2 * Copyright (c) 1997-2007 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
3 * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
13 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
15 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
17 * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
18 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
19 * without specific prior written permission.
21 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
22 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
23 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
24 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
25 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
26 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
27 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
28 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
29 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
30 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
36 #define MAX_TIME ((time_t)((1U << 31) - 1))
39 _kdc_fix_time(time_t **t
)
45 if(**t
== 0) **t
= MAX_TIME
; /* fix for old clients */
49 realloc_method_data(METHOD_DATA
*md
)
52 pa
= realloc(md
->val
, (md
->len
+ 1) * sizeof(*md
->val
));
61 set_salt_padata(METHOD_DATA
*md
, Salt
*salt
)
64 realloc_method_data(md
);
65 md
->val
[md
->len
- 1].padata_type
= salt
->type
;
66 der_copy_octet_string(&salt
->salt
,
67 &md
->val
[md
->len
- 1].padata_value
);
72 _kdc_find_padata(const KDC_REQ
*req
, int *start
, int type
)
74 if (req
->padata
== NULL
)
77 while((size_t)*start
< req
->padata
->len
){
79 if(req
->padata
->val
[*start
- 1].padata_type
== (unsigned)type
)
80 return &req
->padata
->val
[*start
- 1];
86 * This is a hack to allow predefined weak services, like afs to
87 * still use weak types
91 _kdc_is_weak_exception(krb5_principal principal
, krb5_enctype etype
)
93 if (principal
->name
.name_string
.len
> 0 &&
94 strcmp(principal
->name
.name_string
.val
[0], "afs") == 0 &&
95 (etype
== (krb5_enctype
)ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC
96 || etype
== (krb5_enctype
)ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4
97 || etype
== (krb5_enctype
)ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5
))
104 * Detect if `key' is the using the the precomputed `default_salt'.
108 is_default_salt_p(const krb5_salt
*default_salt
, const Key
*key
)
110 if (key
->salt
== NULL
)
112 if (default_salt
->salttype
!= key
->salt
->type
)
114 if (krb5_data_cmp(&default_salt
->saltvalue
, &key
->salt
->salt
))
120 * return the first appropriate key of `princ' in `ret_key'. Look for
121 * all the etypes in (`etypes', `len'), stopping as soon as we find
122 * one, but preferring one that has default salt.
126 _kdc_find_etype(krb5_context context
, krb5_boolean use_strongest_session_key
,
127 krb5_boolean is_preauth
, hdb_entry_ex
*princ
,
128 krb5_enctype
*etypes
, unsigned len
,
129 krb5_enctype
*ret_enctype
, Key
**ret_key
)
133 krb5_enctype enctype
= (krb5_enctype
)ETYPE_NULL
;
134 const krb5_enctype
*p
;
138 /* We'll want to avoid keys with v4 salted keys in the pre-auth case... */
139 ret
= krb5_get_pw_salt(context
, princ
->entry
.principal
, &def_salt
);
143 ret
= KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP
;
145 if (use_strongest_session_key
) {
148 * Pick the strongest key that the KDC, target service, and
149 * client all support, using the local cryptosystem enctype
150 * list in strongest-to-weakest order to drive the search.
152 * This is not what RFC4120 says to do, but it encourages
153 * adoption of stronger enctypes. This doesn't play well with
154 * clients that have multiple Kerberos client implementations
155 * available with different supported enctype lists.
158 /* drive the search with local supported enctypes list */
159 p
= krb5_kerberos_enctypes(context
);
161 p
[i
] != (krb5_enctype
)ETYPE_NULL
&& enctype
== (krb5_enctype
)ETYPE_NULL
;
163 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context
, p
[i
]) != 0 &&
164 !_kdc_is_weak_exception(princ
->entry
.principal
, p
[i
]))
167 /* check that the client supports it too */
168 for (k
= 0; k
< len
&& enctype
== (krb5_enctype
)ETYPE_NULL
; k
++) {
170 if (p
[i
] != etypes
[k
])
173 /* check target princ support */
175 while (hdb_next_enctype2key(context
, &princ
->entry
, NULL
,
177 if (key
->key
.keyvalue
.length
== 0) {
178 ret
= KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY
;
183 if (is_preauth
&& ret_key
!= NULL
&&
184 !is_default_salt_p(&def_salt
, key
))
191 * Pick the first key from the client's enctype list that is
192 * supported by the cryptosystem and by the given principal.
194 * RFC4120 says we SHOULD pick the first _strong_ key from the
195 * client's list... not the first key... If the admin disallows
196 * weak enctypes in krb5.conf and selects this key selection
197 * algorithm, then we get exactly what RFC4120 says.
199 for(i
= 0; ret
!= 0 && i
< len
; i
++) {
201 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context
, etypes
[i
]) != 0 &&
202 !_kdc_is_weak_exception(princ
->entry
.principal
, etypes
[i
]))
207 hdb_next_enctype2key(context
, &princ
->entry
, NULL
,
208 etypes
[i
], &key
) == 0) {
209 if (key
->key
.keyvalue
.length
== 0) {
210 ret
= KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY
;
215 if (is_preauth
&& ret_key
!= NULL
&&
216 !is_default_salt_p(&def_salt
, key
))
222 if (enctype
== (krb5_enctype
)ETYPE_NULL
) {
224 * if the service principal is one for which there is a known 1DES
225 * exception and no other enctype matches both the client request and
226 * the service key list, provide a DES-CBC-CRC key.
228 if (ret_key
== NULL
&&
229 _kdc_is_weak_exception(princ
->entry
.principal
, ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC
)) {
231 enctype
= ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC
;
233 ret
= KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP
;
238 if (ret_enctype
!= NULL
)
239 *ret_enctype
= enctype
;
244 krb5_free_salt (context
, def_salt
);
249 _kdc_make_anonymous_principalname (PrincipalName
*pn
)
251 pn
->name_type
= KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL
;
252 pn
->name_string
.len
= 1;
253 pn
->name_string
.val
= malloc(sizeof(*pn
->name_string
.val
));
254 if (pn
->name_string
.val
== NULL
)
256 pn
->name_string
.val
[0] = strdup("anonymous");
257 if (pn
->name_string
.val
[0] == NULL
) {
258 free(pn
->name_string
.val
);
259 pn
->name_string
.val
= NULL
;
266 _kdc_r_log(kdc_request_t r
, int level
, const char *fmt
, ...)
