2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/security.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
54 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
55 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
56 #include <net/netlabel.h>
57 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
58 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
59 #include <linux/atomic.h>
60 #include <linux/bitops.h>
61 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
62 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
63 #include <linux/netlink.h>
64 #include <linux/tcp.h>
65 #include <linux/udp.h>
66 #include <linux/dccp.h>
67 #include <linux/quota.h>
68 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
69 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <linux/parser.h>
71 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
73 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
74 #include <linux/personality.h>
75 #include <linux/audit.h>
76 #include <linux/string.h>
77 #include <linux/selinux.h>
78 #include <linux/mutex.h>
79 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
80 #include <linux/syslog.h>
81 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
82 #include <linux/export.h>
83 #include <linux/msg.h>
84 #include <linux/shm.h>
96 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
98 extern struct security_operations
*security_ops
;
100 /* SECMARK reference count */
101 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount
= ATOMIC_INIT(0);
103 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
104 int selinux_enforcing
;
106 static int __init
enforcing_setup(char *str
)
108 unsigned long enforcing
;
109 if (!strict_strtoul(str
, 0, &enforcing
))
110 selinux_enforcing
= enforcing
? 1 : 0;
113 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup
);
116 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
117 int selinux_enabled
= CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
;
119 static int __init
selinux_enabled_setup(char *str
)
121 unsigned long enabled
;
122 if (!strict_strtoul(str
, 0, &enabled
))
123 selinux_enabled
= enabled
? 1 : 0;
126 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup
);
128 int selinux_enabled
= 1;
131 static struct kmem_cache
*sel_inode_cache
;
134 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
137 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
138 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
139 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
140 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
143 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
145 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount
) > 0);
149 * initialise the security for the init task
151 static void cred_init_security(void)
153 struct cred
*cred
= (struct cred
*) current
->real_cred
;
154 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
156 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
158 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
160 tsec
->osid
= tsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
161 cred
->security
= tsec
;
165 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
167 static inline u32
cred_sid(const struct cred
*cred
)
169 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
171 tsec
= cred
->security
;
176 * get the objective security ID of a task
178 static inline u32
task_sid(const struct task_struct
*task
)
183 sid
= cred_sid(__task_cred(task
));
189 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
191 static inline u32
current_sid(void)
193 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
198 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
200 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
202 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
203 u32 sid
= current_sid();
205 isec
= kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache
, GFP_NOFS
);
209 mutex_init(&isec
->lock
);
210 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec
->list
);
212 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
213 isec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_FILE
;
214 isec
->task_sid
= sid
;
215 inode
->i_security
= isec
;
220 static void inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
222 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
223 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
225 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
226 if (!list_empty(&isec
->list
))
227 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
228 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
230 inode
->i_security
= NULL
;
231 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache
, isec
);
234 static int file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
236 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
237 u32 sid
= current_sid();
239 fsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
244 fsec
->fown_sid
= sid
;
245 file
->f_security
= fsec
;
250 static void file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
252 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
253 file
->f_security
= NULL
;
257 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
259 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
261 sbsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
265 mutex_init(&sbsec
->lock
);
266 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec
->isec_head
);
267 spin_lock_init(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
269 sbsec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
270 sbsec
->def_sid
= SECINITSID_FILE
;
271 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
272 sb
->s_security
= sbsec
;
277 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
279 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
280 sb
->s_security
= NULL
;
284 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
286 static const char *labeling_behaviors
[6] = {
288 "uses transition SIDs",
290 "uses genfs_contexts",
291 "not configured for labeling",
292 "uses mountpoint labeling",
295 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
);
297 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode
*inode
)
299 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, NULL
);
308 Opt_labelsupport
= 5,
311 static const match_table_t tokens
= {
312 {Opt_context
, CONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
313 {Opt_fscontext
, FSCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
314 {Opt_defcontext
, DEFCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
315 {Opt_rootcontext
, ROOTCONTEXT_STR
"%s"},
316 {Opt_labelsupport
, LABELSUPP_STR
},
320 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
322 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid
,
323 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
324 const struct cred
*cred
)
326 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
329 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
330 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
334 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
335 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
339 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid
,
340 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
,
341 const struct cred
*cred
)
343 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
345 rc
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
346 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
350 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
351 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, NULL
);
355 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block
*sb
)
357 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
358 struct dentry
*root
= sb
->s_root
;
359 struct inode
*root_inode
= root
->d_inode
;
362 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
) {
363 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
364 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
365 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
366 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
367 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
368 if (!root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
369 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
370 "xattr support\n", sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
374 rc
= root_inode
->i_op
->getxattr(root
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, NULL
, 0);
375 if (rc
< 0 && rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
376 if (rc
== -EOPNOTSUPP
)
377 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
378 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
379 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
381 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: (dev %s, type "
382 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb
->s_id
,
383 sb
->s_type
->name
, -rc
);
388 sbsec
->flags
|= (SE_SBINITIALIZED
| SE_SBLABELSUPP
);
390 if (sbsec
->behavior
> ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors
))
391 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
392 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
);
394 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
395 sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
,
396 labeling_behaviors
[sbsec
->behavior
-1]);
398 if (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS
||
399 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
||
400 sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE
||
401 sbsec
->behavior
> ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors
))
402 sbsec
->flags
&= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP
;
404 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
405 if (strncmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
406 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBLABELSUPP
;
408 /* Initialize the root inode. */
409 rc
= inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode
, root
);
411 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
412 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
413 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
415 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
417 if (!list_empty(&sbsec
->isec_head
)) {
418 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
=
419 list_entry(sbsec
->isec_head
.next
,
420 struct inode_security_struct
, list
);
421 struct inode
*inode
= isec
->inode
;
422 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
423 inode
= igrab(inode
);
425 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode
))
429 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
430 list_del_init(&isec
->list
);
433 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
439 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
440 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
441 * mount options, or whatever.
443 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*sb
,
444 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
447 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
448 char *context
= NULL
;
452 security_init_mnt_opts(opts
);
454 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
460 tmp
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
461 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
462 for (i
= 0; i
< 8; i
++) {
464 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
467 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
468 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
)
469 opts
->num_mnt_opts
++;
471 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
472 if (!opts
->mnt_opts
) {
477 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(opts
->num_mnt_opts
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
478 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
484 if (sbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
) {
485 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
488 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
489 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
491 if (sbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
) {
492 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
, &context
, &len
);
495 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
496 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
498 if (sbsec
->flags
& DEFCONTEXT_MNT
) {
499 rc
= security_sid_to_context(sbsec
->def_sid
, &context
, &len
);
502 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
503 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
505 if (sbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
) {
506 struct inode
*root
= sbsec
->sb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
507 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= root
->i_security
;
509 rc
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
512 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = context
;
513 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
515 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
) {
516 opts
->mnt_opts
[i
] = NULL
;
517 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP
;
520 BUG_ON(i
!= opts
->num_mnt_opts
);
525 security_free_mnt_opts(opts
);
529 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
, char flag
,
530 u32 old_sid
, u32 new_sid
)
532 char mnt_flags
= sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
;
534 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
535 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
536 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& flag
) ||
537 (old_sid
!= new_sid
))
540 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
541 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
543 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
544 if (mnt_flags
& flag
)
550 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
551 * labeling information.
553 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block
*sb
,
554 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
556 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
558 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
559 const char *name
= sb
->s_type
->name
;
560 struct inode
*inode
= sbsec
->sb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
561 struct inode_security_struct
*root_isec
= inode
->i_security
;
562 u32 fscontext_sid
= 0, context_sid
= 0, rootcontext_sid
= 0;
563 u32 defcontext_sid
= 0;
564 char **mount_options
= opts
->mnt_opts
;
565 int *flags
= opts
->mnt_opts_flags
;
566 int num_opts
= opts
->num_mnt_opts
;
568 mutex_lock(&sbsec
->lock
);
570 if (!ss_initialized
) {
572 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
573 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
574 server is ready to handle calls. */
578 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
579 "before the security server is initialized\n");
584 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
585 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
586 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
587 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
589 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
590 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
591 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
592 * will be used for both mounts)
594 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) && (sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
)
599 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
600 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
601 * than once with different security options.
603 for (i
= 0; i
< num_opts
; i
++) {
606 if (flags
[i
] == SE_SBLABELSUPP
)
608 rc
= security_context_to_sid(mount_options
[i
],
609 strlen(mount_options
[i
]), &sid
);
611 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
612 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
613 mount_options
[i
], sb
->s_id
, name
, rc
);
620 if (bad_option(sbsec
, FSCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->sid
,
622 goto out_double_mount
;
624 sbsec
->flags
|= FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
629 if (bad_option(sbsec
, CONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
,
631 goto out_double_mount
;
633 sbsec
->flags
|= CONTEXT_MNT
;
635 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
636 rootcontext_sid
= sid
;
638 if (bad_option(sbsec
, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
, root_isec
->sid
,
640 goto out_double_mount
;
642 sbsec
->flags
|= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
646 defcontext_sid
= sid
;
648 if (bad_option(sbsec
, DEFCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->def_sid
,
650 goto out_double_mount
;
652 sbsec
->flags
|= DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
661 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
662 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
663 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_MNTMASK
) && !num_opts
)
664 goto out_double_mount
;
669 if (strcmp(sb
->s_type
->name
, "proc") == 0)
670 sbsec
->flags
|= SE_SBPROC
;
672 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
673 rc
= security_fs_use((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBPROC
) ? "proc" : sb
->s_type
->name
, &sbsec
->behavior
, &sbsec
->sid
);
675 printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
676 __func__
, sb
->s_type
->name
, rc
);
680 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
682 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid
, sbsec
, cred
);
686 sbsec
->sid
= fscontext_sid
;
690 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
691 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
692 * the superblock context if not already set.
