content/common/sandbox_win.cc

   1 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
   2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
   3 // found in the LICENSE file.
   4
   5 #include "content/common/sandbox_win.h"
   6
   7 #include <string>
   8
   9 #include "base/base_switches.h"
  10 #include "base/command_line.h"
  11 #include "base/debug/profiler.h"
  12 #include "base/files/file_util.h"
  13 #include "base/hash.h"
  14 #include "base/logging.h"
  15 #include "base/memory/shared_memory.h"
  16 #include "base/metrics/sparse_histogram.h"
  17 #include "base/path_service.h"
  18 #include "base/process/launch.h"
  19 #include "base/strings/string_number_conversions.h"
  20 #include "base/strings/string_util.h"
  21 #include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
  22 #include "base/trace_event/trace_event.h"
  23 #include "base/win/iat_patch_function.h"
  24 #include "base/win/scoped_handle.h"
  25 #include "base/win/scoped_process_information.h"
  26 #include "base/win/windows_version.h"
  27 #include "content/common/content_switches_internal.h"
  28 #include "content/public/common/content_client.h"
  29 #include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
  30 #include "content/public/common/dwrite_font_platform_win.h"
  31 #include "content/public/common/sandbox_init.h"
  32 #include "content/public/common/sandboxed_process_launcher_delegate.h"
  33 #include "sandbox/win/src/process_mitigations.h"
  34 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox.h"
  35 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_nt_util.h"
  36 #include "sandbox/win/src/sandbox_policy_base.h"
  37 #include "sandbox/win/src/win_utils.h"
  38 #include "ui/gfx/win/direct_write.h"
  39
  40 static sandbox::BrokerServices* g_broker_services = NULL;
  41 static sandbox::TargetServices* g_target_services = NULL;
  42
  43 namespace content {
  44 namespace {
  45
  46 // The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes
  47 // when they are loaded in the renderer. Note: at runtime we generate short
  48 // versions of the dll name only if the dll has an extension.
  49 // For more information about how this list is generated, and how to get off
  50 // of it, see:
  51 // https://sites.google.com/a/chromium.org/dev/Home/third-party-developers
  52 const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeDlls[] = {
  53   L"adialhk.dll",                 // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  54   L"acpiz.dll",                   // Unknown.
