386
3387 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3388 {
3389 *secid = task_sid(p);
3390 }
3391
3392 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3393 {
3394 int rc;
3395
3396 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3397 if (rc)
3398 return rc;
3399
3400 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3401 }
3402
3403 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3404 {
3405 int rc;
3406
3407 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3408 if (rc)
3409 return rc;
3410
3411 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3412 }
3413
3414 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3415 {
3416 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3417 }
3418
3419 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3420 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3421 {
3422 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3423
3424 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3425 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3426 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3427 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3428 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3429 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3430
3431 return 0;
3432 }
3433
3434 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3435 {
3436 int rc;
3437
3438 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3439 if (rc)
3440 return rc;
3441
3442 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3443 }
3444
3445 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3446 {
3447 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3448 }
3449
3450 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3451 {
3452 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3453 }
3454
3455 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3456 int sig, u32 secid)
3457 {
3458 u32 perm;
3459 int rc;
3460
3461 if (!sig)
3462 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3463 else
3464 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3465 if (secid)
3466 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3467 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3468 else
3469 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3470 return rc;
3471 }
3472
3473 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3474 {
3475 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3476 }
3477
3478 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3479 struct inode *inode)
3480 {
3481 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3482 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3483
3484 isec->sid = sid;
3485 isec->initialized = 1;
3486 }
3487
3488 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3489 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3490 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3491 {
3492 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3493 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3494
3495 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3496 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3497 if (ih == NULL)
3498 goto out;
3499
3500 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3501 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3502 goto out;
3503
3504 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3505 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3506 ret = 0;
3507
3508 if (proto)
3509 *proto = ih->protocol;
3510
3511 switch (ih->protocol) {
3512 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3513 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3514
3515 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3516 break;
3517
3518 offset += ihlen;
3519 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3520 if (th == NULL)
3521 break;
3522
3523 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3524 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3525 break;
3526 }
3527
3528 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3529 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3530
3531 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3532 break;
3533
3534 offset += ihlen;
3535 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3536 if (uh == NULL)
3537 break;
3538
3539 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3540 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3541 break;
3542 }
3543
3544 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3545 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3546
3547 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3548 break;
3549
3550 offset += ihlen;
3551 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3552 if (dh == NULL)
3553 break;
3554
3555 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3556 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3557 break;
3558 }
3559
3560 default:
3561 break;
3562 }
3563 out:
3564 return ret;
3565 }
3566
3567 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3568
3569 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3570 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3571 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3572 {
3573 u8 nexthdr;
3574 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3575 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3576 __be16 frag_off;
3577
3578 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3579 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3580 if (ip6 == NULL)
3581 goto out;
3582
3583 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
3584 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
3585 ret = 0;
3586
3587 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3588 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3589 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3590 if (offset < 0)
3591 goto out;
3592
3593 if (proto)
3594 *proto = nexthdr;
3595
3596 switch (nexthdr) {
3597 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3598 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3599
3600 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3601 if (th == NULL)
3602 break;
3603
3604 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3605 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3606 break;
3607 }
3608
3609 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3610 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3611
3612 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3613 if (uh == NULL)
3614 break;
3615
3616 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3617 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3618 break;
3619 }
3620
3621 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3622 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3623
3624 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3625 if (dh == NULL)
3626 break;
3627
3628 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3629 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3630 break;
3631 }
3632
3633 /* includes fragments */
3634 default:
3635 break;
3636 }
3637 out:
3638 return ret;
3639 }
3640
3641 #endif /* IPV6 */
3642
3643 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3644 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3645 {
3646 char *addrp;
3647 int ret;
3648
3649 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
3650 case PF_INET:
3651 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3652 if (ret)
3653 goto parse_error;
3654 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
3655 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
3656 goto okay;
3657
3658 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3659 case PF_INET6:
3660 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3661 if (ret)
3662 goto parse_error;
3663 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
3664 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
3665 goto okay;
3666 #endif /* IPV6 */
3667 default:
3668 addrp = NULL;
3669 goto okay;
3670 }
3671
3672 parse_error:
3673 printk(KERN_WARNING
3674 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3675 " unable to parse packet\n");
3676 return ret;
3677
3678 okay:
3679 if (_addrp)
3680 *_addrp = addrp;
3681 return 0;
3682 }
3683
3684 /**
3685 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3686 * @skb: the packet
3687 * @family: protocol family
3688 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3689 *
3690 * Description:
3691 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3692 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3693 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3694 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3695 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3696 * peer labels.
