caps/nsScriptSecurityManager.cpp

   1 /* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
   2 /* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
   3 /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
   4  * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
   5  * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
   6
   7 #include "nsScriptSecurityManager.h"
   8
   9 #include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h"
  10 #include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_extensions.h"
  11 #include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_security.h"
  12 #include "mozilla/StoragePrincipalHelper.h"
  13
  14 #include "xpcpublic.h"
  15 #include "XPCWrapper.h"
  16 #include "nsILoadContext.h"
  17 #include "nsIScriptObjectPrincipal.h"
  18 #include "nsIScriptContext.h"
  19 #include "nsIScriptError.h"
  20 #include "nsINestedURI.h"
  21 #include "nspr.h"
  22 #include "nsJSPrincipals.h"
  23 #include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
  24 #include "ExpandedPrincipal.h"
  25 #include "SystemPrincipal.h"
  26 #include "DomainPolicy.h"
  27 #include "nsString.h"
  28 #include "nsCRT.h"
  29 #include "nsCRTGlue.h"
  30 #include "nsContentSecurityUtils.h"
  31 #include "nsDocShell.h"
  32 #include "nsError.h"
  33 #include "nsGlobalWindowInner.h"
  34 #include "nsDOMCID.h"
  35 #include "nsTextFormatter.h"
  36 #include "nsIStringBundle.h"
  37 #include "nsNetUtil.h"
  38 #include "nsIEffectiveTLDService.h"
  39 #include "nsDirectoryServiceDefs.h"
  40 #include "nsIScriptGlobalObject.h"
  41 #include "nsPIDOMWindow.h"
  42 #include "nsIDocShell.h"
  43 #include "nsIConsoleService.h"
  44 #include "nsIOService.h"
  45 #include "nsIContent.h"
  46 #include "nsDOMJSUtils.h"
  47 #include "nsAboutProtocolUtils.h"
  48 #include "nsIClassInfo.h"
  49 #include "nsIURIFixup.h"
  50 #include "nsIChromeRegistry.h"
  51 #include "nsIResProtocolHandler.h"
  52 #include "nsIContentSecurityPolicy.h"
  53 #include "mozilla/Components.h"
  54 #include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
  55 #include "mozilla/dom/BindingUtils.h"
  56 #include "mozilla/NullPrincipal.h"
  57 #include <stdint.h>
  58 #include "mozilla/dom/ContentChild.h"
  59 #include "mozilla/dom/ContentParent.h"
  60 #include "mozilla/dom/Exceptions.h"
  61 #include "mozilla/dom/nsCSPContext.h"
  62 #include "mozilla/dom/ScriptSettings.h"
  63 #include "mozilla/ClearOnShutdown.h"
  64 #include "mozilla/ResultExtensions.h"
  65 #include "mozilla/StaticPtr.h"
  66 #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerCommon.h"
  67 #include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h"
  68 #include "nsContentUtils.h"
  69 #include "nsJSUtils.h"
  70 #include "nsILoadInfo.h"
  71
  72 // This should be probably defined on some other place... but I couldn't find it
  73 #define WEBAPPS_PERM_NAME "webapps-manage"
  74
  75 using namespace mozilla;
  76 using namespace mozilla::dom;
  77
  78 nsIIOService* nsScriptSecurityManager::sIOService = nullptr;
  79 bool nsScriptSecurityManager::sStrictFileOriginPolicy = true;
  80
  81 namespace {
  82
  83 class BundleHelper {
  84  public:
  85   NS_INLINE_DECL_REFCOUNTING(BundleHelper)
  86
  87   static nsIStringBundle* GetOrCreate() {
  88     MOZ_ASSERT(!sShutdown);
  89
  90     // Already shutting down. Nothing should require the use of the string
  91     // bundle when shutting down.
  92     if (sShutdown) {
  93       return nullptr;
  94     }
  95
  96     if (!sSelf) {
  97       sSelf = new BundleHelper();
  98     }
  99
 100     return sSelf->GetOrCreateInternal();
 101   }
 102
 103   static void Shutdown() {
 104     sSelf = nullptr;
 105     sShutdown = true;
 106   }
 107
 108  private:
 109   ~BundleHelper() = default;
 110
 111   nsIStringBundle* GetOrCreateInternal() {
 112     if (!mBundle) {
 113       nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundleService> bundleService =
 114           mozilla::services::GetStringBundleService();
 115       if (NS_WARN_IF(!bundleService)) {
 116         return nullptr;
 117       }
 118
 119       nsresult rv = bundleService->CreateBundle(
 120           "chrome://global/locale/security/caps.properties",
 121           getter_AddRefs(mBundle));
 122       if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
 123         return nullptr;
 124       }
 125     }
 126
 127     return mBundle;
 128   }
 129
 130   nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundle> mBundle;
 131
 132   static StaticRefPtr<BundleHelper> sSelf;
 133   static bool sShutdown;
 134 };
 135
 136 StaticRefPtr<BundleHelper> BundleHelper::sSelf;
 137 bool BundleHelper::sShutdown = false;
 138
 139 }  // namespace
 140
 141 ///////////////////////////
 142 // Convenience Functions //
 143 ///////////////////////////
 144
 145 class nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter {
 146  public:
 147   nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter() { ++sInPrincipalDomainOrigin; }
 148   ~nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter() { --sInPrincipalDomainOrigin; }
 149   static uint32_t sInPrincipalDomainOrigin;
 150 };
 151 uint32_t nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter::sInPrincipalDomainOrigin;
 152
 153 static nsresult GetOriginFromURI(nsIURI* aURI, nsACString& aOrigin) {
 154   if (!aURI) {
 155     return NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER;
 156   }
 157   if (nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter::sInPrincipalDomainOrigin > 1) {
 158     // Allow a single recursive call to GetPrincipalDomainOrigin, since that
 159     // might be happening on a different principal from the first call.  But
 160     // after that, cut off the recursion; it just indicates that something
 161     // we're doing in this method causes us to reenter a security check here.
 162     return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
 163   }
 164
 165   nsAutoInPrincipalDomainOriginSetter autoSetter;
 166
 167   nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri = NS_GetInnermostURI(aURI);
 168   NS_ENSURE_TRUE(uri, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
 169
 170   nsAutoCString hostPort;
 171
 172   nsresult rv = uri->GetHostPort(hostPort);
 173   if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
 174     nsAutoCString scheme;
 175     rv = uri->GetScheme(scheme);
 176     NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 177     aOrigin = scheme + "://"_ns + hostPort;
 178   } else {
 179     // Some URIs (e.g., nsSimpleURI) don't support host. Just
 180     // get the full spec.
 181     rv = uri->GetSpec(aOrigin);
 182     NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 183   }
 184
 185   return NS_OK;
 186 }
 187
 188 static nsresult GetPrincipalDomainOrigin(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
 189                                          nsACString& aOrigin) {
 190   aOrigin.Truncate();
 191   nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
 192   aPrincipal->GetDomain(getter_AddRefs(uri));
 193   nsresult rv = GetOriginFromURI(uri, aOrigin);
 194   if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
 195     return rv;
 196   }
 197   // If there is no Domain fallback to the Principals Origin
 198   return aPrincipal->GetOriginNoSuffix(aOrigin);
 199 }
 200
 201 inline void SetPendingExceptionASCII(JSContext* cx, const char* aMsg) {
 202   JS_ReportErrorASCII(cx, "%s", aMsg);
 203 }
 204
 205 inline void SetPendingException(JSContext* cx, const char16_t* aMsg) {
 206   NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8 msg(aMsg);
 207   JS_ReportErrorUTF8(cx, "%s", msg.get());
 208 }
 209
 210 /* static */
 211 bool nsScriptSecurityManager::SecurityCompareURIs(nsIURI* aSourceURI,
 212                                                   nsIURI* aTargetURI) {
 213   return NS_SecurityCompareURIs(aSourceURI, aTargetURI,
 214                                 sStrictFileOriginPolicy);
 215 }
 216
 217 // SecurityHashURI is consistent with SecurityCompareURIs because
 218 // NS_SecurityHashURI is consistent with NS_SecurityCompareURIs.  See
 219 // nsNetUtil.h.
 220 uint32_t nsScriptSecurityManager::SecurityHashURI(nsIURI* aURI) {
 221   return NS_SecurityHashURI(aURI);
 222 }
 223
 224 /*
 225  * GetChannelResultPrincipal will return the principal that the resource
 226  * returned by this channel will use.  For example, if the resource is in
 227  * a sandbox, it will return the nullprincipal.  If the resource is forced
 228  * to inherit principal, it will return the principal of its parent.  If
 229  * the load doesn't require sandboxing or inheriting, it will return the same
 230  * principal as GetChannelURIPrincipal. Namely the principal of the URI
 231  * that is being loaded.
