1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
73 static int null_callback(int ok
,X509_STORE_CTX
*e
);
74 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
);
75 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
);
76 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
77 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
78 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
79 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
80 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
81 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
82 const char X509_version
[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT
;
85 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
)
91 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509
**a
, X509
**b
)
93 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a
,*b
);
97 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
99 X509
*x
,*xtmp
,*chain_ss
=NULL
;
102 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
= ctx
->param
;
105 int (*cb
)(int xok
,X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
106 STACK_OF(X509
) *sktmp
=NULL
;
107 if (ctx
->cert
== NULL
)
109 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY
);
115 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
116 * present and that the first entry is in place */
117 if (ctx
->chain
== NULL
)
119 if ( ((ctx
->chain
=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) ||
120 (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
,ctx
->cert
)))
122 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
125 CRYPTO_add(&ctx
->cert
->references
,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
126 ctx
->last_untrusted
=1;
129 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
130 if (ctx
->untrusted
!= NULL
131 && (sktmp
=sk_X509_dup(ctx
->untrusted
)) == NULL
)
133 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
137 num
=sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
138 x
=sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
,num
-1);
144 /* If we have enough, we break */
145 if (depth
< num
) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
146 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
147 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
151 /* If we are self signed, we break */
152 xn
=X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
153 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
,x
)) break;
155 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
156 if (ctx
->untrusted
!= NULL
)
158 xtmp
=find_issuer(ctx
, sktmp
,x
);
161 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
,xtmp
))
163 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
166 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp
->references
,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
167 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp
,xtmp
);
168 ctx
->last_untrusted
++;
171 /* reparse the full chain for
179 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
180 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
181 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
183 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
187 i
=sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
188 x
=sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
,i
-1);
189 xn
= X509_get_subject_name(x
);
190 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, x
))
192 /* we have a self signed certificate */
193 if (sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1)
195 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
196 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
197 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
199 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
200 if ((ok
<= 0) || X509_cmp(x
, xtmp
))
202 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
;
204 ctx
->error_depth
=i
-1;
205 if (ok
== 1) X509_free(xtmp
);
212 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
213 * so we get any trust settings.
217 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, i
- 1, x
);
218 ctx
->last_untrusted
=0;
223 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
224 chain_ss
=sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
);
225 ctx
->last_untrusted
--;
227 x
=sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
,num
-1);
231 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
234 /* If we have enough, we break */
235 if (depth
< num
) break;
237 /* If we are self signed, we break */
238 xn
=X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
239 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
,x
,x
)) break;
241 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
243 if (ok
< 0) return ok
;
247 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
,x
))
250 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
256 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
257 xn
=X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
259 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
260 if (!ctx
->check_issued(ctx
,x
,x
))
262 if ((chain_ss
== NULL
) || !ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, chain_ss
))
264 if (ctx
->last_untrusted
>= num
)
265 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
;
267 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
;
273 sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
,chain_ss
);
275 ctx
->last_untrusted
=num
;
276 ctx
->current_cert
=chain_ss
;
277 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
;
281 ctx
->error_depth
=num
-1;
287 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
288 ok
= check_chain_extensions(ctx
);
292 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
294 if (param
->trust
> 0) ok
= check_trust(ctx
);
298 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
299 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
,ctx
->chain
);
301 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
302 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
305 ok
= ctx
->check_revocation(ctx
);
308 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
309 if (ctx
->verify
!= NULL
)
312 ok
=internal_verify(ctx
);
315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
316 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
317 ok
= v3_asid_validate_path(ctx
);
319 ok
= v3_addr_validate_path(ctx
);
323 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
324 if (!bad_chain
&& (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK
))
325 ok
= ctx
->check_policy(ctx
);
330 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
,ctx
->chain
);
332 if (sktmp
!= NULL
) sk_X509_free(sktmp
);
333 if (chain_ss
!= NULL
) X509_free(chain_ss
);
338 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
341 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
)
345 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++)
347 issuer
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
348 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, issuer
))
354 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
356 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
)
359 ret
= X509_check_issued(issuer
, x
);
360 if (ret
== X509_V_OK
)
362 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
363 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK
))
367 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
368 ctx
->current_issuer
= issuer
;
369 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
373 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
375 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
377 *issuer
= find_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->other_ctx
, x
);
380 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer
)->references
,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
388 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
389 * with the supplied purpose
392 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
394 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
397 int i
, ok
=0, must_be_ca
, plen
= 0;
399 int (*cb
)(int xok
,X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
400 int proxy_path_length
= 0;
401 int allow_proxy_certs
=
402 !!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS
);
405 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
406 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
407 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
408 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
409 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
410 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
411 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
415 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
417 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
418 allow_proxy_certs
= 1;
420 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