3697 *
3698 */
3699 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3700 {
3701 int err;
3702 u32 xfrm_sid;
3703 u32 nlbl_sid;
3704 u32 nlbl_type;
3705
3706 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3707 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3708
3709 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3710 if (unlikely(err)) {
3711 printk(KERN_WARNING
3712 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3713 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3714 return -EACCES;
3715 }
3716
3717 return 0;
3718 }
3719
3720 /* socket security operations */
3721
3722 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
3723 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
3724 {
3725 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
3726 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3727 return 0;
3728 }
3729
3730 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
3731 socksid);
3732 }
3733
3734 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
3735 {
3736 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3737 struct common_audit_data ad;
3738 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3739 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
3740
3741 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3742 return 0;
3743
3744 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3745 ad.u.net = &net;
3746 ad.u.net->sk = sk;
3747
3748 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3749 }
3750
3751 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3752 int protocol, int kern)
3753 {
3754 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3755 u32 newsid;
3756 u16 secclass;
3757 int rc;
3758
3759 if (kern)
3760 return 0;
3761
3762 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3763 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
3764 if (rc)
3765 return rc;
3766
3767 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3768 }
3769
3770 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3771 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3772 {
3773 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3774 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3775 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3776 int err = 0;
3777
3778 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3779
3780 if (kern)
3781 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3782 else {
3783 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
3784 if (err)
3785 return err;
3786 }
3787
3788 isec->initialized = 1;
3789
3790 if (sock->sk) {
3791 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3792 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3793 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3794 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3795 }
3796
3797 return err;
3798 }
3799
3800 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3801 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3802 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3803
3804 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3805 {
3806 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3807 u16 family;
3808 int err;
3809
3810 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
3811 if (err)
3812 goto out;
3813
3814 /*
3815 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3816 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3817 * check the first address now.
3818 */
3819 family = sk->sk_family;
3820 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3821 char *addrp;
3822 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3823 struct common_audit_data ad;
3824 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3825 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3826 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3827 unsigned short snum;
3828 u32 sid, node_perm;
3829
3830 if (family == PF_INET) {
3831 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3832 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3833 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3834 } else {
3835 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3836 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3837 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3838 }
3839
3840 if (snum) {
3841 int low, high;
3842
3843 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3844
3845 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3846 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3847 snum, &sid);
3848 if (err)
3849 goto out;
3850 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3851 ad.u.net = &net;
3852 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
3853 ad.u.net->family = family;
3854 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3855 sksec->sclass,
3856 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3857 if (err)
3858 goto out;
3859 }
3860 }
3861
3862 switch (sksec->sclass) {
3863 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3864 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3865 break;
3866
3867 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3868 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3869 break;
3870
3871 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3872 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3873 break;
3874
3875 default:
3876 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3877 break;
3878 }
3879
3880 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3881 if (err)
3882 goto out;
3883
3884 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3885 ad.u.net = &net;
3886 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
3887 ad.u.net->family = family;
3888
3889 if (family == PF_INET)
3890 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3891 else
3892 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
3893
3894 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3895 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3896 if (err)
3897 goto out;
3898 }
3899 out:
3900 return err;
3901 }
3902
3903 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3904 {
3905 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3906 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3907 int err;
3908
3909 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3910 if (err)
3911 return err;
3912
3913 /*
3914 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3915 */
3916 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3917 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3918 struct common_audit_data ad;
3919 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3920 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3921 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3922 unsigned short snum;
3923 u32 sid, perm;
3924
3925 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3926 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3927 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3928 return -EINVAL;
3929 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3930 } else {
3931 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3932 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3933 return -EINVAL;
3934 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3935 }
3936
3937 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3938 if (err)
3939 goto out;
3940
3941 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3942 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3943
3944 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3945 ad.u.net = &net;
3946 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
3947 ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
3948 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3949 if (err)
3950 goto out;
3951 }
3952
3953 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3954
3955 out:
3956 return err;
3957 }
3958
3959 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3960 {
3961 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3962 }
3963
3964 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3965 {
3966 int err;
3967 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3968 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3969
3970 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3971 if (err)
3972 return err;
3973
3974 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3975
3976 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3977 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3978 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3979 newisec->initialized = 1;
3980
3981 return 0;
3982 }
3983
3984 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3985 int size)
3986 {
3987 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
3988 }
3989
3990 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3991 int size, int flags)
3992 {
3993 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
3994 }
3995
3996 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3997 {
3998 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3999 }
4000
4001 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4002 {
4003 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4004 }
4005
4006 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4007 {
4008 int err;
4009
4010 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4011 if (err)
4012 return err;
4013
4014 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4015 }
