2 * Copyright (c) 2000 - 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
3 * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
13 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
15 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
17 * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
18 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
19 * without specific prior written permission.
21 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
22 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
23 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
24 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
25 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
26 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
27 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
28 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
29 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
30 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
39 struct hdb_master_key_data
{
40 krb5_keytab_entry keytab
;
42 struct hdb_master_key_data
*next
;
43 unsigned int key_usage
;
47 hdb_free_master_key(krb5_context context
, hdb_master_key mkey
)
49 struct hdb_master_key_data
*ptr
;
51 krb5_kt_free_entry(context
, &mkey
->keytab
);
53 krb5_crypto_destroy(context
, mkey
->crypto
);
61 hdb_process_master_key(krb5_context context
,
62 int kvno
, krb5_keyblock
*key
, krb5_enctype etype
,
67 *mkey
= calloc(1, sizeof(**mkey
));
69 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ENOMEM
, "malloc: out of memory");
72 (*mkey
)->key_usage
= HDB_KU_MKEY
;
73 (*mkey
)->keytab
.vno
= kvno
;
74 ret
= krb5_parse_name(context
, "K/M", &(*mkey
)->keytab
.principal
);
77 ret
= krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(context
, key
, &(*mkey
)->keytab
.keyblock
);
81 (*mkey
)->keytab
.keyblock
.keytype
= etype
;
82 (*mkey
)->keytab
.timestamp
= time(NULL
);
83 ret
= krb5_crypto_init(context
, key
, etype
, &(*mkey
)->crypto
);
88 hdb_free_master_key(context
, *mkey
);
94 hdb_add_master_key(krb5_context context
, krb5_keyblock
*key
,
95 hdb_master_key
*inout
)
101 for(p
= *inout
; p
; p
= p
->next
)
102 vno
= max(vno
, p
->keytab
.vno
);
104 ret
= hdb_process_master_key(context
, vno
, key
, 0, &p
);
112 static krb5_error_code
113 read_master_keytab(krb5_context context
, const char *filename
,
114 hdb_master_key
*mkey
)
118 krb5_kt_cursor cursor
;
119 krb5_keytab_entry entry
;
122 ret
= krb5_kt_resolve(context
, filename
, &id
);
126 ret
= krb5_kt_start_seq_get(context
, id
, &cursor
);
130 while(krb5_kt_next_entry(context
, id
, &entry
, &cursor
) == 0) {
131 p
= calloc(1, sizeof(*p
));
133 krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context
, id
, &cursor
);
138 ret
= krb5_crypto_init(context
, &p
->keytab
.keyblock
, 0, &p
->crypto
);
142 krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context
, id
, &cursor
);
144 krb5_kt_close(context
, id
);
148 /* read a MIT master keyfile */
149 static krb5_error_code
150 read_master_mit(krb5_context context
, const char *filename
,
151 int byteorder
, hdb_master_key
*mkey
)
159 fd
= open(filename
, O_RDONLY
| O_BINARY
);
161 int save_errno
= errno
;
162 krb5_set_error_message(context
, save_errno
, "failed to open %s: %s",
163 filename
, strerror(save_errno
));
166 sp
= krb5_storage_from_fd(fd
);
171 krb5_storage_set_flags(sp
, byteorder
);
172 /* could possibly use ret_keyblock here, but do it with more
175 ret
= krb5_ret_int16(sp
, &enctype
);
178 ret
= krb5_enctype_valid(context
, enctype
);
181 key
.keytype
= enctype
;
182 ret
= krb5_ret_data(sp
, &key
.keyvalue
);
186 ret
= hdb_process_master_key(context
, 1, &key
, 0, mkey
);
187 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context
, &key
);
189 krb5_storage_free(sp
);
194 /* read an old master key file */
195 static krb5_error_code
196 read_master_encryptionkey(krb5_context context
, const char *filename
,
197 hdb_master_key
*mkey
)
202 unsigned char buf
[256];
206 fd
= open(filename
, O_RDONLY
