caps/nsScriptSecurityManager.cpp

   1 /* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
   2 /* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
   3 /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
   4  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
   5  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
   6
   7 #include "nsScriptSecurityManager.h"
   8
   9 #include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h"
  10 #include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_extensions.h"
  11 #include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_security.h"
  12 #include "mozilla/StoragePrincipalHelper.h"
  13
  14 #include "xpcpublic.h"
  15 #include "XPCWrapper.h"
  16 #include "nsILoadContext.h"
  17 #include "nsIScriptObjectPrincipal.h"
  18 #include "nsIScriptContext.h"
  19 #include "nsIScriptError.h"
  20 #include "nsINestedURI.h"
  21 #include "nspr.h"
  22 #include "nsJSPrincipals.h"
  23 #include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
  24 #include "ExpandedPrincipal.h"
  25 #include "SystemPrincipal.h"
  26 #include "DomainPolicy.h"
  27 #include "nsString.h"
  28 #include "nsCRT.h"
  29 #include "nsCRTGlue.h"
  30 #include "nsContentSecurityUtils.h"
  31 #include "nsDocShell.h"
  32 #include "nsError.h"
  33 #include "nsGlobalWindowInner.h"
  34 #include "nsDOMCID.h"
  35 #include "nsTextFormatter.h"
  36 #include "nsIStringBundle.h"
  37 #include "nsNetUtil.h"
  38 #include "nsIEffectiveTLDService.h"
  39 #include "nsDirectoryServiceDefs.h"
  40 #include "nsIScriptGlobalObject.h"
  41 #include "nsPIDOMWindow.h"
  42 #include "nsIDocShell.h"
  43 #include "nsIConsoleService.h"
  44 #include "nsIOService.h"
  45 #include "nsIContent.h"
  46 #include "nsDOMJSUtils.h"
  47 #include "nsAboutProtocolUtils.h"
  48 #include "nsIClassInfo.h"
  49 #include "nsIURIFixup.h"
  50 #include "nsIChromeRegistry.h"
  51 #include "nsIResProtocolHandler.h"
  52 #include "nsIContentSecurityPolicy.h"
  53 #include "mozilla/Components.h"
  54 #include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
  55 #include "mozilla/dom/BindingUtils.h"
  56 #include "mozilla/NullPrincipal.h"
  57 #include <stdint.h>
  58 #include "mozilla/dom/ContentChild.h"
  59 #include "mozilla/dom/ContentParent.h"
  60 #include "mozilla/dom/nsCSPContext.h"
  61 #include "mozilla/dom/ScriptSettings.h"
  62 #include "mozilla/ClearOnShutdown.h"
  63 #include "mozilla/StaticPtr.h"
  64 #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerCommon.h"
  65 #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h"
  66 #include "nsContentUtils.h"
  67 #include "nsJSUtils.h"
  68 #include "nsILoadInfo.h"
  69
  70 // This should be probably defined on some other place... but I couldn't find it
  71 #define WEBAPPS_PERM_NAME "webapps-manage"
  72
  73 using namespace mozilla;
  74 using namespace mozilla::dom;
  75
  76 nsIIOService* nsScriptSecurityManager::sIOService = nullptr;
  77 bool nsScriptSecurityManager::sStrictFileOriginPolicy = true;
  78
  79 namespace {
  80
  81 class BundleHelper {
  82  public:
  83   NS_INLINE_DECL_REFCOUNTING(BundleHelper)
  84
  85   static nsIStringBundle* GetOrCreate() {
  86     MOZ_ASSERT(!sShutdown);
  87
  88     // Already shutting down. Nothing should require the use of the string
  89     // bundle when shutting down.
  90     if (sShutdown) {
  91       return nullptr;
  92     }
  93
  94     if (!sSelf) {
  95       sSelf = new BundleHelper();
  96     }
  97
  98     return sSelf->GetOrCreateInternal();
  99   }
 100
 101   static void Shutdown() {
 102     sSelf = nullptr;
 103     sShutdown = true;
 104   }
 105
 106  private:
 107   ~BundleHelper() = default;
 108
 109   nsIStringBundle* GetOrCreateInternal() {
 110     if (!mBundle) {
 111       nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundleService> bundleService =
 112           mozilla::services::GetStringBundleService();
 113       if (NS_WARN_IF(!bundleService)) {
 114         return nullptr;
 115       }
 116
 117       nsresult rv = bundleService->CreateBundle(
 118           "chrome://global/locale/security/caps.properties",
 119           getter_AddRefs(mBundle));
 120       if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
 121         return nullptr;
 122       }
 123     }
 124
 125     return mBundle;
 126   }
 127
 128   nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundle> mBundle;
 129
 130   static StaticRefPtr<BundleHelper> sSelf;
 131   static bool sShutdown;
 132 };
 133
 134 StaticRefPtr<BundleHelper> BundleHelper::sSelf;
 135 bool BundleHelper::sShutdown = false;
 136
 137 }  // namespace
 138
 139 ///////////////////////////
 140 // Convenience Functions //
 141 ///////////////////////////
 142
 143 class nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter {
 144  public:
 145   nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter() { ++sInPrincipalDomainOrigin; }
 146   ~nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter() { --sInPrincipalDomainOrigin; }
 147   static uint32_t sInPrincipalDomainOrigin;
 148 };
 149 uint32_t nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter::sInPrincipalDomainOrigin;
 150
 151 static nsresult GetOriginFromURI(nsIURI* aURI, nsACString& aOrigin) {
 152   if (!aURI) {
 153     return NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER;
 154   }
 155   if (nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter::sInPrincipalDomainOrigin > 1) {
 156     // Allow a single recursive call to GetPrincipalDomainOrigin, since that
 157     // might be happening on a different principal from the first call.  But
 158     // after that, cut off the recursion; it just indicates that something
 159     // we're doing in this method causes us to reenter a security check here.
 160     return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
 161   }
 162
 163   nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter autoSetter;
 164
 165   nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri = NS_GetInnermostURI(aURI);
 166   NS_ENSURE_TRUE(uri, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
 167
 168   nsAutoCString hostPort;
 169
 170   nsresult rv = uri->GetHostPort(hostPort);
 171   if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
 172     nsAutoCString scheme;
 173     rv = uri->GetScheme(scheme);
 174     NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 175     aOrigin = scheme + "://"_ns + hostPort;
 176   } else {
 177     // Some URIs (e.g., nsSimpleURI) don't support host. Just
 178     // get the full spec.
 179     rv = uri->GetSpec(aOrigin);
 180     NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 181   }
 182
 183   return NS_OK;
 184 }
 185
 186 static nsresult GetPrincipalDomainOrigin(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
 187                                          nsACString& aOrigin) {
 188   aOrigin.Truncate();
 189   nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
 190   aPrincipal->GetDomain(getter_AddRefs(uri));
 191   nsresult rv = GetOriginFromURI(uri, aOrigin);
 192   if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
 193     return rv;
 194   }
 195   // If there is no Domain fallback to the Principals Origin
 196   return aPrincipal->GetOriginNoSuffix(aOrigin);
 197 }
 198
 199 inline void SetPendingExceptionASCII(JSContext* cx, const char* aMsg) {
 200   JS_ReportErrorASCII(cx, "%s", aMsg);
 201 }
 202
 203 inline void SetPendingException(JSContext* cx, const char16_t* aMsg) {
 204   NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8 msg(aMsg);
 205   JS_ReportErrorUTF8(cx, "%s", msg.get());
 206 }
 207
 208 /* static */
 209 bool nsScriptSecurityManager::SecurityCompareURIs(nsIURI* aSourceURI,
 210                                                   nsIURI* aTargetURI) {
 211   return NS_SecurityCompareURIs(aSourceURI, aTargetURI,
 212                                 sStrictFileOriginPolicy);
 213 }
 214
 215 // SecurityHashURI is consistent with SecurityCompareURIs because
 216 // NS_SecurityHashURI is consistent with NS_SecurityCompareURIs.  See
 217 // nsNetUtil.h.
 218 uint32_t nsScriptSecurityManager::SecurityHashURI(nsIURI* aURI) {
 219   return NS_SecurityHashURI(aURI);
 220 }
 221
 222 /*
 223  * GetChannelResultPrincipal will return the principal that the resource
 224  * returned by this channel will use.  For example, if the resource is in
 225  * a sandbox, it will return the nullprincipal.  If the resource is forced
 226  * to inherit principal, it will return the principal of its parent.  If
 227  * the load doesn't require sandboxing or inheriting, it will return the same
 228  * principal as GetChannelURIPrincipal. Namely the principal of the URI
 229  * that is being loaded.
