kernel - SWAP CACHE part 22/many - Fix counter overflow introduced in part 21
[dragonfly.git] / usr.sbin / rpc.yppasswdd / yppasswdd_server.c
blobd08244e881a6ae9f0dc9e15f077449766fb7251b
1 /*
2 * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996
3 * Bill Paul <wpaul@ctr.columbia.edu>. All rights reserved.
5 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
6 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
7 * are met:
8 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
9 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
10 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
12 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
13 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
14 * must display the following acknowledgement:
15 * This product includes software developed by Bill Paul.
16 * 4. Neither the name of the author nor the names of any co-contributors
17 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
18 * without specific prior written permission.
20 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY Bill Paul AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
21 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
22 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
23 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL Bill Paul OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
24 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
25 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
26 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
27 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
28 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
29 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
30 * SUCH DAMAGE.
32 * $FreeBSD: src/usr.sbin/rpc.yppasswdd/yppasswdd_server.c,v 1.29 2003/06/15 21:24:45 mbr Exp $
33 * $DragonFly: src/usr.sbin/rpc.yppasswdd/yppasswdd_server.c,v 1.7 2005/11/25 00:32:49 swildner Exp $
36 #include <sys/param.h>
37 #include <sys/fcntl.h>
38 #include <sys/socket.h>
39 #include <sys/stat.h>
40 #include <sys/wait.h>
42 #include <arpa/inet.h>
43 #include <netinet/in.h>
45 #include <ctype.h>
46 #include <db.h>
47 #include <dirent.h>
48 #include <errno.h>
49 #include <limits.h>
50 #include <pwd.h>
51 #include <signal.h>
52 #include <stdio.h>
53 #include <stdlib.h>
54 #include <string.h>
55 #include <unistd.h>
57 #include <libgen.h>
58 #include <libutil.h>
60 #include <rpc/rpc.h>
61 #include <rpcsvc/yp.h>
62 struct dom_binding;
63 #include <rpcsvc/ypclnt.h>
64 #include "yppasswdd_extern.h"
65 #include "yppasswd.h"
66 #include "yppasswd_private.h"
67 #include "ypxfr_extern.h"
68 #include "yp_extern.h"
70 static struct passwd yp_password;
72 static void
73 copy_yp_pass(char *p, int x, int m)
75 char *t, *s = p;
76 static char *buf;
78 yp_password.pw_fields = 0;
80 buf = realloc(buf, m + 10);
81 bzero(buf, m + 10);
83 /* Turn all colons into NULLs */
84 while (strchr(s, ':')) {
85 s = (strchr(s, ':') + 1);
86 *(s - 1)= '\0';
89 t = buf;
90 #define EXPAND(e) e = t; while ((*t++ = *p++));
91 EXPAND(yp_password.pw_name);
92 yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_NAME;
93 EXPAND(yp_password.pw_passwd);
94 yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_PASSWD;
95 yp_password.pw_uid = atoi(p);
96 p += (strlen(p) + 1);
97 yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_UID;
98 yp_password.pw_gid = atoi(p);
99 p += (strlen(p) + 1);
100 yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_GID;
101 if (x) {
102 EXPAND(yp_password.pw_class);
103 yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_CLASS;
104 yp_password.pw_change = atol(p);
105 p += (strlen(p) + 1);