 232  */
 233 NS_IMETHODIMP
 234 nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelResultPrincipal(nsIChannel* aChannel,
 235                                                    nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) {
 236   return GetChannelResultPrincipal(aChannel, aPrincipal,
 237                                    /*aIgnoreSandboxing*/ false);
 238 }
 239
 240 nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelResultPrincipalIfNotSandboxed(
 241     nsIChannel* aChannel, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) {
 242   return GetChannelResultPrincipal(aChannel, aPrincipal,
 243                                    /*aIgnoreSandboxing*/ true);
 244 }
 245
 246 NS_IMETHODIMP
 247 nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelResultStoragePrincipal(
 248     nsIChannel* aChannel, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) {
 249   nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal;
 250   nsresult rv = GetChannelResultPrincipal(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(principal),
 251                                           /*aIgnoreSandboxing*/ false);
 252   if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
 253     return rv;
 254   }
 255
 256   return StoragePrincipalHelper::Create(
 257       aChannel, principal, /* aForceIsolation */ false, aPrincipal);
 258 }
 259
 260 NS_IMETHODIMP
 261 nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelResultPrincipals(
 262     nsIChannel* aChannel, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal,
 263     nsIPrincipal** aPartitionedPrincipal) {
 264   nsresult rv = GetChannelResultPrincipal(aChannel, aPrincipal,
 265                                           /*aIgnoreSandboxing*/ false);
 266   if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
 267     return rv;
 268   }
 269
 270   if (!(*aPrincipal)->GetIsContentPrincipal()) {
 271     // If for some reason we don't have a content principal here, just reuse our
 272     // principal for the storage principal too, since attempting to create a
 273     // storage principal would fail anyway.
 274     nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> copy = *aPrincipal;
 275     copy.forget(aPartitionedPrincipal);
 276     return NS_OK;
 277   }
 278
 279   return StoragePrincipalHelper::Create(
 280       aChannel, *aPrincipal, /* aForceIsolation */ true, aPartitionedPrincipal);
 281 }
 282
 283 nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelResultPrincipal(
 284     nsIChannel* aChannel, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal, bool aIgnoreSandboxing) {
 285   MOZ_ASSERT(aChannel, "Must have channel!");
 286
 287   // Check whether we have an nsILoadInfo that says what we should do.
 288   nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
 289   if (loadInfo->GetForceInheritPrincipalOverruleOwner()) {
 290     nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principalToInherit =
 291         loadInfo->FindPrincipalToInherit(aChannel);
 292     principalToInherit.forget(aPrincipal);
 293     return NS_OK;
 294   }
 295
 296   nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> owner;
 297   aChannel->GetOwner(getter_AddRefs(owner));
 298   if (owner) {
 299     CallQueryInterface(owner, aPrincipal);
 300     if (*aPrincipal) {
 301       return NS_OK;
 302     }
 303   }
 304
 305   if (!aIgnoreSandboxing && loadInfo->GetLoadingSandboxed()) {
 306     nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> sandboxedLoadingPrincipal =
 307         loadInfo->GetSandboxedLoadingPrincipal();
 308     MOZ_ASSERT(sandboxedLoadingPrincipal);
 309     sandboxedLoadingPrincipal.forget(aPrincipal);
 310     return NS_OK;
 311   }
 312
 313   bool forceInherit = loadInfo->GetForceInheritPrincipal();
 314   if (aIgnoreSandboxing && !forceInherit) {
 315     // Check if SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL was dropped because of
 316     // sandboxing:
 317     if (loadInfo->GetLoadingSandboxed() &&
 318         loadInfo->GetForceInheritPrincipalDropped()) {
 319       forceInherit = true;
 320     }
 321   }
 322   if (forceInherit) {
 323     nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principalToInherit =
 324         loadInfo->FindPrincipalToInherit(aChannel);
 325     principalToInherit.forget(aPrincipal);
 326     return NS_OK;
 327   }
 328
 329   auto securityMode = loadInfo->GetSecurityMode();
 330   // The data: inheritance flags should only apply to the initial load,
 331   // not to loads that it might have redirected to.
 332   if (loadInfo->RedirectChain().IsEmpty() &&
 333       (securityMode ==
 334            nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT ||
 335        securityMode ==
 336            nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT ||
 337        securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT)) {
 338     nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
 339     nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
 340     NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 341
 342     nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principalToInherit =
 343         loadInfo->FindPrincipalToInherit(aChannel);
 344     bool inheritForAboutBlank = loadInfo->GetAboutBlankInherits();
 345
 346     if (nsContentUtils::ChannelShouldInheritPrincipal(
 347             principalToInherit, uri, inheritForAboutBlank, false)) {
 348       principalToInherit.forget(aPrincipal);
 349       return NS_OK;
 350     }
 351   }
 352   return GetChannelURIPrincipal(aChannel, aPrincipal);
 353 }
 354
 355 /* The principal of the URI that this channel is loading. This is never
 356  * affected by things like sandboxed loads, or loads where we forcefully
 357  * inherit the principal.  Think of this as the principal of the server
 358  * which this channel is loading from.  Most callers should use
 359  * GetChannelResultPrincipal instead of GetChannelURIPrincipal.  Only
 360  * call GetChannelURIPrincipal if you are sure that you want the
 361  * principal that matches the uri, even in cases when the load is
 362  * sandboxed or when the load could be a blob or data uri (i.e even when
 363  * you encounter loads that may or may not be sandboxed and loads
 364  * that may or may not inherit)."
 365  */
 366 NS_IMETHODIMP
 367 nsScriptSecurityManager::GetChannelURIPrincipal(nsIChannel* aChannel,
 368                                                 nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) {
 369   MOZ_ASSERT(aChannel, "Must have channel!");
 370
 371   // Get the principal from the URI.  Make sure this does the same thing
 372   // as Document::Reset and PrototypeDocumentContentSink::Init.
 373   nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
 374   nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
 375   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 376
 377   nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
 378
 379   // Inherit the origin attributes from loadInfo.
 380   // If this is a top-level document load, the origin attributes of the
 381   // loadInfo will be set from nsDocShell::DoURILoad.
 382   // For subresource loading, the origin attributes of the loadInfo is from
 383   // its loadingPrincipal.
 384   OriginAttributes attrs = loadInfo->GetOriginAttributes();
 385
 386   nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin =
 387       BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(uri, attrs);
 388   prin.forget(aPrincipal);
 389   return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
 390 }
 391
 392 /////////////////////////////
 393 // nsScriptSecurityManager //
 394 /////////////////////////////
 395
 396 ////////////////////////////////////
 397 // Methods implementing ISupports //
 398 ////////////////////////////////////
 399 NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsScriptSecurityManager, nsIScriptSecurityManager)
 400
 401 ///////////////////////////////////////////////////
 402 // Methods implementing nsIScriptSecurityManager //
 403 ///////////////////////////////////////////////////
 404
 405 ///////////////// Security Checks /////////////////
 406
 407 bool nsScriptSecurityManager::ContentSecurityPolicyPermitsJSAction(
 408     JSContext* cx, JS::HandleString aCode) {
 409   MOZ_ASSERT(cx == nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext());
 410
 411   // Get the window, if any, corresponding to the current global
 412   nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> csp;
 413   if (nsGlobalWindowInner* win = xpc::CurrentWindowOrNull(cx)) {
 414     csp = win->GetCsp();
 415   }
 416
 417   nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> subjectPrincipal = nsContentUtils::SubjectPrincipal();
 418   if (!csp) {
 419     // Get the CSP for addon sandboxes.  If the principal is expanded and has a
 420     // csp, we're probably in luck.
 421     auto* basePrin = BasePrincipal::Cast(subjectPrincipal);
 422     // ContentScriptAddonPolicy means it is also an expanded principal, thus
 423     // this is in a sandbox used as a content script.
 424     if (basePrin->ContentScriptAddonPolicy()) {
 425       basePrin->As<ExpandedPrincipal>()->GetCsp(getter_AddRefs(csp));
 426     }
 427     // don't do anything unless there's a CSP
 428     if (!csp) {
 429       return true;
 430     }
 431   }
 432
 433   nsCOMPtr<nsICSPEventListener> cspEventListener;
 434   if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
 435     WorkerPrivate* workerPrivate =
 436         mozilla::dom::GetWorkerPrivateFromContext(cx);
 437     if (workerPrivate) {
 438       cspEventListener = workerPrivate->CSPEventListener();
 439     }
 440   }
 441
 442   bool evalOK = true;
 443   bool reportViolation = false;
 444   nsresult rv = csp->GetAllowsEval(&reportViolation, &evalOK);
 445
 446   // A little convoluted. We want the scriptSample for a) reporting a violation
 447   // or b) passing it to AssertEvalNotUsingSystemPrincipal or c) we're in the
 448   // parent process. So do the work to get it if either of those cases is true.
