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Import OpenSSL 0.9.8h.
[dragonfly.git] / crypto / openssl-0.9 / ssl / s3_srvr.c
blob903522ab59940a724bcc80bf3dc24292628edfe8
1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124
125 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
127
128 #include <stdio.h>
129 #include "ssl_locl.h"
130 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
131 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
132 #include <openssl/rand.h>
133 #include <openssl/objects.h>
134 #include <openssl/evp.h>
135 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
136 #include <openssl/x509.h>
137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
138 #include <openssl/dh.h>
139 #endif
140 #include <openssl/bn.h>
141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
142 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
143 #endif
144 #include <openssl/md5.h>
145
146 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
148 static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
149 #endif
150
151 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
152 {
153 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
154 return(SSLv3_server_method());
155 else
156 return(NULL);
157 }
158
159 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
160 ssl3_accept,
161 ssl_undefined_function,
162 ssl3_get_server_method)
163
164 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
165 {
166 BUF_MEM *buf;
167 unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
168 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
169 long num1;
170 int ret= -1;
171 int new_state,state,skip=0;
172
173 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
174 ERR_clear_error();
175 clear_sys_error();
176
177 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
178 cb=s->info_callback;
179 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
180 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
181
182 /* init things to blank */
183 s->in_handshake++;
184 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
185
186 if (s->cert == NULL)
187 {
188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
189 return(-1);
190 }
191
192 for (;;)
193 {
194 state=s->state;
195
196 switch (s->state)
197 {
198 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
199 s->new_session=1;
200 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
201
202 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
203 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
204 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
205 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
206
207 s->server=1;
208 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
209
210 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
211 {
212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
213 return -1;
214 }
215 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
216
217 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
218 {
219 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
220 {
221 ret= -1;
222 goto end;
223 }
224 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
225 {
226 ret= -1;
227 goto end;
228 }
229 s->init_buf=buf;
230 }
231
232 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
233 {
234 ret= -1;
235 goto end;
236 }
237
238 s->init_num=0;
239
240 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
241 {
242 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
243 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
244 */
245 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
246
247 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
248 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
249 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
250 }
251 else
252 {
253 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
254 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
255 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
256 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
257 }
258 break;
259
260 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
261 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
262
263 s->shutdown=0;
264 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
265 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
266 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
267 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
268 s->init_num=0;
269
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
271 break;
272
273 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
274 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
275 break;
276
277 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
278 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
279 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
280
281 s->shutdown=0;
282 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
283 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
284 s->new_session = 2;
285 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
286 s->init_num=0;
287 break;
288
289 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
290 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
291 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
292 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
293 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
294 if (s->hit)
295 {
296 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
297 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
298 else
299 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
300 }
301 #else
302 if (s->hit)
303 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
304 #endif
305 else
306 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
307 s->init_num=0;
308 break;
309
310 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
311 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
312 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */
313 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)
314 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
315 {
316 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
317 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
319 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
320 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
321 else
322 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
323 }
324 else
325 {
326 skip = 1;
327 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
328 }
329 #else
330 }
331 else
332 skip=1;
333
334 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
335 #endif
336 s->init_num=0;
337 break;
338
339 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
341 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
342
343 /* clear this, it may get reset by
344 * send_server_key_exchange */
345 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
347 && !(l & SSL_KRB5)
348 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
349 )
350 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
351 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
352 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
353 * be able to handle this) */
354 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
355 else
356 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
357
358
359 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
360 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
361 *
362 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
363 * message only if the cipher suite is either
364 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
365 * server certificate contains the server's
366 * public key for key exchange.
367 */
368 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
369 || (l & SSL_kECDHE)
370 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
371 || ((l & SSL_kRSA)
372 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
373 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
374 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
375 )
376 )
377 )
378 )
379 {
380 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
381 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
382 }
383 else
384 skip=1;
385
386 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
387 s->init_num=0;
388 break;
389
390 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
391 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
392 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
393 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
394 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
395 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
396 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
397 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
398 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
399 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
400 * and in RFC 2246): */
401 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
402 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
403 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
404 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
405 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
406 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
407 {
408 /* no cert request */
409 skip=1;
410 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
411 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
412 }
413 else
414 {
415 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
416 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
417 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
418 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
419 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
420 #else
421 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
422 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
423 #endif
424 s->init_num=0;
425 }
426 break;
427
428 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
429 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
430 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
431 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
432 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
433 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
434 s->init_num=0;
435 break;
436
437 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
438 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
439 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
440 if (num1 > 0)
441 {
442 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
443 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
444 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
445 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
446 }
447
448 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
449 break;
450
451 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
452 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
453 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
454 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
455 if (ret <= 0)
456 goto end;
457 if (ret == 2)
458 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
459 else {
460 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
461 {
462 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
463 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
464 }
465 s->init_num=0;
466 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
467 }
468 break;
469
470 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
471 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
472 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
473 if (ret <= 0)
474 goto end;
475 if (ret == 2)
476 {
477 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
478 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
479 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
480 * message is not sent.
