bnx2x: avoid null pointer dereference when enabling SR-IOV
[linux-2.6/btrfs-unstable.git] / net / mac80211 / wpa.c
blobd6572822076367cdf203207892a2880c7e4487c2
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
3 * Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
7 * published by the Free Software Foundation.
8 */
10 #include <linux/netdevice.h>
11 #include <linux/types.h>
12 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
13 #include <linux/compiler.h>
14 #include <linux/ieee80211.h>
15 #include <linux/gfp.h>
16 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
17 #include <net/mac80211.h>
18 #include <crypto/aes.h>
20 #include "ieee80211_i.h"
21 #include "michael.h"
22 #include "tkip.h"
23 #include "aes_ccm.h"
24 #include "aes_cmac.h"
25 #include "wpa.h"
27 ieee80211_tx_result
28 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
30 u8 *data, *key, *mic;
31 size_t data_len;
32 unsigned int hdrlen;
33 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
34 struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
35 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
36 int tail;
38 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
39 if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
40 skb->len < 24 || !ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
41 return TX_CONTINUE;
43 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
44 if (skb->len < hdrlen)
45 return TX_DROP;
47 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
48 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen;
50 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) {
51 /* Need to use software crypto for the test */
52 info->control.hw_key = NULL;
55 if (info->control.hw_key &&
56 (info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_DONTFRAG ||
57 tx->local->ops->set_frag_threshold) &&
58 !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC)) {
59 /* hwaccel - with no need for SW-generated MMIC */
60 return TX_CONTINUE;
63 tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
64 if (!info->control.hw_key)
65 tail += IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
67 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
68 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN))
69 return TX_DROP;
71 key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY];
72 mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
73 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
74 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE))
75 mic[0]++;
77 return TX_CONTINUE;
81 ieee80211_rx_result
82 ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
84 u8 *data, *key = NULL;
85 size_t data_len;
86 unsigned int hdrlen;
87 u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN];
88 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
89 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
90 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
93 * it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other
94 * than data frames.
96 if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
97 return RX_CONTINUE;
100 * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it or
101 * the IV with the key index. In this case we have solely rely
102 * on the driver to set RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR in the event of a
103 * MIC failure report.
105 if (status->flag & (RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) {
106 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
107 goto mic_fail_no_key;
109 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) && rx->key &&
110 rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP)
111 goto update_iv;
113 return RX_CONTINUE;
117 * Some hardware seems to generate Michael MIC failure reports; even
118 * though, the frame was not encrypted with TKIP and therefore has no
119 * MIC. Ignore the flag them to avoid triggering countermeasures.
121 if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
122 !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
123 return RX_CONTINUE;
125 if (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP && rx->key->conf.keyidx) {
127 * APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC
128 * errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for
129 * group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast
130 * frames in the BSS. (
132 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
135 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
136 goto mic_fail;
138 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
139 if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
140 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
142 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
143 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
144 hdr = (void *)skb->data;
146 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
147 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
148 key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
149 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
150 if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0)
151 goto mic_fail;
153 /* remove Michael MIC from payload */
154 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
156 update_iv:
157 /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
158 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
159 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
161 return RX_CONTINUE;
163 mic_fail:
164 rx->key->u.tkip.mic_failures++;
166 mic_fail_no_key:
168 * In some cases the key can be unset - e.g. a multicast packet, in
169 * a driver that supports HW encryption. Send up the key idx only if
170 * the key is set.
172 mac80211_ev_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata,
173 rx->key ? rx->key->conf.keyidx : -1,
174 (void *) skb->data, NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
175 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
179 static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
181 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
182 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
183 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
184 unsigned int hdrlen;
185 int len, tail;
186 u8 *pos;
188 if (info->control.hw_key &&
189 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
190 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
191 /* hwaccel - with no need for software-generated IV */
192 return 0;
195 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
196 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
198 if (info->control.hw_key)
199 tail = 0;
200 else
201 tail = IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
203 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
204 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN))
205 return -1;
207 pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
208 memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen);
209 skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) +
210 IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
211 pos += hdrlen;
213 /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
214 if (info->control.hw_key &&
215 (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
216 return 0;
218 /* Increase IV for the frame */
219 spin_lock(&key->u.tkip.txlock);
220 key->u.tkip.tx.iv16++;
221 if (key->u.tkip.tx.iv16 == 0)
222 key->u.tkip.tx.iv32++;
223 pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, key);
224 spin_unlock(&key->u.tkip.txlock);
226 /* hwaccel - with software IV */
227 if (info->control.hw_key)
228 return 0;
230 /* Add room for ICV */
231 skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
233 return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(tx->local->wep_tx_tfm,
234 key, skb, pos, len);
238 ieee80211_tx_result
239 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
241 struct sk_buff *skb;
243 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
245 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
246 if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
247 return TX_DROP;
250 return TX_CONTINUE;
254 ieee80211_rx_result
255 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
257 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data;
258 int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0;
259 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
260 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
261 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
263 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
265 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
266 return RX_CONTINUE;
268 if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12)
269 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
271 /* it may be possible to optimize this a bit more */
272 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
273 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
274 hdr = (void *)skb->data;
277 * Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption.
278 * In the case where hardware checks the IV as well,
279 * we don't even get here, see ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt()
281 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)
282 hwaccel = 1;
284 res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(rx->local->wep_rx_tfm,
285 key, skb->data + hdrlen,
286 skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
287 hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx,
288 &rx->tkip_iv32,
289 &rx->tkip_iv16);
290 if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
291 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
293 /* Trim ICV */
294 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
296 /* Remove IV */
297 memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
298 skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
300 return RX_CONTINUE;
304 static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
305 int encrypted)
307 __le16 mask_fc;
308 int a4_included, mgmt;
309 u8 qos_tid;
310 u16 len_a;
311 unsigned int hdrlen;
312 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
315 * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
316 * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
318 mgmt = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control);
319 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
320 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
321 IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
322 if (!mgmt)
323 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
324 mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
326 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
327 len_a = hdrlen - 2;
328 a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control);
330 if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
331 qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) & IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
332 else
333 qos_tid = 0;
335 /* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC
336 * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived
337 * from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the
338 * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take
339 * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting
340 * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs.
342 b_0[0] = 0x1;
344 /* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
345 * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
347 b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
348 memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
349 memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
351 /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
352 * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
353 put_unaligned_be16(len_a, &aad[0]);
354 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
355 memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
357 /* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
358 aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
359 aad[23] = 0;
361 if (a4_included) {
362 memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
363 aad[30] = qos_tid;
364 aad[31] = 0;
365 } else {
366 memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
367 aad[24] = qos_tid;
372 static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id)
374 hdr[0] = pn[5];
375 hdr[1] = pn[4];
376 hdr[2] = 0;
377 hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
378 hdr[4] = pn[3];
379 hdr[5] = pn[2];
380 hdr[6] = pn[1];
381 hdr[7] = pn[0];
385 static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
387 pn[0] = hdr[7];
388 pn[1] = hdr[6];
389 pn[2] = hdr[5];
390 pn[3] = hdr[4];
391 pn[4] = hdr[1];
392 pn[5] = hdr[0];
396 static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
398 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
399 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
400 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
401 int hdrlen, len, tail;
402 u8 *pos;
403 u8 pn[6];
404 u64 pn64;
405 u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
406 u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
408 if (info->control.hw_key &&
409 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
410 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
412 * hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP
413 * header or MIC fields
415 return 0;
418 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
419 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
421 if (info->control.hw_key)
422 tail = 0;
423 else
424 tail = IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN;
426 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
427 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
428 return -1;
430 pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
431 memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
432 skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) +
433 IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
435 /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
436 if (info->control.hw_key &&
437 (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
438 return 0;
440 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) pos;
441 pos += hdrlen;
443 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.ccmp.tx_pn);
445 pn[5] = pn64;
446 pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
447 pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
448 pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
449 pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
450 pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
452 ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
454 /* hwaccel - with software CCMP header */
455 if (info->control.hw_key)
456 return 0;
458 pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
459 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad, 0);
460 ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len,
461 skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN));
463 return 0;
467 ieee80211_tx_result
468 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
470 struct sk_buff *skb;
472 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
474 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
475 if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
476 return TX_DROP;
479 return TX_CONTINUE;
483 ieee80211_rx_result
484 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
486 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
487 int hdrlen;
488 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
489 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
490 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
491 u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN];
492 int data_len;
493 int queue;
495 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
497 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
498 !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(hdr))
499 return RX_CONTINUE;
501 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN -
502 IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN;
503 if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
504 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
506 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
507 if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
508 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
509 } else {
510 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
511 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
514 ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
516 queue = rx->security_idx;
518 if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) {
519 key->u.ccmp.replays++;
520 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
523 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
524 u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
525 u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
526 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
527 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad, 1);
529 if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
530 key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad,
531 skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN,
532 data_len,
533 skb->data + skb->len - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN))
534 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
537 memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
539 /* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
540 if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN))
541 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
542 memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
543 skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
545 return RX_CONTINUE;
549 static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad)
551 __le16 mask_fc;
552 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
554 /* BIP AAD: FC(masked) || A1 || A2 || A3 */
556 /* FC type/subtype */
557 /* Mask FC Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData flags to zero */
558 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
559 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | IEEE80211_FCTL_PM |
560 IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
561 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *) &aad[0]);
562 /* A1 || A2 || A3 */
563 memcpy(aad + 2, &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
567 static inline void bip_ipn_set64(u8 *d, u64 pn)
569 *d++ = pn;
570 *d++ = pn >> 8;
571 *d++ = pn >> 16;
572 *d++ = pn >> 24;
573 *d++ = pn >> 32;
574 *d = pn >> 40;
577 static inline void bip_ipn_swap(u8 *d, const u8 *s)
579 *d++ = s[5];
580 *d++ = s[4];
581 *d++ = s[3];
582 *d++ = s[2];
583 *d++ = s[1];
584 *d = s[0];
588 ieee80211_tx_result
589 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
591 struct sk_buff *skb;
592 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
593 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
594 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
595 u8 aad[20];
596 u64 pn64;
598 if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
599 return TX_DROP;
601 skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
603 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
605 if (info->control.hw_key)
606 return TX_CONTINUE;
608 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
609 return TX_DROP;
611 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
612 mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
613 mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
614 mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
616 /* PN = PN + 1 */
617 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn);
619 bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
621 bip_aad(skb, aad);
624 * MIC = AES-128-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 64)
626 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
627 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
629 return TX_CONTINUE;
633 ieee80211_rx_result
634 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
636 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
637 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
638 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
639 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
640 u8 aad[20], mic[8], ipn[6];
641 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
643 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
644 return RX_CONTINUE;
646 /* management frames are already linear */
648 if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
649 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
651 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *)
652 (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
653 if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
654 mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
655 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
657 bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
659 if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
660 key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
661 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
664 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
665 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
666 bip_aad(skb, aad);
667 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
668 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
669 if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
670 key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
671 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
675 memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
677 /* Remove MMIE */
678 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
680 return RX_CONTINUE;
683 ieee80211_tx_result
684 ieee80211_crypto_hw_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
686 struct sk_buff *skb;
687 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = NULL;
689 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
690 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
692 /* handle hw-only algorithm */
693 if (!info->control.hw_key)
694 return TX_DROP;
697 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
699 return TX_CONTINUE;