4016
4017 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4018 int optname)
4019 {
4020 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4021 }
4022
4023 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4024 {
4025 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4026 }
4027
4028 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4029 struct sock *other,
4030 struct sock *newsk)
4031 {
4032 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4033 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4034 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4035 struct common_audit_data ad;
4036 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4037 int err;
4038
4039 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4040 ad.u.net = &net;
4041 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4042
4043 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4044 sksec_other->sclass,
4045 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4046 if (err)
4047 return err;
4048
4049 /* server child socket */
4050 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4051 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4052 &sksec_new->sid);
4053 if (err)
4054 return err;
4055
4056 /* connecting socket */
4057 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4058
4059 return 0;
4060 }
4061
4062 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4063 struct socket *other)
4064 {
4065 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4066 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4067 struct common_audit_data ad;
4068 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4069
4070 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4071 ad.u.net = &net;
4072 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4073
4074 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4075 &ad);
4076 }
4077
4078 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4079 u32 peer_sid,
4080 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4081 {
4082 int err;
4083 u32 if_sid;
4084 u32 node_sid;
4085
4086 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4087 if (err)
4088 return err;
4089 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4090 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4091 if (err)
4092 return err;
4093
4094 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4095 if (err)
4096 return err;
4097 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4098 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4099 }
4100
4101 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4102 u16 family)
4103 {
4104 int err = 0;
4105 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4106 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4107 struct common_audit_data ad;
4108 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4109 char *addrp;
4110
4111 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4112 ad.u.net = &net;
4113 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4114 ad.u.net->family = family;
4115 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4116 if (err)
4117 return err;
4118
4119 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4120 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4121 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4122 if (err)
4123 return err;
4124 }
4125
4126 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4127 if (err)
4128 return err;
4129 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4130
4131 return err;
4132 }
4133
4134 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4135 {
4136 int err;
4137 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4138 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4139 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4140 struct common_audit_data ad;
4141 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4142 char *addrp;
4143 u8 secmark_active;
4144 u8 peerlbl_active;
4145
4146 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4147 return 0;
4148
4149 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4150 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4151 family = PF_INET;
4152
4153 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4154 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4155 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4156 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4157 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4158 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4159
4160 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4161 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4162 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4163 return 0;
4164
4165 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4166 ad.u.net = &net;
4167 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4168 ad.u.net->family = family;
4169 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4170 if (err)
4171 return err;
4172
4173 if (peerlbl_active) {
4174 u32 peer_sid;
4175
4176 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4177 if (err)
4178 return err;
4179 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->skb_iif, addrp, family,
4180 peer_sid, &ad);
4181 if (err) {
4182 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4183 return err;
4184 }
4185 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4186 PEER__RECV, &ad);
4187 if (err)
4188 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4189 }
4190
4191 if (secmark_active) {
4192 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4193 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4194 if (err)
4195 return err;
4196 }
4197
4198 return err;
4199 }
4200
4201 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4202 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4203 {
4204 int err = 0;
4205 char *scontext;
4206 u32 scontext_len;
4207 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4208 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4209
4210 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4211 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4212 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4213 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4214 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4215
4216 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4217 if (err)
4218 return err;
4219
4220 if (scontext_len > len) {
4221 err = -ERANGE;
4222 goto out_len;
4223 }
4224
4225 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4226 err = -EFAULT;
4227
4228 out_len:
4229 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4230 err = -EFAULT;
4231 kfree(scontext);
4232 return err;
4233 }
4234
4235 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4236 {
4237 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4238 u16 family;
4239
4240 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4241 family = PF_INET;
4242 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4243 family = PF_INET6;
4244 else if (sock)
4245 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4246 else
4247 goto out;
4248
4249 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4250 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4251 else if (skb)
4252 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4253
4254 out:
4255 *secid = peer_secid;
4256 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4257 return -EINVAL;
4258 return 0;
4259 }
4260
4261 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4262 {
4263 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4264
4265 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4266 if (!sksec)
4267 return -ENOMEM;
4268
4269 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4270 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4271 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4272 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4273
4274 return 0;
4275 }
4276
4277 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4278 {
4279 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4280
4281 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4282 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4283 kfree(sksec);
4284 }
4285
4286 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4287 {
4288 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4289 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4290
4291 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4292 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4293 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4294
4295 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4296 }
4297
4298 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4299 {
4300 if (!sk)
4301 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4302 else {
4303 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4304
4305 *secid = sksec->sid;
4306 }
4307 }
4308
4309 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4310 {
4311 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4312 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4313
4314 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4315 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4316 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4317 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4318 }
4319
4320 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4321 struct request_sock *req)
4322 {
