s3:rpcclient: we also need some ndr_pull functions
[Samba/ita.git] / source4 / kdc / db-glue.c
blobc8bbea75317d5d34ffd48933493e45d7310f8bff
1 /*
2 Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
4 Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
6 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
7 Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
9 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
12 (at your option) any later version.
14 This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 GNU General Public License for more details.
20 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
21 along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
24 #include "includes.h"
25 #include "system/time.h"
26 #include "../libds/common/flags.h"
27 #include "lib/ldb/include/ldb.h"
28 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h"
29 #include "libcli/security/security.h"
30 #include "auth/auth.h"
31 #include "auth/credentials/credentials.h"
32 #include "auth/auth_sam.h"
33 #include "../lib/util/util_ldb.h"
34 #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
35 #include "dsdb/common/util.h"
36 #include "librpc/ndr/libndr.h"
37 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
38 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/lsa.h"
39 #include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
40 #include "param/param.h"
41 #include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
42 #include "system/kerberos.h"
43 #include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
44 #include <hdb.h>
45 #include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
46 #include "kdc/db-glue.h"
48 enum samba_kdc_ent_type
49 { SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
50 SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
52 enum trust_direction {
53 UNKNOWN = 0,
54 INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
55 OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
58 static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
59 "trustPartner",
60 "trustAuthIncoming",
61 "trustAuthOutgoing",
62 "whenCreated",
63 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
64 "trustAttributes",
65 "trustDirection",
66 "trustType",
67 NULL
70 static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val)
72 const char *tmp;
73 const char *gentime;
74 struct tm tm;
76 gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
77 if (!gentime)
78 return default_val;
80 tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
81 if (tmp == NULL) {
82 return default_val;
85 return timegm(&tm);
88 static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, int userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type)
90 HDBFlags flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
92 /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
93 flags.immutable = 1;
95 /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
96 flags.invalid = 1;
98 flags.renewable = 1;
100 /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
101 flags.server = 1;
103 /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
104 if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
105 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
106 flags.client = 1;
108 flags.invalid = 0;
111 if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
112 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
113 flags.client = 1;
115 flags.invalid = 0;
117 if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
118 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
119 flags.client = 1;
121 flags.invalid = 0;
123 if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
124 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
125 flags.client = 1;
127 flags.invalid = 0;
130 /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
131 if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
132 flags.client = 0;
134 if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
135 flags.invalid = 1;
138 if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
139 flags.invalid = 1;
143 UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
145 if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
146 flags.invalid = 1;
149 /* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
152 if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
153 flags.invalid = 1;
156 if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
157 flags.require_hwauth = 1;
159 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
160 flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
162 if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
163 flags.forwardable = 1;
164 flags.proxiable = 1;
167 if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
168 flags.require_preauth = 0;
169 } else {
170 flags.require_preauth = 1;
173 return flags;
176 static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p)
178 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = p->entry_ex;
179 free_hdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry);
180 return 0;
183 static void samba_kdc_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
185 /* this function is called only from hdb_free_entry().
