hammer utility - Add force support to cleanup
[dragonfly.git] / crypto / openssh / auth-rsa.c
blob369e66fac4c5074b66322378a4345e7cc509cd85
1 /* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.78 2010/07/13 23:13:16 djm Exp $ */
2 /*
3 * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
4 * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
5 * All rights reserved
6 * RSA-based authentication. This code determines whether to admit a login
7 * based on RSA authentication. This file also contains functions to check
8 * validity of the host key.
10 * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
11 * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
12 * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
13 * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
14 * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
17 #include "includes.h"
19 #include <sys/types.h>
20 #include <sys/stat.h>
22 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
23 #include <openssl/md5.h>
25 #include <pwd.h>
26 #include <stdio.h>
27 #include <stdarg.h>
28 #include <string.h>
30 #include "xmalloc.h"
31 #include "rsa.h"
32 #include "packet.h"
33 #include "ssh1.h"
34 #include "uidswap.h"
35 #include "match.h"
36 #include "buffer.h"
37 #include "pathnames.h"
38 #include "log.h"
39 #include "servconf.h"
40 #include "key.h"
41 #include "auth-options.h"
42 #include "hostfile.h"
43 #include "authfile.h"
44 #include "auth.h"
45 #ifdef GSSAPI
46 #include "ssh-gss.h"
47 #endif
48 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
49 #include "ssh.h"
50 #include "misc.h"
52 /* import */
53 extern ServerOptions options;
56 * Session identifier that is used to bind key exchange and authentication
57 * responses to a particular session.
59 extern u_char session_id[16];
62 * The .ssh/authorized_keys file contains public keys, one per line, in the
63 * following format:
64 * options bits e n comment
65 * where bits, e and n are decimal numbers,
66 * and comment is any string of characters up to newline. The maximum
67 * length of a line is SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES characters. See sshd(8) for a
68 * description of the options.
71 BIGNUM *
72 auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key)
74 BIGNUM *challenge;
75 BN_CTX *ctx;
77 if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
78 fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_new() failed");
79 /* Generate a random challenge. */
80 if (BN_rand(challenge, 256, 0, 0) == 0)
81 fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_rand failed");
82 if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
83 fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_CTX_new failed");
84 if (BN_mod(challenge, challenge, key->rsa->n, ctx) == 0)
85 fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_mod failed");
86 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
88 return challenge;
91 int
92 auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16])
94 u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16];
95 MD5_CTX md;
96 int len;
98 if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
99 return 0;
101 /* don't allow short keys */
102 if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
103 error("auth_rsa_verify_response: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
104 BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
105 return (0);
108 /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
109 len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
110 if (len <= 0 || len > 32)
111 fatal("auth_rsa_verify_response: bad challenge length %d", len);
112 memset(buf, 0, 32);
113 BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len);
114 MD5_Init(&md);
115 MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32);
116 MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16);
117 MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md);
119 /* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
120 if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
121 /* Wrong answer. */
122 return (0);
124 /* Correct answer. */
125 return (1);
129 * Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client,
130 * and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to
131 * our challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer.
135 auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *key)
137 BIGNUM *challenge, *encrypted_challenge;
138 u_char response[16];
139 int i, success;
141 if ((encrypted_challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
142 fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: BN_new() failed");
144 challenge = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key));
146 /* Encrypt the challenge with the public key. */
147 rsa_public_encrypt(encrypted_challenge, challenge, key->rsa);
149 /* Send the encrypted challenge to the client. */
150 packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
151 packet_put_bignum(encrypted_challenge);
152 packet_send();
153 BN_clear_free(encrypted_challenge);
154 packet_write_wait();
156 /* Wait for a response. */
157 packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
158 for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
159 response[i] = (u_char)packet_get_char();
160 packet_check_eom();
162 success = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_verify_response(key, challenge, response));
163 BN_clear_free(challenge);
164 return (success);
168 * check if there's user key matching client_n,
169 * return key if login is allowed, NULL otherwise
173 auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
175 char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *file;
176 int allowed = 0;
177 u_int bits;
178 FILE *f;
179 u_long linenum = 0;
180 Key *key;
182 /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
183 temporarily_use_uid(pw);
185 /* The authorized keys. */
186 file = authorized_keys_file(pw);
187 debug("trying public RSA key file %s", file);
188 f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes);
189 if (!f) {
190 xfree(file);
191 restore_uid();
192 return (0);
195 /* Flag indicating whether the key is allowed. */
196 allowed = 0;
198 key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
201 * Go though the accepted keys, looking for the current key. If
202 * found, perform a challenge-response dialog to verify that the
203 * user really has the corresponding private key.
