2 /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (shenson@bigfoot.com) for the OpenSSL
5 /* ====================================================================
6 * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
12 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
15 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
16 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
17 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
20 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
21 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
22 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
23 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
25 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
26 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
27 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
28 * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
30 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
31 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
32 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
34 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
36 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
37 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
39 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
40 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
41 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
42 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
43 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
44 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
45 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
46 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
48 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
49 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
50 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
51 * ====================================================================
53 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
54 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
55 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
61 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
62 #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
64 static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509
*x
);
66 static int check_ssl_ca(const X509
*x
);
67 static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
, int ca
);
68 static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
, int ca
);
69 static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
, int ca
);
70 static int purpose_smime(const X509
*x
, int ca
);
71 static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
, int ca
);
72 static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
, int ca
);
73 static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
, int ca
);
74 static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
, int ca
);
75 static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
, int ca
);
77 static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE
* const *a
,
78 const X509_PURPOSE
* const *b
);
79 static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE
*p
);
81 static X509_PURPOSE xstandard
[] = {
82 {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT
, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT
, 0, check_purpose_ssl_client
, "SSL client", "sslclient", NULL
},
83 {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER
, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER
, 0, check_purpose_ssl_server
, "SSL server", "sslserver", NULL
},
84 {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER
, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER
, 0, check_purpose_ns_ssl_server
, "Netscape SSL server", "nssslserver", NULL
},
85 {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN
, X509_TRUST_EMAIL
, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign
, "S/MIME signing", "smimesign", NULL
},
86 {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT
, X509_TRUST_EMAIL
, 0, check_purpose_smime_encrypt
, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL
},
87 {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN
, X509_TRUST_COMPAT
, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign
, "CRL signing", "crlsign", NULL
},
88 {X509_PURPOSE_ANY
, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
, 0, no_check
, "Any Purpose", "any", NULL
},
89 {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER
, X509_TRUST_COMPAT
, 0, ocsp_helper
, "OCSP helper", "ocsphelper", NULL
},
92 #define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE))
94 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE
)
96 static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE
) *xptable
= NULL
;
98 static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE
* const *a
,
99 const X509_PURPOSE
* const *b
)
101 return (*a
)->purpose
- (*b
)->purpose
;
104 /* As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509*
105 * I really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const
107 int X509_check_purpose(X509
*x
, int id
, int ca
)
110 const X509_PURPOSE
*pt
;
111 if(!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SET
)) {
112 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
113 x509v3_cache_extensions(x
);
114 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
116 if(id
== -1) return 1;
117 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id
);
118 if(idx
== -1) return -1;
119 pt
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
120 return pt
->check_purpose(pt
, x
, ca
);
123 int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p