271 s
= kdc_log_msg_va(r
->context
, r
->config
, level
, fmt
, ap
);
277 _kdc_set_e_text(kdc_request_t r
, const char *e_text
)
280 kdc_log(r
->context
, r
->config
, 0, "%s", e_text
);
284 _kdc_log_timestamp(krb5_context context
,
285 krb5_kdc_configuration
*config
,
287 KerberosTime authtime
, KerberosTime
*starttime
,
288 KerberosTime endtime
, KerberosTime
*renew_till
)
290 char authtime_str
[100], starttime_str
[100],
291 endtime_str
[100], renewtime_str
[100];
293 krb5_format_time(context
, authtime
,
294 authtime_str
, sizeof(authtime_str
), TRUE
);
296 krb5_format_time(context
, *starttime
,
297 starttime_str
, sizeof(starttime_str
), TRUE
);
299 strlcpy(starttime_str
, "unset", sizeof(starttime_str
));
300 krb5_format_time(context
, endtime
,
301 endtime_str
, sizeof(endtime_str
), TRUE
);
303 krb5_format_time(context
, *renew_till
,
304 renewtime_str
, sizeof(renewtime_str
), TRUE
);
306 strlcpy(renewtime_str
, "unset", sizeof(renewtime_str
));
308 kdc_log(context
, config
, 5,
309 "%s authtime: %s starttime: %s endtime: %s renew till: %s",
310 type
, authtime_str
, starttime_str
, endtime_str
, renewtime_str
);
319 static krb5_error_code
320 pa_pkinit_validate(kdc_request_t r
, const PA_DATA
*pa
)
322 pk_client_params
*pkp
= NULL
;
323 char *client_cert
= NULL
;
326 ret
= _kdc_pk_rd_padata(r
->context
, r
->config
, &r
->req
, pa
, r
->client
, &pkp
);
327 if (ret
|| pkp
== NULL
) {
328 ret
= KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY
;
329 _kdc_r_log(r
, 5, "Failed to decode PKINIT PA-DATA -- %s",
334 ret
= _kdc_pk_check_client(r
->context
,
341 _kdc_set_e_text(r
, "PKINIT certificate not allowed to "
342 "impersonate principal");
346 _kdc_r_log(r
, 0, "PKINIT pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
347 r
->client_name
, client_cert
);
350 ret
= _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(r
->context
, r
->config
, pkp
, r
->client
,
351 r
->sessionetype
, &r
->req
, &r
->request
,
352 &r
->reply_key
, &r
->session_key
, &r
->outpadata
);
354 _kdc_set_e_text(r
, "Failed to build PK-INIT reply");
358 ret
= _kdc_add_inital_verified_cas(r
->context
, r
->config
,
363 _kdc_pk_free_client_param(r
->context
, pkp
);
374 static krb5_error_code
375 make_pa_enc_challange(krb5_context context
, METHOD_DATA
*md
,
382 EncryptedData encdata
;
387 krb5_us_timeofday (context
, &p
.patimestamp
, &usec
);
391 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ENC_TS_ENC
, buf
, buf_size
, &p
, &len
, ret
);
395 krb5_abortx(context
, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
397 ret
= krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context
,
399 KRB5_KU_ENC_CHALLENGE_KDC
,
408 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncryptedData
, buf
, buf_size
, &encdata
, &len
, ret
);
409 free_EncryptedData(&encdata
);
413 krb5_abortx(context
, "internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
415 ret
= krb5_padata_add(context
, md
, KRB5_PADATA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE
, buf
, len
);
421 static krb5_error_code
422 pa_enc_chal_validate(kdc_request_t r
, const PA_DATA
*pa
)
424 krb5_data pepper1
, pepper2
, ts_data
;
425 KDC_REQ_BODY
*b
= &r
->req
.req_body
;
426 int invalidPassword
= 0;
427 EncryptedData enc_data
;
428 krb5_enctype aenctype
;
434 heim_assert(r
->armor_crypto
!= NULL
, "ENC-CHAL called for non FAST");
436 if (_kdc_is_anon_request(b
)) {
437 ret
= KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY
;
438 kdc_log(r
->context
, r
->config
, 0, "ENC-CHALL doesn't support anon");
442 ret
= decode_EncryptedData(pa
->padata_value
.data
,
443 pa
->padata_value
.length
,
447 ret
= KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY
;
448 _kdc_r_log(r
, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
453 pepper1
.data
= "clientchallengearmor";
454 pepper1
.length
= strlen(pepper1
.data
);
455 pepper2
.data
= "challengelongterm";
456 pepper2
.length
= strlen(pepper2
.data
);
458 krb5_crypto_getenctype(r
->context
, r
->armor_crypto
, &aenctype
);
460 for (i
= 0; i
< r
->client
->entry
.keys
.len
; i
++) {
461 krb5_crypto challangecrypto
, longtermcrypto
;
462 krb5_keyblock challangekey
;
465 k
= &r
->client
->entry
.keys
.val
[i
];
467 ret
= krb5_crypto_init(r
->context
, &k
->key
, 0, &longtermcrypto
);
471 ret
= krb5_crypto_fx_cf2(r
->context
, r
->armor_crypto
, longtermcrypto
,
472 &pepper1
, &pepper2
, aenctype
,
474 krb5_crypto_destroy(r
->context
, longtermcrypto
);
478 ret
= krb5_crypto_init(r
->context
, &challangekey
, 0,
483 ret
= krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData(r
->context
, challangecrypto
,
484 KRB5_KU_ENC_CHALLENGE_CLIENT
,
488 const char *msg
= krb5_get_error_message(r
->context
, ret
);
489 krb5_error_code ret2
;
494 ret2
= krb5_enctype_to_string(r
->context
, k
->key
.keytype
, &str
);
497 _kdc_r_log(r
, 5, "Failed to decrypt ENC-CHAL -- %s "
498 "(enctype %s) error %s",
499 r
->client_name
, str
? str
: "unknown enctype", msg
);
500 krb5_free_error_message(r
->context
, msg
);
506 ret
= decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data
.data
,
510 krb5_data_free(&ts_data
);
512 krb5_crypto_destroy(r
->context
, challangecrypto
);
513 ret
= KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED
;
514 _kdc_r_log(r
, 5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s",
519 if (labs(kdc_time
- p
.patimestamp
) > r
->context
->max_skew
) {
520 char client_time
[100];
522 krb5_crypto_destroy(r
->context
, challangecrypto
);
524 krb5_format_time(r
->context
, p
.patimestamp
,
525 client_time
, sizeof(client_time
), TRUE
);
527 ret
= KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW
;
528 _kdc_r_log(r
, 0, "Too large time skew, "
529 "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
531 (unsigned)labs(kdc_time
- p
.patimestamp
),
532 r
->context
->max_skew
,
535 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p
);
539 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p
);
541 ret
= make_pa_enc_challange(r
->context
, &r
->outpadata
,
543 krb5_crypto_destroy(r
->context
, challangecrypto
);
547 set_salt_padata(&r
->outpadata
, k
->salt
);
548 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r
->context
, &r
->reply_key
);
549 ret
= krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r
->context
, &k
->key
, &r
->reply_key
);
556 if (r
->clientdb
->hdb_auth_status
)
557 r
->clientdb
->hdb_auth_status(r
->context
, r
->clientdb
, r
->client
,
562 if (invalidPassword
&& r
->clientdb
->hdb_auth_status
) {
563 r
->clientdb
->hdb_auth_status(r
->context
, r
->clientdb
, r
->client
,
564 HDB_AUTH_WRONG_PASSWORD
);
565 ret
= KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED
;
568 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data
);
573 static krb5_error_code
574 pa_enc_ts_validate(kdc_request_t r
, const PA_DATA
*pa
)
576 EncryptedData enc_data
;
585 if (_kdc_is_anon_request(&r
->req
.req_body
)) {
586 ret
= KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY
;
587 _kdc_set_e_text(r
, "ENC-TS doesn't support anon");
591 ret
= decode_EncryptedData(pa
->padata_value
.data
,
592 pa
->padata_value
.length
,
596 ret
= KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY
;
597 _kdc_r_log(r
, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
602 ret
= hdb_enctype2key(r
->context
, &r
->client
->entry
, NULL
,
603 enc_data
.etype
, &pa_key
);
606 _kdc_set_e_text(r
, "No key matching entype");
607 ret
= KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP
;
608 if(krb5_enctype_to_string(r
->context
, enc_data
.etype
, &estr
))
612 "No client key matching pa-data (%d) -- %s",
613 enc_data
.etype
, r
->client_name
);
616 "No client key matching pa-data (%s) -- %s",
617 estr
, r
->client_name
);
619 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data
);
624 ret
= krb5_crypto_init(r
->context
, &pa_key
->key
, 0, &crypto
);
626 const char *msg
= krb5_get_error_message(r
->context
, ret
);
627 _kdc_r_log(r
, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg
);
628 krb5_free_error_message(r
->context
, msg
);
629 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data
);
633 ret
= krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (r
->context
,
635 KRB5_KU_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP
,
638 krb5_crypto_destroy(r
->context
, crypto
);
640 * Since the user might have several keys with the same
641 * enctype but with diffrent salting, we need to try all
642 * the keys with the same enctype.