| O_BINARY
);
208 int save_errno
= errno
;
209 krb5_set_error_message(context
, save_errno
, "failed to open %s: %s",
210 filename
, strerror(save_errno
));
214 len
= read(fd
, buf
, sizeof(buf
));
217 int save_errno
= errno
;
218 krb5_set_error_message(context
, save_errno
, "error reading %s: %s",
219 filename
, strerror(save_errno
));
223 ret
= decode_EncryptionKey(buf
, len
, &key
, &ret_len
);
224 memset(buf
, 0, sizeof(buf
));
228 /* Originally, the keytype was just that, and later it got changed
229 to des-cbc-md5, but we always used des in cfb64 mode. This
230 should cover all cases, but will break if someone has hacked
231 this code to really use des-cbc-md5 -- but then that's not my
233 if(key
.keytype
== ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC
|| key
.keytype
== ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5
)
234 key
.keytype
= ETYPE_DES_CFB64_NONE
;
236 ret
= hdb_process_master_key(context
, 0, &key
, 0, mkey
);
237 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context
, &key
);
241 /* read a krb4 /.k style file */
242 static krb5_error_code
243 read_master_krb4(krb5_context context
, const char *filename
,
244 hdb_master_key
*mkey
)
249 unsigned char buf
[256];
252 fd
= open(filename
, O_RDONLY
| O_BINARY
);
254 int save_errno
= errno
;
255 krb5_set_error_message(context
, save_errno
, "failed to open %s: %s",
256 filename
, strerror(save_errno
));
260 len
= read(fd
, buf
, sizeof(buf
));
263 int save_errno
= errno
;
264 krb5_set_error_message(context
, save_errno
, "error reading %s: %s",
265 filename
, strerror(save_errno
));
269 krb5_set_error_message(context
, HEIM_ERR_EOF
,
270 "bad contents of %s", filename
);
271 return HEIM_ERR_EOF
; /* XXX file might be too large */
274 memset(&key
, 0, sizeof(key
));
275 key
.keytype
= ETYPE_DES_PCBC_NONE
;
276 ret
= krb5_data_copy(&key
.keyvalue
, buf
, len
);
277 memset(buf
, 0, sizeof(buf
));
281 ret
= hdb_process_master_key(context
, 0, &key
, 0, mkey
);
282 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context
, &key
);
287 hdb_read_master_key(krb5_context context
, const char *filename
,
288 hdb_master_key
*mkey
)
291 unsigned char buf
[16];
299 filename
= HDB_DB_DIR
"/m-key";
301 f
= fopen(filename
, "r");
303 int save_errno
= errno
;
304 krb5_set_error_message(context
, save_errno
, "failed to open %s: %s",
305 filename
, strerror(save_errno
));
309 if(fread(buf
, 1, 2, f
) != 2) {
311 krb5_set_error_message(context
, HEIM_ERR_EOF
, "end of file reading %s", filename
);
315 fseek(f
, 0, SEEK_END
);
325 ret
= read_master_krb4(context
, filename
, mkey
);
326 } else if(buf
[0] == 0x30 && len
<= 127 && buf
[1] == len
- 2) {
327 ret
= read_master_encryptionkey(context
, filename
, mkey
);
328 } else if(buf
[0] == 5 && buf
[1] >= 1 && buf
[1] <= 2) {
329 ret
= read_master_keytab(context
, filename
, mkey
);
332 * Check both LittleEndian and BigEndian since they key file
333 * might be moved from a machine with diffrent byte order, or
334 * its running on MacOS X that always uses BE master keys.
336 ret
= read_master_mit(context
, filename
, KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_LE
, mkey
);
338 ret
= read_master_mit(context
, filename
, KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_BE
, mkey
);
344 hdb_write_master_key(krb5_context context
, const char *filename
,
352 filename
= HDB_DB_DIR
"/m-key";
354 ret
= krb5_kt_resolve(context
, filename
, &kt
);
358 for(p
= mkey
; p
; p
= p
->next
) {
359 ret
= krb5_kt_add_entry(context
, kt
, &p
->keytab
);
362 krb5_kt_close(context
, kt
);
368 _hdb_set_master_key_usage(krb5_context context
, HDB
*db
, unsigned int key_usage
)
370 if (db
->hdb_master_key_set
== 0)
371 return HDB_ERR_NO_MKEY
;
372 db
->hdb_master_key
->key_usage
= key_usage
;
377 _hdb_find_master_key(uint32_t *mkvno
, hdb_master_key mkey
)
379 hdb_master_key ret
= NULL
;
381 if(ret
== NULL
&& mkey
->keytab
.vno
== 0)
384 if(ret
== NULL
|| mkey
->keytab
.vno
> ret
->keytab
.vno
)
386 } else if((uint32_t)mkey
->keytab