4323 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4324 int err;
4325 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4326 u32 newsid;
4327 u32 peersid;
4328
4329 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4330 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4331 family = PF_INET;
4332
4333 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4334 if (err)
4335 return err;
4336 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4337 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4338 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4339 } else {
4340 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4341 if (err)
4342 return err;
4343 req->secid = newsid;
4344 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4345 }
4346
4347 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4348 }
4349
4350 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4351 const struct request_sock *req)
4352 {
4353 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4354
4355 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4356 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4357 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4358 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4359 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4360 time it will have been created and available. */
4361
4362 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4363 * thread with access to newsksec */
4364 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4365 }
4366
4367 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4368 {
4369 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4370 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4371
4372 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4373 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4374 family = PF_INET;
4375
4376 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4377 }
4378
4379 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4380 {
4381 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4382 u32 tsid;
4383
4384 __tsec = current_security();
4385 tsid = __tsec->sid;
4386
4387 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4388 }
4389
4390 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4391 {
4392 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4393 }
4394
4395 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4396 {
4397 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4398 }
4399
4400 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4401 struct flowi *fl)
4402 {
4403 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4404 }
4405
4406 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4407 {
4408 u32 sid = current_sid();
4409
4410 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4411 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4412 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4413 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4414 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4415 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4416
4417 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4418 NULL);
4419 }
4420
4421 static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
4422 {
4423 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4424
4425 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4426 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4427 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4428 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4429 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4430 * protocols were being used */
4431
4432 /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
4433 * the sockcreate SID here */
4434
4435 sksec->sid = current_sid();
4436 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4437 }
4438
4439 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
4440 {
4441 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4442 u32 sid = current_sid();
4443 int err;
4444
4445 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4446 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4447 if (err)
4448 return err;
4449 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4450 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4451 if (err)
4452 return err;
4453
4454 sksec->sid = sid;
4455
4456 return 0;
4457 }
4458
4459 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4460 {
4461 int err = 0;
4462 u32 perm;
4463 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4464 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4465
4466 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4467 err = -EINVAL;
4468 goto out;
4469 }
4470 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4471
4472 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4473 if (err) {
4474 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4475 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4476 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4477 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4478 nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4479 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4480 err = 0;
4481 }
4482
4483 /* Ignore */
4484 if (err == -ENOENT)
4485 err = 0;
4486 goto out;
4487 }
4488
4489 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4490 out:
4491 return err;
4492 }
4493
4494 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4495
4496 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4497 u16 family)
4498 {
4499 int err;
4500 char *addrp;
4501 u32 peer_sid;
4502 struct common_audit_data ad;
4503 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4504 u8 secmark_active;
4505 u8 netlbl_active;
4506 u8 peerlbl_active;
4507
4508 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4509 return NF_ACCEPT;
4510
4511 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4512 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4513 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4514 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4515 return NF_ACCEPT;
4516
4517 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4518 return NF_DROP;
4519
4520 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4521 ad.u.net = &net;
4522 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4523 ad.u.net->family = family;
4524 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4525 return NF_DROP;
4526
4527 if (peerlbl_active) {
4528 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4529 peer_sid, &ad);
4530 if (err) {
4531 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4532 return NF_DROP;
4533 }
4534 }
4535
4536 if (secmark_active)
4537 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4538 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4539 return NF_DROP;
4540
4541 if (netlbl_active)
4542 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4543 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4544 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4545 * protection */
4546 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4547 return NF_DROP;
4548
4549 return NF_ACCEPT;
4550 }
4551
4552 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4553 struct sk_buff *skb,
4554 const struct net_device *in,
4555 const struct net_device *out,
4556 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4557 {
4558 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4559 }
4560
4561 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4562 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4563 struct sk_buff *skb,
4564 const struct net_device *in,
4565 const struct net_device *out,
4566 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4567 {
4568 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4569 }
4570 #endif /* IPV6 */
4571
4572 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4573 u16 family)
4574 {
4575 u32 sid;
4576
4577 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4578 return NF_ACCEPT;
4579
4580 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4581 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4582 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4583 if (skb->sk) {
4584 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4585 sid = sksec->sid;
4586 } else
4587 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4588 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4589 return NF_DROP;
4590
4591 return NF_ACCEPT;
4592 }
4593
4594 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4595 struct sk_buff *skb,
4596 const struct net_device *in,
4597 const struct net_device *out,
4598 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4599 {
4600 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4601 }
4602
4603 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4604 int ifindex,
4605 u16 family)
4606 {
4607 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4608 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4609 struct common_audit_data ad;
4610 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4611 char *addrp;
4612 u8 proto;
4613
4614 if (sk == NULL)
4615 return NF_ACCEPT;
4616 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4617
4618 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4619 ad.u.net = &net;
4620 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4621 ad.u.net->family = family;
4622 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4623 return NF_DROP;