695 if (!fscontext_sid
) {
696 rc
= may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
700 sbsec
->sid
= context_sid
;
702 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid
, sbsec
,
707 if (!rootcontext_sid
)
708 rootcontext_sid
= context_sid
;
710 sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= context_sid
;
711 sbsec
->behavior
= SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
;
714 if (rootcontext_sid
) {
715 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid
, sbsec
,
720 root_isec
->sid
= rootcontext_sid
;
721 root_isec
->initialized
= 1;
724 if (defcontext_sid
) {
725 if (sbsec
->behavior
!= SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
) {
727 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: defcontext option is "
728 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
732 if (defcontext_sid
!= sbsec
->def_sid
) {
733 rc
= may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid
,
739 sbsec
->def_sid
= defcontext_sid
;
742 rc
= sb_finish_set_opts(sb
);
744 mutex_unlock(&sbsec
->lock
);
748 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
749 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb
->s_id
, name
);
753 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
*oldsb
,
754 struct super_block
*newsb
)
756 const struct superblock_security_struct
*oldsbsec
= oldsb
->s_security
;
757 struct superblock_security_struct
*newsbsec
= newsb
->s_security
;
759 int set_fscontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& FSCONTEXT_MNT
);
760 int set_context
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& CONTEXT_MNT
);
761 int set_rootcontext
= (oldsbsec
->flags
& ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
);
764 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
765 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
770 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
771 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
));
773 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
774 if (newsbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)
777 mutex_lock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
779 newsbsec
->flags
= oldsbsec
->flags
;
781 newsbsec
->sid
= oldsbsec
->sid
;
782 newsbsec
->def_sid
= oldsbsec
->def_sid
;
783 newsbsec
->behavior
= oldsbsec
->behavior
;
786 u32 sid
= oldsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
790 if (!set_rootcontext
) {
791 struct inode
*newinode
= newsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
792 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= newinode
->i_security
;
795 newsbsec
->mntpoint_sid
= sid
;
797 if (set_rootcontext
) {
798 const struct inode
*oldinode
= oldsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
799 const struct inode_security_struct
*oldisec
= oldinode
->i_security
;
800 struct inode
*newinode
= newsb
->s_root
->d_inode
;
801 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
= newinode
->i_security
;
803 newisec
->sid
= oldisec
->sid
;
806 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb
);
807 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec
->lock
);
810 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options
,
811 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
814 char *context
= NULL
, *defcontext
= NULL
;
815 char *fscontext
= NULL
, *rootcontext
= NULL
;
816 int rc
, num_mnt_opts
= 0;
818 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= 0;
820 /* Standard string-based options. */
821 while ((p
= strsep(&options
, "|")) != NULL
) {
823 substring_t args
[MAX_OPT_ARGS
];
828 token
= match_token(p
, tokens
, args
);
832 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
834 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
837 context
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
847 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
850 fscontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
857 case Opt_rootcontext
:
860 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
863 rootcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
871 if (context
|| defcontext
) {
873 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG
);
876 defcontext
= match_strdup(&args
[0]);
882 case Opt_labelsupport
:
886 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
893 opts
->mnt_opts
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC
);
897 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
= kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS
, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC
);
898 if (!opts
->mnt_opts_flags
) {
899 kfree(opts
->mnt_opts
);
904 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = fscontext
;
905 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT
;
908 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = context
;
909 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = CONTEXT_MNT
;
912 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = rootcontext
;
913 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
;
916 opts
->mnt_opts
[num_mnt_opts
] = defcontext
;
917 opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[num_mnt_opts
++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT
;
920 opts
->num_mnt_opts
= num_mnt_opts
;
931 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
933 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block
*sb
, void *data
)
936 char *options
= data
;
937 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
939 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts
);
944 BUG_ON(sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
);
946 rc
= selinux_parse_opts_str(options
, &opts
);
951 rc
= selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
);
954 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
958 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file
*m
,
959 struct security_mnt_opts
*opts
)
964 for (i
= 0; i
< opts
->num_mnt_opts
; i
++) {
967 if (opts
->mnt_opts
[i
])
968 has_comma
= strchr(opts
->mnt_opts
[i
], ',');
972 switch (opts
->mnt_opts_flags
[i
]) {
974 prefix
= CONTEXT_STR
;
977 prefix
= FSCONTEXT_STR
;
979 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
:
980 prefix
= ROOTCONTEXT_STR
;
983 prefix
= DEFCONTEXT_STR
;
987 seq_puts(m
, LABELSUPP_STR
);
993 /* we need a comma before each option */
998 seq_puts(m
, opts
->mnt_opts
[i
]);
1004 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file
*m
, struct super_block
*sb
)
1006 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
1009 rc
= selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb
, &opts
);
1011 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1017 selinux_write_opts(m
, &opts
);
1019 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
1024 static inline u16
inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode
)
1026 switch (mode
& S_IFMT
) {
1028 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE
;
1030 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
;
1032 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1034 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE
;
1036 return SECCLASS_DIR
;
1038 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE
;
1040 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE
;
1044 return SECCLASS_FILE
;
1047 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol
)
1049 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_TCP
);
1052 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol
)
1054 return (protocol
== IPPROTO_IP
|| protocol
== IPPROTO_UDP
);
1057 static inline u16
socket_type_to_security_class(int family
, int type
, int protocol
)
1063 case SOCK_SEQPACKET
:
1064 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
;
1066 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET
;
1073 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol
))
1074 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
;
1076 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1078 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol
))
1079 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
;
1081 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1083 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
;
1085 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET
;
1091 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET
;
1092 case NETLINK_FIREWALL
:
1093 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET
;
1094 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG
:
1095 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET
;
1097 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET
;
1099 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET
;
1100 case NETLINK_SELINUX
:
1101 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET
;
1103 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET
;
1104 case NETLINK_IP6_FW
:
1105 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET
;
1106 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG
:
1107 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET
;
1108 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT
:
1109 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET
;
1111 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET
;
1114 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET
;
1116 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET
;
1118 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET
;
1121 return SECCLASS_SOCKET
;
1124 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1125 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry
*dentry
,
1130 char *buffer
, *path
;
1132 buffer
= (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
1136 path
= dentry_path_raw(dentry
, buffer
, PAGE_SIZE
);
1140 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1141 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1142 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1143 while (path
[1] >= '0' && path
[1] <= '9') {
1147 rc
= security_genfs_sid("proc", path
, tclass
, sid
);
1149 free_page((unsigned long)buffer
);
1153 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry
*dentry
,
1161 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1162 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode
*inode
, struct dentry
*opt_dentry
)
1164 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= NULL
;
1165 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1167 struct dentry
*dentry
;
1168 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1169 char *context
= NULL
;
1173 if (isec
->initialized
)
1176 mutex_lock(&isec
->lock
);
1177 if (isec
->initialized
)
1180 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1181 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
)) {
1182 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1183 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1184 server is ready to handle calls. */
1185 spin_lock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1186 if (list_empty(&isec
->list
))
1187 list_add(&isec
->list
, &sbsec
->isec_head
);
1188 spin_unlock(&sbsec
->isec_lock
);
1192 switch (sbsec
->behavior
) {
1193 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR
:
1194 if (!inode
->i_op
->getxattr
) {
1195 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1199 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1200 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1202 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1203 dentry
= dget(opt_dentry
);
1205 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1206 dentry
= d_find_alias(inode
);
1210 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1211 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1212 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1213 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1214 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1215 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1216 * be used again by userspace.
1221 len
= INITCONTEXTLEN
;
1222 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1228 context
[len
] = '\0';
1229 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1231 if (rc
== -ERANGE
) {
1234 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1235 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
,
1242 context
= kmalloc(len
+1, GFP_NOFS
);
1248 context
[len
] = '\0';
1249 rc
= inode
->i_op
->getxattr(dentry
,
1255 if (rc
!= -ENODATA
) {
1256 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1257 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__
,
1258 -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
1262 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1263 sid
= sbsec
->def_sid
;
1266 rc
= security_context_to_sid_default(context
, rc
, &sid
,
1270 char *dev
= inode
->i_sb
->s_id
;
1271 unsigned long ino
= inode
->i_ino
;
1273 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
1274 if (printk_ratelimit())
1275 printk(KERN_NOTICE
"SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1276 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1277 "filesystem in question.\n", ino
, dev
, context
);
1279 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1280 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1281 __func__
, context
, -rc
, dev
, ino
);
1284 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1292 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK
:
1293 isec
->sid
= isec
->task_sid
;
1295 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS
:
1296 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1297 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1299 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1300 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1301 rc
= security_transition_sid(isec
->task_sid
, sbsec
->sid
,
1302 isec
->sclass
, NULL
, &sid
);
1307 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
:
1308 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
1311 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1312 isec
->sid
= sbsec
->sid
;
1314 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBPROC
) && !S_ISLNK(inode
->i_mode
)) {
1316 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1317 rc
= selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry
,
1328 isec
->initialized
= 1;
1331 mutex_unlock(&isec
->lock
);
1333 if (isec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_FILE
)
1334 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
1338 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1339 static inline u32
signal_to_av(int sig
)
1345 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1346 perm
= PROCESS__SIGCHLD
;
1349 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1350 perm
= PROCESS__SIGKILL
;
1353 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1354 perm
= PROCESS__SIGSTOP
;
1357 /* All other signals. */
1358 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNAL
;
1366 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1367 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1369 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred
*actor
,
1370 const struct cred
*target
,
1373 u32 asid
= cred_sid(actor
), tsid
= cred_sid(target
);
1375 return avc_has_perm(asid
, tsid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1379 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1380 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1381 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1382 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1384 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct
*tsk1
,
1385 const struct task_struct
*tsk2
,
1388 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec1
, *__tsec2
;
1392 __tsec1
= __task_cred(tsk1
)->security
; sid1
= __tsec1
->sid
;
1393 __tsec2
= __task_cred(tsk2
)->security
; sid2
= __tsec2
->sid
;
1395 return avc_has_perm(sid1
, sid2
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1399 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1400 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1401 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1402 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1404 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1409 sid
= current_sid();
1410 tsid
= task_sid(tsk
);
1411 return avc_has_perm(sid
, tsid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perms
, NULL
);
1414 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1415 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1418 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1419 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred
*cred
,
1422 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1423 struct av_decision avd
;
1425 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1426 u32 av
= CAP_TO_MASK(cap
);
1429 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP
;
1432 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap
)) {
1434 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY
;
1437 sclass
= SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2
;
1441 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap
);
1446 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, 0, &avd
);
1447 if (audit
== SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT
) {
1448 int rc2
= avc_audit(sid
, sid
, sclass
, av
, &avd
, rc
, &ad
, 0);
1455 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1456 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
1459 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
1461 return avc_has_perm(sid
, SECINITSID_KERNEL
,
1462 SECCLASS_SYSTEM
, perms
, NULL
);
1465 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1466 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1467 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1468 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1469 struct inode
*inode
,
1471 struct common_audit_data
*adp
,
1474 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
1477 validate_creds(cred
);
1479 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
1482 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1483 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1485 return avc_has_perm_flags(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, adp
, flags
);
1488 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1489 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1490 pathname if needed. */
1491 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1492 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1495 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
1496 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1498 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1499 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1500 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
, 0);
1503 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1504 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1505 pathname if needed. */
1506 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1510 struct inode
*inode
= path
->dentry
->d_inode
;
1511 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1513 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1515 return inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
, 0);
1518 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1519 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1520 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1521 check a particular permission to the file.