 449   nsAutoJSString scriptSample;
 450   if (reportViolation || subjectPrincipal->IsSystemPrincipal() ||
 451       XRE_IsE10sParentProcess()) {
 452     if (NS_WARN_IF(!scriptSample.init(cx, aCode))) {
 453       JS_ClearPendingException(cx);
 454       return false;
 455     }
 456   }
 457
 458 #if !defined(ANDROID)
 459   if (!nsContentSecurityUtils::IsEvalAllowed(
 460           cx, subjectPrincipal->IsSystemPrincipal(), scriptSample)) {
 461     return false;
 462   }
 463 #endif
 464
 465   if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
 466     NS_WARNING("CSP: failed to get allowsEval");
 467     return true;  // fail open to not break sites.
 468   }
 469
 470   if (reportViolation) {
 471     JS::AutoFilename scriptFilename;
 472     nsAutoString fileName;
 473     unsigned lineNum = 0;
 474     unsigned columnNum = 0;
 475     if (JS::DescribeScriptedCaller(cx, &scriptFilename, &lineNum, &columnNum)) {
 476       if (const char* file = scriptFilename.get()) {
 477         CopyUTF8toUTF16(nsDependentCString(file), fileName);
 478       }
 479     } else {
 480       MOZ_ASSERT(!JS_IsExceptionPending(cx));
 481     }
 482     csp->LogViolationDetails(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_EVAL,
 483                              nullptr,  // triggering element
 484                              cspEventListener, fileName, scriptSample, lineNum,
 485                              columnNum, u""_ns, u""_ns);
 486   }
 487
 488   return evalOK;
 489 }
 490
 491 // static
 492 bool nsScriptSecurityManager::JSPrincipalsSubsume(JSPrincipals* first,
 493                                                   JSPrincipals* second) {
 494   return nsJSPrincipals::get(first)->Subsumes(nsJSPrincipals::get(second));
 495 }
 496
 497 NS_IMETHODIMP
 498 nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckSameOriginURI(nsIURI* aSourceURI,
 499                                             nsIURI* aTargetURI,
 500                                             bool reportError,
 501                                             bool aFromPrivateWindow) {
 502   // Please note that aFromPrivateWindow is only 100% accurate if
 503   // reportError is true.
 504   if (!SecurityCompareURIs(aSourceURI, aTargetURI)) {
 505     if (reportError) {
 506       ReportError("CheckSameOriginError", aSourceURI, aTargetURI,
 507                   aFromPrivateWindow);
 508     }
 509     return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
 510   }
 511   return NS_OK;
 512 }
 513
 514 NS_IMETHODIMP
 515 nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIFromScript(JSContext* cx, nsIURI* aURI) {
 516   // Get principal of currently executing script.
 517   MOZ_ASSERT(cx == nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext());
 518   nsIPrincipal* principal = nsContentUtils::SubjectPrincipal();
 519   nsresult rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(
 520       // Passing 0 for the window ID here is OK, because we will report a
 521       // script-visible exception anyway.
 522       principal, aURI, nsIScriptSecurityManager::STANDARD, 0);
 523   if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
 524     // OK to load
 525     return NS_OK;
 526   }
 527
 528   // Report error.
 529   nsAutoCString spec;
 530   if (NS_FAILED(aURI->GetAsciiSpec(spec))) return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
 531   nsAutoCString msg("Access to '");
 532   msg.Append(spec);
 533   msg.AppendLiteral("' from script denied");
 534   SetPendingExceptionASCII(cx, msg.get());
 535   return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
 536 }
 537
 538 /**
 539  * Helper method to handle cases where a flag passed to
 540  * CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal means denying loading if the given URI has certain
 541  * nsIProtocolHandler flags set.
 542  * @return if success, access is allowed. Otherwise, deny access
 543  */
 544 static nsresult DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(nsIURI* aURI, uint32_t aURIFlags) {
 545   MOZ_ASSERT(aURI, "Must have URI!");
 546
 547   bool uriHasFlags;
 548   nsresult rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aURI, aURIFlags, &uriHasFlags);
 549   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 550
 551   if (uriHasFlags) {
 552     return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
 553   }
 554
 555   return NS_OK;
 556 }
 557
 558 static bool EqualOrSubdomain(nsIURI* aProbeArg, nsIURI* aBase) {
 559   nsresult rv;
 560   nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> probe = aProbeArg;
 561
 562   nsCOMPtr<nsIEffectiveTLDService> tldService =
 563       do_GetService(NS_EFFECTIVETLDSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
 564   NS_ENSURE_TRUE(tldService, false);
 565   while (true) {
 566     if (nsScriptSecurityManager::SecurityCompareURIs(probe, aBase)) {
 567       return true;
 568     }
 569
 570     nsAutoCString host, newHost;
 571     rv = probe->GetHost(host);
 572     NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
 573
 574     rv = tldService->GetNextSubDomain(host, newHost);
 575     if (rv == NS_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DOMAIN_LEVELS) {
 576       return false;
 577     }
 578     NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
 579     rv = NS_MutateURI(probe).SetHost(newHost).Finalize(probe);
 580     NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
 581   }
 582 }
 583
 584 NS_IMETHODIMP
 585 nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
 586                                                    nsIURI* aTargetURI,
 587                                                    uint32_t aFlags,
 588                                                    uint64_t aInnerWindowID) {
 589   MOZ_ASSERT(aPrincipal, "CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal must have a principal");
 590
 591   // If someone passes a flag that we don't understand, we should
 592   // fail, because they may need a security check that we don't
 593   // provide.
 594   NS_ENSURE_FALSE(
 595       aFlags &
 596           ~(nsIScriptSecurityManager::LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT |
 597             nsIScriptSecurityManager::ALLOW_CHROME |
 598             nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT |
 599             nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL |
 600             nsIScriptSecurityManager::DONT_REPORT_ERRORS),
 601       NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
 602   NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aPrincipal);
 603   NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aTargetURI);
 604
 605   // If DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL is set, we prevent loading of URIs which
 606   // would do such inheriting. That would be URIs that do not have their own
 607   // security context. We do this even for the system principal.
 608   if (aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL) {
 609     nsresult rv = DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(
 610         aTargetURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT);
 611     NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 612   }
 613
 614   if (aPrincipal == mSystemPrincipal) {
 615     // Allow access
 616     return NS_OK;
 617   }
 618
 619   nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> sourceURI;
 620   auto* basePrin = BasePrincipal::Cast(aPrincipal);
 621   basePrin->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(sourceURI));
 622   if (!sourceURI) {
 623     if (basePrin->Is<ExpandedPrincipal>()) {
 624       auto expanded = basePrin->As<ExpandedPrincipal>();
 625       for (auto& prin : expanded->AllowList()) {
 626         nsresult rv =
 627             CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(prin, aTargetURI, aFlags, aInnerWindowID);
 628         if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
 629           // Allow access if it succeeded with one of the allowlisted principals
 630           return NS_OK;
 631         }
 632       }
 633       // None of our allowlisted principals worked.
 634       return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
 635     }
 636     NS_ERROR(
 637         "Non-system principals or expanded principal passed to "
 638         "CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal "
 639         "must have a URI!");
 640     return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
 641   }
 642
 643   // Automatic loads are not allowed from certain protocols.
 644   if (aFlags &
 645       nsIScriptSecurityManager::LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT) {
 646     nsresult rv = DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(
 647         sourceURI,
 648         nsIProtocolHandler::URI_FORBIDS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT);
 649     NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 650   }
 651
 652   // If either URI is a nested URI, get the base URI
 653   nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> sourceBaseURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(sourceURI);
 654   nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> targetBaseURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(aTargetURI);
 655
 656   //-- get the target scheme
 657   nsAutoCString targetScheme;
 658   nsresult rv = targetBaseURI->GetScheme(targetScheme);
 659   if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
 660
 661   //-- Some callers do not allow loading javascript:
 662   if ((aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT) &&
 663       targetScheme.EqualsLiteral("javascript")) {
 664     return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
 665   }
 666
 667   // Check for uris that are only loadable by principals that subsume them
 668   bool targetURIIsLoadableBySubsumers = false;
 669   rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(targetBaseURI,
 670                            nsIProtocolHandler::URI_LOADABLE_BY_SUBSUMERS,
 671                            &targetURIIsLoadableBySubsumers);
 672   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 673
 674   if (targetURIIsLoadableBySubsumers) {
 675     // check nothing else in the URI chain has flags that prevent
 676     // access:
 677     rv = CheckLoadURIFlags(
 678         sourceURI, aTargetURI, sourceBaseURI, targetBaseURI, aFlags,
 679         aPrincipal->OriginAttributesRef().mPrivateBrowsingId > 0,
 680         aInnerWindowID);
 681     NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 682     // Check the principal is allowed to load the target.