421 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->last_untrusted
; i
++)
424 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
425 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
426 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
))
428 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
;
429 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
430 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
434 if (!allow_proxy_certs
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
))
436 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED
;
437 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
438 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
442 ret
= X509_check_ca(x
);
446 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
447 && (ret
!= 1) && (ret
!= 0))
450 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
459 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA
;
466 || ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
470 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
478 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
479 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
483 if (ctx
->param
->purpose
> 0)
485 ret
= X509_check_purpose(x
, ctx
->param
->purpose
,
488 || ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
491 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
;
492 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
493 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
498 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
499 if ((i
> 1) && !(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
)
500 && (x
->ex_pathlen
!= -1)
501 && (plen
> (x
->ex_pathlen
+ proxy_path_length
+ 1)))
503 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
;
504 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
505 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
509 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
510 if (!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
))
512 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
513 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
514 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
516 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
)
518 if (x
->ex_pcpathlen
!= -1 && i
> x
->ex_pcpathlen
)
521 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
;
522 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
523 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
539 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
541 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
546 int (*cb
)(int xok
,X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
548 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
549 i
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
550 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
551 ok
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
552 if (ok
== X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
)
554 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
555 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
556 if (ok
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
)
557 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
;
559 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
;
565 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
568 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
))
570 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL
)
571 last
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
574 for(i
= 0; i
<= last
; i
++)
576 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
577 ok
= check_cert(ctx
);
583 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
585 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
;
588 cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
589 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
);
590 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
591 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
592 ok
= ctx
->get_crl(ctx
, &crl
, x
);
593 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
598 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
;
599 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
602 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
603 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, crl
);
605 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, crl
, x
);
607 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
613 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
615 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int notify
)
619 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
620 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
621 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
625 i
=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
628 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
;
629 if (!notify
|| !ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
635 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
;
636 if (!notify
|| !ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
640 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl
))
642 i
=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
646 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
;
647 if (!notify
|| !ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
653 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
;
654 if (!notify
|| !ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
659 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
664 /* Lookup CRLs from the supplied list. Look for matching isser name
665 * and validity. If we can't find a valid CRL return the last one
666 * with matching name. This gives more meaningful error codes. Otherwise
667 * we'd get a CRL not found error if a CRL existed with matching name but
671 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**pcrl
,
672 X509_NAME
*nm
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
675 X509_CRL
*crl
, *best_crl
= NULL
;
676 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++)
678 crl
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
679 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
)))
681 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 0))
684 CRYPTO_add(&crl
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
692 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
698 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a
699 * subject lookup: maybe use AKID later...
701 static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509
*x
)
704 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
;
707 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
708 ok
= get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, nm
, ctx
->crls
);
715 ok
= X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx
, X509_LU_CRL
, nm
, &xobj
);
719 /* If we got a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
728 *pcrl
= xobj
.data
.crl
;
734 /* Check CRL validity */
735 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
)
738 EVP_PKEY
*ikey
= NULL
;
739 int ok
= 0, chnum
, cnum
;
740 cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
741 chnum
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
742 /* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
743 * is next certificate in chain.
746 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
+ 1);
749 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, chnum
);
750 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
751 if(!ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, issuer
, issuer
))
753 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
;
754 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
761 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
762 if ((issuer
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) &&
763 !(issuer
->ex_kusage
& KU_CRL_SIGN
))
765 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN
;
766 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
770 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
771 ikey
= X509_get_pubkey(issuer
);
775 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
;
776 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
781 /* Verify CRL signature */
782 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl
, ikey
) <= 0)
784 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
;
785 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
791 ok
= check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 1);
802 /* Check certificate against CRL */
803 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
807 STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION
) *exts
;
809 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */
810 rtmp
.serialNumber
= X509_get_serialNumber(x
);
811 /* Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted.
812 * Do this under a lock to avoid race condition.
