1 /**********************************************************************
2 * Copyright (c) 2015 Pieter Wuille, Andrew Poelstra *
3 * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying *
4 * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
5 **********************************************************************/
7 #ifndef SECP256K1_ECMULT_CONST_IMPL_H
8 #define SECP256K1_ECMULT_CONST_IMPL_H
12 #include "ecmult_const.h"
13 #include "ecmult_impl.h"
15 #ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM
20 #define WNAF_SIZE(w) ((WNAF_BITS + (w) - 1) / (w))
22 /* This is like `ECMULT_TABLE_GET_GE` but is constant time */
23 #define ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(r,pre,n,w) do { \
25 int abs_n = (n) * (((n) > 0) * 2 - 1); \
26 int idx_n = abs_n / 2; \
28 VERIFY_CHECK(((n) & 1) == 1); \
29 VERIFY_CHECK((n) >= -((1 << ((w)-1)) - 1)); \
30 VERIFY_CHECK((n) <= ((1 << ((w)-1)) - 1)); \
31 VERIFY_SETUP(secp256k1_fe_clear(&(r)->x)); \
32 VERIFY_SETUP(secp256k1_fe_clear(&(r)->y)); \
33 for (m = 0; m < ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(w); m++) { \
34 /* This loop is used to avoid secret data in array indices. See
35 * the comment in ecmult_gen_impl.h for rationale. */ \
36 secp256k1_fe_cmov(&(r)->x, &(pre)[m].x, m == idx_n); \
37 secp256k1_fe_cmov(&(r)->y, &(pre)[m].y, m == idx_n); \
40 secp256k1_fe_negate(&neg_y, &(r)->y, 1); \
41 secp256k1_fe_cmov(&(r)->y, &neg_y, (n) != abs_n); \
45 /** Convert a number to WNAF notation.
46 * The number becomes represented by sum(2^{wi} * wnaf[i], i=0..WNAF_SIZE(w)+1) - return_val.
47 * It has the following guarantees:
48 * - each wnaf[i] an odd integer between -(1 << w) and (1 << w)
49 * - each wnaf[i] is nonzero
50 * - the number of words set is always WNAF_SIZE(w) + 1
52 * Adapted from `The Width-w NAF Method Provides Small Memory and Fast Elliptic Scalar
53 * Multiplications Secure against Side Channel Attacks`, Okeya and Tagaki. M. Joye (Ed.)
54 * CT-RSA 2003, LNCS 2612, pp. 328-443, 2003. Springer-Verlagy Berlin Heidelberg 2003
56 * Numbers reference steps of `Algorithm SPA-resistant Width-w NAF with Odd Scalar` on pp. 335
58 static int secp256k1_wnaf_const(int *wnaf
, secp256k1_scalar s
, int w
) {
69 secp256k1_scalar neg_s
;
71 /* Note that we cannot handle even numbers by negating them to be odd, as is
72 * done in other implementations, since if our scalars were specified to have
73 * width < 256 for performance reasons, their negations would have width 256
74 * and we'd lose any performance benefit. Instead, we use a technique from
75 * Section 4.2 of the Okeya/Tagaki paper, which is to add either 1 (for even)
76 * or 2 (for odd) to the number we are encoding, returning a skew value indicating
77 * this, and having the caller compensate after doing the multiplication. */
79 /* Negative numbers will be negated to keep their bit representation below the maximum width */
80 flip
= secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&s
);
81 /* We add 1 to even numbers, 2 to odd ones, noting that negation flips parity */
82 bit
= flip
^ !secp256k1_scalar_is_even(&s
);
83 /* We check for negative one, since adding 2 to it will cause an overflow */
84 secp256k1_scalar_negate(&neg_s
, &s
);
85 not_neg_one
= !secp256k1_scalar_is_one(&neg_s
);
86 secp256k1_scalar_cadd_bit(&s
, bit
, not_neg_one
);
87 /* If we had negative one, flip == 1, s.d[0] == 0, bit == 1, so caller expects
88 * that we added two to it and flipped it. In fact for -1 these operations are
89 * identical. We only flipped, but since skewing is required (in the sense that
90 * the skew must be 1 or 2, never zero) and flipping is not, we need to change
91 * our flags to claim that we only skewed. */
92 global_sign
= secp256k1_scalar_cond_negate(&s
, flip
);
93 global_sign
*= not_neg_one
* 2 - 1;
97 u_last
= secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(&s
, w
);
98 while (word
* w
< WNAF_BITS
) {
103 u
= secp256k1_scalar_shr_int(&s
, w
);
105 even
= ((u
& 1) == 0);
106 sign
= 2 * (u_last
> 0) - 1;
108 u_last
-= sign
* even
* (1 << w
);
110 /* 4.3, adapted for global sign change */
111 wnaf
[word
++] = u_last
* global_sign
;
115 wnaf
[word
] = u
* global_sign
;
117 VERIFY_CHECK(secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s
));
118 VERIFY_CHECK(word
== WNAF_SIZE(w
));
123 static void secp256k1_ecmult_const(secp256k1_gej
*r
, const secp256k1_ge
*a
, const secp256k1_scalar
*scalar
) {
124 secp256k1_ge pre_a
[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A
)];
129 int wnaf_1
[1 + WNAF_SIZE(WINDOW_A
- 1)];
130 #ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM
131 secp256k1_ge pre_a_lam
[ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A
)];
132 int wnaf_lam
[1 + WNAF_SIZE(WINDOW_A
- 1)];
134 secp256k1_scalar q_1
, q_lam
;
138 secp256k1_scalar sc
= *scalar
;
140 /* build wnaf representation for q. */
141 #ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM
142 /* split q into q_1 and q_lam (where q = q_1 + q_lam*lambda, and q_1 and q_lam are ~128 bit) */
143 secp256k1_scalar_split_lambda(&q_1
, &q_lam
, &sc
);
144 skew_1
= secp256k1_wnaf_const(wnaf_1
, q_1
, WINDOW_A
- 1);
145 skew_lam
= secp256k1_wnaf_const(wnaf_lam
, q_lam
, WINDOW_A
- 1);
147 skew_1
= secp256k1_wnaf_const(wnaf_1
, sc
, WINDOW_A
- 1);
150 /* Calculate odd multiples of a.