186 * Make sure we neutralize the destructor or we will
187 * get a double free later when hdb_free_entry() will
188 * try to call free_hdb_entry() */
189 talloc_set_destructor(entry_ex->ctx, NULL);
191 /* now proceed to free the talloc part */
192 talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx);
195 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
196 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
197 struct ldb_message *msg,
198 uint32_t rid,
199 unsigned int userAccountControl,
200 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
201 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
203 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
204 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
205 struct samr_Password *hash;
206 const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
207 struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
208 struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
209 bool newer_keys = false;
210 struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
211 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL;
212 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
213 uint16_t i;
214 uint16_t allocated_keys = 0;
216 /* Supported Enc for this entry */
217 uint32_t supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES; /* by default, we support all enc types */
219 /* However, if this is a TGS-REQ, then lock it down to a
220 * reasonable guess as to what the server can decode. The
221 * krbtgt is special - default to use what is stored for the KDC */
222 if (rid != DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
223 /* This is the standard set for a server that has not declared a msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes */
224 supported_enctypes = ENC_CRC32 | ENC_RSA_MD5 | ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
226 supported_enctypes = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
227 supported_enctypes);
228 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
229 /* Be double-sure never to use DES here */
230 supported_enctypes &= ~(ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5);
233 switch (ent_type) {
234 case SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT:
235 case SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST:
236 /* Disallow krbtgt and trust tickets to be DES encrypted, it's just too dangerous */
237 supported_enctypes &= ~(ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5);
238 break;
239 default:
240 break;
241 /* No further restrictions */
244 /* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
245 if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
246 /* However, don't allow use of DES, if we were told not to by msDS-SupportedEncTypes */
247 supported_enctypes &= ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5;
250 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
251 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
253 entry_ex->entry.kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
255 /* Get keys from the db */
257 hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
258 sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
260 /* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */
261 if (hash) {
262 allocated_keys++;
265 /* supplementalCredentials if present */
266 if (sc_val) {
267 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, &scb,
268 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
269 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
270 dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
271 ret = EINVAL;
272 goto out;
275 if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
276 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
277 ret = EINVAL;
278 goto out;
281 for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
282 if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
283 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
284 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
285 scpk = NULL;
286 continue;
288 newer_keys = true;
289 break;
290 } else if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
291 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
292 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
293 scpk = NULL;
296 * we don't break here in hope to find
297 * a Kerberos-Newer-Keys package
303 * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys or Primary:Kerberos element
304 * of supplementalCredentials
306 if (scpk) {
307 DATA_BLOB blob;
309 blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
310 if (!blob.data) {
311 ret = ENOMEM;
312 goto out;
315 /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
316 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &_pkb,
317 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
318 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
319 ret = EINVAL;
320 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
321 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
322 goto out;
325 if (newer_keys && _pkb.version != 4) {
326 ret = EINVAL;
327 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
328 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
329 goto out;
332 if (!newer_keys && _pkb.version != 3) {
333 ret = EINVAL;
334 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
335 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
336 goto out;
339 if (_pkb.version == 4) {
340 pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
341 allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys;
342 } else if (_pkb.version == 3) {
343 pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3;
344 allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys;
348 if (allocated_keys == 0) {
349 /* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
350 * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
351 * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
352 return 0;
355 /* allocate space to decode into */
356 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
357 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(Key));
358 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
359 ret = ENOMEM;
360 goto out;
363 if (hash && (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5)) {
364 Key key;
366 key.mkvno = 0;
367 key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
369 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
370 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
371 hash->hash, sizeof(hash->hash),
372 &key.key);
373 if (ret) {
374 goto out;
377 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
378 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
381 if (pkb4) {
382 for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) {
383 Key key;
385 if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue;
387 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb4->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
388 continue;
391 key.mkvno = 0;
392 key.salt = NULL;
394 if (pkb4->salt.string) {
395 DATA_BLOB salt;
397 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string);
399 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
400 if (key.salt == NULL) {
401 ret = ENOMEM;
402 goto out;
405 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
407 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
408 if (ret) {
409 free(key.salt);
410 key.salt = NULL;
411 goto out;
415 /* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */
417 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
418 pkb4->keys[i].keytype,
419 pkb4->keys[i].value->data,
420 pkb4->keys[i].value->length,
421 &key.key);
422 if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
423 DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
424 pkb4->keys[i].keytype));
425 ret = 0;
426 continue;
428 if (ret) {
429 if (key.salt) {
430 free_Salt(key.salt);
431 free(key.salt);
432 key.salt = NULL;
434 goto out;
437 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
438 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
440 } else if (pkb3) {
441 for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) {
442 Key key;
444 if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue;
446 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb3->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
447 continue;
450 key.mkvno = 0;
451 key.salt = NULL;
453 if (pkb3->salt.string) {
454 DATA_BLOB salt;
456 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string);
458 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
459 if (key.salt == NULL) {
460 ret = ENOMEM;
461 goto out;
464 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
466 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
467 if (ret) {
468 free(key.salt);
469 key.salt = NULL;
470 goto out;
474 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
475 pkb3->keys[i].keytype,
476 pkb3->keys[i].value->data,
477 pkb3->keys[i].value->length,