205 while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
206 char *cp;
207 char *key_options;
208 int keybits;
209 char *fp;
211 /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
212 for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
214 if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
215 continue;
218 * Check if there are options for this key, and if so,
219 * save their starting address and skip the option part
220 * for now. If there are no options, set the starting
221 * address to NULL.
223 if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9') {
224 int quoted = 0;
225 key_options = cp;
226 for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
227 if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
228 cp++; /* Skip both */
229 else if (*cp == '"')
230 quoted = !quoted;
232 } else
233 key_options = NULL;
235 /* Parse the key from the line. */
236 if (hostfile_read_key(&cp, &bits, key) == 0) {
237 debug("%.100s, line %lu: non ssh1 key syntax",
238 file, linenum);
239 continue;
241 /* cp now points to the comment part. */
243 /* Check if the we have found the desired key (identified by its modulus). */
244 if (BN_cmp(key->rsa->n, client_n) != 0)
245 continue;
247 /* check the real bits */
248 keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
249 if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits)
250 logit("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch: "
251 "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
252 file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
254 if (blacklisted_key(key)) {
255 fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
256 if (options.permit_blacklisted_keys)
257 logit("Public key %s blacklisted (see "
258 "ssh-vulnkey(1)); continuing anyway", fp);
259 else
260 logit("Public key %s blacklisted (see "
261 "ssh-vulnkey(1))", fp);
262 xfree(fp);
263 if (!options.permit_blacklisted_keys)
264 continue;
267 /* We have found the desired key. */
269 * If our options do not allow this key to be used,
270 * do not send challenge.
272 if (!auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum))
273 continue;
274 if (key_is_cert_authority)
275 continue;
276 /* break out, this key is allowed */
277 allowed = 1;
278 break;
281 /* Restore the privileged uid. */
282 restore_uid();
284 /* Close the file. */
285 xfree(file);
286 fclose(f);
288 /* return key if allowed */
289 if (allowed && rkey != NULL)
290 *rkey = key;
291 else
292 key_free(key);
293 return (allowed);
297 * Performs the RSA authentication dialog with the client. This returns
298 * 0 if the client could not be authenticated, and 1 if authentication was
299 * successful. This may exit if there is a serious protocol violation.
302 auth_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM *client_n)
304 Key *key;
305 char *fp;
306 struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
308 /* no user given */
309 if (!authctxt->valid)
310 return 0;
312 if (!PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_key_allowed(pw, client_n, &key))) {
313 auth_clear_options();
314 return (0);
317 /* Perform the challenge-response dialog for this key. */
318 if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(key)) {
319 /* Wrong response. */
320 verbose("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
321 packet_send_debug("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
323 * Break out of the loop. Otherwise we might send
324 * another challenge and break the protocol.
326 key_free(key);
327 return (0);
330 * Correct response. The client has been successfully
331 * authenticated. Note that we have not yet processed the
332 * options; this will be reset if the options cause the
333 * authentication to be rejected.
335 fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
336 verbose("Found matching %s key: %s",
337 key_type(key), fp);
338 xfree(fp);
339 key_free(key);
341 packet_send_debug("RSA authentication accepted.");
342 return (1);