3 NETWORK WORKING GROUP L. Zhu
4 Internet-Draft P. Leach
5 Expires: October 2, 2005 K. Jaganathan
10 Kerberos Cryptosystem Negotiation Extension
11 draft-zhu-kerb-enctype-nego-01
15 This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions
16 of Section 3 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, each
17 author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of
18 which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of
19 which he or she become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with
22 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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27 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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30 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
32 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
33 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
35 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
36 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
38 This Internet-Draft will expire on October 2, 2005.
42 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
46 This document specifies an extension by Kerberos to negotiate new
47 encryption types between the client-server peers.
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61 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
62 2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
63 3. Negotiation Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
64 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
65 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
66 6. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
67 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
68 A. Leveraging this Enctype Negotiation in Windows SPNEGO
69 Implementations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
70 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 7
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117 Under the current mechanism [CLAR], the KDC must limit the ticket
118 session key enctype chosen for a given server to one it believes is
119 supported by both the client and the server. If both the client and
120 server understand a stronger enctype than the one selected by the
121 KDC, they can not negotiate it. As the result, the protection of
122 application traffic is often weaker than necessary when the server
123 can support different sets of enctypes depending on the server
124 application software being used.
126 This document specifies an extension to Kerberos to allow clients and
127 servers to negotiate a different and possible stronger cryptosystem
128 to be used in subsequent communication.
130 This extension utilizes an authorization data element in the
131 authenticator of the AP-REQ message [CLAR]. The client sends the
132 list of enctypes that it supports to the server, the server then
133 informs the client its choice. The negotiated subkey is sent in the
134 AP-REP message [CLAR].
136 2. Conventions Used in This Document
138 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
139 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
140 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
142 3. Negotiation Extension
144 If the client prefers an enctype over that of the service ticket
145 session key, then it MUST send the list of enctypes it supports
146 (including the one selected by the KDC) in decreasing preference
149 The client sends the enctype list via the authorization-data of the
150 authenticator in the AP-REQ [CLAR]. A new authorization data element
151 type AD-ETYPE-NEGOTIATION (129) is defined. This authorization data
152 element itself is enclosed in the AD-IF-RELEVANT container, thus a
153 correctly implemented server that does not understand this element
154 should ignore it [CLAR]. The value of this authorization element
155 contains the DER [X60] encoding of the following ASN.1 type:
157 EtypeList ::= SEQUENCE OF Int32
158 -- Specifies the enctypes supported by the client.
159 -- This enctype list is in decreasing preference order
160 -- (favorite choice first).
161 -- Int32 is defined in [CLAR].
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171 If the EtypeList is present and the server prefers an enctype from
172 the client's enctype list over that of the AP-REQ authenticator
173 subkey (if that is present) or the service ticket session key, the
174 server MUST create a subkey using that enctype. This negotiated
175 subkey is sent in the subkey field of AP-REP message and it MUST be
176 used for subsequent communication.
178 This negotiation extension MUST NOT be used when the client does not
179 expect the subkey in the AP-REP message from the server.
181 Note that to preserve the quality of randomness provided by the KDC,
182 implementations of this extension SHOULD consider using the service
183 ticket session key value as a source of additional entropy when
184 generating the negotiated subkey. If the AP-REQ authenticator subkey
185 is present, it MAY also be used as a source of entropy.
187 The policy by which the client or the server chooses an enctype
188 (i.e., how the preference order for the supported enctypes is
189 selected) is an implementation-specific local matter.
191 4. Security Considerations
193 The client's enctype list and the server's reply enctype are part of
194 encrypted data, thus the security considerations are the same as
195 those of the Kerberos encrypted data.
197 In all cases, the communicating peers are exposed to the denial of
200 5. IANA Considerations
202 No IANA actions are required for this document.
204 6. Normative References
206 [CLAR] RFC-Editor: To be replaced by RFC number for draft-ietf-
207 krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications. Work in Progress.
209 [GSS-CFX] RFC-Editor: To be replaced by RFC number for draft-ietf-
210 krb-wg-gssapi-cfx. Work in Progress.
212 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
213 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
215 [RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
216 Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000.
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227 RFC-Editor: To be replaced by RFC number for draft-ietf-
228 kitten-2478bis. Work in progress.
230 [X690] ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules
231 (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
232 Encoding Rules (DER), ITU-T Recommendation X.690 (1997) |
233 ISO/IEC International Standard 8825-1:1998.
239 Microsoft Corporation
244 Email: lzhu@microsoft.com
248 Microsoft Corporation
253 Email: paulle@microsoft.com
257 Microsoft Corporation
262 Email: karthikj@microsoft.com
264 Appendix A. Leveraging this Enctype Negotiation in Windows SPNEGO
267 The SPNEGO implementations in Windows 2000, Windows XP and Windows
268 2003 do not generate or verify the mechlistMIC field when it is
269 required [SPNEGOBIS].
271 When the SPNEGO implementations that are updated according to
272 [SPNEGOBIS], an SSPI initiator or acceptor needs to determine if the
273 peer is updated, so that it can generate the mechlistMIC token when
274 the peer can process it. With the bidirectional negotiation, the
275 updated SPNEGO implementation can achieve the following two goals:
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286 o It can remain backward compatible with legacy implementations, if
287 local policy allows unsafe and unprotected negotiation with
288 downlevel implementations when the mechlistMIC token exchange
289 would otherwise be required by [SPNEGOBIS].
291 o The mechanism negotiation is protected according to [SPNEGOBIS]
292 when both peers are updated.
294 However, the updated SPNEGO implementation itself can not securely
295 inform the peer whether the local implementation is updated, thus it
296 has to obtain such information from the negotiated mechanism.
298 For Windows SPNEGO implementations, both the initiator and the
299 acceptor are assumed to have been updated if a "newer" [CLAR] or
300 different enctype is negotiated for use by the Kerberos GSS-API
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