 230  */
 231 NS_IMETHODIMP
 232 nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelResultPrincipal(nsIChannel* aChannel,
 233                                                    nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) {
 234   return GetChannelResultPrincipal(aChannel, aPrincipal,
 235                                    /*aIgnoreSandboxing*/ false);
 236 }
 237
 238 nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelResultPrincipalIfNotSandboxed(
 239     nsIChannel* aChannel, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) {
 240   return GetChannelResultPrincipal(aChannel, aPrincipal,
 241                                    /*aIgnoreSandboxing*/ true);
 242 }
 243
 244 NS_IMETHODIMP
 245 nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelResultStoragePrincipal(
 246     nsIChannel* aChannel, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) {
 247   nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal;
 248   nsresult rv = GetChannelResultPrincipal(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(principal),
 249                                           /*aIgnoreSandboxing*/ false);
 250   if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
 251     return rv;
 252   }
 253
 254   return StoragePrincipalHelper::Create(
 255       aChannel, principal, /* aForceIsolation */ false, aPrincipal);
 256 }
 257
 258 NS_IMETHODIMP
 259 nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelResultPrincipals(
 260     nsIChannel* aChannel, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal,
 261     nsIPrincipal** aPartitionedPrincipal) {
 262   nsresult rv = GetChannelResultPrincipal(aChannel, aPrincipal,
 263                                           /*aIgnoreSandboxing*/ false);
 264   if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
 265     return rv;
 266   }
 267
 268   if (!(*aPrincipal)->GetIsContentPrincipal()) {
 269     // If for some reason we don't have a content principal here, just reuse our
 270     // principal for the storage principal too, since attempting to create a
 271     // storage principal would fail anyway.
 272     nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> copy = *aPrincipal;
 273     copy.forget(aPartitionedPrincipal);
 274     return NS_OK;
 275   }
 276
 277   return StoragePrincipalHelper::Create(
 278       aChannel, *aPrincipal, /* aForceIsolation */ true, aPartitionedPrincipal);
 279 }
 280
 281 nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelResultPrincipal(
 282     nsIChannel* aChannel, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal, bool aIgnoreSandboxing) {
 283   MOZ_ASSERT(aChannel, "Must have channel!");
 284
 285   // Check whether we have an nsILoadInfo that says what we should do.
 286   nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
 287   if (loadInfo->GetForceInheritPrincipalOverruleOwner()) {
 288     nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principalToInherit =
 289         loadInfo->FindPrincipalToInherit(aChannel);
 290     principalToInherit.forget(aPrincipal);
 291     return NS_OK;
 292   }
 293
 294   nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> owner;
 295   aChannel->GetOwner(getter_AddRefs(owner));
 296   if (owner) {
 297     CallQueryInterface(owner, aPrincipal);
 298     if (*aPrincipal) {
 299       return NS_OK;
 300     }
 301   }
 302
 303   if (!aIgnoreSandboxing && loadInfo->GetLoadingSandboxed()) {
 304     nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> sandboxedLoadingPrincipal =
 305         loadInfo->GetSandboxedLoadingPrincipal();
 306     MOZ_ASSERT(sandboxedLoadingPrincipal);
 307     sandboxedLoadingPrincipal.forget(aPrincipal);
 308     return NS_OK;
 309   }
 310
 311   bool forceInherit = loadInfo->GetForceInheritPrincipal();
 312   if (aIgnoreSandboxing && !forceInherit) {
 313     // Check if SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL was dropped because of
 314     // sandboxing:
 315     if (loadInfo->GetLoadingSandboxed() &&
 316         loadInfo->GetForceInheritPrincipalDropped()) {
 317       forceInherit = true;
 318     }
 319   }
 320   if (forceInherit) {
 321     nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principalToInherit =
 322         loadInfo->FindPrincipalToInherit(aChannel);
 323     principalToInherit.forget(aPrincipal);
 324     return NS_OK;
 325   }
 326
 327   auto securityMode = loadInfo->GetSecurityMode();
 328   // The data: inheritance flags should only apply to the initial load,
 329   // not to loads that it might have redirected to.
 330   if (loadInfo->RedirectChain().IsEmpty() &&
 331       (securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS ||
 332        securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS ||
 333        securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS)) {
 334     nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
 335     nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
 336     NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 337
 338     nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principalToInherit =
 339         loadInfo->FindPrincipalToInherit(aChannel);
 340     bool inheritForAboutBlank = loadInfo->GetAboutBlankInherits();
 341
 342     if (nsContentUtils::ChannelShouldInheritPrincipal(
 343             principalToInherit, uri, inheritForAboutBlank, false)) {
 344       principalToInherit.forget(aPrincipal);
 345       return NS_OK;
 346     }
 347   }
 348   return GetChannelURIPrincipal(aChannel, aPrincipal);
 349 }
 350
 351 /* The principal of the URI that this channel is loading. This is never
 352  * affected by things like sandboxed loads, or loads where we forcefully
 353  * inherit the principal.  Think of this as the principal of the server
 354  * which this channel is loading from.  Most callers should use
 355  * GetChannelResultPrincipal instead of GetChannelURIPrincipal.  Only
 356  * call GetChannelURIPrincipal if you are sure that you want the
 357  * principal that matches the uri, even in cases when the load is
 358  * sandboxed or when the load could be a blob or data uri (i.e even when
 359  * you encounter loads that may or may not be sandboxed and loads
 360  * that may or may not inherit)."
 361  */
 362 NS_IMETHODIMP
 363 nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelURIPrincipal(nsIChannel* aChannel,
 364                                                 nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) {
 365   MOZ_ASSERT(aChannel, "Must have channel!");
 366
 367   // Get the principal from the URI.  Make sure this does the same thing
 368   // as Document::Reset and PrototypeDocumentContentSink::Init.
 369   nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
 370   nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
 371   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 372
 373   nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
 374
 375   // Inherit the origin attributes from loadInfo.
 376   // If this is a top-level document load, the origin attributes of the
 377   // loadInfo will be set from nsDocShell::DoURILoad.
 378   // For subresource loading, the origin attributes of the loadInfo is from
 379   // its loadingPrincipal.
 380   OriginAttributes attrs = loadInfo->GetOriginAttributes();
 381
 382   nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin =
 383       BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(uri, attrs);
 384   prin.forget(aPrincipal);
 385   return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
 386 }
 387
 388 /////////////////////////////
 389 // nsScriptSecurityManager //
 390 /////////////////////////////
 391
 392 ////////////////////////////////////
 393 // Methods implementing ISupports //
 394 ////////////////////////////////////
 395 NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsScriptSecurityManager, nsIScriptSecurityManager)
 396
 397 ///////////////////////////////////////////////////
 398 // Methods implementing nsIScriptSecurityManager //
 399 ///////////////////////////////////////////////////
 400
 401 ///////////////// Security Checks /////////////////
 402
 403 bool nsScriptSecurityManager::ContentSecurityPolicyPermitsJSAction(
 404     JSContext* cx, JS::HandleString aCode) {
 405   MOZ_ASSERT(cx == nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext());
 406
 407   // Get the window, if any, corresponding to the current global
 408   nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> csp;
 409   if (nsGlobalWindowInner* win = xpc::CurrentWindowOrNull(cx)) {
 410     csp = win->GetCsp();
 411   }
 412
 413   nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> subjectPrincipal = nsContentUtils::SubjectPrincipal();
 414   if (!csp) {
 415     if (!StaticPrefs::extensions_content_script_csp_enabled()) {
 416       return true;
 417     }
 418     // Get the CSP for addon sandboxes.  If the principal is expanded and has a
 419     // csp, we're probably in luck.
 420     auto* basePrin = BasePrincipal::Cast(subjectPrincipal);
 421     // ContentScriptAddonPolicy means it is also an expanded principal, thus
 422     // this is in a sandbox used as a content script.