4624
4625 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4626 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4627 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4628 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4629
4630 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4631 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4632
4633 return NF_ACCEPT;
4634 }
4635
4636 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4637 u16 family)
4638 {
4639 u32 secmark_perm;
4640 u32 peer_sid;
4641 struct sock *sk;
4642 struct common_audit_data ad;
4643 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4644 char *addrp;
4645 u8 secmark_active;
4646 u8 peerlbl_active;
4647
4648 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4649 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4650 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4651 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4652 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4653 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4654 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
4655 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4656 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4657 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4658 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4659 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4660 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4661 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
4662 return NF_ACCEPT;
4663 #endif
4664 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4665 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4666 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4667 return NF_ACCEPT;
4668
4669 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4670 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4671 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4672 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4673 sk = skb->sk;
4674 if (sk == NULL) {
4675 if (skb->skb_iif) {
4676 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4677 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4678 return NF_DROP;
4679 } else {
4680 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4681 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4682 }
4683 } else {
4684 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4685 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4686 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4687 }
4688
4689 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4690 ad.u.net = &net;
4691 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4692 ad.u.net->family = family;
4693 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4694 return NF_DROP;
4695
4696 if (secmark_active)
4697 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4698 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4699 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4700
4701 if (peerlbl_active) {
4702 u32 if_sid;
4703 u32 node_sid;
4704
4705 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4706 return NF_DROP;
4707 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4708 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4709 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4710
4711 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4712 return NF_DROP;
4713 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4714 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4715 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4716 }
4717
4718 return NF_ACCEPT;
4719 }
4720
4721 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4722 struct sk_buff *skb,
4723 const struct net_device *in,
4724 const struct net_device *out,
4725 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4726 {
4727 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4728 }
4729
4730 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4731 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4732 struct sk_buff *skb,
4733 const struct net_device *in,
4734 const struct net_device *out,
4735 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4736 {
4737 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4738 }
4739 #endif /* IPV6 */
4740
4741 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4742
4743 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4744 {
4745 int err;
4746
4747 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4748 if (err)
4749 return err;
4750
4751 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4752 }
4753
4754 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4755 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4756 u16 sclass)
4757 {
4758 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4759 u32 sid;
4760
4761 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4762 if (!isec)
4763 return -ENOMEM;
4764
4765 sid = task_sid(task);
4766 isec->sclass = sclass;
4767 isec->sid = sid;
4768 perm->security = isec;
4769
4770 return 0;
4771 }
4772
4773 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4774 {
4775 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4776 perm->security = NULL;
4777 kfree(isec);
4778 }
4779
4780 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4781 {
4782 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4783
4784 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4785 if (!msec)
4786 return -ENOMEM;
4787
4788 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4789 msg->security = msec;
4790
4791 return 0;
4792 }
4793
4794 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4795 {
4796 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4797
4798 msg->security = NULL;
4799 kfree(msec);
4800 }
4801
4802 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4803 u32 perms)
4804 {
4805 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4806 struct common_audit_data ad;
4807 u32 sid = current_sid();
4808
4809 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4810
4811 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4812 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4813
4814 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4815 }
4816
4817 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4818 {
4819 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4820 }
4821
4822 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4823 {
4824 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4825 }
4826
4827 /* message queue security operations */
4828 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4829 {
4830 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4831 struct common_audit_data ad;
4832 u32 sid = current_sid();
4833 int rc;
4834
4835 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4836 if (rc)
4837 return rc;
4838
4839 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4840
4841 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4842 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4843
4844 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4845 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
4846 if (rc) {
4847 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4848 return rc;
4849 }
4850 return 0;
4851 }
4852
4853 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4854 {
4855 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4856 }
4857
4858 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4859 {
4860 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4861 struct common_audit_data ad;
4862 u32 sid = current_sid();
4863
4864 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4865
4866 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4867 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4868
4869 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4870 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4871 }
4872
4873 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4874 {
4875 int err;
4876 int perms;
4877
4878 switch (cmd) {
4879 case IPC_INFO:
4880 case MSG_INFO:
4881 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4882 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4883 case IPC_STAT:
4884 case MSG_STAT:
4885 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4886 break;
4887 case IPC_SET:
4888 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4889 break;
4890 case IPC_RMID:
4891 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4892 break;
4893 default:
4894 return 0;
4895 }
4896
4897 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4898 return err;
4899 }
4900
4901 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4902 {
4903 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4904 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4905 struct common_audit_data ad;
4906 u32 sid = current_sid();
4907 int rc;
4908
4909 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4910 msec = msg->security;
4911
4912 /*
4913 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4914 */
4915 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4916 /*
4917 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4918 * message queue this message will be stored in
4919 */
4920 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4921 NULL, &msec->sid);
4922 if (rc)
4923 return rc;
4924 }
4925
4926 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4927 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4928
