1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <linux/atomic.h>
49 #include <linux/namei.h>
51 #include <linux/export.h>
52 #include <linux/slab.h>
53 #include <linux/mount.h>
54 #include <linux/socket.h>
55 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
56 #include <linux/audit.h>
57 #include <linux/personality.h>
58 #include <linux/time.h>
59 #include <linux/netlink.h>
60 #include <linux/compiler.h>
61 #include <asm/unistd.h>
62 #include <linux/security.h>
63 #include <linux/list.h>
64 #include <linux/tty.h>
65 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
66 #include <linux/highmem.h>
67 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
68 #include <linux/capability.h>
69 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
70 #include <linux/compat.h>
74 /* flags stating the success for a syscall */
75 #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
76 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
77 #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
79 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
80 * for saving names from getname(). If we get more names we will allocate
81 * a name dynamically and also add those to the list anchored by names_list. */
84 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
85 #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
87 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
88 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
90 /* number of audit rules */
93 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
96 struct audit_cap_data
{
97 kernel_cap_t permitted
;
98 kernel_cap_t inheritable
;
100 unsigned int fE
; /* effective bit of a file capability */
101 kernel_cap_t effective
; /* effective set of a process */
105 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
106 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
107 * pointers at syscall exit time).
109 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
111 struct list_head list
; /* audit_context->names_list */
120 struct audit_cap_data fcap
;
121 unsigned int fcap_ver
;
122 int name_len
; /* number of name's characters to log */
123 bool name_put
; /* call __putname() for this name */
125 * This was an allocated audit_names and not from the array of
126 * names allocated in the task audit context. Thus this name
127 * should be freed on syscall exit
132 struct audit_aux_data
{
133 struct audit_aux_data
*next
;
137 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
139 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
140 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
142 struct audit_aux_data_execve
{
143 struct audit_aux_data d
;
146 struct mm_struct
*mm
;
149 struct audit_aux_data_pids
{
150 struct audit_aux_data d
;
151 pid_t target_pid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
152 kuid_t target_auid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
153 kuid_t target_uid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
154 unsigned int target_sessionid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
155 u32 target_sid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
156 char target_comm
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
][TASK_COMM_LEN
];
160 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps
{
161 struct audit_aux_data d
;
162 struct audit_cap_data fcap
;
163 unsigned int fcap_ver
;
164 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap
;
165 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap
;
168 struct audit_aux_data_capset
{
169 struct audit_aux_data d
;
171 struct audit_cap_data cap
;
174 struct audit_tree_refs
{
175 struct audit_tree_refs
*next
;
176 struct audit_chunk
*c
[31];
179 /* The per-task audit context. */
180 struct audit_context
{
181 int dummy
; /* must be the first element */
182 int in_syscall
; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
183 enum audit_state state
, current_state
;
184 unsigned int serial
; /* serial number for record */
185 int major
; /* syscall number */
186 struct timespec ctime
; /* time of syscall entry */
187 unsigned long argv
[4]; /* syscall arguments */
188 long return_code
;/* syscall return code */
190 int return_valid
; /* return code is valid */
192 * The names_list is the list of all audit_names collected during this
193 * syscall. The first AUDIT_NAMES entries in the names_list will
194 * actually be from the preallocated_names array for performance
195 * reasons. Except during allocation they should never be referenced
196 * through the preallocated_names array and should only be found/used
197 * by running the names_list.
199 struct audit_names preallocated_names
[AUDIT_NAMES
];
200 int name_count
; /* total records in names_list */
201 struct list_head names_list
; /* anchor for struct audit_names->list */
202 char * filterkey
; /* key for rule that triggered record */
204 struct audit_context
*previous
; /* For nested syscalls */
205 struct audit_aux_data
*aux
;
206 struct audit_aux_data
*aux_pids
;
207 struct sockaddr_storage
*sockaddr
;
209 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
211 kuid_t uid
, euid
, suid
, fsuid
;
212 kgid_t gid
, egid
, sgid
, fsgid
;
213 unsigned long personality
;
219 unsigned int target_sessionid
;
221 char target_comm
[TASK_COMM_LEN
];
223 struct audit_tree_refs
*trees
, *first_trees
;
224 struct list_head killed_trees
;
242 unsigned long qbytes
;
246 struct mq_attr mqstat
;
255 unsigned int msg_prio
;
256 struct timespec abs_timeout
;
265 struct audit_cap_data cap
;
280 static inline int open_arg(int flags
, int mask
)
282 int n
= ACC_MODE(flags
);
283 if (flags
& (O_TRUNC
| O_CREAT
))
284 n
|= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
;
288 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context
*ctx
, int mask
)
295 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx
->arch
, n
)) {
297 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) &&
298 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE
, n
))
300 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_READ
) &&
301 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ
, n
))
303 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_ATTR
) &&
304 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR
, n
))
307 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
308 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) &&
309 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32
, n
))
311 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_READ
) &&
312 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32
, n
))
314 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_ATTR
) &&
315 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32
, n
))
319 return mask
& ACC_MODE(ctx
->argv
[1]);
321 return mask
& ACC_MODE(ctx
->argv
[2]);
322 case 4: /* socketcall */
323 return ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) && ctx
->argv
[0] == SYS_BIND
);
325 return mask
& AUDIT_PERM_EXEC
;
331 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context
*ctx
, int val
)
333 struct audit_names
*n
;
334 umode_t mode
= (umode_t
)val
;
339 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
340 if ((n
->ino
!= -1) &&
341 ((n
->mode
& S_IFMT
) == mode
))
349 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
350 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
351 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
352 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
353 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
354 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
355 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
358 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
359 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
363 ctx
->current_state
= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
;
367 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context
*ctx
, struct audit_chunk
*chunk
)
369 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
= ctx
->trees
;
370 int left
= ctx
->tree_count
;
372 p
->c
[--left
] = chunk
;
373 ctx
->tree_count
= left
;
382 ctx
->tree_count
= 30;
388 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
390 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
= ctx
->trees
;
391 ctx
->trees
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs
), GFP_KERNEL
);
397 p
->next
= ctx
->trees
;
399 ctx
->first_trees
= ctx
->trees
;
400 ctx
->tree_count
= 31;
405 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
,
406 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
, int count
)
408 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
409 struct audit_tree_refs
*q
;
412 /* we started with empty chain */
413 p
= ctx
->first_trees
;
415 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
420 for (q
= p
; q
!= ctx
->trees
; q
= q
->next
, n
= 31) {
422 audit_put_chunk(q
->c
[n
]);
426 while (n
-- > ctx
->tree_count
) {
427 audit_put_chunk(q
->c
[n
]);
431 ctx
->tree_count
= count
;
435 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
437 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
, *q
;
438 for (p
= ctx
->first_trees
; p
; p
= q
) {
444 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
, struct audit_tree
*tree
)
446 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
447 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
452 for (p
= ctx
->first_trees
; p
!= ctx
->trees
; p
= p
->next
) {
453 for (n
= 0; n
< 31; n
++)
454 if (audit_tree_match(p
->c
[n
], tree
))
459 for (n
= ctx
->tree_count
; n
< 31; n
++)
460 if (audit_tree_match(p
->c
[n
], tree
))
467 static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid
,
468 struct audit_names
*name
,
469 struct audit_field
*f
,
470 struct audit_context
*ctx
)
472 struct audit_names
*n
;