 423     if (basePrin->ContentScriptAddonPolicy()) {
 424       basePrin->As<ExpandedPrincipal>()->GetCsp(getter_AddRefs(csp));
 425     }
 426     // don't do anything unless there's a CSP
 427     if (!csp) {
 428       return true;
 429     }
 430   }
 431
 432   nsCOMPtr<nsICSPEventListener> cspEventListener;
 433   if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
 434     WorkerPrivate* workerPrivate =
 435         mozilla::dom::GetWorkerPrivateFromContext(cx);
 436     if (workerPrivate) {
 437       cspEventListener = workerPrivate->CSPEventListener();
 438     }
 439   }
 440
 441   bool evalOK = true;
 442   bool reportViolation = false;
 443   nsresult rv = csp->GetAllowsEval(&reportViolation, &evalOK);
 444
 445   // A little convoluted. We want the scriptSample for a) reporting a violation
 446   // or b) passing it to AssertEvalNotUsingSystemPrincipal or c) we're in the
 447   // parent process. So do the work to get it if either of those cases is true.
 448   nsAutoJSString scriptSample;
 449   if (reportViolation || subjectPrincipal->IsSystemPrincipal() ||
 450       XRE_IsE10sParentProcess()) {
 451     if (NS_WARN_IF(!scriptSample.init(cx, aCode))) {
 452       JS_ClearPendingException(cx);
 453       return false;
 454     }
 455   }
 456
 457 #if !defined(ANDROID)
 458   if (!nsContentSecurityUtils::IsEvalAllowed(
 459           cx, subjectPrincipal->IsSystemPrincipal(), scriptSample)) {
 460     return false;
 461   }
 462 #endif
 463
 464   if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
 465     NS_WARNING("CSP: failed to get allowsEval");
 466     return true;  // fail open to not break sites.
 467   }
 468
 469   if (reportViolation) {
 470     JS::AutoFilename scriptFilename;
 471     nsAutoString fileName;
 472     unsigned lineNum = 0;
 473     unsigned columnNum = 0;
 474     if (JS::DescribeScriptedCaller(cx, &scriptFilename, &lineNum, &columnNum)) {
 475       if (const char* file = scriptFilename.get()) {
 476         CopyUTF8toUTF16(nsDependentCString(file), fileName);
 477       }
 478     } else {
 479       MOZ_ASSERT(!JS_IsExceptionPending(cx));
 480     }
 481     csp->LogViolationDetails(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_EVAL,
 482                              nullptr,  // triggering element
 483                              cspEventListener, fileName, scriptSample, lineNum,
 484                              columnNum, EmptyString(), EmptyString());
 485   }
 486
 487   return evalOK;
 488 }
 489
 490 // static
 491 bool nsScriptSecurityManager::JSPrincipalsSubsume(JSPrincipals* first,
 492                                                   JSPrincipals* second) {
 493   return nsJSPrincipals::get(first)->Subsumes(nsJSPrincipals::get(second));
 494 }
 495
 496 NS_IMETHODIMP
 497 nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckSameOriginURI(nsIURI* aSourceURI,
 498                                             nsIURI* aTargetURI,
 499                                             bool reportError,
 500                                             bool aFromPrivateWindow) {
 501   // Please note that aFromPrivateWindow is only 100% accurate if
 502   // reportError is true.
 503   if (!SecurityCompareURIs(aSourceURI, aTargetURI)) {
 504     if (reportError) {
 505       ReportError("CheckSameOriginError", aSourceURI, aTargetURI,
 506                   aFromPrivateWindow);
 507     }
 508     return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
 509   }
 510   return NS_OK;
 511 }
 512
 513 NS_IMETHODIMP
 514 nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIFromScript(JSContext* cx, nsIURI* aURI) {
 515   // Get principal of currently executing script.
 516   MOZ_ASSERT(cx == nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext());
 517   nsIPrincipal* principal = nsContentUtils::SubjectPrincipal();
 518   nsresult rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(
 519       // Passing 0 for the window ID here is OK, because we will report a
 520       // script-visible exception anyway.
 521       principal, aURI, nsIScriptSecurityManager::STANDARD, 0);
 522   if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
 523     // OK to load
 524     return NS_OK;
 525   }
 526
 527   // Report error.
 528   nsAutoCString spec;
 529   if (NS_FAILED(aURI->GetAsciiSpec(spec))) return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
 530   nsAutoCString msg("Access to '");
 531   msg.Append(spec);
 532   msg.AppendLiteral("' from script denied");
 533   SetPendingExceptionASCII(cx, msg.get());
 534   return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
 535 }
 536
 537 /**
 538  * Helper method to handle cases where a flag passed to
 539  * CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal means denying loading if the given URI has certain
 540  * nsIProtocolHandler flags set.
 541  * @return if success, access is allowed. Otherwise, deny access
 542  */
 543 static nsresult DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(nsIURI* aURI, uint32_t aURIFlags) {
 544   MOZ_ASSERT(aURI, "Must have URI!");
 545
 546   bool uriHasFlags;
 547   nsresult rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aURI, aURIFlags, &uriHasFlags);
 548   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 549
 550   if (uriHasFlags) {
 551     return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
 552   }
 553
 554   return NS_OK;
 555 }
 556
 557 static bool EqualOrSubdomain(nsIURI* aProbeArg, nsIURI* aBase) {
 558   nsresult rv;
 559   nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> probe = aProbeArg;
 560
 561   nsCOMPtr<nsIEffectiveTLDService> tldService =
 562       do_GetService(NS_EFFECTIVETLDSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
 563   NS_ENSURE_TRUE(tldService, false);
 564   while (true) {
 565     if (nsScriptSecurityManager::SecurityCompareURIs(probe, aBase)) {
 566       return true;
 567     }
 568
 569     nsAutoCString host, newHost;
 570     rv = probe->GetHost(host);
 571     NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
 572
 573     rv = tldService->GetNextSubDomain(host, newHost);
 574     if (rv == NS_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DOMAIN_LEVELS) {
 575       return false;
 576     }
 577     NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
 578     rv = NS_MutateURI(probe).SetHost(newHost).Finalize(probe);
 579     NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
 580   }
 581 }
 582
 583 NS_IMETHODIMP
 584 nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
 585                                                    nsIURI* aTargetURI,
 586                                                    uint32_t aFlags,
 587                                                    uint64_t aInnerWindowID) {
 588   MOZ_ASSERT(aPrincipal, "CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal must have a principal");
 589
 590   // If someone passes a flag that we don't understand, we should
 591   // fail, because they may need a security check that we don't
 592   // provide.
 593   NS_ENSURE_FALSE(
 594       aFlags &
 595           ~(nsIScriptSecurityManager::LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT |
 596             nsIScriptSecurityManager::ALLOW_CHROME |
 597             nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT |
 598             nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL |
 599             nsIScriptSecurityManager::DONT_REPORT_ERRORS),
 600       NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
 601   NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aPrincipal);
 602   NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aTargetURI);
 603
 604   // If DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL is set, we prevent loading of URIs which
 605   // would do such inheriting. That would be URIs that do not have their own
 606   // security context. We do this even for the system principal.
 607   if (aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL) {
 608     nsresult rv = DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(
 609         aTargetURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT);
 610     NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 611   }
 612
 613   if (aPrincipal == mSystemPrincipal) {
 614     // Allow access
 615     return NS_OK;
 616   }
 617
 618   nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> sourceURI;
 619   auto* basePrin = BasePrincipal::Cast(aPrincipal);
 620   basePrin->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(sourceURI));
 621   if (!sourceURI) {
 622     if (basePrin->Is<ExpandedPrincipal>()) {
 623       auto expanded = basePrin->As<ExpandedPrincipal>();
 624       for (auto& prin : expanded->AllowList()) {
 625         nsresult rv =
 626             CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(prin, aTargetURI, aFlags, aInnerWindowID);
 627         if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
 628           // Allow access if it succeeded with one of the allowlisted principals
 629           return NS_OK;
 630         }
 631       }
 632       // None of our allowlisted principals worked.
 633       return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
 634     }
 635     NS_ERROR(
 636         "Non-system principals or expanded principal passed to "
 637         "CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal "
 638         "must have a URI!");
 639     return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
 640   }
 641
 642   // Automatic loads are not allowed from certain protocols.
