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device-dax: fix sysfs attribute deadlock
[linux-2.6/btrfs-unstable.git] / kernel / auditsc.c
blobe59ffc7fc522ad9d057c34339807dfe35845d45e
1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
3 *
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
7 * All Rights Reserved.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
22 *
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
24 *
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
27 *
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
31 *
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
33 * 2006.
34 *
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
37 *
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
40 *
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
43 */
44
45 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
46
47 #include <linux/init.h>
48 #include <asm/types.h>
49 #include <linux/atomic.h>
50 #include <linux/fs.h>
51 #include <linux/namei.h>
52 #include <linux/mm.h>
53 #include <linux/export.h>
54 #include <linux/slab.h>
55 #include <linux/mount.h>
56 #include <linux/socket.h>
57 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
58 #include <linux/audit.h>
59 #include <linux/personality.h>
60 #include <linux/time.h>
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/compiler.h>
63 #include <asm/unistd.h>
64 #include <linux/security.h>
65 #include <linux/list.h>
66 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
67 #include <linux/highmem.h>
68 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
69 #include <asm/syscall.h>
70 #include <linux/capability.h>
71 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
72 #include <linux/compat.h>
73 #include <linux/ctype.h>
74 #include <linux/string.h>
75 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
76 #include <uapi/linux/limits.h>
77
78 #include "audit.h"
79
80 /* flags stating the success for a syscall */
81 #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
82 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
83 #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
84
85 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits),
86 * see the note near the top of audit_log_execve_info() about this value */
87 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
88
89 /* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */
90 #define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128
91
92 /* number of audit rules */
93 int audit_n_rules;
94
95 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
96 int audit_signals;
97
98 struct audit_aux_data {
99 struct audit_aux_data *next;
100 int type;
101 };
102
103 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
104
105 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
106 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
107
108 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
109 struct audit_aux_data d;
110 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
111 kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
112 kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
113 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
114 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
115 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
116 int pid_count;
117 };
118
119 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
120 struct audit_aux_data d;
121 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
122 unsigned int fcap_ver;
123 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
124 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
125 };
126
127 struct audit_tree_refs {
128 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
129 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
130 };
131
132 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
133 {
134 unsigned n;
135 if (unlikely(!ctx))
136 return 0;
137 n = ctx->major;
138
139 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
140 case 0: /* native */
141 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
142 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
143 return 1;
144 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
145 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
146 return 1;
147 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
148 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
149 return 1;
150 return 0;
151 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
152 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
153 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
154 return 1;
155 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
156 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
157 return 1;
158 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
159 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
160 return 1;
161 return 0;
162 case 2: /* open */
163 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
164 case 3: /* openat */
165 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
166 case 4: /* socketcall */
167 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
168 case 5: /* execve */
169 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
170 default:
171 return 0;
172 }
173 }
174
175 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
176 {
177 struct audit_names *n;
178 umode_t mode = (umode_t)val;
179
180 if (unlikely(!ctx))
181 return 0;
182
183 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
184 if ((n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET) &&
185 ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
186 return 1;
187 }
188
189 return 0;
190 }
191
192 /*
193 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
194 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
195 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
196 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
197 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
198 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
199 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
200 */
201
202 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
203 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
204 {
205 if (!ctx->prio) {
206 ctx->prio = 1;
207 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
208 }
209 }
210
211 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
212 {
213 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
214 int left = ctx->tree_count;
215 if (likely(left)) {
216 p->c[--left] = chunk;
217 ctx->tree_count = left;
218 return 1;
219 }
220 if (!p)
221 return 0;
222 p = p->next;
223 if (p) {
224 p->c[30] = chunk;
225 ctx->trees = p;
226 ctx->tree_count = 30;
227 return 1;
228 }
229 return 0;
230 }
231
232 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
233 {
234 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
235 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
236 if (!ctx->trees) {
237 ctx->trees = p;
238 return 0;
239 }
240 if (p)
241 p->next = ctx->trees;
242 else
243 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
244 ctx->tree_count = 31;
245 return 1;
246 }
247 #endif
248
249 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
250 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
251 {
252 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
253 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
254 int n;
255 if (!p) {
256 /* we started with empty chain */
257 p = ctx->first_trees;
258 count = 31;
259 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
260 if (!p)
261 return;
262 }
263 n = count;
264 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
265 while (n--) {
266 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
267 q->c[n] = NULL;
268 }
269 }
270 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
271 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
272 q->c[n] = NULL;
273 }
274 ctx->trees = p;
275 ctx->tree_count = count;
276 #endif
277 }
278
279 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
280 {
281 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
282 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
283 q = p->next;
284 kfree(p);
285 }
286 }
287
288 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
289 {
290 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
291 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
292 int n;
293 if (!tree)
294 return 0;
295 /* full ones */
296 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
297 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
298 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
299 return 1;
300 }
301 /* partial */
302 if (p) {
303 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
304 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
305 return 1;
306 }
307 #endif
308 return 0;
309 }
310
311 static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid,
312 struct audit_names *name,
313 struct audit_field *f,
314 struct audit_context *ctx)
315 {
316 struct audit_names *n;
317 int rc;
318
319 if (name) {
320 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid);
321 if (rc)
322 return rc;
323 }
324
325 if (ctx) {
326 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
327 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid);
328 if (rc)
329 return rc;
330 }
331 }
332 return 0;
333 }
334
335 static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid,
336 struct audit_names *name,
337 struct audit_field *f,
338 struct audit_context *ctx)
339 {
340 struct audit_names *n;
341 int rc;
342
343 if (name) {
344 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid);
345 if (rc)
346 return rc;
347 }
348
349 if (ctx) {
350 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
351 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid);
352 if (rc)
353 return rc;
354 }
355 }
356 return 0;
357 }
358
359 static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
360 const struct cred *cred,
361 struct audit_field *f,
362 struct audit_context *ctx,
363 struct audit_names *name)
364 {
365 switch (f->val) {
366 /* process to file object comparisons */
367 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
368 return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx);
369 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID:
370 return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx);
371 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
372 return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx);
373 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
374 return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx);
375 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
376 return audit_compare_uid(tsk->loginuid, name, f, ctx);
377 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
378 return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx);
379 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
380 return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx);
381 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
382 return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx);
383 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
384 return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx);
385 /* uid comparisons */
386 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID:
387 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, tsk->loginuid);
388 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID:
389 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid);
390 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID:
391 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid);
392 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID:
393 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
394 /* auid comparisons */
395 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID:
396 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->euid);
397 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID:
398 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->suid);
399 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID:
400 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
401 /* euid comparisons */
402 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID:
403 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid);
404 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID:
405 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
406 /* suid comparisons */
407 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID:
408 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
409 /* gid comparisons */
410 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID:
411 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid);
412 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID:
413 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid);
414 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID:
415 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
416 /* egid comparisons */
417 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID:
418 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid);
419 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID:
420 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
421 /* sgid comparison */
422 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID:
423 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
424 default:
425 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
426 return 0;
427 }
428 return 0;
429 }
430
431 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
432 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
433 * otherwise.