4929 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4930 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4931 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
4932 if (!rc)
4933 /* Can this process send the message */
4934 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4935 MSG__SEND, &ad);
4936 if (!rc)
4937 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4938 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4939 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4940
4941 return rc;
4942 }
4943
4944 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4945 struct task_struct *target,
4946 long type, int mode)
4947 {
4948 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4949 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4950 struct common_audit_data ad;
4951 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4952 int rc;
4953
4954 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4955 msec = msg->security;
4956
4957 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4958 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4959
4960 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4961 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4962 if (!rc)
4963 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4964 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4965 return rc;
4966 }
4967
4968 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4969 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4970 {
4971 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4972 struct common_audit_data ad;
4973 u32 sid = current_sid();
4974 int rc;
4975
4976 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4977 if (rc)
4978 return rc;
4979
4980 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4981
4982 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4983 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4984
4985 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4986 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
4987 if (rc) {
4988 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4989 return rc;
4990 }
4991 return 0;
4992 }
4993
4994 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4995 {
4996 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4997 }
4998
4999 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5000 {
5001 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5002 struct common_audit_data ad;
5003 u32 sid = current_sid();
5004
5005 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5006
5007 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5008 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5009
5010 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5011 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5012 }
5013
5014 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5015 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5016 {
5017 int perms;
5018 int err;
5019
5020 switch (cmd) {
5021 case IPC_INFO:
5022 case SHM_INFO:
5023 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5024 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5025 case IPC_STAT:
5026 case SHM_STAT:
5027 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5028 break;
5029 case IPC_SET:
5030 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5031 break;
5032 case SHM_LOCK:
5033 case SHM_UNLOCK:
5034 perms = SHM__LOCK;
5035 break;
5036 case IPC_RMID:
5037 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5038 break;
5039 default:
5040 return 0;
5041 }
5042
5043 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5044 return err;
5045 }
5046
5047 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5048 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5049 {
5050 u32 perms;
5051
5052 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5053 perms = SHM__READ;
5054 else
5055 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5056
5057 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5058 }
5059
5060 /* Semaphore security operations */
5061 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5062 {
5063 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5064 struct common_audit_data ad;
5065 u32 sid = current_sid();
5066 int rc;
5067
5068 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5069 if (rc)
5070 return rc;
5071
5072 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5073
5074 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5075 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5076
5077 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5078 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
5079 if (rc) {
5080 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5081 return rc;
5082 }
5083 return 0;
5084 }
5085
5086 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5087 {
5088 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5089 }
5090
5091 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5092 {
5093 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5094 struct common_audit_data ad;
5095 u32 sid = current_sid();
5096
5097 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5098
5099 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5100 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5101
5102 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5103 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5104 }
5105
5106 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5107 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5108 {
5109 int err;
5110 u32 perms;
5111
5112 switch (cmd) {
5113 case IPC_INFO:
5114 case SEM_INFO:
5115 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5116 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5117 case GETPID:
5118 case GETNCNT:
5119 case GETZCNT:
5120 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5121 break;
5122 case GETVAL:
5123 case GETALL:
5124 perms = SEM__READ;
5125 break;
5126 case SETVAL:
5127 case SETALL:
5128 perms = SEM__WRITE;
5129 break;
5130 case IPC_RMID:
5131 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5132 break;
5133 case IPC_SET:
5134 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5135 break;
5136 case IPC_STAT:
5137 case SEM_STAT:
5138 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5139 break;
5140 default:
5141 return 0;
5142 }
5143
5144 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5145 return err;
5146 }
5147
5148 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5149 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5150 {
5151 u32 perms;
5152
5153 if (alter)
5154 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5155 else
5156 perms = SEM__READ;
5157
5158 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5159 }
5160
5161 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5162 {
5163 u32 av = 0;
5164
5165 av = 0;
5166 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
5167 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5168 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
5169 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5170
5171 if (av == 0)
5172 return 0;
5173
5174 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5175 }
5176
5177 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5178 {
5179 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5180 *secid = isec->sid;
5181 }
5182
5183 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5184 {
5185 if (inode)
5186 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5187 }
5188
5189 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5190 char *name, char **value)
5191 {
5192 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5193 u32 sid;
5194 int error;
5195 unsigned len;
5196
5197 if (current != p) {
5198 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5199 if (error)
5200 return error;
5201 }
5202
5203 rcu_read_lock();
5204 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5205
5206 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5207 sid = __tsec->sid;
5208 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5209 sid = __tsec->osid;
5210 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5211 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5212 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5213 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5214 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5215 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5216 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5217 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5218 else
5219 goto invalid;
5220 rcu_read_unlock();
5221
5222 if (!sid)
5223 return 0;
5224
5225 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5226 if (error)
5227 return error;
5228 return len;
5229
5230 invalid:
5231 rcu_read_unlock();
5232 return -EINVAL;
5233 }
5234
5235 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5236 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5237 {
5238 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5239 struct task_struct *tracer;
5240 struct cred *new;
5241 u32 sid = 0, ptsid;
5242 int error;
5243 char *str = value;
5244
5245 if (current != p) {
5246 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5247 security attributes. */
5248 return -EACCES;
5249 }
5250
5251 /*
5252 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5253 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5254 * above restriction is ever removed.
