1 /* $OpenBSD: s3_pkt.c,v 1.58 2016/07/10 23:07:34 tedu Exp $ */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
115 #include "ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
118 #include <openssl/evp.h>
120 #include "bytestring.h"
122 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
123 unsigned int len
, int create_empty_fragment
);
124 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL
*s
);
126 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
127 * packet by another n bytes.
128 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
129 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
130 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
131 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
134 ssl3_read_n(SSL
*s
, int n
, int max
, int extend
)
146 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
150 align
= (size_t)rb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
151 align
= (-align
) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1);
154 /* start with empty packet ... */
157 else if (align
!= 0 && left
>= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
158 /* check if next packet length is large
159 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
160 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
161 if (pkt
[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
162 (pkt
[3]<<8|pkt
[4]) >= 128) {
163 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
164 * and its length field is insane, we can
165 * only be led to wrong decision about
166 * whether memmove will occur or not.
167 * Header values has no effect on memmove
168 * arguments and therefore no buffer
169 * overrun can be triggered. */
170 memmove(rb
->buf
+ align
, pkt
, left
);
174 s
->packet
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
175 s
->packet_length
= 0;
176 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
179 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
180 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
181 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
182 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
183 if (left
> 0 && n
> left
)
187 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
189 s
->packet_length
+= n
;
195 /* else we need to read more data */
197 len
= s
->packet_length
;
198 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ align
;
199 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
200 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
201 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
202 if (s
->packet
!= pkt
) {
204 memmove(pkt
, s
->packet
, len
+ left
);
206 rb
->offset
= len
+ align
;
209 if (n
> (int)(rb
->len
- rb
->offset
)) {
210 /* does not happen */
211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
215 if (!s
->read_ahead
) {
216 /* ignore max parameter */
221 if (max
> (int)(rb
->len
- rb
->offset
))
222 max
= rb
->len
- rb
->offset
;
226 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
227 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
228 * len+max if possible) */
231 if (s
->rbio
!= NULL
) {
232 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
233 i
= BIO_read(s
->rbio
, pkt
+ len
+ left
, max
- left
);
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET
);
241 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
244 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
251 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
252 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as
253 * opposed to byte oriented as in the TLS case.
255 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
257 n
= left
; /* makes the while condition false */
261 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
264 s
->packet_length
+= n
;
265 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
269 /* Call this to get a new input record.
270 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
271 * or non-blocking IO.
272 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
273 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
274 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
275 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
277 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
279 ssl3_get_record(SSL
*s
)
282 int enc_err
, n
, i
, ret
= -1;
285 unsigned char md
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
286 unsigned mac_size
, orig_len
;
292 /* check if we have the header */
293 if ((s
->rstate
!= SSL_ST_READ_BODY
) ||
294 (s
->packet_length
< SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
296 uint16_t len
, ssl_version
;
299 n
= ssl3_read_n(s
, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
->s3
->rbuf
.len
, 0);
301 return(n
); /* error or non-blocking */
302 s
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_BODY
;
304 CBS_init(&header
, s
->packet
, n
);
306 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
307 if (!CBS_get_u8(&header
, &type
) ||
308 !CBS_get_u16(&header
, &ssl_version
) ||
309 !CBS_get_u16(&header
, &len
)) {
310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,
311 SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH
);
318 /* Lets check version */
319 if (!s
->first_packet
&& ssl_version
!= s
->version
) {
320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,
321 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
322 if ((s
->version
& 0xFF00) == (ssl_version
& 0xFF00) &&
323 !s
->enc_write_ctx
&& !s
->write_hash
)
324 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
325 s
->version
= ssl_version
;
326 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
330 if ((ssl_version
>> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
) {
331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,
332 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
336 if (rr
->length
> s
->s3
->rbuf
.len
- SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
337 al
= SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,
339 SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
343 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
346 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
348 if (rr
->length
> s
->packet_length
- SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
349 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
351 n
= ssl3_read_n(s
, i
, i
, 1);
353 return(n
); /* error or non-blocking io */
354 /* now n == rr->length,
355 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
358 s
->rstate
=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
; /* set state for later operations */
360 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
361 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
363 rr
->input
= &(s
->packet
[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
]);
365 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
366 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
367 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
368 * the decryption or by the decompression
369 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
370 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
372 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
373 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
375 /* check is not needed I believe */
376 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH
) {
377 al
= SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
382 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
383 rr
->data
= rr
->input
;
385 enc_err
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, 0);
387 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
388 * 1: if the padding is valid
389 * -1: if the padding is invalid */
391 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED
;
392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG
);
397 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
398 if ((sess
!= NULL
) && (s
->enc_read_ctx
!= NULL
) &&
399 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->read_hash
) != NULL
)) {
400 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
401 unsigned char *mac
= NULL
;
402 unsigned char mac_tmp
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
404 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->read_hash
);
405 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
407 /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
408 orig_len
= rr
->length
+ ((unsigned int)rr
->type
>> 8);
410 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
411 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
412 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
413 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
415 if (orig_len
< mac_size
||
416 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
417 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_read_ctx
) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
&&
418 orig_len
< mac_size
+ 1)) {
419 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
424 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_read_ctx
) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
425 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
426 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
427 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
428 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
431 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp
, rr
, mac_size
, orig_len
);
432 rr
->length
-= mac_size
;
434 /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
435 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
436 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
437 rr
->length
-= mac_size
;
438 mac
= &rr
->data
[rr
->length
];
441 i
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
,md
,0 /* not send */);