478 &key.key);
479 if (ret) {
480 if (key.salt) {
481 free_Salt(key.salt);
482 free(key.salt);
483 key.salt = NULL;
485 goto out;
488 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
489 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
493 out:
494 if (ret != 0) {
495 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
497 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) {
498 free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
499 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
501 return ret;
505 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
507 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context,
508 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
509 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
510 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
511 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
512 struct ldb_message *msg,
513 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
515 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
516 unsigned int userAccountControl;
517 unsigned int i;
518 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
519 krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
520 char *realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
522 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
523 NTTIME acct_expiry;
524 NTSTATUS status;
526 uint32_t rid;
527 struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
528 struct ldb_val computer_val;
529 const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
530 computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer");
531 computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data);
533 if (!samAccountName) {
534 ret = ENOENT;
535 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
536 goto out;
539 objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
541 if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
542 is_computer = TRUE;
545 memset(entry_ex, 0, sizeof(*entry_ex));
547 if (!realm) {
548 ret = ENOMEM;
549 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_strdup: out of memory");
550 goto out;
553 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
554 if (!p) {
555 ret = ENOMEM;
556 goto out;
559 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
560 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
561 p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn);
562 if (!p->realm_dn) {
563 ret = ENOMEM;
564 goto out;
567 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
569 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
570 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
572 entry_ex->ctx = p;
573 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
575 userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
578 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
579 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
580 krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, realm, samAccountName, NULL);
581 } else {
582 ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
583 if (ret) {
584 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
585 goto out;
588 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
589 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
590 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
591 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
592 * we determine from our records */
594 /* this has to be with malloc() */
595 krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
598 /* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
599 entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2HDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
601 /* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
602 * default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
603 * by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
604 * their probably patheticly insecure password) */
606 if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server
607 && lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
608 if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
609 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0;
614 /* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
615 * of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
616 * DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
617 * we must return */
619 /* use 'whenCreated' */
620 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
621 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
622 krb5_make_principal(context,
623 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
624 realm, "kadmin", NULL);
626 entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event));
627 if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
628 ret = ENOMEM;
629 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
630 goto out;
633 /* use 'whenChanged' */
634 entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
635 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
636 krb5_make_principal(context,
637 &entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal,
638 realm, "kadmin", NULL);
642 /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
643 * virtue of being that particular RID */
644 status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
646 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
647 ret = EINVAL;
648 goto out;
651 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
652 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
653 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
655 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
656 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
658 /* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
659 * 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
660 * trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
661 * Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
662 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
663 && principal->name.name_string.len == 2
664 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "kadmin") == 0)
665 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], "changepw") == 0)
666 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)) {
667 entry_ex->entry.flags.change_pw = 1;
669 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
670 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
671 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
672 } else if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
673 /* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
674 * client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
676 /* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
677 * it could bypass the password restrictions */
678 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
680 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
681 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
683 } else {
684 NTTIME must_change_time
685 = samdb_result_force_password_change(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
686 realm_dn, msg);
687 if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
688 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
689 } else {
690 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end));
691 if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) {
692 ret = ENOMEM;
693 goto out;
695 *entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
698 acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
699 if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
700 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
701 } else {
702 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end));
703 if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) {
704 ret = ENOMEM;
705 goto out;
707 *entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
711 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
713 entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
715 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
717 entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
719 /* Get keys from the db */
720 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, p, msg,
721 rid, userAccountControl,
722 ent_type, entry_ex);
723 if (ret) {
724 /* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */
725 goto out;
728 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
729 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
730 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
731 ret = ENOMEM;
732 goto out;
734 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
735 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
736 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
737 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
738 ret = ENOMEM;
739 goto out;
741 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
742 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