  55   L"airfoilinject3.dll",          // Airfoil.
  56   L"akinsofthook32.dll",          // Akinsoft Software Engineering.
  57   L"assistant_x64.dll",           // Unknown.
  58   L"avcuf64.dll",                 // Bit Defender Internet Security x64.
  59   L"avgrsstx.dll",                // AVG 8.
  60   L"babylonchromepi.dll",         // Babylon translator.
  61   L"btkeyind.dll",                // Widcomm Bluetooth.
  62   L"cmcsyshk.dll",                // CMC Internet Security.
  63   L"cmsetac.dll",                 // Unknown (suspected malware).
  64   L"cooliris.dll",                // CoolIris.
  65   L"cplushook.dll",               // Unknown (suspected malware).
  66   L"dockshellhook.dll",           // Stardock Objectdock.
  67   L"easyhook32.dll",              // GDIPP and others.
  68   L"esspd.dll",                   // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
  69   L"googledesktopnetwork3.dll",   // Google Desktop Search v5.
  70   L"fwhook.dll",                  // PC Tools Firewall Plus.
  71   L"hookprocesscreation.dll",     // Blumentals Program protector.
  72   L"hookterminateapis.dll",       // Blumentals and Cyberprinter.
  73   L"hookprintapis.dll",           // Cyberprinter.
  74   L"imon.dll",                    // NOD32 Antivirus.
  75   L"icatcdll.dll",                // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
  76   L"icdcnl.dll",                  // Samsung Smart Security ESCORT.
  77   L"ioloHL.dll",                  // Iolo (System Mechanic).
  78   L"kloehk.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
  79   L"lawenforcer.dll",             // Spyware-Browser AntiSpyware (Spybro).
  80   L"libdivx.dll",                 // DivX.
  81   L"lvprcinj01.dll",              // Logitech QuickCam.
  82   L"madchook.dll",                // Madshi (generic hooking library).
  83   L"mdnsnsp.dll",                 // Bonjour.
  84   L"moonsysh.dll",                // Moon Secure Antivirus.
  85   L"mpk.dll",                     // KGB Spy.
  86   L"npdivx32.dll",                // DivX.
  87   L"npggNT.des",                  // GameGuard 2008.
  88   L"npggNT.dll",                  // GameGuard (older).
  89   L"oawatch.dll",                 // Online Armor.
  90   L"pastali32.dll",               // PastaLeads.
  91   L"pavhook.dll",                 // Panda Internet Security.
  92   L"pavlsphook.dll",              // Panda Antivirus.
  93   L"pavshook.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
  94   L"pavshookwow.dll",             // Panda Antivirus.
  95   L"pctavhook.dll",               // PC Tools Antivirus.
  96   L"pctgmhk.dll",                 // PC Tools Spyware Doctor.
  97   L"picrmi32.dll",                // PicRec.
  98   L"picrmi64.dll",                // PicRec.
  99   L"prntrack.dll",                // Pharos Systems.
 100   L"protector.dll",               // Unknown (suspected malware).
 101   L"radhslib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
 102   L"radprlib.dll",                // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter.
 103   L"rapportnikko.dll",            // Trustware Rapport.
 104   L"rlhook.dll",                  // Trustware Bufferzone.
 105   L"rooksdol.dll",                // Trustware Rapport.
 106   L"rndlpepperbrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer.
 107   L"rpchromebrowserrecordhelper.dll",   // RealPlayer.
 108   L"r3hook.dll",                  // Kaspersky Internet Security.
 109   L"sahook.dll",                  // McAfee Site Advisor.
 110   L"sbrige.dll",                  // Unknown.
 111   L"sc2hook.dll",                 // Supercopier 2.
 112   L"sdhook32.dll",                // Spybot - Search & Destroy Live Protection.
 113   L"sguard.dll",                  // Iolo (System Guard).
 114   L"smum32.dll",                  // Spyware Doctor version 6.
 115   L"smumhook.dll",                // Spyware Doctor version 5.
 116   L"ssldivx.dll",                 // DivX.
 117   L"syncor11.dll",                // SynthCore Midi interface.
 118   L"systools.dll",                // Panda Antivirus.
 119   L"tfwah.dll",                   // Threatfire (PC tools).
 120   L"wblind.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 121   L"wbhelp.dll",                  // Stardock Object desktop.
 122   L"winstylerthemehelper.dll"     // Tuneup utilities 2006.
 123 };
 124
 125 #if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
 126 // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\ with the semantic |access|.
 127 // If |children| is set to true, we need to add the wildcard rules to also
 128 // apply the rule to the subfiles and subfolders.
 129 bool AddDirectory(int path, const wchar_t* sub_dir, bool children,
 130                   sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access,
 131                   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 132   base::FilePath directory;
 133   if (!PathService::Get(path, &directory))
 134     return false;
 135
 136   if (sub_dir)
 137     directory = base::MakeAbsoluteFilePath(directory.Append(sub_dir));
 138
 139   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 140   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 141                            directory.value().c_str());
 142   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 143     return false;
 144
 145   std::wstring directory_str = directory.value() + L"\\";
 146   if (children)
 147     directory_str += L"*";
 148   // Otherwise, add the version of the path that ends with a separator.
 149
 150   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access,
 151                            directory_str.c_str());
 152   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 153     return false;
 154
 155   return true;
 156 }
 157 #endif  // !defined(NACL_WIN64)
 158
 159 // Compares the loaded |module| file name matches |module_name|.
 160 bool IsExpandedModuleName(HMODULE module, const wchar_t* module_name) {
 161   wchar_t path[MAX_PATH];
 162   DWORD sz = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, path, arraysize(path));
 163   if ((sz == arraysize(path)) || (sz == 0)) {
 164     // XP does not set the last error properly, so we bail out anyway.
 165     return false;
 166   }
 167   if (!::GetLongPathName(path, path, arraysize(path)))
 168     return false;
 169   base::FilePath fname(path);
 170   return (fname.BaseName().value() == module_name);
 171 }
 172
 173 // Adds a single dll by |module_name| into the |policy| blacklist.
 174 // If |check_in_browser| is true we only add an unload policy only if the dll
 175 // is also loaded in this process.