442 if (i
< 0 || mac
== NULL
||
443 timingsafe_memcmp(md
, mac
, (size_t)mac_size
) != 0)
446 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
+ mac_size
)
452 * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with
453 * TLS 1.0, SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a
454 * decryption failure is directly visible from the ciphertext
455 * anyway, we should not reveal which kind of error
456 * occurred -- this might become visible to an attacker
457 * (e.g. via a logfile)
459 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC
;
460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,
461 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC
);
465 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
) {
466 al
= SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
473 * So at this point the following is true
475 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
476 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
477 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
478 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
482 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
483 s
->packet_length
= 0;
485 /* just read a 0 length packet */
492 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
497 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
498 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
501 ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, int len
)
503 const unsigned char *buf
= buf_
;
504 unsigned int tot
, n
, nw
;
508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
512 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
516 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !s
->in_handshake
) {
517 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
,
522 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
531 if (n
> s
->max_send_fragment
)
532 nw
= s
->max_send_fragment
;
536 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), nw
, 0);
542 if ((i
== (int)n
) || (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
543 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
))) {
545 * Next chunk of data should get another prepended
546 * empty fragment in ciphersuites with known-IV
549 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 0;
560 do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
561 unsigned int len
, int create_empty_fragment
)
563 unsigned char *p
, *plen
;
564 int i
, mac_size
, clear
= 0;
569 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &(s
->s3
->wbuf
);
573 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
))
576 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
577 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
579 return (ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, len
));
581 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
582 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
583 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
586 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
587 /* we may have released our buffer, so get it again */
589 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
))
593 if (len
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
599 if ((sess
== NULL
) || (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) ||
600 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
)) {
601 clear
= s
->enc_write_ctx
? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
604 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
610 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls
613 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
) {
615 * Countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
616 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
618 if (s
->s3
->need_empty_fragments
&&
619 type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
620 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
621 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
622 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
623 * together with the actual payload) */
624 prefix_len
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, buf
, 0, 1);
629 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
)) {
630 /* insufficient space */
631 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
632 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
637 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 1;
640 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
641 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
642 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
643 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
644 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
645 align
= (size_t)wb
->buf
+ 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
646 align
= (-align
) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1);
650 } else if (prefix_len
) {
651 p
= wb
->buf
+ wb
->offset
+ prefix_len
;
653 align
= (size_t)wb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
654 align
= (-align
) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1);
660 /* write the header */
665 *(p
++) = (s
->version
>> 8);
666 /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
667 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
669 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
&& !s
->renegotiate
&&
670 TLS1_get_version(s
) > TLS1_VERSION
)
673 *(p
++) = s
->version
&0xff;
675 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
679 /* Explicit IV length. */
680 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
&& SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
)) {
681 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
682 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
683 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
687 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
688 else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
)
689 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
692 } else if (s
->aead_write_ctx
!= NULL
&&
693 s
->aead_write_ctx
->variable_nonce_in_record
) {
694 eivlen
= s
->aead_write_ctx
->variable_nonce_len
;
698 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
699 wr
->data
= p
+ eivlen
;
700 wr
->length
= (int)len
;
701 wr
->input
= (unsigned char *)buf
;
703 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data */
705 memcpy(wr
->data
, wr
->input
, wr
->length
);
706 wr
->input
= wr
->data
;
708 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
709 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
710 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
713 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
,
714 &(p
[wr
->length
+ eivlen
]), 1) < 0)
716 wr
->length
+= mac_size
;
723 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
726 wr
->length
+= eivlen
;
729 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
730 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, 1);
732 /* record length after mac and block padding */
733 s2n(wr
->length
, plen
);
735 /* we should now have
736 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
738 wr
->type
=type
; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
739 wr
->length
+= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
741 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
742 /* we are in a recursive call;
743 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
748 /* now let's set up wb */
749 wb
->left
= prefix_len
+ wr
->length
;
751 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect
752 * bad write retries later */
753 s
->s3
->wpend_tot
= len
;
754 s
->s3
->wpend_buf
= buf
;
755 s
->s3
->wpend_type
= type
;
756 s
->s3
->wpend_ret
= len
;
758 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
759 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, len
);
764 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
766 ssl3_write_pending(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
, unsigned int len
)
769 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &(s
->s3
->wbuf
);
772 if ((s
->s3
->wpend_tot
> (int)len
) || ((s
->s3
->wpend_buf
!= buf
) &&
773 !(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
)) ||
774 (s
->s3
->wpend_type
!= type
)) {
775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
781 if (s
->wbio
!= NULL
) {
782 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
783 i
= BIO_write(s
->wbio
,
784 (char *)&(wb
->buf
[wb
->offset
]),
785 (unsigned int)wb
->left
);
787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET
);
793 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
795 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
796 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
797 return (s
->s3
->wpend_ret
);
800 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the
801 * whole point in using a datagram service.
812 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
813 * 'type' is one of the following:
815 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
816 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
817 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
819 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
820 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
822 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
823 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
824 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
825 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
826 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
827 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
828 * Change cipher spec protocol
829 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
831 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
833 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