434 *
435 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
436 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
437 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
438 */
439 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
440 struct audit_krule *rule,
441 struct audit_context *ctx,
442 struct audit_names *name,
443 enum audit_state *state,
444 bool task_creation)
445 {
446 const struct cred *cred;
447 int i, need_sid = 1;
448 u32 sid;
449 unsigned int sessionid;
450
451 cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
452
453 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
454 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
455 struct audit_names *n;
456 int result = 0;
457 pid_t pid;
458
459 switch (f->type) {
460 case AUDIT_PID:
461 pid = task_tgid_nr(tsk);
462 result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
463 break;
464 case AUDIT_PPID:
465 if (ctx) {
466 if (!ctx->ppid)
467 ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk);
468 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
469 }
470 break;
471 case AUDIT_EXE:
472 result = audit_exe_compare(tsk, rule->exe);
473 break;
474 case AUDIT_UID:
475 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
476 break;
477 case AUDIT_EUID:
478 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid);
479 break;
480 case AUDIT_SUID:
481 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid);
482 break;
483 case AUDIT_FSUID:
484 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid);
485 break;
486 case AUDIT_GID:
487 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid);
488 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
489 if (!result)
490 result = in_group_p(f->gid);
491 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
492 if (result)
493 result = !in_group_p(f->gid);
494 }
495 break;
496 case AUDIT_EGID:
497 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid);
498 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
499 if (!result)
500 result = in_egroup_p(f->gid);
501 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
502 if (result)
503 result = !in_egroup_p(f->gid);
504 }
505 break;
506 case AUDIT_SGID:
507 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid);
508 break;
509 case AUDIT_FSGID:
510 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid);
511 break;
512 case AUDIT_SESSIONID:
513 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
514 result = audit_comparator(sessionid, f->op, f->val);
515 break;
516 case AUDIT_PERS:
517 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
518 break;
519 case AUDIT_ARCH:
520 if (ctx)
521 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
522 break;
523
524 case AUDIT_EXIT:
525 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
526 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
527 break;
528 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
529 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
530 if (f->val)
531 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
532 else
533 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
534 }
535 break;
536 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
537 if (name) {
538 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
539 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
540 ++result;
541 } else if (ctx) {
542 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
543 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
544 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
545 ++result;
546 break;
547 }
548 }
549 }
550 break;
551 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
552 if (name) {
553 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
554 audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
555 ++result;
556 } else if (ctx) {
557 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
558 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
559 audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
560 ++result;
561 break;
562 }
563 }
564 }
565 break;
566 case AUDIT_INODE:
567 if (name)
568 result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val);
569 else if (ctx) {
570 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
571 if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
572 ++result;
573 break;
574 }
575 }
576 }
577 break;
578 case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
579 if (name) {
580 result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid);
581 } else if (ctx) {
582 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
583 if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) {
584 ++result;
585 break;
586 }
587 }
588 }
589 break;
590 case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
591 if (name) {
592 result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid);
593 } else if (ctx) {
594 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
595 if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) {
596 ++result;
597 break;
598 }
599 }
600 }
601 break;
602 case AUDIT_WATCH:
603 if (name)
604 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev);
605 break;
606 case AUDIT_DIR:
607 if (ctx)
608 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
609 break;
610 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
611 result = audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->uid);
612 break;
613 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
614 result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val);
615 break;
616 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
617 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
618 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
619 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
620 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
621 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
622 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
623 match for now to avoid losing information that
624 may be wanted. An error message will also be
625 logged upon error */
626 if (f->lsm_rule) {
627 if (need_sid) {
628 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
629 need_sid = 0;
630 }
631 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
632 f->op,
633 f->lsm_rule,
634 ctx);
635 }
636 break;
637 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
638 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
639 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
640 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
641 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
642 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
643 also applies here */
644 if (f->lsm_rule) {
645 /* Find files that match */
646 if (name) {
647 result = security_audit_rule_match(
648 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
649 f->lsm_rule, ctx);
650 } else if (ctx) {
651 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
652 if (security_audit_rule_match(n->osid, f->type,
653 f->op, f->lsm_rule,
654 ctx)) {
655 ++result;
656 break;
657 }
658 }
659 }
660 /* Find ipc objects that match */
661 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
662 break;
663 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
664 f->type, f->op,
665 f->lsm_rule, ctx))
666 ++result;
667 }
668 break;
669 case AUDIT_ARG0:
670 case AUDIT_ARG1:
671 case AUDIT_ARG2:
672 case AUDIT_ARG3:
673 if (ctx)
674 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
675 break;
