Ignore machine-check MSRs
[freebsd-src/fkvm-freebsd.git] / sys / kern / subr_acl_posix1e.c
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1 /*-
2 * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 Robert N. M. Watson
3 * All rights reserved.
5 * This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project.
7 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9 * are met:
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
14 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
16 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
17 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
18 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
19 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
20 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
21 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
22 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
23 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
24 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
25 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
26 * SUCH DAMAGE.
29 * Developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
31 * ACL support routines specific to POSIX.1e access control lists. These are
32 * utility routines for code common across file systems implementing POSIX.1e
33 * ACLs.
36 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
37 __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
39 #include <sys/param.h>
40 #include <sys/systm.h>
41 #include <sys/mount.h>
42 #include <sys/priv.h>
43 #include <sys/vnode.h>
44 #include <sys/errno.h>
45 #include <sys/stat.h>
46 #include <sys/acl.h>
49 * Implement a version of vaccess() that understands POSIX.1e ACL semantics;
50 * the access ACL has already been prepared for evaluation by the file system
51 * and is passed via 'uid', 'gid', and 'acl'. Return 0 on success, else an
52 * errno value.
54 int
55 vaccess_acl_posix1e(enum vtype type, uid_t file_uid, gid_t file_gid,
56 struct acl *acl, mode_t acc_mode, struct ucred *cred, int *privused)
58 struct acl_entry *acl_other, *acl_mask;
59 mode_t dac_granted;
60 mode_t priv_granted;
61 mode_t acl_mask_granted;
62 int group_matched, i;
65 * Look for a normal, non-privileged way to access the file/directory
66 * as requested. If it exists, go with that. Otherwise, attempt to
67 * use privileges granted via priv_granted. In some cases, which
68 * privileges to use may be ambiguous due to "best match", in which
69 * case fall back on first match for the time being.
71 if (privused != NULL)
72 *privused = 0;
75 * Determine privileges now, but don't apply until we've found a DAC
76 * entry that matches but has failed to allow access.
78 * XXXRW: Ideally, we'd determine the privileges required before
79 * asking for them.
81 priv_granted = 0;
83 if (type == VDIR) {
84 if ((acc_mode & VEXEC) && !priv_check_cred(cred,
85 PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP, 0))
86 priv_granted |= VEXEC;
87 } else {
88 if ((acc_mode & VEXEC) && !priv_check_cred(cred,
89 PRIV_VFS_EXEC, 0))
90 priv_granted |= VEXEC;
93 if ((acc_mode & VREAD) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_READ, 0))
94 priv_granted |= VREAD;
96 if (((acc_mode & VWRITE) || (acc_mode & VAPPEND)) &&
97 !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_WRITE, 0))
98 priv_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
100 if ((acc_mode & VADMIN) && !priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN, 0))
101 priv_granted |= VADMIN;
104 * The owner matches if the effective uid associated with the
105 * credential matches that of the ACL_USER_OBJ entry. While we're
106 * doing the first scan, also cache the location of the ACL_MASK and
107 * ACL_OTHER entries, preventing some future iterations.
109 acl_mask = acl_other = NULL;
110 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
111 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
112 case ACL_USER_OBJ:
113 if (file_uid != cred->cr_uid)
114 break;
115 dac_granted = 0;
116 dac_granted |= VADMIN;
117 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
118 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
119 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
120 dac_granted |= VREAD;
121 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
122 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
123 if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
124 return (0);
127 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here.
129 if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) ==
130 acc_mode) {
131 if (privused != NULL)
132 *privused = 1;
133 return (0);
135 goto error;
137 case ACL_MASK:
138 acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i];
139 break;
141 case ACL_OTHER:
142 acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i];
143 break;
145 default:
146 break;
151 * An ACL_OTHER entry should always exist in a valid access ACL. If
152 * it doesn't, then generate a serious failure. For now, this means
153 * a debugging message and EPERM, but in the future should probably
154 * be a panic.
156 if (acl_other == NULL) {
158 * XXX This should never happen
160 printf("vaccess_acl_posix1e: ACL_OTHER missing\n");
161 return (EPERM);
165 * Checks against ACL_USER, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, and ACL_GROUP fields are
166 * masked by an ACL_MASK entry, if any. As such, first identify the
167 * ACL_MASK field, then iterate through identifying potential user
168 * matches, then group matches. If there is no ACL_MASK, assume that
169 * the mask allows all requests to succeed.
171 if (acl_mask != NULL) {
172 acl_mask_granted = 0;
173 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
174 acl_mask_granted |= VEXEC;
175 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
176 acl_mask_granted |= VREAD;
177 if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
178 acl_mask_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
179 } else
180 acl_mask_granted = VEXEC | VREAD | VWRITE | VAPPEND;
183 * Check ACL_USER ACL entries. There will either be one or no
184 * matches; if there is one, we accept or rejected based on the
185 * match; otherwise, we continue on to groups.