106 yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_CHANGE;
107 yp_password.pw_expire = atol(p);
108 p += (strlen(p) + 1);
109 yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_EXPIRE;
111 EXPAND(yp_password.pw_gecos);
112 yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_GECOS;
113 EXPAND(yp_password.pw_dir);
114 yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_DIR;
115 EXPAND(yp_password.pw_shell);
116 yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_SHELL;
118 return;
121 static int
122 validchars(char *arg)
124 size_t i;
126 for (i = 0; i < strlen(arg); i++) {
127 if (iscntrl(arg[i])) {
128 yp_error("string contains a control character");
129 return(1);
131 if (arg[i] == ':') {
132 yp_error("string contains a colon");
133 return(1);
135 /* Be evil: truncate strings with \n in them silently. */
136 if (arg[i] == '\n') {
137 arg[i] = '\0';
138 return(0);
141 return(0);
144 static int
145 validate_master(struct passwd *opw __unused, struct x_master_passwd *npw)
148 if (npw->pw_name[0] == '+' || npw->pw_name[0] == '-') {
149 yp_error("client tried to modify an NIS entry");
150 return(1);
153 if (validchars(npw->pw_shell)) {
154 yp_error("specified shell contains invalid characters");
155 return(1);
158 if (validchars(npw->pw_gecos)) {
159 yp_error("specified gecos field contains invalid characters");
160 return(1);
163 if (validchars(npw->pw_passwd)) {
164 yp_error("specified password contains invalid characters");
165 return(1);
167 return(0);
170 static int
171 validate(struct passwd *opw, struct x_passwd *npw)
174 if (npw->pw_name[0] == '+' || npw->pw_name[0] == '-') {
175 yp_error("client tried to modify an NIS entry");
176 return(1);
179 if ((uid_t)npw->pw_uid != opw->pw_uid) {
180 yp_error("UID mismatch: client says user %s has UID %d",
181 npw->pw_name, npw->pw_uid);
182 yp_error("database says user %s has UID %d", opw->pw_name,
183 opw->pw_uid);
184 return(1);
187 if ((gid_t)npw->pw_gid != opw->pw_gid) {
188 yp_error("GID mismatch: client says user %s has GID %d",
189 npw->pw_name, npw->pw_gid);
190 yp_error("database says user %s has GID %d", opw->pw_name,
191 opw->pw_gid);
192 return(1);
196 * Don't allow the user to shoot himself in the foot,
197 * even on purpose.
199 if (!ok_shell(npw->pw_shell)) {
200 yp_error("%s is not a valid shell", npw->pw_shell);
201 return(1);
204 if (validchars(npw->pw_shell)) {
205 yp_error("specified shell contains invalid characters");
206 return(1);
209 if (validchars(npw->pw_gecos)) {
210 yp_error("specified gecos field contains invalid characters");
211 return(1);
214 if (validchars(npw->pw_passwd)) {
215 yp_error("specified password contains invalid characters");
216 return(1);
218 return(0);
222 * Kludge alert:
223 * In order to have one rpc.yppasswdd support multiple domains,
224 * we have to cheat: we search each directory under /var/yp
225 * and try to match the user in each master.passwd.byname
226 * map that we find. If the user matches (username, uid and gid
227 * all agree), then we use that domain. If we match the user in
228 * more than one database, we must abort.
230 static char *
231 find_domain(struct x_passwd *pw)
233 struct stat statbuf;
234 struct dirent *dirp;
235 DIR *dird;
236 char yp_mapdir[MAXPATHLEN + 2];
237 static char domain[YPMAXDOMAIN];
238 char *tmp = NULL;
239 DBT key, data;
240 int hit = 0;
242 yp_error("performing multidomain lookup");
244 if ((dird = opendir(yp_dir)) == NULL) {
245 yp_error("opendir(%s) failed: %s", yp_dir, strerror(errno));
246 return(NULL);
249 while ((dirp = readdir(dird)) != NULL) {
250 snprintf(yp_mapdir, sizeof yp_mapdir, "%s/%s",
251 yp_dir, dirp->d_name);
252 if (stat(yp_mapdir, &statbuf) < 0) {