476 rc
= audit_uid_comparator(uid
, f
->op
, name
->uid
);
482 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
483 rc
= audit_uid_comparator(uid
, f
->op
, n
->uid
);
491 static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid
,
492 struct audit_names
*name
,
493 struct audit_field
*f
,
494 struct audit_context
*ctx
)
496 struct audit_names
*n
;
500 rc
= audit_gid_comparator(gid
, f
->op
, name
->gid
);
506 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
507 rc
= audit_gid_comparator(gid
, f
->op
, n
->gid
);
515 static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
516 const struct cred
*cred
,
517 struct audit_field
*f
,
518 struct audit_context
*ctx
,
519 struct audit_names
*name
)
522 /* process to file object comparisons */
523 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
524 return audit_compare_uid(cred
->uid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
525 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID
:
526 return audit_compare_gid(cred
->gid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
527 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
528 return audit_compare_uid(cred
->euid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
529 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID
:
530 return audit_compare_gid(cred
->egid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
531 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
532 return audit_compare_uid(tsk
->loginuid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
533 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
534 return audit_compare_uid(cred
->suid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
535 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID
:
536 return audit_compare_gid(cred
->sgid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
537 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID
:
538 return audit_compare_uid(cred
->fsuid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
539 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID
:
540 return audit_compare_gid(cred
->fsgid
, name
, f
, ctx
);
541 /* uid comparisons */
542 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID
:
543 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, tsk
->loginuid
);
544 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID
:
545 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, cred
->euid
);
546 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID
:
547 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, cred
->suid
);
548 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID
:
549 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsuid
);
550 /* auid comparisons */
551 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID
:
552 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk
->loginuid
, f
->op
, cred
->euid
);
553 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID
:
554 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk
->loginuid
, f
->op
, cred
->suid
);
555 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID
:
556 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk
->loginuid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsuid
);
557 /* euid comparisons */
558 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID
:
559 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->euid
, f
->op
, cred
->suid
);
560 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID
:
561 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->euid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsuid
);
562 /* suid comparisons */
563 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID
:
564 return audit_uid_comparator(cred
->suid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsuid
);
565 /* gid comparisons */
566 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID
:
567 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, cred
->egid
);
568 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID
:
569 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, cred
->sgid
);
570 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID
:
571 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsgid
);
572 /* egid comparisons */
573 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID
:
574 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->egid
, f
->op
, cred
->sgid
);
575 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID
:
576 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->egid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsgid
);
577 /* sgid comparison */
578 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID
:
579 return audit_gid_comparator(cred
->sgid
, f
->op
, cred
->fsgid
);
581 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
587 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
588 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
591 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
592 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
593 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
595 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
596 struct audit_krule
*rule
,
597 struct audit_context
*ctx
,
598 struct audit_names
*name
,
599 enum audit_state
*state
,
602 const struct cred
*cred
;
606 cred
= rcu_dereference_check(tsk
->cred
, tsk
== current
|| task_creation
);
608 for (i
= 0; i
< rule
->field_count
; i
++) {
609 struct audit_field
*f
= &rule
->fields
[i
];
610 struct audit_names
*n
;
615 result
= audit_comparator(tsk
->pid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
620 ctx
->ppid
= sys_getppid();
621 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->ppid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
625 result
= audit_uid_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
628 result
= audit_uid_comparator(cred
->euid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
631 result
= audit_uid_comparator(cred
->suid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
634 result
= audit_uid_comparator(cred
->fsuid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
637 result
= audit_gid_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
640 result
= audit_gid_comparator(cred
->egid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
643 result
= audit_gid_comparator(cred
->sgid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
646 result
= audit_gid_comparator(cred
->fsgid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
649 result
= audit_comparator(tsk
->personality
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
653 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->arch
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
657 if (ctx
&& ctx
->return_valid
)
658 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_code
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
661 if (ctx
&& ctx
->return_valid
) {
663 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_valid
, f
->op
, AUDITSC_SUCCESS
);
665 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_valid
, f
->op
, AUDITSC_FAILURE
);
670 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
671 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
))
674 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
675 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
676 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
685 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
686 audit_comparator(MINOR(name
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
))
689 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
690 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
691 audit_comparator(MINOR(n
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
700 result
= (name
->ino
== f
->val
);
702 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
703 if (audit_comparator(n
->ino
, f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
712 result
= audit_uid_comparator(name
->uid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
714 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
715 if (audit_uid_comparator(n
->uid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
)) {
724 result
= audit_gid_comparator(name
->gid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
);
726 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
727 if (audit_gid_comparator(n
->gid
, f
->op
, f
->gid
)) {
736 result
= audit_watch_compare(rule
->watch
, name
->ino
, name
->dev
);
740 result
= match_tree_refs(ctx
, rule
->tree
);
745 result
= audit_uid_comparator(tsk
->loginuid
, f
->op
, f
->uid
);
747 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER
:
748 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE
:
749 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE
:
752 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
753 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
754 match for now to avoid losing information that
755 may be wanted. An error message will also be
759 security_task_getsecid(tsk
, &sid
);
762 result
= security_audit_rule_match(sid
, f
->type
,
771 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW
:
772 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH
:
773 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
776 /* Find files that match */
778 result
= security_audit_rule_match(
779 name
->osid
, f
->type
, f
->op
,
782 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
783 if (security_audit_rule_match(n
->osid
, f
->type
,
791 /* Find ipc objects that match */
792 if (!ctx
|| ctx
->type
!= AUDIT_IPC
)
794 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx
->ipc
.osid
,
805 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->argv
[f
->type
-AUDIT_ARG0
], f
->op
, f
->val
);
807 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY
:
