2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
125 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
129 #include "ssl_locl.h"
130 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
131 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
132 #include <openssl/rand.h>
133 #include <openssl/objects.h>
134 #include <openssl/evp.h>
135 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
136 #include <openssl/x509.h>
137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
138 #include <openssl/dh.h>
140 #include <openssl/bn.h>
141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
142 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
144 #include <openssl/md5.h>
146 static SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
);
147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
148 static int nid2curve_id(int nid
);
151 static SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
)
153 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
154 return(SSLv3_server_method());
159 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method
,
161 ssl_undefined_function
,
162 ssl3_get_server_method
)
164 int ssl3_accept(SSL
*s
)
167 unsigned long l
,Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
);
168 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type
,int val
)=NULL
;
171 int new_state
,state
,skip
=0;
173 RAND_add(&Time
,sizeof(Time
),0);
177 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
179 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
180 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
182 /* init things to blank */
184 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) SSL_clear(s
);
188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET
);
198 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
200 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
204 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
205 case SSL_ST_OK
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
208 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
,1);
210 if ((s
->version
>>8) != 3)
212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
215 s
->type
=SSL_ST_ACCEPT
;
217 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
)
219 if ((buf
=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
)
224 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
))
232 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
))
240 if (s
->state
!= SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
)
242 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
243 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
245 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
,1)) { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
247 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
248 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
249 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
253 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
254 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
255 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
256 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
;
260 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
:
261 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
:
264 ret
=ssl3_send_hello_request(s
);
265 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
266 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
;
267 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
273 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
:
277 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
278 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
279 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
:
282 ret
=ssl3_get_client_hello(s
);
283 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
285 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
289 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
290 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
291 ret
=ssl3_send_server_hello(s
);
292 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
293 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
296 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
297 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
299 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
303 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
306 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
310 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
:
311 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
:
312 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */
313 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
& SSL_aNULL
)
314 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
& SSL_aKRB5
))
316 ret
=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s
);
317 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
319 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
320 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
;
322 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
327 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
334 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
339 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
341 l
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
;
343 /* clear this, it may get reset by
344 * send_server_key_exchange */
345 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
)
346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
348 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
350 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
351 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
352 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
353 * be able to handle this) */
354 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
356 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=0;
359 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
360 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
362 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
363 * message only if the cipher suite is either
364 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
365 * server certificate contains the server's
366 * public key for key exchange.
368 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
370 || (l
& (SSL_DH
|SSL_kFZA
))
372 && (s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
== NULL
373 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
374 && EVP_PKEY_size(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
380 ret
=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s
);
381 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
386 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
;
390 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
:
391 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
:
392 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
393 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) ||
394 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
395 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
396 ((s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) &&
397 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
)) ||
398 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
399 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
400 * and in RFC 2246): */
401 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
& SSL_aNULL
) &&
402 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
403 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
404 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) ||
405 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
406 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
& SSL_aKRB5
))
408 /* no cert request */
410 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=0;
411 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
415 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=1;
416 ret
=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s
);
417 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
418 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
419 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
421 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
422 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
428 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
:
429 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
:
430 ret
=ssl3_send_server_done(s
);
431 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
432 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
433 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
437 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
:
438 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
439 num1
=BIO_ctrl(s
->wbio
,BIO_CTRL_INFO
,0,NULL
);
442 s
->rwstate
=SSL_WRITING
;
443 num1
=BIO_flush(s
->wbio
);
444 if (num1
<= 0) { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
445 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
448 s
->state
=s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
451 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
:
452 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B
:
453 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
454 ret
= ssl3_check_client_hello(s
);
458 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
;
460 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
462 ret
=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s
);
463 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
466 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
470 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
471 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
472 ret
=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s
);
477 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
478 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
479 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
480 * message is not sent.