481 */
482 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
483 s->init_num = 0;
484 }
485 else
486 {
487 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
488 s->init_num=0;
489
490 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
491 * a client cert, it can be verified
492 */
493 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
494 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
495 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
496 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
497 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
498 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
499 }
500 break;
501
502 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
503 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
504
505 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
506 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
507 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
508
509 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
510 s->init_num=0;
511 break;
512
513 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
514 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
515 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
516 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
517 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
518 if (s->hit)
519 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
521 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
522 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
523 #endif
524 else
525 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
526 s->init_num=0;
527 break;
528
529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
530 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
531 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
532 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
533 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
534 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
535 s->init_num=0;
536 break;
537
538 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
539 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
540 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
541 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
542 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
543 s->init_num=0;
544 break;
545
546 #endif
547
548 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
549 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
550
551 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
552 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
553 { ret= -1; goto end; }
554
555 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
556 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
557
558 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
559 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
560 s->init_num=0;
561
562 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
563 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
564 {
565 ret= -1;
566 goto end;
567 }
568
569 break;
570
571 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
572 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
573 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
574 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
575 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
576 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
577 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
578 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
579 if (s->hit)
580 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
581 else
582 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
583 s->init_num=0;
584 break;
585
586 case SSL_ST_OK:
587 /* clean a few things up */
588 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
589
590 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
591 s->init_buf=NULL;
592
593 /* remove buffering on output */
594 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
595
596 s->init_num=0;
597
598 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
599 {
600 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
601 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
602
603 s->new_session=0;
604
605 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
606
607 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
608 /* s->server=1; */
609 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
610
611 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
612 }
613
614 ret = 1;
615 goto end;
616 /* break; */
617
618 default:
619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
620 ret= -1;
621 goto end;
622 /* break; */
623 }
624
625 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
626 {
627 if (s->debug)
628 {
629 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
630 goto end;
631 }
632
633
634 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
635 {
636 new_state=s->state;
637 s->state=state;
638 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
639 s->state=new_state;
640 }
641 }
642 skip=0;
643 }
644 end:
645 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
646
647 s->in_handshake--;
648 if (cb != NULL)
649 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
650 return(ret);
651 }
652
653 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
654 {
655 unsigned char *p;
656
657 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
658 {
659 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
660 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
661 *(p++)=0;
662 *(p++)=0;
663 *(p++)=0;
664
665 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
666 /* number of bytes to write */
667 s->init_num=4;
668 s->init_off=0;
669 }
670
671 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
672 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
673 }
674
675 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
676 {
677 int ok;
678 long n;
679
680 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
681 * so permit appropriate message length */
682 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
683 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
684 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
685 -1,
686 s->max_cert_list,
687 &ok);
688 if (!ok) return((int)n);
689 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
690 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
691 {
692 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
693 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
694 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
695 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
697 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
698 {
699 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
700 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
701 }
702 #endif
703 return 2;
704 }
705 return 1;
706 }
707
708 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
709 {
710 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
711 unsigned int cookie_len;
712 long n;
713 unsigned long id;
714 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
715 SSL_CIPHER *c;
716 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
717 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
718 #endif
719 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
720
721 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
722 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
723 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
724 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
725 * TLSv1.
726 */
727 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
728 {
729 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
730 }
731 s->first_packet=1;
732 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
733 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
734 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
735 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
736 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
737 &ok);
738
739 if (!ok) return((int)n);
740 s->first_packet=0;
741 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
742
743 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
744 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
745 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
746 p+=2;
747
748 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
749 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
750 {
751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
752 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
753 {
754 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
755 s->version = s->client_version;
756 }
757 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
758 goto f_err;
759 }
760
761 /* load the client random */
762 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
763 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
764
765 /* get the session-id */
766 j= *(p++);
767
768 s->hit=0;
769 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
770 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
771 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
772 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
773 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
774 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
775 * an earlier library version)
776 */
777 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
778 {
779 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
780 goto err;
781 }
782 else
783 {
784 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
785 if (i == 1)
786 { /* previous session */
787 s->hit=1;
788 }
789 else if (i == -1)
790 goto err;
791 else /* i == 0 */
792 {
793 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
794 goto err;
795 }
796 }
797
798 p+=j;
799
800 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
801 {
802 /* cookie stuff */
803 cookie_len = *(p++);
804
805 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
806 s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
807 {
808 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
809 if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
810 {
811 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
813 goto f_err;
814 }
815 }
816
817 /*
818 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
819 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
820 * does not cause an overflow.