 643   if (aFlags &
 644       nsIScriptSecurityManager::LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT) {
 645     nsresult rv = DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(
 646         sourceURI,
 647         nsIProtocolHandler::URI_FORBIDS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT);
 648     NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 649   }
 650
 651   // If either URI is a nested URI, get the base URI
 652   nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> sourceBaseURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(sourceURI);
 653   nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> targetBaseURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(aTargetURI);
 654
 655   //-- get the target scheme
 656   nsAutoCString targetScheme;
 657   nsresult rv = targetBaseURI->GetScheme(targetScheme);
 658   if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
 659
 660   //-- Some callers do not allow loading javascript:
 661   if ((aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT) &&
 662       targetScheme.EqualsLiteral("javascript")) {
 663     return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
 664   }
 665
 666   // Check for uris that are only loadable by principals that subsume them
 667   bool targetURIIsLoadableBySubsumers = false;
 668   rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(targetBaseURI,
 669                            nsIProtocolHandler::URI_LOADABLE_BY_SUBSUMERS,
 670                            &targetURIIsLoadableBySubsumers);
 671   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 672
 673   if (targetURIIsLoadableBySubsumers) {
 674     // check nothing else in the URI chain has flags that prevent
 675     // access:
 676     rv = CheckLoadURIFlags(
 677         sourceURI, aTargetURI, sourceBaseURI, targetBaseURI, aFlags,
 678         aPrincipal->OriginAttributesRef().mPrivateBrowsingId > 0,
 679         aInnerWindowID);
 680     NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 681     // Check the principal is allowed to load the target.
 682     if (aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::DONT_REPORT_ERRORS) {
 683       return aPrincipal->CheckMayLoad(targetBaseURI, false);
 684     }
 685     return aPrincipal->CheckMayLoadWithReporting(targetBaseURI, false,
 686                                                  aInnerWindowID);
 687   }
 688
 689   //-- get the source scheme
 690   nsAutoCString sourceScheme;
 691   rv = sourceBaseURI->GetScheme(sourceScheme);
 692   if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
 693
 694   if (sourceScheme.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral(NS_NULLPRINCIPAL_SCHEME)) {
 695     // A null principal can target its own URI.
 696     if (sourceURI == aTargetURI) {
 697       return NS_OK;
 698     }
 699   } else if (StaticPrefs::
 700                  security_view_source_reachable_from_inner_protocol() &&
 701              sourceScheme.EqualsIgnoreCase(targetScheme.get()) &&
 702              aTargetURI->SchemeIs("view-source")) {
 703     // exception for foo: linking to view-source:foo for reftests...
 704     return NS_OK;
 705   } else if (sourceScheme.EqualsIgnoreCase("file") &&
 706              targetScheme.EqualsIgnoreCase("moz-icon")) {
 707     // exception for file: linking to moz-icon://.ext?size=...
 708     // Note that because targetScheme is the base (innermost) URI scheme,
 709     // this does NOT allow file -> moz-icon:file:///... links.
 710     // This is intentional.
 711     return NS_OK;
 712   }
 713
 714   // Check for webextension
 715   bool targetURIIsLoadableByExtensions = false;
 716   rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aTargetURI,
 717                            nsIProtocolHandler::URI_LOADABLE_BY_EXTENSIONS,
 718                            &targetURIIsLoadableByExtensions);
 719   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 720
 721   if (targetURIIsLoadableByExtensions &&
 722       BasePrincipal::Cast(aPrincipal)->AddonPolicy()) {
 723     return NS_OK;
 724   }
 725
 726   // If we get here, check all the schemes can link to each other, from the top
 727   // down:
 728   nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> currentURI = sourceURI;
 729   nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> currentOtherURI = aTargetURI;
 730
 731   bool denySameSchemeLinks = false;
 732   rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aTargetURI,
 733                            nsIProtocolHandler::URI_SCHEME_NOT_SELF_LINKABLE,
 734                            &denySameSchemeLinks);
 735   if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
 736
 737   while (currentURI && currentOtherURI) {
 738     nsAutoCString scheme, otherScheme;
 739     currentURI->GetScheme(scheme);
 740     currentOtherURI->GetScheme(otherScheme);
 741
 742     bool schemesMatch =
 743         scheme.Equals(otherScheme, nsCaseInsensitiveCStringComparator);
 744     bool isSamePage = false;
 745     // about: URIs are special snowflakes.
 746     if (scheme.EqualsLiteral("about") && schemesMatch) {
 747       nsAutoCString moduleName, otherModuleName;
 748       // about: pages can always link to themselves:
 749       isSamePage =
 750           NS_SUCCEEDED(NS_GetAboutModuleName(currentURI, moduleName)) &&
 751           NS_SUCCEEDED(
 752               NS_GetAboutModuleName(currentOtherURI, otherModuleName)) &&
 753           moduleName.Equals(otherModuleName);
 754       if (!isSamePage) {
 755         // We will have allowed the load earlier if the source page has
 756         // system principal. So we know the source has a content
 757         // principal, and it's trying to link to something else.
 758         // Linkable about: pages are always reachable, even if we hit
 759         // the CheckLoadURIFlags call below.
 760         // We punch only 1 other hole: iff the source is unlinkable,
 761         // we let them link to other pages explicitly marked SAFE
 762         // for content. This avoids world-linkable about: pages linking
 763         // to non-world-linkable about: pages.
 764         nsCOMPtr<nsIAboutModule> module, otherModule;
 765         bool knowBothModules =
 766             NS_SUCCEEDED(
 767                 NS_GetAboutModule(currentURI, getter_AddRefs(module))) &&
 768             NS_SUCCEEDED(NS_GetAboutModule(currentOtherURI,
 769                                            getter_AddRefs(otherModule)));
 770         uint32_t aboutModuleFlags = 0;
 771         uint32_t otherAboutModuleFlags = 0;
 772         knowBothModules =
 773             knowBothModules &&
 774             NS_SUCCEEDED(module->GetURIFlags(currentURI, &aboutModuleFlags)) &&
 775             NS_SUCCEEDED(otherModule->GetURIFlags(currentOtherURI,
 776                                                   &otherAboutModuleFlags));
 777         if (knowBothModules) {
 778           isSamePage = !(aboutModuleFlags & nsIAboutModule::MAKE_LINKABLE) &&
 779                        (otherAboutModuleFlags &
 780                         nsIAboutModule::URI_SAFE_FOR_UNTRUSTED_CONTENT);
 781           if (isSamePage &&
 782               otherAboutModuleFlags & nsIAboutModule::MAKE_LINKABLE) {
 783             // XXXgijs: this is a hack. The target will be nested
 784             // (with innerURI of moz-safe-about:whatever), and
 785             // the source isn't, so we won't pass if we finish
 786             // the loop. We *should* pass, though, so return here.
 787             // This hack can go away when bug 1228118 is fixed.
 788             return NS_OK;
 789           }
 790         }
 791       }
 792     } else {
 793       bool equalExceptRef = false;
 794       rv = currentURI->EqualsExceptRef(currentOtherURI, &equalExceptRef);
 795       isSamePage = NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && equalExceptRef;
 796     }
 797
 798     // If schemes are not equal, or they're equal but the target URI
 799     // is different from the source URI and doesn't always allow linking
 800     // from the same scheme, check if the URI flags of the current target
 801     // URI allow the current source URI to link to it.
 802     // The policy is specified by the protocol flags on both URIs.
 803     if (!schemesMatch || (denySameSchemeLinks && !isSamePage)) {
 804       return CheckLoadURIFlags(
 805           currentURI, currentOtherURI, sourceBaseURI, targetBaseURI, aFlags,
 806           aPrincipal->OriginAttributesRef().mPrivateBrowsingId > 0,
 807           aInnerWindowID);
 808     }
 809     // Otherwise... check if we can nest another level:
 810     nsCOMPtr<nsINestedURI> nestedURI = do_QueryInterface(currentURI);
 811     nsCOMPtr<nsINestedURI> nestedOtherURI = do_QueryInterface(currentOtherURI);
 812
 813     // If schemes match and neither URI is nested further, we're OK.
 814     if (!nestedURI && !nestedOtherURI) {
 815       return NS_OK;
 816     }
 817     // If one is nested and the other isn't, something is wrong.
 818     if (!nestedURI != !nestedOtherURI) {
 819       return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
 820     }
 821     // Otherwise, both should be nested and we'll go through the loop again.
 822     nestedURI->GetInnerURI(getter_AddRefs(currentURI));
 823     nestedOtherURI->GetInnerURI(getter_AddRefs(currentOtherURI));
 824   }
 825
 826   // We should never get here. We should always return from inside the loop.
 827   return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
 828 }
 829
 830 /**
 831  * Helper method to check whether the target URI and its innermost ("base") URI
 832  * has protocol flags that should stop it from being loaded by the source URI
 833  * (and/or the source URI's innermost ("base") URI), taking into account any
 834  * nsIScriptSecurityManager flags originally passed to
 835  * CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal and friends.