5255 */
5256 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5257 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5258 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5259 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5260 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5261 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5262 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5263 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5264 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5265 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5266 else
5267 error = -EINVAL;
5268 if (error)
5269 return error;
5270
5271 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5272 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5273 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5274 str[size-1] = 0;
5275 size--;
5276 }
5277 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5278 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5279 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
5280 struct audit_buffer *ab;
5281 size_t audit_size;
5282
5283 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5284 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5285 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
5286 audit_size = size - 1;
5287 else
5288 audit_size = size;
5289 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
5290 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5291 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
5292 audit_log_end(ab);
5293
5294 return error;
5295 }
5296 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5297 &sid);
5298 }
5299 if (error)
5300 return error;
5301 }
5302
5303 new = prepare_creds();
5304 if (!new)
5305 return -ENOMEM;
5306
5307 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5308 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5309 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5310 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5311 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5312 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5313 tsec = new->security;
5314 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5315 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5316 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5317 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5318 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5319 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5320 if (error)
5321 goto abort_change;
5322 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5323 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5324 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5325 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5326 error = -EINVAL;
5327 if (sid == 0)
5328 goto abort_change;
5329
5330 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5331 error = -EPERM;
5332 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5333 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5334 if (error)
5335 goto abort_change;
5336 }
5337
5338 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5339 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5340 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5341 if (error)
5342 goto abort_change;
5343
5344 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5345 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5346 ptsid = 0;
5347 task_lock(p);
5348 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5349 if (tracer)
5350 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5351 task_unlock(p);
5352
5353 if (tracer) {
5354 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5355 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5356 if (error)
5357 goto abort_change;
5358 }
5359
5360 tsec->sid = sid;
5361 } else {
5362 error = -EINVAL;
5363 goto abort_change;
5364 }
5365
5366 commit_creds(new);
5367 return size;
5368
5369 abort_change:
5370 abort_creds(new);
5371 return error;
5372 }
5373
5374 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5375 {
5376 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5377 }
5378
5379 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5380 {
5381 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5382 }
5383
5384 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5385 {
5386 kfree(secdata);
5387 }
5388
5389 /*
5390 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5391 */
5392 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5393 {
5394 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5395 }
5396
5397 /*
5398 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5399 */
5400 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5401 {
5402 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5403 }
5404
5405 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5406 {
5407 int len = 0;
5408 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5409 ctx, true);
5410 if (len < 0)
5411 return len;
5412 *ctxlen = len;
5413 return 0;
5414 }
5415 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5416
5417 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5418 unsigned long flags)
5419 {
5420 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5421 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5422
5423 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5424 if (!ksec)
5425 return -ENOMEM;
5426
5427 tsec = cred->security;
5428 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5429 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5430 else
5431 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5432
5433 k->security = ksec;
5434 return 0;
5435 }
5436
5437 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5438 {
5439 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5440
5441 k->security = NULL;
5442 kfree(ksec);
5443 }
5444
5445 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5446 const struct cred *cred,
5447 key_perm_t perm)
5448 {
5449 struct key *key;
5450 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5451 u32 sid;
5452
5453 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5454 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5455 appear to be created. */
5456 if (perm == 0)
5457 return 0;
5458
5459 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5460
5461 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5462 ksec = key->security;
5463
5464 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5465 }
5466
5467 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5468 {
5469 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5470 char *context = NULL;
5471 unsigned len;
5472 int rc;
5473
5474 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5475 if (!rc)
5476 rc = len;
5477 *_buffer = context;
5478 return rc;
5479 }
5480
5481 #endif
5482
5483 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5484 .name = "selinux",
5485
5486 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5487 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5488 .capget = selinux_capget,
5489 .capset = selinux_capset,
5490 .capable = selinux_capable,
5491 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5492 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5493 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5494 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5495
5496 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5497
5498 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5499 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5500 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5501 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5502
5503 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5504 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5505 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5506 .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount,
5507 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5508 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5509 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5510 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5511 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5512 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5513 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5514 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5515
5516
5517 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5518 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5519 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5520 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5521 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5522 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5523 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5524 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5525 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5526 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5527 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5528 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5529 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5530 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5531 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5532 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5533 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5534 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5535 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5536 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5537 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5538 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5539 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5540 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5541 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5542
5543 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5544 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5545 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5546 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5547 .mmap_file = selinux_mmap_file,
5548 .mmap_addr = selinux_mmap_addr,
5549 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5550 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5551 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5552 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5553 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5554 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5555
5556 .file_open = selinux_file_open,
5557
5558 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5559 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5560 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5561 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5562 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5563 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5564 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5565 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5566 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5567 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5568 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5569 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5570 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5571 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5572 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5573 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5574 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5575 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5576 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5577 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5578 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5579 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5580