645 krb5_error_code ret2
;
646 const char *msg
= krb5_get_error_message(r
->context
, ret
);
648 ret2
= krb5_enctype_to_string(r
->context
,
649 pa_key
->key
.keytype
, &str
);
652 _kdc_r_log(r
, 5, "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA -- %s "
653 "(enctype %s) error %s",
654 r
->client_name
, str
? str
: "unknown enctype", msg
);
655 krb5_free_error_message(r
->context
, msg
);
658 if(hdb_next_enctype2key(r
->context
, &r
->client
->entry
, NULL
,
659 enc_data
.etype
, &pa_key
) == 0)
662 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data
);
664 if (r
->clientdb
->hdb_auth_status
)
665 r
->clientdb
->hdb_auth_status(r
->context
, r
->clientdb
, r
->client
,
666 HDB_AUTH_WRONG_PASSWORD
);
668 ret
= KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED
;
671 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data
);
672 ret
= decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data
.data
,
676 krb5_data_free(&ts_data
);
678 ret
= KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED
;
679 _kdc_r_log(r
, 5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s",
683 if (labs(kdc_time
- p
.patimestamp
) > r
->context
->max_skew
) {
684 char client_time
[100];
686 krb5_format_time(r
->context
, p
.patimestamp
,
687 client_time
, sizeof(client_time
), TRUE
);
689 ret
= KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW
;
690 _kdc_r_log(r
, 0, "Too large time skew, "
691 "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
693 (unsigned)labs(kdc_time
- p
.patimestamp
),
694 r
->context
->max_skew
,
698 * The following is needed to make windows clients to
699 * retry using the timestamp in the error message, if
700 * there is a e_text, they become unhappy.
703 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p
);
706 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p
);
708 set_salt_padata(&r
->outpadata
, pa_key
->salt
);
710 ret
= krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r
->context
, &pa_key
->key
, &r
->reply_key
);
714 ret
= krb5_enctype_to_string(r
->context
, pa_key
->key
.keytype
, &str
);
717 _kdc_r_log(r
, 2, "ENC-TS Pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
718 r
->client_name
, str
? str
: "unknown enctype");
732 #define PA_ANNOUNCE 1
733 #define PA_REQ_FAST 2 /* only use inside fast */
734 krb5_error_code (*validate
)(kdc_request_t
, const PA_DATA
*pa
);
737 static const struct kdc_patypes pat
[] = {
740 KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ
, "PK-INIT(ietf)", PA_ANNOUNCE
,
744 KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN
, "PK-INIT(win2k)", PA_ANNOUNCE
,
748 KRB5_PADATA_PKINIT_KX
, "Anonymous PK-INIT", PA_ANNOUNCE
,
752 { KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ
, "PK-INIT(ietf)", 0, NULL
},
753 { KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN
, "PK-INIT(win2k)", 0, NULL
},
754 { KRB5_PADATA_PKINIT_KX
, "Anonymous PK-INIT", 0, NULL
},
756 { KRB5_PADATA_PA_PK_OCSP_RESPONSE
, "OCSP", 0, NULL
},
758 KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP
, "ENC-TS",
763 KRB5_PADATA_ENCRYPTED_CHALLENGE
, "ENC-CHAL",
764 PA_ANNOUNCE
| PA_REQ_FAST
,
767 { KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP
, "REQ-ENC-PA-REP", 0, NULL
},
768 { KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST
, "FX-FAST", PA_ANNOUNCE
, NULL
},
769 { KRB5_PADATA_FX_ERROR
, "FX-ERROR", 0, NULL
},
770 { KRB5_PADATA_FX_COOKIE
, "FX-COOKIE", 0, NULL
}
774 log_patypes(krb5_context context
,
775 krb5_kdc_configuration
*config
,
778 struct rk_strpool
*p
= NULL
;
782 for (n
= 0; n
< padata
->len
; n
++) {
783 for (m
= 0; m
< sizeof(pat
) / sizeof(pat
[0]); m
++) {
784 if (padata
->val
[n
].padata_type
== pat
[m
].type
) {
785 p
= rk_strpoolprintf(p
, "%s", pat
[m
].name
);
789 if (m
== sizeof(pat
) / sizeof(pat
[0]))
790 p
= rk_strpoolprintf(p
, "%d", padata
->val
[n
].padata_type
);
791 if (p
&& n
+ 1 < padata
->len
)
792 p
= rk_strpoolprintf(p
, ", ");
794 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0, "out of memory");
799 p
= rk_strpoolprintf(p
, "none");
801 str
= rk_strpoolcollect(p
);
802 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0, "Client sent patypes: %s", str
);
811 _kdc_encode_reply(krb5_context context
,
812 krb5_kdc_configuration
*config
,
813 krb5_crypto armor_crypto
, uint32_t nonce
,
814 KDC_REP
*rep
, EncTicketPart
*et
, EncKDCRepPart
*ek
,
816 int skvno
, const EncryptionKey
*skey
,
817 int ckvno
, const EncryptionKey
*reply_key
,
828 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTicketPart
, buf
, buf_size
, et
, &len
, ret
);
830 const char *msg
= krb5_get_error_message(context
, ret
);
831 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0, "Failed to encode ticket: %s", msg
);
832 krb5_free_error_message(context
, msg
);
836 krb5_abortx(context
, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
838 ret
= krb5_crypto_init(context
, skey
, etype
, &crypto
);
840 const char *msg
= krb5_get_error_message(context
, ret
);
841 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg
);
842 krb5_free_error_message(context
, msg
);
846 ret
= krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context
,
852 &rep
->ticket
.enc_part
);
854 krb5_crypto_destroy(context
, crypto
);
856 const char *msg
= krb5_get_error_message(context
, ret
);
857 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0, "Failed to encrypt data: %s", msg
);
858 krb5_free_error_message(context
, msg
);
864 krb5_keyblock
*strengthen_key
= NULL
;
865 KrbFastFinished finished
;
867 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0, "FAST armor protection");
869 memset(&finished
, 0, sizeof(finished
));
870 krb5_data_zero(&data
);
872 finished
.timestamp
= kdc_time
;
874 finished
.crealm
= et
->crealm
;
875 finished
.cname
= et
->cname
;
877 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Ticket
, data
.data
, data
.length
,
878 &rep
->ticket
, &len
, ret
);
881 if (data
.length
!= len
)
882 krb5_abortx(context
, "internal asn.1 error");
884 ret
= krb5_create_checksum(context
, armor_crypto
,
885 KRB5_KU_FAST_FINISHED
, 0,
886 data
.data
, data
.length
,
887 &finished
.ticket_checksum
);
888 krb5_data_free(&data
);
892 ret
= _kdc_fast_mk_response(context
, armor_crypto
,
893 rep
->padata
, strengthen_key
, &finished
,
895 free_Checksum(&finished
.ticket_checksum
);
900 free_METHOD_DATA(rep
->padata
);
902 rep
->padata
= calloc(1, sizeof(*(rep
->padata
)));
903 if (rep
->padata
== NULL
) {
904 krb5_data_free(&data
);
909 ret
= krb5_padata_add(context
, rep
->padata
,
911 data
.data
, data
.length
);
916 * Hide client name of privacy reasons
918 if (1 /* r->fast_options.hide_client_names */) {
919 rep
->crealm
[0] = '\0';
920 free_PrincipalName(&rep
->cname
);
921 rep
->cname
.name_type
= 0;
925 if(rep
->msg_type
== krb_as_rep
&& !config
->encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep
)
926 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncASRepPart
, buf
, buf_size
, ek
, &len
, ret
);
928 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTGSRepPart
, buf
, buf_size
, ek
, &len
, ret
);
930 const char *msg
= krb5_get_error_message(context
, ret
);
931 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg
);
932 krb5_free_error_message(context
, msg
);
935 if(buf_size
!= len
) {
937 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
938 *e_text
= "KDC internal error";
939 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC
;
941 ret
= krb5_crypto_init(context
, reply_key
, 0, &crypto
);
943 const char *msg
= krb5_get_error_message(context
, ret
);
945 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg
);
946 krb5_free_error_message(context
, msg
);
949 if(rep
->msg_type
== krb_as_rep
) {
950 krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context
,
952 KRB5_KU_AS_REP_ENC_PART
,
958 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AS_REP
, buf
, buf_size
, rep
, &len
, ret
);
960 krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context
,
962 rk_is_subkey
? KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SUB_KEY
: KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SESSION
,
968 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(TGS_REP
, buf
, buf_size
, rep
, &len
, ret
);
970 krb5_crypto_destroy(context
, crypto
);
972 const char *msg
= krb5_get_error_message(context
, ret
);
973 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg
);
974 krb5_free_error_message(context
, msg
);
977 if(buf_size
!= len
) {
979 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
980 *e_text
= "KDC internal error";
981 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC
;
984 reply
->length
= buf_size
;
989 * Return 1 if the client have only older enctypes, this is for
990 * determining if the server should send ETYPE_INFO2 or not.