 683     if (aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::DONT_REPORT_ERRORS) {
 684       return aPrincipal->CheckMayLoad(targetBaseURI, false);
 685     }
 686     return aPrincipal->CheckMayLoadWithReporting(targetBaseURI, false,
 687                                                  aInnerWindowID);
 688   }
 689
 690   //-- get the source scheme
 691   nsAutoCString sourceScheme;
 692   rv = sourceBaseURI->GetScheme(sourceScheme);
 693   if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
 694
 695   if (sourceScheme.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral(NS_NULLPRINCIPAL_SCHEME)) {
 696     // A null principal can target its own URI.
 697     if (sourceURI == aTargetURI) {
 698       return NS_OK;
 699     }
 700   } else if (sourceScheme.EqualsIgnoreCase("file") &&
 701              targetScheme.EqualsIgnoreCase("moz-icon")) {
 702     // exception for file: linking to moz-icon://.ext?size=...
 703     // Note that because targetScheme is the base (innermost) URI scheme,
 704     // this does NOT allow file -> moz-icon:file:///... links.
 705     // This is intentional.
 706     return NS_OK;
 707   }
 708
 709   // Check for webextension
 710   bool targetURIIsLoadableByExtensions = false;
 711   rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aTargetURI,
 712                            nsIProtocolHandler::URI_LOADABLE_BY_EXTENSIONS,
 713                            &targetURIIsLoadableByExtensions);
 714   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 715
 716   if (targetURIIsLoadableByExtensions &&
 717       BasePrincipal::Cast(aPrincipal)->AddonPolicy()) {
 718     return NS_OK;
 719   }
 720
 721   // If we get here, check all the schemes can link to each other, from the top
 722   // down:
 723   nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> currentURI = sourceURI;
 724   nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> currentOtherURI = aTargetURI;
 725
 726   bool denySameSchemeLinks = false;
 727   rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aTargetURI,
 728                            nsIProtocolHandler::URI_SCHEME_NOT_SELF_LINKABLE,
 729                            &denySameSchemeLinks);
 730   if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
 731
 732   while (currentURI && currentOtherURI) {
 733     nsAutoCString scheme, otherScheme;
 734     currentURI->GetScheme(scheme);
 735     currentOtherURI->GetScheme(otherScheme);
 736
 737     bool schemesMatch =
 738         scheme.Equals(otherScheme, nsCaseInsensitiveCStringComparator);
 739     bool isSamePage = false;
 740     // about: URIs are special snowflakes.
 741     if (scheme.EqualsLiteral("about") && schemesMatch) {
 742       nsAutoCString moduleName, otherModuleName;
 743       // about: pages can always link to themselves:
 744       isSamePage =
 745           NS_SUCCEEDED(NS_GetAboutModuleName(currentURI, moduleName)) &&
 746           NS_SUCCEEDED(
 747               NS_GetAboutModuleName(currentOtherURI, otherModuleName)) &&
 748           moduleName.Equals(otherModuleName);
 749       if (!isSamePage) {
 750         // We will have allowed the load earlier if the source page has
 751         // system principal. So we know the source has a content
 752         // principal, and it's trying to link to something else.
 753         // Linkable about: pages are always reachable, even if we hit
 754         // the CheckLoadURIFlags call below.
 755         // We punch only 1 other hole: iff the source is unlinkable,
 756         // we let them link to other pages explicitly marked SAFE
 757         // for content. This avoids world-linkable about: pages linking
 758         // to non-world-linkable about: pages.
 759         nsCOMPtr<nsIAboutModule> module, otherModule;
 760         bool knowBothModules =
 761             NS_SUCCEEDED(
 762                 NS_GetAboutModule(currentURI, getter_AddRefs(module))) &&
 763             NS_SUCCEEDED(NS_GetAboutModule(currentOtherURI,
 764                                            getter_AddRefs(otherModule)));
 765         uint32_t aboutModuleFlags = 0;
 766         uint32_t otherAboutModuleFlags = 0;
 767         knowBothModules =
 768             knowBothModules &&
 769             NS_SUCCEEDED(module->GetURIFlags(currentURI, &aboutModuleFlags)) &&
 770             NS_SUCCEEDED(otherModule->GetURIFlags(currentOtherURI,
 771                                                   &otherAboutModuleFlags));
 772         if (knowBothModules) {
 773           isSamePage = !(aboutModuleFlags & nsIAboutModule::MAKE_LINKABLE) &&
 774                        (otherAboutModuleFlags &
 775                         nsIAboutModule::URI_SAFE_FOR_UNTRUSTED_CONTENT);
 776           if (isSamePage &&
 777               otherAboutModuleFlags & nsIAboutModule::MAKE_LINKABLE) {
 778             // XXXgijs: this is a hack. The target will be nested
 779             // (with innerURI of moz-safe-about:whatever), and
 780             // the source isn't, so we won't pass if we finish
 781             // the loop. We *should* pass, though, so return here.
 782             // This hack can go away when bug 1228118 is fixed.
 783             return NS_OK;
 784           }
 785         }
 786       }
 787     } else {
 788       bool equalExceptRef = false;
 789       rv = currentURI->EqualsExceptRef(currentOtherURI, &equalExceptRef);
 790       isSamePage = NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && equalExceptRef;
 791     }
 792
 793     // If schemes are not equal, or they're equal but the target URI
 794     // is different from the source URI and doesn't always allow linking
 795     // from the same scheme, check if the URI flags of the current target
 796     // URI allow the current source URI to link to it.
 797     // The policy is specified by the protocol flags on both URIs.
 798     if (!schemesMatch || (denySameSchemeLinks && !isSamePage)) {
 799       return CheckLoadURIFlags(
 800           currentURI, currentOtherURI, sourceBaseURI, targetBaseURI, aFlags,
 801           aPrincipal->OriginAttributesRef().mPrivateBrowsingId > 0,
 802           aInnerWindowID);
 803     }
 804     // Otherwise... check if we can nest another level:
 805     nsCOMPtr<nsINestedURI> nestedURI = do_QueryInterface(currentURI);
 806     nsCOMPtr<nsINestedURI> nestedOtherURI = do_QueryInterface(currentOtherURI);
 807
 808     // If schemes match and neither URI is nested further, we're OK.
 809     if (!nestedURI && !nestedOtherURI) {
 810       return NS_OK;
 811     }
 812     // If one is nested and the other isn't, something is wrong.
 813     if (!nestedURI != !nestedOtherURI) {
 814       return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
 815     }
 816     // Otherwise, both should be nested and we'll go through the loop again.
 817     nestedURI->GetInnerURI(getter_AddRefs(currentURI));
 818     nestedOtherURI->GetInnerURI(getter_AddRefs(currentOtherURI));
 819   }
 820
 821   // We should never get here. We should always return from inside the loop.
 822   return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
 823 }
 824
 825 /**
 826  * Helper method to check whether the target URI and its innermost ("base") URI
 827  * has protocol flags that should stop it from being loaded by the source URI
 828  * (and/or the source URI's innermost ("base") URI), taking into account any
 829  * nsIScriptSecurityManager flags originally passed to
 830  * CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal and friends.
 831  *
 832  * @return if success, access is allowed. Otherwise, deny access
 833  */
 834 nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIFlags(
 835     nsIURI* aSourceURI, nsIURI* aTargetURI, nsIURI* aSourceBaseURI,
 836     nsIURI* aTargetBaseURI, uint32_t aFlags, bool aFromPrivateWindow,
 837     uint64_t aInnerWindowID) {
 838   // Note that the order of policy checks here is very important!
 839   // We start from most restrictive and work our way down.
 840   bool reportErrors = !(aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::DONT_REPORT_ERRORS);
 841   const char* errorTag = "CheckLoadURIError";
 842
 843   nsAutoCString targetScheme;
 844   nsresult rv = aTargetBaseURI->GetScheme(targetScheme);
 845   if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
 846
 847   // Check for system target URI
 848   rv = DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(aTargetURI,
 849                                nsIProtocolHandler::URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD);
 850   if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
 851     // Deny access, since the origin principal is not system
 852     if (reportErrors) {
 853       ReportError(errorTag, aSourceURI, aTargetURI, aFromPrivateWindow,
 854                   aInnerWindowID);
 855     }
 856     return rv;
 857   }
 858
 859   // Used by ExtensionProtocolHandler to prevent loading extension resources
 860   // in private contexts if the extension does not have permission.