482 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
487 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
490 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
491 * a client cert, it can be verified
493 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
494 &(s
->s3
->finish_dgst1
),
495 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[0]));
496 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
497 &(s
->s3
->finish_dgst2
),
498 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]));
502 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
:
503 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
:
505 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
506 ret
=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s
);
507 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
509 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
513 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
:
514 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
:
515 ret
=ssl3_get_finished(s
,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
,
516 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
);
517 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
521 else if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
522 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
525 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
530 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
531 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
532 ret
=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s
);
533 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
534 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
538 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
:
539 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
:
540 ret
=ssl3_send_cert_status(s
);
541 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
542 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
548 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
:
549 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
:
551 s
->session
->cipher
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
552 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
553 { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
555 ret
=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
556 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
);
558 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
559 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
;
562 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
563 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
571 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
:
572 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
:
573 ret
=ssl3_send_finished(s
,
574 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
,
575 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
576 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
577 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
578 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
580 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
582 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL_ST_OK
;
587 /* clean a few things up */
588 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
590 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
593 /* remove buffering on output */
594 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
598 if (s
->new_session
== 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
600 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
601 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
605 ssl_update_cache(s
,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
607 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
609 s
->handshake_func
=ssl3_accept
;
611 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
,1);
619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
625 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
)
629 if ((ret
=BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
634 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
))
638 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP
,1);
645 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
649 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT
,ret
);
653 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
657 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
)
659 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
660 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
665 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
;
666 /* number of bytes to write */
671 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
672 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
675 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
680 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
681 * so permit appropriate message length */
682 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
688 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
689 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
690 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
)
692 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
693 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
694 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
695 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
697 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
699 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
700 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
708 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
710 int i
,j
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
711 unsigned int cookie_len
;
714 unsigned char *p
,*d
,*q
;
716 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
719 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
=NULL
;
721 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
722 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
723 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
724 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
727 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
)
729 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
732 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
733 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
,
734 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
,
735 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
736 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
739 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
741 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
743 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
744 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
745 s
->client_version
=(((int)p
[0])<<8)|(int)p
[1];
748 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
> s
->version
) ||
749 (s
->version
!= DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
< s
->version
))
751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
752 if ((s
->client_version
>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
)
754 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
755 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
757 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
761 /* load the client random */
762 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
,p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
765 /* get the session-id */
769 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
770 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
771 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
772 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
773 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
774 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
775 * an earlier library version)
777 if ((s
->new_session
&& (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
)))
779 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
784 i
=ssl_get_prev_session(s
, p
, j
, d
+ n
);
786 { /* previous session */
793 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
800 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
)
805 if ( (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) &&
806 s
->d1
->send_cookie
== 0)
808 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
809 if ( cookie_len
!= s
->d1
->cookie_len
)
811 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
818 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
819 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
820 * does not cause an overflow.
822 if ( cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
))
825 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
826 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
830 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
831 if ( (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) &&
834 memcpy(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, p
, cookie_len
);
836 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
)
838 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
,
841 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
843 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
846 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
848 else if ( memcmp(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
849 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) /* default verification */
851 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
852 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
853 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
862 if ((i
== 0) && (j
!= 0))
864 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
865 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
871 /* not enough data */
872 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
876 if ((i
> 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
,p
,i
,&(ciphers
))
883 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
884 if ((s
->hit
) && (i
> 0))
887 id
=s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
890 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers
));
892 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++)
894 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
,i
);
896 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
897 i
,sk_num(ciphers
),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
907 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
) == 1))
909 /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
910 s
->session
->cipher
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, 0);
914 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
915 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
916 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
917 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
927 /* not enough data */
928 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
935 if (p
[j
] == 0) break;
942 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
947 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
949 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
)
951 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
,&p
,d
,n
, &al
))
953 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
954 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
958 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
963 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
964 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
965 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
966 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=NULL
;
967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
968 if (s
->ctx
->comp_methods
!= NULL
)
969 { /* See if we have a match */
972 nn
=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
975 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
988 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
994 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
995 #if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
996 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
997 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
998 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
1002 /* wrong number of bytes,
1003 * there could be more to follow */
1004 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1011 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1016 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1017 s
->session
->compress_meth
=0;
1019 s
->session
->compress_meth
=(comp
== NULL
)?0:comp
->id
;
1021 if (s
->session
->ciphers
!= NULL
)
1022 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1023 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1024 if (ciphers
== NULL
)
1026 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED
);
1031 c
=ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,s
->session
->ciphers
,
1032 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1036 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1040 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=c
;
1044 /* Session-id reuse */
1045 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1046 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1047 SSL_CIPHER
*nc
=NULL
;
1048 SSL_CIPHER
*ec
=NULL
;
1050 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
)
1052 sk
=s
->session
->ciphers
;
1053 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++)
1055 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
,i
);
1056 if (c
->algorithms
& SSL_eNULL
)
1058 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c
))
1062 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=nc
;
1063 else if (ec
!= NULL
)
1064 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=ec
;
1066 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1070 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1073 /* we now have the following setup.