994 older_enctype(krb5_enctype enctype
)
997 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC
:
998 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4
:
999 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5
:
1000 case ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1
:
1001 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5
:
1002 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56
:
1004 * The following three is "old" windows enctypes and is needed for
1005 * windows 2000 hosts.
1007 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_MD4
:
1008 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD
:
1009 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD_EXP
:
1020 static krb5_error_code
1021 make_etype_info_entry(krb5_context context
, ETYPE_INFO_ENTRY
*ent
, Key
*key
)
1023 ent
->etype
= key
->key
.keytype
;
1026 ALLOC(ent
->salttype
);
1028 if(key
->salt
->type
== hdb_pw_salt
)
1029 *ent
->salttype
= 0; /* or 1? or NULL? */
1030 else if(key
->salt
->type
== hdb_afs3_salt
)
1033 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0, "unknown salt-type: %d",
1035 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC
;
1037 /* according to `the specs', we can't send a salt if
1038 we have AFS3 salted key, but that requires that you
1039 *know* what cell you are using (e.g by assuming
1040 that the cell is the same as the realm in lower
1043 ALLOC(ent
->salttype
);
1044 *ent
->salttype
= key
->salt
->type
;
1047 * We shouldn't sent salttype since it is incompatible with the
1048 * specification and it breaks windows clients. The afs
1049 * salting problem is solved by using KRB5-PADATA-AFS3-SALT
1050 * implemented in Heimdal 0.7 and later.
1052 ent
->salttype
= NULL
;
1054 krb5_copy_data(context
, &key
->salt
->salt
,
1057 /* we return no salt type at all, as that should indicate
1058 * the default salt type and make everybody happy. some
1059 * systems (like w2k) dislike being told the salt type
1062 ent
->salttype
= NULL
;
1068 static krb5_error_code
1069 get_pa_etype_info(krb5_context context
,
1070 krb5_kdc_configuration
*config
,
1071 METHOD_DATA
*md
, Key
*ckey
)
1073 krb5_error_code ret
= 0;
1080 pa
.val
= calloc(1, sizeof(pa
.val
[0]));
1084 ret
= make_etype_info_entry(context
, &pa
.val
[0], ckey
);
1086 free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa
);
1090 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO
, buf
, len
, &pa
, &len
, ret
);
1091 free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa
);
1094 ret
= realloc_method_data(md
);
1099 md
->val
[md
->len
- 1].padata_type
= KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO
;
1100 md
->val
[md
->len
- 1].padata_value
.length
= len
;
1101 md
->val
[md
->len
- 1].padata_value
.data
= buf
;
1109 extern int _krb5_AES_SHA1_string_to_default_iterator
;
1110 extern int _krb5_AES_SHA2_string_to_default_iterator
;
1112 static krb5_error_code
1113 make_s2kparams(int value
, size_t len
, krb5_data
**ps2kparams
)
1115 krb5_data
*s2kparams
;
1116 krb5_error_code ret
;
1119 if (s2kparams
== NULL
)
1121 ret
= krb5_data_alloc(s2kparams
, len
);
1126 _krb5_put_int(s2kparams
->data
, value
, len
);
1127 *ps2kparams
= s2kparams
;
1131 static krb5_error_code
1132 make_etype_info2_entry(ETYPE_INFO2_ENTRY
*ent
, Key
*key
)
1134 krb5_error_code ret
;
1136 ent
->etype
= key
->key
.keytype
;
1139 if (ent
->salt
== NULL
)
1141 *ent
->salt
= malloc(key
->salt
->salt
.length
+ 1);
1142 if (*ent
->salt
== NULL
) {
1147 memcpy(*ent
->salt
, key
->salt
->salt
.data
, key
->salt
->salt
.length
);
1148 (*ent
->salt
)[key
->salt
->salt
.length
] = '\0';
1152 ent
->s2kparams
= NULL
;
1154 switch (key
->key
.keytype
) {
1155 case ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
:
1156 case ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
:
1157 ret
= make_s2kparams(_krb5_AES_SHA1_string_to_default_iterator
,
1158 4, &ent
->s2kparams
);
1160 case KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128
:
1161 case KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192
:
1162 ret
= make_s2kparams(_krb5_AES_SHA2_string_to_default_iterator
,
1163 4, &ent
->s2kparams
);
1165 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC
:
1166 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4
:
1167 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5
:
1168 /* Check if this was a AFS3 salted key */
1169 if(key
->salt
&& key
->salt
->type
== hdb_afs3_salt
)
1170 ret
= make_s2kparams(1, 1, &ent
->s2kparams
);
1182 * Return an ETYPE-INFO2. Enctypes are storted the same way as in the
1183 * database (client supported enctypes first, then the unsupported
1187 static krb5_error_code
1188 get_pa_etype_info2(krb5_context context
,
1189 krb5_kdc_configuration
*config
,
1190 METHOD_DATA
*md
, Key
*ckey
)
1192 krb5_error_code ret
= 0;
1198 pa
.val
= calloc(1, sizeof(pa
.val
[0]));
1202 ret
= make_etype_info2_entry(&pa
.val
[0], ckey
);
1204 free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa
);
1208 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO2
, buf
, len
, &pa
, &len
, ret
);
1209 free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa
);
1212 ret
= realloc_method_data(md
);
1217 md
->val
[md
->len
- 1].padata_type
= KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO2
;
1218 md
->val
[md
->len
- 1].padata_value
.length
= len
;
1219 md
->val
[md
->len
- 1].padata_value
.data
= buf
;
1228 log_as_req(krb5_context context
,
1229 krb5_kdc_configuration
*config
,
1230 krb5_enctype cetype
,
1231 krb5_enctype setype
,
1232 const KDC_REQ_BODY
*b
)
1234 krb5_error_code ret
;
1235 struct rk_strpool
*p
;
1239 p
= rk_strpoolprintf(NULL
, "%s", "Client supported enctypes: ");
1241 for (i
= 0; i
< b
->etype
.len
; i
++) {
1242 ret
= krb5_enctype_to_string(context
, b
->etype
.val
[i
], &str
);
1244 p
= rk_strpoolprintf(p
, "%s", str
);
1247 p
= rk_strpoolprintf(p
, "%d", b
->etype
.val
[i
]);
1248 if (p
&& i
+ 1 < b
->etype
.len
)
1249 p
= rk_strpoolprintf(p
, ", ");
1251 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0, "out of memory");
1256 p
= rk_strpoolprintf(p
, "no encryption types");
1262 ret
= krb5_enctype_to_string(context
, cetype
, &cet
);
1264 ret
= krb5_enctype_to_string(context
, setype
, &set
);
1266 p
= rk_strpoolprintf(p
, ", using %s/%s", cet
, set
);
1272 p
= rk_strpoolprintf(p
, ", using enctypes %d/%d",
1276 str
= rk_strpoolcollect(p
);
1277 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0, "%s", str
);
1282 unparse_flags(KDCOptions2int(b
->kdc_options
), asn1_KDCOptions_units(),
1283 fixedstr
, sizeof(fixedstr
));
1285 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0, "Requested flags: %s", fixedstr
);
1290 * verify the flags on `client' and `server', returning 0
1291 * if they are OK and generating an error messages and returning
1292 * and error code otherwise.
