2 * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Boris Popov
5 * Copyright (c) 2003, 2004 Tim J. Robbins.
8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
11 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
12 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
13 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
15 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
16 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
17 * must display the following acknowledgement:
18 * This product includes software developed by Boris Popov.
19 * 4. Neither the name of the author nor the names of any co-contributors
20 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
21 * without specific prior written permission.
23 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
24 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
25 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
26 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
27 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
28 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
29 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
30 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
31 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
32 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
35 * $FreeBSD: src/sys/netsmb/smb_crypt.c,v 1.1.2.3 2001/09/03 08:55:11 bp Exp $
36 * $DragonFly: src/sys/netproto/smb/smb_crypt.c,v 1.5 2008/01/05 14:02:40 swildner Exp $
38 #include <sys/param.h>
39 #include <sys/malloc.h>
40 #include <sys/kernel.h>
41 #include <sys/systm.h>
44 #include <sys/fcntl.h>
45 #include <sys/socket.h>
46 #include <sys/socketvar.h>
47 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
49 #include <sys/endian.h>
51 #include <sys/mchain.h>
55 #include <sys/iconv.h>
63 #include "opt_netsmb.h"
65 #include <crypto/des/des.h>
67 static u_char N8
[] = {0x4b, 0x47, 0x53, 0x21, 0x40, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25};
71 smb_E(const u_char
*key
, u_char
*data
, u_char
*dest
)
73 des_key_schedule
*ksp
;
76 kk
[0] = key
[0] & 0xfe;
77 kk
[1] = key
[0] << 7 | (key
[1] >> 1 & 0xfe);
78 kk
[2] = key
[1] << 6 | (key
[2] >> 2 & 0xfe);
79 kk
[3] = key
[2] << 5 | (key
[3] >> 3 & 0xfe);
80 kk
[4] = key
[3] << 4 | (key
[4] >> 4 & 0xfe);
81 kk
[5] = key
[4] << 3 | (key
[5] >> 5 & 0xfe);
82 kk
[6] = key
[5] << 2 | (key
[6] >> 6 & 0xfe);
84 ksp
= kmalloc(sizeof(des_key_schedule
), M_SMBTEMP
, M_WAITOK
);
85 des_set_key((des_cblock
*)kk
, *ksp
);
86 des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock
*)data
, (des_cblock
*)dest
, *ksp
, 1);
87 kfree(ksp
, M_SMBTEMP
);
91 smb_encrypt(const u_char
*apwd
, u_char
*C8
, u_char
*RN
)
93 u_char
*p
, *P14
, *S21
;
95 p
= kmalloc(14 + 21, M_SMBTEMP
, M_WAITOK
| M_ZERO
);
98 bcopy(apwd
, P14
, min(14, strlen(apwd
)));
100 * S21 = concat(Ex(P14, N8), zeros(5));
103 smb_E(P14
+ 7, N8
, S21
+ 8);
106 smb_E(S21
+ 7, C8
, RN
+ 8);
107 smb_E(S21
+ 14, C8
, RN
+ 16);
113 smb_ntencrypt(const u_char
*apwd
, u_char
*C8
, u_char
*RN
)
121 unipwd
= kmalloc((len
+ 1) * sizeof(u_int16_t
), M_SMBTEMP
, M_WAITOK
);
123 * S21 = concat(MD4(U(apwd)), zeros(5));
125 smb_strtouni(unipwd
, apwd
);
126 ctxp
= kmalloc(sizeof(MD4_CTX
), M_SMBTEMP
, M_WAITOK
);
128 MD4Update(ctxp
, (u_char
*)unipwd
, len
* sizeof(u_int16_t
));
129 kfree(unipwd
, M_SMBTEMP
);
132 kfree(ctxp
, M_SMBTEMP
);
135 smb_E(S21
+ 7, C8
, RN
+ 8);
136 smb_E(S21
+ 14, C8
, RN
+ 16);
141 * Calculate message authentication code (MAC) key for virtual circuit.
144 smb_calcmackey(struct smb_vc
*vcp
)
150 u_char S16
[16], S21
[21];
152 KASSERT(vcp
->vc_hflags2
& SMB_FLAGS2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE
,
153 ("signatures not enabled"));
155 if (vcp
->vc_mackey
!= NULL
) {
156 kfree(vcp
->vc_mackey
, M_SMBTEMP
);
157 vcp
->vc_mackey
= NULL
;
158 vcp
->vc_mackeylen
= 0;
163 * The partial MAC key is the concatenation of the 16 byte session
164 * key and the 24 byte challenge response.