808 /* ignore this field for filtering */
812 result
= audit_match_perm(ctx
, f
->val
);
815 result
= audit_match_filetype(ctx
, f
->val
);
817 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE
:
818 result
= audit_field_compare(tsk
, cred
, f
, ctx
, name
);
826 if (rule
->prio
<= ctx
->prio
)
828 if (rule
->filterkey
) {
829 kfree(ctx
->filterkey
);
830 ctx
->filterkey
= kstrdup(rule
->filterkey
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
832 ctx
->prio
= rule
->prio
;
834 switch (rule
->action
) {
835 case AUDIT_NEVER
: *state
= AUDIT_DISABLED
; break;
836 case AUDIT_ALWAYS
: *state
= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
; break;
841 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
842 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
843 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
845 static enum audit_state
audit_filter_task(struct task_struct
*tsk
, char **key
)
847 struct audit_entry
*e
;
848 enum audit_state state
;
851 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK
], list
) {
852 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, NULL
, NULL
,
854 if (state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
)
855 *key
= kstrdup(e
->rule
.filterkey
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
861 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
;
864 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
865 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
866 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
867 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
869 static enum audit_state
audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
870 struct audit_context
*ctx
,
871 struct list_head
*list
)
873 struct audit_entry
*e
;
874 enum audit_state state
;
876 if (audit_pid
&& tsk
->tgid
== audit_pid
)
877 return AUDIT_DISABLED
;
880 if (!list_empty(list
)) {
881 int word
= AUDIT_WORD(ctx
->major
);
882 int bit
= AUDIT_BIT(ctx
->major
);
884 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, list
, list
) {
885 if ((e
->rule
.mask
[word
] & bit
) == bit
&&
886 audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, ctx
, NULL
,
889 ctx
->current_state
= state
;
895 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
;
899 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
900 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
902 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
903 struct audit_names
*n
,
904 struct audit_context
*ctx
) {
906 int h
= audit_hash_ino((u32
)n
->ino
);
907 struct list_head
*list
= &audit_inode_hash
[h
];
908 struct audit_entry
*e
;
909 enum audit_state state
;
911 word
= AUDIT_WORD(ctx
->major
);
912 bit
= AUDIT_BIT(ctx
->major
);
914 if (list_empty(list
))
917 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, list
, list
) {
918 if ((e
->rule
.mask
[word
] & bit
) == bit
&&
919 audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, ctx
, n
, &state
, false)) {
920 ctx
->current_state
= state
;
928 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
929 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
930 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
931 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
933 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct
*tsk
, struct audit_context
*ctx
)
935 struct audit_names
*n
;
937 if (audit_pid
&& tsk
->tgid
== audit_pid
)
942 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
943 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk
, n
, ctx
))
949 static inline struct audit_context
*audit_get_context(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
953 struct audit_context
*context
= tsk
->audit_context
;
957 context
->return_valid
= return_valid
;
960 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
961 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
964 * This is actually a test for:
965 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
966 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
968 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
970 if (unlikely(return_code
<= -ERESTARTSYS
) &&
971 (return_code
>= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK
) &&
972 (return_code
!= -ENOIOCTLCMD
))
973 context
->return_code
= -EINTR
;
975 context
->return_code
= return_code
;
977 if (context
->in_syscall
&& !context
->dummy
) {
978 audit_filter_syscall(tsk
, context
, &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT
]);
979 audit_filter_inodes(tsk
, context
);
982 tsk
->audit_context
= NULL
;
986 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context
*context
)
988 struct audit_names
*n
, *next
;
991 if (context
->put_count
+ context
->ino_count
!= context
->name_count
) {
992 printk(KERN_ERR
"%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
993 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
994 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
996 context
->serial
, context
->major
, context
->in_syscall
,
997 context
->name_count
, context
->put_count
,
999 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
1000 printk(KERN_ERR
"names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i
,
1001 n
->name
, n
->name
?: "(null)");
1008 context
->put_count
= 0;
1009 context
->ino_count
= 0;
1012 list_for_each_entry_safe(n
, next
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
1014 if (n
->name
&& n
->name_put
)
1019 context
->name_count
= 0;
1020 path_put(&context
->pwd
);
1021 context
->pwd
.dentry
= NULL
;
1022 context
->pwd
.mnt
= NULL
;
1025 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context
*context
)
1027 struct audit_aux_data
*aux
;
1029 while ((aux
= context
->aux
)) {
1030 context
->aux
= aux
->next
;
1033 while ((aux
= context
->aux_pids
)) {
1034 context
->aux_pids
= aux
->next
;
1039 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context
*context
,
1040 enum audit_state state
)
1042 memset(context
, 0, sizeof(*context
));
1043 context
->state
= state
;
1044 context
->prio
= state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
? ~0ULL : 0;
1047 static inline struct audit_context
*audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state
)
1049 struct audit_context
*context
;
1051 if (!(context
= kmalloc(sizeof(*context
), GFP_KERNEL
)))
1053 audit_zero_context(context
, state
);
1054 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context
->killed_trees
);
1055 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context
->names_list
);
1060 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
1063 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
1064 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
1065 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
1068 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct
*tsk
)
1070 struct audit_context
*context
;
1071 enum audit_state state
;
1074 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled
))
1075 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
1077 state
= audit_filter_task(tsk
, &key
);
1078 if (state
== AUDIT_DISABLED
)
1081 if (!(context
= audit_alloc_context(state
))) {
1083 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
1086 context
->filterkey
= key
;
1088 tsk
->audit_context
= context
;
1089 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk
, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT
);
1093 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context
*context
)
1095 struct audit_context
*previous
;
1099 previous
= context
->previous
;
1100 if (previous
|| (count
&& count
< 10)) {
1102 printk(KERN_ERR
"audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
1103 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
1104 context
->serial
, context
->major
,
1105 context
->name_count
, count
);
1107 audit_free_names(context
);
1108 unroll_tree_refs(context
, NULL
, 0);
1109 free_tree_refs(context
);
1110 audit_free_aux(context
);
1111 kfree(context
->filterkey
);
1112 kfree(context
->sockaddr
);
1117 printk(KERN_ERR
"audit: freed %d contexts\n", count
);
1120 void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer
*ab
)
1127 security_task_getsecid(current
, &sid
);
1131 error
= security_secid_to_secctx(sid
, &ctx
, &len
);
1133 if (error
!= -EINVAL
)
1138 audit_log_format(ab
, " subj=%s", ctx
);
1139 security_release_secctx(ctx
, len
);
1143 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
1147 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context
);
1149 void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, struct task_struct
*tsk
)
1151 const struct cred
*cred
;
1152 char name
[sizeof(tsk
->comm
)];
1153 struct mm_struct
*mm
= tsk
->mm
;
1154 struct vm_area_struct
*vma
;
1160 /* tsk == current */
1161 cred
= current_cred();
1163 spin_lock_irq(&tsk
->sighand
->siglock
);
1164 if (tsk
->signal
&& tsk
->signal
->tty
&& tsk
->signal
->tty
->name
)
1165 tty
= tsk
->signal
->tty
->name
;
1168 spin_unlock_irq(&tsk
->sighand
->siglock
);
1171 audit_log_format(ab
,
1172 " ppid=%ld pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
1173 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
1174 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u ses=%u tty=%s",
1177 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, tsk
->loginuid
),
1178 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, cred
->uid
),
1179 from_kgid(&init_user_ns
, cred
->gid
),
1180 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, cred
->euid
),
1181 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, cred
->suid
),
1182 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, cred
->fsuid
),
1183 from_kgid(&init_user_ns
, cred
->egid
),
1184 from_kgid(&init_user_ns
, cred
->sgid
),
1185 from_kgid(&init_user_ns
, cred
->fsgid
),
1186 tsk
->sessionid
, tty
);