1075 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1076 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1077 * compression - basically ignored right now
1078 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1079 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1080 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1081 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1088 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1091 if (ciphers
!= NULL
) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1095 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1098 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1100 unsigned long l
,Time
;
1102 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1104 buf
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1105 p
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1106 Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
); /* Time */
1108 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-4) <= 0)
1110 /* Do the message type and length last */
1113 *(p
++)=s
->version
>>8;
1114 *(p
++)=s
->version
&0xff;
1117 memcpy(p
,s
->s3
->server_random
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1118 p
+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1120 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1121 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1122 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1123 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1124 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1125 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1126 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1128 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1129 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1130 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1131 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1132 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1135 if (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1137 s
->session
->session_id_length
=0;
1139 sl
=s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1140 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
))
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1146 memcpy(p
,s
->session
->session_id
,sl
);
1149 /* put the cipher */
1150 i
=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,p
);
1153 /* put the compression method */
1154 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1157 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1160 *(p
++)=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1163 if ((p
= ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) == NULL
)
1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1172 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
1175 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
;
1176 /* number of bytes to write */
1181 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1182 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1185 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1189 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
)
1191 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1194 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1199 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
;
1200 /* number of bytes to write */
1205 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1206 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1209 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1215 unsigned char md_buf
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
1218 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1221 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1222 EC_KEY
*ecdh
=NULL
, *ecdhp
;
1223 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1226 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1229 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1239 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1240 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
)
1242 type
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
& SSL_MKEY_MASK
;
1247 r
[0]=r
[1]=r
[2]=r
[3]=NULL
;
1249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1250 if (type
& SSL_kRSA
)
1253 if ((rsa
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1255 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb(s
,
1256 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1257 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1260 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1269 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1270 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1275 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
1279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1280 if (type
& SSL_kEDH
)
1283 if ((dhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1284 dhp
=s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
,
1285 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1286 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1289 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1294 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1301 if ((dh
=DHparams_dup(dhp
)) == NULL
)
1303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1308 if ((dhp
->pub_key
== NULL
||
1309 dhp
->priv_key
== NULL
||
1310 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
)))
1312 if(!DH_generate_key(dh
))
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1321 dh
->pub_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->pub_key
);
1322 dh
->priv_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->priv_key
);
1323 if ((dh
->pub_key
== NULL
) ||
1324 (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
))
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1336 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1337 if (type
& SSL_kECDHE
)
1339 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1341 ecdhp
=cert
->ecdh_tmp
;
1342 if ((ecdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1344 ecdhp
=s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb(s
,
1345 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1346 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1350 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
1355 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
1357 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
1358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1362 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1368 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp
))
1370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1375 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
=ecdh
;
1376 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1377 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1378 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
))
1380 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh
))
1382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1387 if (((group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
)) == NULL
) ||
1388 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1389 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
))
1391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1395 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1396 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163))
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1402 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1403 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1404 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1407 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group
)))
1410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1414 /* Encode the public key.
1415 * First check the size of encoding and
1416 * allocate memory accordingly.
