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x86_64: prepare shared kernel/hpet.c
[firewire-audio.git] / security / selinux / hooks.c
blob0753b20e23fed48c80f4864b67fbe476de8daced
1 /*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
14 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
16 * Paul Moore, <paul.moore@hp.com>
17 *
18 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
19 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
20 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
21 */
22
23 #include <linux/module.h>
24 #include <linux/init.h>
25 #include <linux/kernel.h>
26 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
27 #include <linux/errno.h>
28 #include <linux/sched.h>
29 #include <linux/security.h>
30 #include <linux/xattr.h>
31 #include <linux/capability.h>
32 #include <linux/unistd.h>
33 #include <linux/mm.h>
34 #include <linux/mman.h>
35 #include <linux/slab.h>
36 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
37 #include <linux/swap.h>
38 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
39 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
40 #include <linux/file.h>
41 #include <linux/namei.h>
42 #include <linux/mount.h>
43 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
44 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
45 #include <linux/kd.h>
46 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
48 #include <linux/tty.h>
49 #include <net/icmp.h>
50 #include <net/ip.h> /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */
51 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
52 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
53 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
54 #include <linux/bitops.h>
55 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
56 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
57 #include <linux/netlink.h>
58 #include <linux/tcp.h>
59 #include <linux/udp.h>
60 #include <linux/dccp.h>
61 #include <linux/quota.h>
62 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
63 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
64 #include <linux/parser.h>
65 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
66 #include <net/ipv6.h>
67 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
68 #include <linux/personality.h>
69 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
70 #include <linux/audit.h>
71 #include <linux/string.h>
72 #include <linux/selinux.h>
73 #include <linux/mutex.h>
74
75 #include "avc.h"
76 #include "objsec.h"
77 #include "netif.h"
78 #include "xfrm.h"
79 #include "netlabel.h"
80
81 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
82 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
83
84 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
85 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
86 extern int selinux_compat_net;
87
88 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
89 int selinux_enforcing = 0;
90
91 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
92 {
93 selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0);
94 return 1;
95 }
96 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
97 #endif
98
99 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
100 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
101
102 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
103 {
104 selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
105 return 1;
106 }
107 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
108 #else
109 int selinux_enabled = 1;
110 #endif
111
112 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
113 static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL;
114
115 /* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
116 just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
117 The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
118 module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
119 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
120
121 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
122 before the policy was loaded. */
123 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
124 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
125
126 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
127
128 /* Return security context for a given sid or just the context
129 length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */
130 static int selinux_getsecurity(u32 sid, void *buffer, size_t size)
131 {
132 char *context;
133 unsigned len;
134 int rc;
135
136 rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
137 if (rc)
138 return rc;
139
140 if (!buffer || !size)
141 goto getsecurity_exit;
142
143 if (size < len) {
144 len = -ERANGE;
145 goto getsecurity_exit;
146 }
147 memcpy(buffer, context, len);
148
149 getsecurity_exit:
150 kfree(context);
151 return len;
152 }
153
154 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
155
156 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
157 {
158 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
159
160 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
161 if (!tsec)
162 return -ENOMEM;
163
164 tsec->task = task;
165 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
166 task->security = tsec;
167
168 return 0;
169 }
170
171 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
172 {
173 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
174 task->security = NULL;
175 kfree(tsec);
176 }
177
178 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
179 {
180 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
181 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
182
183 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
184 if (!isec)
185 return -ENOMEM;
186
187 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
188 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
189 isec->inode = inode;
190 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
191 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
192 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
193 inode->i_security = isec;
194
195 return 0;
196 }
197
198 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
199 {
200 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
201 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
202
203 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
204 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
205 list_del_init(&isec->list);
206 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
207
208 inode->i_security = NULL;
209 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
210 }
211
212 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
213 {
214 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
215 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
216
217 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
218 if (!fsec)
219 return -ENOMEM;
220
221 fsec->file = file;
222 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
223 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
224 file->f_security = fsec;
225
226 return 0;
227 }
228
229 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
230 {
231 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
232 file->f_security = NULL;
233 kfree(fsec);
234 }
235
236 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
237 {
238 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
239
240 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
241 if (!sbsec)
242 return -ENOMEM;
243
244 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
245 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
246 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
247 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
248 sbsec->sb = sb;
249 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
250 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
251 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
252 sb->s_security = sbsec;
253
254 return 0;
255 }
256
257 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
258 {
259 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
260
261 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
262 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
263 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
264 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
265
266 sb->s_security = NULL;
267 kfree(sbsec);
268 }
269
270 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
271 {
272 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
273
274 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
275 if (!ssec)
276 return -ENOMEM;
277
278 ssec->sk = sk;
279 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
280 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
281 sk->sk_security = ssec;
282
283 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(ssec, family);
284
285 return 0;
286 }
287
288 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
289 {
290 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
291
292 sk->sk_security = NULL;
293 kfree(ssec);
294 }
295
296 /* The security server must be initialized before
297 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
298 extern int ss_initialized;
299
300 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
301
302 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
303 "uses xattr",
304 "uses transition SIDs",
305 "uses task SIDs",
306 "uses genfs_contexts",
307 "not configured for labeling",
308 "uses mountpoint labeling",
309 };
310
311 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
312
313 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
314 {
315 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
316 }
317
318 enum {
319 Opt_error = -1,
320 Opt_context = 1,
321 Opt_fscontext = 2,
322 Opt_defcontext = 4,
323 Opt_rootcontext = 8,
324 };
325
326 static match_table_t tokens = {
327 {Opt_context, "context=%s"},
328 {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
329 {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
330 {Opt_rootcontext, "rootcontext=%s"},
331 {Opt_error, NULL},
332 };
333
334 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
335
336 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
337 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
338 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
339 {
340 int rc;
341
342 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
343 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
344 if (rc)
345 return rc;
346
347 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
348 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
349 return rc;
350 }
351
352 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
353 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
354 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
355 {
356 int rc;
357 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
358 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
359 if (rc)
360 return rc;
361
362 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
363 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
364 return rc;
365 }
366
367 static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
368 {
369 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
370 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
371 const char *name;
372 u32 sid;
373 int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0;
374 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
375 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
376
377 if (!data)
378 goto out;
379
380 name = sb->s_type->name;
381
382 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
383
384 /* NFS we understand. */
385 if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) {
386 struct nfs_mount_data *d = data;
387
388 if (d->version < NFS_MOUNT_VERSION)
389 goto out;
390
391 if (d->context[0]) {
392 context = d->context;
393 seen |= Opt_context;
394 }
395 } else
396 goto out;
397
398 } else {
399 /* Standard string-based options. */
400 char *p, *options = data;
401
402 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
403 int token;
404 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
405
406 if (!*p)
407 continue;
408
409 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
410
411 switch (token) {
412 case Opt_context:
413 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
414 rc = -EINVAL;
415 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
416 goto out_free;
417 }
418 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
419 if (!context) {
420 rc = -ENOMEM;
421 goto out_free;
422 }
423 if (!alloc)
424 alloc = 1;
425 seen |= Opt_context;
426 break;
427
428 case Opt_fscontext:
429 if (seen & Opt_fscontext) {
430 rc = -EINVAL;
431 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
432 goto out_free;
433 }
434 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
435 if (!fscontext) {
436 rc = -ENOMEM;
437 goto out_free;
438 }
439 if (!alloc)
440 alloc = 1;
441 seen |= Opt_fscontext;
442 break;
443
444 case Opt_rootcontext:
445 if (seen & Opt_rootcontext) {
446 rc = -EINVAL;
447 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
448 goto out_free;
449 }
450 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
451 if (!rootcontext) {
452 rc = -ENOMEM;
453 goto out_free;
454 }
455 if (!alloc)
456 alloc = 1;
457 seen |= Opt_rootcontext;
458 break;
459
460 case Opt_defcontext:
461 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
462 rc = -EINVAL;
463 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: "
464 "defcontext option is invalid "
465 "for this filesystem type\n");
466 goto out_free;
467 }
468 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
469 rc = -EINVAL;
470 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
471 goto out_free;
472 }
473 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
474 if (!defcontext) {
475 rc = -ENOMEM;
476 goto out_free;
477 }
478 if (!alloc)
479 alloc = 1;
480 seen |= Opt_defcontext;
481 break;
482
483 default:
484 rc = -EINVAL;
485 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount "
486 "option\n");
487 goto out_free;
488
489 }
490 }
491 }
492
493 if (!seen)
494 goto out;
495
496 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
497 if (fscontext) {
498 rc = security_context_to_sid(fscontext, strlen(fscontext), &sid);
499 if (rc) {
500 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
501 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
502 fscontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
503 goto out_free;
504 }
505
506 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
507 if (rc)
508 goto out_free;
509
510 sbsec->sid = sid;
511 }
512
513 /*
514 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
515 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
516 * the superblock context if not already set.