1522 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1523 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1524 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1525 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1526 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1530 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
1531 struct inode
*inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
1532 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1533 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1536 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
1537 ad
.u
.path
= file
->f_path
;
1539 if (sid
!= fsec
->sid
) {
1540 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, fsec
->sid
,
1548 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1551 rc
= inode_has_perm(cred
, inode
, av
, &ad
, 0);
1557 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1558 static int may_create(struct inode
*dir
,
1559 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1562 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
1563 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
1564 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1566 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1569 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
1570 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
1573 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
1575 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1576 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1578 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1579 DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
,
1584 if (!newsid
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
)) {
1585 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, dsec
->sid
, tclass
,
1586 &dentry
->d_name
, &newsid
);
1591 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, tclass
, FILE__CREATE
, &ad
);
1595 return avc_has_perm(newsid
, sbsec
->sid
,
1596 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
1597 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
1600 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1601 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid
,
1602 struct task_struct
*ctx
)
1604 u32 sid
= task_sid(ctx
);
1606 return avc_has_perm(sid
, ksid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, KEY__CREATE
, NULL
);
1610 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1613 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1614 static int may_link(struct inode
*dir
,
1615 struct dentry
*dentry
,
1619 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
, *isec
;
1620 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1621 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1625 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
1626 isec
= dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1628 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1629 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
1632 av
|= (kind
? DIR__REMOVE_NAME
: DIR__ADD_NAME
);
1633 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1648 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1653 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, av
, &ad
);
1657 static inline int may_rename(struct inode
*old_dir
,
1658 struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
1659 struct inode
*new_dir
,
1660 struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
1662 struct inode_security_struct
*old_dsec
, *new_dsec
, *old_isec
, *new_isec
;
1663 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1664 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1666 int old_is_dir
, new_is_dir
;
1669 old_dsec
= old_dir
->i_security
;
1670 old_isec
= old_dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1671 old_is_dir
= S_ISDIR(old_dentry
->d_inode
->i_mode
);
1672 new_dsec
= new_dir
->i_security
;
1674 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
1676 ad
.u
.dentry
= old_dentry
;
1677 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
,
1678 DIR__REMOVE_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
, &ad
);
1681 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1682 old_isec
->sclass
, FILE__RENAME
, &ad
);
1685 if (old_is_dir
&& new_dir
!= old_dir
) {
1686 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, old_isec
->sid
,
1687 old_isec
->sclass
, DIR__REPARENT
, &ad
);
1692 ad
.u
.dentry
= new_dentry
;
1693 av
= DIR__ADD_NAME
| DIR__SEARCH
;
1694 if (new_dentry
->d_inode
)
1695 av
|= DIR__REMOVE_NAME
;
1696 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_dsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_DIR
, av
, &ad
);
1699 if (new_dentry
->d_inode
) {
1700 new_isec
= new_dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
1701 new_is_dir
= S_ISDIR(new_dentry
->d_inode
->i_mode
);
1702 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, new_isec
->sid
,
1704 (new_is_dir
? DIR__RMDIR
: FILE__UNLINK
), &ad
);
1712 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1713 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred
*cred
,
1714 struct super_block
*sb
,
1716 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
1718 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
1719 u32 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
1721 sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
1722 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sbsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
, perms
, ad
);
1725 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1726 static inline u32
file_mask_to_av(int mode
, int mask
)
1730 if (!S_ISDIR(mode
)) {
1731 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1732 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
1733 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1736 if (mask
& MAY_APPEND
)
1738 else if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1742 if (mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1744 if (mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1746 if (mask
& MAY_READ
)
1753 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1754 static inline u32
file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
1758 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_READ
)
1760 if (file
->f_mode
& FMODE_WRITE
) {
1761 if (file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
)
1768 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1777 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1780 static inline u32
open_file_to_av(struct file
*file
)
1782 u32 av
= file_to_av(file
);
1784 if (selinux_policycap_openperm
)
1790 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1792 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct
*child
,
1797 rc
= cap_ptrace_access_check(child
, mode
);
1801 if (mode
& PTRACE_MODE_READ
) {
1802 u32 sid
= current_sid();
1803 u32 csid
= task_sid(child
);
1804 return avc_has_perm(sid
, csid
, SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__READ
, NULL
);
1807 return current_has_perm(child
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
1810 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct
*parent
)
1814 rc
= cap_ptrace_traceme(parent
);
1818 return task_has_perm(parent
, current
, PROCESS__PTRACE
);
1821 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct
*target
, kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
1822 kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
, kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
1826 error
= current_has_perm(target
, PROCESS__GETCAP
);
1830 return cap_capget(target
, effective
, inheritable
, permitted
);
1833 static int selinux_capset(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
1834 const kernel_cap_t
*effective
,
1835 const kernel_cap_t
*inheritable
,
1836 const kernel_cap_t
*permitted
)
1840 error
= cap_capset(new, old
,
1841 effective
, inheritable
, permitted
);
1845 return cred_has_perm(old
, new, PROCESS__SETCAP
);
1849 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1850 * which was removed).
1852 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1853 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1854 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1855 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1858 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred
*cred
, struct user_namespace
*ns
,
1863 rc
= cap_capable(cred
, ns
, cap
, audit
);
1867 return cred_has_capability(cred
, cap
, audit
);
1870 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds
, int type
, int id
, struct super_block
*sb
)
1872 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
1884 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD
, NULL
);
1889 rc
= superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET
, NULL
);
1892 rc
= 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1898 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry
*dentry
)
1900 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
1902 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__QUOTAON
);
1905 static int selinux_syslog(int type
)
1910 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL
: /* Read last kernel messages */
1911 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER
: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1912 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ
);
1914 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF
: /* Disable logging to console */
1915 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON
: /* Enable logging to console */
1916 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1917 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL
:
1918 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE
);
1920 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE
: /* Close log */
1921 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN
: /* Open log */
1922 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ
: /* Read from log */
1923 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR
: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1924 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR
: /* Clear ring buffer */
1926 rc
= task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD
);
1933 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1934 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1935 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1937 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1938 * processes that allocate mappings.
1940 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct
*mm
, long pages
)
1942 int rc
, cap_sys_admin
= 0;
1944 rc
= selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns
, CAP_SYS_ADMIN
,
1945 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
1949 return __vm_enough_memory(mm
, pages
, cap_sys_admin
);
1952 /* binprm security operations */
1954 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
1956 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
1957 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
1958 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
1959 struct common_audit_data ad
;
1960 struct inode
*inode
= bprm
->file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
1963 rc
= cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm
);
1967 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
1968 * the script interpreter */
1969 if (bprm
->cred_prepared
)
1972 old_tsec
= current_security();
1973 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
1974 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
1976 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1977 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
1978 new_tsec
->osid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
1980 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1981 new_tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
1982 new_tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
1983 new_tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
1985 if (old_tsec
->exec_sid
) {
1986 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->exec_sid
;
1987 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1988 new_tsec
->exec_sid
= 0;
1991 * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs and a transition is
1992 * explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
1994 if (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS
)
1997 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1998 rc
= security_transition_sid(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
1999 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, NULL
,
2005 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
;
2006 ad
.u
.path
= bprm
->file
->f_path
;
2008 if ((bprm
->file
->f_path
.mnt
->mnt_flags
& MNT_NOSUID
) ||
2009 (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS
))
2010 new_tsec
->sid
= old_tsec
->sid
;
2012 if (new_tsec
->sid
== old_tsec
->sid
) {
2013 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2014 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS
, &ad
);
2018 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2019 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2020 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__TRANSITION
, &ad
);
2024 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->sid
, isec
->sid
,
2025 SECCLASS_FILE
, FILE__ENTRYPOINT
, &ad
);
2029 /* Check for shared state */
2030 if (bprm
->unsafe
& LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE
) {
2031 rc
= avc_has_perm(old_tsec
->sid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2032 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SHARE
,
2038 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2039 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2041 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE
| LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
)) {
2042 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
2043 struct task_security_struct
*sec
;
2047 tracer
= ptrace_parent(current
);
2048 if (likely(tracer
!= NULL
)) {
2049 sec
= __task_cred(tracer
)->security
;
2055 rc
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, new_tsec
->sid
,
2057 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
2063 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2064 bprm
->per_clear
|= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID
;
2070 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2072 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2080 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2081 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2082 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2083 atsecure
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
,
2085 PROCESS__NOATSECURE
, NULL
);
2088 return (atsecure
|| cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm
));
2091 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2092 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred
*cred
,
2093 struct files_struct
*files
)
2095 struct file
*file
, *devnull
= NULL
;
2096 struct tty_struct
*tty
;
2097 struct fdtable
*fdt
;
2101 tty
= get_current_tty();
2103 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock
);
2104 if (!list_empty(&tty
->tty_files
)) {
2105 struct tty_file_private
*file_priv
;
2107 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2108 Use path_has_perm on the tty path directly rather
2109 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2110 file may belong to another process and we are only
2111 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2112 file_priv
= list_first_entry(&tty
->tty_files
,
2113 struct tty_file_private
, list
);
2114 file
= file_priv
->file
;
2115 if (path_has_perm(cred
, &file
->f_path
, FILE__READ
| FILE__WRITE
))
2118 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock
);
2121 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2125 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2126 spin_lock(&files
->file_lock
);
2128 unsigned long set
, i
;
2133 fdt
= files_fdtable(files
);
2134 if (i
>= fdt
->max_fds
)
2136 set
= fdt
->open_fds
[j
];
2139 spin_unlock(&files
->file_lock
);
2140 for ( ; set
; i
++, set
>>= 1) {
2145 if (file_has_perm(cred
,
2147 file_to_av(file
))) {
2149 fd
= get_unused_fd();
2159 devnull
= dentry_open(
2161 mntget(selinuxfs_mount
),
2163 if (IS_ERR(devnull
)) {
2170 fd_install(fd
, devnull
);
2175 spin_lock(&files
->file_lock
);
2178 spin_unlock(&files
->file_lock
);
2182 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2184 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2186 struct task_security_struct
*new_tsec
;
2187 struct rlimit
*rlim
, *initrlim
;
2190 new_tsec
= bprm
->cred
->security
;
2191 if (new_tsec
->sid
== new_tsec
->osid
)
2194 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2195 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm
->cred
, current
->files
);
2197 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2198 current
->pdeath_signal
= 0;
2200 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2201 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2202 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2204 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2205 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2206 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2207 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2208 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2210 rc
= avc_has_perm(new_tsec
->osid
, new_tsec
->sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
2211 PROCESS__RLIMITINH
, NULL
);
2213 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2215 for (i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++) {
2216 rlim
= current
->signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2217 initrlim
= init_task
.signal
->rlim
+ i
;
2218 rlim
->rlim_cur
= min(rlim
->rlim_max
, initrlim
->rlim_cur
);
2220 task_unlock(current
);
2221 update_rlimit_cpu(current
, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU
));
2226 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2229 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2231 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2232 struct itimerval itimer
;
2242 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2243 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2244 * flush and unblock signals.