821 */
822 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
823 {
824 /* too much data */
825 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
826 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
827 goto f_err;
828 }
829
830 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
831 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
832 cookie_len > 0)
833 {
834 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
835
836 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
837 {
838 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
839 cookie_len) == 0)
840 {
841 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
843 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
844 goto f_err;
845 }
846 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
847 }
848 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
849 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
850 {
851 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
852 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
853 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
854 goto f_err;
855 }
856 }
857
858 p += cookie_len;
859 }
860
861 n2s(p,i);
862 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
863 {
864 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
865 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
867 goto f_err;
868 }
869 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
870 {
871 /* not enough data */
872 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
874 goto f_err;
875 }
876 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
877 == NULL))
878 {
879 goto err;
880 }
881 p+=i;
882
883 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
884 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
885 {
886 j=0;
887 id=s->session->cipher->id;
888
889 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
890 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
891 #endif
892 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
893 {
894 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
895 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
896 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
897 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
898 #endif
899 if (c->id == id)
900 {
901 j=1;
902 break;
903 }
904 }
905 if (j == 0)
906 {
907 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
908 {
909 /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
910 s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
911 }
912 else
913 {
914 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
915 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
916 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
917 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
918 goto f_err;
919 }
920 }
921 }
922
923 /* compression */
924 i= *(p++);
925 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
926 {
927 /* not enough data */
928 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
930 goto f_err;
931 }
932 q=p;
933 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
934 {
935 if (p[j] == 0) break;
936 }
937
938 p+=i;
939 if (j >= i)
940 {
941 /* no compress */
942 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
944 goto f_err;
945 }
946
947 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
948 /* TLS extensions*/
949 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
950 {
951 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
952 {
953 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
954 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
955 goto f_err;
956 }
957 }
958 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
960 goto err;
961 }
962 #endif
963 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
964 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
965 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
966 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
968 if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
969 { /* See if we have a match */
970 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
971
972 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
973 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
974 {
975 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
976 v=comp->id;
977 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
978 {
979 if (v == q[o])
980 {
981 done=1;
982 break;
983 }
984 }
985 if (done) break;
986 }
987 if (done)
988 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
989 else
990 comp=NULL;
991 }
992 #endif
993
994 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
995 #if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
996 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
997 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
998 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
999 {
1000 if (p < (d+n))
1001 {
1002 /* wrong number of bytes,
1003 * there could be more to follow */
1004 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1006 goto f_err;
1007 }
1008 }
1009 #endif
1010
1011 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1012 * pick a cipher */
1013
1014 if (!s->hit)
1015 {
1016 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1017 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1018 #else
1019 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1020 #endif
1021 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1022 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1023 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1024 if (ciphers == NULL)
1025 {
1026 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1028 goto f_err;
1029 }
1030 ciphers=NULL;
1031 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1032 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1033
1034 if (c == NULL)
1035 {
1036 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1038 goto f_err;
1039 }
1040 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1041 }
1042 else
1043 {
1044 /* Session-id reuse */
1045 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1046 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1047 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1048 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1049
1050 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1051 {
1052 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1053 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1054 {
1055 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1056 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
1057 nc=c;
1058 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1059 ec=c;
1060 }
1061 if (nc != NULL)
1062 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1063 else if (ec != NULL)
1064 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1065 else
1066 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1067 }
1068 else
1069 #endif
1070 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1071 }
1072
1073 /* we now have the following setup.
1074 * client_random
1075 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1076 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1077 * compression - basically ignored right now
1078 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1079 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1080 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1081 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1082 */
1083
1084 ret=1;
1085 if (0)
1086 {
1087 f_err:
1088 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1089 }
1090 err:
1091 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1092 return(ret);
1093 }
1094
1095 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1096 {
1097 unsigned char *buf;
1098 unsigned char *p,*d;
1099 int i,sl;
1100 unsigned long l,Time;
1101
1102 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1103 {
1104 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1105 p=s->s3->server_random;
1106 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1107 l2n(Time,p);
1108 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1109 return -1;
1110 /* Do the message type and length last */
1111 d=p= &(buf[4]);
1112
1113 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1114 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1115
1116 /* Random stuff */
1117 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1118 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1119
1120 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1121 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1122 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1123 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1124 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1125 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1126 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1127 *
1128 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1129 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1130 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1131 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1132 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1133 * is unaffected.