 176 void BlacklistAddOneDll(const wchar_t* module_name,
 177                         bool check_in_browser,
 178                         sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 179   HMODULE module = check_in_browser ? ::GetModuleHandleW(module_name) : NULL;
 180   if (!module) {
 181     // The module could have been loaded with a 8.3 short name. We check
 182     // the three most common cases: 'thelongname.dll' becomes
 183     // 'thelon~1.dll', 'thelon~2.dll' and 'thelon~3.dll'.
 184     std::wstring name(module_name);
 185     size_t period = name.rfind(L'.');
 186     DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, period);
 187     DCHECK_LE(3U, (name.size() - period));
 188     if (period <= 8)
 189       return;
 190     for (wchar_t ix = '1'; ix <= '3'; ++ix) {
 191       const wchar_t suffix[] = {'~', ix, 0};
 192       std::wstring alt_name = name.substr(0, 6) + suffix;
 193       alt_name += name.substr(period, name.size());
 194       if (check_in_browser) {
 195         module = ::GetModuleHandleW(alt_name.c_str());
 196         if (!module)
 197           return;
 198         // We found it, but because it only has 6 significant letters, we
 199         // want to make sure it is the right one.
 200         if (!IsExpandedModuleName(module, module_name))
 201           return;
 202       }
 203       // Found a match. We add both forms to the policy.
 204       policy->AddDllToUnload(alt_name.c_str());
 205     }
 206   }
 207   policy->AddDllToUnload(module_name);
 208   DVLOG(1) << "dll to unload found: " << module_name;
 209   return;
 210 }
 211
 212 // Adds policy rules for unloaded the known dlls that cause chrome to crash.
 213 // Eviction of injected DLLs is done by the sandbox so that the injected module
 214 // does not get a chance to execute any code.
 215 void AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 216   for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomeDlls); ++ix)
 217     BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeDlls[ix], true, policy);
 218 }
 219
 220 // Returns the object path prepended with the current logon session.
 221 base::string16 PrependWindowsSessionPath(const base::char16* object) {
 222   // Cache this because it can't change after process creation.
 223   static uintptr_t s_session_id = 0;
 224   if (s_session_id == 0) {
 225     HANDLE token;
 226     DWORD session_id_length;
 227     DWORD session_id = 0;
 228
 229     CHECK(::OpenProcessToken(::GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token));
 230     CHECK(::GetTokenInformation(token, TokenSessionId, &session_id,
 231         sizeof(session_id), &session_id_length));
 232     CloseHandle(token);
 233     if (session_id)
 234       s_session_id = session_id;
 235   }
 236
 237   return base::StringPrintf(L"\\Sessions\\%d%ls", s_session_id, object);
 238 }
 239
 240 // Checks if the sandbox should be let to run without a job object assigned.
 241 bool ShouldSetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line) {
 242   if (!cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob))
 243     return true;
 244
 245   // Windows 8 allows nested jobs so we don't need to check if we are in other
 246   // job.
 247   if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8)
 248     return true;
 249
 250   BOOL in_job = true;
 251   // Either there is no job yet associated so we must add our job,
 252   if (!::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &in_job))
 253     NOTREACHED() << "IsProcessInJob failed. " << GetLastError();
 254   if (!in_job)
 255     return true;
 256
 257   // ...or there is a job but the JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK limit is set.
 258   JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION job_info = {};
 259   if (!::QueryInformationJobObject(NULL,
 260                                    JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation, &job_info,
 261                                    sizeof(job_info), NULL)) {
 262     NOTREACHED() << "QueryInformationJobObject failed. " << GetLastError();
 263     return true;
 264   }
 265   if (job_info.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags & JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK)
 266     return true;
 267
 268   return false;
 269 }
 270
 271 // Adds the generic policy rules to a sandbox TargetPolicy.
 272 bool AddGenericPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 273   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 274
 275   // Renderers need to copy sections for plugin DIBs and GPU.
 276   // GPU needs to copy sections to renderers.
 277   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 278                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 279                            L"Section");
 280   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 281     return false;
 282
 283   // Add the policy for the client side of a pipe. It is just a file
 284   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 285   // "chrome." so the sandboxed process cannot connect to system services.