814 if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl
->crl
->revoked
))
816 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL
);
817 sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl
->crl
->revoked
);
818 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL
);
820 idx
= sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl
->crl
->revoked
, &rtmp
);
821 /* If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
822 * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
826 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
;
827 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
831 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
834 /* See if we have any critical CRL extensions: since we
835 * currently don't handle any CRL extensions the CRL must be
837 * This code accesses the X509_CRL structure directly: applications
841 exts
= crl
->crl
->extensions
;
843 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts
); idx
++)
845 ext
= sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts
, idx
);
846 if (ext
->critical
> 0)
849 X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION
;
850 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
858 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
861 ret
= X509_policy_check(&ctx
->tree
, &ctx
->explicit_policy
, ctx
->chain
,
862 ctx
->param
->policies
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
865 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
868 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
871 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
876 for (i
= 1; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++)
878 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
879 if (!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY
))
881 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
882 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION
;
883 ret
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
889 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
890 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY
;
891 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
894 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY
)
896 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
897 ctx
->error
= X509_V_OK
;
898 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(2, ctx
))
905 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
910 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
911 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
915 i
=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x
), ptime
);
918 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
;
920 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
926 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
;
928 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
932 i
=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x
), ptime
);
935 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
;
937 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
943 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
;
945 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
952 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
957 int (*cb
)(int xok
,X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
961 n
=sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
962 ctx
->error_depth
=n
-1;
964 xi
=sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
,n
);
966 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, xi
, xi
))
972 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
;
973 ctx
->current_cert
=xi
;
981 xs
=sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
,n
);
985 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
991 if ((pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(xi
)) == NULL
)
993 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
;
994 ctx
->current_cert
=xi
;
998 else if (X509_verify(xs
,pkey
) <= 0)
999 /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert,
1000 * this is a waste of time. That check should
1001 * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
1002 * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
1003 * we don't verify again and again in SSL
1004 * handshakes and the like once the cert has
1005 * been declared trusted. */
1007 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
;
1008 ctx
->current_cert
=xs
;
1012 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1016 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1022 ok
= check_cert_time(ctx
, xs
);
1026 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1027 ctx
->current_issuer
=xi
;
1028 ctx
->current_cert
=xs
;
1036 xs
=sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
,n
);
1044 int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME
*ctm
)
1046 return X509_cmp_time(ctm
, NULL
);
1049 int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME
*ctm
, time_t *cmp_time
)
1054 char buff1
[24],buff2
[24],*p
;
1059 str
=(char *)ctm
->data
;
1060 if (ctm
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
)
1062 if ((i
< 11) || (i
> 17)) return 0;
1069 if (i
< 13) return 0;
1075 if ((*str
== 'Z') || (*str
== '-') || (*str
== '+'))
1076 { *(p
++)='0'; *(p
++)='0'; }
1081 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1085 while ((*str
>= '0') && (*str
<= '9')) str
++;
1096 if ((*str
!= '+') && (*str
!= '-'))
1098 offset
=((str
[1]-'0')*10+(str
[2]-'0'))*60;
1099 offset
+=(str
[3]-'0')*10+(str
[4]-'0');
1104 atm
.length
=sizeof(buff2
);
1105 atm
.data
=(unsigned char *)buff2
;
1107 if (X509_time_adj(&atm
,-offset
*60, cmp_time
) == NULL
)
1110 if (ctm
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
)
1112 i
=(buff1
[0]-'0')*10+(buff1
[1]-'0');
1113 if (i
< 50) i
+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1114 j
=(buff2
[0]-'0')*10+(buff2
[1]-'0');
1117 if (i
< j
) return -1;
1118 if (i
> j
) return 1;
1120 i
=strcmp(buff1
,buff2
);
1121 if (i
== 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1127 ASN1_TIME
*X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long adj
)
1129 return X509_time_adj(s
, adj
, NULL
);
1132 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long adj
, time_t *in_tm
)
1137 if (in_tm
) t
= *in_tm
;
1141 if (s
) type
= s
->type
;
1142 if (type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s
,t
);
1143 if (type
== V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s
, t
);
1144 return ASN1_TIME_set(s
, t
);
1147 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
1149 EVP_PKEY
*ktmp
=NULL
,*ktmp2
;
1152 if ((pkey
!= NULL
) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) return 1;
1154 for (i
=0; i
<sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++)
1156 ktmp
=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
,i
));
1159 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY
);
1162 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp
))
1166 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp
);
1172 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN
);
1176 /* first, populate the other certs */
1177 for (j
=i
-1; j
>= 0; j
--)
1179 ktmp2
=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
,j
));
1180 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2
,ktmp
);
1181 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2
);
1184 if (pkey
!= NULL
) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey
,ktmp
);
1185 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp
);
1189 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl
, void *argp
, CRYPTO_EX_new
*new_func
,
1190 CRYPTO_EX_dup
*dup_func
, CRYPTO_EX_free
*free_func
)
1192 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1193 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1194 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, argl
, argp
,
1195 new_func
, dup_func
, free_func
);
1198 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
, void *data
)
1200 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
,idx
,data
);
1203 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
)
1205 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