1188 get_task_comm(name
, tsk
);
1189 audit_log_format(ab
, " comm=");
1190 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, name
);
1193 down_read(&mm
->mmap_sem
);
1196 if ((vma
->vm_flags
& VM_EXECUTABLE
) &&
1198 audit_log_d_path(ab
, " exe=",
1199 &vma
->vm_file
->f_path
);
1204 up_read(&mm
->mmap_sem
);
1206 audit_log_task_context(ab
);
1209 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_info
);
1211 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context
*context
, pid_t pid
,
1212 kuid_t auid
, kuid_t uid
, unsigned int sessionid
,
1213 u32 sid
, char *comm
)
1215 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1220 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_OBJ_PID
);
1224 audit_log_format(ab
, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid
,
1225 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, auid
),
1226 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, uid
), sessionid
);
1227 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid
, &ctx
, &len
)) {
1228 audit_log_format(ab
, " obj=(none)");
1231 audit_log_format(ab
, " obj=%s", ctx
);
1232 security_release_secctx(ctx
, len
);
1234 audit_log_format(ab
, " ocomm=");
1235 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, comm
);
1242 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
1243 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
1244 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundary)
1246 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
1247 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
1248 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
1249 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
1250 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
1252 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context
*context
,
1253 struct audit_buffer
**ab
,
1256 const char __user
*p
,
1259 char arg_num_len_buf
[12];
1260 const char __user
*tmp_p
= p
;
1261 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */
1262 size_t arg_num_len
= snprintf(arg_num_len_buf
, 12, "%d", arg_num
) + 5;
1263 size_t len
, len_left
, to_send
;
1264 size_t max_execve_audit_len
= MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
;
1265 unsigned int i
, has_cntl
= 0, too_long
= 0;
1268 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1269 len_left
= len
= strnlen_user(p
, MAX_ARG_STRLEN
) - 1;
1272 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1273 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1274 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1277 if (unlikely((len
== -1) || len
> MAX_ARG_STRLEN
- 1)) {
1279 send_sig(SIGKILL
, current
, 0);
1283 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1285 if (len_left
> MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
)
1286 to_send
= MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
;
1289 ret
= copy_from_user(buf
, tmp_p
, to_send
);
1291 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1292 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1297 send_sig(SIGKILL
, current
, 0);
1300 buf
[to_send
] = '\0';
1301 has_cntl
= audit_string_contains_control(buf
, to_send
);
1304 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1305 * send half as much in each message
1307 max_execve_audit_len
= MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
/ 2;
1310 len_left
-= to_send
;
1312 } while (len_left
> 0);
1316 if (len
> max_execve_audit_len
)
1319 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1320 for (i
= 0; len_left
> 0; i
++) {
1323 if (len_left
> max_execve_audit_len
)
1324 to_send
= max_execve_audit_len
;
1328 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1329 room_left
= MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
- arg_num_len
- *len_sent
;
1331 room_left
-= (to_send
* 2);
1333 room_left
-= to_send
;
1334 if (room_left
< 0) {
1337 *ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_EXECVE
);
1343 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1344 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1346 if ((i
== 0) && (too_long
))
1347 audit_log_format(*ab
, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num
,
1348 has_cntl
? 2*len
: len
);
1351 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1352 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1353 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1355 if (len
>= max_execve_audit_len
)
1356 ret
= copy_from_user(buf
, p
, to_send
);
1361 send_sig(SIGKILL
, current
, 0);
1364 buf
[to_send
] = '\0';
1366 /* actually log it */
1367 audit_log_format(*ab
, " a%d", arg_num
);
1369 audit_log_format(*ab
, "[%d]", i
);
1370 audit_log_format(*ab
, "=");
1372 audit_log_n_hex(*ab
, buf
, to_send
);
1374 audit_log_string(*ab
, buf
);
1377 len_left
-= to_send
;
1378 *len_sent
+= arg_num_len
;
1380 *len_sent
+= to_send
* 2;
1382 *len_sent
+= to_send
;
1384 /* include the null we didn't log */
1388 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context
*context
,
1389 struct audit_buffer
**ab
,
1390 struct audit_aux_data_execve
*axi
)
1393 size_t len_sent
= 0;
1394 const char __user
*p
;
1397 if (axi
->mm
!= current
->mm
)
1398 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
1400 p
= (const char __user
*)axi
->mm
->arg_start
;
1402 audit_log_format(*ab
, "argc=%d", axi
->argc
);
1405 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1406 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1407 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1408 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1410 buf
= kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
+ 1, GFP_KERNEL
);
1412 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
1416 for (i
= 0; i
< axi
->argc
; i
++) {
1417 len
= audit_log_single_execve_arg(context
, ab
, i
,
1426 static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, char *prefix
, kernel_cap_t
*cap
)
1430 audit_log_format(ab
, " %s=", prefix
);
1431 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i
) {
1432 audit_log_format(ab
, "%08x", cap
->cap
[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S
-1) - i
]);
1436 static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, struct audit_names
*name
)
1438 kernel_cap_t
*perm
= &name
->fcap
.permitted
;
1439 kernel_cap_t
*inh
= &name
->fcap
.inheritable
;
1442 if (!cap_isclear(*perm
)) {
1443 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_fp", perm
);
1446 if (!cap_isclear(*inh
)) {
1447 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_fi", inh
);
1452 audit_log_format(ab
, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name
->fcap
.fE
, name
->fcap_ver
);
1455 static void show_special(struct audit_context
*context
, int *call_panic
)
1457 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1460 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, context
->type
);
1464 switch (context
->type
) {
1465 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL
: {
1466 int nargs
= context
->socketcall
.nargs
;
1467 audit_log_format(ab
, "nargs=%d", nargs
);
1468 for (i
= 0; i
< nargs
; i
++)
1469 audit_log_format(ab
, " a%d=%lx", i
,
1470 context
->socketcall
.args
[i
]);
1473 u32 osid
= context
->ipc
.osid
;
1475 audit_log_format(ab
, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1476 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, context
->ipc
.uid
),
1477 from_kgid(&init_user_ns
, context
->ipc
.gid
),
1482 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid
, &ctx
, &len
)) {
1483 audit_log_format(ab
, " osid=%u", osid
);
1486 audit_log_format(ab
, " obj=%s", ctx
);
1487 security_release_secctx(ctx
, len
);
1490 if (context
->ipc
.has_perm
) {
1492 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
,
1493 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM
);
1494 audit_log_format(ab
,
1495 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1496 context
->ipc
.qbytes
,
1497 context
->ipc
.perm_uid
,
1498 context
->ipc
.perm_gid
,
1499 context
->ipc
.perm_mode
);
1504 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN
: {
1505 audit_log_format(ab
,
1506 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1507 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1508 context
->mq_open
.oflag
, context
->mq_open
.mode
,
1509 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_flags
,
1510 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_maxmsg
,
1511 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_msgsize
,
1512 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_curmsgs
);
1514 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV
: {
1515 audit_log_format(ab
,
1516 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1517 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1518 context
->mq_sendrecv
.mqdes
,
1519 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_len
,
1520 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_prio
,
1521 context
->mq_sendrecv
.abs_timeout
.tv_sec
,
1522 context
->mq_sendrecv
.abs_timeout
.tv_nsec
);
1524 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY
: {
1525 audit_log_format(ab
, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1526 context
->mq_notify
.mqdes
,
1527 context
->mq_notify
.sigev_signo
);
1529 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR
: {
1530 struct mq_attr
*attr
= &context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqstat
;
1531 audit_log_format(ab
,
1532 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1534 context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqdes
,
1535 attr
->mq_flags
, attr
->mq_maxmsg
,
1536 attr
->mq_msgsize
, attr
->mq_curmsgs
);
1538 case AUDIT_CAPSET
: {
1539 audit_log_format(ab
, "pid=%d", context
->capset
.pid
);
1540 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pi", &context