 836  *
 837  * @return if success, access is allowed. Otherwise, deny access
 838  */
 839 nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIFlags(
 840     nsIURI* aSourceURI, nsIURI* aTargetURI, nsIURI* aSourceBaseURI,
 841     nsIURI* aTargetBaseURI, uint32_t aFlags, bool aFromPrivateWindow,
 842     uint64_t aInnerWindowID) {
 843   // Note that the order of policy checks here is very important!
 844   // We start from most restrictive and work our way down.
 845   bool reportErrors = !(aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::DONT_REPORT_ERRORS);
 846   const char* errorTag = "CheckLoadURIError";
 847
 848   nsAutoCString targetScheme;
 849   nsresult rv = aTargetBaseURI->GetScheme(targetScheme);
 850   if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
 851
 852   // Check for system target URI
 853   rv = DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(aTargetURI,
 854                                nsIProtocolHandler::URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD);
 855   if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
 856     // Deny access, since the origin principal is not system
 857     if (reportErrors) {
 858       ReportError(errorTag, aSourceURI, aTargetURI, aFromPrivateWindow,
 859                   aInnerWindowID);
 860     }
 861     return rv;
 862   }
 863
 864   // Used by ExtensionProtocolHandler to prevent loading extension resources
 865   // in private contexts if the extension does not have permission.
 866   if (aFromPrivateWindow) {
 867     rv = DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(
 868         aTargetURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_DISALLOW_IN_PRIVATE_CONTEXT);
 869     if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
 870       if (reportErrors) {
 871         ReportError(errorTag, aSourceURI, aTargetURI, aFromPrivateWindow,
 872                     aInnerWindowID);
 873       }
 874       return rv;
 875     }
 876   }
 877
 878   // Check for chrome target URI
 879   bool targetURIIsUIResource = false;
 880   rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aTargetURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE,
 881                            &targetURIIsUIResource);
 882   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 883   if (targetURIIsUIResource) {
 884     if (aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::ALLOW_CHROME) {
 885       // Allow a URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE source to link to a URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE
 886       // target if ALLOW_CHROME is set.
 887       //
 888       // ALLOW_CHROME is a flag that we pass on all loads _except_ docshell
 889       // loads (since docshell loads run the loaded content with its origin
 890       // principal). So we're effectively allowing resource://, chrome://,
 891       // and moz-icon:// source URIs to load resource://, chrome://, and
 892       // moz-icon:// files, so long as they're not loading it as a document.
 893       bool sourceIsUIResource;
 894       rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aSourceBaseURI,
 895                                nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE,
 896                                &sourceIsUIResource);
 897       NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 898       if (sourceIsUIResource) {
 899         return NS_OK;
 900       }
 901
 902       if (targetScheme.EqualsLiteral("resource")) {
 903         if (StaticPrefs::security_all_resource_uri_content_accessible()) {
 904           return NS_OK;
 905         }
 906
 907         nsCOMPtr<nsIProtocolHandler> ph;
 908         rv = sIOService->GetProtocolHandler("resource", getter_AddRefs(ph));
 909         NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 910         if (!ph) {
 911           return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
 912         }
 913
 914         nsCOMPtr<nsIResProtocolHandler> rph = do_QueryInterface(ph);
 915         if (!rph) {
 916           return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
 917         }
 918
 919         bool accessAllowed = false;
 920         rph->AllowContentToAccess(aTargetBaseURI, &accessAllowed);
 921         if (accessAllowed) {
 922           return NS_OK;
 923         }
 924       } else if (targetScheme.EqualsLiteral("chrome")) {
 925         // Allow the load only if the chrome package is allowlisted.
 926         nsCOMPtr<nsIXULChromeRegistry> reg(
 927             do_GetService(NS_CHROMEREGISTRY_CONTRACTID));
 928         if (reg) {
 929           bool accessAllowed = false;
 930           reg->AllowContentToAccess(aTargetBaseURI, &accessAllowed);
 931           if (accessAllowed) {
 932             return NS_OK;
 933           }
 934         }
 935       } else if (targetScheme.EqualsLiteral("moz-page-thumb")) {
 936         if (XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
 937           return NS_OK;
 938         }
 939
 940         auto& remoteType = dom::ContentChild::GetSingleton()->GetRemoteType();
 941         if (remoteType.EqualsLiteral(PRIVILEGEDABOUT_REMOTE_TYPE)) {
 942           return NS_OK;
 943         }
 944       }
 945     }
 946
 947     if (reportErrors) {
 948       ReportError(errorTag, aSourceURI, aTargetURI, aFromPrivateWindow,
 949                   aInnerWindowID);
 950     }
 951     return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
 952   }
 953
 954   // Check for target URI pointing to a file
 955   bool targetURIIsLocalFile = false;
 956   rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aTargetURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_LOCAL_FILE,
 957                            &targetURIIsLocalFile);
 958   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 959   if (targetURIIsLocalFile) {
 960     // Allow domains that were allowlisted in the prefs. In 99.9% of cases,
 961     // this array is empty.
 962     bool isAllowlisted;
 963     MOZ_ALWAYS_SUCCEEDS(InFileURIAllowlist(aSourceURI, &isAllowlisted));
 964     if (isAllowlisted) {
 965       return NS_OK;
 966     }
 967
 968     // Allow chrome://
 969     if (aSourceBaseURI->SchemeIs("chrome")) {
 970       return NS_OK;
 971     }
 972
 973     // Nothing else.
 974     if (reportErrors) {
 975       ReportError(errorTag, aSourceURI, aTargetURI, aFromPrivateWindow,
 976                   aInnerWindowID);
 977     }
 978     return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
 979   }
 980
 981 #ifdef DEBUG
 982   {
 983     // Everyone is allowed to load this. The case URI_LOADABLE_BY_SUBSUMERS
 984     // is handled by the caller which is just delegating to us as a helper.
 985     bool hasSubsumersFlag = false;
 986     NS_URIChainHasFlags(aTargetBaseURI,
 987                         nsIProtocolHandler::URI_LOADABLE_BY_SUBSUMERS,
 988                         &hasSubsumersFlag);
 989     bool hasLoadableByAnyone = false;
 990     NS_URIChainHasFlags(aTargetBaseURI,
 991                         nsIProtocolHandler::URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE,
 992                         &hasLoadableByAnyone);
 993     MOZ_ASSERT(hasLoadableByAnyone || hasSubsumersFlag,
 994                "why do we get here and do not have any of the two flags set?");
 995   }
 996 #endif
 997
 998   return NS_OK;
 999 }
1000
1001 nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::ReportError(const char* aMessageTag,
1002                                               const nsACString& aSourceSpec,
1003                                               const nsACString& aTargetSpec,
1004                                               bool aFromPrivateWindow,
1005                                               uint64_t aInnerWindowID) {
1006   if (aSourceSpec.IsEmpty() || aTargetSpec.IsEmpty()) {
1007     return NS_OK;
1008   }
1009
1010   nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundle> bundle = BundleHelper::GetOrCreate();
1011   if (NS_WARN_IF(!bundle)) {
1012     return NS_OK;
1013   }
1014
1015   // Localize the error message
1016   nsAutoString message;
1017   AutoTArray<nsString, 2> formatStrings;
1018   CopyASCIItoUTF16(aSourceSpec, *formatStrings.AppendElement());
1019   CopyASCIItoUTF16(aTargetSpec, *formatStrings.AppendElement());
1020   nsresult rv =
1021       bundle->FormatStringFromName(aMessageTag, formatStrings, message);
1022   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1023
1024   nsCOMPtr<nsIConsoleService> console(
1025       do_GetService(NS_CONSOLESERVICE_CONTRACTID));
1026   NS_ENSURE_TRUE(console, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
1027   nsCOMPtr<nsIScriptError> error(do_CreateInstance(NS_SCRIPTERROR_CONTRACTID));
1028   NS_ENSURE_TRUE(error, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
1029
1030   // using category of "SOP" so we can link to MDN
1031   if (aInnerWindowID != 0) {
1032     rv = error->InitWithWindowID(
1033         message, EmptyString(), EmptyString(), 0, 0, nsIScriptError::errorFlag,
1034         "SOP"_ns, aInnerWindowID, true /* From chrome context */);
1035   } else {
1036     rv = error->Init(message, EmptyString(), EmptyString(), 0, 0,
1037                      nsIScriptError::errorFlag, "SOP", aFromPrivateWindow,
1038                      true /* From chrome context */);
1039   }
1040   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1041   console->LogMessage(error);
1042   return NS_OK;
1043 }
1044
1045 nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::ReportError(const char* aMessageTag,
1046                                               nsIURI* aSource, nsIURI* aTarget,
1047                                               bool aFromPrivateWindow,
1048                                               uint64_t aInnerWindowID) {
1049   NS_ENSURE_TRUE(aSource && aTarget, NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER);
1050
1051   // Get the source URL spec
1052   nsAutoCString sourceSpec;
1053   nsresult rv = aSource->GetAsciiSpec(sourceSpec);
1054   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1055
1056   // Get the target URL spec
1057   nsAutoCString targetSpec;
1058   rv = aTarget->GetAsciiSpec(targetSpec);
1059   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1060
1061   return ReportError(aMessageTag, sourceSpec, targetSpec, aFromPrivateWindow,
1062                      aInnerWindowID);
1063 }
1064
1065 NS_IMETHODIMP
1066 nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIStrWithPrincipal(
1067     nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, const nsACString& aTargetURIStr,
1068     uint32_t aFlags) {
1069   nsresult rv;
1070   nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> target;
1071   rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(target), aTargetURIStr);
1072   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1073
1074   rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(aPrincipal, target, aFlags, 0);
1075   if (rv == NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI) {
1076     // Don't warn because NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI is one of the expected
1077     // return values.