517 */
518 if (context) {
519 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid);
520 if (rc) {
521 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
522 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
523 context, sb->s_id, name, rc);
524 goto out_free;
525 }
526
527 if (!fscontext) {
528 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
529 if (rc)
530 goto out_free;
531 sbsec->sid = sid;
532 } else {
533 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
534 if (rc)
535 goto out_free;
536 }
537 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
538
539 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
540 }
541
542 if (rootcontext) {
543 struct inode *inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
544 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
545 rc = security_context_to_sid(rootcontext, strlen(rootcontext), &sid);
546 if (rc) {
547 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
548 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
549 rootcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
550 goto out_free;
551 }
552
553 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
554 if (rc)
555 goto out_free;
556
557 isec->sid = sid;
558 isec->initialized = 1;
559 }
560
561 if (defcontext) {
562 rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid);
563 if (rc) {
564 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
565 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
566 defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
567 goto out_free;
568 }
569
570 if (sid == sbsec->def_sid)
571 goto out_free;
572
573 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
574 if (rc)
575 goto out_free;
576
577 sbsec->def_sid = sid;
578 }
579
580 out_free:
581 if (alloc) {
582 kfree(context);
583 kfree(defcontext);
584 kfree(fscontext);
585 kfree(rootcontext);
586 }
587 out:
588 return rc;
589 }
590
591 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
592 {
593 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
594 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
595 struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
596 int rc = 0;
597
598 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
599 if (sbsec->initialized)
600 goto out;
601
602 if (!ss_initialized) {
603 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
604 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
605 server is ready to handle calls. */
606 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
607 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
608 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
609 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
610 goto out;
611 }
612
613 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
614 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
615 if (rc) {
616 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
617 __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
618 goto out;
619 }
620
621 rc = try_context_mount(sb, data);
622 if (rc)
623 goto out;
624
625 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
626 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
627 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
628 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
629 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
630 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
631 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
632 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
633 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
634 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
635 goto out;
636 }
637 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
638 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
639 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
640 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
641 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
642 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
643 else
644 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
645 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
646 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
647 goto out;
648 }
649 }
650
651 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
652 sbsec->proc = 1;
653
654 sbsec->initialized = 1;
655
656 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) {
657 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
658 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
659 }
660 else {
661 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
662 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
663 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
664 }
665
666 /* Initialize the root inode. */
667 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root);
668
669 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
670 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
671 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
672 populates itself. */
673 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
674 next_inode:
675 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
676 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
677 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
678 struct inode_security_struct, list);
679 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
680 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
681 inode = igrab(inode);
682 if (inode) {
683 if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode))
684 inode_doinit(inode);
685 iput(inode);
686 }
687 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
688 list_del_init(&isec->list);
689 goto next_inode;
690 }
691 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
692 out:
693 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
694 return rc;
695 }
696
697 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
698 {
699 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
700 case S_IFSOCK:
701 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
702 case S_IFLNK:
703 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
704 case S_IFREG:
705 return SECCLASS_FILE;
706 case S_IFBLK:
707 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
708 case S_IFDIR:
709 return SECCLASS_DIR;
710 case S_IFCHR:
711 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
712 case S_IFIFO:
713 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
714
715 }
716
717 return SECCLASS_FILE;
718 }
719
720 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
721 {
722 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
723 }
724
725 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
726 {
727 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
728 }
729
730 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
731 {
732 switch (family) {
733 case PF_UNIX:
734 switch (type) {
735 case SOCK_STREAM:
736 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
737 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
738 case SOCK_DGRAM:
739 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
740 }
741 break;
742 case PF_INET:
743 case PF_INET6:
744 switch (type) {
745 case SOCK_STREAM:
746 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
747 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
748 else
749 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
750 case SOCK_DGRAM:
751 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
752 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
753 else
754 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
755 case SOCK_DCCP:
756 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
757 default:
758 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
759 }
760 break;
761 case PF_NETLINK:
762 switch (protocol) {
763 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
764 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
765 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
766 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
767 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
768 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
769 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
770 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
771 case NETLINK_XFRM:
772 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
773 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
774 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
775 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
776 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
777 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
778 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
779 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
780 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
781 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
782 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
783 default:
784 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
785 }
786 case PF_PACKET:
787 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
788 case PF_KEY:
789 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
790 case PF_APPLETALK:
791 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
792 }
793
794 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
795 }
796
797 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
798 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
799 u16 tclass,
800 u32 *sid)
801 {
802 int buflen, rc;
803 char *buffer, *path, *end;
804
805 buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
806 if (!buffer)
807 return -ENOMEM;
808
809 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
810 end = buffer+buflen;
811 *--end = '\0';
812 buflen--;
813 path = end-1;
814 *path = '/';
815 while (de && de != de->parent) {
816 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
817 if (buflen < 0)
818 break;
819 end -= de->namelen;
820 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
821 *--end = '/';
822 path = end;
823 de = de->parent;
824 }
825 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
826 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
827 return rc;
828 }
829 #else
830 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
831 u16 tclass,
832 u32 *sid)
833 {
834 return -EINVAL;
835 }
836 #endif
837
838 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
839 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
840 {
841 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
842 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
843 u32 sid;
844 struct dentry *dentry;
845 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
846 char *context = NULL;
847 unsigned len = 0;
848 int rc = 0;
849
850 if (isec->initialized)
851 goto out;
852
853 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
854 if (isec->initialized)
855 goto out_unlock;
856
857 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
858 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
859 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
860 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
861 server is ready to handle calls. */
862 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
863 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
864 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
865 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
866 goto out_unlock;
867 }
868
869 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
870 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
871 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
872 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
873 break;
874 }
875
876 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
877 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
878 if (opt_dentry) {
879 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
880 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
881 } else {
882 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
883 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
884 }
885 if (!dentry) {
886 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: no dentry for dev=%s "
887 "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
888 inode->i_ino);
889 goto out_unlock;
890 }
891
892 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
893 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
894 if (!context) {
895 rc = -ENOMEM;
896 dput(dentry);
897 goto out_unlock;
898 }
899 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
900 context, len);
901 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
902 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
903 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
904 NULL, 0);
905 if (rc < 0) {
906 dput(dentry);
907 goto out_unlock;
908 }
909 kfree(context);
910 len = rc;
911 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
912 if (!context) {
913 rc = -ENOMEM;
914 dput(dentry);
915 goto out_unlock;
916 }
917 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
918 XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
919 context, len);
920 }
921 dput(dentry);
922 if (rc < 0) {
923 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
924 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: getxattr returned "
925 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
926 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
927 kfree(context);
928 goto out_unlock;
929 }
930 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
931 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
932 rc = 0;
933 } else {
934 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
935 sbsec->def_sid);
936 if (rc) {
937 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: context_to_sid(%s) "
938 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
939 __FUNCTION__, context, -rc,
940 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
941 kfree(context);
942 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
943 rc = 0;
944 break;
945 }
946 }
947 kfree(context);
948 isec->sid = sid;
949 break;
950 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
951 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
952 break;
953 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
954 /* Default to the fs SID. */
955 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
956
957 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
958 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
959 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
960 sbsec->sid,
961 isec->sclass,
962 &sid);
963 if (rc)
964 goto out_unlock;
965 isec->sid = sid;
966 break;
967 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
968 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
969 break;
970 default:
971 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
972 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
973
974 if (sbsec->proc) {
975 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
976 if (proci->pde) {
977 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
978 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
979 isec->sclass,
980 &sid);
981 if (rc)
982 goto out_unlock;
983 isec->sid = sid;
984 }
985 }
986 break;
987 }
988
989 isec->initialized = 1;
990
991 out_unlock:
992 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
993 out:
994 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
995 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
996 return rc;
997 }
998
999 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1000 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1001 {
1002 u32 perm = 0;
1003
1004 switch (sig) {
1005 case SIGCHLD:
1006 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1007 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1008 break;
1009 case SIGKILL:
1010 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1011 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1012 break;
1013 case SIGSTOP:
1014 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1015 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1016 break;
1017 default:
1018 /* All other signals. */
1019 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1020 break;
1021 }
1022
1023 return perm;
1024 }
1025
1026 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1027 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1028 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1029 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1030 u32 perms)
1031 {
1032 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1033
1034 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1035 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1036 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1037 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1038 }
1039
1040 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1041 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1042 int cap)
1043 {
1044 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1045 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1046
1047 tsec = tsk->security;
1048
1049 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP);
1050 ad.tsk = tsk;
1051 ad.u.cap = cap;
1052
1053 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1054 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad);
1055 }
1056
1057 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1058 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1059 u32 perms)
1060 {
1061 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1062
1063 tsec = tsk->security;
1064
1065 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1066 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1067 }
1068
1069 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1070 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1071 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1072 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1073 struct inode *inode,
1074 u32 perms,
1075 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1076 {
1077 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1078 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1079 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1080
1081 if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (inode)))
1082 return 0;
1083
1084 tsec = tsk->security;
1085 isec = inode->i_security;
1086
1087 if (!adp) {
1088 adp = &ad;
1089 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1090 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1091 }
1092
1093 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1094 }
1095
1096 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1097 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1098 pathname if needed. */
1099 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1100 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1101 struct dentry *dentry,
1102 u32 av)
1103 {
1104 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1105 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1106 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1107 ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
1108 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1109 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1110 }
1111
1112 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1113 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1114 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1115 check a particular permission to the file.