676 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
677 /* ignore this field for filtering */
678 result = 1;
679 break;
680 case AUDIT_PERM:
681 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
682 break;
683 case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
684 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
685 break;
686 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
687 result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
688 break;
689 }
690 if (!result)
691 return 0;
692 }
693
694 if (ctx) {
695 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
696 return 0;
697 if (rule->filterkey) {
698 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
699 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
700 }
701 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
702 }
703 switch (rule->action) {
704 case AUDIT_NEVER:
705 *state = AUDIT_DISABLED;
706 break;
707 case AUDIT_ALWAYS:
708 *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
709 break;
710 }
711 return 1;
712 }
713
714 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
715 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
716 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
717 */
718 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
719 {
720 struct audit_entry *e;
721 enum audit_state state;
722
723 rcu_read_lock();
724 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
725 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
726 &state, true)) {
727 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
728 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
729 rcu_read_unlock();
730 return state;
731 }
732 }
733 rcu_read_unlock();
734 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
735 }
736
737 static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
738 {
739 int word, bit;
740
741 if (val > 0xffffffff)
742 return false;
743
744 word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
745 if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
746 return false;
747
748 bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
749
750 return rule->mask[word] & bit;
751 }
752
753 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
754 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
755 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
756 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
757 */
758 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
759 struct audit_context *ctx,
760 struct list_head *list)
761 {
762 struct audit_entry *e;
763 enum audit_state state;
764
765 if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
766 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
767
768 rcu_read_lock();
769 if (!list_empty(list)) {
770 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
771 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
772 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
773 &state, false)) {
774 rcu_read_unlock();
775 ctx->current_state = state;
776 return state;
777 }
778 }
779 }
780 rcu_read_unlock();
781 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
782 }
783
784 /*
785 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
786 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
787 */
788 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
789 struct audit_names *n,
790 struct audit_context *ctx) {
791 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
792 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
793 struct audit_entry *e;
794 enum audit_state state;
795
796 if (list_empty(list))
797 return 0;
798
799 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
800 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
801 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
802 ctx->current_state = state;
803 return 1;
804 }
805 }
806
807 return 0;
808 }
809
810 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
811 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
812 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
813 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
814 */
815 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
816 {
817 struct audit_names *n;
818
819 if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
820 return;
821
822 rcu_read_lock();
823
824 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
825 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx))
826 break;
827 }
828 rcu_read_unlock();
829 }
830
831 /* Transfer the audit context pointer to the caller, clearing it in the tsk's struct */
832 static inline struct audit_context *audit_take_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
833 int return_valid,
834 long return_code)
835 {
836 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
837
838 if (!context)
839 return NULL;
840 context->return_valid = return_valid;
841
842 /*
843 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
844 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
845 * signal handlers
846 *
847 * This is actually a test for:
848 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
849 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
850 *
851 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
852 */
853 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
854 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
855 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
856 context->return_code = -EINTR;
857 else
858 context->return_code = return_code;
859
860 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) {
861 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
862 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
863 }
864
865 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
866 return context;
867 }
868
869 static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context)
870 {
871 kfree(context->proctitle.value);
872 context->proctitle.value = NULL;
873 context->proctitle.len = 0;
874 }
875
876 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
877 {
878 struct audit_names *n, *next;
879
880 list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
881 list_del(&n->list);
882 if (n->name)
883 putname(n->name);
884 if (n->should_free)
885 kfree(n);
886 }
887 context->name_count = 0;
888 path_put(&context->pwd);
889 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
890 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
891 }
892
893 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
894 {
895 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
896
897 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
898 context->aux = aux->next;
899 kfree(aux);
900 }
901 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
902 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
903 kfree(aux);
904 }
905 }
906
907 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
908 {
909 struct audit_context *context;
910
911 context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
912 if (!context)
913 return NULL;
914 context->state = state;
915 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
916 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
917 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
918 return context;
919 }
920
921 /**
922 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
923 * @tsk: task
924 *
925 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
926 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
927 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
928 * needed.