253 yp_error("stat(%s) failed: %s", yp_mapdir,
254 strerror(errno));
255 closedir(dird);
256 return(NULL);
258 if (S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode)) {
259 tmp = (char *)dirp->d_name;
260 key.data = pw->pw_name;
261 key.size = strlen(pw->pw_name);
263 if (yp_get_record(tmp,"master.passwd.byname",
264 &key, &data, 0) != YP_TRUE) {
265 continue;
267 *((char *)data.data + data.size) = '\0';
268 copy_yp_pass(data.data, 1, data.size);
269 if (yp_password.pw_uid == (uid_t)pw->pw_uid &&
270 yp_password.pw_gid == (gid_t)pw->pw_gid) {
271 hit++;
272 snprintf(domain, YPMAXDOMAIN, "%s", tmp);
277 closedir(dird);
278 if (hit > 1) {
279 yp_error("found same user in two different domains");
280 return(NULL);
281 } else
282 return((char *)&domain);
285 static const char *maps[] = {
286 "master.passwd.byname",
287 "master.passwd.byuid",
288 "passwd.byname",
289 "passwd.byuid"
292 static const char *formats[] = {
293 "%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%ld:%ld:%s:%s:%s",
294 "%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%ld:%ld:%s:%s:%s",
295 "%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%s:%s",
296 "%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%s:%s"
299 static int
300 update_inplace(struct passwd *pw, char *domain)
302 DB *dbp = NULL;
303 DBT key = { NULL, 0 };
304 DBT data = { NULL, 0 };
305 char pwbuf[YPMAXRECORD];
306 char keybuf[20];
307 int i;
308 char *ptr = NULL;
309 static char yp_last[] = "YP_LAST_MODIFIED";
310 char yplastbuf[YPMAXRECORD];
312 snprintf(yplastbuf, sizeof yplastbuf, "%llu",
313 (unsigned long long)time(NULL));
315 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
317 if (i % 2) {
318 snprintf(keybuf, sizeof keybuf,
319 "%llu", (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
320 key.data = &keybuf;
321 key.size = strlen(keybuf);
322 } else {
323 key.data = pw->pw_name;
324 key.size = strlen(pw->pw_name);
328 * XXX The passwd.byname and passwd.byuid maps come in
329 * two flavors: secure and insecure. The secure version
330 * has a '*' in the password field whereas the insecure one
331 * has a real crypted password. The maps will be insecure
332 * if they were built with 'unsecure = TRUE' enabled in
333 * /var/yp/Makefile, but we'd have no way of knowing if
334 * this has been done unless we were to try parsing the
335 * Makefile, which is a disgusting thought. Instead, we
336 * read the records from the maps, skip to the first ':'
337 * in them, and then look at the character immediately
338 * following it. If it's an '*' then the map is 'secure'
339 * and we must not insert a real password into the pw_passwd
340 * field. If it's not an '*', then we put the real crypted
341 * password in.
343 if (yp_get_record(domain,maps[i],&key,&data,1) != YP_TRUE) {
344 yp_error("couldn't read %s/%s: %s", domain,
345 maps[i], strerror(errno));
346 return(1);
349 if ((ptr = strchr(data.data, ':')) == NULL) {
350 yp_error("no colon in passwd record?!");
351 return(1);
355 * XXX Supposing we have more than one user with the same
356 * UID? (Or more than one user with the same name?) We could
357 * end up modifying the wrong record if were not careful.
359 if (i % 2) {
360 if (strncmp(data.data, pw->pw_name,
361 strlen(pw->pw_name))) {
362 yp_error("warning: found entry for UID %d "
363 "in map %s@%s with wrong name (%.*s)",
364 pw->pw_uid, maps[i], domain,
365 (int)(ptr - (char *)data.data),
366 (char *)data.data);
367 yp_error("there may be more than one user "
368 "with the same UID - continuing");
369 continue;
371 } else {
373 * We're really being ultra-paranoid here.
374 * This is generally a 'can't happen' condition.