1418 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1419 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1420 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1423 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
1424 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen
*sizeof(unsigned char));
1425 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
1426 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
))
1428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1433 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1434 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1435 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1436 encodedPoint
, encodedlen
, bn_ctx
);
1438 if (encodedlen
== 0)
1440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1444 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
); bn_ctx
=NULL
;
1446 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1447 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1448 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1449 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1454 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1455 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1463 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1465 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1469 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++)
1471 nr
[i
]=BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1475 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
& SSL_aNULL
))
1477 if ((pkey
=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
,s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
))
1480 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1483 kn
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1491 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,n
+4+kn
))
1493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1496 d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1499 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++)
1506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1507 if (type
& SSL_kECDHE
)
1509 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1510 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1511 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1512 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1513 * the actual encoded point itself
1515 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1523 memcpy((unsigned char*)p
,
1524 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint
,
1526 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1534 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1535 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1536 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1537 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1541 for (num
=2; num
> 0; num
--)
1543 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
,
1544 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
1545 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
,(num
== 2)
1546 ?s
->ctx
->md5
:s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1547 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1548 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1549 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1550 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
,q
,
1551 (unsigned int *)&i
);
1555 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
,
1556 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0)
1558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_RSA
);
1566 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1567 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
1570 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
,EVP_dss1(), NULL
);
1571 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1572 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1573 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1574 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
1575 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_DSA
);
1585 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1586 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
1588 /* let's do ECDSA */
1589 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL
);
1590 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1591 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1592 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1593 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
1594 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_ECDSA
);
1605 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1606 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
1612 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
1615 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1621 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
1622 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1623 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1625 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1627 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1628 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1629 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1631 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1635 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
1637 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1639 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
=NULL
;
1643 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
)
1647 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4]);
1649 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1651 n
=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
,p
);
1660 sk
=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
1664 for (i
=0; i
<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++)
1666 name
=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
,i
);
1667 j
=i2d_X509_NAME(name
,NULL
);
1668 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,4+n
+j
+2))
1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
1673 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+n
]);
1674 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
))
1677 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
1684 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
1685 j
-=2; s2n(j
,d
); j
+=2;
1691 /* else no CA names */
1692 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+off
]);
1695 d
=(unsigned char *)buf
->data
;
1696 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
1699 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1704 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1705 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ s
->init_num
;
1708 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1715 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
;
1718 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1719 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1724 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1730 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1732 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
1734 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1740 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1742 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1743 EC_KEY
*srvr_ecdh
= NULL
;
1744 EVP_PKEY
*clnt_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
1745 EC_POINT
*clnt_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1746 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1749 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1750 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
1751 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
1752 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1756 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
1757 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1759 l
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
;
1761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1764 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1765 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
)
1767 if ((s
->cert
!= NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
!= NULL
))
1768 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
;
1769 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1770 * be sent already */
1773 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY
);
1781 pkey
=s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
;
1782 if ( (pkey
== NULL
) ||
1783 (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
) ||
1784 (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
))
1786 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
1793 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */
1794 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&&
1795 s
->client_version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
1800 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
))
1802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
1812 i
=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n
,p
,p
,rsa
,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
1816 if (i
!= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
1818 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1819 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1822 if ((al
== -1) && !((p
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
1824 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1825 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1826 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1827 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1828 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1830 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1831 if (!((s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) &&
1832 (p
[0] == (s
->version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->version
& 0xff))))
1834 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1835 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1837 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1838 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1839 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1840 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1841 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1842 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1843 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1849 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1850 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1851 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1853 i
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
1854 p
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
1855 p
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
1856 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
+2, i
-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1860 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
1861 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
1862 s
->session
->master_key
,
1864 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
1868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1869 if (l
& (SSL_kEDH
|SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
))
1874 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
))
1876 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
1886 if (n
== 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1888 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS
);
1894 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
== NULL
)
1896 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1901 dh_srvr
=s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
;
1904 pub
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
);
1907 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
1911 i
=DH_compute_key(p
,pub
,dh_srvr
);
1915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1919 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
1924 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
1925 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
1926 s
->session
->master_key
,p
,i
);
1927 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
1931 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1934 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
1935 krb5_data enc_ticket
;
1936 krb5_data authenticator
;
1938 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
1939 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
1940 EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
1941 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
1942 unsigned char pms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1943 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
];
1945 krb5_timestamp authtime
= 0;
1946 krb5_ticket_times ttimes
;
1948 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
1950 if (!kssl_ctx
) kssl_ctx
= kssl_ctx_new();
1953 enc_ticket
.length
= i
;
1955 if (n
< (int)enc_ticket
.length
+ 6)
1957 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1958 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1962 enc_ticket
.data
= (char *)p
;
1963 p
+=enc_ticket
.length
;
1966 authenticator
.length
= i
;
1968 if (n
< (int)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
) + 6)
1970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1971 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1975 authenticator
.data
= (char *)p
;
1976 p
+=authenticator
.length
;
1980 enc_pms
.data
= (char *)p
;
1983 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
1986 if(enc_pms
.length
> sizeof pms
)
1988 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1989 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1993 if (n
!= (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+
1994 enc_pms
.length
+ 6))
1996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1997 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2001 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, &ttimes
,
2005 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2006 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2008 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2009 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2015 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2016 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2018 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx
, &authenticator
,
2019 &authtime
, &kssl_err
)) != 0)
2022 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2023 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2025 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2026 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2032 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_validate_times(authtime
, &ttimes
)) != 0)
2034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, krb5rc
);
2039 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx
);
2040 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2042 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2046 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2048 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
,enc
,NULL
,kssl_ctx
->key
,iv
))
2050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2051 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2054 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, pms
,&outl
,
2055 (unsigned char *)enc_pms
.data
, enc_pms
.length
))
2057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2058 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2061 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2064 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2067 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
,&(pms
[outl
]),&padl
))
2069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2070 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2074 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2077 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2080 if (!((pms
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (pms
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2082 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2083 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2084 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2085 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2086 * the protocol version.