1116 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1117 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1118 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1119 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1120 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1121 struct file *file,
1122 u32 av)
1123 {
1124 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1125 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1126 struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_path.mnt;
1127 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
1128 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1129 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1130 int rc;
1131
1132 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1133 ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
1134 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1135
1136 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1137 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1138 SECCLASS_FD,
1139 FD__USE,
1140 &ad);
1141 if (rc)
1142 return rc;
1143 }
1144
1145 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1146 if (av)
1147 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1148
1149 return 0;
1150 }
1151
1152 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1153 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1154 struct dentry *dentry,
1155 u16 tclass)
1156 {
1157 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1158 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1159 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1160 u32 newsid;
1161 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1162 int rc;
1163
1164 tsec = current->security;
1165 dsec = dir->i_security;
1166 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1167
1168 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1169 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1170
1171 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1172 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1173 &ad);
1174 if (rc)
1175 return rc;
1176
1177 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1178 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1179 } else {
1180 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1181 &newsid);
1182 if (rc)
1183 return rc;
1184 }
1185
1186 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1187 if (rc)
1188 return rc;
1189
1190 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1191 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1192 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1193 }
1194
1195 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1196 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1197 struct task_struct *ctx)
1198 {
1199 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1200
1201 tsec = ctx->security;
1202
1203 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1204 }
1205
1206 #define MAY_LINK 0
1207 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1208 #define MAY_RMDIR 2
1209
1210 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1211 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1212 struct dentry *dentry,
1213 int kind)
1214
1215 {
1216 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1217 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1218 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1219 u32 av;
1220 int rc;
1221
1222 tsec = current->security;
1223 dsec = dir->i_security;
1224 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1225
1226 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1227 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1228
1229 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1230 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1231 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1232 if (rc)
1233 return rc;
1234
1235 switch (kind) {
1236 case MAY_LINK:
1237 av = FILE__LINK;
1238 break;
1239 case MAY_UNLINK:
1240 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1241 break;
1242 case MAY_RMDIR:
1243 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1244 break;
1245 default:
1246 printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link: unrecognized kind %d\n", kind);
1247 return 0;
1248 }
1249
1250 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1251 return rc;
1252 }
1253
1254 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1255 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1256 struct inode *new_dir,
1257 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1258 {
1259 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1260 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1261 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1262 u32 av;
1263 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1264 int rc;
1265
1266 tsec = current->security;
1267 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1268 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1269 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1270 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1271
1272 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1273
1274 ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry;
1275 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1276 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1277 if (rc)
1278 return rc;
1279 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1280 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1281 if (rc)
1282 return rc;
1283 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1284 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1285 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1286 if (rc)
1287 return rc;
1288 }
1289
1290 ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry;
1291 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1292 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1293 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1294 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1295 if (rc)
1296 return rc;
1297 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1298 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1299 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1300 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1301 new_isec->sclass,
1302 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1303 if (rc)
1304 return rc;
1305 }
1306
1307 return 0;
1308 }
1309
1310 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1311 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1312 struct super_block *sb,
1313 u32 perms,
1314 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1315 {
1316 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1317 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1318
1319 tsec = tsk->security;
1320 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1321 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1322 perms, ad);
1323 }
1324
1325 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1326 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1327 {
1328 u32 av = 0;
1329
1330 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1331 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1332 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1333 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1334 av |= FILE__READ;
1335
1336 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1337 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1338 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1339 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1340
1341 } else {
1342 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1343 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1344 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1345 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1346 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1347 av |= DIR__READ;
1348 }
1349
1350 return av;
1351 }
1352
1353 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1354 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1355 {
1356 u32 av = 0;
1357
1358 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1359 av |= FILE__READ;
1360 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1361 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1362 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1363 else
1364 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1365 }
1366
1367 return av;
1368 }
1369
1370 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1371
1372 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
1373 {
1374 struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security;
1375 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1376 int rc;
1377
1378 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
1379 if (rc)
1380 return rc;
1381
1382 rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1383 /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */
1384 if (!(child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !rc)
1385 csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid;
1386 return rc;
1387 }
1388
1389 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1390 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1391 {
1392 int error;
1393
1394 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1395 if (error)
1396 return error;
1397
1398 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1399 }
1400
1401 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1402 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1403 {
1404 int error;
1405
1406 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1407 if (error)
1408 return error;
1409
1410 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1411 }
1412
1413 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1414 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1415 {
1416 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1417 }
1418
1419 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1420 {
1421 int rc;
1422
1423 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1424 if (rc)
1425 return rc;
1426
1427 return task_has_capability(tsk,cap);
1428 }
1429
1430 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1431 {
1432 int buflen, rc;
1433 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1434
1435 rc = -ENOMEM;
1436 buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1437 if (!buffer)
1438 goto out;
1439
1440 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1441 end = buffer+buflen;
1442 *--end = '\0';
1443 buflen--;
1444 path = end-1;
1445 *path = '/';
1446 while (table) {
1447 const char *name = table->procname;
1448 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1449 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1450 if (buflen < 0)
1451 goto out_free;
1452 end -= namelen;
1453 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1454 *--end = '/';
1455 path = end;
1456 table = table->parent;
1457 }
1458 buflen -= 4;
1459 if (buflen < 0)
1460 goto out_free;
1461 end -= 4;
1462 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1463 path = end;
1464 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1465 out_free:
1466 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1467 out:
1468 return rc;
1469 }
1470
1471 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1472 {
1473 int error = 0;
1474 u32 av;
1475 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1476 u32 tsid;
1477 int rc;
1478
1479 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1480 if (rc)
1481 return rc;
1482
1483 tsec = current->security;
1484
1485 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1486 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1487 if (rc) {
1488 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1489 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1490 }
1491
1492 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1493 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1494 if(op == 001) {
1495 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1496 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1497 } else {
1498 av = 0;
1499 if (op & 004)
1500 av |= FILE__READ;
1501 if (op & 002)
1502 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1503 if (av)
1504 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1505 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1506 }
1507
1508 return error;
1509 }
1510
1511 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1512 {
1513 int rc = 0;
1514
1515 if (!sb)
1516 return 0;
1517
1518 switch (cmds) {
1519 case Q_SYNC:
1520 case Q_QUOTAON:
1521 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
1522 case Q_SETINFO:
1523 case Q_SETQUOTA:
1524 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1525 sb,
1526 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1527 break;
1528 case Q_GETFMT:
1529 case Q_GETINFO:
1530 case Q_GETQUOTA:
1531 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1532 sb,
1533 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1534 break;
1535 default:
1536 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1537 break;
1538 }
1539 return rc;
1540 }
1541
1542 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1543 {
1544 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1545 }
1546
1547 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1548 {
1549 int rc;
1550
1551 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1552 if (rc)
1553 return rc;
1554
1555 switch (type) {
1556 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1557 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1558 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1559 break;
1560 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1561 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1562 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1563 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1564 break;
1565 case 0: /* Close log */
1566 case 1: /* Open log */
1567 case 2: /* Read from log */
1568 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1569 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1570 default:
1571 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1572 break;
1573 }
1574 return rc;
1575 }
1576
1577 /*
1578 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1579 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1580 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1581 *
1582 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1583 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1584 * the capability is granted.
1585 *
1586 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1587 * processes that allocate mappings.
1588 */
1589 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1590 {
1591 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1592 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1593
1594 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1595 if (rc == 0)
1596 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1597 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1598 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1599 0,
1600 NULL);
1601
1602 if (rc == 0)
1603 cap_sys_admin = 1;
1604
1605 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1606 }
1607
1608 /* binprm security operations */
1609
1610 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1611 {
1612 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1613
1614 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1615 if (!bsec)
1616 return -ENOMEM;
1617
1618 bsec->bprm = bprm;
1619 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1620 bsec->set = 0;
1621
1622 bprm->security = bsec;
1623 return 0;
1624 }
1625
1626 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1627 {
1628 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1629 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1630 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1631 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1632 u32 newsid;
1633 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1634 int rc;
1635
1636 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1637 if (rc)
1638 return rc;
1639
1640 bsec = bprm->security;
1641
1642 if (bsec->set)
1643 return 0;
1644
1645 tsec = current->security;
1646 isec = inode->i_security;
1647
1648 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1649 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1650
1651 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1652 tsec->create_sid = 0;
1653 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1654 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1655
1656 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1657 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1658 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1659 tsec->exec_sid = 0;
1660 } else {
1661 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1662 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1663 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1664 if (rc)
1665 return rc;
1666 }
1667
1668 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1669 ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_path.mnt;
1670 ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_path.dentry;
1671
1672 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1673 newsid = tsec->sid;
1674
1675 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1676 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1677 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
1678 if (rc)
1679 return rc;
1680 } else {
1681 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
1682 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
1683 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
1684 if (rc)
1685 return rc;
1686
1687 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
1688 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
1689 if (rc)
1690 return rc;
1691
1692 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
1693 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
1694
1695 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
1696 bsec->sid = newsid;
1697 }
1698
1699 bsec->set = 1;
1700 return 0;
1701 }
1702
1703 static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1704 {
1705 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
1706 }
1707
1708
1709 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1710 {
1711 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1712 int atsecure = 0;
1713
1714 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
1715 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
1716 the noatsecure permission is granted between
1717 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
1718 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
1719 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1720 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
1721 }
1722
1723 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
1724 }
1725
1726 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1727 {
1728 kfree(bprm->security);
1729 bprm->security = NULL;
1730 }
1731
1732 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
1733 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
1734
1735 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
1736 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
1737 {
1738 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1739 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
1740 struct tty_struct *tty;
1741 struct fdtable *fdt;
1742 long j = -1;
1743 int drop_tty = 0;
1744
1745 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
1746 tty = get_current_tty();
1747 if (tty) {
1748 file_list_lock();
1749 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
1750 if (file) {
1751 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
1752 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
1753 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
1754 file may belong to another process and we are only
1755 interested in the inode-based check here. */
1756 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1757 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
1758 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
1759 drop_tty = 1;
1760 }
1761 }
1762 file_list_unlock();
1763 }
1764 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
1765 /* Reset controlling tty. */
1766 if (drop_tty)
1767 no_tty();
1768
1769 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
1770
1771 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1772
1773 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1774 for (;;) {
1775 unsigned long set, i;
1776 int fd;
1777
1778 j++;
1779 i = j * __NFDBITS;
1780 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
1781 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
1782 break;
1783 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
1784 if (!set)
1785 continue;
1786 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1787 for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
1788 if (set & 1) {
1789 file = fget(i);
1790 if (!file)
1791 continue;
1792 if (file_has_perm(current,
1793 file,
1794 file_to_av(file))) {
1795 sys_close(i);
1796 fd = get_unused_fd();
1797 if (fd != i) {
1798 if (fd >= 0)
1799 put_unused_fd(fd);
1800 fput(file);
1801 continue;
1802 }
1803 if (devnull) {
1804 get_file(devnull);
1805 } else {
1806 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
1807 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
1808 devnull = NULL;
1809 put_unused_fd(fd);
1810 fput(file);
1811 continue;
1812 }
1813 }
1814 fd_install(fd, devnull);
1815 }
1816 fput(file);
1817 }
1818 }
1819 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1820
1821 }
1822 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1823 }
1824
1825 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
1826 {
1827 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1828 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1829 u32 sid;
1830 int rc;
1831
1832 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
1833
1834 tsec = current->security;
1835
1836 bsec = bprm->security;
1837 sid = bsec->sid;
1838
1839 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
1840 bsec->unsafe = 0;
1841 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
1842 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
1843 unchanged and kill. */
1844 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
1845 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1846 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
1847 if (rc) {
1848 bsec->unsafe = 1;
1849 return;
1850 }
1851 }
1852
1853 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
1854 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
1855 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
1856 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
1857 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
1858 NULL);
1859 if (rc) {
1860 bsec->unsafe = 1;
1861 return;
1862 }
1863 }
1864 tsec->sid = sid;
1865 }
1866 }
1867
1868 /*
1869 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
1870 */
1871 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1872 {
1873 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1874 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
1875 struct itimerval itimer;
1876 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1877 int rc, i;
1878
1879 tsec = current->security;
1880 bsec = bprm->security;
1881
1882 if (bsec->unsafe) {
1883 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
1884 return;
1885 }
1886 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
1887 return;
1888
1889 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
1890 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
1891
1892 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
1893 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
1894 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
1895 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
1896 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
1897 will be checked against the new SID. */
1898 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1899 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
1900 if (rc) {
1901 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
1902 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
1903 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
1904 flush_signals(current);
1905 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
1906 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
1907 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
1908 recalc_sigpending();
1909 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
1910 }
1911
1912 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
1913 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
1914
1915 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
1916 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
1917 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
1918 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
1919 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
1920 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
1921 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
1922 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
1923 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
1924 RLIMIT_STACK.*/
1925 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1926 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
1927 if (rc) {
1928 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
1929 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
1930 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
1931 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur);
1932 }
1933 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
1934 /*
1935 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
1936 * to be refigured.
