parport: Revert "parport: fix memory leak"
[linux-2.6/btrfs-unstable.git] / crypto / asymmetric_keys / pkcs7_trust.c
blob1d29376072da4a502e720fe10fc8fb34f6c4749a
1 /* Validate the trust chain of a PKCS#7 message.
3 * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
6 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
7 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
8 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
9 * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
12 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt
13 #include <linux/kernel.h>
14 #include <linux/export.h>
15 #include <linux/slab.h>
16 #include <linux/err.h>
17 #include <linux/asn1.h>
18 #include <linux/key.h>
19 #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
20 #include "public_key.h"
21 #include "pkcs7_parser.h"
23 /**
24 * Check the trust on one PKCS#7 SignedInfo block.
26 static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
27 struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo,
28 struct key *trust_keyring)
30 struct public_key_signature *sig = &sinfo->sig;
31 struct x509_certificate *x509, *last = NULL, *p;
32 struct key *key;
33 bool trusted;
34 int ret;
36 kenter(",%u,", sinfo->index);
38 if (sinfo->unsupported_crypto) {
39 kleave(" = -ENOPKG [cached]");
40 return -ENOPKG;
43 for (x509 = sinfo->signer; x509; x509 = x509->signer) {
44 if (x509->seen) {
45 if (x509->verified) {
46 trusted = x509->trusted;
47 goto verified;
49 kleave(" = -ENOKEY [cached]");
50 return -ENOKEY;
52 x509->seen = true;
54 /* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted
55 * keys.
57 key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, x509->id,
58 false);
59 if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
60 /* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message
61 * is apparently the same as one we already trust.
62 * Verify that the trusted variant can also validate
63 * the signature on the descendant.
65 pr_devel("sinfo %u: Cert %u as key %x\n",
66 sinfo->index, x509->index, key_serial(key));
67 goto matched;
69 if (key == ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM))
70 return -ENOMEM;
72 /* Self-signed certificates form roots of their own, and if we
73 * don't know them, then we can't accept them.
75 if (x509->next == x509) {
76 kleave(" = -ENOKEY [unknown self-signed]");
77 return -ENOKEY;
80 might_sleep();
81 last = x509;
82 sig = &last->sig;
85 /* No match - see if the root certificate has a signer amongst the
86 * trusted keys.
88 if (last && last->authority) {
89 key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->authority,
90 false);
91 if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
92 x509 = last;
93 pr_devel("sinfo %u: Root cert %u signer is key %x\n",
94 sinfo->index, x509->index, key_serial(key));
95 goto matched;
97 if (PTR_ERR(key) != -ENOKEY)
98 return PTR_ERR(key);
101 /* As a last resort, see if we have a trusted public key that matches
102 * the signed info directly.
104 key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
105 sinfo->signing_cert_id,
106 false);
107 if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
108 pr_devel("sinfo %u: Direct signer is key %x\n",
109 sinfo->index, key_serial(key));
110 x509 = NULL;
111 goto matched;
113 if (PTR_ERR(key) != -ENOKEY)
114 return PTR_ERR(key);
116 kleave(" = -ENOKEY [no backref]");
117 return -ENOKEY;
119 matched:
120 ret = verify_signature(key, sig);
121 trusted = test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED, &key->flags);
122 key_put(key);
123 if (ret < 0) {
124 if (ret == -ENOMEM)
125 return ret;
126 kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [verify %d]", ret);
127 return -EKEYREJECTED;
130 verified:
131 if (x509) {
132 x509->verified = true;
133 for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer) {
134 p->verified = true;
135 p->trusted = trusted;
138 sinfo->trusted = trusted;
139 kleave(" = 0");
140 return 0;
144 * pkcs7_validate_trust - Validate PKCS#7 trust chain
145 * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 certificate to validate
146 * @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points
147 * @_trusted: Set to true if trustworth, false otherwise
149 * Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message intersects
150 * keys we already know and trust.
152 * Returns, in order of descending priority:
154 * (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a signature failed to match for which we have a valid
155 * key, or:
157 * (*) 0 if at least one signature chain intersects with the keys in the trust
158 * keyring, or:
160 * (*) -ENOPKG if a suitable crypto module couldn't be found for a check on a
161 * chain.
163 * (*) -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a match for any of the signature chains in
164 * the message.
166 * May also return -ENOMEM.
168 int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
169 struct key *trust_keyring,
170 bool *_trusted)
172 struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
173 struct x509_certificate *p;
174 int cached_ret = -ENOKEY;
175 int ret;
177 for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next)
178 p->seen = false;
180 for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
181 ret = pkcs7_validate_trust_one(pkcs7, sinfo, trust_keyring);
182 switch (ret) {
183 case -ENOKEY:
184 continue;
185 case -ENOPKG:
186 if (cached_ret == -ENOKEY)
187 cached_ret = -ENOPKG;
188 continue;
189 case 0:
190 *_trusted |= sinfo->trusted;
191 cached_ret = 0;
192 continue;
193 default:
194 return ret;
198 return cached_ret;
200 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_validate_trust);