->capset
.cap
.inheritable
);
1541 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pp", &context
->capset
.cap
.permitted
);
1542 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pe", &context
->capset
.cap
.effective
);
1545 audit_log_format(ab
, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context
->mmap
.fd
,
1546 context
->mmap
.flags
);
1552 static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context
*context
, struct audit_names
*n
,
1553 int record_num
, int *call_panic
)
1555 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1556 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_PATH
);
1558 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1560 audit_log_format(ab
, "item=%d", record_num
);
1563 switch (n
->name_len
) {
1564 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL
:
1565 /* log the full path */
1566 audit_log_format(ab
, " name=");
1567 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, n
->name
);
1570 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1571 * directory component is the cwd */
1572 audit_log_d_path(ab
, " name=", &context
->pwd
);
1575 /* log the name's directory component */
1576 audit_log_format(ab
, " name=");
1577 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, n
->name
,
1581 audit_log_format(ab
, " name=(null)");
1583 if (n
->ino
!= (unsigned long)-1) {
1584 audit_log_format(ab
, " inode=%lu"
1585 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho"
1586 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1591 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, n
->uid
),
1592 from_kgid(&init_user_ns
, n
->gid
),
1599 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1600 n
->osid
, &ctx
, &len
)) {
1601 audit_log_format(ab
, " osid=%u", n
->osid
);
1604 audit_log_format(ab
, " obj=%s", ctx
);
1605 security_release_secctx(ctx
, len
);
1609 audit_log_fcaps(ab
, n
);
1614 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context
*context
, struct task_struct
*tsk
)
1616 int i
, call_panic
= 0;
1617 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1618 struct audit_aux_data
*aux
;
1619 struct audit_names
*n
;
1621 /* tsk == current */
1622 context
->personality
= tsk
->personality
;
1624 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SYSCALL
);
1626 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1627 audit_log_format(ab
, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1628 context
->arch
, context
->major
);
1629 if (context
->personality
!= PER_LINUX
)
1630 audit_log_format(ab
, " per=%lx", context
->personality
);
1631 if (context
->return_valid
)
1632 audit_log_format(ab
, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1633 (context
->return_valid
==AUDITSC_SUCCESS
)?"yes":"no",
1634 context
->return_code
);
1636 audit_log_format(ab
,
1637 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1642 context
->name_count
);
1644 audit_log_task_info(ab
, tsk
);
1645 audit_log_key(ab
, context
->filterkey
);
1648 for (aux
= context
->aux
; aux
; aux
= aux
->next
) {
1650 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, aux
->type
);
1652 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1654 switch (aux
->type
) {
1656 case AUDIT_EXECVE
: {
1657 struct audit_aux_data_execve
*axi
= (void *)aux
;
1658 audit_log_execve_info(context
, &ab
, axi
);
1661 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS
: {
1662 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps
*axs
= (void *)aux
;
1663 audit_log_format(ab
, "fver=%x", axs
->fcap_ver
);
1664 audit_log_cap(ab
, "fp", &axs
->fcap
.permitted
);
1665 audit_log_cap(ab
, "fi", &axs
->fcap
.inheritable
);
1666 audit_log_format(ab
, " fe=%d", axs
->fcap
.fE
);
1667 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pp", &axs
->old_pcap
.permitted
);
1668 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pi", &axs
->old_pcap
.inheritable
);
1669 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pe", &axs
->old_pcap
.effective
);
1670 audit_log_cap(ab
, "new_pp", &axs
->new_pcap
.permitted
);
1671 audit_log_cap(ab
, "new_pi", &axs
->new_pcap
.inheritable
);
1672 audit_log_cap(ab
, "new_pe", &axs
->new_pcap
.effective
);
1680 show_special(context
, &call_panic
);
1682 if (context
->fds
[0] >= 0) {
1683 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_FD_PAIR
);
1685 audit_log_format(ab
, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1686 context
->fds
[0], context
->fds
[1]);
1691 if (context
->sockaddr_len
) {
1692 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SOCKADDR
);
1694 audit_log_format(ab
, "saddr=");
1695 audit_log_n_hex(ab
, (void *)context
->sockaddr
,
1696 context
->sockaddr_len
);
1701 for (aux
= context
->aux_pids
; aux
; aux
= aux
->next
) {
1702 struct audit_aux_data_pids
*axs
= (void *)aux
;
1704 for (i
= 0; i
< axs
->pid_count
; i
++)
1705 if (audit_log_pid_context(context
, axs
->target_pid
[i
],
1706 axs
->target_auid
[i
],
1708 axs
->target_sessionid
[i
],
1710 axs
->target_comm
[i
]))
1714 if (context
->target_pid
&&
1715 audit_log_pid_context(context
, context
->target_pid
,
1716 context
->target_auid
, context
->target_uid
,
1717 context
->target_sessionid
,
1718 context
->target_sid
, context
->target_comm
))
1721 if (context
->pwd
.dentry
&& context
->pwd
.mnt
) {
1722 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_CWD
);
1724 audit_log_d_path(ab
, " cwd=", &context
->pwd
);
1730 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
)
1731 audit_log_name(context
, n
, i
++, &call_panic
);
1733 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1734 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_EOE
);
1738 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1742 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1743 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1745 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1747 void __audit_free(struct task_struct
*tsk
)
1749 struct audit_context
*context
;
1751 context
= audit_get_context(tsk
, 0, 0);
1755 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1756 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1757 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1758 * in the context of the idle thread */
1759 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1760 if (context
->in_syscall
&& context
->current_state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
)
1761 audit_log_exit(context
, tsk
);
1762 if (!list_empty(&context
->killed_trees
))
1763 audit_kill_trees(&context
->killed_trees
);
1765 audit_free_context(context
);
1769 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1770 * @arch: architecture type
1771 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1772 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1773 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1774 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1775 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1777 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1778 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1779 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1780 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1781 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1782 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1785 void __audit_syscall_entry(int arch
, int major
,
1786 unsigned long a1
, unsigned long a2
,
1787 unsigned long a3
, unsigned long a4
)
1789 struct task_struct
*tsk
= current
;
1790 struct audit_context
*context
= tsk
->audit_context
;
1791 enum audit_state state
;
1797 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
1798 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1799 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1800 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1801 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1805 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
1807 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1808 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1810 if (context
->in_syscall
) {
1811 struct audit_context
*newctx
;
1815 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1816 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1817 context
->serial
, tsk
->pid
, context
->major
, major
);
1819 newctx
= audit_alloc_context(context
->state
);
1821 newctx
->previous
= context
;
1823 tsk
->audit_context
= newctx
;
1825 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1826 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1827 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1828 * to abandon auditing. */
1829 audit_zero_context(context
, context
->state
);
1832 BUG_ON(context
->in_syscall
|| context
->name_count
);
1837 context
->arch
= arch
;
1838 context
->major
= major
;
1839 context
->argv
[0] = a1
;
1840 context
->argv
[1] = a2
;
1841 context
->argv
[2] = a3
;
1842 context
->argv
[3] = a4
;
1844 state
= context
->state
;
1845 context
->dummy
= !audit_n_rules
;
1846 if (!context
->dummy
&& state
== AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
) {
1848 state
= audit_filter_syscall(tsk
, context
, &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY
]);
1850 if (state
== AUDIT_DISABLED
)
1853 context
->serial
= 0;
1854 context
->ctime
= CURRENT_TIME
;
1855 context
->in_syscall
= 1;
1856 context
->current_state
= state
;
1861 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1862 * @success: success value of the syscall
1863 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
1865 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1866 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1867 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
1868 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1869 * free the names stored from getname().