929 */
930 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
931 {
932 struct audit_context *context;
933 enum audit_state state;
934 char *key = NULL;
935
936 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
937 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
938
939 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
940 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) {
941 clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
942 return 0;
943 }
944
945 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
946 kfree(key);
947 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
948 return -ENOMEM;
949 }
950 context->filterkey = key;
951
952 tsk->audit_context = context;
953 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
954 return 0;
955 }
956
957 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
958 {
959 audit_free_names(context);
960 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
961 free_tree_refs(context);
962 audit_free_aux(context);
963 kfree(context->filterkey);
964 kfree(context->sockaddr);
965 audit_proctitle_free(context);
966 kfree(context);
967 }
968
969 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
970 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
971 u32 sid, char *comm)
972 {
973 struct audit_buffer *ab;
974 char *ctx = NULL;
975 u32 len;
976 int rc = 0;
977
978 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
979 if (!ab)
980 return rc;
981
982 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
983 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
984 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
985 if (sid) {
986 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
987 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
988 rc = 1;
989 } else {
990 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
991 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
992 }
993 }
994 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
995 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
996 audit_log_end(ab);
997
998 return rc;
999 }
1000
1001 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1002 struct audit_buffer **ab)
1003 {
1004 long len_max;
1005 long len_rem;
1006 long len_full;
1007 long len_buf;
1008 long len_abuf = 0;
1009 long len_tmp;
1010 bool require_data;
1011 bool encode;
1012 unsigned int iter;
1013 unsigned int arg;
1014 char *buf_head;
1015 char *buf;
1016 const char __user *p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start;
1017
1018 /* NOTE: this buffer needs to be large enough to hold all the non-arg
1019 * data we put in the audit record for this argument (see the
1020 * code below) ... at this point in time 96 is plenty */
1021 char abuf[96];
1022
1023 /* NOTE: we set MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN to a rather arbitrary limit, the
1024 * current value of 7500 is not as important as the fact that it
1025 * is less than 8k, a setting of 7500 gives us plenty of wiggle
1026 * room if we go over a little bit in the logging below */
1027 WARN_ON_ONCE(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN > 7500);
1028 len_max = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1029
1030 /* scratch buffer to hold the userspace args */
1031 buf_head = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1032 if (!buf_head) {
1033 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
1034 return;
1035 }
1036 buf = buf_head;
1037
1038 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc);
1039
1040 len_rem = len_max;
1041 len_buf = 0;
1042 len_full = 0;
1043 require_data = true;
1044 encode = false;
1045 iter = 0;
1046 arg = 0;
1047 do {
1048 /* NOTE: we don't ever want to trust this value for anything
1049 * serious, but the audit record format insists we
1050 * provide an argument length for really long arguments,
1051 * e.g. > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN, so we have no choice but
1052 * to use strncpy_from_user() to obtain this value for
1053 * recording in the log, although we don't use it
1054 * anywhere here to avoid a double-fetch problem */
1055 if (len_full == 0)
1056 len_full = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1057
1058 /* read more data from userspace */
1059 if (require_data) {
1060 /* can we make more room in the buffer? */
1061 if (buf != buf_head) {
1062 memmove(buf_head, buf, len_buf);
1063 buf = buf_head;
1064 }
1065
1066 /* fetch as much as we can of the argument */
1067 len_tmp = strncpy_from_user(&buf_head[len_buf], p,
1068 len_max - len_buf);
1069 if (len_tmp == -EFAULT) {
1070 /* unable to copy from userspace */
1071 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1072 goto out;
1073 } else if (len_tmp == (len_max - len_buf)) {
1074 /* buffer is not large enough */
1075 require_data = true;
1076 /* NOTE: if we are going to span multiple
1077 * buffers force the encoding so we stand
1078 * a chance at a sane len_full value and
1079 * consistent record encoding */
1080 encode = true;
1081 len_full = len_full * 2;
1082 p += len_tmp;
1083 } else {
1084 require_data = false;
1085 if (!encode)
1086 encode = audit_string_contains_control(
1087 buf, len_tmp);
1088 /* try to use a trusted value for len_full */
1089 if (len_full < len_max)
1090 len_full = (encode ?
1091 len_tmp * 2 : len_tmp);
1092 p += len_tmp + 1;
1093 }
1094 len_buf += len_tmp;
1095 buf_head[len_buf] = '\0';
1096
1097 /* length of the buffer in the audit record? */
1098 len_abuf = (encode ? len_buf * 2 : len_buf + 2);
1099 }
1100
1101 /* write as much as we can to the audit log */
1102 if (len_buf > 0) {
1103 /* NOTE: some magic numbers here - basically if we
1104 * can't fit a reasonable amount of data into the
1105 * existing audit buffer, flush it and start with
1106 * a new buffer */
1107 if ((sizeof(abuf) + 8) > len_rem) {
1108 len_rem = len_max;
1109 audit_log_end(*ab);
1110 *ab = audit_log_start(context,
1111 GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1112 if (!*ab)
1113 goto out;
1114 }
1115
1116 /* create the non-arg portion of the arg record */
1117 len_tmp = 0;
1118 if (require_data || (iter > 0) ||
1119 ((len_abuf + sizeof(abuf)) > len_rem)) {
1120 if (iter == 0) {
1121 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1122 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1123 " a%d_len=%lu",
1124 arg, len_full);
1125 }
1126 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1127 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1128 " a%d[%d]=", arg, iter++);
1129 } else
1130 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1131 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1132 " a%d=", arg);
1133 WARN_ON(len_tmp >= sizeof(abuf));
1134 abuf[sizeof(abuf) - 1] = '\0';
1135
1136 /* log the arg in the audit record */
1137 audit_log_format(*ab, "%s", abuf);
1138 len_rem -= len_tmp;
1139 len_tmp = len_buf;
1140 if (encode) {
1141 if (len_abuf > len_rem)
1142 len_tmp = len_rem / 2; /* encoding */
1143 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
1144 len_rem -= len_tmp * 2;
1145 len_abuf -= len_tmp * 2;
1146 } else {
1147 if (len_abuf > len_rem)
1148 len_tmp = len_rem - 2; /* quotes */
1149 audit_log_n_string(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
1150 len_rem -= len_tmp + 2;
1151 /* don't subtract the "2" because we still need
1152 * to add quotes to the remaining string */
1153 len_abuf -= len_tmp;
1154 }
1155 len_buf -= len_tmp;
1156 buf += len_tmp;
1157 }
1158
1159 /* ready to move to the next argument? */
1160 if ((len_buf == 0) && !require_data) {
1161 arg++;
1162 iter = 0;
1163 len_full = 0;
1164 require_data = true;
1165 encode = false;
1166 }
1167 } while (arg < context->execve.argc);
1168
1169 /* NOTE: the caller handles the final audit_log_end() call */
1170
1171 out:
1172 kfree(buf_head);
1173 }
1174
1175 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1176 {
1177 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1178 int i;
1179
1180 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1181 if (!ab)
1182 return;
1183
1184 switch (context->type) {
1185 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1186 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1187 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1188 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1189 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1190 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1191 break; }
1192 case AUDIT_IPC: {
1193 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1194
1195 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1196 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
1197 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
1198 context->ipc.mode);
1199 if (osid) {
1200 char *ctx = NULL;
1201 u32 len;
1202 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1203 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1204 *call_panic = 1;
1205 } else {
1206 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1207 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1208 }
1209 }
1210 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1211 audit_log_end(ab);
1212 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1213 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1214 if (unlikely(!ab))
1215 return;
1216 audit_log_format(ab,
1217 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1218 context->ipc.qbytes,
1219 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1220 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1221 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1222 }
1223 break; }
1224 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN:
1225 audit_log_format(ab,