 286   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 287                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 288                            L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*");
 289   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 290     return false;
 291
 292   // Add the policy for the server side of nacl pipe. It is just a file
 293   // in the \pipe\ namespace. We restrict it to pipes that start with
 294   // "chrome.nacl" so the sandboxed process cannot connect to
 295   // system services.
 296   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 297                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 298                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.nacl.*");
 299   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 300     return false;
 301
 302   // Allow the server side of sync sockets, which are pipes that have
 303   // the "chrome.sync" namespace and a randomly generated suffix.
 304   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
 305                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
 306                            L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.sync.*");
 307   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 308     return false;
 309
 310   // Add the policy for debug message only in debug
 311 #ifndef NDEBUG
 312   base::FilePath app_dir;
 313   if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &app_dir))
 314     return false;
 315
 316   wchar_t long_path_buf[MAX_PATH];
 317   DWORD long_path_return_value = GetLongPathName(app_dir.value().c_str(),
 318                                                  long_path_buf,
 319                                                  MAX_PATH);
 320   if (long_path_return_value == 0 || long_path_return_value >= MAX_PATH)
 321     return false;
 322
 323   base::FilePath debug_message(long_path_buf);
 324   debug_message = debug_message.AppendASCII("debug_message.exe");
 325   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS,
 326                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC,
 327                            debug_message.value().c_str());
 328   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 329     return false;
 330 #endif  // NDEBUG
 331
 332   // Add the policy for read-only PDB file access for stack traces.
 333 #if !defined(OFFICIAL_BUILD)
 334   base::FilePath exe;
 335   if (!PathService::Get(base::FILE_EXE, &exe))
 336     return false;
 337   base::FilePath pdb_path = exe.DirName().Append(L"*.pdb");
 338   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 339                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
 340                            pdb_path.value().c_str());
 341   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 342     return false;
 343 #endif
 344
 345 #if defined(SANITIZER_COVERAGE)
 346   DWORD coverage_dir_size =
 347       ::GetEnvironmentVariable(L"SANITIZER_COVERAGE_DIR", NULL, 0);
 348   if (coverage_dir_size == 0) {
 349     LOG(WARNING) << "SANITIZER_COVERAGE_DIR was not set, coverage won't work.";
 350   } else {
 351     std::wstring coverage_dir;
 352     wchar_t* coverage_dir_str =
 353         base::WriteInto(&coverage_dir, coverage_dir_size);
 354     coverage_dir_size = ::GetEnvironmentVariable(
 355         L"SANITIZER_COVERAGE_DIR", coverage_dir_str, coverage_dir_size);
 356     CHECK(coverage_dir.size() == coverage_dir_size);
 357     base::FilePath sancov_path =
 358         base::FilePath(coverage_dir).Append(L"*.sancov");
 359     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 360                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 361                              sancov_path.value().c_str());
 362     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 363       return false;
 364   }
 365 #endif
 366
 367   AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
 368   return true;
 369 }
 370
 371 bool AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 372   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 373   // Renderers need to share events with plugins.
 374   result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
 375                            sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
 376                            L"Event");
 377   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 378     return false;
 379
 380   // Win8+ adds a device DeviceApi that we don't need.
 381   if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_WIN7)
 382     result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"File", L"\\Device\\DeviceApi");
 383   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 384     return false;
 385
 386   // Close the proxy settings on XP.
 387   if (base::win::GetVersion() <= base::win::VERSION_SERVER_2003)
 388     result = policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Key",
 389                  L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\" \
 390                      L"CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings");
 391   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 392     return false;
 393
 394
 395   sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED;
 396   if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) {
 397     // On 2003/Vista the initial token has to be restricted if the main
 398     // token is restricted.
 399     initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS;
 400   }
 401
 402   policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN);
 403   // Prevents the renderers from manipulating low-integrity processes.
 404   policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_UNTRUSTED);
 405   policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
 406
 407   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK !=  policy->SetAlternateDesktop(true)) {
 408     DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer";
 409   }
 410
 411   return true;
 412 }
 413
 414 // Updates the command line arguments with debug-related flags. If debug flags
 415 // have been used with this process, they will be filtered and added to
 416 // command_line as needed.
 417 void ProcessDebugFlags(base::CommandLine* command_line) {
 418   const base::CommandLine& current_cmd_line =
 419       *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 420   std::string type = command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 421   if (current_cmd_line.HasSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren)) {
 422     // Look to pass-on the kWaitForDebugger flag.