.vno
== *mkvno
)
394 _hdb_mkey_version(hdb_master_key mkey
)
396 return mkey
->keytab
.vno
;
400 _hdb_mkey_decrypt(krb5_context context
, hdb_master_key key
,
401 krb5_key_usage usage
,
402 void *ptr
, size_t size
, krb5_data
*res
)
404 return krb5_decrypt(context
, key
->crypto
, usage
,
409 _hdb_mkey_encrypt(krb5_context context
, hdb_master_key key
,
410 krb5_key_usage usage
,
411 const void *ptr
, size_t size
, krb5_data
*res
)
413 return krb5_encrypt(context
, key
->crypto
, usage
,
418 hdb_unseal_key_mkey(krb5_context context
, Key
*k
, hdb_master_key mkey
)
430 key
= _hdb_find_master_key(k
->mkvno
, mkey
);
433 return HDB_ERR_NO_MKEY
;
435 ret
= _hdb_mkey_decrypt(context
, key
, HDB_KU_MKEY
,
436 k
->key
.keyvalue
.data
,
437 k
->key
.keyvalue
.length
,
439 if(ret
== KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY
) {
440 /* try to decrypt with MIT key usage */
441 ret
= _hdb_mkey_decrypt(context
, key
, 0,
442 k
->key
.keyvalue
.data
,
443 k
->key
.keyvalue
.length
,
449 /* fixup keylength if the key got padded when encrypting it */
450 ret
= krb5_enctype_keysize(context
, k
->key
.keytype
, &keysize
);
452 krb5_data_free(&res
);
455 if (keysize
> res
.length
) {
456 krb5_data_free(&res
);
457 return KRB5_BAD_KEYSIZE
;
460 memset(k
->key
.keyvalue
.data
, 0, k
->key
.keyvalue
.length
);
461 free(k
->key
.keyvalue
.data
);
462 k
->key
.keyvalue
= res
;
463 k
->key
.keyvalue
.length
= keysize
;
471 hdb_unseal_keys_mkey(krb5_context context
, hdb_entry
*ent
, hdb_master_key mkey
)
475 for(i
= 0; i
< ent
->keys
.len
; i
++){
478 ret
= hdb_unseal_key_mkey(context
, &ent
->keys
.val
[i
], mkey
);
486 hdb_unseal_keys(krb5_context context
, HDB
*db
, hdb_entry
*ent
)
488 if (db
->hdb_master_key_set
== 0)
490 return hdb_unseal_keys_mkey(context
, ent
, db
->hdb_master_key
);
494 hdb_unseal_keys_kvno(krb5_context context
, HDB
*db
, krb5_kvno kvno
,
495 unsigned flags
, hdb_entry
*ent
)
497 krb5_error_code ret
= HDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
499 HDB_Ext_KeySet
*hist_keys
;
502 unsigned int tmp_len
;
503 unsigned int kvno_diff
= 0;
506 int exclude_dead
= 0;
507 KerberosTime now
= 0;
512 if ((flags
& HDB_F_LIVE_CLNT_KVNOS
) || (flags
& HDB_F_LIVE_SVC_KVNOS
)) {
515 if (HDB_F_LIVE_CLNT_KVNOS
)
516 kvno_diff
= hdb_entry_get_kvno_diff_clnt(ent
);
518 kvno_diff
= hdb_entry_get_kvno_diff_svc(ent
);
521 ext
= hdb_find_extension(ent
, choice_HDB_extension_data_hist_keys
);
525 /* For swapping; see below */
526 tmp_len
= ent
->keys
.len
;
527 tmp_val
= ent
->keys
.val
;
528 tmp_kvno
= ent
->kvno
;
529 (void) hdb_entry_get_pw_change_time(ent
, &tmp_set_time
);
531 hist_keys
= &ext
->data
.u
.hist_keys
;
533 for (i
= 0; i
< hist_keys
->len
; i
++) {
534 if (kvno
!= 0 && hist_keys
->val
[i
].kvno
!= kvno
)
538 ((ent
->max_life
!= NULL
&&
539 hist_keys
->val
[i
].set_time
!= NULL
&&
540 (*hist_keys
->val
[i
].set_time
) < (now
- (*ent
->max_life
))) ||
541 (hist_keys
->val
[i
].kvno
< kvno
&&
542 (kvno
- hist_keys
->val
[i
].kvno
) > kvno_diff
)))
544 * The KDC may want to to check for this keyset's set_time
545 * is within the TGS principal's max_life, say. But we stop
550 /* Either the keys we want, or all the keys */
551 for (k
= 0; k
< hist_keys
->val
[i
].keys
.len
; k
++) {
552 ret
= hdb_unseal_key_mkey(context
,
553 &hist_keys
->val
[i
].keys
.val
[k
],
556 * If kvno == 0 we might not want to bail here! E.g., if we
557 * no longer have the right master key, so just ignore this.
559 * We could filter out keys that we can't decrypt here
560 * because of HDB_ERR_NO_MKEY. However, it seems safest to
561 * filter them out only where necessary, say, in kadm5.
563 if (ret
&& kvno
!= 0)
565 if (ret
&& ret
!= HDB_ERR_NO_MKEY
)
573 * What follows is a bit of a hack.
575 * This is the keyset we're being asked for, but it's not the
576 * current keyset. So we add the current keyset to the history,
577 * leave the one we were asked for in the history, and pretend
578 * the one we were asked for is also the current keyset.