1296 kdc_check_flags(krb5_context context
,
1297 krb5_kdc_configuration
*config
,
1298 hdb_entry_ex
*client_ex
, const char *client_name
,
1299 hdb_entry_ex
*server_ex
, const char *server_name
,
1300 krb5_boolean is_as_req
)
1302 if(client_ex
!= NULL
) {
1303 hdb_entry
*client
= &client_ex
->entry
;
1306 if (client
->flags
.locked_out
) {
1307 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0,
1308 "Client (%s) is locked out", client_name
);
1309 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY
;
1312 if (client
->flags
.invalid
) {
1313 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0,
1314 "Client (%s) has invalid bit set", client_name
);
1315 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY
;
1318 if(!client
->flags
.client
){
1319 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0,
1320 "Principal may not act as client -- %s", client_name
);
1321 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY
;
1324 if (client
->valid_start
&& *client
->valid_start
> kdc_time
) {
1325 char starttime_str
[100];
1326 krb5_format_time(context
, *client
->valid_start
,
1327 starttime_str
, sizeof(starttime_str
), TRUE
);
1328 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0,
1329 "Client not yet valid until %s -- %s",
1330 starttime_str
, client_name
);
1331 return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET
;
1334 if (client
->valid_end
&& *client
->valid_end
< kdc_time
) {
1335 char endtime_str
[100];
1336 krb5_format_time(context
, *client
->valid_end
,
1337 endtime_str
, sizeof(endtime_str
), TRUE
);
1338 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0,
1339 "Client expired at %s -- %s",
1340 endtime_str
, client_name
);
1341 return KRB5KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP
;
1344 if (client
->flags
.require_pwchange
&&
1345 (server_ex
== NULL
|| !server_ex
->entry
.flags
.change_pw
)) {
1346 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0,
1347 "Client's key must be changed -- %s", client_name
);
1348 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED
;
1351 if (client
->pw_end
&& *client
->pw_end
< kdc_time
1352 && (server_ex
== NULL
|| !server_ex
->entry
.flags
.change_pw
)) {
1353 char pwend_str
[100];
1354 krb5_format_time(context
, *client
->pw_end
,
1355 pwend_str
, sizeof(pwend_str
), TRUE
);
1356 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0,
1357 "Client's key has expired at %s -- %s",
1358 pwend_str
, client_name
);
1359 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED
;
1365 if (server_ex
!= NULL
) {
1366 hdb_entry
*server
= &server_ex
->entry
;
1368 if (server
->flags
.locked_out
) {
1369 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0,
1370 "Client server locked out -- %s", server_name
);
1371 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY
;
1373 if (server
->flags
.invalid
) {
1374 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0,
1375 "Server has invalid flag set -- %s", server_name
);
1376 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY
;
1379 if(!server
->flags
.server
){
1380 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0,
1381 "Principal may not act as server -- %s", server_name
);
1382 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY
;
1385 if(!is_as_req
&& server
->flags
.initial
) {
1386 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0,
1387 "AS-REQ is required for server -- %s", server_name
);
1388 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY
;
1391 if (server
->valid_start
&& *server
->valid_start
> kdc_time
) {
1392 char starttime_str
[100];
1393 krb5_format_time(context
, *server
->valid_start
,
1394 starttime_str
, sizeof(starttime_str
), TRUE
);
1395 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0,
1396 "Server not yet valid until %s -- %s",
1397 starttime_str
, server_name
);
1398 return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET
;
1401 if (server
->valid_end
&& *server
->valid_end
< kdc_time
) {
1402 char endtime_str
[100];
1403 krb5_format_time(context
, *server
->valid_end
,
1404 endtime_str
, sizeof(endtime_str
), TRUE
);
1405 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0,
1406 "Server expired at %s -- %s",
1407 endtime_str
, server_name
);
1408 return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP
;
1411 if (server
->pw_end
&& *server
->pw_end
< kdc_time
) {
1412 char pwend_str
[100];
1413 krb5_format_time(context
, *server
->pw_end
,
1414 pwend_str
, sizeof(pwend_str
), TRUE
);
1415 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0,
1416 "Server's key has expired at -- %s",
1417 pwend_str
, server_name
);
1418 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED
;
1425 * Return TRUE if `from' is part of `addresses' taking into consideration
1426 * the configuration variables that tells us how strict we should be about
1431 _kdc_check_addresses(krb5_context context
,
1432 krb5_kdc_configuration
*config
,
1433 HostAddresses
*addresses
, const struct sockaddr
*from
)
1435 krb5_error_code ret
;
1437 krb5_boolean result
;
1438 krb5_boolean only_netbios
= TRUE
;
1441 if(config
->check_ticket_addresses
== 0)
1444 if(addresses
== NULL
)
1445 return config
->allow_null_ticket_addresses
;
1447 for (i
= 0; i
< addresses
->len
; ++i
) {
1448 if (addresses
->val
[i
].addr_type
!= KRB5_ADDRESS_NETBIOS
) {
1449 only_netbios
= FALSE
;
1453 /* Windows sends it's netbios name, which I can only assume is
1454 * used for the 'allowed workstations' check. This is painful,
1455 * but we still want to check IP addresses if they happen to be
1460 return config
->allow_null_ticket_addresses
;
1462 ret
= krb5_sockaddr2address (context
, from
, &addr
);
1466 result
= krb5_address_search(context
, &addr
, addresses
);
1467 krb5_free_address (context
, &addr
);
1476 send_pac_p(krb5_context context
, KDC_REQ
*req
)
1478 krb5_error_code ret
;
1479 PA_PAC_REQUEST pacreq
;
1483 pa
= _kdc_find_padata(req
, &i
, KRB5_PADATA_PA_PAC_REQUEST
);
1487 ret
= decode_PA_PAC_REQUEST(pa
->padata_value
.data
,
1488 pa
->padata_value
.length
,
1493 i
= pacreq
.include_pac
;
1494 free_PA_PAC_REQUEST(&pacreq
);
1504 static krb5_error_code
1505 generate_pac(kdc_request_t r
, Key
*skey
)
1507 krb5_error_code ret
;
1511 ret
= _kdc_pac_generate(r
->context
, r
->client
, &p
);
1513 _kdc_r_log(r
, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
1520 ret
= _krb5_pac_sign(r
->context
, p
, r
->et
.authtime
,
1521 r
->client
->entry
.principal
,
1522 &skey
->key
, /* Server key */
1523 &skey
->key
, /* FIXME: should be krbtgt key */
1525 krb5_pac_free(r
->context
, p
);
1527 _kdc_r_log(r
, 0, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
1532 ret
= _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(r
->context
, &r
->et
,
1533 KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC
,
1535 krb5_data_free(&data
);
1545 _kdc_is_anonymous(krb5_context context
, krb5_principal principal
)
1547 if (principal
->name
.name_type
!= KRB5_NT_WELLKNOWN
||
1548 principal
->name
.name_string
.len
!= 2 ||
1549 strcmp(principal
->name
.name_string
.val
[0], KRB5_WELLKNOWN_NAME
) != 0 ||
1550 strcmp(principal
->name
.name_string
.val
[1], KRB5_ANON_NAME
) != 0)
1556 require_preauth_p(kdc_request_t r
)
1558 return r
->config
->require_preauth
1559 || r
->client
->entry
.flags
.require_preauth
1560 || r
->server
->entry
.flags
.require_preauth
;
1568 static krb5_error_code
1569 add_enc_pa_rep(kdc_request_t r
)
1571 krb5_error_code ret
;
1577 ret