 423     std::string value = current_cmd_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
 424         switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren);
 425     if (value.empty() || value == type) {
 426       command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kWaitForDebugger);
 427     }
 428     command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kWaitForDebuggerChildren, value);
 429   }
 430 }
 431
 432 // This code is test only, and attempts to catch unsafe uses of
 433 // DuplicateHandle() that copy privileged handles into sandboxed processes.
 434 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 435 base::win::IATPatchFunction g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle;
 436
 437 typedef BOOL (WINAPI *DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr)(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 438                                                   HANDLE source_handle,
 439                                                   HANDLE target_process_handle,
 440                                                   LPHANDLE target_handle,
 441                                                   DWORD desired_access,
 442                                                   BOOL inherit_handle,
 443                                                   DWORD options);
 444
 445 DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle;
 446
 447 NtQueryObject g_QueryObject = NULL;
 448
 449 static const char* kDuplicateHandleWarning =
 450     "You are attempting to duplicate a privileged handle into a sandboxed"
 451     " process.\n Please use the sandbox::BrokerDuplicateHandle API or"
 452     " contact security@chromium.org for assistance.";
 453
 454 void CheckDuplicateHandle(HANDLE handle) {
 455   // Get the object type (32 characters is safe; current max is 14).
 456   BYTE buffer[sizeof(OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) + 32 * sizeof(wchar_t)];
 457   OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION* type_info =
 458       reinterpret_cast<OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION*>(buffer);
 459   ULONG size = sizeof(buffer) - sizeof(wchar_t);
 460   NTSTATUS error;
 461   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectTypeInformation, type_info, size, &size);
 462   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 463   type_info->Name.Buffer[type_info->Name.Length / sizeof(wchar_t)] = L'\0';
 464
 465   // Get the object basic information.
 466   OBJECT_BASIC_INFORMATION basic_info;
 467   size = sizeof(basic_info);
 468   error = g_QueryObject(handle, ObjectBasicInformation, &basic_info, size,
 469                         &size);
 470   CHECK(NT_SUCCESS(error));
 471
 472   CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & WRITE_DAC)) <<
 473       kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 474
 475   if (0 == _wcsicmp(type_info->Name.Buffer, L"Process")) {
 476     const ACCESS_MASK kDangerousMask =
 477         ~static_cast<DWORD>(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION | SYNCHRONIZE);
 478     CHECK(!(basic_info.GrantedAccess & kDangerousMask)) <<
 479         kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 480   }
 481 }
 482
 483 BOOL WINAPI DuplicateHandlePatch(HANDLE source_process_handle,
 484                                  HANDLE source_handle,
 485                                  HANDLE target_process_handle,
 486                                  LPHANDLE target_handle,
 487                                  DWORD desired_access,
 488                                  BOOL inherit_handle,
 489                                  DWORD options) {
 490   // Duplicate the handle so we get the final access mask.
 491   if (!g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(source_process_handle, source_handle,
 492                                    target_process_handle, target_handle,
 493                                    desired_access, inherit_handle, options))
 494     return FALSE;
 495
 496   // We're not worried about broker handles or not crossing process boundaries.
 497   if (source_process_handle == target_process_handle ||
 498       target_process_handle == ::GetCurrentProcess())
 499     return TRUE;
 500
 501   // Only sandboxed children are placed in jobs, so just check them.
 502   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 503   if (!::IsProcessInJob(target_process_handle, NULL, &is_in_job)) {
 504     // We need a handle with permission to check the job object.
 505     if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) {
 506       HANDLE temp_handle;
 507       CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(::GetCurrentProcess(),
 508                                         target_process_handle,
 509                                         ::GetCurrentProcess(),
 510                                         &temp_handle,
 511                                         PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION,
 512                                         FALSE, 0));
 513       base::win::ScopedHandle process(temp_handle);
 514       CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(process.Get(), NULL, &is_in_job));
 515     }
 516   }
 517
 518   if (is_in_job) {
 519     // We never allow inheritable child handles.
 520     CHECK(!inherit_handle) << kDuplicateHandleWarning;
 521
 522     // Duplicate the handle again, to get the final permissions.