1134 */
1135 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1136 && !s->hit)
1137 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1138
1139 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1140 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1141 {
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1143 return -1;
1144 }
1145 *(p++)=sl;
1146 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1147 p+=sl;
1148
1149 /* put the cipher */
1150 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1151 p+=i;
1152
1153 /* put the compression method */
1154 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1155 *(p++)=0;
1156 #else
1157 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1158 *(p++)=0;
1159 else
1160 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1161 #endif
1162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1163 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1164 {
1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1166 return -1;
1167 }
1168 #endif
1169 /* do the header */
1170 l=(p-d);
1171 d=buf;
1172 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1173 l2n3(l,d);
1174
1175 s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
1176 /* number of bytes to write */
1177 s->init_num=p-buf;
1178 s->init_off=0;
1179 }
1180
1181 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1182 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1183 }
1184
1185 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1186 {
1187 unsigned char *p;
1188
1189 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1190 {
1191 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1192
1193 /* do the header */
1194 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1195 *(p++)=0;
1196 *(p++)=0;
1197 *(p++)=0;
1198
1199 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1200 /* number of bytes to write */
1201 s->init_num=4;
1202 s->init_off=0;
1203 }
1204
1205 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1206 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1207 }
1208
1209 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1210 {
1211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1212 unsigned char *q;
1213 int j,num;
1214 RSA *rsa;
1215 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1216 unsigned int u;
1217 #endif
1218 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1219 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1220 #endif
1221 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1222 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1223 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1224 int encodedlen = 0;
1225 int curve_id = 0;
1226 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1227 #endif
1228 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1229 unsigned char *p,*d;
1230 int al,i;
1231 unsigned long type;
1232 int n;
1233 CERT *cert;
1234 BIGNUM *r[4];
1235 int nr[4],kn;
1236 BUF_MEM *buf;
1237 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1238
1239 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1240 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1241 {
1242 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
1243 cert=s->cert;
1244
1245 buf=s->init_buf;
1246
1247 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1248 n=0;
1249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1250 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1251 {
1252 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1253 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1254 {
1255 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1256 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1257 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1258 if(rsa == NULL)
1259 {
1260 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1262 goto f_err;
1263 }
1264 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1265 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1266 }
1267 if (rsa == NULL)
1268 {
1269 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1270 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1271 goto f_err;
1272 }
1273 r[0]=rsa->n;
1274 r[1]=rsa->e;
1275 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1276 }
1277 else
1278 #endif
1279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1280 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1281 {
1282 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1283 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1284 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1285 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1286 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1287 if (dhp == NULL)
1288 {
1289 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1291 goto f_err;
1292 }
1293
1294 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1295 {
1296 DH_free(dh);
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1298 goto err;
1299 }
1300
1301 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1302 {
1303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1304 goto err;
1305 }
1306
1307 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1308 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1309 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1310 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1311 {
1312 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1313 {
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1315 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1316 goto err;
1317 }
1318 }
1319 else
1320 {
1321 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1322 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1323 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1324 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1325 {
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1327 goto err;
1328 }
1329 }
1330 r[0]=dh->p;
1331 r[1]=dh->g;
1332 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1333 }
1334 else
1335 #endif
1336 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1337 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1338 {
1339 const EC_GROUP *group;
1340
1341 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1342 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1343 {
1344 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1345 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1346 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1347 }
1348 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1349 {
1350 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1352 goto f_err;
1353 }
1354
1355 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1356 {
1357 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1359 goto err;
1360 }
1361
1362 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1363 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1364 {
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1366 goto err;
1367 }
1368 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1369 {
1370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1371 goto err;
1372 }
1373 ecdh = ecdhp;
1374
1375 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1376 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1377 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1378 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1379 {
1380 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1381 {
1382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1383 goto err;
1384 }
1385 }
1386
1387 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1388 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1389 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1390 {
1391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1392 goto err;
1393 }
1394
1395 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1396 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1397 {
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1399 goto err;
1400 }
1401
1402 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1403 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1404 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1405 */
1406 if ((curve_id =
1407 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1408 == 0)
1409 {
1410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1411 goto err;
1412 }
1413
1414 /* Encode the public key.
1415 * First check the size of encoding and
1416 * allocate memory accordingly.
1417 */
1418 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1419 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1420 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1421 NULL, 0, NULL);
1422
1423 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1424 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1425 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1426 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1427 {
1428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1429 goto err;
1430 }
1431
1432
1433 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1434 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1435 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1436 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1437
1438 if (encodedlen == 0)
1439 {
1440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1441 goto err;
1442 }
1443
1444 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1445
1446 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1447 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1448 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1449 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1450 * structure.