2087 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2088 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2090 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
))
2092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2093 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2098 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2100 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2101 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2102 s
->session
->master_key
, pms
, outl
);
2104 if (kssl_ctx
->client_princ
)
2106 size_t len
= strlen(kssl_ctx
->client_princ
);
2107 if ( len
< SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH
)
2109 s
->session
->krb5_client_princ_len
= len
;
2110 memcpy(s
->session
->krb5_client_princ
,kssl_ctx
->client_princ
,len
);
2115 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2116 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2117 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2118 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2122 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2125 if ((l
& SSL_kECDH
) || (l
& SSL_kECDHE
))
2130 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
2131 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2133 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2134 if ((srvr_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
)
2136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2137 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2141 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2144 /* use the certificate */
2145 tkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2149 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2150 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2152 tkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
;
2155 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2156 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2158 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh
, group
) ||
2159 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh
, priv_key
))
2161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2166 /* Let's get client's public key */
2167 if ((clnt_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
)
2169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2170 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2176 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2180 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2184 if (((clnt_pub_pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
))
2186 (clnt_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
))
2188 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2189 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2190 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2191 * never executed. When that support is
2192 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2193 * received in the certificate is
2194 * authorized for key agreement.
2195 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2196 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2199 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2201 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS
);
2205 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint
,
2206 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) == 0)
2208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2212 ret
= 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2216 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2217 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2219 if ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
2221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2222 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2226 /* Get encoded point length */
2229 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
,
2230 clnt_ecpoint
, p
, i
, bn_ctx
) == 0)
2232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2236 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2237 * currently, so set it to the start
2239 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2242 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2243 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
);
2244 if (field_size
<= 0)
2246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2250 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
, NULL
);
2253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2258 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2259 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2260 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2261 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2262 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2264 /* Compute the master secret */
2265 s
->session
->master_key_length
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
-> \
2266 generate_master_secret(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, p
, i
);
2268 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2274 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2276 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2282 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2283 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2286 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2287 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2288 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2289 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2290 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2291 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2296 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
)
2298 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
2305 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2306 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
,
2307 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
,
2312 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2314 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
2316 peer
=s
->session
->peer
;
2317 pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(peer
);
2318 type
=X509_certificate_type(peer
,pkey
);
2326 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
)
2328 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
2329 if ((peer
!= NULL
) && (type
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
2331 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE
);
2341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED
);
2342 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2346 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
2348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
2349 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2353 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
2355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
2356 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2360 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2361 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2367 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2371 j
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2372 if ((i
> j
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0))
2374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
2375 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2379 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2380 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2382 i
=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
2383 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
,
2387 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
2393 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE
);
2400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2401 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
2403 j
=DSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
2404 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
2405 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.dsa
);
2409 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE
);
2416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2417 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
2419 j
=ECDSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
2420 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
2421 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.ec
);
2425 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
2427 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
2434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2435 al
=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
2444 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2447 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2451 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2453 int i
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
2455 unsigned long l
,nc
,llen
,n
;
2456 const unsigned char *p
,*q
;
2458 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
=NULL
;
2460 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2467 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2469 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
)
2471 if ( (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
2472 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
2475 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2478 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2479 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
2481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
);
2482 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2485 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
2489 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
)
2491 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