 861   if (aFromPrivateWindow) {
 862     rv = DenyAccessIfURIHasFlags(
 863         aTargetURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_DISALLOW_IN_PRIVATE_CONTEXT);
 864     if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
 865       if (reportErrors) {
 866         ReportError(errorTag, aSourceURI, aTargetURI, aFromPrivateWindow,
 867                     aInnerWindowID);
 868       }
 869       return rv;
 870     }
 871   }
 872
 873   // Check for chrome target URI
 874   bool targetURIIsUIResource = false;
 875   rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aTargetURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE,
 876                            &targetURIIsUIResource);
 877   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 878   if (targetURIIsUIResource) {
 879     // ALLOW_CHROME is a flag that we pass on all loads _except_ docshell
 880     // loads (since docshell loads run the loaded content with its origin
 881     // principal). We are effectively allowing resource:// and chrome://
 882     // URIs to load as long as they are content accessible and as long
 883     // they're not loading it as a document.
 884     if (aFlags & nsIScriptSecurityManager::ALLOW_CHROME) {
 885       bool sourceIsUIResource = false;
 886       rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aSourceBaseURI,
 887                                nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE,
 888                                &sourceIsUIResource);
 889       NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 890       if (sourceIsUIResource) {
 891         // TODO Bug 1654488: Remove pref in CheckLoadURIFlags which
 892         // allows all UI resources to load
 893         if (StaticPrefs::
 894                 security_caps_allow_uri_is_ui_resource_in_checkloaduriflags()) {
 895           return NS_OK;
 896         }
 897         // Special case for moz-icon URIs loaded by a local resources like
 898         // e.g. chrome: or resource:
 899         if (targetScheme.EqualsLiteral("moz-icon")) {
 900           return NS_OK;
 901         }
 902       }
 903
 904       if (targetScheme.EqualsLiteral("resource")) {
 905         if (StaticPrefs::security_all_resource_uri_content_accessible()) {
 906           return NS_OK;
 907         }
 908
 909         nsCOMPtr<nsIProtocolHandler> ph;
 910         rv = sIOService->GetProtocolHandler("resource", getter_AddRefs(ph));
 911         NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 912         if (!ph) {
 913           return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
 914         }
 915
 916         nsCOMPtr<nsIResProtocolHandler> rph = do_QueryInterface(ph);
 917         if (!rph) {
 918           return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
 919         }
 920
 921         bool accessAllowed = false;
 922         rph->AllowContentToAccess(aTargetBaseURI, &accessAllowed);
 923         if (accessAllowed) {
 924           return NS_OK;
 925         }
 926       } else if (targetScheme.EqualsLiteral("chrome")) {
 927         // Allow the load only if the chrome package is allowlisted.
 928         nsCOMPtr<nsIXULChromeRegistry> reg(
 929             do_GetService(NS_CHROMEREGISTRY_CONTRACTID));
 930         if (reg) {
 931           bool accessAllowed = false;
 932           reg->AllowContentToAccess(aTargetBaseURI, &accessAllowed);
 933           if (accessAllowed) {
 934             return NS_OK;
 935           }
 936         }
 937       } else if (targetScheme.EqualsLiteral("moz-page-thumb")) {
 938         if (XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
 939           return NS_OK;
 940         }
 941
 942         auto& remoteType = dom::ContentChild::GetSingleton()->GetRemoteType();
 943         if (remoteType == PRIVILEGEDABOUT_REMOTE_TYPE) {
 944           return NS_OK;
 945         }
 946       }
 947     }
 948
 949     if (reportErrors) {
 950       ReportError(errorTag, aSourceURI, aTargetURI, aFromPrivateWindow,
 951                   aInnerWindowID);
 952     }
 953     return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
 954   }
 955
 956   // Check for target URI pointing to a file
 957   bool targetURIIsLocalFile = false;
 958   rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aTargetURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_LOCAL_FILE,
 959                            &targetURIIsLocalFile);
 960   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
 961   if (targetURIIsLocalFile) {
 962     // Allow domains that were allowlisted in the prefs. In 99.9% of cases,
 963     // this array is empty.
 964     bool isAllowlisted;
 965     MOZ_ALWAYS_SUCCEEDS(InFileURIAllowlist(aSourceURI, &isAllowlisted));
 966     if (isAllowlisted) {
 967       return NS_OK;
 968     }
 969
 970     // Allow chrome://
 971     if (aSourceBaseURI->SchemeIs("chrome")) {
 972       return NS_OK;
 973     }
 974
 975     // Nothing else.
 976     if (reportErrors) {
 977       ReportError(errorTag, aSourceURI, aTargetURI, aFromPrivateWindow,
 978                   aInnerWindowID);
 979     }
 980     return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
 981   }
 982
 983 #ifdef DEBUG
 984   {
 985     // Everyone is allowed to load this. The case URI_LOADABLE_BY_SUBSUMERS
 986     // is handled by the caller which is just delegating to us as a helper.
 987     bool hasSubsumersFlag = false;
 988     NS_URIChainHasFlags(aTargetBaseURI,
 989                         nsIProtocolHandler::URI_LOADABLE_BY_SUBSUMERS,
 990                         &hasSubsumersFlag);
 991     bool hasLoadableByAnyone = false;
 992     NS_URIChainHasFlags(aTargetBaseURI,
 993                         nsIProtocolHandler::URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE,
 994                         &hasLoadableByAnyone);
 995     MOZ_ASSERT(hasLoadableByAnyone || hasSubsumersFlag,
 996                "why do we get here and do not have any of the two flags set?");
 997   }
 998 #endif
 999
1000   return NS_OK;
1001 }
1002
1003 nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::ReportError(const char* aMessageTag,
1004                                               const nsACString& aSourceSpec,
1005                                               const nsACString& aTargetSpec,
1006                                               bool aFromPrivateWindow,
1007                                               uint64_t aInnerWindowID) {
1008   if (aSourceSpec.IsEmpty() || aTargetSpec.IsEmpty()) {
1009     return NS_OK;
1010   }
1011
1012   nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundle> bundle = BundleHelper::GetOrCreate();
1013   if (NS_WARN_IF(!bundle)) {
1014     return NS_OK;
1015   }
1016
1017   // Localize the error message
1018   nsAutoString message;
1019   AutoTArray<nsString, 2> formatStrings;
1020   CopyASCIItoUTF16(aSourceSpec, *formatStrings.AppendElement());
1021   CopyASCIItoUTF16(aTargetSpec, *formatStrings.AppendElement());
1022   nsresult rv =
1023       bundle->FormatStringFromName(aMessageTag, formatStrings, message);
1024   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1025
1026   nsCOMPtr<nsIConsoleService> console(
1027       do_GetService(NS_CONSOLESERVICE_CONTRACTID));
1028   NS_ENSURE_TRUE(console, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
1029   nsCOMPtr<nsIScriptError> error(do_CreateInstance(NS_SCRIPTERROR_CONTRACTID));
1030   NS_ENSURE_TRUE(error, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
1031
1032   // using category of "SOP" so we can link to MDN
1033   if (aInnerWindowID != 0) {
1034     rv = error->InitWithWindowID(
1035         message, u""_ns, u""_ns, 0, 0, nsIScriptError::errorFlag, "SOP"_ns,
1036         aInnerWindowID, true /* From chrome context */);
1037   } else {
1038     rv = error->Init(message, u""_ns, u""_ns, 0, 0, nsIScriptError::errorFlag,
1039                      "SOP", aFromPrivateWindow, true /* From chrome context */);
1040   }
1041   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1042   console->LogMessage(error);
1043   return NS_OK;
1044 }
1045
1046 nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::ReportError(const char* aMessageTag,
1047                                               nsIURI* aSource, nsIURI* aTarget,
1048                                               bool aFromPrivateWindow,
1049                                               uint64_t aInnerWindowID) {
1050   NS_ENSURE_TRUE(aSource && aTarget, NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER);
1051
1052   // Get the source URL spec
1053   nsAutoCString sourceSpec;
1054   nsresult rv = aSource->GetAsciiSpec(sourceSpec);
1055   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1056
1057   // Get the target URL spec
1058   nsAutoCString targetSpec;
1059   rv = aTarget->GetAsciiSpec(targetSpec);
1060   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1061
1062   return ReportError(aMessageTag, sourceSpec, targetSpec, aFromPrivateWindow,
1063                      aInnerWindowID);
1064 }
1065
1066 NS_IMETHODIMP
1067 nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIStrWithPrincipal(
1068     nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, const nsACString& aTargetURIStr,
1069     uint32_t aFlags) {
1070   nsresult rv;
1071   nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> target;
1072   rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(target), aTargetURIStr);
1073   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1074
1075   rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(aPrincipal, target, aFlags, 0);
1076   if (rv == NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI) {
1077     // Don't warn because NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI is one of the expected
1078     // return values.