151 * All multiples are brought to the same Z 'denominator', which is stored
152 * in Z. Due to secp256k1' isomorphism we can do all operations pretending
153 * that the Z coordinate was 1, use affine addition formulae, and correct
154 * the Z coordinate of the result once at the end.
156 secp256k1_gej_set_ge(r
, a
);
157 secp256k1_ecmult_odd_multiples_table_globalz_windowa(pre_a
, &Z
, r
);
158 for (i
= 0; i
< ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A
); i
++) {
159 secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&pre_a
[i
].y
);
161 #ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM
162 for (i
= 0; i
< ECMULT_TABLE_SIZE(WINDOW_A
); i
++) {
163 secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(&pre_a_lam
[i
], &pre_a
[i
]);
167 /* first loop iteration (separated out so we can directly set r, rather
168 * than having it start at infinity, get doubled several times, then have
169 * its new value added to it) */
170 i
= wnaf_1
[WNAF_SIZE(WINDOW_A
- 1)];
171 VERIFY_CHECK(i
!= 0);
172 ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa
, pre_a
, i
, WINDOW_A
);
173 secp256k1_gej_set_ge(r
, &tmpa
);
174 #ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM
175 i
= wnaf_lam
[WNAF_SIZE(WINDOW_A
- 1)];
176 VERIFY_CHECK(i
!= 0);
177 ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa
, pre_a_lam
, i
, WINDOW_A
);
178 secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r
, r
, &tmpa
);
180 /* remaining loop iterations */
181 for (i
= WNAF_SIZE(WINDOW_A
- 1) - 1; i
>= 0; i
--) {
184 for (j
= 0; j
< WINDOW_A
- 1; ++j
) {
185 secp256k1_gej_double_nonzero(r
, r
, NULL
);
189 ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa
, pre_a
, n
, WINDOW_A
);
190 VERIFY_CHECK(n
!= 0);
191 secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r
, r
, &tmpa
);
192 #ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM
194 ECMULT_CONST_TABLE_GET_GE(&tmpa
, pre_a_lam
, n
, WINDOW_A
);
195 VERIFY_CHECK(n
!= 0);
196 secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r
, r
, &tmpa
);
200 secp256k1_fe_mul(&r
->z
, &r
->z
, &Z
);
203 /* Correct for wNAF skew */
204 secp256k1_ge correction
= *a
;
205 secp256k1_ge_storage correction_1_stor
;
206 #ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM
207 secp256k1_ge_storage correction_lam_stor
;
209 secp256k1_ge_storage a2_stor
;
211 secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&tmpj
, &correction
);
212 secp256k1_gej_double_var(&tmpj
, &tmpj
, NULL
);
213 secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&correction
, &tmpj
);
214 secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&correction_1_stor
, a
);
215 #ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM
216 secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&correction_lam_stor
, a
);
218 secp256k1_ge_to_storage(&a2_stor
, &correction
);
220 /* For odd numbers this is 2a (so replace it), for even ones a (so no-op) */
221 secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(&correction_1_stor
, &a2_stor
, skew_1
== 2);
222 #ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM
223 secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(&correction_lam_stor
, &a2_stor
, skew_lam
== 2);
226 /* Apply the correction */
227 secp256k1_ge_from_storage(&correction
, &correction_1_stor
);
228 secp256k1_ge_neg(&correction
, &correction
);
229 secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r
, r
, &correction
);
231 #ifdef USE_ENDOMORPHISM
232 secp256k1_ge_from_storage(&correction
, &correction_lam_stor
);
233 secp256k1_ge_neg(&correction
, &correction
);
234 secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(&correction
, &correction
);
235 secp256k1_gej_add_ge(r
, r
, &correction
);
240 #endif /* SECP256K1_ECMULT_CONST_IMPL_H */