376 snprintf(pwbuf, sizeof pwbuf, ":%d:%d:", pw->pw_uid,
377 pw->pw_gid);
378 if (!strstr(data.data, pwbuf)) {
379 yp_error("warning: found entry for user %s \
380 in map %s@%s with wrong UID", pw->pw_name, maps[i], domain);
381 yp_error("there may be more than one user \
382 with the same name - continuing");
383 continue;
387 if (i < 2) {
388 snprintf(pwbuf, sizeof pwbuf, formats[i],
389 pw->pw_name, pw->pw_passwd, pw->pw_uid,
390 pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_class, pw->pw_change,
391 pw->pw_expire, pw->pw_gecos, pw->pw_dir,
392 pw->pw_shell);
393 } else {
394 snprintf(pwbuf, sizeof pwbuf, formats[i],
395 pw->pw_name, *(ptr+1) == '*' ? "*" : pw->pw_passwd,
396 pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gecos, pw->pw_dir,
397 pw->pw_shell);
400 #define FLAGS O_RDWR|O_CREAT
402 if ((dbp = yp_open_db_rw(domain, maps[i], FLAGS)) == NULL) {
403 yp_error("couldn't open %s/%s r/w: %s",domain,
404 maps[i],strerror(errno));
405 return(1);
408 data.data = pwbuf;
409 data.size = strlen(pwbuf);
411 if (yp_put_record(dbp, &key, &data, 1) != YP_TRUE) {
412 yp_error("failed to update record in %s/%s", domain,
413 maps[i]);
414 (dbp->close)(dbp);
415 return(1);
418 key.data = yp_last;
419 key.size = strlen(yp_last);
420 data.data = (char *)&yplastbuf;
421 data.size = strlen(yplastbuf);
423 if (yp_put_record(dbp, &key, &data, 1) != YP_TRUE) {
424 yp_error("failed to update timestamp in %s/%s", domain,
425 maps[i]);
426 (dbp->close)(dbp);
427 return(1);
430 (dbp->close)(dbp);
433 return(0);
436 int *
437 yppasswdproc_update_1_svc(yppasswd *argp, struct svc_req *rqstp)
439 static int result;
440 struct sockaddr_in *rqhost;
441 DBT key, data;
442 int rval = 0;
443 int pfd, tfd;
444 int pid;
445 int passwd_changed = 0;
446 int shell_changed = 0;
447 int gecos_changed = 0;
448 char *oldshell = NULL;
449 char *oldgecos = NULL;
450 char *passfile_hold;
451 char passfile_buf[MAXPATHLEN + 2];
452 char passfile_hold_buf[MAXPATHLEN + 2];
453 char *domain = yppasswd_domain;
454 static struct sockaddr_in clntaddr;
455 static struct timeval t_saved, t_test;
458 * Normal user updates always use the 'default' master.passwd file.
461 passfile = passfile_default;
462 result = 1;
464 rqhost = svc_getcaller(rqstp->rq_xprt);
466 gettimeofday(&t_test, NULL);
467 if (!bcmp(rqhost, &clntaddr, sizeof *rqhost) &&
468 t_test.tv_sec > t_saved.tv_sec &&
469 t_test.tv_sec - t_saved.tv_sec < 300) {
471 bzero(&clntaddr, sizeof clntaddr);
472 bzero(&t_saved, sizeof t_saved);
473 return(NULL);
476 bcopy(rqhost, &clntaddr, sizeof clntaddr);
477 gettimeofday(&t_saved, NULL);
479 if (yp_access(resvport ? "master.passwd.byname" : NULL, rqstp)) {
480 yp_error("rejected update request from unauthorized host");
481 svcerr_auth(rqstp->rq_xprt, AUTH_BADCRED);
482 return(&result);
486 * Step one: find the user. (It's kinda pointless to
487 * proceed if the user doesn't exist.) We look for the
488 * user in the master.passwd.byname database, _NOT_ by
489 * using getpwent() and friends! We can't use getpwent()
490 * since the NIS master server is not guaranteed to be
491 * configured as an NIS client.