1079     return rv;
1080   }
1081   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1082
1083   // Now start testing fixup -- since aTargetURIStr is a string, not
1084   // an nsIURI, we may well end up fixing it up before loading.
1085   // Note: This needs to stay in sync with the nsIURIFixup api.
1086   nsCOMPtr<nsIURIFixup> fixup = components::URIFixup::Service();
1087   if (!fixup) {
1088     return rv;
1089   }
1090
1091   // URIFixup's keyword and alternate flags can only fixup to http/https, so we
1092   // can skip testing them. This simplifies our life because this code can be
1093   // invoked from the content process where the search service would not be
1094   // available.
1095   uint32_t flags[] = {nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAG_NONE,
1096                       nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAG_FIX_SCHEME_TYPOS};
1097   for (uint32_t i = 0; i < ArrayLength(flags); ++i) {
1098     uint32_t fixupFlags = flags[i];
1099     if (aPrincipal->OriginAttributesRef().mPrivateBrowsingId > 0) {
1100       fixupFlags |= nsIURIFixup::FIXUP_FLAG_PRIVATE_CONTEXT;
1101     }
1102     nsCOMPtr<nsIURIFixupInfo> fixupInfo;
1103     rv = fixup->GetFixupURIInfo(aTargetURIStr, fixupFlags,
1104                                 getter_AddRefs(fixupInfo));
1105     NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1106     rv = fixupInfo->GetPreferredURI(getter_AddRefs(target));
1107     NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1108
1109     rv = CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(aPrincipal, target, aFlags, 0);
1110     if (rv == NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI) {
1111       // Don't warn because NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI is one of the expected
1112       // return values.
1113       return rv;
1114     }
1115     NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1116   }
1117
1118   return rv;
1119 }
1120
1121 NS_IMETHODIMP
1122 nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIWithPrincipalFromJS(
1123     nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, nsIURI* aTargetURI, uint32_t aFlags,
1124     uint64_t aInnerWindowID, JSContext* aCx) {
1125   MOZ_ASSERT(aPrincipal,
1126              "CheckLoadURIWithPrincipalFromJS must have a principal");
1127   NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aPrincipal);
1128   NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aTargetURI);
1129
1130   nsresult rv =
1131       CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(aPrincipal, aTargetURI, aFlags, aInnerWindowID);
1132   if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
1133     nsAutoCString uriStr;
1134     Unused << aTargetURI->GetSpec(uriStr);
1135
1136     nsAutoCString message("Load of ");
1137     message.Append(uriStr);
1138
1139     nsAutoCString principalStr;
1140     Unused << aPrincipal->GetSpec(principalStr);
1141     if (!principalStr.IsEmpty()) {
1142       message.AppendPrintf(" from %s", principalStr.get());
1143     }
1144
1145     message.Append(" denied");
1146
1147     dom::Throw(aCx, rv, message);
1148   }
1149
1150   return rv;
1151 }
1152
1153 NS_IMETHODIMP
1154 nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckLoadURIStrWithPrincipalFromJS(
1155     nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, const nsACString& aTargetURIStr, uint32_t aFlags,
1156     JSContext* aCx) {
1157   nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> targetURI;
1158   MOZ_TRY(NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(targetURI), aTargetURIStr));
1159
1160   return CheckLoadURIWithPrincipalFromJS(aPrincipal, targetURI, aFlags, 0, aCx);
1161 }
1162
1163 NS_IMETHODIMP
1164 nsScriptSecurityManager::InFileURIAllowlist(nsIURI* aUri, bool* aResult) {
1165   MOZ_ASSERT(aUri);
1166   MOZ_ASSERT(aResult);
1167
1168   *aResult = false;
1169   for (nsIURI* uri : EnsureFileURIAllowlist()) {
1170     if (EqualOrSubdomain(aUri, uri)) {
1171       *aResult = true;
1172       return NS_OK;
1173     }
1174   }
1175
1176   return NS_OK;
1177 }
1178
1179 ///////////////// Principals ///////////////////////
1180
1181 NS_IMETHODIMP
1182 nsScriptSecurityManager::GetSystemPrincipal(nsIPrincipal** result) {
1183   NS_ADDREF(*result = mSystemPrincipal);
1184
1185   return NS_OK;
1186 }
1187
1188 NS_IMETHODIMP
1189 nsScriptSecurityManager::CreateContentPrincipal(
1190     nsIURI* aURI, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aOriginAttributes, JSContext* aCx,
1191     nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) {
1192   OriginAttributes attrs;
1193   if (!aOriginAttributes.isObject() || !attrs.Init(aCx, aOriginAttributes)) {
1194     return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
1195   }
1196   nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin =
1197       BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(aURI, attrs);
1198   prin.forget(aPrincipal);
1199   return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
1200 }
1201
1202 NS_IMETHODIMP
1203 nsScriptSecurityManager::CreateContentPrincipalFromOrigin(
1204     const nsACString& aOrigin, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) {
1205   if (StringBeginsWith(aOrigin, "["_ns)) {
1206     return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
1207   }
1208
1209   if (StringBeginsWith(aOrigin,
1210                        nsLiteralCString(NS_NULLPRINCIPAL_SCHEME ":"))) {
1211     return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
1212   }
1213
1214   nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin = BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(aOrigin);
1215   prin.forget(aPrincipal);
1216   return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
1217 }
1218
1219 NS_IMETHODIMP
1220 nsScriptSecurityManager::PrincipalToJSON(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
1221                                          nsACString& aJSON) {
1222   aJSON.Truncate();
1223   if (!aPrincipal) {
1224     return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
1225   }
1226
1227   BasePrincipal::Cast(aPrincipal)->ToJSON(aJSON);
1228
1229   if (aJSON.IsEmpty()) {
1230     return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
1231   }
1232
1233   return NS_OK;
1234 }
1235
1236 NS_IMETHODIMP
1237 nsScriptSecurityManager::JSONToPrincipal(const nsACString& aJSON,
1238                                          nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) {
1239   if (aJSON.IsEmpty()) {
1240     return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
1241   }
1242
1243   nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal = BasePrincipal::FromJSON(aJSON);
1244
1245   if (!principal) {
1246     return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
1247   }
1248
1249   principal.forget(aPrincipal);
1250   return NS_OK;
1251 }
1252
1253 NS_IMETHODIMP
1254 nsScriptSecurityManager::CreateNullPrincipal(
1255     JS::Handle<JS::Value> aOriginAttributes, JSContext* aCx,
1256     nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) {
1257   OriginAttributes attrs;
1258   if (!aOriginAttributes.isObject() || !attrs.Init(aCx, aOriginAttributes)) {
1259     return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
1260   }
1261   nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin = NullPrincipal::Create(attrs);
1262   prin.forget(aPrincipal);
1263   return NS_OK;
1264 }
1265
1266 NS_IMETHODIMP
1267 nsScriptSecurityManager::GetLoadContextContentPrincipal(
1268     nsIURI* aURI, nsILoadContext* aLoadContext, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) {
1269   NS_ENSURE_STATE(aLoadContext);
1270   OriginAttributes docShellAttrs;
1271   aLoadContext->GetOriginAttributes(docShellAttrs);
1272
1273   nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin =
1274       BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(aURI, docShellAttrs);
1275   prin.forget(aPrincipal);
1276   return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
1277 }
1278
1279 NS_IMETHODIMP
1280 nsScriptSecurityManager::GetDocShellContentPrincipal(
1281     nsIURI* aURI, nsIDocShell* aDocShell, nsIPrincipal** aPrincipal) {
1282   nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin = BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(
1283       aURI, nsDocShell::Cast(aDocShell)->GetOriginAttributes());
1284   prin.forget(aPrincipal);
1285   return *aPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
1286 }
1287
1288 NS_IMETHODIMP
1289 nsScriptSecurityManager::PrincipalWithOA(
1290     nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, JS::Handle<JS::Value> aOriginAttributes,
1291     JSContext* aCx, nsIPrincipal** aReturnPrincipal) {
1292   if (!aPrincipal) {
1293     return NS_OK;
1294   }
1295   if (aPrincipal->GetIsContentPrincipal()) {
1296     OriginAttributes attrs;
1297     if (!aOriginAttributes.isObject() || !attrs.Init(aCx, aOriginAttributes)) {
1298       return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
1299     }
1300     RefPtr<ContentPrincipal> copy = new ContentPrincipal();
1301     auto* contentPrincipal = static_cast<ContentPrincipal*>(aPrincipal);
1302     nsresult rv = copy->Init(contentPrincipal, attrs);
1303     NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1304     copy.forget(aReturnPrincipal);
1305   } else {
1306     // We do this for null principals, system principals (both fine)
1307     // ... and expanded principals, where we should probably do something
1308     // cleverer, but I also don't think we care too much.