746 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
748 out:
749 if (ret != 0) {
750 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
751 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
752 } else {
753 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
756 return ret;
760 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
762 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
763 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
764 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
765 enum trust_direction direction,
766 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
767 struct ldb_message *msg,
768 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
770 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
771 const char *dnsdomain;
772 char *realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
773 DATA_BLOB password_utf16;
774 struct samr_Password password_hash;
775 const struct ldb_val *password_val;
776 struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
777 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
779 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
780 int ret, trust_direction_flags;
781 unsigned int i;
783 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
784 if (!p) {
785 ret = ENOMEM;
786 goto out;
789 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
790 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
791 p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
793 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
795 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
796 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
798 entry_ex->ctx = p;
799 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
801 /* use 'whenCreated' */
802 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
803 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
804 krb5_make_principal(context,
805 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
806 realm, "kadmin", NULL);
808 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
810 trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0);
812 if (direction == INBOUND) {
813 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
815 } else { /* OUTBOUND */
816 dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL);
817 /* replace realm */
818 talloc_free(realm);
819 realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
820 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
823 if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) {
824 ret = ENOENT;
825 goto out;
828 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, &password_blob,
829 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
830 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
831 ret = EINVAL;
832 goto out;
835 entry_ex->entry.kvno = -1;
836 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
837 if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
838 entry_ex->entry.kvno = password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.version.version;
842 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
843 if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
844 password_utf16 = data_blob_const(password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
845 password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
846 /* In the future, generate all sorts of
847 * hashes, but for now we can't safely convert
848 * the random strings windows uses into
849 * utf8 */
851 /* but as it is utf16 already, we can get the NT password/arcfour-hmac-md5 key */
852 mdfour(password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
853 break;
854 } else if (password_blob.current->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
855 password_hash = password_blob.current->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
856 break;
860 if (i < password_blob.count) {
861 Key key;
862 /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
863 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(1, sizeof(Key));
865 key.mkvno = 0;
866 key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
868 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
869 ret = ENOMEM;
870 goto out;
873 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
874 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
875 password_hash.hash, sizeof(password_hash.hash),
876 &key.key);
878 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
879 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
882 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
884 ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
885 if (ret) {
886 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
887 goto out;
890 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
891 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
892 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
893 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
894 * we determine from our records */
896 krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
897 entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
898 entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
899 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
900 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
901 entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
903 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
905 entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
907 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
909 entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
911 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
912 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
913 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
914 ret = ENOMEM;
915 goto out;
917 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
918 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
919 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
920 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
921 ret = ENOMEM;
922 goto out;
924 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
925 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
929 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
931 out:
932 if (ret != 0) {
933 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
934 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
935 } else {
936 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
939 return ret;
943 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
944 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
945 const char *realm,
946 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
947 struct ldb_message **pmsg)
949 int lret;
950 krb5_error_code ret;
951 char *filter = NULL;
952 const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
954 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
955 filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=trustedDomain)(|(flatname=%s)(trustPartner=%s)))", realm, realm);
957 if (!filter) {
958 ret = ENOMEM;
959 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory");
960 return ret;
963 lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx, &res,
964 ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx),
965 LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs, "%s", filter);
966 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
967 DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search for %s: %s\n", filter, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx)));
968 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
969 } else if (res->count == 0 || res->count > 1) {
970 DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for %s: got %d\n", filter, res->count));
971 talloc_free(res);
972 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
974 talloc_steal(mem_ctx, res->msgs);
975 *pmsg = res->msgs[0];
976 talloc_free(res);
977 return 0;
980 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
981 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
982 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
983 krb5_const_principal principal,
984 const char **attrs,
985 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
986 struct ldb_message **msg) {
987 NTSTATUS nt_status;
988 char *principal_string;
989 krb5_error_code ret;
991 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string);
993 if (ret != 0) {
994 return ret;
997 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
998 mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
999 realm_dn, msg);
1000 free(principal_string);
1001 if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
1002 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1003 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1004 return ENOMEM;
1005 } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1006 return EINVAL;
1009 return ret;
1012 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context,