187 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
188 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
189 case ACL_USER:
190 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != cred->cr_uid)
191 break;
192 dac_granted = 0;
193 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
194 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
195 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
196 dac_granted |= VREAD;
197 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
198 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
199 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
200 if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
201 return (0);
203 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here.
205 if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) !=
206 acc_mode)
207 goto error;
209 if (privused != NULL)
210 *privused = 1;
211 return (0);
216 * Group match is best-match, not first-match, so find a "best"
217 * match. Iterate across, testing each potential group match. Make
218 * sure we keep track of whether we found a match or not, so that we
219 * know if we should try again with any available privilege, or if we
220 * should move on to ACL_OTHER.
222 group_matched = 0;
223 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
224 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
225 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
226 if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred))
227 break;
228 dac_granted = 0;
229 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
230 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
231 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
232 dac_granted |= VREAD;
233 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
234 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
235 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
237 if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
238 return (0);
240 group_matched = 1;
241 break;
243 case ACL_GROUP:
244 if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id, cred))
245 break;
246 dac_granted = 0;
247 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
248 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
249 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
250 dac_granted |= VREAD;
251 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
252 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
253 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
255 if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
256 return (0);
258 group_matched = 1;
259 break;
261 default:
262 break;
266 if (group_matched == 1) {
268 * There was a match, but it did not grant rights via pure
269 * DAC. Try again, this time with privilege.
271 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
272 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
273 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
274 if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred))
275 break;
276 dac_granted = 0;
277 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
278 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
279 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
280 dac_granted |= VREAD;
281 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
282 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
283 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
286 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here.
288 if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | priv_granted))
289 != acc_mode)
290 break;
292 if (privused != NULL)
293 *privused = 1;
294 return (0);
296 case ACL_GROUP:
297 if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id,
298 cred))
299 break;
300 dac_granted = 0;
301 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
302 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
303 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
304 dac_granted |= VREAD;
305 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
306 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
307 dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
310 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here.
312 if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | priv_granted))
313 != acc_mode)
314 break;
316 if (privused != NULL)
317 *privused = 1;
318 return (0);
320 default:
321 break;
325 * Even with privilege, group membership was not sufficient.
326 * Return failure.
328 goto error;
332 * Fall back on ACL_OTHER. ACL_MASK is not applied to ACL_OTHER.
334 dac_granted = 0;
335 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
336 dac_granted |= VEXEC;
337 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
338 dac_granted |= VREAD;
339 if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
340 dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
342 if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
343 return (0);
345 * XXXRW: Do privilege lookup here.
347 if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | priv_granted)) == acc_mode) {
348 if (privused != NULL)
349 *privused = 1;
350 return (0);
353 error:
354 return ((acc_mode & VADMIN) ? EPERM : EACCES);
358 * For the purposes of filesystems maintaining the _OBJ entries in an inode
359 * with a mode_t field, this routine converts a mode_t entry to an
360 * acl_perm_t.
362 acl_perm_t
363 acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(acl_tag_t tag, mode_t mode)
365 acl_perm_t perm = 0;
367 switch(tag) {
368 case ACL_USER_OBJ:
369 if (mode & S_IXUSR)
370 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
371 if (mode & S_IRUSR)
372 perm |= ACL_READ;
373 if (mode & S_IWUSR)
374 perm |= ACL_WRITE;
375 return (perm);
377 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
378 if (mode & S_IXGRP)
379 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
380 if (mode & S_IRGRP)
381 perm |= ACL_READ;
382 if (mode & S_IWGRP)
383 perm |= ACL_WRITE;
384 return (perm);
386 case ACL_OTHER:
387 if (mode & S_IXOTH)
388 perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
389 if (mode & S_IROTH)
390 perm |= ACL_READ;
391 if (mode & S_IWOTH)
392 perm |= ACL_WRITE;
393 return (perm);
395 default:
396 printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag);
397 return (0);
402 * Given inode information (uid, gid, mode), return an acl entry of the
403 * appropriate type.
405 struct acl_entry
406 acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry(acl_tag_t tag, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
408 struct acl_entry acl_entry;
410 acl_entry.ae_tag = tag;
411 acl_entry.ae_perm = acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(tag, mode);
412 switch(tag) {
413 case ACL_USER_OBJ:
414 acl_entry.ae_id = uid;
415 break;
417 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
418 acl_entry.ae_id = gid;
419 break;
421 case ACL_OTHER:
422 acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
423 break;
425 default:
426 acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
427 printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag);
430 return (acl_entry);
434 * Utility function to generate a file mode given appropriate ACL entries.
436 mode_t
437 acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(struct acl_entry *acl_user_obj_entry,
438 struct acl_entry *acl_group_obj_entry, struct acl_entry *acl_other_entry)
440 mode_t mode;
442 mode = 0;
443 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
444 mode |= S_IXUSR;
445 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
446 mode |= S_IRUSR;
447 if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
448 mode |= S_IWUSR;
449 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
450 mode |= S_IXGRP;
451 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
452 mode |= S_IRGRP;
453 if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
454 mode |= S_IWGRP;
455 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
456 mode |= S_IXOTH;
457 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
458 mode |= S_IROTH;
459 if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
460 mode |= S_IWOTH;
462 return (mode);
466 * Utility function to generate a file mode given a complete POSIX.1e access
467 * ACL. Note that if the ACL is improperly formed, this may result in a
468 * panic.