1937 */
1938 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
1939 }
1940 }
1941
1942 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
1943 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
1944 wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
1945 }
1946
1947 /* superblock security operations */
1948
1949 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
1950 {
1951 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
1952 }
1953
1954 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
1955 {
1956 superblock_free_security(sb);
1957 }
1958
1959 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
1960 {
1961 if (plen > olen)
1962 return 0;
1963
1964 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
1965 }
1966
1967 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
1968 {
1969 return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
1970 match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1971 match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1972 match_prefix("rootcontext=", sizeof("rootcontext=")-1, option, len));
1973 }
1974
1975 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
1976 {
1977 if (!*first) {
1978 **to = ',';
1979 *to += 1;
1980 } else
1981 *first = 0;
1982 memcpy(*to, from, len);
1983 *to += len;
1984 }
1985
1986 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
1987 int len)
1988 {
1989 int current_size = 0;
1990
1991 if (!*first) {
1992 **to = '|';
1993 *to += 1;
1994 }
1995 else
1996 *first = 0;
1997
1998 while (current_size < len) {
1999 if (*from != '"') {
2000 **to = *from;
2001 *to += 1;
2002 }
2003 from += 1;
2004 current_size += 1;
2005 }
2006 }
2007
2008 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy)
2009 {
2010 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2011 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2012 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2013 int open_quote = 0;
2014
2015 in_curr = orig;
2016 sec_curr = copy;
2017
2018 /* Binary mount data: just copy */
2019 if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
2020 copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr);
2021 goto out;
2022 }
2023
2024 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2025 if (!nosec) {
2026 rc = -ENOMEM;
2027 goto out;
2028 }
2029
2030 nosec_save = nosec;
2031 fnosec = fsec = 1;
2032 in_save = in_end = orig;
2033
2034 do {
2035 if (*in_end == '"')
2036 open_quote = !open_quote;
2037 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2038 *in_end == '\0') {
2039 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2040
2041 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2042 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2043 else
2044 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2045
2046 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2047 }
2048 } while (*in_end++);
2049
2050 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2051 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2052 out:
2053 return rc;
2054 }
2055
2056 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2057 {
2058 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2059 int rc;
2060
2061 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2062 if (rc)
2063 return rc;
2064
2065 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2066 ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
2067 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2068 }
2069
2070 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2071 {
2072 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2073
2074 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2075 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2076 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2077 }
2078
2079 static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
2080 struct nameidata *nd,
2081 char * type,
2082 unsigned long flags,
2083 void * data)
2084 {
2085 int rc;
2086
2087 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
2088 if (rc)
2089 return rc;
2090
2091 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2092 return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
2093 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2094 else
2095 return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry,
2096 FILE__MOUNTON);
2097 }
2098
2099 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2100 {
2101 int rc;
2102
2103 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2104 if (rc)
2105 return rc;
2106
2107 return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
2108 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
2109 }
2110
2111 /* inode security operations */
2112
2113 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2114 {
2115 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2116 }
2117
2118 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2119 {
2120 inode_free_security(inode);
2121 }
2122
2123 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2124 char **name, void **value,
2125 size_t *len)
2126 {
2127 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2128 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2129 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2130 u32 newsid, clen;
2131 int rc;
2132 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2133
2134 tsec = current->security;
2135 dsec = dir->i_security;
2136 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2137
2138 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2139 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2140 } else {
2141 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2142 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2143 &newsid);
2144 if (rc) {
2145 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2146 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2147 "ino=%ld)\n",
2148 __FUNCTION__,
2149 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2150 return rc;
2151 }
2152 }
2153
2154 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2155 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2156 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2157 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2158 isec->sid = newsid;
2159 isec->initialized = 1;
2160 }
2161
2162 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2163 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2164
2165 if (name) {
2166 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
2167 if (!namep)
2168 return -ENOMEM;
2169 *name = namep;
2170 }
2171
2172 if (value && len) {
2173 rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen);
2174 if (rc) {
2175 kfree(namep);
2176 return rc;
2177 }
2178 *value = context;
2179 *len = clen;
2180 }
2181
2182 return 0;
2183 }
2184
2185 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2186 {
2187 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2188 }
2189
2190 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2191 {
2192 int rc;
2193
2194 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
2195 if (rc)
2196 return rc;
2197 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2198 }
2199
2200 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2201 {
2202 int rc;
2203
2204 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2205 if (rc)
2206 return rc;
2207 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2208 }
2209
2210 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2211 {
2212 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2213 }
2214
2215 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2216 {
2217 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2218 }
2219
2220 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2221 {
2222 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2223 }
2224
2225 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2226 {
2227 int rc;
2228
2229 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2230 if (rc)
2231 return rc;
2232
2233 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2234 }
2235
2236 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2237 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2238 {
2239 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2240 }
2241
2242 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2243 {
2244 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2245 }
2246
2247 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2248 {
2249 int rc;
2250
2251 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata);
2252 if (rc)
2253 return rc;
2254 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2255 }
2256
2257 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2258 struct nameidata *nd)
2259 {
2260 int rc;
2261
2262 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2263 if (rc)
2264 return rc;
2265
2266 if (!mask) {
2267 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2268 return 0;
2269 }
2270
2271 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2272 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2273 }
2274
2275 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2276 {
2277 int rc;
2278
2279 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2280 if (rc)
2281 return rc;
2282
2283 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2284 return 0;
2285
2286 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2287 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2288 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2289
2290 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2291 }
2292
2293 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2294 {
2295 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2296 }
2297
2298 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2299 {
2300 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2301 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2302 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2303 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2304 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2305 u32 newsid;
2306 int rc = 0;
2307
2308 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2309 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2310 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2311 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2312 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2313 Restrict to administrator. */
2314 return -EPERM;
2315 }
2316
2317 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2318 ordinary setattr permission. */
2319 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2320 }
2321
2322 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2323 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2324 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2325
2326 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2327 return -EPERM;
2328
2329 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2330 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
2331
2332 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2333 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2334 if (rc)
2335 return rc;
2336
2337 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2338 if (rc)
2339 return rc;
2340
2341 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2342 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2343 if (rc)
2344 return rc;
2345
2346 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2347 isec->sclass);
2348 if (rc)
2349 return rc;
2350
2351 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2352 sbsec->sid,
2353 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2354 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2355 &ad);
2356 }
2357
2358 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
2359 void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2360 {
2361 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2362 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2363 u32 newsid;
2364 int rc;
2365
2366 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2367 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2368 return;
2369 }
2370
2371 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2372 if (rc) {
2373 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unable to obtain SID for context "
2374 "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc);
2375 return;
2376 }
2377
2378 isec->sid = newsid;
2379 return;
2380 }
2381
2382 static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2383 {
2384 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2385 }
2386
2387 static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
2388 {
2389 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2390 }
2391
2392 static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2393 {
2394 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2395 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2396 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2397 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2398 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2399 Restrict to administrator. */
2400 return -EPERM;
2401 }
2402
2403 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2404 ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate
2405 permission for removexattr. */
2406 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2407 }
2408
2409 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2410 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2411 return -EACCES;
2412 }
2413
2414 static const char *selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
2415 {
2416 return XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2417 }
2418
2419 /*
2420 * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the
2421 * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
2422 * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user.
2423 *
2424 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2425 */
2426 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
2427 {
2428 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2429
2430 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2431 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2432
2433 return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
2434 }
2435
2436 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2437 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2438 {
2439 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2440 u32 newsid;
2441 int rc;
2442
2443 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2444 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2445
2446 if (!value || !size)
2447 return -EACCES;
2448
2449 rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid);
2450 if (rc)
2451 return rc;
2452
2453 isec->sid = newsid;
2454 return 0;
2455 }
2456
2457 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2458 {
2459 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2460 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2461 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2462 return len;
2463 }
2464
2465 /* file security operations */
2466
2467 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2468 {
2469 int rc;
2470 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2471
2472 if (!mask) {
2473 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2474 return 0;
2475 }
2476
2477 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2478 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2479 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2480
2481 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2482 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2483 if (rc)
2484 return rc;
2485
2486 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2487 }
2488
2489 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2490 {
2491 return file_alloc_security(file);
2492 }
2493
2494 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2495 {
2496 file_free_security(file);
2497 }
2498
2499 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2500 unsigned long arg)
2501 {
2502 int error = 0;
2503
2504 switch (cmd) {
2505 case FIONREAD:
2506 /* fall through */
2507 case FIBMAP:
2508 /* fall through */
2509 case FIGETBSZ:
2510 /* fall through */
2511 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2512 /* fall through */
2513 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2514 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2515 break;
2516
2517 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2518 /* fall through */
2519 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2520 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2521 break;
2522
2523 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2524 case FIONBIO:
2525 /* fall through */
2526 case FIOASYNC:
2527 error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2528 break;
2529
2530 case KDSKBENT:
2531 case KDSKBSENT:
2532 error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
2533 break;
2534
2535 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2536 * to the file's ioctl() function.