1871 void __audit_syscall_exit(int success
, long return_code
)
1873 struct task_struct
*tsk
= current
;
1874 struct audit_context
*context
;
1877 success
= AUDITSC_SUCCESS
;
1879 success
= AUDITSC_FAILURE
;
1881 context
= audit_get_context(tsk
, success
, return_code
);
1885 if (context
->in_syscall
&& context
->current_state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
)
1886 audit_log_exit(context
, tsk
);
1888 context
->in_syscall
= 0;
1889 context
->prio
= context
->state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
? ~0ULL : 0;
1891 if (!list_empty(&context
->killed_trees
))
1892 audit_kill_trees(&context
->killed_trees
);
1894 if (context
->previous
) {
1895 struct audit_context
*new_context
= context
->previous
;
1896 context
->previous
= NULL
;
1897 audit_free_context(context
);
1898 tsk
->audit_context
= new_context
;
1900 audit_free_names(context
);
1901 unroll_tree_refs(context
, NULL
, 0);
1902 audit_free_aux(context
);
1903 context
->aux
= NULL
;
1904 context
->aux_pids
= NULL
;
1905 context
->target_pid
= 0;
1906 context
->target_sid
= 0;
1907 context
->sockaddr_len
= 0;
1909 context
->fds
[0] = -1;
1910 if (context
->state
!= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
) {
1911 kfree(context
->filterkey
);
1912 context
->filterkey
= NULL
;
1914 tsk
->audit_context
= context
;
1918 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode
*inode
)
1920 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1921 struct audit_context
*context
;
1922 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
1923 struct audit_chunk
*chunk
;
1925 if (likely(hlist_empty(&inode
->i_fsnotify_marks
)))
1927 context
= current
->audit_context
;
1929 count
= context
->tree_count
;
1931 chunk
= audit_tree_lookup(inode
);
1935 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
)))
1937 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context
))) {
1938 printk(KERN_WARNING
"out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1939 audit_set_auditable(context
);
1940 audit_put_chunk(chunk
);
1941 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1944 put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
);
1948 static void handle_path(const struct dentry
*dentry
)
1950 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1951 struct audit_context
*context
;
1952 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
1953 const struct dentry
*d
, *parent
;
1954 struct audit_chunk
*drop
;
1958 context
= current
->audit_context
;
1960 count
= context
->tree_count
;
1965 seq
= read_seqbegin(&rename_lock
);
1967 struct inode
*inode
= d
->d_inode
;
1968 if (inode
&& unlikely(!hlist_empty(&inode
->i_fsnotify_marks
))) {
1969 struct audit_chunk
*chunk
;
1970 chunk
= audit_tree_lookup(inode
);
1972 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
))) {
1978 parent
= d
->d_parent
;
1983 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock
, seq
) || drop
)) { /* in this order */
1986 /* just a race with rename */
1987 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1990 audit_put_chunk(drop
);
1991 if (grow_tree_refs(context
)) {
1992 /* OK, got more space */
1993 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1998 "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1999 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
2000 audit_set_auditable(context
);
2007 static struct audit_names
*audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context
*context
)
2009 struct audit_names
*aname
;
2011 if (context
->name_count
< AUDIT_NAMES
) {
2012 aname
= &context
->preallocated_names
[context
->name_count
];
2013 memset(aname
, 0, sizeof(*aname
));
2015 aname
= kzalloc(sizeof(*aname
), GFP_NOFS
);
2018 aname
->should_free
= true;
2021 aname
->ino
= (unsigned long)-1;
2022 list_add_tail(&aname
->list
, &context
->names_list
);
2024 context
->name_count
++;
2026 context
->ino_count
++;
2032 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
2033 * @name: name to add
2035 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
2036 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
2038 void __audit_getname(const char *name
)
2040 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2041 struct audit_names
*n
;
2043 if (!context
->in_syscall
) {
2044 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
2045 printk(KERN_ERR
"%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
2046 __FILE__
, __LINE__
, context
->serial
, name
);
2052 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
);
2057 n
->name_len
= AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
2060 if (!context
->pwd
.dentry
)
2061 get_fs_pwd(current
->fs
, &context
->pwd
);
2064 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
2065 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
2067 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
2068 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
2069 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
2071 void audit_putname(const char *name
)
2073 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2076 if (!context
->in_syscall
) {
2077 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
2078 printk(KERN_ERR
"%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
2079 __FILE__
, __LINE__
, context
->serial
, name
);
2080 if (context
->name_count
) {
2081 struct audit_names
*n
;
2084 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
)
2085 printk(KERN_ERR
"name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i
,
2086 n
->name
, n
->name
?: "(null)");
2093 ++context
->put_count
;
2094 if (context
->put_count
> context
->name_count
) {
2095 printk(KERN_ERR
"%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
2096 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
2099 context
->serial
, context
->major
,
2100 context
->in_syscall
, name
, context
->name_count
,
2101 context
->put_count
);
2108 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names
*name
, const struct dentry
*dentry
)
2110 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps
;
2116 rc
= get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry
, &caps
);
2120 name
->fcap
.permitted
= caps
.permitted
;
2121 name
->fcap
.inheritable
= caps
.inheritable
;
2122 name
->fcap
.fE
= !!(caps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE
);
2123 name
->fcap_ver
= (caps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT
;
2129 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
2130 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names
*name
, const struct dentry
*dentry
,
2131 const struct inode
*inode
)
2133 name
->ino
= inode
->i_ino
;
2134 name
->dev
= inode
->i_sb
->s_dev
;
2135 name
->mode
= inode
->i_mode
;
2136 name
->uid
= inode
->i_uid
;
2137 name
->gid
= inode
->i_gid
;
2138 name
->rdev
= inode
->i_rdev
;
2139 security_inode_getsecid(inode
, &name
->osid
);
2140 audit_copy_fcaps(name
, dentry
);
2144 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
2145 * @name: name being audited
2146 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2148 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
2150 void __audit_inode(const char *name
, const struct dentry
*dentry
)
2152 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2153 const struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
2154 struct audit_names
*n
;
2156 if (!context
->in_syscall
)
2159 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
2160 if (n
->name
&& (n
->name
== name
))
2164 /* unable to find the name from a previous getname() */
2165 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
);
2169 handle_path(dentry
);
2170 audit_copy_inode(n
, dentry
, inode
);
2174 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
2175 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2176 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
2178 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
2179 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
2180 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
2181 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
2182 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
2183 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
2184 * unsuccessful attempts.