580 * This is a bit of a defensive hack in case an entry fetched
581 * this way ever gets modified then stored: if the keyset is not
582 * changed we can detect this and put things back, else we won't
583 * drop any keysets from history by accident.
585 * Note too that we only ever get called with a non-zero kvno
586 * either in the KDC or in cases where we aren't changing the
587 * HDB entry anyways, which is why this is just a defensive
588 * hack. We also don't fetch specific kvnos in the dump case,
589 * so there's no danger that we'll dump this entry and load it
590 * again, repeatedly causing the history to grow boundelessly.
594 ent
->kvno
= hist_keys
->val
[i
].kvno
;
595 ent
->keys
.val
= hist_keys
->val
[i
].keys
.val
;
596 ent
->keys
.len
= hist_keys
->val
[i
].keys
.len
;
597 if (hist_keys
->val
[i
].set_time
!= NULL
)
598 /* Sloppy, but the callers we expect won't care */
599 (void) hdb_entry_set_pw_change_time(context
, ent
,
600 *hist_keys
->val
[i
].set_time
);
601 hist_keys
->val
[i
].kvno
= tmp_kvno
;
602 hist_keys
->val
[i
].keys
.val
= tmp_val
;
603 hist_keys
->val
[i
].keys
.len
= tmp_len
;
604 if (hist_keys
->val
[i
].set_time
!= NULL
)
605 /* Sloppy, but the callers we expect won't care */
606 *hist_keys
->val
[i
].set_time
= tmp_set_time
;
615 hdb_unseal_key(krb5_context context
, HDB
*db
, Key
*k
)
617 if (db
->hdb_master_key_set
== 0)
619 return hdb_unseal_key_mkey(context
, k
, db
->hdb_master_key
);
623 hdb_seal_key_mkey(krb5_context context
, Key
*k
, hdb_master_key mkey
)
632 key
= _hdb_find_master_key(k
->mkvno
, mkey
);
635 return HDB_ERR_NO_MKEY
;
637 ret
= _hdb_mkey_encrypt(context
, key
, HDB_KU_MKEY
,
638 k
->key
.keyvalue
.data
,
639 k
->key
.keyvalue
.length
,
644 memset(k
->key
.keyvalue
.data
, 0, k
->key
.keyvalue
.length
);
645 free(k
->key
.keyvalue
.data
);
646 k
->key
.keyvalue
= res
;
648 if (k
->mkvno
== NULL
) {
649 k
->mkvno
= malloc(sizeof(*k
->mkvno
));
650 if (k
->mkvno
== NULL
)
653 *k
->mkvno
= key
->keytab
.vno
;
659 hdb_seal_keys_mkey(krb5_context context
, hdb_entry
*ent
, hdb_master_key mkey
)
662 HDB_Ext_KeySet
*hist_keys
;
666 for(i
= 0; i
< ent
->keys
.len
; i
++){
667 ret
= hdb_seal_key_mkey(context
, &ent
->keys
.val
[i
], mkey
);
672 ext
= hdb_find_extension(ent
, choice_HDB_extension_data_hist_keys
);
675 hist_keys
= &ext
->data
.u
.hist_keys
;
677 for (i
= 0; i
< hist_keys
->len
; i
++) {
678 for (k
= 0; k
< hist_keys
->val
[i
].keys
.len
; k
++) {
679 ret
= hdb_seal_key_mkey(context
, &hist_keys
->val
[i
].keys
.val
[k
],
690 hdb_seal_keys(krb5_context context
, HDB
*db
, hdb_entry
*ent
)
692 if (db
->hdb_master_key_set
== 0)
695 return hdb_seal_keys_mkey(context
, ent
, db
->hdb_master_key
);
699 hdb_seal_key(krb5_context context
, HDB
*db
, Key
*k
)
701 if (db
->hdb_master_key_set
== 0)
704 return hdb_seal_key_mkey(context
, k
, db
->hdb_master_key
);
708 hdb_set_master_key(krb5_context context
,
715 ret
= hdb_process_master_key(context
, 0, key
, 0, &mkey
);
718 db
->hdb_master_key
= mkey
;
719 #if 0 /* XXX - why? */
720 des_set_random_generator_seed(key
.keyvalue
.data
);
722 db
->hdb_master_key_set
= 1;
723 db
->hdb_master_key
->key_usage
= HDB_KU_MKEY
;
728 hdb_set_master_keyfile (krb5_context context
,
735 ret
= hdb_read_master_key(context
, keyfile
, &key
);
739 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
742 db
->hdb_master_key
= key
;
743 db
->hdb_master_key_set
= 1;
748 hdb_clear_master_key (krb5_context context
,
751 if (db
->hdb_master_key_set
) {
752 hdb_free_master_key(context
, db
->hdb_master_key
);
753 db
->hdb_master_key_set
= 0;