494 if (multidomain) {
495 if ((domain = find_domain(&argp->newpw)) == NULL) {
496 yp_error("multidomain lookup failed - aborting update");
497 return(&result);
498 } else
499 yp_error("updating user %s in domain %s",
500 argp->newpw.pw_name, domain);
503 key.data = argp->newpw.pw_name;
504 key.size = strlen(argp->newpw.pw_name);
506 if ((rval = yp_get_record(domain,"master.passwd.byname",
507 &key, &data, 0)) != YP_TRUE) {
508 if (rval == YP_NOKEY) {
509 yp_error("user %s not found in passwd database",
510 argp->newpw.pw_name);
511 } else {
512 yp_error("database access error: %s",
513 yperr_string(rval));
515 return(&result);
518 /* Nul terminate, please. */
519 *((char *)data.data + data.size) = '\0';
521 copy_yp_pass(data.data, 1, data.size);
523 /* Step 2: check that the supplied oldpass is valid. */
525 if (strcmp(crypt(argp->oldpass, yp_password.pw_passwd),
526 yp_password.pw_passwd)) {
527 yp_error("rejected change attempt -- bad password");
528 yp_error("client address: %s username: %s",
529 inet_ntoa(rqhost->sin_addr),
530 argp->newpw.pw_name);
531 return(&result);
534 /* Step 3: validate the arguments passed to us by the client. */
536 if (validate(&yp_password, &argp->newpw)) {
537 yp_error("rejecting change attempt: bad arguments");
538 yp_error("client address: %s username: %s",
539 inet_ntoa(rqhost->sin_addr),
540 argp->newpw.pw_name);
541 svcerr_decode(rqstp->rq_xprt);
542 return(&result);
545 /* Step 4: update the user's passwd structure. */
547 if (!no_chsh && strcmp(argp->newpw.pw_shell, yp_password.pw_shell)) {
548 oldshell = yp_password.pw_shell;
549 yp_password.pw_shell = argp->newpw.pw_shell;
550 shell_changed++;
554 if (!no_chfn && strcmp(argp->newpw.pw_gecos, yp_password.pw_gecos)) {
555 oldgecos = yp_password.pw_gecos;
556 yp_password.pw_gecos = argp->newpw.pw_gecos;
557 gecos_changed++;
560 if (strcmp(argp->newpw.pw_passwd, yp_password.pw_passwd)) {
561 yp_password.pw_passwd = argp->newpw.pw_passwd;
562 yp_password.pw_change = 0;
563 passwd_changed++;
567 * If the caller specified a domain other than our 'default'
568 * domain, change the path to master.passwd accordingly.
571 if (strcmp(domain, yppasswd_domain)) {
572 snprintf(passfile_buf, sizeof(passfile_buf),
573 "%s/%s/master.passwd", yp_dir, domain);
574 passfile = (char *)&passfile_buf;
578 * Create a filename to hold the original master.passwd
579 * so if our call to yppwupdate fails we can roll back
581 snprintf(passfile_hold_buf, sizeof(passfile_hold_buf),
582 "%s.hold", passfile);
583 passfile_hold = (char *)&passfile_hold_buf;
586 /* Step 5: make a new password file with the updated info. */
588 if (pw_init(dirname(passfile), passfile)) {
589 yp_error("pw_init() failed");
590 return &result;
592 if ((pfd = pw_lock()) == -1) {
593 pw_fini();
594 yp_error("pw_lock() failed");
595 return &result;
597 if ((tfd = pw_tmp(-1)) == -1) {
598 pw_fini();
599 yp_error("pw_tmp() failed");
600 return &result;
602 if (pw_copy(pfd, tfd, &yp_password, NULL) == -1) {
603 pw_fini();
604 yp_error("pw_copy() failed");
605 return &result;
607 if (rename(passfile, passfile_hold) == -1) {
608 pw_fini();
609 yp_error("rename of %s to %s failed", passfile,
610 passfile_hold);
611 return &result;
614 if (strcmp(passfile, _PATH_MASTERPASSWD) == 0) {
616 * NIS server is exporting the system's master.passwd.
617 * Call pw_mkdb to rebuild passwd and the .db files
619 if (pw_mkdb(yp_password.pw_name) == -1) {
620 pw_fini();
621 yp_error("pw_mkdb() failed");
622 rename(passfile_hold, passfile);
623 return &result;
625 } else {
627 * NIS server is exporting a private master.passwd.