1226 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1227 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1228 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1229 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1230 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1231 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1232 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1233 break;
1234 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV:
1235 audit_log_format(ab,
1236 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1237 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1238 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1239 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1240 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1241 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1242 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1243 break;
1244 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY:
1245 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1246 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1247 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1248 break;
1249 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1250 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1251 audit_log_format(ab,
1252 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1253 "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
1254 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1255 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1256 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1257 break; }
1258 case AUDIT_CAPSET:
1259 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1260 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1261 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1262 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1263 break;
1264 case AUDIT_MMAP:
1265 audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
1266 context->mmap.flags);
1267 break;
1268 case AUDIT_EXECVE:
1269 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab);
1270 break;
1271 case AUDIT_KERN_MODULE:
1272 audit_log_format(ab, "name=");
1273 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->module.name);
1274 kfree(context->module.name);
1275 break;
1276 }
1277 audit_log_end(ab);
1278 }
1279
1280 static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len)
1281 {
1282 char *end = proctitle + len - 1;
1283 while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end))
1284 end--;
1285
1286 /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */
1287 len = end - proctitle + 1;
1288 len -= isprint(proctitle[len-1]) == 0;
1289 return len;
1290 }
1291
1292 static void audit_log_proctitle(struct task_struct *tsk,
1293 struct audit_context *context)
1294 {
1295 int res;
1296 char *buf;
1297 char *msg = "(null)";
1298 int len = strlen(msg);
1299 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1300
1301 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE);
1302 if (!ab)
1303 return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
1304
1305 audit_log_format(ab, "proctitle=");
1306
1307 /* Not cached */
1308 if (!context->proctitle.value) {
1309 buf = kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
1310 if (!buf)
1311 goto out;
1312 /* Historically called this from procfs naming */
1313 res = get_cmdline(tsk, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN);
1314 if (res == 0) {
1315 kfree(buf);
1316 goto out;
1317 }
1318 res = audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf, res);
1319 if (res == 0) {
1320 kfree(buf);
1321 goto out;
1322 }
1323 context->proctitle.value = buf;
1324 context->proctitle.len = res;
1325 }
1326 msg = context->proctitle.value;
1327 len = context->proctitle.len;
1328 out:
1329 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, msg, len);
1330 audit_log_end(ab);
1331 }
1332
1333 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
1334 {
1335 int i, call_panic = 0;
1336 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1337 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1338 struct audit_names *n;
1339
1340 /* tsk == current */
1341 context->personality = tsk->personality;
1342
1343 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1344 if (!ab)
1345 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1346 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1347 context->arch, context->major);
1348 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1349 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1350 if (context->return_valid)
1351 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1352 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1353 context->return_code);
1354
1355 audit_log_format(ab,
1356 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1357 context->argv[0],
1358 context->argv[1],
1359 context->argv[2],
1360 context->argv[3],
1361 context->name_count);
1362
1363 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
1364 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
1365 audit_log_end(ab);
1366
1367 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1368
1369 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1370 if (!ab)
1371 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1372
1373 switch (aux->type) {
1374
1375 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1376 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1377 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1378 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1379 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1380 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1381 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1382 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1383 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1384 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1385 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1386 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1387 break; }
1388
1389 }
1390 audit_log_end(ab);
1391 }
1392
1393 if (context->type)
1394 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1395
1396 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1397 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1398 if (ab) {
1399 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1400 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1401 audit_log_end(ab);
1402 }
1403 }
1404
1405 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1406 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1407 if (ab) {
1408 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1409 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1410 context->sockaddr_len);
1411 audit_log_end(ab);
1412 }
1413 }
1414
1415 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1416 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1417
1418 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1419 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1420 axs->target_auid[i],
1421 axs->target_uid[i],
1422 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1423 axs->target_sid[i],
1424 axs->target_comm[i]))
1425 call_panic = 1;
1426 }
1427
1428 if (context->target_pid &&
1429 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1430 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1431 context->target_sessionid,
1432 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1433 call_panic = 1;
1434
1435 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1436 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1437 if (ab) {
1438 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
1439 audit_log_end(ab);
1440 }
1441 }
1442
1443 i = 0;
1444 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1445 if (n->hidden)
1446 continue;
1447 audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
1448 }
1449
1450 audit_log_proctitle(tsk, context);
1451
1452 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1453 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1454 if (ab)
1455 audit_log_end(ab);
1456 if (call_panic)
1457 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1458 }
1459
1460 /**
1461 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1462 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1463 *
1464 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1465 */
1466 void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1467 {
1468 struct audit_context *context;
1469
1470 context = audit_take_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1471 if (!context)
1472 return;
1473
1474 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1475 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1476 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1477 * in the context of the idle thread */
1478 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1479 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1480 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1481 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1482 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1483
1484 audit_free_context(context);
1485 }
1486
1487 /**
1488 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1489 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1490 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1491 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1492 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1493 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1494 *
1495 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1496 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1497 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1498 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1499 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1500 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1501 * be written).