5581 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5582 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5583
5584 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5585 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5586
5587 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5588 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5589 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5590 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5591 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5592 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5593
5594 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5595 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5596 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5597 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5598 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5599
5600 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5601 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5602 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5603 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5604 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5605
5606 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5607
5608 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5609 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5610
5611 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5612 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5613 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5614 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5615 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5616 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5617
5618 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5619 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5620
5621 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5622 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5623 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5624 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5625 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5626 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5627 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5628 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5629 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5630 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5631 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5632 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5633 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5634 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5635 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5636 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5637 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5638 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5639 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5640 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5641 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5642 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5643 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5644 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5645 .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
5646 .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
5647 .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
5648 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5649 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
5650 .tun_dev_post_create = selinux_tun_dev_post_create,
5651 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
5652
5653 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5654 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5655 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5656 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5657 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5658 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5659 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5660 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5661 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5662 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5663 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5664 #endif
5665
5666 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5667 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5668 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5669 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5670 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5671 #endif
5672
5673 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
5674 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5675 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5676 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5677 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5678 #endif
5679 };
5680
5681 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5682 {
5683 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5684 selinux_enabled = 0;
5685 return 0;
5686 }
5687
5688 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5689 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5690 return 0;
5691 }
5692
5693 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5694
5695 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5696 cred_init_security();
5697
5698 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
5699
5700 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5701 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5702 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5703 avc_init();
5704
5705 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5706 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5707
5708 if (selinux_enforcing)
5709 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5710 else
5711 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5712
5713 return 0;
5714 }
5715
5716 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
5717 {
5718 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5719 }
5720
5721 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5722 {
5723 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5724
5725 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5726 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5727 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
5728 }
5729
5730 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5731 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5732 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5733
5734 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5735
5736 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5737 {
5738 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5739 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5740 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
5741 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5742 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5743 },
5744 {
5745 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5746 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5747 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
5748 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5749 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5750 },
5751 {
5752 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5753 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5754 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
5755 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5756 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5757 }
5758 };
5759
5760 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5761
5762 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5763 {
5764 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5765 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5766 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
5767 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5768 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5769 },
5770 {
5771 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5772 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5773 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
5774 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5775 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5776 }
5777 };
5778
5779 #endif /* IPV6 */
5780
5781 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5782 {
5783 int err = 0;
5784
5785 if (!selinux_enabled)
5786 goto out;
5787
5788 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5789
5790 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5791 if (err)
5792 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5793
5794 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5795 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5796 if (err)
5797 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5798 #endif /* IPV6 */
5799
5800 out:
5801 return err;
5802 }
5803
5804 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5805
5806 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5807 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5808 {
5809 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5810
5811 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5812 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5813 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5814 #endif /* IPV6 */
5815 }
5816 #endif
5817
5818 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5819
5820 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5821 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5822 #endif
5823
5824 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5825
5826 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5827 static int selinux_disabled;
5828
5829 int selinux_disable(void)
5830 {
5831 if (ss_initialized) {
5832 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5833 return -EINVAL;
5834 }
5835
5836 if (selinux_disabled) {
5837 /* Only do this once. */
5838 return -EINVAL;
5839 }
5840
5841 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5842
5843 selinux_disabled = 1;
5844 selinux_enabled = 0;
5845
5846 reset_security_ops();
5847
5848 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5849 avc_disable();
5850
5851 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5852 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5853
5854 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
5855 exit_sel_fs();
5856
5857 return 0;
5858 }
5859 #endif
Linux 2.6 libata-dev (mirror)