166 vcp
->vc_mackeylen
= 16 + 24;
167 vcp
->vc_mackey
= kmalloc(vcp
->vc_mackeylen
, M_SMBTEMP
, M_WAITOK
);
170 * Calculate session key:
173 pwd
= smb_vc_getpass(vcp
);
175 unipwd
= kmalloc((len
+ 1) * sizeof(u_int16_t
), M_SMBTEMP
, M_WAITOK
);
176 smb_strtouni(unipwd
, pwd
);
178 MD4Update(&md4
, (u_char
*)unipwd
, len
* sizeof(u_int16_t
));
181 MD4Update(&md4
, S16
, 16);
182 MD4Final(vcp
->vc_mackey
, &md4
);
183 kfree(unipwd
, M_SMBTEMP
);
186 * Calculate response to challenge:
187 * Ex(concat(MD4(U(pass)), zeros(5)), C8)
191 smb_E(S21
, vcp
->vc_ch
, vcp
->vc_mackey
+ 16);
192 smb_E(S21
+ 7, vcp
->vc_ch
, vcp
->vc_mackey
+ 24);
193 smb_E(S21
+ 14, vcp
->vc_ch
, vcp
->vc_mackey
+ 32);
199 * Sign request with MAC.
202 smb_rq_sign(struct smb_rq
*rqp
)
204 struct smb_vc
*vcp
= rqp
->sr_vc
;
210 KASSERT(vcp
->vc_hflags2
& SMB_FLAGS2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE
,
211 ("signatures not enabled"));
213 if (vcp
->vc_mackey
== NULL
)
214 /* XXX Should assert that cmd == SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE. */
218 * This is a bit of a kludge. If the request is non-TRANSACTION,
219 * or it is the first request of a transaction, give it the next
220 * sequence number, and expect the reply to have the sequence number
221 * following that one. Otherwise, it is a secondary request in
222 * a transaction, and it gets the same sequence numbers as the
225 if (rqp
->sr_t2
== NULL
||
226 (rqp
->sr_t2
->t2_flags
& SMBT2_SECONDARY
) == 0) {
227 rqp
->sr_seqno
= vcp
->vc_seqno
++;
228 rqp
->sr_rseqno
= vcp
->vc_seqno
++;
231 * Sequence numbers are already in the struct because
232 * smb_t2_request_int() uses the same one for all the
233 * requests in the transaction.
234 * (At least we hope so.)
236 KASSERT(rqp
->sr_t2
== NULL
||
237 (rqp
->sr_t2
->t2_flags
& SMBT2_SECONDARY
) == 0 ||
238 rqp
->sr_t2
->t2_rq
== rqp
,
239 ("sec t2 rq not using same smb_rq"));
242 /* Initialize sec. signature field to sequence number + zeros. */
243 *(u_int32_t
*)rqp
->sr_rqsig
= htole32(rqp
->sr_seqno
);
244 *(u_int32_t
*)(rqp
->sr_rqsig
+ 4) = 0;
247 * Compute HMAC-MD5 of packet data, keyed by MAC key.
248 * Store the first 8 bytes in the sec. signature field.
250 smb_rq_getrequest(rqp
, &mbp
);
252 MD5Update(&md5
, vcp
->vc_mackey
, vcp
->vc_mackeylen
);
253 for (mb
= mbp
->mb_top
; mb
!= NULL
; mb
= mb
->m_next
)
254 MD5Update(&md5
, mtod(mb
, void *), mb
->m_len
);
255 MD5Final(digest
, &md5
);
256 bcopy(digest
, rqp
->sr_rqsig
, 8);
262 * Verify reply signature.
265 smb_rq_verify(struct smb_rq
*rqp
)
267 struct smb_vc
*vcp
= rqp
->sr_vc
;
274 KASSERT(vcp
->vc_hflags2
& SMB_FLAGS2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE
,
275 ("signatures not enabled"));
277 if (vcp
->vc_mackey
== NULL
)
278 /* XXX Should check that this is a SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE reply. */
282 * Compute HMAC-MD5 of packet data, keyed by MAC key.
283 * We play games to pretend the security signature field
284 * contains their sequence number, to avoid modifying
287 smb_rq_getreply(rqp
, &mdp
);
289 KASSERT(mb
->m_len
>= SMB_HDRLEN
, ("forgot to m_pullup"));
291 MD5Update(&md5
, vcp
->vc_mackey
, vcp
->vc_mackeylen
);
292 MD5Update(&md5
, mtod(mb
, void *), 14);
293 *(u_int32_t
*)sigbuf
= htole32(rqp
->sr_rseqno
);
294 *(u_int32_t
*)(sigbuf
+ 4) = 0;
295 MD5Update(&md5
, sigbuf
, 8);
296 MD5Update(&md5
, mtod(mb
, u_char
*) + 22, mb
->m_len
- 22);
297 for (mb
= mb
->m_next
; mb
!= NULL
; mb
= mb
->m_next
)
298 MD5Update(&md5
, mtod(mb
, void *), mb
->m_len
);
299 MD5Final(digest
, &md5
);
302 * Now verify the signature.
304 if (bcmp(mtod(mdp
->md_top
, u_char
*) + 14, digest
, 8) != 0)