1451 */
1452 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1453
1454 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1455 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1456 */
1457 r[0]=NULL;
1458 r[1]=NULL;
1459 r[2]=NULL;
1460 r[3]=NULL;
1461 }
1462 else
1463 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1464 {
1465 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1467 goto f_err;
1468 }
1469 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1470 {
1471 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1472 n+=2+nr[i];
1473 }
1474
1475 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
1476 {
1477 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1478 == NULL)
1479 {
1480 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1481 goto f_err;
1482 }
1483 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1484 }
1485 else
1486 {
1487 pkey=NULL;
1488 kn=0;
1489 }
1490
1491 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1492 {
1493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1494 goto err;
1495 }
1496 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1497 p= &(d[4]);
1498
1499 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1500 {
1501 s2n(nr[i],p);
1502 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1503 p+=nr[i];
1504 }
1505
1506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1507 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1508 {
1509 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1510 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1511 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1512 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1513 * the actual encoded point itself
1514 */
1515 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1516 p += 1;
1517 *p = 0;
1518 p += 1;
1519 *p = curve_id;
1520 p += 1;
1521 *p = encodedlen;
1522 p += 1;
1523 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1524 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1525 encodedlen);
1526 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1527 p += encodedlen;
1528 }
1529 #endif
1530
1531 /* not anonymous */
1532 if (pkey != NULL)
1533 {
1534 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1535 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1536 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1537 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1538 {
1539 q=md_buf;
1540 j=0;
1541 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1542 {
1543 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1544 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1545 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1546 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1547 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1548 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1549 (unsigned int *)&i);
1550 q+=i;
1551 j+=i;
1552 }
1553 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1554 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1555 {
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1557 goto err;
1558 }
1559 s2n(u,p);
1560 n+=u+2;
1561 }
1562 else
1563 #endif
1564 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1565 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1566 {
1567 /* lets do DSS */
1568 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1569 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1570 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1571 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1572 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1573 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1574 {
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1576 goto err;
1577 }
1578 s2n(i,p);
1579 n+=i+2;
1580 }
1581 else
1582 #endif
1583 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1584 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1585 {
1586 /* let's do ECDSA */
1587 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1588 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1589 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1590 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1591 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1592 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1593 {
1594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1595 goto err;
1596 }
1597 s2n(i,p);
1598 n+=i+2;
1599 }
1600 else
1601 #endif
1602 {
1603 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1604 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1606 goto f_err;
1607 }
1608 }
1609
1610 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1611 l2n3(n,d);
1612
1613 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1614 * it off */
1615 s->init_num=n+4;
1616 s->init_off=0;
1617 }
1618
1619 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1620 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1621 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1622 f_err:
1623 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1624 err:
1625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1626 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1627 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1628 #endif
1629 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1630 return(-1);
1631 }
1632
1633 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1634 {
1635 unsigned char *p,*d;
1636 int i,j,nl,off,n;
1637 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1638 X509_NAME *name;
1639 BUF_MEM *buf;
1640
1641 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1642 {
1643 buf=s->init_buf;
1644
1645 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1646
1647 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1648 p++;
1649 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1650 d[0]=n;
1651 p+=n;
1652 n++;
1653
1654 off=n;
1655 p+=2;
1656 n+=2;
1657
1658 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1659 nl=0;
1660 if (sk != NULL)
1661 {
1662 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1663 {
1664 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1665 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1666 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1667 {
1668 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1669 goto err;
1670 }
1671 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1672 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1673 {
1674 s2n(j,p);
1675 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1676 n+=2+j;
1677 nl+=2+j;
1678 }
1679 else
1680 {
1681 d=p;
1682 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1683 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1684 n+=j;
1685 nl+=j;
1686 }
1687 }
1688 }
1689 /* else no CA names */
1690 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1691 s2n(nl,p);
1692
1693 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1694 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1695 l2n3(n,d);
1696
1697 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1698 * it off */
1699
1700 s->init_num=n+4;
1701 s->init_off=0;
1702 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1703 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1704
1705 /* do the header */
1706 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1707 *(p++)=0;
1708 *(p++)=0;
1709 *(p++)=0;
1710 s->init_num += 4;
1711 #endif
1712
1713 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1714 }
1715
1716 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1717 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1718 err:
1719 return(-1);
1720 }
1721
1722 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1723 {
1724 int i,al,ok;
1725 long n;
1726 unsigned long l;
1727 unsigned char *p;
1728 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1729 RSA *rsa=NULL;
1730 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1731 #endif
1732 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1733 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
1734 DH *dh_srvr;
1735 #endif
1736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1737 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
1738 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1739
1740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1741 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1742 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1743 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1744 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1745 #endif
1746
1747 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1748 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1749 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1750 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1751 2048, /* ??? */
1752 &ok);
1753
1754 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1755 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1756
1757 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
1758
1759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1760 if (l & SSL_kRSA)
1761 {
1762 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1763 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1764 {
1765 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1766 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1767 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1768 * be sent already */
1769 if (rsa == NULL)
1770 {
1771 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1773 goto f_err;
1774
1775 }
1776 }
1777 else
1778 {
1779 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1780 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1781 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1782 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1783 {
1784 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1786 goto f_err;
1787 }
1788 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
1789 }
1790
1791 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */
1792 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION &&
1793 s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1794 {
1795 n2s(p,i);
1796 if (n != i+2)
1797 {
1798 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1799 {
1800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1801 goto err;
1802 }
1803 else
1804 p-=2;
1805 }
1806 else
1807 n=i;
1808 }
1809
1810 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1811
1812 al = -1;
1813
1814 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1815 {
1816 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1817 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1818 }
1819
1820 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1821 {
1822 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1823 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1824 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1825 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1826 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1827 * protocol version.