, int purpose
)
125 if(X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose
) == -1) {
126 X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET
, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE
);
133 int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void)
135 if(!xptable
) return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT
;
136 return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable
) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT
;
139 X509_PURPOSE
* X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx
)
141 if(idx
< 0) return NULL
;
142 if(idx
< (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT
) return xstandard
+ idx
;
143 return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable
, idx
- X509_PURPOSE_COUNT
);
146 int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname
)
150 for(i
= 0; i
< X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i
++) {
151 xptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(i
);
152 if(!strcmp(xptmp
->sname
, sname
)) return i
;
157 int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose
)
161 if((purpose
>= X509_PURPOSE_MIN
) && (purpose
<= X509_PURPOSE_MAX
))
162 return purpose
- X509_PURPOSE_MIN
;
163 tmp
.purpose
= purpose
;
164 if(!xptable
) return -1;
165 idx
= sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable
, &tmp
);
166 if(idx
== -1) return -1;
167 return idx
+ X509_PURPOSE_COUNT
;
170 int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id
, int trust
, int flags
,
171 int (*ck
)(const X509_PURPOSE
*, const X509
*, int),
172 char *name
, char *sname
, void *arg
)
176 /* This is set according to what we change: application can't set it */
177 flags
&= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC
;
178 /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
179 flags
|= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME
;
180 /* Get existing entry if any */
181 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id
);
182 /* Need a new entry */
184 if(!(ptmp
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE
)))) {
185 X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
188 ptmp
->flags
= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC
;
189 } else ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
191 /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
192 if(ptmp
->flags
& X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME
) {
193 OPENSSL_free(ptmp
->name
);
194 OPENSSL_free(ptmp
->sname
);
196 /* dup supplied name */
197 ptmp
->name
= BUF_strdup(name
);
198 ptmp
->sname
= BUF_strdup(sname
);
199 if(!ptmp
->name
|| !ptmp
->sname
) {
200 X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
203 /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
204 ptmp
->flags
&= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC
;
205 /* Set all other flags */
206 ptmp
->flags
|= flags
;
210 ptmp
->check_purpose
= ck
;
211 ptmp
->usr_data
= arg
;
213 /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
215 if(!xptable
&& !(xptable
= sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp
))) {
216 X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
219 if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable
, ptmp
)) {
220 X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
227 static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE
*p
)
230 if (p
->flags
& X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC
)
232 if (p
->flags
& X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME
) {
233 OPENSSL_free(p
->name
);
234 OPENSSL_free(p
->sname
);
240 void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void)
243 sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable
, xptable_free
);
244 for(i
= 0; i
< X509_PURPOSE_COUNT
; i
++) xptable_free(xstandard
+ i
);
248 int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE
*xp
)
253 char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(X509_PURPOSE
*xp
)
258 char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(X509_PURPOSE
*xp
)
263 int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE
*xp
)
268 static int nid_cmp(int *a
, int *b
)
273 int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION
*ex
)
275 /* This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions:
276 * that is those which are used by the verify process. If
277 * an extension is critical and doesn't appear in this list
278 * then the verify process will normally reject the certificate.
279 * The list must be kept in numerical order because it will be
280 * searched using bsearch.
283 static int supported_nids
[] = {
284 NID_netscape_cert_type
, /* 71 */
285 NID_key_usage
, /* 83 */
286 NID_subject_alt_name
, /* 85 */
287 NID_basic_constraints
, /* 87 */
288 NID_certificate_policies
, /* 89 */
289 NID_ext_key_usage
, /* 126 */
290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
291 NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock
, /* 290 */
292 NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum
, /* 291 */
294 NID_proxyCertInfo
/* 661 */
299 ex_nid
= OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex
));
301 if (ex_nid
== NID_undef
)
304 if (OBJ_bsearch((char *)&ex_nid
, (char *)supported_nids
,
305 sizeof(supported_nids
)/sizeof(int), sizeof(int),
306 (int (*)(const void *, const void *))nid_cmp
))
312 static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509
*x
)
314 BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
*bs
;
315 PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION
*pci
;
316 ASN1_BIT_STRING
*usage
;
318 EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE
*extusage
;
322 if(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SET
) return;
323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
324 X509_digest(x
, EVP_sha1(), x
->sha1_hash
, NULL
);
326 /* Does subject name match issuer ? */
327 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x
), X509_get_issuer_name(x
)))
328 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_SS
;
329 /* V1 should mean no extensions ... */
330 if(!X509_get_version(x
)) x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_V1
;
331 /* Handle basic constraints */
332 if((bs
=X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_basic_constraints
, NULL
, NULL
))) {
333 if(bs
->ca
) x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_CA
;
335 if((bs
->pathlen
->type
== V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER
)
337 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_INVALID
;
339 } else x
->ex_pathlen
= ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs
->pathlen
);
340 } else x
->ex_pathlen
= -1;
341 BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs
);
342 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_BCONS
;
344 /* Handle proxy certificates */
345 if((pci
=X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_proxyCertInfo
, NULL
, NULL
))) {
346 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
347 || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x
, NID_subject_alt_name
, 0) >= 0
348 || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x
, NID_issuer_alt_name
, 0) >= 0) {
349 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_INVALID
;
351 if (pci
->pcPathLengthConstraint
) {
353 ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci
->pcPathLengthConstraint
);
354 } else x
->ex_pcpathlen
= -1;
355 PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci
);
356 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_PROXY
;
358 /* Handle key usage */
359 if((usage
=X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_key_usage
, NULL
, NULL
))) {
360 if(usage
->length
> 0) {
361 x
->ex_kusage
= usage
->data
[0];
362 if(usage
->length
> 1)
363 x
->ex_kusage
|= usage
->data
[1] << 8;
364 } else x
->ex_kusage
= 0;
365 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_KUSAGE
;
366 ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage
);
369 if((extusage
=X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_ext_key_usage
, NULL
, NULL
))) {
370 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE
;
371 for(i
= 0; i
< sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage
); i
++) {
372 switch(OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage
,i
))) {
373 case NID_server_auth
:
374 x
->ex_xkusage
|= XKU_SSL_SERVER
;
377 case NID_client_auth
:
378 x
->ex_xkusage
|= XKU_SSL_CLIENT
;
381 case NID_email_protect
:
382 x
->ex_xkusage
|= XKU_SMIME
;
386 x
->ex_xkusage
|= XKU_CODE_SIGN
;
391 x
->ex_xkusage
|= XKU_SGC
;
395 x
->ex_xkusage
|= XKU_OCSP_SIGN
;
399 x
->ex_xkusage
|= XKU_TIMESTAMP
;
403 x
->ex_xkusage
|= XKU_DVCS
;
407 sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage
, ASN1_OBJECT_free
);
410 if((ns
=X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_netscape_cert_type
, NULL
, NULL
))) {
411 if(ns
->length
> 0) x
->ex_nscert
= ns
->data
[0];
412 else x
->ex_nscert
= 0;
413 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_NSCERT
;
414 ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns
);
416 x
->skid
=X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_subject_key_identifier
, NULL
, NULL
);
417 x
->akid
=X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_authority_key_identifier
, NULL
, NULL
);
418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
419 x
->rfc3779_addr
=X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock
, NULL
, NULL
);
420 x
->rfc3779_asid
=X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum
,
423 for (i
= 0; i
< X509_get_ext_count(x
); i
++)
425 ex
= X509_get_ext(x
, i
);
426 if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex
))
428 if (!X509_supported_extension(ex
))
430 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_CRITICAL
;
434 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_SET
;
437 /* CA checks common to all purposes
441 * 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA
442 * 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1.
443 * 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted.
446 #define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
447 #define ku_reject(x, usage) \
448 (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
449 #define xku_reject(x, usage) \
450 (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
451 #define ns_reject(x, usage) \
452 (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
454 static int check_ca(const X509
*x
)
456 /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */
457 if(ku_reject(x
, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN
)) return 0;
458 if(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_BCONS
) {
459 if(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) return 1;
460 /* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */
463 /* we support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */
464 if((x
->ex_flags
& V1_ROOT
) == V1_ROOT
) return 3;
465 /* If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it */
466 else if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) return 4;
467 /* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */
468 else if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_NSCERT
469 && x
->ex_nscert
& NS_ANY_CA
) return 5;