= krb5_crypto_init(r
->context
, &r
->reply_key
, 0, &crypto
);
1581 ret
= krb5_create_checksum(r
->context
, crypto
,
1583 r
->request
.data
, r
->request
.length
,
1585 krb5_crypto_destroy(r
->context
, crypto
);
1589 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Checksum
, cdata
.data
, cdata
.length
,
1590 &checksum
, &len
, ret
);
1591 free_Checksum(&checksum
);
1594 heim_assert(cdata
.length
== len
, "ASN.1 internal error");
1596 if (r
->ek
.encrypted_pa_data
== NULL
) {
1597 ALLOC(r
->ek
.encrypted_pa_data
);
1598 if (r
->ek
.encrypted_pa_data
== NULL
)
1601 ret
= krb5_padata_add(r
->context
, r
->ek
.encrypted_pa_data
,
1602 KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP
, cdata
.data
, cdata
.length
);
1606 return krb5_padata_add(r
->context
, r
->ek
.encrypted_pa_data
,
1607 KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST
, NULL
, 0);
1615 _kdc_as_rep(kdc_request_t r
,
1618 struct sockaddr
*from_addr
,
1621 krb5_context context
= r
->context
;
1622 krb5_kdc_configuration
*config
= r
->config
;
1623 KDC_REQ
*req
= &r
->req
;
1624 KDC_REQ_BODY
*b
= NULL
;
1627 krb5_enctype setype
;
1628 krb5_error_code ret
= 0;
1631 int i
, flags
= HDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ
;
1632 METHOD_DATA error_method
;
1635 memset(&rep
, 0, sizeof(rep
));
1636 error_method
.len
= 0;
1637 error_method
.val
= NULL
;
1640 * Look for FAST armor and unwrap
1642 ret
= _kdc_fast_unwrap_request(r
);
1644 _kdc_r_log(r
, 0, "FAST unwrap request from %s failed: %d", from
, ret
);
1652 flags
|= HDB_F_CANON
;
1654 if(b
->sname
== NULL
){
1655 ret
= KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC
;
1656 _kdc_set_e_text(r
, "No server in request");
1658 ret
= _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context
,
1663 ret
= krb5_unparse_name(context
, r
->server_princ
, &r
->server_name
);
1666 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0,
1667 "AS-REQ malformed server name from %s", from
);
1670 if(b
->cname
== NULL
){
1671 ret
= KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC
;
1672 _kdc_set_e_text(r
, "No client in request");
1674 ret
= _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context
,
1681 ret
= krb5_unparse_name(context
, r
->client_princ
, &r
->client_name
);
1684 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0,
1685 "AS-REQ malformed client name from %s", from
);
1689 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0, "AS-REQ %s from %s for %s",
1690 r
->client_name
, from
, r
->server_name
);
1696 if (_kdc_is_anonymous(context
, r
->client_princ
)) {
1697 if (!_kdc_is_anon_request(b
)) {
1698 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0, "Anonymous ticket w/o anonymous flag");
1699 ret
= KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN
;
1702 } else if (_kdc_is_anon_request(b
)) {
1703 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0,
1704 "Request for a anonymous ticket with non "
1705 "anonymous client name: %s", r
->client_name
);
1706 ret
= KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN
;
1714 ret
= _kdc_db_fetch(context
, config
, r
->client_princ
,
1715 HDB_F_GET_CLIENT
| flags
, NULL
,
1716 &r
->clientdb
, &r
->client
);
1717 if(ret
== HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE
) {
1718 kdc_log(context
, config
, 5, "client %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy",
1721 } else if (ret
== HDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM
) {
1722 char *fixed_client_name
= NULL
;
1724 ret
= krb5_unparse_name(context
, r
->client
->entry
.principal
,
1725 &fixed_client_name
);
1730 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0, "WRONG_REALM - %s -> %s",
1731 r
->client_name
, fixed_client_name
);
1732 free(fixed_client_name
);
1734 ret
= _kdc_fast_mk_error(context
, r
,
1738 KRB5_KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM
,
1742 &r
->client
->entry
.principal
->realm
,
1747 const char *msg
= krb5_get_error_message(context
, ret
);
1748 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", r
->client_name
, msg
);
1749 krb5_free_error_message(context
, msg
);
1750 ret
= KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN
;
1753 ret
= _kdc_db_fetch(context
, config
, r
->server_princ
,
1754 HDB_F_GET_SERVER
|HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT
| flags
,
1755 NULL
, NULL
, &r
->server
);
1756 if(ret
== HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE
) {
1757 kdc_log(context
, config
, 5, "target %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy",
1761 const char *msg
= krb5_get_error_message(context
, ret
);
1762 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", r
->server_name
, msg
);
1763 krb5_free_error_message(context
, msg
);
1764 ret
= KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN
;
1769 * Select a session enctype from the list of the crypto system
1770 * supported enctypes that is supported by the client and is one of
1771 * the enctype of the enctype of the service (likely krbtgt).
1773 * The latter is used as a hint of what enctypes all KDC support,
1774 * to make sure a newer version of KDC won't generate a session
1775 * enctype that an older version of a KDC in the same realm can't
1779 ret
= _kdc_find_etype(context
,
1780 krb5_principal_is_krbtgt(context
, r
->server_princ
) ?
1781 config
->tgt_use_strongest_session_key
:
1782 config
->svc_use_strongest_session_key
, FALSE
,
1783 r
->client
, b
->etype
.val
, b
->etype
.len
, &r
->sessionetype
,
1786 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0,
1787 "Client (%s) from %s has no common enctypes with KDC "
1788 "to use for the session key",
1789 r
->client_name
, from
);
1794 * Pre-auth processing
1800 log_patypes(context
, config
, req
->padata
);
1802 /* Check if preauth matching */
1804 for (n
= 0; !found_pa
&& n
< sizeof(pat
) / sizeof(pat
[0]); n
++) {
1805 if (pat
[n
].validate
== NULL
)
1807 if (r
->armor_crypto
== NULL
&& (pat
[n
].flags
& PA_REQ_FAST
))
1810 kdc_log(context
, config
, 5,
1811 "Looking for %s pa-data -- %s", pat
[n
].name
, r
->client_name
);
1813 pa
= _kdc_find_padata(req
, &i
, pat
[n
].type
);
1815 ret
= pat
[n
].validate(r
, pa
);
1819 kdc_log(context
, config
, 0,
1820 "%s pre-authentication succeeded -- %s",
1821 pat
[n
].name
, r
->client_name
);
1823 r
->et
.flags
.pre_authent
= 1;
1828 if (found_pa
== 0) {
1832 for (n
= 0; n
< sizeof(pat
) / sizeof(pat
[0]); n
++) {
1833 if ((pat
[n
].flags
& PA_ANNOUNCE
) == 0)
1835 ret
= krb5_padata_add(context
, &error_method
,
1836 pat
[n
].type
, NULL
, 0);
1842 * If there is a client key, send ETYPE_INFO{,2}
1844 ret
= _kdc_find_etype(context
,
1845 config
->preauth_use_strongest_session_key
, TRUE
,
1846 r
->client
, b
->etype
.val
, b
->etype
.len
, NULL
, &ckey
);
1851 * - If the client only knows about old enctypes, then send
1852 * both info replies (we send 'info' first in the list).
1853 * - If the client is 'modern', because it knows about 'new'
1854 * enctype types, then only send the 'info2' reply.
1856 * Before we send the full list of etype-info data, we pick
1857 * the client key we would have used anyway below, just pick
1861 if (older_enctype(ckey
->key
.keytype
)) {
1862 ret
= get_pa_etype_info(context
, config
,
1863 &error_method
, ckey
);
1867 ret
= get_pa_etype_info2(context
, config
,
1868 &error_method
, ckey
);
1874 * send requre preauth is its required or anon is requested,
1875 * anon is today only allowed via preauth mechanisms.