 523     HANDLE temp_handle;
 524     CHECK(g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle(target_process_handle, *target_handle,
 525                                       ::GetCurrentProcess(), &temp_handle,
 526                                       0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS));
 527     base::win::ScopedHandle handle(temp_handle);
 528
 529     // Callers use CHECK macro to make sure we get the right stack.
 530     CheckDuplicateHandle(handle.Get());
 531   }
 532
 533   return TRUE;
 534 }
 535 #endif
 536
 537 }  // namespace
 538
 539 void SetJobLevel(const base::CommandLine& cmd_line,
 540                  sandbox::JobLevel job_level,
 541                  uint32 ui_exceptions,
 542                  sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 543   if (ShouldSetJobLevel(cmd_line)) {
 544 #ifdef _WIN64
 545     policy->SetJobMemoryLimit(4ULL * 1024 * 1024 * 1024);
 546 #endif
 547     policy->SetJobLevel(job_level, ui_exceptions);
 548   } else {
 549     policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_NONE, 0);
 550   }
 551 }
 552
 553 // TODO(jschuh): Need get these restrictions applied to NaCl and Pepper.
 554 // Just have to figure out what needs to be warmed up first.
 555 void AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 556   // TODO(cpu): Add back the BaseNamedObjects policy.
 557   base::string16 object_path = PrependWindowsSessionPath(
 558       L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\windows_shell_global_counters");
 559   policy->AddKernelObjectToClose(L"Section", object_path.data());
 560 }
 561
 562 void AddAppContainerPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy, const wchar_t* sid) {
 563   if (base::win::GetVersion() == base::win::VERSION_WIN8 ||
 564       base::win::GetVersion() == base::win::VERSION_WIN8_1) {
 565     const base::CommandLine& command_line =
 566         *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 567     if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableAppContainer)) {
 568       policy->SetLowBox(sid);
 569     }
 570   }
 571 }
 572
 573 bool AddWin32kLockdownPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
 574 #if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
 575   if (!IsWin32kRendererLockdownEnabled())
 576     return true;
 577
 578   // Enable win32k lockdown if not already.
 579   sandbox::MitigationFlags flags = policy->GetProcessMitigations();
 580   if ((flags & sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE) ==
 581       sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE)
 582     return true;
 583
 584   sandbox::ResultCode result =
 585       policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_WIN32K_LOCKDOWN,
 586                       sandbox::TargetPolicy::FAKE_USER_GDI_INIT, nullptr);
 587   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 588     return false;
 589
 590   flags |= sandbox::MITIGATION_WIN32K_DISABLE;
 591   result = policy->SetProcessMitigations(flags);
 592   if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 593     return false;
 594 #endif
 595   return true;
 596 }
 597
 598 bool InitBrokerServices(sandbox::BrokerServices* broker_services) {
 599   // TODO(abarth): DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
 600   //               See <http://b/1287166>.
 601   DCHECK(broker_services);
 602   DCHECK(!g_broker_services);
 603   sandbox::ResultCode result = broker_services->Init();
 604   g_broker_services = broker_services;
 605
 606   // In non-official builds warn about dangerous uses of DuplicateHandle.
 607 #ifndef OFFICIAL_BUILD
 608   BOOL is_in_job = FALSE;
 609   CHECK(::IsProcessInJob(::GetCurrentProcess(), NULL, &is_in_job));
 610   // In a Syzygy-profiled binary, instrumented for import profiling, this
 611   // patch will end in infinite recursion on the attempted delegation to the
 612   // original function.