2246 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2247 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2249 rc
= avc_has_perm(osid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
, PROCESS__SIGINH
, NULL
);
2251 memset(&itimer
, 0, sizeof itimer
);
2252 for (i
= 0; i
< 3; i
++)
2253 do_setitimer(i
, &itimer
, NULL
);
2254 spin_lock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2255 if (!(current
->signal
->flags
& SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT
)) {
2256 __flush_signals(current
);
2257 flush_signal_handlers(current
, 1);
2258 sigemptyset(¤t
->blocked
);
2260 spin_unlock_irq(¤t
->sighand
->siglock
);
2263 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2264 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2265 read_lock(&tasklist_lock
);
2266 __wake_up_parent(current
, current
->real_parent
);
2267 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock
);
2270 /* superblock security operations */
2272 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2274 return superblock_alloc_security(sb
);
2277 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block
*sb
)
2279 superblock_free_security(sb
);
2282 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix
, int plen
, char *option
, int olen
)
2287 return !memcmp(prefix
, option
, plen
);
2290 static inline int selinux_option(char *option
, int len
)
2292 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2293 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2294 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2295 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR
)-1, option
, len
) ||
2296 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR
, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR
)-1, option
, len
));
2299 static inline void take_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
, int len
)
2306 memcpy(*to
, from
, len
);
2310 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to
, char *from
, int *first
,
2313 int current_size
= 0;
2321 while (current_size
< len
) {
2331 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig
, char *copy
)
2333 int fnosec
, fsec
, rc
= 0;
2334 char *in_save
, *in_curr
, *in_end
;
2335 char *sec_curr
, *nosec_save
, *nosec
;
2341 nosec
= (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL
);
2349 in_save
= in_end
= orig
;
2353 open_quote
= !open_quote
;
2354 if ((*in_end
== ',' && open_quote
== 0) ||
2356 int len
= in_end
- in_curr
;
2358 if (selinux_option(in_curr
, len
))
2359 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr
, in_curr
, &fsec
, len
);
2361 take_option(&nosec
, in_curr
, &fnosec
, len
);
2363 in_curr
= in_end
+ 1;
2365 } while (*in_end
++);
2367 strcpy(in_save
, nosec_save
);
2368 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save
);
2373 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block
*sb
, void *data
)
2376 struct security_mnt_opts opts
;
2377 char *secdata
, **mount_options
;
2378 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
= sb
->s_security
;
2380 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
))
2386 if (sb
->s_type
->fs_flags
& FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA
)
2389 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts
);
2390 secdata
= alloc_secdata();
2393 rc
= selinux_sb_copy_data(data
, secdata
);
2395 goto out_free_secdata
;
2397 rc
= selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata
, &opts
);
2399 goto out_free_secdata
;
2401 mount_options
= opts
.mnt_opts
;
2402 flags
= opts
.mnt_opts_flags
;
2404 for (i
= 0; i
< opts
.num_mnt_opts
; i
++) {
2408 if (flags
[i
] == SE_SBLABELSUPP
)
2410 len
= strlen(mount_options
[i
]);
2411 rc
= security_context_to_sid(mount_options
[i
], len
, &sid
);
2413 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2414 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2415 mount_options
[i
], sb
->s_id
, sb
->s_type
->name
, rc
);
2421 if (bad_option(sbsec
, FSCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->sid
, sid
))
2422 goto out_bad_option
;
2425 if (bad_option(sbsec
, CONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
, sid
))
2426 goto out_bad_option
;
2428 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
: {
2429 struct inode_security_struct
*root_isec
;
2430 root_isec
= sb
->s_root
->d_inode
->i_security
;
2432 if (bad_option(sbsec
, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT
, root_isec
->sid
, sid
))
2433 goto out_bad_option
;
2436 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT
:
2437 if (bad_option(sbsec
, DEFCONTEXT_MNT
, sbsec
->def_sid
, sid
))
2438 goto out_bad_option
;
2447 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts
);
2449 free_secdata(secdata
);
2452 printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: unable to change security options "
2453 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb
->s_id
,
2458 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block
*sb
, int flags
, void *data
)
2460 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2461 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2464 rc
= superblock_doinit(sb
, data
);
2468 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2469 if (flags
& MS_KERNMOUNT
)
2472 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2473 ad
.u
.dentry
= sb
->s_root
;
2474 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, sb
, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT
, &ad
);
2477 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2479 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2480 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2482 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2483 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
->d_sb
->s_root
;
2484 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, dentry
->d_sb
, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR
, &ad
);
2487 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name
,
2490 unsigned long flags
,
2493 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2495 if (flags
& MS_REMOUNT
)
2496 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, path
->dentry
->d_sb
,
2497 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT
, NULL
);
2499 return path_has_perm(cred
, path
, FILE__MOUNTON
);
2502 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount
*mnt
, int flags
)
2504 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2506 return superblock_has_perm(cred
, mnt
->mnt_sb
,
2507 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT
, NULL
);
2510 /* inode security operations */
2512 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2514 return inode_alloc_security(inode
);
2517 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode
*inode
)
2519 inode_free_security(inode
);
2522 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode
*inode
, struct inode
*dir
,
2523 const struct qstr
*qstr
, char **name
,
2524 void **value
, size_t *len
)
2526 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
2527 struct inode_security_struct
*dsec
;
2528 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2529 u32 sid
, newsid
, clen
;
2531 char *namep
= NULL
, *context
;
2533 dsec
= dir
->i_security
;
2534 sbsec
= dir
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2537 newsid
= tsec
->create_sid
;
2539 if ((sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) &&
2540 (sbsec
->behavior
== SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT
))
2541 newsid
= sbsec
->mntpoint_sid
;
2542 else if (!newsid
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
)) {
2543 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, dsec
->sid
,
2544 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
),
2547 printk(KERN_WARNING
"%s: "
2548 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2551 -rc
, inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
);
2556 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2557 if (sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBINITIALIZED
) {
2558 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2559 isec
->sclass
= inode_mode_to_security_class(inode
->i_mode
);
2561 isec
->initialized
= 1;
2564 if (!ss_initialized
|| !(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
))
2568 namep
= kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
, GFP_NOFS
);
2575 rc
= security_sid_to_context_force(newsid
, &context
, &clen
);
2587 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mode
)
2589 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_FILE
);
2592 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry
*old_dentry
, struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2594 return may_link(dir
, old_dentry
, MAY_LINK
);
2597 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2599 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_UNLINK
);
2602 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2604 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE
);
2607 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mask
)
2609 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, SECCLASS_DIR
);
2612 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2614 return may_link(dir
, dentry
, MAY_RMDIR
);
2617 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode
*dir
, struct dentry
*dentry
, umode_t mode
, dev_t dev
)
2619 return may_create(dir
, dentry
, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode
));
2622 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode
*old_inode
, struct dentry
*old_dentry
,
2623 struct inode
*new_inode
, struct dentry
*new_dentry
)
2625 return may_rename(old_inode
, old_dentry
, new_inode
, new_dentry
);
2628 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2630 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2632 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__READ
);
2635 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct nameidata
*nameidata
)
2637 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2639 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__READ
);
2642 static noinline
int audit_inode_permission(struct inode
*inode
,
2643 u32 perms
, u32 audited
, u32 denied
,
2646 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2647 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2650 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE
;
2653 rc
= slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
,
2654 audited
, denied
, &ad
, flags
);
2660 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode
*inode
, int mask
)
2662 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2665 unsigned flags
= mask
& MAY_NOT_BLOCK
;
2666 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
2668 struct av_decision avd
;
2670 u32 audited
, denied
;
2672 from_access
= mask
& MAY_ACCESS
;
2673 mask
&= (MAY_READ
|MAY_WRITE
|MAY_EXEC
|MAY_APPEND
);
2675 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2679 validate_creds(cred
);
2681 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode
)))
2684 perms
= file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
);
2686 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
2687 isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2689 rc
= avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, 0, &avd
);
2690 audited
= avc_audit_required(perms
, &avd
, rc
,
2691 from_access
? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS
: 0,
2693 if (likely(!audited
))
2696 rc2
= audit_inode_permission(inode
, perms
, audited
, denied
, flags
);
2702 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct iattr
*iattr
)
2704 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2705 unsigned int ia_valid
= iattr
->ia_valid
;
2706 __u32 av
= FILE__WRITE
;
2708 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2709 if (ia_valid
& ATTR_FORCE
) {
2710 ia_valid
&= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID
| ATTR_KILL_SGID
| ATTR_MODE
|
2716 if (ia_valid
& (ATTR_MODE
| ATTR_UID
| ATTR_GID
|
2717 ATTR_ATIME_SET
| ATTR_MTIME_SET
| ATTR_TIMES_SET
))
2718 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
2720 if (selinux_policycap_openperm
&& (ia_valid
& ATTR_SIZE
))
2723 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, av
);
2726 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount
*mnt
, struct dentry
*dentry
)
2728 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2731 path
.dentry
= dentry
;
2734 return path_has_perm(cred
, &path
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2737 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2739 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2741 if (!strncmp(name
, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
,
2742 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX
- 1)) {
2743 if (!strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_CAPS
)) {
2744 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP
))
2746 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) {
2747 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2748 Restrict to administrator. */
2753 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2754 ordinary setattr permission. */
2755 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__SETATTR
);
2758 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
2759 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
2761 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
2762 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2763 struct superblock_security_struct
*sbsec
;
2764 struct common_audit_data ad
;
2765 u32 newsid
, sid
= current_sid();
2768 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
2769 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
2771 sbsec
= inode
->i_sb
->s_security
;
2772 if (!(sbsec
->flags
& SE_SBLABELSUPP
))
2775 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode
))
2778 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
;
2779 ad
.u
.dentry
= dentry
;
2781 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
,
2782 FILE__RELABELFROM
, &ad
);
2786 rc
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2787 if (rc
== -EINVAL
) {
2788 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
)) {
2789 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2793 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
2794 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
2796 if (str
[size
- 1] == '\0')
2797 audit_size
= size
- 1;
2800 ab
= audit_log_start(current
->audit_context
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
);
2801 audit_log_format(ab
, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
2802 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, value
, audit_size
);
2807 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2812 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, newsid
, isec
->sclass
,
2813 FILE__RELABELTO
, &ad
);
2817 rc
= security_validate_transition(isec
->sid
, newsid
, sid
,
2822 return avc_has_perm(newsid
,
2824 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM
,
2825 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE
,
2829 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
,
2830 const void *value
, size_t size
,
2833 struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
2834 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2838 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
)) {
2839 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2843 rc
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
, &newsid
);
2845 printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2846 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2847 inode
->i_sb
->s_id
, inode
->i_ino
, -rc
);
2855 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2857 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2859 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2862 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry
*dentry
)
2864 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2866 return dentry_has_perm(cred
, dentry
, FILE__GETATTR
);
2869 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry
*dentry
, const char *name
)
2871 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
))
2872 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry
, name
);
2874 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2875 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2880 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2882 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2884 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
, void **buffer
, bool alloc
)
2888 char *context
= NULL
;
2889 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2891 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
2895 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2896 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2897 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2898 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2899 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2900 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2901 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2903 error
= selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns
, CAP_MAC_ADMIN
,
2904 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT
);
2906 error
= security_sid_to_context_force(isec
->sid
, &context
,
2909 error
= security_sid_to_context(isec
->sid
, &context
, &size
);
2922 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, const char *name
,
2923 const void *value
, size_t size
, int flags
)
2925 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2929 if (strcmp(name
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
))
2932 if (!value
|| !size
)
2935 rc
= security_context_to_sid((void *)value
, size
, &newsid
);
2940 isec
->initialized
= 1;
2944 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode
*inode
, char *buffer
, size_t buffer_size
)
2946 const int len
= sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
);
2947 if (buffer
&& len
<= buffer_size
)
2948 memcpy(buffer
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, len
);
2952 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode
*inode
, u32
*secid
)
2954 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2958 /* file security operations */
2960 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
2962 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
2963 struct inode
*inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
2965 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2966 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && (mask
& MAY_WRITE
))
2969 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
,
2970 file_mask_to_av(inode
->i_mode
, mask
));
2973 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file
*file
, int mask
)
2975 struct inode
*inode
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
;
2976 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
= file
->f_security
;
2977 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
2978 u32 sid
= current_sid();
2981 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2984 if (sid
== fsec
->sid
&& fsec
->isid
== isec
->sid
&&
2985 fsec
->pseqno
== avc_policy_seqno())
2986 /* No change since file_open check. */
2989 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file
, mask
);
2992 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file
*file
)
2994 return file_alloc_security(file
);
2997 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file
*file
)
2999 file_free_security(file
);
3002 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
3005 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3015 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
:
3017 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION
:
3018 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__GETATTR
);
3021 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
:
3023 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION
:
3024 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__SETATTR
);
3027 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3031 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, 0);
3036 error
= cred_has_capability(cred
, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG
,
3037 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT
);
3040 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3041 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3044 error
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__IOCTL
);
3049 static int default_noexec
;
3051 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file
*file
, unsigned long prot
, int shared
)
3053 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3056 if (default_noexec
&&
3057 (prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && (!file
|| (!shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
)))) {
3059 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3060 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3061 * This has an additional check.
3063 rc
= cred_has_perm(cred
, cred
, PROCESS__EXECMEM
);
3069 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3070 u32 av
= FILE__READ
;
3072 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3073 if (shared
&& (prot
& PROT_WRITE
))
3076 if (prot
& PROT_EXEC
)
3077 av
|= FILE__EXECUTE
;
3079 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, av
);
3086 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr
)
3089 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3092 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
3093 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
3094 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
3095 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3097 if (addr
< CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
) {
3098 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT
,
3099 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO
, NULL
);
3104 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3105 return cap_mmap_addr(addr
);
3108 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file
*file
, unsigned long reqprot
,
3109 unsigned long prot
, unsigned long flags
)
3111 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3114 return file_map_prot_check(file
, prot
,
3115 (flags
& MAP_TYPE
) == MAP_SHARED
);
3118 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct
*vma
,
3119 unsigned long reqprot
,
3122 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3124 if (selinux_checkreqprot
)
3127 if (default_noexec
&&
3128 (prot
& PROT_EXEC
) && !(vma
->vm_flags
& VM_EXEC
)) {
3130 if (vma
->vm_start
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_brk
&&
3131 vma
->vm_end
<= vma
->vm_mm
->brk
) {
3132 rc
= cred_has_perm(cred
, cred
, PROCESS__EXECHEAP
);
3133 } else if (!vma
->vm_file
&&
3134 vma
->vm_start
<= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
&&
3135 vma
->vm_end
>= vma
->vm_mm
->start_stack
) {
3136 rc
= current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__EXECSTACK
);
3137 } else if (vma
->vm_file
&& vma
->anon_vma
) {
3139 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3140 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3141 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3142 * modified content. This typically should only
3143 * occur for text relocations.