470 mode_t
471 acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(struct acl *acl)
473 struct acl_entry *acl_mask, *acl_user_obj, *acl_group_obj, *acl_other;
474 int i;
477 * Find the ACL entries relevant to a POSIX permission mode.
479 acl_user_obj = acl_group_obj = acl_other = acl_mask = NULL;
480 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
481 switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
482 case ACL_USER_OBJ:
483 acl_user_obj = &acl->acl_entry[i];
484 break;
486 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
487 acl_group_obj = &acl->acl_entry[i];
488 break;
490 case ACL_OTHER:
491 acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i];
492 break;
494 case ACL_MASK:
495 acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i];
496 break;
498 case ACL_USER:
499 case ACL_GROUP:
500 break;
502 default:
503 panic("acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode: bad ae_tag");
507 if (acl_user_obj == NULL || acl_group_obj == NULL || acl_other == NULL)
508 panic("acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode: missing base ae_tags");
511 * POSIX.1e specifies that if there is an ACL_MASK entry, we replace
512 * the mode "group" bits with its permissions. If there isn't, we
513 * use the ACL_GROUP_OBJ permissions.
515 if (acl_mask != NULL)
516 return (acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(acl_user_obj, acl_mask,
517 acl_other));
518 else
519 return (acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(acl_user_obj, acl_group_obj,
520 acl_other));
524 * Perform a syntactic check of the ACL, sufficient to allow an implementing
525 * filesystem to determine if it should accept this and rely on the POSIX.1e
526 * ACL properties.
529 acl_posix1e_check(struct acl *acl)
531 int num_acl_user_obj, num_acl_user, num_acl_group_obj, num_acl_group;
532 int num_acl_mask, num_acl_other, i;
535 * Verify that the number of entries does not exceed the maximum
536 * defined for acl_t.
538 * Verify that the correct number of various sorts of ae_tags are
539 * present:
540 * Exactly one ACL_USER_OBJ
541 * Exactly one ACL_GROUP_OBJ
542 * Exactly one ACL_OTHER
543 * If any ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP entries appear, then exactly one
544 * ACL_MASK entry must also appear.
546 * Verify that all ae_perm entries are in ACL_PERM_BITS.
548 * Verify all ae_tag entries are understood by this implementation.
550 * Note: Does not check for uniqueness of qualifier (ae_id) field.
552 num_acl_user_obj = num_acl_user = num_acl_group_obj = num_acl_group =
553 num_acl_mask = num_acl_other = 0;
554 if (acl->acl_cnt > ACL_MAX_ENTRIES || acl->acl_cnt < 0)
555 return (EINVAL);
556 for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
558 * Check for a valid tag.
560 switch(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
561 case ACL_USER_OBJ:
562 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
563 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
564 return (EINVAL);
565 num_acl_user_obj++;
566 break;
567 case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
568 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
569 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
570 return (EINVAL);
571 num_acl_group_obj++;
572 break;
573 case ACL_USER:
574 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
575 return (EINVAL);
576 num_acl_user++;
577 break;
578 case ACL_GROUP:
579 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
580 return (EINVAL);
581 num_acl_group++;
582 break;
583 case ACL_OTHER:
584 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
585 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
586 return (EINVAL);
587 num_acl_other++;
588 break;
589 case ACL_MASK:
590 acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
591 if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
592 return (EINVAL);
593 num_acl_mask++;
594 break;
595 default:
596 return (EINVAL);
599 * Check for valid perm entries.
601 if ((acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm | ACL_PERM_BITS) !=
602 ACL_PERM_BITS)
603 return (EINVAL);
605 if ((num_acl_user_obj != 1) || (num_acl_group_obj != 1) ||
606 (num_acl_other != 1) || (num_acl_mask != 0 && num_acl_mask != 1))
607 return (EINVAL);
608 if (((num_acl_group != 0) || (num_acl_user != 0)) &&
609 (num_acl_mask != 1))
610 return (EINVAL);
611 return (0);
615 * Given a requested mode for a new object, and a default ACL, combine the
616 * two to produce a new mode. Be careful not to clear any bits that aren't
617 * intended to be affected by the POSIX.1e ACL. Eventually, this might also
618 * take the cmask as an argument, if we push that down into
619 * per-filesystem-code.
621 mode_t
622 acl_posix1e_newfilemode(mode_t cmode, struct acl *dacl)
624 mode_t mode;
626 mode = cmode;
628 * The current composition policy is that a permission bit must be
629 * set in *both* the ACL and the requested creation mode for it to
630 * appear in the resulting mode/ACL. First clear any possibly
631 * effected bits, then reconstruct.
633 mode &= ACL_PRESERVE_MASK;
634 mode |= (ACL_OVERRIDE_MASK & cmode & acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(dacl));
636 return (mode);