834 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
835 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
836 * Application data protocol
837 * none of our business
840 ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, unsigned char *buf
, int len
, int peek
)
842 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
843 int al
, i
, j
, ret
, rrcount
= 0;
848 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.buf
== NULL
) /* Not initialized yet */
849 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
857 if ((type
&& type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
858 type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) ||
859 (peek
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
860 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
864 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) &&
865 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
866 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
867 unsigned char *src
= s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
868 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
873 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
876 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
--;
879 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
880 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
881 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
886 * Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if
887 * type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
889 if (!s
->in_handshake
&& SSL_in_init(s
)) {
890 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
891 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
896 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
903 * Do not process more than three consecutive records, otherwise the
904 * peer can cause us to loop indefinitely. Instead, return with an
905 * SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ so the caller can choose when to handle further
906 * processing. In the future, the total number of non-handshake and
907 * non-application data records per connection should probably also be
910 if (rrcount
++ >= 3) {
911 if ((bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
)) == NULL
) {
912 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
915 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
916 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
917 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
921 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
924 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
925 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
926 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
927 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
931 /* get new packet if necessary */
932 if ((rr
->length
== 0) || (s
->rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
)) {
933 ret
= ssl3_get_record(s
);
938 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
940 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
941 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
942 && (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
943 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
945 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
949 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
950 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
951 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
953 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
958 /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
959 if (type
== rr
->type
) {
960 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
961 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
962 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
963 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
)) {
964 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
966 SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
973 if ((unsigned int)len
> rr
->length
)
976 n
= (unsigned int)len
;
978 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
980 memset(&(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), 0, n
);
983 if (rr
->length
== 0) {
984 s
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
986 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
987 s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0)
988 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
995 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
996 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1000 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment'
1001 * storage, * fill that so that we can process the data
1004 unsigned int dest_maxlen
= 0;
1005 unsigned char *dest
= NULL
;
1006 unsigned int *dest_len
= NULL
;
1008 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1009 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
1010 dest
= s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
1011 dest_len
= &s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
;
1012 } else if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
1013 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->s3
->alert_fragment
;
1014 dest
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
;
1015 dest_len
= &s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
;
1017 if (dest_maxlen
> 0) {
1018 /* available space in 'dest' */
1019 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
;
1021 n
= rr
->length
; /* available bytes */
1023 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1025 dest
[(*dest_len
)++] = rr
->data
[rr
->off
++];
1029 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
)
1030 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
1034 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1035 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1036 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1038 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1039 if ((!s
->server
) && (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1040 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) &&
1041 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)) {
1042 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
1044 if ((s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[1] != 0) ||
1045 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[2] != 0) ||
1046 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[3] != 0)) {
1047 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST
);
1052 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1053 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
1054 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
, 4, s
,
1055 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1057 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1058 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
) &&
1059 !s
->s3
->renegotiate
) {
1060 ssl3_renegotiate(s
);
1061 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
)) {
1062 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1067 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1071 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1072 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0) {
1073 /* no read-ahead left? */
1074 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1075 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1076 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1077 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1078 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1079 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1080 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1081 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1087 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1088 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1091 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1092 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1093 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1096 SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1097 !s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
1098 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1099 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) &&
1100 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)) {
1101 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1103 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1106 if (s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
>= 2) {
1107 int alert_level
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
[0];
1108 int alert_descr
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
[1];
1110 s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
= 0;
1112 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1113 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
,
1114 s
->s3
->alert_fragment
, 2, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1116 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1117 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1118 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1119 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1122 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1123 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1126 if (alert_level
== 1) {
1128 s
->s3
->warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1129 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
) {
1130 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1133 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1134 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1135 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1136 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1137 * expects it to succeed.