1502 */
1503 void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1504 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1505 {
1506 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1507 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1508 enum audit_state state;
1509
1510 if (!context)
1511 return;
1512
1513 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1514
1515 if (!audit_enabled)
1516 return;
1517
1518 context->arch = syscall_get_arch();
1519 context->major = major;
1520 context->argv[0] = a1;
1521 context->argv[1] = a2;
1522 context->argv[2] = a3;
1523 context->argv[3] = a4;
1524
1525 state = context->state;
1526 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1527 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
1528 context->prio = 0;
1529 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1530 }
1531 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
1532 return;
1533
1534 context->serial = 0;
1535 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1536 context->in_syscall = 1;
1537 context->current_state = state;
1538 context->ppid = 0;
1539 }
1540
1541 /**
1542 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1543 * @success: success value of the syscall
1544 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
1545 *
1546 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1547 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1548 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
1549 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1550 * free the names stored from getname().
1551 */
1552 void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
1553 {
1554 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1555 struct audit_context *context;
1556
1557 if (success)
1558 success = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
1559 else
1560 success = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
1561
1562 context = audit_take_context(tsk, success, return_code);
1563 if (!context)
1564 return;
1565
1566 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1567 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1568
1569 context->in_syscall = 0;
1570 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
1571
1572 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1573 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1574
1575 audit_free_names(context);
1576 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1577 audit_free_aux(context);
1578 context->aux = NULL;
1579 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1580 context->target_pid = 0;
1581 context->target_sid = 0;
1582 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
1583 context->type = 0;
1584 context->fds[0] = -1;
1585 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
1586 kfree(context->filterkey);
1587 context->filterkey = NULL;
1588 }
1589 tsk->audit_context = context;
1590 }
1591
1592 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1593 {
1594 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1595 struct audit_context *context;
1596 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1597 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1598 int count;
1599 if (likely(hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks)))
1600 return;
1601 context = current->audit_context;
1602 p = context->trees;
1603 count = context->tree_count;
1604 rcu_read_lock();
1605 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1606 rcu_read_unlock();
1607 if (!chunk)
1608 return;
1609 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1610 return;
1611 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1612 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1613 audit_set_auditable(context);
1614 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1615 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1616 return;
1617 }
1618 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1619 #endif
1620 }
1621
1622 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1623 {
1624 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1625 struct audit_context *context;
1626 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1627 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1628 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1629 unsigned long seq;
1630 int count;
1631
1632 context = current->audit_context;
1633 p = context->trees;
1634 count = context->tree_count;
1635 retry:
1636 drop = NULL;
1637 d = dentry;
1638 rcu_read_lock();
1639 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1640 for(;;) {
1641 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(d);
1642 if (inode && unlikely(!hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) {
1643 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1644 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1645 if (chunk) {
1646 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1647 drop = chunk;
1648 break;
1649 }
1650 }
1651 }
1652 parent = d->d_parent;
1653 if (parent == d)
1654 break;
1655 d = parent;
1656 }
1657 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1658 rcu_read_unlock();
1659 if (!drop) {
1660 /* just a race with rename */
1661 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1662 goto retry;
1663 }
1664 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1665 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1666 /* OK, got more space */
1667 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1668 goto retry;
1669 }
1670 /* too bad */
1671 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1672 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1673 audit_set_auditable(context);
1674 return;
1675 }
1676 rcu_read_unlock();
1677 #endif
1678 }
1679
1680 static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context,
1681 unsigned char type)
1682 {
1683 struct audit_names *aname;
1684
1685 if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) {
1686 aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count];
1687 memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname));
1688 } else {
1689 aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS);
1690 if (!aname)
1691 return NULL;
1692 aname->should_free = true;
1693 }
1694
1695 aname->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
1696 aname->type = type;
1697 list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
1698
1699 context->name_count++;
1700 return aname;
1701 }
1702
1703 /**
1704 * audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
1705 * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
1706 *
1707 * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
1708 * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
1709 * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
1710 */
1711 struct filename *
1712 __audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr)
1713 {
1714 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1715 struct audit_names *n;
1716
1717 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1718 if (!n->name)
1719 continue;
1720 if (n->name->uptr == uptr) {
1721 n->name->refcnt++;
1722 return n->name;
1723 }
1724 }
1725 return NULL;
1726 }
1727
1728 /**
1729 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1730 * @name: name to add
1731 *
1732 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1733 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1734 */
1735 void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
1736 {
1737 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1738 struct audit_names *n;
1739
1740 if (!context->in_syscall)
1741 return;
1742
1743 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
1744 if (!n)
1745 return;
1746
1747 n->name = name;
1748 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1749 name->aname = n;
1750 name->refcnt++;
1751
1752 if (!context->pwd.dentry)
1753 get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
1754 }
1755
1756 /**
1757 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1758 * @name: name being audited
1759 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1760 * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
1761 */
1762 void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1763 unsigned int flags)
1764 {
1765 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1766 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1767 struct audit_names *n;
1768 bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
1769
1770 if (!context->in_syscall)
1771 return;
1772
1773 if (!name)
1774 goto out_alloc;
1775
1776 /*
1777 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
1778 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
1779 */
1780 n = name->aname;
1781 if (n) {
1782 if (parent) {
1783 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
1784 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1785 goto out;
1786 } else {
1787 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
1788 goto out;
1789 }
1790 }
1791
1792 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1793 if (n->ino) {
1794 /* valid inode number, use that for the comparison */
1795 if (n->ino != inode->i_ino ||
1796 n->dev != inode->i_sb->s_dev)
1797 continue;
1798 } else if (n->name) {
1799 /* inode number has not been set, check the name */
1800 if (strcmp(n->name->name, name->name))
1801 continue;
1802 } else
1803 /* no inode and no name (?!) ... this is odd ... */
1804 continue;
1805
1806 /* match the correct record type */
1807 if (parent) {
1808 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
1809 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1810 goto out;
1811 } else {
1812 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
1813 goto out;
1814 }
1815 }
1816
1817 out_alloc:
1818 /* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */
1819 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
1820 if (!n)
1821 return;
1822 if (name) {
1823 n->name = name;
1824 name->refcnt++;
1825 }
1826
1827 out:
1828 if (parent) {
1829 n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1830 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
1831 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN)
1832 n->hidden = true;
1833 } else {
1834 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1835 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
1836 }
1837 handle_path(dentry);
1838 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode);
1839 }
1840
1841 void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
1842 {
1843 __audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0);
1844 }
1845
1846 /**
1847 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1848 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1849 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1850 * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
1851 *
1852 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1853 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1854 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1855 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1856 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1857 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1858 * unsuccessful attempts.