1013 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1014 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1015 krb5_const_principal principal,
1016 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
1017 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1018 krb5_error_code ret;
1019 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1021 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1022 mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
1023 &realm_dn, &msg);
1024 if (ret != 0) {
1025 return ret;
1028 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1029 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
1030 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1031 return ret;
1034 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context,
1035 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1036 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1037 krb5_const_principal principal,
1038 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1040 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
1041 krb5_error_code ret;
1042 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1043 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1044 const char *realm;
1046 krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL;
1047 if (principal->name.name_string.len != 2
1048 || (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
1049 /* Not a krbtgt */
1050 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1053 /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
1055 if (lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)
1056 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1])) {
1057 /* us */
1058 /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
1059 * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
1060 * krbtgt */
1062 int lret;
1063 char *realm_fixed;
1065 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1066 &msg, realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1067 krbtgt_attrs,
1068 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN,
1069 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
1070 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1071 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB!");
1072 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB!");
1073 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1074 } else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1075 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb));
1076 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb));
1077 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1080 realm_fixed = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
1081 if (!realm_fixed) {
1082 ret = ENOMEM;
1083 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "strupper_talloc: out of memory");
1084 return ret;
1087 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &alloc_principal);
1088 if (ret) {
1089 return ret;
1092 free(alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1093 alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1] = strdup(realm_fixed);
1094 talloc_free(realm_fixed);
1095 if (!alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]) {
1096 ret = ENOMEM;
1097 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: strdup() failed!");
1098 return ret;
1100 principal = alloc_principal;
1102 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1103 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
1104 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1105 if (ret != 0) {
1106 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
1108 return ret;
1110 } else {
1111 enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
1113 /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
1115 if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->realm) == 0) {
1116 /* look for inbound trust */
1117 direction = INBOUND;
1118 realm = principal->name.name_string.val[1];
1121 if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->name.name_string.val[1]) == 0) {
1122 /* look for outbound trust */
1123 direction = OUTBOUND;
1124 realm = principal->realm;
1127 /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
1129 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1130 mem_ctx,
1131 realm, realm_dn, &msg);
1133 if (ret != 0) {
1134 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1135 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1136 return ret;
1139 ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1140 principal, direction,
1141 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1142 if (ret != 0) {
1143 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed");
1145 return ret;
1150 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context,
1151 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1152 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1153 krb5_const_principal principal,
1154 const char **attrs,
1155 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1156 struct ldb_message **msg)
1158 krb5_error_code ret;
1159 const char *realm;
1160 if (principal->name.name_string.len >= 2) {
1161 /* 'normal server' case */
1162 int ldb_ret;
1163 NTSTATUS nt_status;
1164 struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
1165 char *principal_string;
1167 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
1168 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
1169 &principal_string);
1170 if (ret != 0) {
1171 return ret;
1174 /* At this point we may find the host is known to be
1175 * in a different realm, so we should generate a
1176 * referral instead */
1177 nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1178 mem_ctx, principal_string,
1179 &user_dn, realm_dn);
1180 free(principal_string);
1182 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1183 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1186 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1187 mem_ctx,
1188 msg, user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1189 attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN, "(objectClass=*)");
1190 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1191 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1194 } else {
1195 int lret;
1196 char *filter = NULL;
1197 char *short_princ;
1198 /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
1199 *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1200 realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal);
1202 /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referall */
1204 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &short_princ);
1206 if (ret != 0) {
1207 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1208 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1209 return ret;
1212 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg,
1213 *realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1214 attrs,
1215 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN,
1216 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
1217 ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ));
1218 free(short_princ);
1219 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1220 DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a entry for %s\n", filter));
1221 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1223 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1224 DEBUG(3, ("Failed single search for for %s - %s\n",
1225 filter, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1226 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1230 return 0;
1233 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
1234 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1235 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1236 krb5_const_principal principal,
1237 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1239 krb5_error_code ret;
1240 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1241 struct ldb_message *msg;
1243 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
1244 server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1245 if (ret != 0) {
1246 return ret;
1249 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1250 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
1251 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1252 if (ret != 0) {
1253 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed");
1256 return ret;
1259 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context,
1260 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1261 krb5_const_principal principal,
1262 unsigned flags,
1263 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1265 krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1266 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
1268 if (!mem_ctx) {
1269 ret = ENOMEM;
1270 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1271 return ret;
1274 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