1877 if (require_preauth_p(r
) || _kdc_is_anon_request(b
)) {
1878 ret
= KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED
;
1879 _kdc_set_e_text(r
, "Need to use PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP/PA-PK-AS-REQ");
1884 ret
= KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET
;
1885 _kdc_set_e_text(r
, "Doesn't have a client key available");
1888 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r
->context
, &r
->reply_key
);
1889 ret
= krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(r
->context
, &ckey
->key
, &r
->reply_key
);
1894 if (r
->clientdb
->hdb_auth_status
) {
1895 r
->clientdb
->hdb_auth_status(context
, r
->clientdb
, r
->client
,
1900 * Verify flags after the user been required to prove its identity
1901 * with in a preauth mech.
1904 ret
= _kdc_check_access(context
, config
, r
->client
, r
->client_name
,
1905 r
->server
, r
->server_name
,
1906 req
, &error_method
);
1911 * Select the best encryption type for the KDC with out regard to
1912 * the client since the client never needs to read that data.
1915 ret
= _kdc_get_preferred_key(context
, config
,
1916 r
->server
, r
->server_name
,
1921 if(f
.renew
|| f
.validate
|| f
.proxy
|| f
.forwarded
|| f
.enc_tkt_in_skey
1922 || (_kdc_is_anon_request(b
) && !config
->allow_anonymous
)) {
1923 ret
= KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION
;
1924 _kdc_set_e_text(r
, "Bad KDC options");
1933 rep
.msg_type
= krb_as_rep
;
1935 if (_kdc_is_anonymous(context
, r
->client_princ
)) {
1936 Realm anon_realm
=KRB5_ANON_REALM
;
1937 ret
= copy_Realm(&anon_realm
, &rep
.crealm
);
1939 ret
= copy_Realm(&r
->client
->entry
.principal
->realm
, &rep
.crealm
);
1942 ret
= _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep
.cname
, r
->client
->entry
.principal
);
1946 rep
.ticket
.tkt_vno
= 5;
1947 copy_Realm(&r
->server
->entry
.principal
->realm
, &rep
.ticket
.realm
);
1948 _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep
.ticket
.sname
,
1949 r
->server
->entry
.principal
);
1950 /* java 1.6 expects the name to be the same type, lets allow that
1951 * uncomplicated name-types. */
1952 #define CNT(sp,t) (((sp)->sname->name_type) == KRB5_NT_##t)
1953 if (CNT(b
, UNKNOWN
) || CNT(b
, PRINCIPAL
) || CNT(b
, SRV_INST
) || CNT(b
, SRV_HST
) || CNT(b
, SRV_XHST
))
1954 rep
.ticket
.sname
.name_type
= b
->sname
->name_type
;
1957 r
->et
.flags
.initial
= 1;
1958 if(r
->client
->entry
.flags
.forwardable
&& r
->server
->entry
.flags
.forwardable
)
1959 r
->et
.flags
.forwardable
= f
.forwardable
;
1960 else if (f
.forwardable
) {
1961 _kdc_set_e_text(r
, "Ticket may not be forwardable");
1962 ret
= KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY
;
1965 if(r
->client
->entry
.flags
.proxiable
&& r
->server
->entry
.flags
.proxiable
)
1966 r
->et
.flags
.proxiable
= f
.proxiable
;
1967 else if (f
.proxiable
) {
1968 _kdc_set_e_text(r
, "Ticket may not be proxiable");
1969 ret
= KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY
;
1972 if(r
->client
->entry
.flags
.postdate
&& r
->server
->entry
.flags
.postdate
)
1973 r
->et
.flags
.may_postdate
= f
.allow_postdate
;
1974 else if (f
.allow_postdate
){
1975 _kdc_set_e_text(r
, "Ticket may not be postdate");
1976 ret
= KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY
;
1980 /* check for valid set of addresses */
1981 if(!_kdc_check_addresses(context
, config
, b
->addresses
, from_addr
)) {
1982 _kdc_set_e_text(r
, "Bad address list in requested");
1983 ret
= KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR
;
1987 ret
= copy_PrincipalName(&rep
.cname
, &r
->et
.cname
);
1990 ret
= copy_Realm(&rep
.crealm
, &r
->et
.crealm
);
1998 start
= r
->et
.authtime
= kdc_time
;
2000 if(f
.postdated
&& req
->req_body
.from
){
2001 ALLOC(r
->et
.starttime
);
2002 start
= *r
->et
.starttime
= *req
->req_body
.from
;
2003 r
->et
.flags
.invalid
= 1;
2004 r
->et
.flags
.postdated
= 1; /* XXX ??? */
2006 _kdc_fix_time(&b
->till
);
2009 /* be careful not overflowing */
2011 if(r
->client
->entry
.max_life
)
2012 t
= start
+ min(t
- start
, *r
->client
->entry
.max_life
);
2013 if(r
->server
->entry
.max_life
)
2014 t
= start
+ min(t
- start
, *r
->server
->entry
.max_life
);
2016 t
= min(t
, start
+ realm
->max_life
);
2019 if(f
.renewable_ok
&& r
->et
.endtime
< *b
->till
){
2021 if(b
->rtime
== NULL
){
2025 if(*b
->rtime
< *b
->till
)
2026 *b
->rtime
= *b
->till
;
2028 if(f
.renewable
&& b
->rtime
){
2032 if(r
->client
->entry
.max_renew
)
2033 t
= start
+ min(t
- start
, *r
->client
->entry
.max_renew
);
2034 if(r
->server
->entry
.max_renew
)
2035 t
= start
+ min(t
- start
, *r
->server
->entry
.max_renew
);
2037 t
= min(t
, start
+ realm
->max_renew
);
2039 ALLOC(r
->et
.renew_till
);
2040 *r
->et
.renew_till
= t
;
2041 r
->et
.flags
.renewable
= 1;
2045 if (_kdc_is_anon_request(b
))
2046 r
->et
.flags
.anonymous
= 1;
2050 copy_HostAddresses(b
->addresses
, r
->et
.caddr
);
2053 r
->et
.transited
.tr_type
= DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS
;
2054 krb5_data_zero(&r
->et
.transited
.contents
);
2056 /* The MIT ASN.1 library (obviously) doesn't tell lengths encoded
2057 * as 0 and as 0x80 (meaning indefinite length) apart, and is thus
2058 * incapable of correctly decoding SEQUENCE OF's of zero length.
2060 * To fix this, always send at least one no-op last_req
2062 * If there's a pw_end or valid_end we will use that,
2063 * otherwise just a dummy lr.
2065 r
->ek
.last_req
.val
= malloc(2 * sizeof(*r
->ek
.last_req
.val
));
2066 if (r
->ek
.last_req
.val
== NULL
) {
2070 r
->ek
.last_req
.len
= 0;
2071 if (r
->client
->entry
.pw_end
2072 && (config
->kdc_warn_pwexpire
== 0
2073 || kdc_time
+ config
->kdc_warn_pwexpire
>= *r
->client
->entry
.pw_end
)) {
2074 r
->ek
.last_req
.val
[r
->ek
.last_req
.len
].lr_type
= LR_PW_EXPTIME
;
2075 r
->ek
.last_req
.val
[r
->ek
.last_req
.len
].lr_value
= *r
->client
->entry
.pw_end
;
2076 ++r
->ek
.last_req
.len
;
2078 if (r
->client
->entry
.valid_end
) {
2079 r
->ek
.last_req
.val
[r
->ek
.last_req
.len
].lr_type
= LR_ACCT_EXPTIME
;
2080 r
->ek
.last_req
.val
[r
->ek
.last_req
.len
].lr_value
= *r
->client
->entry
.valid_end
;
2081 ++r
->ek
.last_req
.len
;
2083 if (r
->ek
.last_req
.len
== 0) {
2084 r
->ek
.last_req
.val
[r
->ek
.last_req
.len
].lr_type
= LR_NONE
;
2085 r
->ek
.last_req
.val
[r
->ek
.last_req
.len
].lr_value
= 0;
2086 ++r
->ek
.last_req
.len
;
2088 r
->ek
.nonce
= b
->nonce
;
2089 if (r
->client
->entry
.valid_end
|| r
->client
->entry
.pw_end
) {
2090 ALLOC(r
->ek
.key_expiration
);
2091 if (r
->client
->entry
.valid_end
) {
2092 if (r
->client
->entry
.pw_end
)
2093 *r
->ek
.key_expiration
= min(*r
->client
->entry
.valid_end
,
2094 *r
->client
->entry
.pw_end
);
2096 *r
->ek
.key_expiration
= *r
->client
->entry
.valid_end
;
2098 *r
->ek
.key_expiration
= *r
->client
->entry
.pw_end
;
2100 r
->ek
.key_expiration
= NULL
;
2101 r
->ek
.flags
= r
->et
.flags
;
2102 r
->ek
.authtime
= r
->et
.authtime
;
2103 if (r
->et
.starttime
) {
2104 ALLOC(r
->ek
.starttime
);
2105 *r
->ek
.starttime
= *r
->et
.starttime
;
2107 r
->ek
.endtime
= r
->et
.endtime
;
2108 if (r
->et
.renew_till
) {
2109 ALLOC(r
->ek
.renew_till
);
2110 *r
->ek
.renew_till
= *r
->et
.renew_till
;
2112 copy_Realm(&rep
.ticket
.realm
, &r
->ek
.srealm
);
2113 copy_PrincipalName(&rep
.ticket
.sname
, &r
->ek
.sname
);
2116 copy_HostAddresses(r
->et
.caddr
, r
->ek
.caddr
);
2120 * Check and session and reply keys
2123 if (r
->session_key
.keytype
== ETYPE_NULL
) {
2124 ret
= krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context
, r
->sessionetype
, &r
->session_key
);
2129 if (r
->reply_key
.keytype
== ETYPE_NULL
) {
2130 _kdc_set_e_text(r
, "Client have no reply key");
2131 ret
= KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET
;
2135 ret
= copy_EncryptionKey(&r
->session_key
, &r
->et
.key
);
2139 ret
= copy_EncryptionKey(&r
->session_key
, &r
->ek
.key
);
2143 if (r
->outpadata
.len
) {
2146 if (rep
.padata
== NULL
) {
2150 ret
= copy_METHOD_DATA(&r
->outpadata
, rep
.padata
);
2156 if (send_pac_p(context
, req
)) {
2157 generate_pac(r
, skey
);
2160 _kdc_log_timestamp(context
, config
, "AS-REQ", r
->et
.authtime
, r
->et
.starttime
,
2161 r
->et
.endtime
, r
->et
.renew_till
);
2163 /* do this as the last thing since this signs the EncTicketPart */
2164 ret
= _kdc_add_KRB5SignedPath(context
,
2168 r
->client
->entry
.principal
,
2175 log_as_req(context
, config
, r
->reply_key
.keytype
, setype
, b
);
2178 * We always say we support FAST/enc-pa-rep
2181 r
->et
.flags
.enc_pa_rep
= r
->ek
.flags
.enc_pa_rep
= 1;
2184 * Add REQ_ENC_PA_REP if client supports it
2188 pa
= _kdc_find_padata(req
, &i
, KRB5_PADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP
);
2191 ret
= add_enc_pa_rep(r
);
2193 const char *msg
= krb5_get_error_message(r
->context
, ret
);
2194 _kdc_r_log(r
, 0, "add_enc_pa_rep failed: %s: %d", msg
, ret
);
2195 krb5_free_error_message(r
->context
, msg
);
2204 ret
= _kdc_encode_reply(context
, config
,
2205 r
->armor_crypto
, req
->req_body
.nonce
,
2206 &rep
, &r
->et
, &r
->ek
, setype
, r
->server
->entry
.kvno
,
2207 &skey
->key
, r
->client
->entry
.kvno
,
2208 &r
->reply_key
, 0, &r
->e_text
, reply
);
2213 * Check if message too large
2215 if (datagram_reply
&& reply
->length
> config
->max_datagram_reply_length
) {
2216 krb5_data_free(reply
);
2217 ret
= KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG
;
2218 _kdc_set_e_text(r
, "Reply packet too large");
2225 * In case of a non proxy error, build an error message.
2227 if(ret
!= 0 && ret
!= HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE
&& reply
->length
== 0) {
2228 ret
= _kdc_fast_mk_error(context
, r
,
2234 &r
->client_princ
->name
,
2235 &r
->client_princ
->realm
,
2242 free_EncTicketPart(&r
->et
);
2243 free_EncKDCRepPart(&r
->ek
);
2244 free_KDCFastState(&r
->fast
);
2246 if (error_method
.len
)
2247 free_METHOD_DATA(&error_method
);
2248 if (r
->outpadata
.len
)
2249 free_METHOD_DATA(&r
->outpadata
);
2250 if (r
->client_princ
) {
2251 krb5_free_principal(context
, r
->client_princ
);
2252 r
->client_princ
= NULL
;
2254 if (r
->client_name
) {
2255 free(r
->client_name
);
2256 r
->client_name
= NULL
;
2258 if (r
->server_princ
){
2259 krb5_free_principal(context
, r
->server_princ
);
2260 r
->server_princ
= NULL
;
2262 if (r
->server_name
) {
2263 free(r
->server_name
);
2264 r
->server_name
= NULL
;
2267 _kdc_free_ent(context
, r
->client
);
2269 _kdc_free_ent(context
, r
->server
);
2270 if (r
->armor_crypto
) {
2271 krb5_crypto_destroy(r
->context
, r
->armor_crypto
);
2272 r
->armor_crypto
= NULL
;
2274 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r
->context
, &r
->reply_key
);
2275 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(r
->context
, &r
->session_key
);
2280 * Add the AuthorizationData `data´ of `type´ to the last element in
2281 * the sequence of authorization_data in `tkt´ wrapped in an IF_RELEVANT
2285 _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(krb5_context context
,
2288 const krb5_data
*data
)
2290 krb5_error_code ret
;
2293 if (tkt
->authorization_data
== NULL
) {
2294 tkt
->authorization_data
= calloc(1, sizeof(*tkt
->authorization_data
));
2295 if (tkt
->authorization_data
== NULL
) {
2296 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ENOMEM
, "out of memory");
2301 /* add the entry to the last element */
2303 AuthorizationData ad
= { 0, NULL
};
2304 AuthorizationDataElement ade
;
2307 ade
.ad_data
= *data
;
2309 ret
= add_AuthorizationData(&ad
, &ade
);
2311 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "add AuthorizationData failed");
2315 ade
.ad_type
= KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT
;
2317 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AuthorizationData
,
2318 ade
.ad_data
.data
, ade
.ad_data
.length
,
2320 free_AuthorizationData(&ad
);
2322 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "ASN.1 encode of "
2323 "AuthorizationData failed");
2326 if (ade
.ad_data
.length
!= size
)
2327 krb5_abortx(context
, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
2329 ret
= add_AuthorizationData(tkt
->authorization_data
, &ade
);
2330 der_free_octet_string(&ade
.ad_data
);
2332 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "add AuthorizationData failed");
2341 _kdc_is_anon_request(const KDC_REQ_BODY
*b
)
2343 /* some versions of heimdal use bit 14 instead of 16 for
2344 request_anonymous, as indicated in the anonymous draft prior to
2345 version 11. Bit 14 is assigned to S4U2Proxy, but all S4U2Proxy
2346 requests will have a second ticket; don't consider those anonymous */
2347 return (b
->kdc_options
.request_anonymous
||
2348 (b
->kdc_options
.constrained_delegation
&& !b
->additional_tickets
));