1078     return rv;
1079   }
1080   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1081
1082   // Now start testing fixup -- since aTargetURIStr is a string, not
1083   // an nsIURI, we may well end up fixing it up before loading.
1084   // Note: This needs to stay in sync with the nsIURIFixup api.
1085   nsCOMPtr<nsIURIFixup> fixup = components::URIFixup::Service();
1086   if (!fixup) {
1087     return rv;
1088   }
1089
1090   // URIFixup's keyword and alternate flags can only fixup to http/https, so we
1091   // can skip testing them. This simplifies our life because this code can be
1092   // invoked from the content process where the search service would not be
1093   // available.
1094   uint32_t flags[] = {nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAG_NONE,
1095                       nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAG_FIX_SCHEME_TYPOS};
1096   for (uint32_t i = 0; i < ArrayLength(flags); ++i) {
1097     uint32_t fixupFlags = flags[i];
1098     if (aPrincipal->OriginAttributesRef().mPrivateBrowsingId > 0) {
1099       fixupFlags |= nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAG_PRIVATE_CONTEXT;
1100     }
1101     rv = fixup->CreateFixupURI(aTargetURIStr, fixupFlags, nullptr,
1102                                getter_AddRefs(target));
1103     NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1104
1105     rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(aPrincipal, target, aFlags, 0);
1106     if (rv == NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI) {
1107       // Don't warn because NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI is one of the expected
1108       // return values.
1109       return rv;
1110     }
1111     NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1112   }
1113
1114   return rv;
1115 }
1116
1117 NS_IMETHODIMP
1118 nsScriptSecurityManager::InFileURIAllowlist(nsIURI* aUri, bool* aResult) {
1119   MOZ_ASSERT(aUri);
1120   MOZ_ASSERT(aResult);
1121
1122   *aResult = false;
1123   for (nsIURI* uri : EnsureFileURIAllowlist()) {
1124     if (EqualOrSubdomain(aUri, uri)) {
1125       *aResult = true;
1126       return NS_OK;
1127     }
1128   }
1129
1130   return NS_OK;
1131 }
1132
1133 ///////////////// Principals ///////////////////////
1134
1135 NS_IMETHODIMP
1136 nsScriptSecurityManager::GetSystemPrincipal(nsIPrincipal** result) {
1137   NS_ADDREF(*result = mSystemPrincipal);
1138
1139   return NS_OK;
1140 }
1141
1142 NS_IMETHODIMP
1143 nsScriptSecurityManager::CreateContentPrincipal(
1144     nsIURI* aURI, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aOriginAttributes, JSContext* aCx,
1145     nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) {
1146   OriginAttributes attrs;
1147   if (!aOriginAttributes.isObject() || !attrs.Init(aCx, aOriginAttributes)) {
1148     return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
1149   }
1150   nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin =
1151       BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(aURI, attrs);
1152   prin.forget(aPrincipal);
1153   return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
1154 }
1155
1156 NS_IMETHODIMP
1157 nsScriptSecurityManager::CreateContentPrincipalFromOrigin(
1158     const nsACString& aOrigin, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) {
1159   if (StringBeginsWith(aOrigin, "["_ns)) {
1160     return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
1161   }
1162
1163   if (StringBeginsWith(aOrigin,
1164                        nsLiteralCString(NS_NULLPRINCIPAL_SCHEME ":"))) {
1165     return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
1166   }
1167
1168   nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin = BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(aOrigin);
1169   prin.forget(aPrincipal);
1170   return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
1171 }
1172
1173 NS_IMETHODIMP
1174 nsScriptSecurityManager::PrincipalToJSON(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
1175                                          nsACString& aJSON) {
1176   aJSON.Truncate();
1177   if (!aPrincipal) {
1178     return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
1179   }
1180
1181   BasePrincipal::Cast(aPrincipal)->ToJSON(aJSON);
1182
1183   if (aJSON.IsEmpty()) {
1184     return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
1185   }
1186
1187   return NS_OK;
1188 }
1189
1190 NS_IMETHODIMP
1191 nsScriptSecurityManager::JSONToPrincipal(const nsACString& aJSON,
1192                                          nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) {
1193   if (aJSON.IsEmpty()) {
1194     return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
1195   }
1196
1197   nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal = BasePrincipal::FromJSON(aJSON);
1198
1199   if (!principal) {
1200     return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
1201   }
1202
1203   principal.forget(aPrincipal);
1204   return NS_OK;
1205 }
1206
1207 NS_IMETHODIMP
1208 nsScriptSecurityManager::CreateNullPrincipal(
1209     JS::Handle<JS::Value> aOriginAttributes, JSContext* aCx,
1210     nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) {
1211   OriginAttributes attrs;
1212   if (!aOriginAttributes.isObject() || !attrs.Init(aCx, aOriginAttributes)) {
1213     return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
1214   }
1215   nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin = NullPrincipal::Create(attrs);
1216   prin.forget(aPrincipal);
1217   return NS_OK;
1218 }
1219
1220 NS_IMETHODIMP
1221 nsScriptSecurityManager::GetLoadContextContentPrincipal(
1222     nsIURI* aURI, nsILoadContext* aLoadContext, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) {
1223   NS_ENSURE_STATE(aLoadContext);
1224   OriginAttributes docShellAttrs;
1225   aLoadContext->GetOriginAttributes(docShellAttrs);
1226
1227   nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin =
1228       BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(aURI, docShellAttrs);
1229   prin.forget(aPrincipal);
1230   return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
1231 }
1232
1233 NS_IMETHODIMP
1234 nsScriptSecurityManager::GetDocShellContentPrincipal(
1235     nsIURI* aURI, nsIDocShell* aDocShell, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) {
1236   nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin = BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(
1237       aURI, nsDocShell::Cast(aDocShell)->GetOriginAttributes());
1238   prin.forget(aPrincipal);
1239   return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
1240 }
1241
1242 NS_IMETHODIMP
1243 nsScriptSecurityManager::PrincipalWithOA(
1244     nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aOriginAttributes,
1245     JSContext* aCx, nsIPrincipal** aReturnPrincipal) {
1246   if (!aPrincipal) {
1247     return NS_OK;
1248   }
1249   if (aPrincipal->GetIsContentPrincipal()) {
1250     OriginAttributes attrs;
1251     if (!aOriginAttributes.isObject() || !attrs.Init(aCx, aOriginAttributes)) {
1252       return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
1253     }
1254     RefPtr<ContentPrincipal> copy = new ContentPrincipal();
1255     auto* contentPrincipal = static_cast<ContentPrincipal*>(aPrincipal);
1256     nsresult rv = copy->Init(contentPrincipal, attrs);
1257     NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1258     copy.forget(aReturnPrincipal);
1259   } else {
1260     // We do this for null principals, system principals (both fine)
1261     // ... and expanded principals, where we should probably do something
1262     // cleverer, but I also don't think we care too much.
1263     nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin = aPrincipal;
1264     prin.forget(aReturnPrincipal);
1265   }
1266
1267   return *aReturnPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
1268 }
1269
1270 NS_IMETHODIMP
1271 nsScriptSecurityManager::CanCreateWrapper(JSContext* cx, const nsIID& aIID,
1272                                           nsISupports* aObj,
1273                                           nsIClassInfo* aClassInfo) {
1274   // XXX Special case for Exception ?