2495 p
=d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2497 if ((sk
=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
)
2499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2506 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2510 for (nc
=0; nc
<llen
; )
2513 if ((l
+nc
+3) > llen
)
2515 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2521 x
=d2i_X509(NULL
,&p
,l
);
2524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2529 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2533 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
,x
))
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2542 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0)
2544 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2545 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
2547 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
2551 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2552 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
2553 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
2555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
2556 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2562 i
=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
,sk
);
2565 al
=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED
);
2571 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) /* This should not be needed */
2572 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
2573 s
->session
->peer
=sk_X509_shift(sk
);
2574 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
2576 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2577 * when we arrive here. */
2578 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
2580 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
2581 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
2583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2587 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
!= NULL
)
2588 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
, X509_free
);
2589 s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
=sk
;
2590 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2591 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2599 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2602 if (x
!= NULL
) X509_free(x
);
2603 if (sk
!= NULL
) sk_X509_pop_free(sk
,X509_free
);
2607 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2612 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
)
2614 x
=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s
);
2616 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2617 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
2618 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK
|SSL_AUTH_MASK
))
2619 != (SSL_aKRB5
|SSL_kKRB5
))
2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2625 l
=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,x
);
2626 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
;
2631 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2632 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
2636 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2637 /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
2638 static int nid2curve_id(int nid
)
2640 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2641 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2643 case NID_sect163k1
: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2645 case NID_sect163r1
: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2647 case NID_sect163r2
: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2649 case NID_sect193r1
: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2651 case NID_sect193r2
: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2653 case NID_sect233k1
: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2655 case NID_sect233r1
: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2657 case NID_sect239k1
: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2659 case NID_sect283k1
: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2661 case NID_sect283r1
: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2663 case NID_sect409k1
: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2665 case NID_sect409r1
: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2667 case NID_sect571k1
: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2669 case NID_sect571r1
: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2671 case NID_secp160k1
: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2673 case NID_secp160r1
: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2675 case NID_secp160r2
: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2677 case NID_secp192k1
: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2679 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1
: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2681 case NID_secp224k1
: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2683 case NID_secp224r1
: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2685 case NID_secp256k1
: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2687 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1
: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2689 case NID_secp384r1
: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2691 case NID_secp521r1
: /* secp521r1 (25) */
2698 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2699 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL
*s
)
2701 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
)
2703 unsigned char *p
, *senc
, *macstart
;
2708 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2709 unsigned char key_name
[16];
2711 /* get session encoding length */
2712 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
2713 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
2718 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2719 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
2720 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
2721 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
2722 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
2723 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
2725 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
2726 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+
2727 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
2729 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen
);
2733 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
);
2735 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2737 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
2738 /* Skip message length for now */
2740 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
2741 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx
);
2742 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
2743 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
2746 if (s
->ctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
)
2748 if (s
->ctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, &ctx
,
2757 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv
, 16);
2758 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
2759 s
->ctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
);
2760 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
2761 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL
);
2762 memcpy(key_name
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16);
2764 l2n(s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
, p
);
2765 /* Skip ticket length for now */
2767 /* Output key name */
2769 memcpy(p
, key_name
, 16);
2772 memcpy(p
, iv
, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
));
2773 p
+= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
2774 /* Encrypt session data */
2775 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
);
2777 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx
, p
, &len
);
2779 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
2781 HMAC_Update(&hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
);
2782 HMAC_Final(&hctx
, p
, &hlen
);
2783 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
2786 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
2788 len
= p
- (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2789 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ 1;
2790 l2n3(len
- 4, p
); /* Message length */
2792 s2n(len
- 10, p
); /* Ticket length */
2794 /* number of bytes to write */
2796 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
;
2801 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
2802 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
2805 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
2807 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
)
2810 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2811 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
2812 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
2815 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
))
2818 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2821 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
2822 /* message length */
2823 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
+ 4, p
);
2825 *(p
++)= s
->tlsext_status_type
;
2826 /* length of OCSP response */
2827 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
, p
);
2828 /* actual response */
2829 memcpy(p
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
);
2830 /* number of bytes to write */
2831 s
->init_num
= 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
;
2832 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
;
2836 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
2837 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));