1828 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1829 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1830 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1831 {
1832 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1833 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1834
1835 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1836 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1837 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1838 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1839 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1840 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1841 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1842 }
1843 }
1844
1845 if (al != -1)
1846 {
1847 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1848 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1849 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1850 ERR_clear_error();
1851 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1852 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1853 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1854 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1855 goto err;
1856 }
1857
1858 s->session->master_key_length=
1859 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1860 s->session->master_key,
1861 p,i);
1862 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1863 }
1864 else
1865 #endif
1866 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1867 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1868 {
1869 n2s(p,i);
1870 if (n != i+2)
1871 {
1872 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1873 {
1874 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1875 goto err;
1876 }
1877 else
1878 {
1879 p-=2;
1880 i=(int)n;
1881 }
1882 }
1883
1884 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1885 {
1886 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1888 goto f_err;
1889 }
1890 else
1891 {
1892 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1893 {
1894 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1896 goto f_err;
1897 }
1898 else
1899 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1900 }
1901
1902 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1903 if (pub == NULL)
1904 {
1905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1906 goto err;
1907 }
1908
1909 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1910
1911 if (i <= 0)
1912 {
1913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1914 goto err;
1915 }
1916
1917 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1918 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
1919
1920 BN_clear_free(pub);
1921 pub=NULL;
1922 s->session->master_key_length=
1923 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1924 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1925 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1926 }
1927 else
1928 #endif
1929 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1930 if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
1931 {
1932 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1933 krb5_data enc_ticket;
1934 krb5_data authenticator;
1935 krb5_data enc_pms;
1936 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1937 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1938 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1939 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1940 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1941 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
1942 int padl, outl;
1943 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
1944 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
1945
1946 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
1947
1948 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
1949
1950 n2s(p,i);
1951 enc_ticket.length = i;
1952
1953 if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6)
1954 {
1955 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1956 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1957 goto err;
1958 }
1959
1960 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
1961 p+=enc_ticket.length;
1962
1963 n2s(p,i);
1964 authenticator.length = i;
1965
1966 if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6)
1967 {
1968 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1969 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1970 goto err;
1971 }
1972
1973 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
1974 p+=authenticator.length;
1975
1976 n2s(p,i);
1977 enc_pms.length = i;
1978 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
1979 p+=enc_pms.length;
1980
1981 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
1982 ** after decryption
1983 */
1984 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
1985 {
1986 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1987 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1988 goto err;
1989 }
1990
1991 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
1992 enc_pms.length + 6))
1993 {
1994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1995 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1996 goto err;
1997 }
1998
1999 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2000 &kssl_err)) != 0)
2001 {
2002 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2003 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2004 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2005 if (kssl_err.text)
2006 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2007 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2009 kssl_err.reason);
2010 goto err;
2011 }
2012
2013 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2014 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2015 */
2016 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2017 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2018 {
2019 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2020 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2021 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2022 if (kssl_err.text)
2023 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2024 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2026 kssl_err.reason);
2027 goto err;
2028 }
2029
2030 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2031 {
2032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2033 goto err;
2034 }
2035
2036 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2037 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2038 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2039
2040 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2041 if (enc == NULL)
2042 goto err;
2043
2044 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2045
2046 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2047 {
2048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2049 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2050 goto err;
2051 }
2052 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2053 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2054 {
2055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2056 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2057 goto err;
2058 }
2059 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2060 {
2061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2062 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2063 goto err;
2064 }
2065 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2066 {
2067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2068 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2069 goto err;
2070 }
2071 outl += padl;
2072 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2073 {
2074 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2075 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2076 goto err;
2077 }
2078 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2079 {
2080 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2081 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2082 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2083 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2084 * the protocol version.
2085 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2086 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2087 */
2088 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2089 {
2090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2091 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2092 goto err;
2093 }
2094 }
2095
2096 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2097
2098 s->session->master_key_length=
2099 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2100 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2101
2102 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2103 {
2104 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2105 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2106 {
2107 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2108 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2109 }
2110 }
2111
2112
2113 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2114 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2115 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2116 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2117 */
2118 }
2119 else
2120 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2121
2122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2123 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
2124 {
2125 int ret = 1;
2126 int field_size = 0;
2127 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2128 const EC_GROUP *group;
2129 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2130
2131 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2132 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2133 {
2134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2135 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2136 goto err;
2137 }
2138
2139 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2140 if (l & SSL_kECDH)
2141 {
2142 /* use the certificate */
2143 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2144 }
2145 else
2146 {
2147 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2148 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2149 */
2150 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2151 }
2152
2153 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2154 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2155
2156 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2157 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2158 {
2159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2160 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2161 goto err;
2162 }
2163
2164 /* Let's get client's public key */
2165 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2166 {
2167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2168 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2169 goto err;
2170 }
2171
2172 if (n == 0L)
2173 {
2174 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2175
2176 if (l & SSL_kECDHE)
2177 {
2178 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2180 goto f_err;
2181 }
2182 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2183 == NULL) ||
2184 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2185 {
2186 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2187 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2188 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2189 * never executed. When that support is
2190 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2191 * received in the certificate is
2192 * authorized for key agreement.