1309     nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin = aPrincipal;
1310     prin.forget(aReturnPrincipal);
1311   }
1312
1313   return *aReturnPrincipal ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
1314 }
1315
1316 NS_IMETHODIMP
1317 nsScriptSecurityManager::CanCreateWrapper(JSContext* cx, const nsIID& aIID,
1318                                           nsISupports* aObj,
1319                                           nsIClassInfo* aClassInfo) {
1320   // XXX Special case for Exception ?
1321
1322   // We give remote-XUL allowlisted domains a free pass here. See bug 932906.
1323   JS::Rooted<JS::Realm*> contextRealm(cx, JS::GetCurrentRealmOrNull(cx));
1324   MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(contextRealm);
1325   if (!xpc::AllowContentXBLScope(contextRealm)) {
1326     return NS_OK;
1327   }
1328
1329   if (nsContentUtils::IsCallerChrome()) {
1330     return NS_OK;
1331   }
1332
1333   //-- Access denied, report an error
1334   nsAutoCString originUTF8;
1335   nsIPrincipal* subjectPrincipal = nsContentUtils::SubjectPrincipal();
1336   GetPrincipalDomainOrigin(subjectPrincipal, originUTF8);
1337   NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 originUTF16(originUTF8);
1338   nsAutoCString classInfoNameUTF8;
1339   if (aClassInfo) {
1340     aClassInfo->GetClassDescription(classInfoNameUTF8);
1341   }
1342   if (classInfoNameUTF8.IsEmpty()) {
1343     classInfoNameUTF8.AssignLiteral("UnnamedClass");
1344   }
1345
1346   nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundle> bundle = BundleHelper::GetOrCreate();
1347   if (NS_WARN_IF(!bundle)) {
1348     return NS_OK;
1349   }
1350
1351   NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 classInfoUTF16(classInfoNameUTF8);
1352   nsresult rv;
1353   nsAutoString errorMsg;
1354   if (originUTF16.IsEmpty()) {
1355     AutoTArray<nsString, 1> formatStrings = {classInfoUTF16};
1356     rv = bundle->FormatStringFromName("CreateWrapperDenied", formatStrings,
1357                                       errorMsg);
1358   } else {
1359     AutoTArray<nsString, 2> formatStrings = {classInfoUTF16, originUTF16};
1360     rv = bundle->FormatStringFromName("CreateWrapperDeniedForOrigin",
1361                                       formatStrings, errorMsg);
1362   }
1363   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1364
1365   SetPendingException(cx, errorMsg.get());
1366   return NS_ERROR_DOM_XPCONNECT_ACCESS_DENIED;
1367 }
1368
1369 NS_IMETHODIMP
1370 nsScriptSecurityManager::CanCreateInstance(JSContext* cx, const nsCID& aCID) {
1371   if (nsContentUtils::IsCallerChrome()) {
1372     return NS_OK;
1373   }
1374
1375   //-- Access denied, report an error
1376   nsAutoCString errorMsg("Permission denied to create instance of class. CID=");
1377   char cidStr[NSID_LENGTH];
1378   aCID.ToProvidedString(cidStr);
1379   errorMsg.Append(cidStr);
1380   SetPendingExceptionASCII(cx, errorMsg.get());
1381   return NS_ERROR_DOM_XPCONNECT_ACCESS_DENIED;
1382 }
1383
1384 NS_IMETHODIMP
1385 nsScriptSecurityManager::CanGetService(JSContext* cx, const nsCID& aCID) {
1386   if (nsContentUtils::IsCallerChrome()) {
1387     return NS_OK;
1388   }
1389
1390   //-- Access denied, report an error
1391   nsAutoCString errorMsg("Permission denied to get service. CID=");
1392   char cidStr[NSID_LENGTH];
1393   aCID.ToProvidedString(cidStr);
1394   errorMsg.Append(cidStr);
1395   SetPendingExceptionASCII(cx, errorMsg.get());
1396   return NS_ERROR_DOM_XPCONNECT_ACCESS_DENIED;
1397 }
1398
1399 const char sJSEnabledPrefName[] = "javascript.enabled";
1400 const char sFileOriginPolicyPrefName[] =
1401     "security.fileuri.strict_origin_policy";
1402
1403 static const char* kObservedPrefs[] = {sJSEnabledPrefName,
1404                                        sFileOriginPolicyPrefName,
1405                                        "capability.policy.", nullptr};
1406
1407 /////////////////////////////////////////////
1408 // Constructor, Destructor, Initialization //
1409 /////////////////////////////////////////////
1410 nsScriptSecurityManager::nsScriptSecurityManager(void)
1411     : mPrefInitialized(false), mIsJavaScriptEnabled(false) {
1412   static_assert(
1413       sizeof(intptr_t) == sizeof(void*),
1414       "intptr_t and void* have different lengths on this platform. "
1415       "This may cause a security failure with the SecurityLevel union.");
1416 }
1417
1418 nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::Init() {
1419   nsresult rv = CallGetService(NS_IOSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &sIOService);
1420   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1421
1422   InitPrefs();
1423
1424   // Create our system principal singleton
1425   RefPtr<SystemPrincipal> system = SystemPrincipal::Create();
1426
1427   mSystemPrincipal = system;
1428
1429   return NS_OK;
1430 }
1431
1432 void nsScriptSecurityManager::InitJSCallbacks(JSContext* aCx) {
1433   //-- Register security check callback in the JS engine
1434   //   Currently this is used to control access to function.caller
1435
1436   static const JSSecurityCallbacks securityCallbacks = {
1437       ContentSecurityPolicyPermitsJSAction,
1438       JSPrincipalsSubsume,
1439   };
1440
1441   MOZ_ASSERT(!JS_GetSecurityCallbacks(aCx));
1442   JS_SetSecurityCallbacks(aCx, &securityCallbacks);
1443   JS_InitDestroyPrincipalsCallback(aCx, nsJSPrincipals::Destroy);
1444
1445   JS_SetTrustedPrincipals(aCx, BasePrincipal::Cast(mSystemPrincipal));
1446 }
1447
1448 /* static */
1449 void nsScriptSecurityManager::ClearJSCallbacks(JSContext* aCx) {
1450   JS_SetSecurityCallbacks(aCx, nullptr);
1451   JS_SetTrustedPrincipals(aCx, nullptr);
1452 }
1453
1454 static StaticRefPtr<nsScriptSecurityManager> gScriptSecMan;
1455
1456 nsScriptSecurityManager::~nsScriptSecurityManager(void) {
1457   Preferences::UnregisterPrefixCallbacks(
1458       nsScriptSecurityManager::ScriptSecurityPrefChanged, kObservedPrefs, this);
1459   if (mDomainPolicy) {
1460     mDomainPolicy->Deactivate();
1461   }
1462   // ContentChild might hold a reference to the domain policy,
1463   // and it might release it only after the security manager is
1464   // gone. But we can still assert this for the main process.
1465   MOZ_ASSERT_IF(XRE_IsParentProcess(), !mDomainPolicy);
1466 }
1467
1468 void nsScriptSecurityManager::Shutdown() {
1469   NS_IF_RELEASE(sIOService);
1470   BundleHelper::Shutdown();
1471 }
1472
1473 nsScriptSecurityManager* nsScriptSecurityManager::GetScriptSecurityManager() {
1474   return gScriptSecMan;
1475 }
1476
1477 /* static */
1478 void nsScriptSecurityManager::InitStatics() {
1479   RefPtr<nsScriptSecurityManager> ssManager = new nsScriptSecurityManager();
1480   nsresult rv = ssManager->Init();
1481   if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
1482     MOZ_CRASH("ssManager->Init() failed");
1483   }
1484
1485   ClearOnShutdown(&gScriptSecMan);
1486   gScriptSecMan = ssManager;
1487 }
1488
1489 // Currently this nsGenericFactory constructor is used only from FastLoad
1490 // (XPCOM object deserialization) code, when "creating" the system principal
1491 // singleton.