3145 rc
= file_has_perm(cred
, vma
->vm_file
, FILE__EXECMOD
);
3151 return file_map_prot_check(vma
->vm_file
, prot
, vma
->vm_flags
&VM_SHARED
);
3154 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
)
3156 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3158 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3161 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file
*file
, unsigned int cmd
,
3164 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3169 if (!file
->f_path
.dentry
|| !file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
) {
3174 if ((file
->f_flags
& O_APPEND
) && !(arg
& O_APPEND
)) {
3175 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__WRITE
);
3184 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3185 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, 0);
3190 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3195 if (!file
->f_path
.dentry
|| !file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
) {
3199 err
= file_has_perm(cred
, file
, FILE__LOCK
);
3206 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file
*file
)
3208 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3210 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3211 fsec
->fown_sid
= current_sid();
3216 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
3217 struct fown_struct
*fown
, int signum
)
3220 u32 sid
= task_sid(tsk
);
3222 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3224 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3225 file
= container_of(fown
, struct file
, f_owner
);
3227 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3230 perm
= signal_to_av(SIGIO
); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3232 perm
= signal_to_av(signum
);
3234 return avc_has_perm(fsec
->fown_sid
, sid
,
3235 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3238 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file
*file
)
3240 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
3242 return file_has_perm(cred
, file
, file_to_av(file
));
3245 static int selinux_file_open(struct file
*file
, const struct cred
*cred
)
3247 struct file_security_struct
*fsec
;
3248 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3250 fsec
= file
->f_security
;
3251 isec
= file
->f_path
.dentry
->d_inode
->i_security
;
3253 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3254 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3255 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3256 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3257 * struct as its SID.
3259 fsec
->isid
= isec
->sid
;
3260 fsec
->pseqno
= avc_policy_seqno();
3262 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3263 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3264 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3265 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3266 * new inode label or new policy.
3267 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3269 return path_has_perm(cred
, &file
->f_path
, open_file_to_av(file
));
3272 /* task security operations */
3274 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags
)
3276 return current_has_perm(current
, PROCESS__FORK
);
3280 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3282 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred
*cred
, gfp_t gfp
)
3284 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3286 tsec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3290 cred
->security
= tsec
;
3295 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3297 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred
*cred
)
3299 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= cred
->security
;
3302 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3303 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3305 BUG_ON(cred
->security
&& (unsigned long) cred
->security
< PAGE_SIZE
);
3306 cred
->security
= (void *) 0x7UL
;
3311 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3313 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
,
3316 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
;
3317 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
3319 old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3321 tsec
= kmemdup(old_tsec
, sizeof(struct task_security_struct
), gfp
);
3325 new->security
= tsec
;
3330 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3332 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
3334 const struct task_security_struct
*old_tsec
= old
->security
;
3335 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3341 * set the security data for a kernel service
3342 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3344 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred
*new, u32 secid
)
3346 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3347 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3350 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, secid
,
3351 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3352 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE
,
3356 tsec
->create_sid
= 0;
3357 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= 0;
3358 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= 0;
3364 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3365 * objective context of the specified inode
3367 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred
*new, struct inode
*inode
)
3369 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3370 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= new->security
;
3371 u32 sid
= current_sid();
3374 ret
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
3375 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE
,
3376 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS
,
3380 tsec
->create_sid
= isec
->sid
;
3384 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name
)
3387 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3389 sid
= task_sid(current
);
3391 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD
;
3392 ad
.u
.kmod_name
= kmod_name
;
3394 return avc_has_perm(sid
, SECINITSID_KERNEL
, SECCLASS_SYSTEM
,
3395 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST
, &ad
);
3398 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct
*p
, pid_t pgid
)
3400 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETPGID
);
3403 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3405 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETPGID
);
3408 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct
*p
)
3410 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSESSION
);
3413 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct
*p
, u32
*secid
)
3415 *secid
= task_sid(p
);
3418 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct
*p
, int nice
)
3422 rc
= cap_task_setnice(p
, nice
);
3426 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3429 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct
*p
, int ioprio
)
3433 rc
= cap_task_setioprio(p
, ioprio
);
3437 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3440 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct
*p
)
3442 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3445 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct
*p
, unsigned int resource
,
3446 struct rlimit
*new_rlim
)
3448 struct rlimit
*old_rlim
= p
->signal
->rlim
+ resource
;
3450 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3451 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3452 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3453 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3454 if (old_rlim
->rlim_max
!= new_rlim
->rlim_max
)
3455 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT
);
3460 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
3464 rc
= cap_task_setscheduler(p
);
3468 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3471 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct
*p
)
3473 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETSCHED
);
3476 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct
*p
)
3478 return current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSCHED
);
3481 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct
*p
, struct siginfo
*info
,
3488 perm
= PROCESS__SIGNULL
; /* null signal; existence test */
3490 perm
= signal_to_av(sig
);
3492 rc
= avc_has_perm(secid
, task_sid(p
),
3493 SECCLASS_PROCESS
, perm
, NULL
);
3495 rc
= current_has_perm(p
, perm
);
3499 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct
*p
)
3501 return task_has_perm(p
, current
, PROCESS__SIGCHLD
);
3504 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct
*p
,
3505 struct inode
*inode
)
3507 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= inode
->i_security
;
3508 u32 sid
= task_sid(p
);
3511 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3514 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3515 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3516 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3518 int offset
, ihlen
, ret
= -EINVAL
;
3519 struct iphdr _iph
, *ih
;
3521 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3522 ih
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_iph
), &_iph
);
3526 ihlen
= ih
->ihl
* 4;
3527 if (ihlen
< sizeof(_iph
))
3530 ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
= ih
->saddr
;
3531 ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.daddr
= ih
->daddr
;
3535 *proto
= ih
->protocol
;
3537 switch (ih
->protocol
) {
3539 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3541 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3545 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3549 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= th
->source
;
3550 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= th
->dest
;
3555 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
3557 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3561 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
3565 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= uh
->source
;
3566 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= uh
->dest
;
3570 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
3571 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
3573 if (ntohs(ih
->frag_off
) & IP_OFFSET
)
3577 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
3581 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
3582 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
3593 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3595 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3596 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
3597 struct common_audit_data
*ad
, u8
*proto
)
3600 int ret
= -EINVAL
, offset
;
3601 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h
, *ip6
;
3604 offset
= skb_network_offset(skb
);
3605 ip6
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_ipv6h
), &_ipv6h
);
3609 ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
= ip6
->saddr
;
3610 ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.daddr
= ip6
->daddr
;
3613 nexthdr
= ip6
->nexthdr
;
3614 offset
+= sizeof(_ipv6h
);
3615 offset
= ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb
, offset
, &nexthdr
, &frag_off
);
3624 struct tcphdr _tcph
, *th
;
3626 th
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_tcph
), &_tcph
);
3630 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= th
->source
;
3631 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= th
->dest
;
3636 struct udphdr _udph
, *uh
;
3638 uh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_udph
), &_udph
);
3642 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= uh
->source
;
3643 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= uh
->dest
;
3647 case IPPROTO_DCCP
: {
3648 struct dccp_hdr _dccph
, *dh
;
3650 dh
= skb_header_pointer(skb
, offset
, sizeof(_dccph
), &_dccph
);
3654 ad
->u
.net
->sport
= dh
->dccph_sport
;
3655 ad
->u
.net
->dport
= dh
->dccph_dport
;
3659 /* includes fragments */
3669 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff
*skb
, struct common_audit_data
*ad
,
3670 char **_addrp
, int src
, u8
*proto
)
3675 switch (ad
->u
.net
->family
) {
3677 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb
, ad
, proto
);
3680 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
:
3681 &ad
->u
.net
->v4info
.daddr
);
3684 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3686 ret
= selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb
, ad
, proto
);
3689 addrp
= (char *)(src
? &ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
:
3690 &ad
->u
.net
->v6info
.daddr
);
3700 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3701 " unable to parse packet\n");
3711 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3713 * @family: protocol family
3714 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3717 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3718 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3719 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3720 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3721 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3725 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff
*skb
, u16 family
, u32
*sid
)
3732 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb
, &xfrm_sid
);
3733 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb
, family
, &nlbl_type
, &nlbl_sid
);
3735 err
= security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid
, nlbl_type
, xfrm_sid
, sid
);
3736 if (unlikely(err
)) {
3738 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3739 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3746 /* socket security operations */
3748 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
,
3749 u16 secclass
, u32
*socksid
)
3751 if (tsec
->sockcreate_sid
> SECSID_NULL
) {
3752 *socksid
= tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
3756 return security_transition_sid(tsec
->sid
, tsec
->sid
, secclass
, NULL
,
3760 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct
*task
, struct sock
*sk
, u32 perms
)
3762 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
3763 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3764 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
3765 u32 tsid
= task_sid(task
);
3767 if (sksec
->sid
== SECINITSID_KERNEL
)
3770 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
3774 return avc_has_perm(tsid
, sksec
->sid
, sksec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
3777 static int selinux_socket_create(int family
, int type
,
3778 int protocol
, int kern
)
3780 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
3788 secclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
3789 rc
= socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec
, secclass
, &newsid
);
3793 return avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, newsid
, secclass
, SOCKET__CREATE
, NULL
);
3796 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket
*sock
, int family
,
3797 int type
, int protocol
, int kern
)
3799 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
= current_security();
3800 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
3801 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
3804 isec
->sclass
= socket_type_to_security_class(family
, type
, protocol
);
3807 isec
->sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
3809 err
= socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec
, isec
->sclass
, &(isec
->sid
));
3814 isec
->initialized
= 1;
3817 sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
3818 sksec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
3819 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
3820 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock
->sk
, family
);
3826 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3827 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3828 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3830 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
3832 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
3836 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, SOCKET__BIND
);
3841 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3842 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3843 * check the first address now.
3845 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
3846 if (family
== PF_INET
|| family
== PF_INET6
) {
3848 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
3849 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3850 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
3851 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
3852 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
3853 unsigned short snum
;
3856 if (family
== PF_INET
) {
3857 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
3858 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
3859 addrp
= (char *)&addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
3861 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
3862 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
3863 addrp
= (char *)&addr6
->sin6_addr
.s6_addr
;
3869 inet_get_local_port_range(&low
, &high
);
3871 if (snum
< max(PROT_SOCK
, low
) || snum
> high
) {
3872 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
,
3876 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
3878 ad
.u
.net
->sport
= htons(snum
);
3879 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
3880 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
,
3882 SOCKET__NAME_BIND
, &ad
);
3888 switch (sksec
->sclass
) {
3889 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
:
3890 node_perm
= TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3893 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET
:
3894 node_perm
= UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3897 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
:
3898 node_perm
= DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3902 node_perm
= RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND
;
3906 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &sid
);
3910 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
3912 ad
.u
.net
->sport
= htons(snum
);
3913 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
3915 if (family
== PF_INET
)
3916 ad
.u
.net
->v4info
.saddr
= addr4
->sin_addr
.s_addr
;
3918 ad
.u
.net
->v6info
.saddr
= addr6
->sin6_addr
;
3920 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
,
3921 sksec
->sclass
, node_perm
, &ad
);
3929 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket
*sock
, struct sockaddr
*address
, int addrlen
)
3931 struct sock
*sk
= sock
->sk
;
3932 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
3935 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, SOCKET__CONNECT
);
3940 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3942 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
||
3943 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET
) {
3944 struct common_audit_data ad
;
3945 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
3946 struct sockaddr_in
*addr4
= NULL
;
3947 struct sockaddr_in6
*addr6
= NULL
;
3948 unsigned short snum
;
3951 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
) {
3952 addr4
= (struct sockaddr_in
*)address
;
3953 if (addrlen
< sizeof(struct sockaddr_in
))
3955 snum
= ntohs(addr4
->sin_port
);
3957 addr6
= (struct sockaddr_in6
*)address
;
3958 if (addrlen
< SIN6_LEN_RFC2133
)
3960 snum
= ntohs(addr6
->sin6_port
);
3963 err
= sel_netport_sid(sk
->sk_protocol
, snum
, &sid
);
3967 perm
= (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
) ?