2193 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2194 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2195 * group.
2196 */
2197 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2199 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2200 goto f_err;
2201 }
2202
2203 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2204 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2205 {
2206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2207 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2208 goto err;
2209 }
2210 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2211 }
2212 else
2213 {
2214 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2215 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2216 */
2217 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2218 {
2219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2220 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2221 goto err;
2222 }
2223
2224 /* Get encoded point length */
2225 i = *p;
2226 p += 1;
2227 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2228 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2229 {
2230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2231 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2232 goto err;
2233 }
2234 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2235 * currently, so set it to the start
2236 */
2237 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2238 }
2239
2240 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2241 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2242 if (field_size <= 0)
2243 {
2244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2245 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2246 goto err;
2247 }
2248 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2249 if (i <= 0)
2250 {
2251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2252 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2253 goto err;
2254 }
2255
2256 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2257 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2258 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2259 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2260 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2261
2262 /* Compute the master secret */
2263 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2264 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2265
2266 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2267 return (ret);
2268 }
2269 else
2270 #endif
2271 {
2272 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2274 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2275 goto f_err;
2276 }
2277
2278 return(1);
2279 f_err:
2280 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2281 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2282 err:
2283 #endif
2284 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2285 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2286 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2287 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2288 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2289 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2290 #endif
2291 return(-1);
2292 }
2293
2294 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2295 {
2296 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2297 unsigned char *p;
2298 int al,ok,ret=0;
2299 long n;
2300 int type=0,i,j;
2301 X509 *peer;
2302
2303 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2304 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2305 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2306 -1,
2307 514, /* 514? */
2308 &ok);
2309
2310 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2311
2312 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2313 {
2314 peer=s->session->peer;
2315 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2316 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2317 }
2318 else
2319 {
2320 peer=NULL;
2321 pkey=NULL;
2322 }
2323
2324 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2325 {
2326 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2327 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2328 {
2329 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2331 goto f_err;
2332 }
2333 ret=1;
2334 goto end;
2335 }
2336
2337 if (peer == NULL)
2338 {
2339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2340 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2341 goto f_err;
2342 }
2343
2344 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2345 {
2346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2347 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2348 goto f_err;
2349 }
2350
2351 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2352 {
2353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2354 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2355 goto f_err;
2356 }
2357
2358 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2359 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2360 n2s(p,i);
2361 n-=2;
2362 if (i > n)
2363 {
2364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2365 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2366 goto f_err;
2367 }
2368
2369 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2370 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2371 {
2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2373 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2374 goto f_err;
2375 }
2376
2377 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2378 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2379 {
2380 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2381 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2382 pkey->pkey.rsa);
2383 if (i < 0)
2384 {
2385 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2387 goto f_err;
2388 }
2389 if (i == 0)
2390 {
2391 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2393 goto f_err;
2394 }
2395 }
2396 else
2397 #endif
2398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2399 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2400 {
2401 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2402 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2403 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2404 if (j <= 0)
2405 {
2406 /* bad signature */
2407 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2409 goto f_err;
2410 }
2411 }
2412 else
2413 #endif
2414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2415 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2416 {
2417 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2418 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2419 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2420 if (j <= 0)
2421 {
2422 /* bad signature */
2423 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2425 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2426 goto f_err;
2427 }
2428 }
2429 else
2430 #endif
2431 {
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2433 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2434 goto f_err;
2435 }
2436
2437
2438 ret=1;
2439 if (0)
2440 {
2441 f_err:
2442 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2443 }
2444 end:
2445 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2446 return(ret);
2447 }
2448
2449 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2450 {
2451 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2452 X509 *x=NULL;
2453 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2454 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2455 unsigned char *d;
2456 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2457
2458 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2459 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
2460 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
2461 -1,
2462 s->max_cert_list,
2463 &ok);
2464
2465 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2466
2467 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2468 {
2469 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2470 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2471 {
2472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2473 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2474 goto f_err;
2475 }
2476 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2477 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2478 {
2479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2480 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2481 goto f_err;
2482 }
2483 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2484 return(1);
2485 }
2486
2487 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2488 {
2489 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2491 goto f_err;
2492 }
2493 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2494
2495 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2496 {
2497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2498 goto err;
2499 }
2500
2501 n2l3(p,llen);
2502 if (llen+3 != n)
2503 {
2504 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2506 goto f_err;
2507 }
2508 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2509 {
2510 n2l3(p,l);
2511 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2512 {
2513 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2515 goto f_err;
2516 }
2517
2518 q=p;
2519 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2520 if (x == NULL)
2521 {
2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2523 goto err;
2524 }
2525 if (p != (q+l))
2526 {
2527 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2529 goto f_err;
2530 }
2531 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2532 {
2533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2534 goto err;
2535 }
2536 x=NULL;
2537 nc+=l+3;
2538 }
2539
2540 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2541 {
2542 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2543 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2544 {
2545 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2547 goto f_err;