2186 void __audit_inode_child(const struct dentry
*dentry
,
2187 const struct inode
*parent
)
2189 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2190 const char *found_parent
= NULL
, *found_child
= NULL
;
2191 const struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
2192 const char *dname
= dentry
->d_name
.name
;
2193 struct audit_names
*n
;
2196 if (!context
->in_syscall
)
2202 /* parent is more likely, look for it first */
2203 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
2207 if (n
->ino
== parent
->i_ino
&&
2208 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname
, n
->name
, &dirlen
)) {
2209 n
->name_len
= dirlen
; /* update parent data in place */
2210 found_parent
= n
->name
;
2215 /* no matching parent, look for matching child */
2216 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
2220 /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */
2221 if (!strcmp(dname
, n
->name
) ||
2222 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname
, n
->name
, &dirlen
)) {
2224 audit_copy_inode(n
, NULL
, inode
);
2226 n
->ino
= (unsigned long)-1;
2227 found_child
= n
->name
;
2233 if (!found_parent
) {
2234 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
);
2237 audit_copy_inode(n
, NULL
, parent
);
2241 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
);
2245 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2246 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2247 * audit_free_names() */
2249 n
->name
= found_parent
;
2250 n
->name_len
= AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
2251 /* don't call __putname() */
2252 n
->name_put
= false;
2256 audit_copy_inode(n
, NULL
, inode
);
2259 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child
);
2262 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2263 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2264 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
2265 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2267 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2269 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context
*ctx
,
2270 struct timespec
*t
, unsigned int *serial
)
2272 if (!ctx
->in_syscall
)
2275 ctx
->serial
= audit_serial();
2276 t
->tv_sec
= ctx
->ctime
.tv_sec
;
2277 t
->tv_nsec
= ctx
->ctime
.tv_nsec
;
2278 *serial
= ctx
->serial
;
2281 ctx
->current_state
= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
;
2286 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
2287 static atomic_t session_id
= ATOMIC_INIT(0);
2290 * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid
2291 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2295 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2297 int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid
)
2299 struct task_struct
*task
= current
;
2300 struct audit_context
*context
= task
->audit_context
;
2301 unsigned int sessionid
;
2303 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE
2304 if (uid_valid(task
->loginuid
))
2306 #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */
2307 if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL
))
2309 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */
2311 sessionid
= atomic_inc_return(&session_id
);
2312 if (context
&& context
->in_syscall
) {
2313 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2315 ab
= audit_log_start(NULL
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_LOGIN
);
2317 audit_log_format(ab
, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
2318 "old auid=%u new auid=%u"
2319 " old ses=%u new ses=%u",
2321 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, task_uid(task
)),
2322 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, task
->loginuid
),
2323 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, loginuid
),
2324 task
->sessionid
, sessionid
);
2328 task
->sessionid
= sessionid
;
2329 task
->loginuid
= loginuid
;
2334 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2337 * @attr: queue attributes
2340 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag
, umode_t mode
, struct mq_attr
*attr
)
2342 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2345 memcpy(&context
->mq_open
.attr
, attr
, sizeof(struct mq_attr
));
2347 memset(&context
->mq_open
.attr
, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr
));
2349 context
->mq_open
.oflag
= oflag
;
2350 context
->mq_open
.mode
= mode
;
2352 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_OPEN
;
2356 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2357 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2358 * @msg_len: Message length
2359 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2360 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2363 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes
, size_t msg_len
, unsigned int msg_prio
,
2364 const struct timespec
*abs_timeout
)
2366 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2367 struct timespec
*p
= &context
->mq_sendrecv
.abs_timeout
;
2370 memcpy(p
, abs_timeout
, sizeof(struct timespec
));
2372 memset(p
, 0, sizeof(struct timespec
));
2374 context
->mq_sendrecv
.mqdes
= mqdes
;
2375 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_len
= msg_len
;
2376 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_prio
= msg_prio
;
2378 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV
;
2382 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2383 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2384 * @notification: Notification event
2388 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes
, const struct sigevent
*notification
)
2390 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2393 context
->mq_notify
.sigev_signo
= notification
->sigev_signo
;
2395 context
->mq_notify
.sigev_signo
= 0;
2397 context
->mq_notify
.mqdes
= mqdes
;
2398 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY
;
2402 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2403 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2407 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes
, struct mq_attr
*mqstat
)
2409 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2410 context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqdes
= mqdes
;
2411 context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqstat
= *mqstat
;
2412 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR
;
2416 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2417 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2420 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
)
2422 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2423 context
->ipc
.uid
= ipcp
->uid
;
2424 context
->ipc
.gid
= ipcp
->gid
;
2425 context
->ipc
.mode
= ipcp
->mode
;
2426 context
->ipc
.has_perm
= 0;
2427 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp
, &context
->ipc
.osid
);
2428 context
->type
= AUDIT_IPC
;
2432 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2433 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2434 * @uid: msgq user id
2435 * @gid: msgq group id
2436 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2438 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2440 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes
, uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
, umode_t mode
)
2442 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2444 context
->ipc
.qbytes
= qbytes
;
2445 context
->ipc
.perm_uid
= uid
;
2446 context
->ipc
.perm_gid
= gid
;
2447 context
->ipc
.perm_mode
= mode
;
2448 context
->ipc
.has_perm
= 1;
2451 int __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2453 struct audit_aux_data_execve
*ax
;
2454 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2456 ax
= kmalloc(sizeof(*ax
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2460 ax
->argc
= bprm
->argc
;
2461 ax
->envc
= bprm
->envc
;
2463 ax
->d
.type
= AUDIT_EXECVE
;
2464 ax
->d
.next
= context
->aux
;
2465 context
->aux
= (void *)ax
;
2471 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2472 * @nargs: number of args
2476 void __audit_socketcall(int nargs
, unsigned long *args
)
2478 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2480 context
->type
= AUDIT_SOCKETCALL
;
2481 context
->socketcall
.nargs
= nargs
;
2482 memcpy(context
->socketcall
.args
, args
, nargs
* sizeof(unsigned long));
2486 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2487 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2488 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2491 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1
, int fd2
)
2493 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2494 context
->fds
[0] = fd1
;
2495 context
->fds
[1] = fd2
;
2499 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2500 * @len: data length in user space
2501 * @a: data address in kernel space
2503 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2505 int __audit_sockaddr(int len
, void *a
)
2507 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2509 if (!context
->sockaddr
) {
2510 void *p
= kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2513 context
->sockaddr
= p
;
2516 context
->sockaddr_len
= len
;
2517 memcpy(context
->sockaddr
, a
, len
);
2521 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct
*t
)
2523 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2525 context
->target_pid
= t
->pid
;
2526 context
->target_auid
= audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2527 context
->target_uid
= task_uid(t
);
2528 context
->target_sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2529 security_task_getsecid(t
, &context
->target_sid
);
2530 memcpy(context
->target_comm
, t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2534 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2535 * @sig: signal value
2536 * @t: task being signaled
2538 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2539 * and uid that is doing that.