3968 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
: DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT
;
3970 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
3972 ad
.u
.net
->dport
= htons(snum
);
3973 ad
.u
.net
->family
= sk
->sk_family
;
3974 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, sid
, sksec
->sclass
, perm
, &ad
);
3979 err
= selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk
, address
);
3985 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket
*sock
, int backlog
)
3987 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__LISTEN
);
3990 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket
*sock
, struct socket
*newsock
)
3993 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
;
3994 struct inode_security_struct
*newisec
;
3996 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__ACCEPT
);
4000 newisec
= SOCK_INODE(newsock
)->i_security
;
4002 isec
= SOCK_INODE(sock
)->i_security
;
4003 newisec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4004 newisec
->sid
= isec
->sid
;
4005 newisec
->initialized
= 1;
4010 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
4013 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__WRITE
);
4016 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket
*sock
, struct msghdr
*msg
,
4017 int size
, int flags
)
4019 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__READ
);
4022 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket
*sock
)
4024 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
4027 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket
*sock
)
4029 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETATTR
);
4032 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
, int optname
)
4036 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__SETOPT
);
4040 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock
, level
, optname
);
4043 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket
*sock
, int level
,
4046 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__GETOPT
);
4049 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket
*sock
, int how
)
4051 return sock_has_perm(current
, sock
->sk
, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN
);
4054 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock
*sock
,
4058 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_sock
= sock
->sk_security
;
4059 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_other
= other
->sk_security
;
4060 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec_new
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4061 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4062 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4065 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4067 ad
.u
.net
->sk
= other
;
4069 err
= avc_has_perm(sksec_sock
->sid
, sksec_other
->sid
,
4070 sksec_other
->sclass
,
4071 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO
, &ad
);
4075 /* server child socket */
4076 sksec_new
->peer_sid
= sksec_sock
->sid
;
4077 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other
->sid
, sksec_sock
->sid
,
4082 /* connecting socket */
4083 sksec_sock
->peer_sid
= sksec_new
->sid
;
4088 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket
*sock
,
4089 struct socket
*other
)
4091 struct sk_security_struct
*ssec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4092 struct sk_security_struct
*osec
= other
->sk
->sk_security
;
4093 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4094 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4096 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4098 ad
.u
.net
->sk
= other
->sk
;
4100 return avc_has_perm(ssec
->sid
, osec
->sid
, osec
->sclass
, SOCKET__SENDTO
,
4104 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex
, char *addrp
, u16 family
,
4106 struct common_audit_data
*ad
)
4112 err
= sel_netif_sid(ifindex
, &if_sid
);
4115 err
= avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
4116 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__INGRESS
, ad
);
4120 err
= sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
);
4123 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
4124 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__RECVFROM
, ad
);
4127 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4131 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4132 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4133 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4134 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4137 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4139 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
4140 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4141 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4145 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4146 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4152 err
= selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
, skb
, family
, &ad
);
4155 err
= selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
);
4160 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4163 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4164 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4165 u32 sk_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4166 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4167 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4172 if (family
!= PF_INET
&& family
!= PF_INET6
)
4175 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4176 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4179 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4180 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4181 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4182 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4183 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4184 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk
, skb
, family
);
4186 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4187 peerlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4188 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4191 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4193 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= skb
->skb_iif
;
4194 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4195 err
= selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
);
4199 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4202 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
);
4205 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb
->skb_iif
, addrp
, family
,
4208 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4211 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, peer_sid
, SECCLASS_PEER
,
4214 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 0);
4217 if (secmark_active
) {
4218 err
= avc_has_perm(sk_sid
, skb
->secmark
, SECCLASS_PACKET
,
4227 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket
*sock
, char __user
*optval
,
4228 int __user
*optlen
, unsigned len
)
4233 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sock
->sk
->sk_security
;
4234 u32 peer_sid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4236 if (sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET
||
4237 sksec
->sclass
== SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET
)
4238 peer_sid
= sksec
->peer_sid
;
4239 if (peer_sid
== SECSID_NULL
)
4240 return -ENOPROTOOPT
;
4242 err
= security_sid_to_context(peer_sid
, &scontext
, &scontext_len
);
4246 if (scontext_len
> len
) {
4251 if (copy_to_user(optval
, scontext
, scontext_len
))
4255 if (put_user(scontext_len
, optlen
))
4261 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket
*sock
, struct sk_buff
*skb
, u32
*secid
)
4263 u32 peer_secid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4266 if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4268 else if (skb
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IPV6
))
4271 family
= sock
->sk
->sk_family
;
4275 if (sock
&& family
== PF_UNIX
)
4276 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock
), &peer_secid
);
4278 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_secid
);
4281 *secid
= peer_secid
;
4282 if (peer_secid
== SECSID_NULL
)
4287 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock
*sk
, int family
, gfp_t priority
)
4289 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4291 sksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec
), priority
);
4295 sksec
->peer_sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4296 sksec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4297 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec
);
4298 sk
->sk_security
= sksec
;
4303 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock
*sk
)
4305 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4307 sk
->sk_security
= NULL
;
4308 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec
);
4312 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock
*sk
, struct sock
*newsk
)
4314 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4315 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4317 newsksec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4318 newsksec
->peer_sid
= sksec
->peer_sid
;
4319 newsksec
->sclass
= sksec
->sclass
;
4321 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec
);
4324 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock
*sk
, u32
*secid
)
4327 *secid
= SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET
;
4329 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4331 *secid
= sksec
->sid
;
4335 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock
*sk
, struct socket
*parent
)
4337 struct inode_security_struct
*isec
= SOCK_INODE(parent
)->i_security
;
4338 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4340 if (sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET
|| sk
->sk_family
== PF_INET6
||
4341 sk
->sk_family
== PF_UNIX
)
4342 isec
->sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4343 sksec
->sclass
= isec
->sclass
;
4346 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4347 struct request_sock
*req
)
4349 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4351 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4355 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4356 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4359 err
= selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peersid
);
4362 if (peersid
== SECSID_NULL
) {
4363 req
->secid
= sksec
->sid
;
4364 req
->peer_secid
= SECSID_NULL
;
4366 err
= security_sid_mls_copy(sksec
->sid
, peersid
, &newsid
);
4369 req
->secid
= newsid
;
4370 req
->peer_secid
= peersid
;
4373 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req
, family
);
4376 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock
*newsk
,
4377 const struct request_sock
*req
)
4379 struct sk_security_struct
*newsksec
= newsk
->sk_security
;
4381 newsksec
->sid
= req
->secid
;
4382 newsksec
->peer_sid
= req
->peer_secid
;
4383 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4384 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4385 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4386 time it will have been created and available. */
4388 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4389 * thread with access to newsksec */
4390 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk
, req
->rsk_ops
->family
);
4393 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4395 u16 family
= sk
->sk_family
;
4396 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4398 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4399 if (family
== PF_INET6
&& skb
->protocol
== htons(ETH_P_IP
))
4402 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &sksec
->peer_sid
);
4405 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid
)
4407 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec
;
4410 __tsec
= current_security();
4413 return avc_has_perm(tsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
4416 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4418 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount
);
4421 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4423 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount
);
4426 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock
*req
,
4429 fl
->flowi_secid
= req
->secid
;
4432 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4434 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4436 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4437 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4438 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4439 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4440 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4441 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4443 return avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE
,
4447 static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock
*sk
)
4449 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4451 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4452 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4453 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4454 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4455 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4456 * protocols were being used */
4458 /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
4459 * the sockcreate SID here */
4461 sksec
->sid
= current_sid();
4462 sksec
->sclass
= SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
;
4465 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock
*sk
)
4467 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4468 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4471 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sksec
->sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4472 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM
, NULL
);
4475 err
= avc_has_perm(sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET
,
4476 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO
, NULL
);
4485 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4489 struct nlmsghdr
*nlh
;
4490 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4492 if (skb
->len
< NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4496 nlh
= nlmsg_hdr(skb
);
4498 err
= selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec
->sclass
, nlh
->nlmsg_type
, &perm
);
4500 if (err
== -EINVAL
) {
4501 audit_log(current
->audit_context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
,
4502 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4503 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4504 nlh
->nlmsg_type
, sksec
->sclass
);
4505 if (!selinux_enforcing
|| security_get_allow_unknown())
4515 err
= sock_has_perm(current
, sk
, perm
);
4520 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4522 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff
*skb
, int ifindex
,
4528 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4529 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4534 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4537 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4538 netlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled();
4539 peerlbl_active
= netlbl_active
|| selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4540 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4543 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
) != 0)
4546 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4548 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= ifindex
;
4549 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4550 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 1, NULL
) != 0)
4553 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4554 err
= selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex
, addrp
, family
,
4557 selinux_netlbl_err(skb
, err
, 1);
4563 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4564 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__FORWARD_IN
, &ad
))
4568 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4569 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4570 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4572 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, peer_sid
) != 0)
4578 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum
,
4579 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4580 const struct net_device
*in
,
4581 const struct net_device
*out
,
4582 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4584 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, in
->ifindex
, PF_INET
);
4587 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4588 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum
,
4589 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4590 const struct net_device
*in
,
4591 const struct net_device
*out
,
4592 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4594 return selinux_ip_forward(skb
, in
->ifindex
, PF_INET6
);
4598 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4603 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4606 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4607 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4608 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4610 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= skb
->sk
->sk_security
;