1492 already_AddRefed<SystemPrincipal>
1493 nsScriptSecurityManager::SystemPrincipalSingletonConstructor() {
1494   if (gScriptSecMan)
1495     return do_AddRef(gScriptSecMan->mSystemPrincipal)
1496         .downcast<SystemPrincipal>();
1497   return nullptr;
1498 }
1499
1500 struct IsWhitespace {
1501   static bool Test(char aChar) { return NS_IsAsciiWhitespace(aChar); };
1502 };
1503 struct IsWhitespaceOrComma {
1504   static bool Test(char aChar) {
1505     return aChar == ',' || NS_IsAsciiWhitespace(aChar);
1506   };
1507 };
1508
1509 template <typename Predicate>
1510 uint32_t SkipPast(const nsCString& str, uint32_t base) {
1511   while (base < str.Length() && Predicate::Test(str[base])) {
1512     ++base;
1513   }
1514   return base;
1515 }
1516
1517 template <typename Predicate>
1518 uint32_t SkipUntil(const nsCString& str, uint32_t base) {
1519   while (base < str.Length() && !Predicate::Test(str[base])) {
1520     ++base;
1521   }
1522   return base;
1523 }
1524
1525 // static
1526 void nsScriptSecurityManager::ScriptSecurityPrefChanged(const char* aPref,
1527                                                         void* aSelf) {
1528   static_cast<nsScriptSecurityManager*>(aSelf)->ScriptSecurityPrefChanged(
1529       aPref);
1530 }
1531
1532 inline void nsScriptSecurityManager::ScriptSecurityPrefChanged(
1533     const char* aPref) {
1534   MOZ_ASSERT(mPrefInitialized);
1535   mIsJavaScriptEnabled =
1536       Preferences::GetBool(sJSEnabledPrefName, mIsJavaScriptEnabled);
1537   sStrictFileOriginPolicy =
1538       Preferences::GetBool(sFileOriginPolicyPrefName, false);
1539   mFileURIAllowlist.reset();
1540 }
1541
1542 void nsScriptSecurityManager::AddSitesToFileURIAllowlist(
1543     const nsCString& aSiteList) {
1544   for (uint32_t base = SkipPast<IsWhitespace>(aSiteList, 0), bound = 0;
1545        base < aSiteList.Length();
1546        base = SkipPast<IsWhitespace>(aSiteList, bound)) {
1547     // Grab the current site.
1548     bound = SkipUntil<IsWhitespace>(aSiteList, base);
1549     nsAutoCString site(Substring(aSiteList, base, bound - base));
1550
1551     // Check if the URI is schemeless. If so, add both http and https.
1552     nsAutoCString unused;
1553     if (NS_FAILED(sIOService->ExtractScheme(site, unused))) {
1554       AddSitesToFileURIAllowlist("http://"_ns + site);
1555       AddSitesToFileURIAllowlist("https://"_ns + site);
1556       continue;
1557     }
1558
1559     // Convert it to a URI and add it to our list.
1560     nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
1561     nsresult rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(uri), site);
1562     if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
1563       mFileURIAllowlist.ref().AppendElement(uri);
1564     } else {
1565       nsCOMPtr<nsIConsoleService> console(
1566           do_GetService("@mozilla.org/consoleservice;1"));
1567       if (console) {
1568         nsAutoString msg =
1569             u"Unable to to add site to file:// URI allowlist: "_ns +
1570             NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16(site);
1571         console->LogStringMessage(msg.get());
1572       }
1573     }
1574   }
1575 }
1576
1577 nsresult nsScriptSecurityManager::InitPrefs() {
1578   nsIPrefBranch* branch = Preferences::GetRootBranch();
1579   NS_ENSURE_TRUE(branch, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
1580
1581   mPrefInitialized = true;
1582
1583   // Set the initial value of the "javascript.enabled" prefs
1584   ScriptSecurityPrefChanged();
1585
1586   // set observer callbacks in case the value of the prefs change
1587   Preferences::RegisterPrefixCallbacks(
1588       nsScriptSecurityManager::ScriptSecurityPrefChanged, kObservedPrefs, this);
1589
1590   return NS_OK;
1591 }
1592
1593 NS_IMETHODIMP
1594 nsScriptSecurityManager::GetDomainPolicyActive(bool* aRv) {
1595   *aRv = !!mDomainPolicy;
1596   return NS_OK;
1597 }
1598
1599 NS_IMETHODIMP
1600 nsScriptSecurityManager::ActivateDomainPolicy(nsIDomainPolicy** aRv) {
1601   if (!XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
1602     return NS_ERROR_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE;
1603   }
1604
1605   return ActivateDomainPolicyInternal(aRv);
1606 }
1607
1608 NS_IMETHODIMP
1609 nsScriptSecurityManager::ActivateDomainPolicyInternal(nsIDomainPolicy** aRv) {
1610   // We only allow one domain policy at a time. The holder of the previous
1611   // policy must explicitly deactivate it first.
1612   if (mDomainPolicy) {
1613     return NS_ERROR_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE;
1614   }
1615
1616   mDomainPolicy = new DomainPolicy();
1617   nsCOMPtr<nsIDomainPolicy> ptr = mDomainPolicy;
1618   ptr.forget(aRv);
1619   return NS_OK;
1620 }
1621
1622 // Intentionally non-scriptable. Script must have a reference to the
1623 // nsIDomainPolicy to deactivate it.
1624 void nsScriptSecurityManager::DeactivateDomainPolicy() {
1625   mDomainPolicy = nullptr;
1626 }
1627
1628 void nsScriptSecurityManager::CloneDomainPolicy(DomainPolicyClone* aClone) {
1629   MOZ_ASSERT(aClone);
1630   if (mDomainPolicy) {
1631     mDomainPolicy->CloneDomainPolicy(aClone);
1632   } else {
1633     aClone->active() = false;
1634   }
1635 }
1636
1637 NS_IMETHODIMP
1638 nsScriptSecurityManager::PolicyAllowsScript(nsIURI* aURI, bool* aRv) {
1639   nsresult rv;
1640
1641   // Compute our rule. If we don't have any domain policy set up that might
1642   // provide exceptions to this rule, we're done.
1643   *aRv = mIsJavaScriptEnabled;
1644   if (!mDomainPolicy) {
1645     return NS_OK;
1646   }
1647
1648   // We have a domain policy. Grab the appropriate set of exceptions to the
1649   // rule (either the blocklist or the allowlist, depending on whether script
1650   // is enabled or disabled by default).
1651   nsCOMPtr<nsIDomainSet> exceptions;
1652   nsCOMPtr<nsIDomainSet> superExceptions;
1653   if (*aRv) {
1654     mDomainPolicy->GetBlocklist(getter_AddRefs(exceptions));
1655     mDomainPolicy->GetSuperBlocklist(getter_AddRefs(superExceptions));
1656   } else {
1657     mDomainPolicy->GetAllowlist(getter_AddRefs(exceptions));
1658     mDomainPolicy->GetSuperAllowlist(getter_AddRefs(superExceptions));
1659   }
1660
1661   bool contains;
1662   rv = exceptions->Contains(aURI, &contains);
1663   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1664   if (contains) {
1665     *aRv = !*aRv;
1666     return NS_OK;
1667   }
1668   rv = superExceptions->ContainsSuperDomain(aURI, &contains);
1669   NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
1670   if (contains) {
1671     *aRv = !*aRv;
1672   }
1673
1674   return NS_OK;
1675 }
1676
1677 const nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIURI>>&
1678 nsScriptSecurityManager::EnsureFileURIAllowlist() {
1679   if (mFileURIAllowlist.isSome()) {
1680     return mFileURIAllowlist.ref();
1681   }
1682
1683   //
1684   // Rebuild the set of principals for which we allow file:// URI loads. This
1685   // implements a small subset of an old pref-based CAPS people that people
1686   // have come to depend on. See bug 995943.
1687   //
1688
1689   mFileURIAllowlist.emplace();
1690   nsAutoCString policies;
1691   mozilla::Preferences::GetCString("capability.policy.policynames", policies);
1692   for (uint32_t base = SkipPast<IsWhitespaceOrComma>(policies, 0), bound = 0;
1693        base < policies.Length();
1694        base = SkipPast<IsWhitespaceOrComma>(policies, bound)) {
1695     // Grab the current policy name.
1696     bound = SkipUntil<IsWhitespaceOrComma>(policies, base);
1697     auto policyName = Substring(policies, base, bound - base);
1698
1699     // Figure out if this policy allows loading file:// URIs. If not, we can
1700     // skip it.
1701     nsCString checkLoadURIPrefName =
1702         "capability.policy."_ns + policyName + ".checkloaduri.enabled"_ns;
1703     nsAutoString value;
1704     nsresult rv = Preferences::GetString(checkLoadURIPrefName.get(), value);
1705     if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !value.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("allaccess")) {
1706       continue;
1707     }
1708
1709     // Grab the list of domains associated with this policy.
1710     nsCString domainPrefName =
1711         "capability.policy."_ns + policyName + ".sites"_ns;
1712     nsAutoCString siteList;
1713     Preferences::GetCString(domainPrefName.get(), siteList);
1714     AddSitesToFileURIAllowlist(siteList);
1715   }
1716
1717   return mFileURIAllowlist.ref();
1718 }