1275 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, entry_ex);
1276 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1278 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
1279 /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
1280 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, entry_ex);
1281 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1283 /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
1284 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, entry_ex);
1285 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1287 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
1288 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, entry_ex);
1289 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1292 done:
1293 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1294 return ret;
1297 struct samba_kdc_seq {
1298 unsigned int index;
1299 unsigned int count;
1300 struct ldb_message **msgs;
1301 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1304 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context,
1305 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1306 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1308 krb5_error_code ret;
1309 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1310 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1311 hdb_entry_ex entry_ex;
1312 memset(&entry_ex, '\0', sizeof(entry_ex));
1314 if (!priv) {
1315 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1318 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
1320 if (!mem_ctx) {
1321 ret = ENOMEM;
1322 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
1323 return ret;
1326 if (priv->index < priv->count) {
1327 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1328 NULL, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
1329 priv->realm_dn, priv->msgs[priv->index++], entry);
1330 } else {
1331 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1334 if (ret != 0) {
1335 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1336 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1337 } else {
1338 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1341 return ret;
1344 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context,
1345 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1346 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1348 struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb;
1349 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1350 char *realm;
1351 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
1352 krb5_error_code ret;
1353 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1354 int lret;
1356 if (priv) {
1357 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1358 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1361 priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq);
1362 if (!priv) {
1363 ret = ENOMEM;
1364 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
1365 return ret;
1368 priv->index = 0;
1369 priv->msgs = NULL;
1370 priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx);
1371 priv->count = 0;
1373 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context");
1375 if (!mem_ctx) {
1376 ret = ENOMEM;
1377 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
1378 return ret;
1381 ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
1382 if (ret != 0) {
1383 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1384 return ret;
1387 lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
1388 priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
1389 "(objectClass=user)");
1391 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1392 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1393 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1396 priv->count = res->count;
1397 priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
1398 talloc_free(res);
1400 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv;
1402 ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1404 if (ret != 0) {
1405 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1406 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1407 } else {
1408 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1410 return ret;
1413 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context,
1414 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1415 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1417 return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1420 /* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal
1422 * This is currently a very nasty hack - allowing only delegation to itself.
1424 * This is shared between the constrained delegation and S4U2Self code.
1426 krb5_error_code
1427 samba_kdc_check_identical_client_and_server(krb5_context context,
1428 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1429 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1430 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
1432 krb5_error_code ret;
1433 krb5_principal enterprise_prinicpal = NULL;
1434 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1435 struct ldb_message *msg;
1436 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1437 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1438 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1439 const char *delegation_check_attrs[] = {
1440 "objectSid", NULL
1443 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation");
1445 if (!mem_ctx) {
1446 ret = ENOMEM;
1447 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1448 return ret;
1451 if (target_principal->name.name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1452 /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
1453 if (target_principal->name.name_string.len != 1) {
1454 ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
1455 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation: request for delegation to enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
1456 target_principal->name.name_string.len);
1457 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1458 return ret;
1460 ret = krb5_parse_name(context, target_principal->name.name_string.val[0],
1461 &enterprise_prinicpal);
1462 if (ret) {
1463 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1464 return ret;
1466 target_principal = enterprise_prinicpal;
1469 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, target_principal,
1470 delegation_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1472 krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_prinicpal);
1474 if (ret != 0) {
1475 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1476 return ret;
1479 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1480 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1482 /* Allow delegation to the same principal, even if by a different
1483 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1484 * comparison */
1485 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1486 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1487 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1490 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1491 return ret;
1494 /* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
1495 * slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
1496 * database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
1497 * SID */
1499 krb5_error_code
1500 samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context,
1501 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1502 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1503 krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
1505 krb5_error_code ret;
1506 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1507 struct ldb_message *msg;
1508 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1509 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1510 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1511 const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
1512 "objectSid", NULL
1515 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
1517 if (!mem_ctx) {
1518 ret = ENOMEM;
1519 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1520 return ret;
1523 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1524 mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
1525 ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1527 if (ret != 0) {
1528 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1529 return ret;
1532 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1533 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1535 /* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
1536 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1537 * comparison */
1538 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1539 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1540 return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
1543 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1544 return ret;