4613 sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4614 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb
, family
, sid
) != 0)
4620 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum
,
4621 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4622 const struct net_device
*in
,
4623 const struct net_device
*out
,
4624 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4626 return selinux_ip_output(skb
, PF_INET
);
4629 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4633 struct sock
*sk
= skb
->sk
;
4634 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
;
4635 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4636 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4642 sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4644 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4646 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= ifindex
;
4647 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4648 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, &proto
))
4651 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4652 if (avc_has_perm(sksec
->sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4653 SECCLASS_PACKET
, PACKET__SEND
, &ad
))
4654 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4656 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec
->sid
, skb
, &ad
, proto
))
4657 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4662 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff
*skb
, int ifindex
,
4668 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4669 struct lsm_network_audit net
= {0,};
4674 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4675 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4676 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4677 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4678 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer
)
4679 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb
, ifindex
, family
);
4681 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4682 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4683 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4684 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4685 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4686 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4687 if (skb_dst(skb
) != NULL
&& skb_dst(skb
)->xfrm
!= NULL
)
4690 secmark_active
= selinux_secmark_enabled();
4691 peerlbl_active
= netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4692 if (!secmark_active
&& !peerlbl_active
)
4695 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4696 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4697 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4698 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4702 secmark_perm
= PACKET__FORWARD_OUT
;
4703 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb
, family
, &peer_sid
))
4706 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4707 peer_sid
= SECINITSID_KERNEL
;
4710 struct sk_security_struct
*sksec
= sk
->sk_security
;
4711 peer_sid
= sksec
->sid
;
4712 secmark_perm
= PACKET__SEND
;
4715 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET
;
4717 ad
.u
.net
->netif
= ifindex
;
4718 ad
.u
.net
->family
= family
;
4719 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb
, &ad
, &addrp
, 0, NULL
))
4723 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, skb
->secmark
,
4724 SECCLASS_PACKET
, secmark_perm
, &ad
))
4725 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4727 if (peerlbl_active
) {
4731 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex
, &if_sid
))
4733 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, if_sid
,
4734 SECCLASS_NETIF
, NETIF__EGRESS
, &ad
))
4735 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4737 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp
, family
, &node_sid
))
4739 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid
, node_sid
,
4740 SECCLASS_NODE
, NODE__SENDTO
, &ad
))
4741 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED
);
4747 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum
,
4748 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4749 const struct net_device
*in
,
4750 const struct net_device
*out
,
4751 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4753 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, out
->ifindex
, PF_INET
);
4756 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4757 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum
,
4758 struct sk_buff
*skb
,
4759 const struct net_device
*in
,
4760 const struct net_device
*out
,
4761 int (*okfn
)(struct sk_buff
*))
4763 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb
, out
->ifindex
, PF_INET6
);
4767 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4769 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock
*sk
, struct sk_buff
*skb
)
4773 err
= cap_netlink_send(sk
, skb
);
4777 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk
, skb
);
4780 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct
*task
,
4781 struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
,
4784 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4787 isec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
4791 sid
= task_sid(task
);
4792 isec
->sclass
= sclass
;
4794 perm
->security
= isec
;
4799 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm
*perm
)
4801 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= perm
->security
;
4802 perm
->security
= NULL
;
4806 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4808 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
4810 msec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
4814 msec
->sid
= SECINITSID_UNLABELED
;
4815 msg
->security
= msec
;
4820 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4822 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
= msg
->security
;
4824 msg
->security
= NULL
;
4828 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipc_perms
,
4831 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4832 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4833 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4835 isec
= ipc_perms
->security
;
4837 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
4838 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= ipc_perms
->key
;
4840 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, isec
->sclass
, perms
, &ad
);
4843 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4845 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg
);
4848 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg
*msg
)
4850 msg_msg_free_security(msg
);
4853 /* message queue security operations */
4854 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
4856 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4857 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4858 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4861 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &msq
->q_perm
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
);
4865 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4867 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
4868 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4870 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
4873 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
4879 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue
*msq
)
4881 ipc_free_security(&msq
->q_perm
);
4884 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int msqflg
)
4886 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4887 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4888 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4890 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4892 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
4893 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4895 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
4896 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
4899 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue
*msq
, int cmd
)
4907 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4908 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
4911 perms
= MSGQ__GETATTR
| MSGQ__ASSOCIATE
;
4914 perms
= MSGQ__SETATTR
;
4917 perms
= MSGQ__DESTROY
;
4923 err
= ipc_has_perm(&msq
->q_perm
, perms
);
4927 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
, int msqflg
)
4929 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4930 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
4931 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4932 u32 sid
= current_sid();
4935 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4936 msec
= msg
->security
;
4939 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4941 if (msec
->sid
== SECINITSID_UNLABELED
) {
4943 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4944 * message queue this message will be stored in
4946 rc
= security_transition_sid(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
4952 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
4953 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4955 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4956 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
4959 /* Can this process send the message */
4960 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSG
,
4963 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4964 rc
= avc_has_perm(msec
->sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_MSGQ
,
4965 MSGQ__ENQUEUE
, &ad
);
4970 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue
*msq
, struct msg_msg
*msg
,
4971 struct task_struct
*target
,
4972 long type
, int mode
)
4974 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4975 struct msg_security_struct
*msec
;
4976 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4977 u32 sid
= task_sid(target
);
4980 isec
= msq
->q_perm
.security
;
4981 msec
= msg
->security
;
4983 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
4984 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= msq
->q_perm
.key
;
4986 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
,
4987 SECCLASS_MSGQ
, MSGQ__READ
, &ad
);
4989 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, msec
->sid
,
4990 SECCLASS_MSG
, MSG__RECEIVE
, &ad
);
4994 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4995 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
4997 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
4998 struct common_audit_data ad
;
4999 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5002 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &shp
->shm_perm
, SECCLASS_SHM
);
5006 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
5008 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5009 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
5011 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
5014 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
5020 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
)
5022 ipc_free_security(&shp
->shm_perm
);
5025 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int shmflg
)
5027 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5028 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5029 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5031 isec
= shp
->shm_perm
.security
;
5033 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5034 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= shp
->shm_perm
.key
;
5036 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SHM
,
5037 SHM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5040 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5041 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
, int cmd
)
5049 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5050 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5053 perms
= SHM__GETATTR
| SHM__ASSOCIATE
;
5056 perms
= SHM__SETATTR
;
5063 perms
= SHM__DESTROY
;
5069 err
= ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
5073 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel
*shp
,
5074 char __user
*shmaddr
, int shmflg
)
5078 if (shmflg
& SHM_RDONLY
)
5081 perms
= SHM__READ
| SHM__WRITE
;
5083 return ipc_has_perm(&shp
->shm_perm
, perms
);
5086 /* Semaphore security operations */
5087 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5089 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5090 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5091 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5094 rc
= ipc_alloc_security(current
, &sma
->sem_perm
, SECCLASS_SEM
);
5098 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5100 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5101 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5103 rc
= avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5106 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5112 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array
*sma
)
5114 ipc_free_security(&sma
->sem_perm
);
5117 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array
*sma
, int semflg
)
5119 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
;
5120 struct common_audit_data ad
;
5121 u32 sid
= current_sid();
5123 isec
= sma
->sem_perm
.security
;
5125 ad
.type
= LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC
;
5126 ad
.u
.ipc_id
= sma
->sem_perm
.key
;
5128 return avc_has_perm(sid
, isec
->sid
, SECCLASS_SEM
,
5129 SEM__ASSOCIATE
, &ad
);
5132 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5133 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array
*sma
, int cmd
)
5141 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5142 return task_has_system(current
, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO
);
5146 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
;
5157 perms
= SEM__DESTROY
;
5160 perms
= SEM__SETATTR
;
5164 perms
= SEM__GETATTR
| SEM__ASSOCIATE
;
5170 err
= ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5174 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array
*sma
,
5175 struct sembuf
*sops
, unsigned nsops
, int alter
)
5180 perms
= SEM__READ
| SEM__WRITE
;
5184 return ipc_has_perm(&sma
->sem_perm
, perms
);
5187 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, short flag
)
5193 av
|= IPC__UNIX_READ
;
5195 av
|= IPC__UNIX_WRITE
;
5200 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp
, av
);
5203 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
, u32
*secid
)
5205 struct ipc_security_struct
*isec
= ipcp
->security
;
5209 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry
*dentry
, struct inode
*inode
)
5212 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode
, dentry
);
5215 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5216 char *name
, char **value
)
5218 const struct task_security_struct
*__tsec
;
5224 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__GETATTR
);
5230 __tsec
= __task_cred(p
)->security
;
5232 if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5234 else if (!strcmp(name
, "prev"))
5236 else if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5237 sid
= __tsec
->exec_sid
;
5238 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5239 sid
= __tsec
->create_sid
;
5240 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5241 sid
= __tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5242 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5243 sid
= __tsec
->sockcreate_sid
;
5251 error
= security_sid_to_context(sid
, value
, &len
);
5261 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct
*p
,
5262 char *name
, void *value
, size_t size
)
5264 struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5265 struct task_struct
*tracer
;
5272 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5273 security attributes. */
5278 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5279 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5280 * above restriction is ever removed.
5282 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec"))
5283 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETEXEC
);
5284 else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate"))
5285 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE
);
5286 else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate"))
5287 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE
);
5288 else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate"))
5289 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE
);
5290 else if (!strcmp(name
, "current"))
5291 error
= current_has_perm(p
, PROCESS__SETCURRENT
);
5297 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5298 if (size
&& str
[1] && str
[1] != '\n') {
5299 if (str
[size
-1] == '\n') {
5303 error
= security_context_to_sid(value
, size
, &sid
);
5304 if (error
== -EINVAL
&& !strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5305 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN
)) {
5306 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
5309 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5310 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5311 if (str
[size
- 1] == '\0')
5312 audit_size
= size
- 1;
5315 ab
= audit_log_start(current
->audit_context
, GFP_ATOMIC
, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR
);
5316 audit_log_format(ab
, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5317 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, value
, audit_size
);
5322 error
= security_context_to_sid_force(value