1859 */
1860 void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
1861 const struct dentry *dentry,
1862 const unsigned char type)
1863 {
1864 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1865 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1866 const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name;
1867 struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
1868
1869 if (!context->in_syscall)
1870 return;
1871
1872 if (inode)
1873 handle_one(inode);
1874
1875 /* look for a parent entry first */
1876 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1877 if (!n->name ||
1878 (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT &&
1879 n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
1880 continue;
1881
1882 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && n->dev == parent->i_sb->s_dev &&
1883 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname,
1884 n->name->name, n->name_len)) {
1885 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1886 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
1887 found_parent = n;
1888 break;
1889 }
1890 }
1891
1892 /* is there a matching child entry? */
1893 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1894 /* can only match entries that have a name */
1895 if (!n->name ||
1896 (n->type != type && n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
1897 continue;
1898
1899 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name->name) ||
1900 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name,
1901 found_parent ?
1902 found_parent->name_len :
1903 AUDIT_NAME_FULL)) {
1904 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1905 n->type = type;
1906 found_child = n;
1907 break;
1908 }
1909 }
1910
1911 if (!found_parent) {
1912 /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
1913 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
1914 if (!n)
1915 return;
1916 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent);
1917 }
1918
1919 if (!found_child) {
1920 found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type);
1921 if (!found_child)
1922 return;
1923
1924 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
1925 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
1926 * audit_free_names() */
1927 if (found_parent) {
1928 found_child->name = found_parent->name;
1929 found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1930 found_child->name->refcnt++;
1931 }
1932 }
1933
1934 if (inode)
1935 audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode);
1936 else
1937 found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
1938 }
1939 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
1940
1941 /**
1942 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
1943 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
1944 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
1945 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
1946 *
1947 * Also sets the context as auditable.
1948 */
1949 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
1950 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
1951 {
1952 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
1953 return 0;
1954 if (!ctx->serial)
1955 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
1956 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
1957 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
1958 *serial = ctx->serial;
1959 if (!ctx->prio) {
1960 ctx->prio = 1;
1961 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
1962 }
1963 return 1;
1964 }
1965
1966 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
1967 static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
1968
1969 static int audit_set_loginuid_perm(kuid_t loginuid)
1970 {
1971 /* if we are unset, we don't need privs */
1972 if (!audit_loginuid_set(current))
1973 return 0;
1974 /* if AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE means never ever allow a change*/
1975 if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE))
1976 return -EPERM;
1977 /* it is set, you need permission */
1978 if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
1979 return -EPERM;
1980 /* reject if this is not an unset and we don't allow that */
1981 if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_ONLY_UNSET_LOGINUID) && uid_valid(loginuid))
1982 return -EPERM;
1983 return 0;
1984 }
1985
1986 static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid,
1987 unsigned int oldsessionid, unsigned int sessionid,
1988 int rc)
1989 {
1990 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1991 uid_t uid, oldloginuid, loginuid;
1992 struct tty_struct *tty;
1993
1994 if (!audit_enabled)
1995 return;
1996
1997 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
1998 if (!ab)
1999 return;
2000
2001 uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current));
2002 oldloginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, koldloginuid);
2003 loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, kloginuid),
2004 tty = audit_get_tty(current);
2005
2006 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_tgid_nr(current), uid);
2007 audit_log_task_context(ab);
2008 audit_log_format(ab, " old-auid=%u auid=%u tty=%s old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d",
2009 oldloginuid, loginuid, tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)",
2010 oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc);
2011 audit_put_tty(tty);
2012 audit_log_end(ab);
2013 }
2014
2015 /**
2016 * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid
2017 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2018 *
2019 * Returns 0.
2020 *
2021 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2022 */
2023 int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
2024 {
2025 struct task_struct *task = current;
2026 unsigned int oldsessionid, sessionid = (unsigned int)-1;
2027 kuid_t oldloginuid;
2028 int rc;
2029
2030 oldloginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2031 oldsessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2032
2033 rc = audit_set_loginuid_perm(loginuid);
2034 if (rc)
2035 goto out;
2036
2037 /* are we setting or clearing? */
2038 if (uid_valid(loginuid)) {
2039 sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
2040 if (unlikely(sessionid == (unsigned int)-1))
2041 sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
2042 }
2043
2044 task->sessionid = sessionid;
2045 task->loginuid = loginuid;
2046 out:
2047 audit_log_set_loginuid(oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, rc);
2048 return rc;
2049 }
2050
2051 /**
2052 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2053 * @oflag: open flag
2054 * @mode: mode bits
2055 * @attr: queue attributes
2056 *
2057 */
2058 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2059 {
2060 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2061
2062 if (attr)
2063 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2064 else
2065 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2066
2067 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2068 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2069
2070 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2071 }
2072
2073 /**
2074 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2075 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2076 * @msg_len: Message length
2077 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2078 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2079 *
2080 */
2081 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2082 const struct timespec *abs_timeout)
2083 {
2084 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2085 struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2086
2087 if (abs_timeout)
2088 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec));
2089 else
2090 memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec));
2091
2092 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2093 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2094 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2095
2096 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2097 }
2098
2099 /**
2100 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2101 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2102 * @notification: Notification event
2103 *
2104 */
2105
2106 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2107 {
2108 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2109
2110 if (notification)
2111 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2112 else
2113 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2114
2115 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2116 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2117 }
2118
2119 /**
2120 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2121 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2122 * @mqstat: MQ flags
2123 *
2124 */
2125 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2126 {
2127 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2128 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2129 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2130 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2131 }
2132
2133 /**
2134 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2135 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2136 *
2137 */
2138 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2139 {
2140 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2141 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2142 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2143 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2144 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2145 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2146 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2147 }
2148
2149 /**
2150 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2151 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2152 * @uid: msgq user id
2153 * @gid: msgq group id
2154 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2155 *
2156 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2157 */
2158 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
2159 {
2160 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2161
2162 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2163 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2164 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2165 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2166 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2167 }
2168
2169 void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2170 {
2171 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2172
2173 context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2174 context->execve.argc = bprm->argc;
2175 }
2176
2177
2178 /**
2179 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2180 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
2181 * @args: args array
2182 *
2183 */
2184 int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2185 {
2186 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2187
2188 if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args)
2189 return -EINVAL;
2190 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2191 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2192 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2193 return 0;
2194 }
2195
2196 /**
2197 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2198 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2199 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2200 *
2201 */
2202 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2203 {
2204 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2205 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2206 context->fds[1] = fd2;
2207 }
2208
2209 /**
2210 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2211 * @len: data length in user space
2212 * @a: data address in kernel space
2213 *
2214 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2215 */
2216 int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2217 {
2218 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2219
2220 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2221 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2222 if (!p)
2223 return -ENOMEM;
2224 context->sockaddr = p;
2225 }
2226
2227 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2228 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2229 return 0;
2230 }
2231
2232 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2233 {
2234 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2235
2236 context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2237 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2238 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2239 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2240 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2241 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2242 }
2243
2244 /**
2245 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2246 * @sig: signal value
2247 * @t: task being signaled
2248 *
2249 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2250 * and uid that is doing that.
2251 */
2252 int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
2253 {
2254 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2255 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
2256 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
2257 kuid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t);
2258
2259 if (auditd_test_task(t)) {
2260 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
2261 audit_sig_pid = task_tgid_nr(tsk);
2262 if (uid_valid(tsk->loginuid))
2263 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
2264 else
2265 audit_sig_uid = uid;
2266 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
2267 }
2268 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2269 return 0;
2270 }
2271
2272 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2273 * in audit_context */
2274 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2275 ctx->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2276 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2277 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2278 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2279 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2280 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2281 return 0;
2282 }
2283
2284 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2285 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2286 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2287 if (!axp)
2288 return -ENOMEM;
2289
2290 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2291 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2292 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2293 }
2294 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2295
2296 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = task_tgid_nr(t);
2297 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2298 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2299 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2300 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2301 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2302 axp->pid_count++;
2303
2304 return 0;
2305 }
2306
2307 /**
2308 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2309 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2310 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2311 * @old: the old credentials
2312 *
2313 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2314 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2315 *
2316 * -Eric
2317 */
2318 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2319 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2320 {
2321 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2322 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2323 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2324
2325 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2326 if (!ax)
2327 return -ENOMEM;
2328
2329 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2330 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2331 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2332
2333 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
2334
2335 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2336 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2337 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2338 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2339
2340 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2341 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2342 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2343
2344 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2345 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2346 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2347 return 0;
2348 }
2349
2350 /**
2351 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2352 * @new: the new credentials
2353 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2354 *
2355 * Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2356 * audit system if applicable
2357 */
2358 void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2359 {
2360 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2361 context->capset.pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
2362 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2363 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2364 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2365 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2366 }
2367
2368 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
2369 {
2370 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2371 context->mmap.fd = fd;
2372 context->mmap.flags = flags;
2373 context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
2374 }
2375
2376 void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
2377 {
2378 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2379
2380 context->module.name = kmalloc(strlen(name) + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
2381 strcpy(context->module.name, name);
2382 context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE;
2383 }
2384
2385 static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
2386 {
2387 kuid_t auid, uid;
2388 kgid_t gid;
2389 unsigned int sessionid;
2390 char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
2391
2392 auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2393 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2394 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2395
2396 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2397 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
2398 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid),
2399 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
2400 sessionid);
2401 audit_log_task_context(ab);
2402 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_tgid_nr(current));
2403 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
2404 audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
2405 }
2406
2407 /**
2408 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2409 * @signr: signal value
2410 *
2411 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2412 * should record the event for investigation.
2413 */
2414 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2415 {
2416 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2417
2418 if (!audit_enabled)
2419 return;
2420
2421 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2422 return;
2423
2424 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2425 if (unlikely(!ab))
2426 return;
2427 audit_log_task(ab);
2428 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld res=1", signr);
2429 audit_log_end(ab);
2430 }
2431
2432 void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
2433 {
2434 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2435
2436 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
2437 if (unlikely(!ab))
2438 return;
2439 audit_log_task(ab);
2440 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x",
2441 signr, syscall_get_arch(), syscall,
2442 in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current), code);
2443 audit_log_end(ab);
2444 }
2445
2446 struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
2447 {
2448 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
2449 if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
2450 return NULL;
2451 return &ctx->killed_trees;
2452 }
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