 613   if (!base::debug::IsBinaryInstrumented() &&
 614       !is_in_job && !g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.is_patched()) {
 615     HMODULE module = NULL;
 616     wchar_t module_name[MAX_PATH];
 617     CHECK(::GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS,
 618                               reinterpret_cast<LPCWSTR>(InitBrokerServices),
 619                               &module));
 620     DWORD result = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, module_name, MAX_PATH);
 621     if (result && (result != MAX_PATH)) {
 622       ResolveNTFunctionPtr("NtQueryObject", &g_QueryObject);
 623       result = g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.Patch(
 624           module_name, "kernel32.dll", "DuplicateHandle",
 625           DuplicateHandlePatch);
 626       CHECK(result == 0);
 627       g_iat_orig_duplicate_handle =
 628           reinterpret_cast<DuplicateHandleFunctionPtr>(
 629               g_iat_patch_duplicate_handle.original_function());
 630     }
 631   }
 632 #endif
 633
 634   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 635 }
 636
 637 bool InitTargetServices(sandbox::TargetServices* target_services) {
 638   DCHECK(target_services);
 639   DCHECK(!g_target_services);
 640   sandbox::ResultCode result = target_services->Init();
 641   g_target_services = target_services;
 642   return sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == result;
 643 }
 644
 645 base::Process StartSandboxedProcess(
 646     SandboxedProcessLauncherDelegate* delegate,
 647     base::CommandLine* cmd_line) {
 648   const base::CommandLine& browser_command_line =
 649       *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
 650   std::string type_str = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
 651
 652   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str);
 653
 654   // Propagate the --allow-no-job flag if present.
 655   if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob) &&
 656       !cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob)) {
 657     cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kAllowNoSandboxJob);
 658   }
 659
 660   ProcessDebugFlags(cmd_line);
 661
 662   // Prefetch hints on windows:
 663   // Using a different prefetch profile per process type will allow Windows
 664   // to create separate pretetch settings for browser, renderer etc.
 665   cmd_line->AppendArg(base::StringPrintf("/prefetch:%d", base::Hash(type_str)));
 666
 667   if ((delegate && !delegate->ShouldSandbox()) ||
 668       browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) ||
 669       cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) {
 670     base::Process process =
 671         base::LaunchProcess(*cmd_line, base::LaunchOptions());
 672     // TODO(rvargas) crbug.com/417532: Don't share a raw handle.
 673     g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(process.Handle());
 674     return process.Pass();
 675   }
 676
 677   sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy();
 678
 679   sandbox::MitigationFlags mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_HEAP_TERMINATE |
 680                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_BOTTOM_UP_ASLR |
 681                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP |
 682                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_DEP_NO_ATL_THUNK |
 683                                          sandbox::MITIGATION_SEHOP;
 684
 685   if (policy->SetProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 686     return base::Process();
 687
 688 #if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
 689   if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess &&
 690       IsWin32kRendererLockdownEnabled()) {
 691     if (!AddWin32kLockdownPolicy(policy))
 692       return base::Process();
 693   }
 694 #endif
 695
 696   mitigations = sandbox::MITIGATION_STRICT_HANDLE_CHECKS |
 697                 sandbox::MITIGATION_DLL_SEARCH_ORDER;
 698
 699   if (policy->SetDelayedProcessMitigations(mitigations) != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 700     return base::Process();
 701
 702   SetJobLevel(*cmd_line, sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0, policy);
 703
 704   bool disable_default_policy = false;
 705   base::FilePath exposed_dir;
 706   if (delegate)
 707     delegate->PreSandbox(&disable_default_policy, &exposed_dir);
 708
 709   if (!disable_default_policy && !AddPolicyForSandboxedProcess(policy))
 710     return base::Process();
 711
 712   if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess) {
 713 #if !defined(NACL_WIN64)
 714     if (gfx::win::ShouldUseDirectWrite()) {
 715       AddDirectory(base::DIR_WINDOWS_FONTS,
 716                   NULL,
 717                   true,
 718                   sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY,
 719                   policy);
 720
 721       // If DirectWrite is enabled for font rendering then open the font cache
 722       // section which is created by the browser and pass the handle to the
 723       // renderer process. This is needed because renderer processes on
 724       // Windows 8+ may be running in an AppContainer sandbox and hence their
 725       // kernel object namespace may be partitioned.
 726       std::string name(content::kFontCacheSharedSectionName);
 727       name.append(base::UintToString(base::GetCurrentProcId()));
 728
 729       base::SharedMemory direct_write_font_cache_section;
 730       if (direct_write_font_cache_section.Open(name, true)) {
 731         void* shared_handle =
 732             policy->AddHandleToShare(direct_write_font_cache_section.handle());
 733         cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kFontCacheSharedHandle,
 734             base::UintToString(reinterpret_cast<unsigned int>(shared_handle)));
 735       }
 736     }
 737 #endif
 738   } else {
 739     // Hack for Google Desktop crash. Trick GD into not injecting its DLL into
 740     // this subprocess. See
 741     // http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=25580
 742     cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("ignored", " --type=renderer ");
 743   }
 744
 745   sandbox::ResultCode result;
 746   if (!exposed_dir.empty()) {
 747     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 748                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 749                              exposed_dir.value().c_str());
 750     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 751       return base::Process();
 752
 753     base::FilePath exposed_files = exposed_dir.AppendASCII("*");
 754     result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 755                              sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 756                              exposed_files.value().c_str());
 757     if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
 758       return base::Process();
 759   }
 760
 761   if (!AddGenericPolicy(policy)) {
 762     NOTREACHED();
 763     return base::Process();
 764   }
 765
 766   // Allow the renderer and gpu processes to access the log file.