, size
,
5329 new = prepare_creds();
5333 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5334 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5335 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5336 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5337 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5338 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5339 tsec
= new->security
;
5340 if (!strcmp(name
, "exec")) {
5341 tsec
->exec_sid
= sid
;
5342 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "fscreate")) {
5343 tsec
->create_sid
= sid
;
5344 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "keycreate")) {
5345 error
= may_create_key(sid
, p
);
5348 tsec
->keycreate_sid
= sid
;
5349 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "sockcreate")) {
5350 tsec
->sockcreate_sid
= sid
;
5351 } else if (!strcmp(name
, "current")) {
5356 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5358 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5359 error
= security_bounded_transition(tsec
->sid
, sid
);
5364 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5365 error
= avc_has_perm(tsec
->sid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5366 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION
, NULL
);
5370 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5371 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5374 tracer
= ptrace_parent(p
);
5376 ptsid
= task_sid(tracer
);
5380 error
= avc_has_perm(ptsid
, sid
, SECCLASS_PROCESS
,
5381 PROCESS__PTRACE
, NULL
);
5400 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid
, char **secdata
, u32
*seclen
)
5402 return security_sid_to_context(secid
, secdata
, seclen
);
5405 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata
, u32 seclen
, u32
*secid
)
5407 return security_context_to_sid(secdata
, seclen
, secid
);
5410 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata
, u32 seclen
)
5416 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5418 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
5420 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
5424 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5426 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry
*dentry
, void *ctx
, u32 ctxlen
)
5428 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry
, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX
, ctx
, ctxlen
, 0);
5431 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode
*inode
, void **ctx
, u32
*ctxlen
)
5434 len
= selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode
, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
,
5443 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key
*k
, const struct cred
*cred
,
5444 unsigned long flags
)
5446 const struct task_security_struct
*tsec
;
5447 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5449 ksec
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct
), GFP_KERNEL
);
5453 tsec
= cred
->security
;
5454 if (tsec
->keycreate_sid
)
5455 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->keycreate_sid
;
5457 ksec
->sid
= tsec
->sid
;
5463 static void selinux_key_free(struct key
*k
)
5465 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= k
->security
;
5471 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref
,
5472 const struct cred
*cred
,
5476 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
;
5479 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5480 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5481 appear to be created. */
5485 sid
= cred_sid(cred
);
5487 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
5488 ksec
= key
->security
;
5490 return avc_has_perm(sid
, ksec
->sid
, SECCLASS_KEY
, perm
, NULL
);
5493 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key
*key
, char **_buffer
)
5495 struct key_security_struct
*ksec
= key
->security
;
5496 char *context
= NULL
;
5500 rc
= security_sid_to_context(ksec
->sid
, &context
, &len
);
5509 static struct security_operations selinux_ops
= {
5512 .ptrace_access_check
= selinux_ptrace_access_check
,
5513 .ptrace_traceme
= selinux_ptrace_traceme
,
5514 .capget
= selinux_capget
,
5515 .capset
= selinux_capset
,
5516 .capable
= selinux_capable
,
5517 .quotactl
= selinux_quotactl
,
5518 .quota_on
= selinux_quota_on
,
5519 .syslog
= selinux_syslog
,
5520 .vm_enough_memory
= selinux_vm_enough_memory
,
5522 .netlink_send
= selinux_netlink_send
,
5524 .bprm_set_creds
= selinux_bprm_set_creds
,
5525 .bprm_committing_creds
= selinux_bprm_committing_creds
,
5526 .bprm_committed_creds
= selinux_bprm_committed_creds
,
5527 .bprm_secureexec
= selinux_bprm_secureexec
,
5529 .sb_alloc_security
= selinux_sb_alloc_security
,
5530 .sb_free_security
= selinux_sb_free_security
,
5531 .sb_copy_data
= selinux_sb_copy_data
,
5532 .sb_remount
= selinux_sb_remount
,
5533 .sb_kern_mount
= selinux_sb_kern_mount
,
5534 .sb_show_options
= selinux_sb_show_options
,
5535 .sb_statfs
= selinux_sb_statfs
,
5536 .sb_mount
= selinux_mount
,
5537 .sb_umount
= selinux_umount
,
5538 .sb_set_mnt_opts
= selinux_set_mnt_opts
,
5539 .sb_clone_mnt_opts
= selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts
,
5540 .sb_parse_opts_str
= selinux_parse_opts_str
,
5543 .inode_alloc_security
= selinux_inode_alloc_security
,
5544 .inode_free_security
= selinux_inode_free_security
,
5545 .inode_init_security
= selinux_inode_init_security
,
5546 .inode_create
= selinux_inode_create
,
5547 .inode_link
= selinux_inode_link
,
5548 .inode_unlink
= selinux_inode_unlink
,
5549 .inode_symlink
= selinux_inode_symlink
,
5550 .inode_mkdir
= selinux_inode_mkdir
,
5551 .inode_rmdir
= selinux_inode_rmdir
,
5552 .inode_mknod
= selinux_inode_mknod
,
5553 .inode_rename
= selinux_inode_rename
,
5554 .inode_readlink
= selinux_inode_readlink
,
5555 .inode_follow_link
= selinux_inode_follow_link
,
5556 .inode_permission
= selinux_inode_permission
,
5557 .inode_setattr
= selinux_inode_setattr
,
5558 .inode_getattr
= selinux_inode_getattr
,
5559 .inode_setxattr
= selinux_inode_setxattr
,
5560 .inode_post_setxattr
= selinux_inode_post_setxattr
,
5561 .inode_getxattr
= selinux_inode_getxattr
,
5562 .inode_listxattr
= selinux_inode_listxattr
,
5563 .inode_removexattr
= selinux_inode_removexattr
,
5564 .inode_getsecurity
= selinux_inode_getsecurity
,
5565 .inode_setsecurity
= selinux_inode_setsecurity
,
5566 .inode_listsecurity
= selinux_inode_listsecurity
,
5567 .inode_getsecid
= selinux_inode_getsecid
,
5569 .file_permission
= selinux_file_permission
,
5570 .file_alloc_security
= selinux_file_alloc_security
,
5571 .file_free_security
= selinux_file_free_security
,
5572 .file_ioctl
= selinux_file_ioctl
,
5573 .mmap_file
= selinux_mmap_file
,
5574 .mmap_addr
= selinux_mmap_addr
,
5575 .file_mprotect
= selinux_file_mprotect
,
5576 .file_lock
= selinux_file_lock
,
5577 .file_fcntl
= selinux_file_fcntl
,
5578 .file_set_fowner
= selinux_file_set_fowner
,
5579 .file_send_sigiotask
= selinux_file_send_sigiotask
,
5580 .file_receive
= selinux_file_receive
,
5582 .file_open
= selinux_file_open
,
5584 .task_create
= selinux_task_create
,
5585 .cred_alloc_blank
= selinux_cred_alloc_blank
,
5586 .cred_free
= selinux_cred_free
,
5587 .cred_prepare
= selinux_cred_prepare
,
5588 .cred_transfer
= selinux_cred_transfer
,
5589 .kernel_act_as
= selinux_kernel_act_as
,
5590 .kernel_create_files_as
= selinux_kernel_create_files_as
,
5591 .kernel_module_request
= selinux_kernel_module_request
,
5592 .task_setpgid
= selinux_task_setpgid
,
5593 .task_getpgid
= selinux_task_getpgid
,
5594 .task_getsid
= selinux_task_getsid
,
5595 .task_getsecid
= selinux_task_getsecid
,
5596 .task_setnice
= selinux_task_setnice
,
5597 .task_setioprio
= selinux_task_setioprio
,
5598 .task_getioprio
= selinux_task_getioprio
,
5599 .task_setrlimit
= selinux_task_setrlimit
,
5600 .task_setscheduler
= selinux_task_setscheduler
,
5601 .task_getscheduler
= selinux_task_getscheduler
,
5602 .task_movememory
= selinux_task_movememory
,
5603 .task_kill
= selinux_task_kill
,
5604 .task_wait
= selinux_task_wait
,
5605 .task_to_inode
= selinux_task_to_inode
,
5607 .ipc_permission
= selinux_ipc_permission
,
5608 .ipc_getsecid
= selinux_ipc_getsecid
,
5610 .msg_msg_alloc_security
= selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security
,
5611 .msg_msg_free_security
= selinux_msg_msg_free_security
,
5613 .msg_queue_alloc_security
= selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security
,
5614 .msg_queue_free_security
= selinux_msg_queue_free_security
,
5615 .msg_queue_associate
= selinux_msg_queue_associate
,
5616 .msg_queue_msgctl
= selinux_msg_queue_msgctl
,
5617 .msg_queue_msgsnd
= selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd
,
5618 .msg_queue_msgrcv
= selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv
,
5620 .shm_alloc_security
= selinux_shm_alloc_security
,
5621 .shm_free_security
= selinux_shm_free_security
,
5622 .shm_associate
= selinux_shm_associate
,
5623 .shm_shmctl
= selinux_shm_shmctl
,
5624 .shm_shmat
= selinux_shm_shmat
,
5626 .sem_alloc_security
= selinux_sem_alloc_security
,
5627 .sem_free_security
= selinux_sem_free_security
,
5628 .sem_associate
= selinux_sem_associate
,
5629 .sem_semctl
= selinux_sem_semctl
,
5630 .sem_semop
= selinux_sem_semop
,
5632 .d_instantiate
= selinux_d_instantiate
,
5634 .getprocattr
= selinux_getprocattr
,
5635 .setprocattr
= selinux_setprocattr
,
5637 .secid_to_secctx
= selinux_secid_to_secctx
,
5638 .secctx_to_secid
= selinux_secctx_to_secid
,
5639 .release_secctx
= selinux_release_secctx
,
5640 .inode_notifysecctx
= selinux_inode_notifysecctx
,
5641 .inode_setsecctx
= selinux_inode_setsecctx
,
5642 .inode_getsecctx
= selinux_inode_getsecctx
,
5644 .unix_stream_connect
= selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect
,
5645 .unix_may_send
= selinux_socket_unix_may_send
,
5647 .socket_create
= selinux_socket_create
,
5648 .socket_post_create
= selinux_socket_post_create
,
5649 .socket_bind
= selinux_socket_bind
,
5650 .socket_connect
= selinux_socket_connect
,
5651 .socket_listen
= selinux_socket_listen
,
5652 .socket_accept
= selinux_socket_accept
,
5653 .socket_sendmsg
= selinux_socket_sendmsg
,
5654 .socket_recvmsg
= selinux_socket_recvmsg
,
5655 .socket_getsockname
= selinux_socket_getsockname
,
5656 .socket_getpeername
= selinux_socket_getpeername
,
5657 .socket_getsockopt
= selinux_socket_getsockopt
,
5658 .socket_setsockopt
= selinux_socket_setsockopt
,
5659 .socket_shutdown
= selinux_socket_shutdown
,
5660 .socket_sock_rcv_skb
= selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb
,
5661 .socket_getpeersec_stream
= selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream
,
5662 .socket_getpeersec_dgram
= selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram
,
5663 .sk_alloc_security
= selinux_sk_alloc_security
,
5664 .sk_free_security
= selinux_sk_free_security
,
5665 .sk_clone_security
= selinux_sk_clone_security
,
5666 .sk_getsecid
= selinux_sk_getsecid
,
5667 .sock_graft
= selinux_sock_graft
,
5668 .inet_conn_request
= selinux_inet_conn_request
,
5669 .inet_csk_clone
= selinux_inet_csk_clone
,
5670 .inet_conn_established
= selinux_inet_conn_established
,
5671 .secmark_relabel_packet
= selinux_secmark_relabel_packet
,
5672 .secmark_refcount_inc
= selinux_secmark_refcount_inc
,
5673 .secmark_refcount_dec
= selinux_secmark_refcount_dec
,
5674 .req_classify_flow
= selinux_req_classify_flow
,
5675 .tun_dev_create
= selinux_tun_dev_create
,
5676 .tun_dev_post_create
= selinux_tun_dev_post_create
,
5677 .tun_dev_attach
= selinux_tun_dev_attach
,
5679 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5680 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc
,
5681 .xfrm_policy_clone_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_clone
,
5682 .xfrm_policy_free_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_free
,
5683 .xfrm_policy_delete_security
= selinux_xfrm_policy_delete
,
5684 .xfrm_state_alloc_security
= selinux_xfrm_state_alloc
,
5685 .xfrm_state_free_security
= selinux_xfrm_state_free
,
5686 .xfrm_state_delete_security
= selinux_xfrm_state_delete
,
5687 .xfrm_policy_lookup
= selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup
,
5688 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
= selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match
,
5689 .xfrm_decode_session
= selinux_xfrm_decode_session
,
5693 .key_alloc
= selinux_key_alloc
,
5694 .key_free
= selinux_key_free
,
5695 .key_permission
= selinux_key_permission
,
5696 .key_getsecurity
= selinux_key_getsecurity
,
5700 .audit_rule_init
= selinux_audit_rule_init
,
5701 .audit_rule_known
= selinux_audit_rule_known
,
5702 .audit_rule_match
= selinux_audit_rule_match
,
5703 .audit_rule_free
= selinux_audit_rule_free
,
5707 static __init
int selinux_init(void)
5709 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops
)) {
5710 selinux_enabled
= 0;
5714 if (!selinux_enabled
) {
5715 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5719 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5721 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5722 cred_init_security();
5724 default_noexec
= !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS
& VM_EXEC
);
5726 sel_inode_cache
= kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5727 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct
),
5728 0, SLAB_PANIC
, NULL
);
5731 if (register_security(&selinux_ops
))
5732 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5734 if (selinux_enforcing
)
5735 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5737 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5742 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block
*sb
, void *unused
)
5744 superblock_doinit(sb
, NULL
);
5747 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5749 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5751 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5752 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5753 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init
, NULL
);
5756 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5757 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5758 security_initcall(selinux_init
);
5760 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5762 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops
[] = {
5764 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_postroute
,
5765 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5767 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
5768 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
5771 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_forward
,
5772 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5774 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
5775 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
5778 .hook
= selinux_ipv4_output
,
5779 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5781 .hooknum
= NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT
,
5782 .priority
= NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
5786 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5788 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops
[] = {
5790 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_postroute
,
5791 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5793 .hooknum
= NF_INET_POST_ROUTING
,
5794 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST
,
5797 .hook
= selinux_ipv6_forward
,
5798 .owner
= THIS_MODULE
,
5800 .hooknum
= NF_INET_FORWARD
,
5801 .priority
= NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST
,
5807 static int __init
selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5811 if (!selinux_enabled
)
5814 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5816 err
= nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops
));
5818 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err
);
5820 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5821 err
= nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops
));
5823 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err
);
5830 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init
);
5832 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5833 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5835 printk(KERN_DEBUG
"SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5837 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops
));
5838 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5839 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops
, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops
));
5844 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5846 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5847 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5850 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5852 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5853 static int selinux_disabled
;
5855 int selinux_disable(void)
5857 if (ss_initialized
) {
5858 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5862 if (selinux_disabled
) {
5863 /* Only do this once. */
5867 printk(KERN_INFO
"SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5869 selinux_disabled
= 1;
5870 selinux_enabled
= 0;
5872 reset_security_ops();
5874 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5877 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5878 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5880 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */