2 When `fetch.fsckObjects` or `receive.fsckObjects` are
3 not set, the value of this variable is used instead.
6 When set, the fetch or receive will abort in the case of a malformed
7 object or a link to a nonexistent object. In addition, various other
8 issues are checked for, including legacy issues (see `fsck.<msg-id>`),
9 and potential security issues like the existence of a `.GIT` directory
10 or a malicious `.gitmodules` file (see the release notes for v2.2.1
11 and v2.17.1 for details). Other sanity and security checks may be
12 added in future releases.
14 On the receiving side, failing fsckObjects will make those objects
15 unreachable, see "QUARANTINE ENVIRONMENT" in
16 linkgit:git-receive-pack[1]. On the fetch side, malformed objects will
17 instead be left unreferenced in the repository.
19 Due to the non-quarantine nature of the `fetch.fsckObjects`
20 implementation it cannot be relied upon to leave the object store
21 clean like `receive.fsckObjects` can.
23 As objects are unpacked they're written to the object store, so there
24 can be cases where malicious objects get introduced even though the
25 "fetch" failed, only to have a subsequent "fetch" succeed because only
26 new incoming objects are checked, not those that have already been
27 written to the object store. That difference in behavior should not be
28 relied upon. In the future, such objects may be quarantined for
31 For now, the paranoid need to find some way to emulate the quarantine
32 environment if they'd like the same protection as "push". E.g. in the
33 case of an internal mirror do the mirroring in two steps, one to fetch
34 the untrusted objects, and then do a second "push" (which will use the
35 quarantine) to another internal repo, and have internal clients
36 consume this pushed-to repository, or embargo internal fetches and
37 only allow them once a full "fsck" has run (and no new fetches have
38 happened in the meantime).
41 String(s) `receive-pack` and `upload-pack` use to decide which
42 refs to omit from their initial advertisements. Use more than
43 one definition to specify multiple prefix strings. A ref that is
44 under the hierarchies listed in the value of this variable is
45 excluded, and is hidden when responding to `git push` or `git
46 fetch`. See `receive.hideRefs` and `uploadpack.hideRefs` for
47 program-specific versions of this config.
49 You may also include a `!` in front of the ref name to negate the entry,
50 explicitly exposing it, even if an earlier entry marked it as hidden.
51 If you have multiple hideRefs values, later entries override earlier ones
52 (and entries in more-specific config files override less-specific ones).
54 If a namespace is in use, the namespace prefix is stripped from each
55 reference before it is matched against `transfer.hiderefs` patterns.
56 For example, if `refs/heads/master` is specified in `transfer.hideRefs` and
57 the current namespace is `foo`, then `refs/namespaces/foo/refs/heads/master`
58 is omitted from the advertisements but `refs/heads/master` and
59 `refs/namespaces/bar/refs/heads/master` are still advertised as so-called
60 "have" lines. In order to match refs before stripping, add a `^` in front of
61 the ref name. If you combine `!` and `^`, `!` must be specified first.
63 Even if you hide refs, a client may still be able to steal the target
64 objects via the techniques described in the "SECURITY" section of the
65 linkgit:gitnamespaces[7] man page; it's best to keep private data in a
68 transfer.unpackLimit::
69 When `fetch.unpackLimit` or `receive.unpackLimit` are
70 not set, the value of this variable is used instead.
71 The default value is 100.
73 transfer.advertiseSID::
74 Boolean. When true, client and server processes will advertise their
75 unique session IDs to their remote counterpart. Defaults to false.