2537 */
2538 default:
2539 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2540
2541 }
2542 return error;
2543 }
2544
2545 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2546 {
2547 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2548 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2549 /*
2550 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2551 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2552 * This has an additional check.
2553 */
2554 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2555 if (rc)
2556 return rc;
2557 }
2558 #endif
2559
2560 if (file) {
2561 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2562 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2563
2564 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2565 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2566 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2567
2568 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2569 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2570
2571 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2572 }
2573 return 0;
2574 }
2575
2576 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2577 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2578 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
2579 {
2580 int rc = 0;
2581 u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct*)(current->security))->sid;
2582
2583 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
2584 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
2585 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
2586 if (rc || addr_only)
2587 return rc;
2588
2589 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2590 prot = reqprot;
2591
2592 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2593 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2594 }
2595
2596 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2597 unsigned long reqprot,
2598 unsigned long prot)
2599 {
2600 int rc;
2601
2602 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2603 if (rc)
2604 return rc;
2605
2606 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2607 prot = reqprot;
2608
2609 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2610 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
2611 rc = 0;
2612 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
2613 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
2614 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
2615 PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
2616 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
2617 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
2618 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
2619 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
2620 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
2621 /*
2622 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2623 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
2624 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
2625 * modified content. This typically should only
2626 * occur for text relocations.
2627 */
2628 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
2629 FILE__EXECMOD);
2630 }
2631 if (rc)
2632 return rc;
2633 }
2634 #endif
2635
2636 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
2637 }
2638
2639 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
2640 {
2641 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2642 }
2643
2644 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2645 unsigned long arg)
2646 {
2647 int err = 0;
2648
2649 switch (cmd) {
2650 case F_SETFL:
2651 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
2652 err = -EINVAL;
2653 break;
2654 }
2655
2656 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
2657 err = file_has_perm(current, file,FILE__WRITE);
2658 break;
2659 }
2660 /* fall through */
2661 case F_SETOWN:
2662 case F_SETSIG:
2663 case F_GETFL:
2664 case F_GETOWN:
2665 case F_GETSIG:
2666 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
2667 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2668 break;
2669 case F_GETLK:
2670 case F_SETLK:
2671 case F_SETLKW:
2672 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
2673 case F_GETLK64:
2674 case F_SETLK64:
2675 case F_SETLKW64:
2676 #endif
2677 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
2678 err = -EINVAL;
2679 break;
2680 }
2681 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2682 break;
2683 }
2684
2685 return err;
2686 }
2687
2688 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
2689 {
2690 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2691 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2692
2693 tsec = current->security;
2694 fsec = file->f_security;
2695 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
2696
2697 return 0;
2698 }
2699
2700 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
2701 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
2702 {
2703 struct file *file;
2704 u32 perm;
2705 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2706 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2707
2708 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
2709 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
2710
2711 tsec = tsk->security;
2712 fsec = file->f_security;
2713
2714 if (!signum)
2715 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
2716 else
2717 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
2718
2719 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
2720 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2721 }
2722
2723 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
2724 {
2725 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
2726 }
2727
2728 /* task security operations */
2729
2730 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
2731 {
2732 int rc;
2733
2734 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
2735 if (rc)
2736 return rc;
2737
2738 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
2739 }
2740
2741 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2742 {
2743 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
2744 int rc;
2745
2746 tsec1 = current->security;
2747
2748 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
2749 if (rc)
2750 return rc;
2751 tsec2 = tsk->security;
2752
2753 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
2754 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
2755
2756 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
2757 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
2758 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
2759 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
2760 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
2761
2762 /* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
2763 This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
2764 subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */
2765 tsec2->ptrace_sid = tsec1->ptrace_sid;
2766
2767 return 0;
2768 }
2769
2770 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2771 {
2772 task_free_security(tsk);
2773 }
2774
2775 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2776 {
2777 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
2778 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
2779 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
2780 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
2781 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
2782 capable hook. */
2783 return 0;
2784 }
2785
2786 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2787 {
2788 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags);
2789 }
2790
2791 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
2792 {
2793 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2794 return 0;
2795 }
2796
2797 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2798 {
2799 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
2800 }
2801
2802 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2803 {
2804 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
2805 }
2806
2807 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2808 {
2809 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
2810 }
2811
2812 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
2813 {
2814 selinux_get_task_sid(p, secid);
2815 }
2816
2817 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
2818 {
2819 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2820 return 0;
2821 }
2822
2823 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2824 {
2825 int rc;
2826
2827 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
2828 if (rc)
2829 return rc;
2830
2831 return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2832 }
2833
2834 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
2835 {
2836 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2837 }
2838
2839 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
2840 {
2841 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2842 }
2843
2844 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
2845 {
2846 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
2847 int rc;
2848
2849 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
2850 if (rc)
2851 return rc;
2852
2853 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
2854 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
2855 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
2856 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
2857 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
2858 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
2859
2860 return 0;
2861 }
2862
2863 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
2864 {
2865 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2866 }
2867
2868 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2869 {
2870 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2871 }
2872
2873 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
2874 {
2875 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2876 }
2877
2878 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
2879 int sig, u32 secid)
2880 {
2881 u32 perm;
2882 int rc;
2883 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2884
2885 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
2886 if (rc)
2887 return rc;
2888
2889 if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
2890 return 0;
2891
2892 if (!sig)
2893 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
2894 else
2895 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
2896 tsec = p->security;
2897 if (secid)
2898 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2899 else
2900 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
2901 return rc;
2902 }
2903
2904 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
2905 unsigned long arg2,
2906 unsigned long arg3,
2907 unsigned long arg4,
2908 unsigned long arg5)
2909 {
2910 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
2911 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
2912 the state of the current process. */
2913 return 0;
2914 }
2915
2916 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
2917 {
2918 u32 perm;
2919
2920 perm = signal_to_av(p->exit_signal);
2921
2922 return task_has_perm(p, current, perm);
2923 }
2924
2925 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
2926 {
2927 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2928
2929 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
2930
2931 tsec = p->security;
2932 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2933 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
2934 return;
2935 }
2936
2937 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
2938 struct inode *inode)
2939 {
2940 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
2941 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2942
2943 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
2944 isec->initialized = 1;
2945 return;
2946 }
2947
2948 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2949 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
2950 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
2951 {
2952 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
2953 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
2954
2955 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
2956 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
2957 if (ih == NULL)
2958 goto out;
2959
2960 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
2961 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
2962 goto out;
2963
2964 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
2965 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
2966 ret = 0;
2967
2968 if (proto)
2969 *proto = ih->protocol;
2970
2971 switch (ih->protocol) {
2972 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
2973 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2974
2975 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2976 break;
2977
2978 offset += ihlen;
2979 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2980 if (th == NULL)
2981 break;
2982
2983 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2984 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2985 break;
2986 }
2987
2988 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
2989 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2990
2991 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2992 break;
2993
2994 offset += ihlen;
2995 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2996 if (uh == NULL)
2997 break;
2998
2999 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3000 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3001 break;
3002 }
3003
3004 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3005 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3006
3007 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3008 break;
3009
3010 offset += ihlen;
3011 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3012 if (dh == NULL)
3013 break;
3014
3015 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3016 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3017 break;
3018 }
3019
3020 default:
3021 break;
3022 }
3023 out:
3024 return ret;
3025 }
3026
3027 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3028
3029 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3030 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3031 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3032 {
3033 u8 nexthdr;
3034 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3035 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3036
3037 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3038 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3039 if (ip6 == NULL)
3040 goto out;
3041
3042 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3043 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3044 ret = 0;
3045
3046 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3047 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3048 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3049 if (offset < 0)
3050 goto out;
3051
3052 if (proto)
3053 *proto = nexthdr;
3054
3055 switch (nexthdr) {
3056 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3057 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3058
3059 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3060 if (th == NULL)
3061 break;
3062
3063 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3064 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3065 break;
3066 }
3067
3068 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3069 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3070
3071 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3072 if (uh == NULL)
3073 break;
3074
3075 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3076 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3077 break;
3078 }
3079
3080 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3081 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3082
3083 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3084 if (dh == NULL)
3085 break;
3086
3087 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3088 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3089 break;
3090 }
3091
3092 /* includes fragments */
3093 default:
3094 break;
3095 }
3096 out:
3097 return ret;
3098 }
3099
3100 #endif /* IPV6 */
3101
3102 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3103 char **addrp, int *len, int src, u8 *proto)
3104 {
3105 int ret = 0;
3106
3107 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3108 case PF_INET:
3109 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3110 if (ret || !addrp)
3111 break;
3112 *len = 4;
3113 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3114 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3115 break;
3116
3117 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3118 case PF_INET6:
3119 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3120 if (ret || !addrp)
3121 break;
3122 *len = 16;
3123 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3124 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3125 break;
3126 #endif /* IPV6 */
3127 default:
3128 break;
3129 }
3130
3131 return ret;
3132 }
3133
3134 /**
3135 * selinux_skb_extlbl_sid - Determine the external label of a packet
3136 * @skb: the packet
3137 * @sid: the packet's SID
3138 *
3139 * Description:
3140 * Check the various different forms of external packet labeling and determine
3141 * the external SID for the packet. If only one form of external labeling is
3142 * present then it is used, if both labeled IPsec and NetLabel labels are
3143 * present then the SELinux type information is taken from the labeled IPsec
3144 * SA and the MLS sensitivity label information is taken from the NetLabel
3145 * security attributes. This bit of "magic" is done in the call to
3146 * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid().
3147 *
3148 */
3149 static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
3150 {
3151 u32 xfrm_sid;
3152 u32 nlbl_sid;
3153
3154 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3155 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
3156 (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL ?
3157 SECINITSID_NETMSG : xfrm_sid),
3158 &nlbl_sid) != 0)
3159 nlbl_sid = SECSID_NULL;
3160 *sid = (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL ? xfrm_sid : nlbl_sid);
3161 }
3162
3163 /* socket security operations */
3164 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3165 u32 perms)
3166 {
3167 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3168 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3169 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3170 int err = 0;
3171
3172 tsec = task->security;
3173 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3174
3175 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3176 goto out;
3177
3178 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3179 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3180 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3181
3182 out:
3183 return err;
3184 }
3185
3186 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3187 int protocol, int kern)
3188 {
3189 int err = 0;
3190 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3191 u32 newsid;
3192
3193 if (kern)
3194 goto out;
3195
3196 tsec = current->security;
3197 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3198 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3199 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3200 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3201
3202 out:
3203 return err;
3204 }
3205
3206 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3207 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3208 {
3209 int err = 0;
3210 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3211 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3212 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3213 u32 newsid;
3214
3215 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3216
3217 tsec = current->security;
3218 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3219 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3220 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3221 isec->initialized = 1;
3222
3223 if (sock->sk) {
3224 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3225 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3226 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3227 }
3228
3229 return err;
3230 }
3231
3232 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3233 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3234 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3235 #define ip_local_port_range_0 sysctl_local_port_range[0]
3236 #define ip_local_port_range_1 sysctl_local_port_range[1]
3237
3238 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3239 {
3240 u16 family;
3241 int err;
3242
3243 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3244 if (err)
3245 goto out;
3246
3247 /*
3248 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3249 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3250 * check the first address now.
3251 */
3252 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3253 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3254 char *addrp;
3255 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3256 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3257 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3258 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3259 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3260 unsigned short snum;
3261 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3262 u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
3263
3264 tsec = current->security;
3265 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3266
3267 if (family == PF_INET) {
3268 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3269 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3270 addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
3271 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3272 } else {
3273 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3274 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3275 addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
3276 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3277 }
3278
3279 if (snum&&(snum < max(PROT_SOCK,ip_local_port_range_0) ||
3280 snum > ip_local_port_range_1)) {
3281 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3282 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3283 if (err)
3284 goto out;
3285 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3286 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3287 ad.u.net.family = family;
3288 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3289 isec->sclass,
3290 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3291 if (err)
3292 goto out;
3293 }
3294
3295 switch(isec->sclass) {
3296 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3297 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3298 break;
3299
3300 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3301 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3302 break;
3303
3304 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3305 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3306 break;
3307
3308 default:
3309 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3310 break;
3311 }
3312
3313 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid);
3314 if (err)
3315 goto out;
3316
3317 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3318 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3319 ad.u.net.family = family;
3320
3321 if (family == PF_INET)
3322 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3323 else
3324 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3325
3326 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3327 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3328 if (err)
3329 goto out;
3330 }
3331 out:
3332 return err;
3333 }
3334
3335 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3336 {
3337 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3338 int err;
3339
3340 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3341 if (err)
3342 return err;
3343
3344 /*
3345 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3346 */
3347 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3348 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3349 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3350 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3351 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3352 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3353 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3354 unsigned short snum;
3355 u32 sid, perm;
3356
3357 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3358 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3359 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3360 return -EINVAL;
3361 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3362 } else {
3363 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3364 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3365 return -EINVAL;
3366 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3367 }
3368
3369 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3370 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3371 if (err)
3372 goto out;
3373
3374 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3375 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3376
3377 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3378 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3379 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3380 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3381 if (err)
3382 goto out;
3383 }
3384
3385 out:
3386 return err;
3387 }
3388
3389 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3390 {
3391 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3392 }
3393
3394 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3395 {
3396 int err;
3397 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3398 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3399
3400 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3401 if (err)
3402 return err;
3403
3404 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3405
3406 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3407 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3408 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3409 newisec->initialized = 1;
3410
3411 return 0;
3412 }
3413
3414 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3415 int size)
3416 {
3417 int rc;
3418
3419 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3420 if (rc)
3421 return rc;
3422
3423 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3424 }
3425
3426 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3427 int size, int flags)
3428 {
3429 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3430 }
3431
3432 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3433 {
3434 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3435 }
3436
3437 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3438 {
3439 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3440 }
3441
3442 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname)
3443 {
3444 int err;
3445
3446 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3447 if (err)
3448 return err;
3449
3450 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3451 }
3452
3453 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3454 int optname)
3455 {
3456 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3457 }
3458
3459 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3460 {
3461 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3462 }
3463
3464 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3465 struct socket *other,
3466 struct sock *newsk)
3467 {
3468 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3469 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3470 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3471 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3472 int err;
3473
3474 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3475 if (err)
3476 return err;
3477
3478 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3479 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3480
3481 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3482 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3483
3484 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3485 isec->sclass,
3486 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3487 if (err)
3488 return err;
3489
3490 /* connecting socket */
3491 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3492 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3493
3494 /* server child socket */
3495 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3496 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3497 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3498
3499 return err;
3500 }
3501
3502 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3503 struct socket *other)
3504 {
3505 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3506 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3507 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3508 int err;
3509
3510 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3511 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3512
3513 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3514 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3515
3516 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3517 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3518 if (err)
3519 return err;
3520
3521 return 0;
3522 }
3523
3524 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3525 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
3526 {
3527 int err = 0;
3528 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
3529 struct socket *sock;
3530 u16 sock_class = 0;
3531 u32 sock_sid = 0;
3532
3533 read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3534 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3535 if (sock) {
3536 struct inode *inode;
3537 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3538 if (inode) {
3539 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3540 isec = inode->i_security;
3541 sock_sid = isec->sid;
3542 sock_class = isec->sclass;
3543 }
3544 }
3545 read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3546 if (!sock_sid)
3547 goto out;
3548
3549 if (!skb->dev)
3550 goto out;
3551
3552 err = sel_netif_sids(skb->dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3553 if (err)
3554 goto out;
3555
3556 switch (sock_class) {
3557 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3558 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
3559 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
3560 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3561 break;
3562
3563 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3564 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
3565 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
3566 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3567 break;
3568
3569 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3570 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
3571 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
3572 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3573 break;
3574
3575 default:
3576 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
3577 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
3578 break;
3579 }
3580
3581 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
3582 if (err)
3583 goto out;
3584
3585 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3586 if (err)
3587 goto out;
3588
3589 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
3590 if (err)
3591 goto out;
3592
3593 if (recv_perm) {
3594 u32 port_sid;
3595
3596 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3597 sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.sport),
3598 &port_sid);
3599 if (err)
3600 goto out;
3601
3602 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
3603 sock_class, recv_perm, ad);
3604 }
3605
3606 out:
3607 return err;
3608 }
3609
3610 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3611 {
3612 u16 family;
3613 char *addrp;
3614 int len, err = 0;
3615 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3616 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3617
3618 family = sk->sk_family;
3619 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
3620 goto out;
3621
3622 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
3623 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
3624 family = PF_INET;
3625
3626 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3627 ad.u.net.netif = skb->dev ? skb->dev->name : "[unknown]";
3628 ad.u.net.family = family;
3629
3630 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1, NULL);
3631 if (err)
3632 goto out;
3633
3634 if (selinux_compat_net)
3635 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, family,
3636 addrp, len);
3637 else
3638 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
3639 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
3640 if (err)
3641 goto out;
3642
3643 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, &ad);
3644 if (err)
3645 goto out;
3646
3647 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
3648 out:
3649 return err;
3650 }
3651
3652 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
3653 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
3654 {
3655 int err = 0;
3656 char *scontext;
3657 u32 scontext_len;
3658 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3659 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3660 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
3661
3662 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3663
3664 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
3665 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3666 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3667 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
3668 }
3669 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
3670 err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
3671 goto out;
3672 }
3673
3674 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
3675
3676 if (err)
3677 goto out;
3678
3679 if (scontext_len > len) {
3680 err = -ERANGE;
3681 goto out_len;
3682 }
3683
3684 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
3685 err = -EFAULT;
3686
3687 out_len:
3688 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
3689 err = -EFAULT;
3690
3691 kfree(scontext);
3692 out:
3693 return err;
3694 }
3695
3696 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
3697 {
3698 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
3699 int err = 0;
3700
3701 if (sock && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
3702 selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
3703 else if (skb)
3704 selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &peer_secid);
3705
3706 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
3707 err = -EINVAL;
3708 *secid = peer_secid;
3709
3710 return err;
3711 }
3712
3713 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
3714 {
3715 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
3716 }
3717
3718 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
3719 {
3720 sk_free_security(sk);
3721 }
3722
3723 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
3724 {
3725 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
3726 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
3727
3728 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
3729 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
3730
3731 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(ssec, newssec);
3732 }
3733
3734 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
3735 {
3736 if (!sk)
3737 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
3738 else {
3739 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3740
3741 *secid = sksec->sid;
3742 }
3743 }
3744
3745 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock* sk, struct socket *parent)
3746 {
3747 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
3748 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3749
3750 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
3751 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
3752 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
3753
3754 selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent);
3755 }
3756
3757 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3758 struct request_sock *req)
3759 {
3760 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3761 int err;
3762 u32 newsid;
3763 u32 peersid;
3764
3765 selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &peersid);
3766 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
3767 req->secid = sksec->sid;
3768 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
3769 return 0;
3770 }
3771
3772 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
3773 if (err)
3774 return err;
3775
3776 req->secid = newsid;
3777 req->peer_secid = peersid;
3778 return 0;
3779 }
3780
3781 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
3782 const struct request_sock *req)
3783 {
3784 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
3785
3786 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
3787 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
3788 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
3789 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
3790 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
3791 time it will have been created and available. */
3792
3793 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
3794 * thread with access to newsksec */
3795 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
3796 }
3797
3798 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
3799 struct sk_buff *skb)
3800 {
3801 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3802
3803 selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &sksec->peer_sid);
3804 }
3805
3806 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
3807 struct flowi *fl)
3808 {
3809 fl->secid = req->secid;
3810 }
3811
3812 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3813 {
3814 int err = 0;
3815 u32 perm;
3816 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
3817 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
3818 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3819
3820 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
3821 err = -EINVAL;
3822 goto out;
3823 }
3824 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
3825
3826 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
3827 if (err) {
3828 if (err == -EINVAL) {
3829 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
3830 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
3831 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
3832 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
3833 if (!selinux_enforcing)
3834 err = 0;
3835 }
3836
3837 /* Ignore */
3838 if (err == -ENOENT)
3839 err = 0;
3840 goto out;
3841 }
3842
3843 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
3844 out:
3845 return err;
3846 }
3847
3848 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
3849
3850 static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev,
3851 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3852 u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
3853 {
3854 int err = 0;
3855 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
3856 struct socket *sock;
3857 struct inode *inode;
3858 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3859
3860 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3861 if (!sock)
3862 goto out;
3863
3864 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3865 if (!inode)
3866 goto out;
3867
3868 isec = inode->i_security;
3869
3870 err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3871 if (err)
3872 goto out;
3873
3874 switch (isec->sclass) {
3875 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3876 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
3877 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
3878 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3879 break;
3880
3881 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3882 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
3883 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
3884 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3885 break;
3886
3887 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3888 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
3889 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
3890 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3891 break;
3892
3893 default:
3894 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
3895 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
3896 break;
3897 }
3898
3899 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
3900 if (err)
3901 goto out;
3902
3903 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3904 if (err)
3905 goto out;
3906
3907 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
3908 if (err)
3909 goto out;
3910
3911 if (send_perm) {
3912 u32 port_sid;
3913
3914 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
3915 sk->sk_type,
3916 sk->sk_protocol,
3917 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport),
3918 &port_sid);
3919 if (err)
3920 goto out;
3921
3922 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
3923 send_perm, ad);
3924 }
3925 out:
3926 return err;
3927 }
3928
3929 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3930 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3931 const struct net_device *in,
3932 const struct net_device *out,
3933 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
3934 u16 family)
3935 {
3936 char *addrp;
3937 int len, err = 0;
3938 struct sock *sk;
3939 struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
3940 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3941 struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
3942 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3943 u8 proto;
3944
3945 sk = skb->sk;
3946 if (!sk)
3947 goto out;
3948
3949 sksec = sk->sk_security;
3950
3951 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3952 ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
3953 ad.u.net.family = family;
3954
3955 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0, &proto);
3956 if (err)
3957 goto out;
3958
3959 if (selinux_compat_net)
3960 err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, &ad,
3961 family, addrp, len);
3962 else
3963 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
3964 PACKET__SEND, &ad);
3965
3966 if (err)
3967 goto out;
3968
3969 err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto);
3970 out:
3971 return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3972 }
3973
3974 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3975 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3976 const struct net_device *in,
3977 const struct net_device *out,
3978 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3979 {
3980 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET);
3981 }
3982
3983 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3984
3985 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3986 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3987 const struct net_device *in,
3988 const struct net_device *out,
3989 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3990 {
3991 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6);
3992 }
3993
3994 #endif /* IPV6 */
3995
3996 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
3997
3998 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3999 {
4000 int err;
4001
4002 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4003 if (err)
4004 return err;
4005
4006 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4007 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4008
4009 return err;
4010 }
4011
4012 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4013 {
4014 int err;
4015 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4016
4017 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4018 if (err)
4019 return err;
4020
4021 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4022 ad.u.cap = capability;
4023
4024 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4025 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4026 }
4027
4028 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4029 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4030 u16 sclass)
4031 {
4032 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
4033 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4034
4035 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4036 if (!isec)
4037 return -ENOMEM;
4038
4039 isec->sclass = sclass;
4040 isec->ipc_perm = perm;
4041 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
4042 perm->security = isec;
4043
4044 return 0;
4045 }
4046
4047 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4048 {
4049 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4050 perm->security = NULL;
4051 kfree(isec);
4052 }
4053
4054 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4055 {
4056 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4057
4058 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4059 if (!msec)
4060 return -ENOMEM;
4061
4062 msec->msg = msg;
4063 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4064 msg->security = msec;
4065
4066 return 0;
4067 }
4068
4069 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4070 {
4071 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4072
4073 msg->security = NULL;
4074 kfree(msec);
4075 }
4076
4077 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4078 u32 perms)
4079 {
4080 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4081 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4082 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4083
4084 tsec = current->security;
4085 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4086
4087 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4088 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4089
4090 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4091 }
4092
4093 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4094 {
4095 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4096 }
4097
4098 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4099 {
4100 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4101 }
4102
4103 /* message queue security operations */
4104 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4105 {
4106 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4107 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4108 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4109 int rc;
4110
4111 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4112 if (rc)
4113 return rc;
4114
4115 tsec = current->security;
4116 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4117
4118 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4119 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4120
4121 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4122 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
4123 if (rc) {
4124 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4125 return rc;
4126 }
4127 return 0;
4128 }
4129
4130 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4131 {
4132 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4133 }
4134
4135 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4136 {
4137 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4138 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4139 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4140
4141 tsec = current->security;
4142 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4143
4144 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4145 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4146
4147 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4148 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4149 }
4150
4151 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4152 {
4153 int err;
4154 int perms;
4155
4156 switch(cmd) {
4157 case IPC_INFO:
4158 case MSG_INFO:
4159 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4160 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4161 case IPC_STAT:
4162 case MSG_STAT:
4163 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4164 break;
4165 case IPC_SET:
4166 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4167 break;
4168 case IPC_RMID:
4169 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4170 break;
4171 default:
4172 return 0;
4173 }
4174
4175 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4176 return err;
4177 }
4178
4179 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4180 {
4181 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4182 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4183 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4184 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4185 int rc;
4186
4187 tsec = current->security;
4188 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4189 msec = msg->security;
4190
4191 /*
4192 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4193 */
4194 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4195 /*
4196 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4197 * message queue this message will be stored in
4198 */
4199 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4200 isec->sid,
4201 SECCLASS_MSG,
4202 &msec->sid);
4203 if (rc)
4204 return rc;
4205 }
4206
4207 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4208 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4209
4210 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4211 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4212 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
4213 if (!rc)
4214 /* Can this process send the message */
4215 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4216 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4217 if (!rc)
4218 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4219 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4220 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4221
4222 return rc;
4223 }
4224
4225 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4226 struct task_struct *target,
4227 long type, int mode)
4228 {
4229 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4230 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4231 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4232 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4233 int rc;
4234
4235 tsec = target->security;
4236 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4237 msec = msg->security;
4238
4239 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4240 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4241
4242 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4243 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4244 if (!rc)
4245 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4246 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4247 return rc;
4248 }
4249
4250 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4251 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4252 {
4253 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4254 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4255 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4256 int rc;
4257
4258 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4259 if (rc)
4260 return rc;
4261
4262 tsec = current->security;
4263 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4264
4265 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4266 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4267
4268 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4269 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
4270 if (rc) {
4271 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4272 return rc;
4273 }
4274 return 0;
4275 }
4276
4277 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4278 {
4279 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4280 }
4281
4282 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4283 {
4284 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4285 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4286 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4287
4288 tsec = current->security;
4289 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4290
4291 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4292 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4293
4294 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4295 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4296 }
4297
4298 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4299 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4300 {
4301 int perms;
4302 int err;
4303
4304 switch(cmd) {
4305 case IPC_INFO:
4306 case SHM_INFO:
4307 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4308 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4309 case IPC_STAT:
4310 case SHM_STAT:
4311 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4312 break;
4313 case IPC_SET:
4314 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4315 break;
4316 case SHM_LOCK:
4317 case SHM_UNLOCK:
4318 perms = SHM__LOCK;
4319 break;
4320 case IPC_RMID:
4321 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4322 break;
4323 default:
4324 return 0;
4325 }
4326
4327 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4328 return err;
4329 }
4330
4331 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4332 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4333 {
4334 u32 perms;
4335 int rc;
4336
4337 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
4338 if (rc)
4339 return rc;
4340
4341 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4342 perms = SHM__READ;
4343 else
4344 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4345
4346 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4347 }
4348
4349 /* Semaphore security operations */
4350 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4351 {
4352 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4353 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4354 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4355 int rc;
4356
4357 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4358 if (rc)
4359 return rc;
4360
4361 tsec = current->security;
4362 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4363
4364 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4365 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4366
4367 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4368 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
4369 if (rc) {
4370 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4371 return rc;
4372 }
4373 return 0;
4374 }
4375
4376 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4377 {
4378 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4379 }
4380
4381 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
4382 {
4383 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4384 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4385 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4386
4387 tsec = current->security;
4388 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4389
4390 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4391 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4392
4393 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4394 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4395 }
4396
4397 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
4398 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
4399 {
4400 int err;
4401 u32 perms;
4402
4403 switch(cmd) {
4404 case IPC_INFO:
4405 case SEM_INFO:
4406 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4407 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4408 case GETPID:
4409 case GETNCNT:
4410 case GETZCNT:
4411 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
4412 break;
4413 case GETVAL:
4414 case GETALL:
4415 perms = SEM__READ;
4416 break;
4417 case SETVAL:
4418 case SETALL:
4419 perms = SEM__WRITE;
4420 break;
4421 case IPC_RMID:
4422 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
4423 break;
4424 case IPC_SET:
4425 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
4426 break;
4427 case IPC_STAT:
4428 case SEM_STAT:
4429 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
4430 break;
4431 default:
4432 return 0;
4433 }
4434
4435 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4436 return err;
4437 }
4438
4439 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
4440 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
4441 {
4442 u32 perms;
4443
4444 if (alter)
4445 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
4446 else
4447 perms = SEM__READ;
4448
4449 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4450 }
4451
4452 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
4453 {
4454 u32 av = 0;
4455
4456 av = 0;
4457 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
4458 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
4459 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
4460 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
4461
4462 if (av == 0)
4463 return 0;
4464
4465 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
4466 }
4467
4468 /* module stacking operations */
4469 static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4470 {
4471 if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
4472 printk(KERN_ERR "%s: There is already a secondary security "
4473 "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4474 return -EINVAL;
4475 }
4476
4477 secondary_ops = ops;
4478
4479 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n",
4480 __FUNCTION__,
4481 name);
4482
4483 return 0;
4484 }
4485
4486 static int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4487 {
4488 if (ops != secondary_ops) {
4489 printk(KERN_ERR "%s: trying to unregister a security module "
4490 "that is not registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4491 return -EINVAL;
4492 }
4493
4494 secondary_ops = original_ops;
4495
4496 return 0;
4497 }
4498
4499 static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
4500 {
4501 if (inode)
4502 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
4503 }
4504
4505 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4506 char *name, char **value)
4507 {
4508 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4509 u32 sid;
4510 int error;
4511 unsigned len;
4512
4513 if (current != p) {
4514 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
4515 if (error)
4516 return error;
4517 }
4518
4519 tsec = p->security;
4520
4521 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4522 sid = tsec->sid;
4523 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
4524 sid = tsec->osid;
4525 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4526 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
4527 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4528 sid = tsec->create_sid;
4529 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
4530 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
4531 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4532 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4533 else
4534 return -EINVAL;
4535
4536 if (!sid)
4537 return 0;
4538
4539 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
4540 if (error)
4541 return error;
4542 return len;
4543 }
4544
4545 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4546 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4547 {
4548 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4549 u32 sid = 0;
4550 int error;
4551 char *str = value;
4552
4553 if (current != p) {
4554 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
4555 security attributes. */
4556 return -EACCES;
4557 }
4558
4559 /*
4560 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
4561 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
4562 * above restriction is ever removed.
4563 */
4564 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4565 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
4566 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4567 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
4568 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
4569 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
4570 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4571 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
4572 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4573 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
4574 else
4575 error = -EINVAL;
4576 if (error)
4577 return error;
4578
4579 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
4580 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
4581 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
4582 str[size-1] = 0;
4583 size--;
4584 }
4585 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
4586 if (error)
4587 return error;
4588 }
4589
4590 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
4591 performed during the actual operation (execve,
4592 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
4593 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
4594 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
4595 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
4596 tsec = p->security;
4597 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4598 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
4599 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4600 tsec->create_sid = sid;
4601 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
4602 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
4603 if (error)
4604 return error;
4605 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
4606 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4607 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
4608 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
4609 struct av_decision avd;
4610
4611 if (sid == 0)
4612 return -EINVAL;
4613
4614 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
4615 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
4616 struct task_struct *g, *t;
4617 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
4618 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
4619 do_each_thread(g, t)
4620 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
4621 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4622 return -EPERM;
4623 }
4624 while_each_thread(g, t);
4625 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4626 }
4627
4628 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
4629 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4630 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
4631 if (error)
4632 return error;
4633
4634 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
4635 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
4636 task_lock(p);
4637 if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
4638 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
4639 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4640 PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
4641 if (!error)
4642 tsec->sid = sid;
4643 task_unlock(p);
4644 avc_audit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4645 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
4646 if (error)
4647 return error;
4648 } else {
4649 tsec->sid = sid;
4650 task_unlock(p);
4651 }
4652 }
4653 else
4654 return -EINVAL;
4655
4656 return size;
4657 }
4658
4659 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
4660 {
4661 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
4662 }
4663
4664 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
4665 {
4666 kfree(secdata);
4667 }
4668
4669 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4670
4671 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
4672 unsigned long flags)
4673 {
4674 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
4675 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
4676
4677 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4678 if (!ksec)
4679 return -ENOMEM;
4680
4681 ksec->obj = k;
4682 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
4683 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
4684 else
4685 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
4686 k->security = ksec;
4687
4688 return 0;
4689 }
4690
4691 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
4692 {
4693 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
4694
4695 k->security = NULL;
4696 kfree(ksec);
4697 }
4698
4699 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
4700 struct task_struct *ctx,
4701 key_perm_t perm)
4702 {
4703 struct key *key;
4704 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4705 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
4706
4707 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
4708
4709 tsec = ctx->security;
4710 ksec = key->security;
4711
4712 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
4713 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
4714 appear to be created. */
4715 if (perm == 0)
4716 return 0;
4717
4718 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
4719 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
4720 }
4721
4722 #endif
4723
4724 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
4725 .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
4726 .capget = selinux_capget,
4727 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
4728 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
4729 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
4730 .capable = selinux_capable,
4731 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
4732 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
4733 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
4734 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
4735
4736 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
4737 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
4738
4739 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
4740 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
4741 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
4742 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
4743 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
4744 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
4745 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
4746
4747 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
4748 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
4749 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
4750 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
4751 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
4752 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
4753 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
4754
4755 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
4756 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
4757 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
4758 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
4759 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
4760 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
4761 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
4762 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
4763 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
4764 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
4765 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
4766 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
4767 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
4768 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
4769 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
4770 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
4771 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
4772 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
4773 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
4774 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
4775 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
4776 .inode_xattr_getsuffix = selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix,
4777 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
4778 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
4779 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
4780
4781 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
4782 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
4783 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
4784 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
4785 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
4786 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
4787 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
4788 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
4789 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
4790 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
4791 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
4792
4793 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
4794 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
4795 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
4796 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
4797 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
4798 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
4799 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
4800 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
4801 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
4802 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
4803 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
4804 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
4805 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
4806 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
4807 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
4808 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
4809 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
4810 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
4811 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
4812 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
4813 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
4814 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
4815 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
4816
4817 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
4818
4819 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
4820 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
4821
4822 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
4823 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
4824 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
4825 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
4826 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
4827 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
4828
4829 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
4830 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
4831 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
4832 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
4833 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
4834
4835 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
4836 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
4837 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
4838 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
4839 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
4840
4841 .register_security = selinux_register_security,
4842 .unregister_security = selinux_unregister_security,
4843
4844 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
4845
4846 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
4847 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
4848
4849 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
4850 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
4851
4852 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
4853 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
4854
4855 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
4856 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
4857 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
4858 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
4859 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
4860 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
4861 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
4862 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
4863 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
4864 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
4865 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
4866 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
4867 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
4868 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
4869 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
4870 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
4871 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
4872 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
4873 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
4874 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
4875 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
4876 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
4877 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
4878 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
4879 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
4880
4881 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
4882 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
4883 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
4884 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
4885 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
4886 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
4887 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
4888 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
4889 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
4890 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
4891 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
4892 #endif
4893
4894 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4895 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
4896 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
4897 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
4898 #endif
4899 };
4900
4901 static __init int selinux_init(void)
4902 {
4903 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4904
4905 if (!selinux_enabled) {
4906 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
4907 return 0;
4908 }
4909
4910 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
4911
4912 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
4913 if (task_alloc_security(current))
4914 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
4915 tsec = current->security;
4916 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4917
4918 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
4919 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
4920 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
4921 avc_init();
4922
4923 original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
4924 if (!secondary_ops)
4925 panic ("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
4926 if (register_security (&selinux_ops))
4927 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
4928
4929 if (selinux_enforcing) {
4930 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
4931 } else {
4932 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
4933 }
4934
4935 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4936 /* Add security information to initial keyrings */
4937 selinux_key_alloc(&root_user_keyring, current,
4938 KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
4939 selinux_key_alloc(&root_session_keyring, current,
4940 KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
4941 #endif
4942
4943 return 0;
4944 }
4945
4946 void selinux_complete_init(void)
4947 {
4948 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
4949
4950 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
4951 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
4952 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4953 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4954 next_sb:
4955 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
4956 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
4957 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
4958 struct superblock_security_struct,
4959 list);
4960 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
4961 sb->s_count++;
4962 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4963 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4964 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
4965 if (sb->s_root)
4966 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
4967 drop_super(sb);
4968 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4969 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4970 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
4971 goto next_sb;
4972 }
4973 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4974 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4975 }
4976
4977 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
4978 all processes and objects when they are created. */
4979 security_initcall(selinux_init);
4980
4981 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
4982
4983 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = {
4984 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute_last,
4985 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4986 .pf = PF_INET,
4987 .hooknum = NF_IP_POST_ROUTING,
4988 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4989 };
4990
4991 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4992
4993 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = {
4994 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute_last,
4995 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4996 .pf = PF_INET6,
4997 .hooknum = NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING,
4998 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4999 };
5000
5001 #endif /* IPV6 */
5002
5003 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5004 {
5005 int err = 0;
5006
5007 if (!selinux_enabled)
5008 goto out;
5009
5010 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5011
5012 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
5013 if (err)
5014 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5015
5016 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5017
5018 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
5019 if (err)
5020 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5021
5022 #endif /* IPV6 */
5023
5024 out:
5025 return err;
5026 }
5027
5028 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5029
5030 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5031 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5032 {
5033 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5034
5035 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
5036 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5037 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
5038 #endif /* IPV6 */
5039 }
5040 #endif
5041
5042 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5043
5044 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5045 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5046 #endif
5047
5048 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5049
5050 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5051 int selinux_disable(void)
5052 {
5053 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5054 static int selinux_disabled = 0;
5055
5056 if (ss_initialized) {
5057 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5058 return -EINVAL;
5059 }
5060
5061 if (selinux_disabled) {
5062 /* Only do this once. */
5063 return -EINVAL;
5064 }
5065
5066 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5067
5068 selinux_disabled = 1;
5069 selinux_enabled = 0;
5070
5071 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5072 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5073
5074 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5075 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5076
5077 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
5078 exit_sel_fs();
5079
5080 return 0;
5081 }
5082 #endif
5083
5084
AMDTP streaming driver for the Linux FireWire stack (Juju)