2548 }
2549 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2550 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2551 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2552 {
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2554 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2555 goto f_err;
2556 }
2557 }
2558 else
2559 {
2560 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2561 if (!i)
2562 {
2563 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2565 goto f_err;
2566 }
2567 }
2568
2569 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2570 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2571 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2572 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2573
2574 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2575 * when we arrive here. */
2576 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2577 {
2578 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2579 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2580 {
2581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2582 goto err;
2583 }
2584 }
2585 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2586 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2587 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2588 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2589 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2590
2591 sk=NULL;
2592
2593 ret=1;
2594 if (0)
2595 {
2596 f_err:
2597 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2598 }
2599 err:
2600 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2601 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2602 return(ret);
2603 }
2604
2605 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2606 {
2607 unsigned long l;
2608 X509 *x;
2609
2610 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2611 {
2612 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2613 if (x == NULL &&
2614 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2615 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
2616 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
2617 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
2618 {
2619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2620 return(0);
2621 }
2622
2623 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2624 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2625 s->init_num=(int)l;
2626 s->init_off=0;
2627 }
2628
2629 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2630 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2631 }
2632
2633
2634 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2635 /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
2636 static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
2637 {
2638 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2639 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2640 switch (nid) {
2641 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2642 return 1;
2643 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2644 return 2;
2645 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2646 return 3;
2647 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2648 return 4;
2649 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2650 return 5;
2651 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2652 return 6;
2653 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2654 return 7;
2655 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2656 return 8;
2657 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2658 return 9;
2659 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2660 return 10;
2661 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2662 return 11;
2663 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2664 return 12;
2665 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2666 return 13;
2667 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2668 return 14;
2669 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2670 return 15;
2671 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2672 return 16;
2673 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2674 return 17;
2675 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2676 return 18;
2677 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2678 return 19;
2679 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2680 return 20;
2681 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2682 return 21;
2683 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2684 return 22;
2685 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2686 return 23;
2687 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2688 return 24;
2689 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
2690 return 25;
2691 default:
2692 return 0;
2693 }
2694 }
2695 #endif
2696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2697 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
2698 {
2699 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
2700 {
2701 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
2702 int len, slen;
2703 unsigned int hlen;
2704 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
2705 HMAC_CTX hctx;
2706 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2707 unsigned char key_name[16];
2708
2709 /* get session encoding length */
2710 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2711 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
2712 * too long
2713 */
2714 if (slen > 0xFF00)
2715 return -1;
2716 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2717 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
2718 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
2719 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
2720 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
2721 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
2722 */
2723 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
2724 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
2725 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
2726 return -1;
2727 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
2728 if (!senc)
2729 return -1;
2730 p = senc;
2731 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
2732
2733 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2734 /* do the header */
2735 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
2736 /* Skip message length for now */
2737 p += 3;
2738 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2739 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2740 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
2741 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
2742 * from parent ctx.
2743 */
2744 if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2745 {
2746 if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
2747 &hctx, 1) < 0)
2748 {
2749 OPENSSL_free(senc);
2750 return -1;
2751 }
2752 }
2753 else
2754 {
2755 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
2756 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2757 s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
2758 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2759 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2760 memcpy(key_name, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
2761 }
2762 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
2763 /* Skip ticket length for now */
2764 p += 2;
2765 /* Output key name */
2766 macstart = p;
2767 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
2768 p += 16;
2769 /* output IV */
2770 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
2771 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2772 /* Encrypt session data */
2773 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
2774 p += len;
2775 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
2776 p += len;
2777 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2778
2779 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
2780 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
2781 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2782
2783 p += hlen;
2784 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
2785 /* Total length */
2786 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2787 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
2788 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
2789 p += 4;
2790 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
2791
2792 /* number of bytes to write */
2793 s->init_num= len;
2794 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
2795 s->init_off=0;
2796 OPENSSL_free(senc);
2797 }
2798
2799 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
2800 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2801 }
2802
2803 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
2804 {
2805 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
2806 {
2807 unsigned char *p;
2808 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2809 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
2810 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
2811 * + (ocsp response)
2812 */
2813 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
2814 return -1;
2815
2816 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2817
2818 /* do the header */
2819 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
2820 /* message length */
2821 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
2822 /* status type */
2823 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
2824 /* length of OCSP response */
2825 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
2826 /* actual response */
2827 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
2828 /* number of bytes to write */
2829 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
2830 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
2831 s->init_off = 0;
2832 }
2833
2834 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
2835 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2836 }
2837 #endif
DragonFly BSD