628 * Rename tempfile into final location
630 if (rename(pw_tempname(), passfile) == -1) {
631 pw_fini();
632 yp_error("rename of %s to %s failed",
633 pw_tempname(), passfile);
634 rename(passfile_hold, passfile);
635 return &result;
639 pw_fini();
641 if (inplace) {
642 if ((rval = update_inplace(&yp_password, domain))) {
643 yp_error("inplace update failed -- rebuilding maps");
647 switch ((pid = fork())) {
648 case 0:
649 if (inplace && !rval) {
650 execlp(MAP_UPDATE_PATH, MAP_UPDATE, passfile,
651 yppasswd_domain, "pushpw", NULL);
652 } else {
653 execlp(MAP_UPDATE_PATH, MAP_UPDATE, passfile,
654 yppasswd_domain, NULL);
656 yp_error("couldn't exec map update process: %s",
657 strerror(errno));
658 unlink(passfile);
659 rename(passfile_hold, passfile);
660 exit(1);
661 break;
662 case -1:
663 yp_error("fork() failed: %s", strerror(errno));
664 unlink(passfile);
665 rename(passfile_hold, passfile);
666 return(&result);
667 break;
668 default:
669 unlink(passfile_hold);
670 break;
673 if (verbose) {
674 yp_error("update completed for user %s (uid %d) in %s:",
675 argp->newpw.pw_name, argp->newpw.pw_uid, passfile);
677 if (passwd_changed)
678 yp_error("password changed");
680 if (gecos_changed)
681 yp_error("gecos changed ('%s' -> '%s')",
682 oldgecos, argp->newpw.pw_gecos);
684 if (shell_changed)
685 yp_error("shell changed ('%s' -> '%s')",
686 oldshell, argp->newpw.pw_shell);
689 result = 0;
690 return (&result);
694 * Note that this function performs a little less sanity checking
695 * than the last one. Since only the superuser is allowed to use it,
696 * it is assumed that the caller knows what he's doing.
698 int *
699 yppasswdproc_update_master_1_svc(master_yppasswd *argp, struct svc_req *rqstp)
701 static int result;
702 int pfd, tfd;
703 int pid;
704 uid_t uid;
705 int rval = 0;
706 DBT key, data;
707 char *passfile_hold;
708 char passfile_buf[MAXPATHLEN + 2];
709 char passfile_hold_buf[MAXPATHLEN + 2];
710 struct sockaddr_in *rqhost;
711 SVCXPRT *transp;
713 result = 1;
714 transp = rqstp->rq_xprt;
717 * NO AF_INET CONNETCIONS ALLOWED!
719 rqhost = svc_getcaller(transp);
720 if (rqhost->sin_family != AF_UNIX) {
721 yp_error("Alert! %s/%d attempted to use superuser-only \
722 procedure!\n", inet_ntoa(rqhost->sin_addr), rqhost->sin_port);
723 svcerr_auth(transp, AUTH_BADCRED);
724 return(&result);
727 if (rqstp->rq_cred.oa_flavor != AUTH_SYS) {
728 yp_error("caller didn't send proper credentials");
729 svcerr_auth(transp, AUTH_BADCRED);
730 return(&result);
733 if (__rpc_get_local_uid(transp, &uid) < 0) {
734 yp_error("caller didn't send proper credentials");
735 svcerr_auth(transp, AUTH_BADCRED);
736 return(&result);
739 if (uid) {
740 yp_error("caller euid is %d, expecting 0 -- rejecting request",
741 uid);
742 svcerr_auth(rqstp->rq_xprt, AUTH_BADCRED);
743 return(&result);
746 passfile = passfile_default;
748 key.data = argp->newpw.pw_name;
749 key.size = strlen(argp->newpw.pw_name);
752 * The superuser may add entries to the passwd maps if
753 * rpc.yppasswdd is started with the -a flag. Paranoia
754 * prevents me from allowing additions by default.
756 if ((rval = yp_get_record(argp->domain, "master.passwd.byname",
757 &key, &data, 0)) != YP_TRUE) {
758 if (rval == YP_NOKEY) {
759 yp_error("user %s not found in passwd database",
760 argp->newpw.pw_name);
761 if (allow_additions)
762 yp_error("notice: adding user %s to \
763 master.passwd database for domain %s", argp->newpw.pw_name, argp->domain);
764 else
765 yp_error("restart rpc.yppasswdd with the -a flag to \
766 allow additions to be made to the password database");
767 } else {
768 yp_error("database access error: %s",
769 yperr_string(rval));
771 if (!allow_additions)
772 return(&result);
773 } else {
775 /* Nul terminate, please. */
776 *((char *)data.data + data.size) = '\0';
778 copy_yp_pass(data.data, 1, data.size);
782 * Perform a small bit of sanity checking.