470 /* can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it */
475 int X509_check_ca(X509
*x
)
477 if(!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SET
)) {
478 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
479 x509v3_cache_extensions(x
);
480 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
486 /* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */
487 static int check_ssl_ca(const X509
*x
)
490 ca_ret
= check_ca(x
);
491 if(!ca_ret
) return 0;
492 /* check nsCertType if present */
493 if(ca_ret
!= 5 || x
->ex_nscert
& NS_SSL_CA
) return ca_ret
;
498 static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
, int ca
)
500 if(xku_reject(x
,XKU_SSL_CLIENT
)) return 0;
501 if(ca
) return check_ssl_ca(x
);
502 /* We need to do digital signatures with it */
503 if(ku_reject(x
,KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE
)) return 0;
504 /* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */
505 if(ns_reject(x
, NS_SSL_CLIENT
)) return 0;
509 static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
, int ca
)
511 if(xku_reject(x
,XKU_SSL_SERVER
|XKU_SGC
)) return 0;
512 if(ca
) return check_ssl_ca(x
);
514 if(ns_reject(x
, NS_SSL_SERVER
)) return 0;
515 /* Now as for keyUsage: we'll at least need to sign OR encipher */
516 if(ku_reject(x
, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE
|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT
)) return 0;
522 static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
, int ca
)
525 ret
= check_purpose_ssl_server(xp
, x
, ca
);
526 if(!ret
|| ca
) return ret
;
527 /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */
528 if(ku_reject(x
, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT
)) return 0;
532 /* common S/MIME checks */
533 static int purpose_smime(const X509
*x
, int ca
)
535 if(xku_reject(x
,XKU_SMIME
)) return 0;
538 ca_ret
= check_ca(x
);
539 if(!ca_ret
) return 0;
540 /* check nsCertType if present */
541 if(ca_ret
!= 5 || x
->ex_nscert
& NS_SMIME_CA
) return ca_ret
;
544 if(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_NSCERT
) {
545 if(x
->ex_nscert
& NS_SMIME
) return 1;
546 /* Workaround for some buggy certificates */
547 if(x
->ex_nscert
& NS_SSL_CLIENT
) return 2;
553 static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
, int ca
)
556 ret
= purpose_smime(x
, ca
);
557 if(!ret
|| ca
) return ret
;
558 if(ku_reject(x
, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE
|KU_NON_REPUDIATION
)) return 0;
562 static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
, int ca
)
565 ret
= purpose_smime(x
, ca
);
566 if(!ret
|| ca
) return ret
;
567 if(ku_reject(x
, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT
)) return 0;
571 static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
, int ca
)
575 if((ca_ret
= check_ca(x
)) != 2) return ca_ret
;
578 if(ku_reject(x
, KU_CRL_SIGN
)) return 0;
582 /* OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that
583 * each CA is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain.
586 static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
, int ca
)
588 /* Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know"
590 if(ca
) return check_ca(x
);
591 /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
595 static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
, int ca
)
600 /* Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second.
601 * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates
602 * which have been looked up using some simple method such as by
605 * 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer)
606 * 2. If akid(subject) exists check it matches issuer
607 * 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing
608 * returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match
609 * codes for X509_verify_cert()
612 int X509_check_issued(X509
*issuer
, X509
*subject
)
614 if(X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer
),
615 X509_get_issuer_name(subject
)))
616 return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH
;
617 x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer
);
618 x509v3_cache_extensions(subject
);
620 /* Check key ids (if present) */
621 if(subject
->akid
->keyid
&& issuer
->skid
&&
622 ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(subject
->akid
->keyid
, issuer
->skid
) )
623 return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH
;
624 /* Check serial number */
625 if(subject
->akid
->serial
&&
626 ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer
),
627 subject
->akid
->serial
))
628 return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH
;
629 /* Check issuer name */
630 if(subject
->akid
->issuer
) {
631 /* Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes
632 * SEQUENCE OF GeneralName. So look for a DirName.
633 * There may be more than one but we only take any
634 * notice of the first.
638 X509_NAME
*nm
= NULL
;
640 gens
= subject
->akid
->issuer
;
641 for(i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens
); i
++) {
642 gen
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens
, i
);
643 if(gen
->type
== GEN_DIRNAME
) {
648 if(nm
&& X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer
)))
649 return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH
;
652 if(subject
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
)
654 if(ku_reject(issuer
, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE
))
655 return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE
;
657 else if(ku_reject(issuer
, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN
))
658 return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN
;