2541 int __audit_signal_info(int sig
, struct task_struct
*t
)
2543 struct audit_aux_data_pids
*axp
;
2544 struct task_struct
*tsk
= current
;
2545 struct audit_context
*ctx
= tsk
->audit_context
;
2546 kuid_t uid
= current_uid(), t_uid
= task_uid(t
);
2548 if (audit_pid
&& t
->tgid
== audit_pid
) {
2549 if (sig
== SIGTERM
|| sig
== SIGHUP
|| sig
== SIGUSR1
|| sig
== SIGUSR2
) {
2550 audit_sig_pid
= tsk
->pid
;
2551 if (uid_valid(tsk
->loginuid
))
2552 audit_sig_uid
= tsk
->loginuid
;
2554 audit_sig_uid
= uid
;
2555 security_task_getsecid(tsk
, &audit_sig_sid
);
2557 if (!audit_signals
|| audit_dummy_context())
2561 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2562 * in audit_context */
2563 if (!ctx
->target_pid
) {
2564 ctx
->target_pid
= t
->tgid
;
2565 ctx
->target_auid
= audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2566 ctx
->target_uid
= t_uid
;
2567 ctx
->target_sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2568 security_task_getsecid(t
, &ctx
->target_sid
);
2569 memcpy(ctx
->target_comm
, t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2573 axp
= (void *)ctx
->aux_pids
;
2574 if (!axp
|| axp
->pid_count
== AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
) {
2575 axp
= kzalloc(sizeof(*axp
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2579 axp
->d
.type
= AUDIT_OBJ_PID
;
2580 axp
->d
.next
= ctx
->aux_pids
;
2581 ctx
->aux_pids
= (void *)axp
;
2583 BUG_ON(axp
->pid_count
>= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
);
2585 axp
->target_pid
[axp
->pid_count
] = t
->tgid
;
2586 axp
->target_auid
[axp
->pid_count
] = audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2587 axp
->target_uid
[axp
->pid_count
] = t_uid
;
2588 axp
->target_sessionid
[axp
->pid_count
] = audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2589 security_task_getsecid(t
, &axp
->target_sid
[axp
->pid_count
]);
2590 memcpy(axp
->target_comm
[axp
->pid_count
], t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2597 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2598 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2599 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2600 * @old: the old credentials
2602 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2603 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2607 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
,
2608 const struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
2610 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps
*ax
;
2611 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2612 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps
;
2613 struct dentry
*dentry
;
2615 ax
= kmalloc(sizeof(*ax
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2619 ax
->d
.type
= AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS
;
2620 ax
->d
.next
= context
->aux
;
2621 context
->aux
= (void *)ax
;
2623 dentry
= dget(bprm
->file
->f_dentry
);
2624 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry
, &vcaps
);
2627 ax
->fcap
.permitted
= vcaps
.permitted
;
2628 ax
->fcap
.inheritable
= vcaps
.inheritable
;
2629 ax
->fcap
.fE
= !!(vcaps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE
);
2630 ax
->fcap_ver
= (vcaps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT
;
2632 ax
->old_pcap
.permitted
= old
->cap_permitted
;
2633 ax
->old_pcap
.inheritable
= old
->cap_inheritable
;
2634 ax
->old_pcap
.effective
= old
->cap_effective
;
2636 ax
->new_pcap
.permitted
= new->cap_permitted
;
2637 ax
->new_pcap
.inheritable
= new->cap_inheritable
;
2638 ax
->new_pcap
.effective
= new->cap_effective
;
2643 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2644 * @pid: target pid of the capset call
2645 * @new: the new credentials
2646 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2648 * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2649 * audit system if applicable
2651 void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid
,
2652 const struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
2654 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2655 context
->capset
.pid
= pid
;
2656 context
->capset
.cap
.effective
= new->cap_effective
;
2657 context
->capset
.cap
.inheritable
= new->cap_effective
;
2658 context
->capset
.cap
.permitted
= new->cap_permitted
;
2659 context
->type
= AUDIT_CAPSET
;
2662 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd
, int flags
)
2664 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2665 context
->mmap
.fd
= fd
;
2666 context
->mmap
.flags
= flags
;
2667 context
->type
= AUDIT_MMAP
;
2670 static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, char *reason
, long signr
)
2674 unsigned int sessionid
;
2676 auid
= audit_get_loginuid(current
);
2677 sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(current
);
2678 current_uid_gid(&uid
, &gid
);
2680 audit_log_format(ab
, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2681 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, auid
),
2682 from_kuid(&init_user_ns
, uid
),
2683 from_kgid(&init_user_ns
, gid
),
2685 audit_log_task_context(ab
);
2686 audit_log_format(ab
, " pid=%d comm=", current
->pid
);
2687 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, current
->comm
);
2688 audit_log_format(ab
, " reason=");
2689 audit_log_string(ab
, reason
);
2690 audit_log_format(ab
, " sig=%ld", signr
);
2693 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2694 * @signr: signal value
2696 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2697 * should record the event for investigation.
2699 void audit_core_dumps(long signr
)
2701 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2706 if (signr
== SIGQUIT
) /* don't care for those */
2709 ab
= audit_log_start(NULL
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND
);
2710 audit_log_abend(ab
, "memory violation", signr
);
2714 void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall
, long signr
, int code
)
2716 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2718 ab
= audit_log_start(NULL
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND
);
2719 audit_log_abend(ab
, "seccomp", signr
);
2720 audit_log_format(ab
, " syscall=%ld", syscall
);
2721 audit_log_format(ab
, " compat=%d", is_compat_task());
2722 audit_log_format(ab
, " ip=0x%lx", KSTK_EIP(current
));
2723 audit_log_format(ab
, " code=0x%x", code
);
2727 struct list_head
*audit_killed_trees(void)
2729 struct audit_context
*ctx
= current
->audit_context
;
2730 if (likely(!ctx
|| !ctx
->in_syscall
))
2732 return &ctx
->killed_trees
;