1139 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1140 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1142 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) {
1143 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1145 SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1148 } else if (alert_level
== 2) {
1150 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1151 s
->s3
->fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1153 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1154 ERR_asprintf_error_data("SSL alert number %d",
1156 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1157 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->ctx
, s
->session
);
1160 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1168 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) {
1169 /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1170 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1175 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1176 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1177 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1178 if ((rr
->length
!= 1) || (rr
->off
!= 0) ||
1179 (rr
->data
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
)) {
1180 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1182 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
1186 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1187 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
1188 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1190 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1194 /* Check that we should be receiving a Change Cipher Spec. */
1195 if (!(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
)) {
1196 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1198 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1201 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
1205 if (s
->msg_callback
) {
1206 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
,
1207 SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, rr
->data
, 1, s
,
1208 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1211 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
1212 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
))
1218 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1219 if ((s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) && !s
->in_handshake
) {
1220 if (((s
->state
&SSL_ST_MASK
) == SSL_ST_OK
) &&
1221 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
)) {
1222 s
->state
= s
->server
? SSL_ST_ACCEPT
: SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
1226 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1231 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1235 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1236 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1238 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1239 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1240 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1241 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1242 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1243 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1244 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1245 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1255 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
1256 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
1258 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&&
1259 s
->version
<= TLS1_1_VERSION
) {
1263 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1266 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1268 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1269 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1270 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1271 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1272 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1275 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1276 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1277 * but have application data. If the library was
1278 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1279 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1280 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1281 * we will indulge it.
1283 if (s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
&&
1284 (s
->s3
->total_renegotiations
!= 0) &&
1285 (((s
->state
& SSL_ST_CONNECT
) &&
1286 (s
->state
>= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
) &&
1287 (s
->state
<= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
)) ||
1288 ((s
->state
& SSL_ST_ACCEPT
) &&
1289 (s
->state
<= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
) &&
1290 (s
->state
>= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
)))) {
1291 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
1294 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1302 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1308 ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
)
1314 if (s
->state
& SSL_ST_ACCEPT
)
1315 i
= SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
;
1317 i
= SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
;
1319 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.key_block
== NULL
) {
1320 if (s
->session
== NULL
|| s
->session
->master_key_length
== 0) {
1321 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
1323 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1327 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
1328 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
1332 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
, i
))
1335 /* we have to record the message digest at
1336 * this point so we can get it before we read
1337 * the finished message */
1338 if (s
->state
& SSL_ST_CONNECT
) {
1339 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
1340 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
1342 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
1343 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
1346 i
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
, sender
, slen
,
1347 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
1349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1352 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
= i
;
1358 ssl3_send_alert(SSL
*s
, int level
, int desc
)
1360 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1361 desc
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->alert_value(desc
);
1364 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1365 if ((level
== 2) && (s
->session
!= NULL
))
1366 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->ctx
, s
->session
);
1368 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
= 1;
1369 s
->s3
->send_alert
[0] = level
;
1370 s
->s3
->send_alert
[1] = desc
;
1371 if (s
->s3
->wbuf
.left
== 0) /* data still being written out? */
1372 return s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
1374 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1375 * some time in the future */
1380 ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL
*s
)
1383 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
1385 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
= 0;
1386 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, &s
->s3
->send_alert
[0], 2, 0);
1388 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
= 1;
1390 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1391 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1392 * we will not worry too much. */
1393 if (s
->s3
->send_alert
[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
)
1394 (void)BIO_flush(s
->wbio
);
1396 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1397 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
,
1398 s
->s3
->send_alert
, 2, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1400 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1401 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1402 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1403 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1406 j
= (s
->s3
->send_alert
[0]<<8)|s
->s3
->send_alert
[1];
1407 cb(s
, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT
, j
);