[Extensions Toolbar] Move tab-specific logic and increase test robustness
[chromium-blink-merge.git] / net / cert / cert_verify_proc_android.cc
blob91d0b559a225870f06f3f06bc1f934fd58f58c15
1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
3 // found in the LICENSE file.
5 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_android.h"
7 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
9 #include <string>
10 #include <vector>
12 #include "base/logging.h"
13 #include "base/sha1.h"
14 #include "base/strings/string_piece.h"
15 #include "crypto/sha2.h"
16 #include "net/android/cert_verify_result_android.h"
17 #include "net/android/network_library.h"
18 #include "net/base/net_errors.h"
19 #include "net/cert/asn1_util.h"
20 #include "net/cert/cert_status_flags.h"
21 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_result.h"
22 #include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h"
24 namespace net {
26 namespace {
28 // Returns true if the certificate verification call was successful (regardless
29 // of its result), i.e. if |verify_result| was set. Otherwise returns false.
30 bool VerifyFromAndroidTrustManager(const std::vector<std::string>& cert_bytes,
31 const std::string& hostname,
32 CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
33 android::CertVerifyStatusAndroid status;
34 std::vector<std::string> verified_chain;
36 // TODO(joth): Fetch the authentication type from SSL rather than hardcode.
37 android::VerifyX509CertChain(cert_bytes, "RSA", hostname,
38 &status, &verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root,
39 &verified_chain);
40 switch (status) {
41 case android::CERT_VERIFY_STATUS_ANDROID_FAILED:
42 return false;
43 case android::CERT_VERIFY_STATUS_ANDROID_OK:
44 break;
45 case android::CERT_VERIFY_STATUS_ANDROID_NO_TRUSTED_ROOT:
46 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID;
47 break;
48 case android::CERT_VERIFY_STATUS_ANDROID_EXPIRED:
49 case android::CERT_VERIFY_STATUS_ANDROID_NOT_YET_VALID:
50 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID;
51 break;
52 case android::CERT_VERIFY_STATUS_ANDROID_UNABLE_TO_PARSE:
53 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
54 break;
55 case android::CERT_VERIFY_STATUS_ANDROID_INCORRECT_KEY_USAGE:
56 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
57 break;
58 default:
59 NOTREACHED();
60 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID;
61 break;
64 // Save the verified chain.
65 if (!verified_chain.empty()) {
66 std::vector<base::StringPiece> verified_chain_pieces(verified_chain.size());
67 for (size_t i = 0; i < verified_chain.size(); i++) {
68 verified_chain_pieces[i] = base::StringPiece(verified_chain[i]);
70 scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> verified_cert =
71 X509Certificate::CreateFromDERCertChain(verified_chain_pieces);
72 if (verified_cert.get())
73 verify_result->verified_cert = verified_cert;
76 // Extract the algorithm information from the certs
77 X509Certificate::OSCertHandles chain;
78 const X509Certificate::OSCertHandles& intermediates =
79 verify_result->verified_cert->GetIntermediateCertificates();
80 chain.push_back(verify_result->verified_cert->os_cert_handle());
81 chain.insert(chain.end(), intermediates.begin(), intermediates.end());
83 // If the chain successfully verified, ignore the trust anchor (the last
84 // certificate). Otherwise, assume the chain is partial. This is not entirely
85 // correct, as a full chain may have been constructed and then failed to
86 // validate. However, if that is the case, the more serious error will
87 // override any SHA-1 considerations.
88 size_t correction_for_root =
89 (status == android::CERT_VERIFY_STATUS_ANDROID_OK) ? 1 : 0;
90 for (size_t i = 0; i < chain.size() - correction_for_root; ++i) {
91 int sig_alg = OBJ_obj2nid(chain[i]->sig_alg->algorithm);
92 if (sig_alg == NID_md2WithRSAEncryption) {
93 verify_result->has_md2 = true;
94 } else if (sig_alg == NID_md4WithRSAEncryption) {
95 verify_result->has_md4 = true;
96 } else if (sig_alg == NID_md5WithRSAEncryption ||
97 sig_alg == NID_md5WithRSA) {
98 verify_result->has_md5 = true;
99 } else if (sig_alg == NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption ||
100 sig_alg == NID_dsaWithSHA || sig_alg == NID_dsaWithSHA1 ||
101 sig_alg == NID_dsaWithSHA1_2 || sig_alg == NID_sha1WithRSA ||
102 sig_alg == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1) {
103 verify_result->has_sha1 = true;
107 // Extract the public key hashes.
108 for (size_t i = 0; i < verified_chain.size(); i++) {
109 base::StringPiece spki_bytes;
110 if (!asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(verified_chain[i], &spki_bytes))
111 continue;
113 HashValue sha1(HASH_VALUE_SHA1);
114 base::SHA1HashBytes(reinterpret_cast<const uint8*>(spki_bytes.data()),
115 spki_bytes.size(), sha1.data());
116 verify_result->public_key_hashes.push_back(sha1);
118 HashValue sha256(HASH_VALUE_SHA256);
119 crypto::SHA256HashString(spki_bytes, sha256.data(), crypto::kSHA256Length);
120 verify_result->public_key_hashes.push_back(sha256);
123 return true;
126 bool GetChainDEREncodedBytes(X509Certificate* cert,
127 std::vector<std::string>* chain_bytes) {
128 X509Certificate::OSCertHandle cert_handle = cert->os_cert_handle();
129 X509Certificate::OSCertHandles cert_handles =
130 cert->GetIntermediateCertificates();
132 // Make sure the peer's own cert is the first in the chain, if it's not
133 // already there.
134 if (cert_handles.empty() || cert_handles[0] != cert_handle)
135 cert_handles.insert(cert_handles.begin(), cert_handle);
137 chain_bytes->reserve(cert_handles.size());
138 for (X509Certificate::OSCertHandles::const_iterator it =
139 cert_handles.begin(); it != cert_handles.end(); ++it) {
140 std::string cert_bytes;
141 if(!X509Certificate::GetDEREncoded(*it, &cert_bytes))
142 return false;
143 chain_bytes->push_back(cert_bytes);
145 return true;
148 } // namespace
150 CertVerifyProcAndroid::CertVerifyProcAndroid() {}
152 CertVerifyProcAndroid::~CertVerifyProcAndroid() {}
154 bool CertVerifyProcAndroid::SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors() const {
155 return false;
158 int CertVerifyProcAndroid::VerifyInternal(
159 X509Certificate* cert,
160 const std::string& hostname,
161 int flags,
162 CRLSet* crl_set,
163 const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
164 CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
165 if (!cert->VerifyNameMatch(hostname,
166 &verify_result->common_name_fallback_used)) {
167 verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID;
170 std::vector<std::string> cert_bytes;
171 if (!GetChainDEREncodedBytes(cert, &cert_bytes))
172 return ERR_CERT_INVALID;
173 if (!VerifyFromAndroidTrustManager(cert_bytes, hostname, verify_result)) {
174 NOTREACHED();
175 return ERR_FAILED;
177 if (IsCertStatusError(verify_result->cert_status))
178 return MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
180 return OK;
183 } // namespace net