1275
1276   // We give remote-XUL allowlisted domains a free pass here. See bug 932906.
1277   JS::Rooted<JS::Realm*> contextRealm(cx, JS::GetCurrentRealmOrNull(cx));
1278   MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(contextRealm);
1279   if (!xpc::AllowContentXBLScope(contextRealm)) {
1280     return NS_OK;
1281   }
1282
1283   if (nsContentUtils::IsCallerChrome()) {
1284     return NS_OK;
1285   }
1286
1287   //-- Access denied, report an error
1288   nsAutoCString originUTF8;
1289   nsIPrincipal* subjectPrincipal = nsContentUtils::SubjectPrincipal();
1290   GetPrincipalDomainOrigin(subjectPrincipal, originUTF8);
1291   NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 originUTF16(originUTF8);
1292   nsAutoCString classInfoNameUTF8;
1293   if (aClassInfo) {
1294     aClassInfo->GetClassDescription(classInfoNameUTF8);
1295   }
1296   if (classInfoNameUTF8.IsEmpty()) {
1297     classInfoNameUTF8.AssignLiteral("UnnamedClass");
1298   }
1299
1300   nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundle> bundle = BundleHelper::GetOrCreate();
1301   if (NS_WARN_IF(!bundle)) {
1302     return NS_OK;
1303   }
1304
1305   NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 classInfoUTF16(classInfoNameUTF8);
1306   nsresult rv;
1307   nsAutoString errorMsg;
1308   if (originUTF16.IsEmpty()) {
1309     AutoTArray<nsString, 1> formatStrings = {classInfoUTF16};
1310     rv = bundle->FormatStringFromName("CreateWrapperDenied", formatStrings,
1311                                       errorMsg);
1312   } else {
1313     AutoTArray<nsString, 2> formatStrings = {classInfoUTF16, originUTF16};
1314     rv = bundle->FormatStringFromName("CreateWrapperDeniedForOrigin",
1315                                       formatStrings, errorMsg);
1316   }
1317   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1318
1319   SetPendingException(cx, errorMsg.get());
1320   return NS_ERROR_DOM_XPCONNECT_ACCESS_DENIED;
1321 }
1322
1323 NS_IMETHODIMP
1324 nsScriptSecurityManager::CanCreateInstance(JSContext* cx, const nsCID& aCID) {
1325   if (nsContentUtils::IsCallerChrome()) {
1326     return NS_OK;
1327   }
1328
1329   //-- Access denied, report an error
1330   nsAutoCString errorMsg("Permission denied to create instance of class. CID=");
1331   char cidStr[NSID_LENGTH];
1332   aCID.ToProvidedString(cidStr);
1333   errorMsg.Append(cidStr);
1334   SetPendingExceptionASCII(cx, errorMsg.get());
1335   return NS_ERROR_DOM_XPCONNECT_ACCESS_DENIED;
1336 }
1337
1338 NS_IMETHODIMP
1339 nsScriptSecurityManager::CanGetService(JSContext* cx, const nsCID& aCID) {
1340   if (nsContentUtils::IsCallerChrome()) {
1341     return NS_OK;
1342   }
1343
1344   //-- Access denied, report an error
1345   nsAutoCString errorMsg("Permission denied to get service. CID=");
1346   char cidStr[NSID_LENGTH];
1347   aCID.ToProvidedString(cidStr);
1348   errorMsg.Append(cidStr);
1349   SetPendingExceptionASCII(cx, errorMsg.get());
1350   return NS_ERROR_DOM_XPCONNECT_ACCESS_DENIED;
1351 }
1352
1353 const char sJSEnabledPrefName[] = "javascript.enabled";
1354 const char sFileOriginPolicyPrefName[] =
1355     "security.fileuri.strict_origin_policy";
1356
1357 static const char* kObservedPrefs[] = {sJSEnabledPrefName,
1358                                        sFileOriginPolicyPrefName,
1359                                        "capability.policy.", nullptr};
1360
1361 /////////////////////////////////////////////
1362 // Constructor, Destructor, Initialization //
1363 /////////////////////////////////////////////
1364 nsScriptSecurityManager::nsScriptSecurityManager(void)
1365     : mPrefInitialized(false), mIsJavaScriptEnabled(false) {
1366   static_assert(
1367       sizeof(intptr_t) == sizeof(void*),
1368       "intptr_t and void* have different lengths on this platform. "
1369       "This may cause a security failure with the SecurityLevel union.");
1370 }
1371
1372 nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::Init() {
1373   nsresult rv = CallGetService(NS_IOSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &sIOService);
1374   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1375
1376   InitPrefs();
1377
1378   // Create our system principal singleton
1379   RefPtr<SystemPrincipal> system = SystemPrincipal::Create();
1380
1381   mSystemPrincipal = system;
1382
1383   return NS_OK;
1384 }
1385
1386 void nsScriptSecurityManager::InitJSCallbacks(JSContext* aCx) {
1387   //-- Register security check callback in the JS engine
1388   //   Currently this is used to control access to function.caller
1389
1390   static const JSSecurityCallbacks securityCallbacks = {
1391       ContentSecurityPolicyPermitsJSAction,
1392       JSPrincipalsSubsume,
1393   };
1394
1395   MOZ_ASSERT(!JS_GetSecurityCallbacks(aCx));
1396   JS_SetSecurityCallbacks(aCx, &securityCallbacks);
1397   JS_InitDestroyPrincipalsCallback(aCx, nsJSPrincipals::Destroy);
1398
1399   JS_SetTrustedPrincipals(aCx, BasePrincipal::Cast(mSystemPrincipal));
1400 }
1401
1402 /* static */
1403 void nsScriptSecurityManager::ClearJSCallbacks(JSContext* aCx) {
1404   JS_SetSecurityCallbacks(aCx, nullptr);
1405   JS_SetTrustedPrincipals(aCx, nullptr);
1406 }
1407
1408 static StaticRefPtr<nsScriptSecurityManager> gScriptSecMan;
1409
1410 nsScriptSecurityManager::~nsScriptSecurityManager(void) {
1411   Preferences::UnregisterPrefixCallbacks(
1412       nsScriptSecurityManager::ScriptSecurityPrefChanged, kObservedPrefs, this);
1413   if (mDomainPolicy) {
1414     mDomainPolicy->Deactivate();
1415   }
1416   // ContentChild might hold a reference to the domain policy,
1417   // and it might release it only after the security manager is
1418   // gone. But we can still assert this for the main process.
1419   MOZ_ASSERT_IF(XRE_IsParentProcess(), !mDomainPolicy);
1420 }
1421
1422 void nsScriptSecurityManager::Shutdown() {
1423   NS_IF_RELEASE(sIOService);
1424   BundleHelper::Shutdown();
1425 }
1426
1427 nsScriptSecurityManager* nsScriptSecurityManager::GetScriptSecurityManager() {
1428   return gScriptSecMan;
1429 }
1430
1431 /* static */
1432 void nsScriptSecurityManager::InitStatics() {
1433   RefPtr<nsScriptSecurityManager> ssManager = new nsScriptSecurityManager();
1434   nsresult rv = ssManager->Init();
1435   if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
1436     MOZ_CRASH("ssManager->Init() failed");
1437   }
1438
1439   ClearOnShutdown(&gScriptSecMan);
1440   gScriptSecMan = ssManager;
1441 }
1442
1443 // Currently this nsGenericFactory constructor is used only from FastLoad
1444 // (XPCOM object deserialization) code, when "creating" the system principal
1445 // singleton.