,idx
);
1208 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1213 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int err
)
1218 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1220 return ctx
->error_depth
;
1223 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1225 return ctx
->current_cert
;
1228 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1233 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1237 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
;
1238 if (!ctx
->chain
|| !(chain
= sk_X509_dup(ctx
->chain
))) return NULL
;
1239 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++)
1241 x
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
1242 CRYPTO_add(&x
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
1247 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
1252 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
1257 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *sk
)
1262 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int purpose
)
1264 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, purpose
, 0);
1267 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int trust
)
1269 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, 0, trust
);
1272 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1273 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1274 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1275 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1276 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1277 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1278 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1279 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1282 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int def_purpose
,
1283 int purpose
, int trust
)
1286 /* If purpose not set use default */
1287 if (!purpose
) purpose
= def_purpose
;
1288 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1292 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose
);
1295 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
1296 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
1299 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
1300 if (ptmp
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
)
1302 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose
);
1305 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
1306 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
1309 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
1311 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1312 if (!trust
) trust
= ptmp
->trust
;
1316 idx
= X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust
);
1319 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
1320 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID
);
1325 if (purpose
&& !ctx
->param
->purpose
) ctx
->param
->purpose
= purpose
;
1326 if (trust
&& !ctx
->param
->trust
) ctx
->param
->trust
= trust
;
1330 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1332 X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
;
1333 ctx
= (X509_STORE_CTX
*)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX
));
1336 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1339 memset(ctx
, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX
));
1343 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1345 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
1349 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_STORE
*store
, X509
*x509
,
1350 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
1354 ctx
->current_method
=0;
1356 ctx
->untrusted
=chain
;
1358 ctx
->last_untrusted
=0;
1359 ctx
->other_ctx
=NULL
;
1363 ctx
->explicit_policy
=0;
1365 ctx
->current_cert
=NULL
;
1366 ctx
->current_issuer
=NULL
;
1369 ctx
->param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
1373 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1377 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
1383 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, store
->param
);
1385 ctx
->param
->flags
|= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT
|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE
;
1389 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
1390 ctx
->cleanup
= store
->cleanup
;
1396 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
,
1397 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
1401 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1405 if (store
&& store
->check_issued
)
1406 ctx
->check_issued
= store
->check_issued
;
1408 ctx
->check_issued
= check_issued
;
1410 if (store
&& store
->get_issuer
)
1411 ctx
->get_issuer
= store
->get_issuer
;
1413 ctx
->get_issuer
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer
;
1415 if (store
&& store
->verify_cb
)
1416 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
1418 ctx
->verify_cb
= null_callback
;
1420 if (store
&& store
->verify
)
1421 ctx
->verify
= store
->verify
;
1423 ctx
->verify
= internal_verify
;
1425 if (store
&& store
->check_revocation
)
1426 ctx
->check_revocation
= store
->check_revocation
;
1428 ctx
->check_revocation
= check_revocation
;
1430 if (store
&& store
->get_crl
)
1431 ctx
->get_crl
= store
->get_crl
;
1433 ctx
->get_crl
= get_crl
;
1435 if (store
&& store
->check_crl
)
1436 ctx
->check_crl
= store
->check_crl
;
1438 ctx
->check_crl
= check_crl
;
1440 if (store
&& store
->cert_crl
)
1441 ctx
->cert_crl
= store
->cert_crl
;
1443 ctx
->cert_crl
= cert_crl
;
1445 ctx
->check_policy
= check_policy
;
1448 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
1449 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
1450 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
1451 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
1452 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
,
1456 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1462 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
1463 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
1466 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
1468 ctx
->other_ctx
= sk
;
1469 ctx
->get_issuer
= get_issuer_sk
;
1472 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1474 if (ctx
->cleanup
) ctx
->cleanup(ctx
);
1475 if (ctx
->param
!= NULL
)
1477 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
1480 if (ctx
->tree
!= NULL
)
1482 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx
->tree
);
1485 if (ctx
->chain
!= NULL
)
1487 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx
->chain
,X509_free
);
1490 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
, &(ctx
->ex_data
));
1491 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA
));
1494 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
1496 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx
->param
, depth
);
1499 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
)
1501 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx
->param
, flags
);
1504 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
, time_t t
)
1506 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx
->param
, t
);
1509 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1510 int (*verify_cb
)(int, X509_STORE_CTX
*))
1512 ctx
->verify_cb
=verify_cb
;
1515 X509_POLICY_TREE
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1520 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1522 return ctx
->explicit_policy
;
1525 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
1527 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
;
1528 param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name
);
1531 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, param
);
1534 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1539 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
)
1542 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
1546 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509
)
1547 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509
)
1549 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME
)
1551 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE
)
1552 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE
)