 767   if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess ||
 768       type_str == switches::kGpuProcess) {
 769     if (logging::IsLoggingToFileEnabled()) {
 770       DCHECK(base::FilePath(logging::GetLogFileFullPath()).IsAbsolute());
 771       policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
 772                       sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
 773                       logging::GetLogFileFullPath().c_str());
 774     }
 775   }
 776
 777 #if !defined(OFFICIAL_BUILD)
 778   // If stdout/stderr point to a Windows console, these calls will
 779   // have no effect.
 780   policy->SetStdoutHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE));
 781   policy->SetStderrHandle(GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE));
 782 #endif
 783
 784   if (delegate) {
 785     bool success = true;
 786     delegate->PreSpawnTarget(policy, &success);
 787     if (!success)
 788       return base::Process();
 789   }
 790
 791   TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 792
 793   PROCESS_INFORMATION temp_process_info = {};
 794   result = g_broker_services->SpawnTarget(
 795                cmd_line->GetProgram().value().c_str(),
 796                cmd_line->GetCommandLineString().c_str(),
 797                policy, &temp_process_info);
 798   DWORD last_error = ::GetLastError();
 799   base::win::ScopedProcessInformation target(temp_process_info);
 800
 801   TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
 802
 803   if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
 804     if (result == sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_GENERIC)
 805       DPLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process";
 806     else if (result == sandbox::SBOX_ERROR_CREATE_PROCESS) {
 807       // TODO(shrikant): Remove this special case handling after determining
 808       // cause for lowbox/createprocess errors.
 809       sandbox::PolicyBase* policy_base =
 810           static_cast<sandbox::PolicyBase*>(policy);
 811       UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY(policy_base->GetLowBoxSid() ?
 812                                       "Process.Sandbox.Lowbox.Launch.Error" :
 813                                       "Process.Sandbox.Launch.Error",
 814                                   last_error);
 815     } else
 816       DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process. Error: " << result;
 817
 818     policy->Release();
 819     return base::Process();
 820   }
 821   policy->Release();
 822
 823   if (delegate)
 824     delegate->PostSpawnTarget(target.process_handle());
 825
 826   CHECK(ResumeThread(target.thread_handle()) != -1);
 827   TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str);
 828   return base::Process(target.TakeProcessHandle());
 829 }
 830
 831 bool BrokerDuplicateHandle(HANDLE source_handle,
 832                            DWORD target_process_id,
 833                            HANDLE* target_handle,
 834                            DWORD desired_access,
 835                            DWORD options) {
 836   // If our process is the target just duplicate the handle.
 837   if (::GetCurrentProcessId() == target_process_id) {
 838     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 839                                ::GetCurrentProcess(), target_handle,
 840                                desired_access, FALSE, options);
 841
 842   }
 843
 844   // Try the broker next
 845   if (g_target_services &&
 846       g_target_services->DuplicateHandle(source_handle, target_process_id,
 847                                          target_handle, desired_access,
 848                                          options) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
 849     return true;
 850   }
 851
 852   // Finally, see if we already have access to the process.
 853   base::win::ScopedHandle target_process;
 854   target_process.Set(::OpenProcess(PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, FALSE,
 855                                     target_process_id));
 856   if (target_process.IsValid()) {
 857     return !!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), source_handle,
 858                                 target_process.Get(), target_handle,
 859                                 desired_access, FALSE, options);
 860   }
 861
 862   return false;
 863 }
 864
 865 bool BrokerAddTargetPeer(HANDLE peer_process) {
 866   return g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(peer_process) == sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK;
 867 }
 868
 869 }  // namespace content