1446 already_AddRefed<SystemPrincipal>
1447 nsScriptSecurityManager::SystemPrincipalSingletonConstructor() {
1448   if (gScriptSecMan)
1449     return do_AddRef(gScriptSecMan->mSystemPrincipal)
1450         .downcast<SystemPrincipal>();
1451   return nullptr;
1452 }
1453
1454 struct IsWhitespace {
1455   static bool Test(char aChar) { return NS_IsAsciiWhitespace(aChar); };
1456 };
1457 struct IsWhitespaceOrComma {
1458   static bool Test(char aChar) {
1459     return aChar == ',' || NS_IsAsciiWhitespace(aChar);
1460   };
1461 };
1462
1463 template <typename Predicate>
1464 uint32_t SkipPast(const nsCString& str, uint32_t base) {
1465   while (base < str.Length() && Predicate::Test(str[base])) {
1466     ++base;
1467   }
1468   return base;
1469 }
1470
1471 template <typename Predicate>
1472 uint32_t SkipUntil(const nsCString& str, uint32_t base) {
1473   while (base < str.Length() && !Predicate::Test(str[base])) {
1474     ++base;
1475   }
1476   return base;
1477 }
1478
1479 // static
1480 void nsScriptSecurityManager::ScriptSecurityPrefChanged(const char* aPref,
1481                                                         void* aSelf) {
1482   static_cast<nsScriptSecurityManager*>(aSelf)->ScriptSecurityPrefChanged(
1483       aPref);
1484 }
1485
1486 inline void nsScriptSecurityManager::ScriptSecurityPrefChanged(
1487     const char* aPref) {
1488   MOZ_ASSERT(mPrefInitialized);
1489   mIsJavaScriptEnabled =
1490       Preferences::GetBool(sJSEnabledPrefName, mIsJavaScriptEnabled);
1491   sStrictFileOriginPolicy =
1492       Preferences::GetBool(sFileOriginPolicyPrefName, false);
1493   mFileURIAllowlist.reset();
1494 }
1495
1496 void nsScriptSecurityManager::AddSitesToFileURIAllowlist(
1497     const nsCString& aSiteList) {
1498   for (uint32_t base = SkipPast<IsWhitespace>(aSiteList, 0), bound = 0;
1499        base < aSiteList.Length();
1500        base = SkipPast<IsWhitespace>(aSiteList, bound)) {
1501     // Grab the current site.
1502     bound = SkipUntil<IsWhitespace>(aSiteList, base);
1503     nsAutoCString site(Substring(aSiteList, base, bound - base));
1504
1505     // Check if the URI is schemeless. If so, add both http and https.
1506     nsAutoCString unused;
1507     if (NS_FAILED(sIOService->ExtractScheme(site, unused))) {
1508       AddSitesToFileURIAllowlist("http://"_ns + site);
1509       AddSitesToFileURIAllowlist("https://"_ns + site);
1510       continue;
1511     }
1512
1513     // Convert it to a URI and add it to our list.
1514     nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
1515     nsresult rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(uri), site);
1516     if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
1517       mFileURIAllowlist.ref().AppendElement(uri);
1518     } else {
1519       nsCOMPtr<nsIConsoleService> console(
1520           do_GetService("@mozilla.org/consoleservice;1"));
1521       if (console) {
1522         nsAutoString msg =
1523             u"Unable to to add site to file:// URI allowlist: "_ns +
1524             NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16(site);
1525         console->LogStringMessage(msg.get());
1526       }
1527     }
1528   }
1529 }
1530
1531 nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::InitPrefs() {
1532   nsIPrefBranch* branch = Preferences::GetRootBranch();
1533   NS_ENSURE_TRUE(branch, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
1534
1535   mPrefInitialized = true;
1536
1537   // Set the initial value of the "javascript.enabled" prefs
1538   ScriptSecurityPrefChanged();
1539
1540   // set observer callbacks in case the value of the prefs change
1541   Preferences::RegisterPrefixCallbacks(
1542       nsScriptSecurityManager::ScriptSecurityPrefChanged, kObservedPrefs, this);
1543
1544   return NS_OK;
1545 }
1546
1547 NS_IMETHODIMP
1548 nsScriptSecurityManager::GetDomainPolicyActive(bool* aRv) {
1549   *aRv = !!mDomainPolicy;
1550   return NS_OK;
1551 }
1552
1553 NS_IMETHODIMP
1554 nsScriptSecurityManager::ActivateDomainPolicy(nsIDomainPolicy** aRv) {
1555   if (!XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
1556     return NS_ERROR_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE;
1557   }
1558
1559   return ActivateDomainPolicyInternal(aRv);
1560 }
1561
1562 NS_IMETHODIMP
1563 nsScriptSecurityManager::ActivateDomainPolicyInternal(nsIDomainPolicy** aRv) {
1564   // We only allow one domain policy at a time. The holder of the previous
1565   // policy must explicitly deactivate it first.
1566   if (mDomainPolicy) {
1567     return NS_ERROR_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE;
1568   }
1569
1570   mDomainPolicy = new DomainPolicy();
1571   nsCOMPtr<nsIDomainPolicy> ptr = mDomainPolicy;
1572   ptr.forget(aRv);
1573   return NS_OK;
1574 }
1575
1576 // Intentionally non-scriptable. Script must have a reference to the
1577 // nsIDomainPolicy to deactivate it.
1578 void nsScriptSecurityManager::DeactivateDomainPolicy() {
1579   mDomainPolicy = nullptr;
1580 }
1581
1582 void nsScriptSecurityManager::CloneDomainPolicy(DomainPolicyClone* aClone) {
1583   MOZ_ASSERT(aClone);
1584   if (mDomainPolicy) {
1585     mDomainPolicy->CloneDomainPolicy(aClone);
1586   } else {
1587     aClone->active() = false;
1588   }
1589 }
1590
1591 NS_IMETHODIMP
1592 nsScriptSecurityManager::PolicyAllowsScript(nsIURI* aURI, bool* aRv) {
1593   nsresult rv;
1594
1595   // Compute our rule. If we don't have any domain policy set up that might
1596   // provide exceptions to this rule, we're done.
1597   *aRv = mIsJavaScriptEnabled;
1598   if (!mDomainPolicy) {
1599     return NS_OK;
1600   }
1601
1602   // We have a domain policy. Grab the appropriate set of exceptions to the
1603   // rule (either the blocklist or the allowlist, depending on whether script
1604   // is enabled or disabled by default).
1605   nsCOMPtr<nsIDomainSet> exceptions;
1606   nsCOMPtr<nsIDomainSet> superExceptions;
1607   if (*aRv) {
1608     mDomainPolicy->GetBlocklist(getter_AddRefs(exceptions));
1609     mDomainPolicy->GetSuperBlocklist(getter_AddRefs(superExceptions));
1610   } else {
1611     mDomainPolicy->GetAllowlist(getter_AddRefs(exceptions));
1612     mDomainPolicy->GetSuperAllowlist(getter_AddRefs(superExceptions));
1613   }
1614
1615   bool contains;
1616   rv = exceptions->Contains(aURI, &contains);
1617   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1618   if (contains) {
1619     *aRv = !*aRv;
1620     return NS_OK;
1621   }
1622   rv = superExceptions->ContainsSuperDomain(aURI, &contains);
1623   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1624   if (contains) {
1625     *aRv = !*aRv;
1626   }
1627
1628   return NS_OK;
1629 }
1630
1631 const nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIURI>>&
1632 nsScriptSecurityManager::EnsureFileURIAllowlist() {
1633   if (mFileURIAllowlist.isSome()) {
1634     return mFileURIAllowlist.ref();
1635   }
1636
1637   //
1638   // Rebuild the set of principals for which we allow file:// URI loads. This
1639   // implements a small subset of an old pref-based CAPS people that people
1640   // have come to depend on. See bug 995943.
1641   //
1642
1643   mFileURIAllowlist.emplace();
1644   nsAutoCString policies;
1645   mozilla::Preferences::GetCString("capability.policy.policynames", policies);
1646   for (uint32_t base = SkipPast<IsWhitespaceOrComma>(policies, 0), bound = 0;
1647        base < policies.Length();
1648        base = SkipPast<IsWhitespaceOrComma>(policies, bound)) {
1649     // Grab the current policy name.
1650     bound = SkipUntil<IsWhitespaceOrComma>(policies, base);
1651     auto policyName = Substring(policies, base, bound - base);
1652
1653     // Figure out if this policy allows loading file:// URIs. If not, we can
1654     // skip it.
1655     nsCString checkLoadURIPrefName =
1656         "capability.policy."_ns + policyName + ".checkloaduri.enabled"_ns;
1657     nsAutoString value;
1658     nsresult rv = Preferences::GetString(checkLoadURIPrefName.get(), value);
1659     if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !value.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("allaccess")) {
1660       continue;
1661     }
1662
1663     // Grab the list of domains associated with this policy.
1664     nsCString domainPrefName =
1665         "capability.policy."_ns + policyName + ".sites"_ns;
1666     nsAutoCString siteList;
1667     Preferences::GetCString(domainPrefName.get(), siteList);
1668     AddSitesToFileURIAllowlist(siteList);
1669   }
1670
1671   return mFileURIAllowlist.ref();
1672 }