784 if (validate_master(rval == YP_TRUE ? &yp_password:NULL,&argp->newpw)){
785 yp_error("rejecting update attempt for %s: bad arguments",
786 argp->newpw.pw_name);
787 return(&result);
791 * If the caller specified a domain other than our 'default'
792 * domain, change the path to master.passwd accordingly.
795 if (strcmp(argp->domain, yppasswd_domain)) {
796 snprintf(passfile_buf, sizeof(passfile_buf),
797 "%s/%s/master.passwd", yp_dir, argp->domain);
798 passfile = (char *)&passfile_buf;
802 * Create a filename to hold the original master.passwd
803 * so if our call to yppwupdate fails we can roll back
805 snprintf(passfile_hold_buf, sizeof(passfile_hold_buf),
806 "%s.hold", passfile);
807 passfile_hold = (char *)&passfile_hold_buf;
809 if (pw_init(dirname(passfile), passfile)) {
810 yp_error("pw_init() failed");
811 return &result;
813 if ((pfd = pw_lock()) == -1) {
814 pw_fini();
815 yp_error("pw_lock() failed");
816 return &result;
818 if ((tfd = pw_tmp(-1)) == -1) {
819 pw_fini();
820 yp_error("pw_tmp() failed");
821 return &result;
823 if (pw_copy(pfd, tfd, (struct passwd *)&argp->newpw, NULL) == -1) {
824 pw_fini();
825 yp_error("pw_copy() failed");
826 return &result;
828 if (rename(passfile, passfile_hold) == -1) {
829 pw_fini();
830 yp_error("rename of %s to %s failed", passfile,
831 passfile_hold);
832 return &result;
834 if (strcmp(passfile, _PATH_MASTERPASSWD) == 0) {
836 * NIS server is exporting the system's master.passwd.
837 * Call pw_mkdb to rebuild passwd and the .db files
839 if (pw_mkdb(argp->newpw.pw_name) == -1) {
840 pw_fini();
841 yp_error("pw_mkdb() failed");
842 rename(passfile_hold, passfile);
843 return &result;
845 } else {
847 * NIS server is exporting a private master.passwd.
848 * Rename tempfile into final location
850 if (rename(pw_tempname(), passfile) == -1) {
851 pw_fini();
852 yp_error("rename of %s to %s failed",
853 pw_tempname(), passfile);
854 rename(passfile_hold, passfile);
855 return &result;
858 pw_fini();
860 if (inplace) {
861 if ((rval = update_inplace((struct passwd *)&argp->newpw,
862 argp->domain))) {
863 yp_error("inplace update failed -- rebuilding maps");
867 switch ((pid = fork())) {
868 case 0:
869 if (inplace && !rval) {
870 execlp(MAP_UPDATE_PATH, MAP_UPDATE, passfile,
871 argp->domain, "pushpw", NULL);
872 } else {
873 execlp(MAP_UPDATE_PATH, MAP_UPDATE, passfile,
874 argp->domain, NULL);
876 yp_error("couldn't exec map update process: %s",
877 strerror(errno));
878 unlink(passfile);
879 rename(passfile_hold, passfile);
880 exit(1);
881 break;
882 case -1:
883 yp_error("fork() failed: %s", strerror(errno));
884 unlink(passfile);
885 rename(passfile_hold, passfile);
886 return(&result);
887 break;
888 default:
889 unlink(passfile_hold);
890 break;
893 yp_error("performed update of user %s (uid %d) domain %s",
894 argp->newpw.pw_name,
895 argp->newpw.pw_uid,
896 argp->domain);
898 result = 0;
899 return(&result);