2 * Copyright (c) 2000 - 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
3 * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
13 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
15 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
17 * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
18 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
19 * without specific prior written permission.
21 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
22 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
23 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
24 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
25 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
26 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
27 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
28 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
29 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
30 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
39 struct hdb_master_key_data
{
40 krb5_keytab_entry keytab
;
42 struct hdb_master_key_data
*next
;
46 hdb_free_master_key(krb5_context context
, hdb_master_key mkey
)
48 struct hdb_master_key_data
*ptr
;
50 krb5_kt_free_entry(context
, &mkey
->keytab
);
52 krb5_crypto_destroy(context
, mkey
->crypto
);
60 hdb_process_master_key(krb5_context context
,
61 int kvno
, krb5_keyblock
*key
, krb5_enctype etype
,
66 *mkey
= calloc(1, sizeof(**mkey
));
68 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ENOMEM
, "malloc: out of memory");
71 (*mkey
)->keytab
.vno
= kvno
;
72 ret
= krb5_parse_name(context
, "K/M", &(*mkey
)->keytab
.principal
);
75 ret
= krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(context
, key
, &(*mkey
)->keytab
.keyblock
);
79 (*mkey
)->keytab
.keyblock
.keytype
= etype
;
80 (*mkey
)->keytab
.timestamp
= time(NULL
);
81 ret
= krb5_crypto_init(context
, key
, etype
, &(*mkey
)->crypto
);
86 hdb_free_master_key(context
, *mkey
);
92 hdb_add_master_key(krb5_context context
, krb5_keyblock
*key
,
93 hdb_master_key
*inout
)
99 for(p
= *inout
; p
; p
= p
->next
)
100 vno
= max(vno
, p
->keytab
.vno
);
102 ret
= hdb_process_master_key(context
, vno
, key
, 0, &p
);
110 static krb5_error_code
111 read_master_keytab(krb5_context context
, const char *filename
,
112 hdb_master_key
*mkey
)
116 krb5_kt_cursor cursor
;
117 krb5_keytab_entry entry
;
120 ret
= krb5_kt_resolve(context
, filename
, &id
);
124 ret
= krb5_kt_start_seq_get(context
, id
, &cursor
);
128 while(krb5_kt_next_entry(context
, id
, &entry
, &cursor
) == 0) {
129 p
= calloc(1, sizeof(*p
));
131 krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context
, id
, &cursor
);
136 ret
= krb5_crypto_init(context
, &p
->keytab
.keyblock
, 0, &p
->crypto
);
140 krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context
, id
, &cursor
);
142 krb5_kt_close(context
, id
);
146 /* read a MIT master keyfile */
147 static krb5_error_code
148 read_master_mit(krb5_context context
, const char *filename
,
149 int byteorder
, hdb_master_key
*mkey
)
157 fd
= open(filename
, O_RDONLY
| O_BINARY
);
159 int save_errno
= errno
;
160 krb5_set_error_message(context
, save_errno
, "failed to open %s: %s",
161 filename
, strerror(save_errno
));
164 sp
= krb5_storage_from_fd(fd
);
169 krb5_storage_set_flags(sp
, byteorder
);
170 /* could possibly use ret_keyblock here, but do it with more
173 ret
= krb5_ret_int16(sp
, &enctype
);
176 ret
= krb5_enctype_valid(context
, enctype
);
179 key
.keytype
= enctype
;
180 ret
= krb5_ret_data(sp
, &key
.keyvalue
);
184 ret
= hdb_process_master_key(context
, 1, &key
, 0, mkey
);
185 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context
, &key
);
187 krb5_storage_free(sp
);
192 /* read an old master key file */
193 static krb5_error_code
194 read_master_encryptionkey(krb5_context context
, const char *filename
,
195 hdb_master_key
*mkey
)
200 unsigned char buf
[256];
204 fd
= open(filename
, O_RDONLY
| O_BINARY
);
206 int save_errno
= errno
;
207 krb5_set_error_message(context
, save_errno
, "failed to open %s: %s",
208 filename
, strerror(save_errno
));
212 len
= read(fd
, buf
, sizeof(buf
));
215 int save_errno
= errno
;
216 krb5_set_error_message(context
, save_errno
, "error reading %s: %s",
217 filename
, strerror(save_errno
));
221 ret
= decode_EncryptionKey(buf
, len
, &key
, &ret_len
);
222 memset(buf
, 0, sizeof(buf
));
226 /* Originally, the keytype was just that, and later it got changed
227 to des-cbc-md5, but we always used des in cfb64 mode. This
228 should cover all cases, but will break if someone has hacked
229 this code to really use des-cbc-md5 -- but then that's not my
231 if(key
.keytype
== ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC
|| key
.keytype
== ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5
)
232 key
.keytype
= ETYPE_DES_CFB64_NONE
;
234 ret
= hdb_process_master_key(context
, 0, &key
, 0, mkey
);
235 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context
, &key
);
239 /* read a krb4 /.k style file */
240 static krb5_error_code
241 read_master_krb4(krb5_context context
, const char *filename
,
242 hdb_master_key
*mkey
)
247 unsigned char buf
[256];
250 fd
= open(filename
, O_RDONLY
| O_BINARY
);
252 int save_errno
= errno
;
253 krb5_set_error_message(context
, save_errno
, "failed to open %s: %s",
254 filename
, strerror(save_errno
));
258 len
= read(fd
, buf
, sizeof(buf
));
261 int save_errno
= errno
;
262 krb5_set_error_message(context
, save_errno
, "error reading %s: %s",
263 filename
, strerror(save_errno
));
267 krb5_set_error_message(context
, HEIM_ERR_EOF
,
268 "bad contents of %s", filename
);
269 return HEIM_ERR_EOF
; /* XXX file might be too large */
272 memset(&key
, 0, sizeof(key
));
273 key
.keytype
= ETYPE_DES_PCBC_NONE
;
274 ret
= krb5_data_copy(&key
.keyvalue
, buf
, len
);
275 memset(buf
, 0, sizeof(buf
));
279 ret
= hdb_process_master_key(context
, 0, &key
, 0, mkey
);
280 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context
, &key
);
285 hdb_read_master_key(krb5_context context
, const char *filename
,
286 hdb_master_key
*mkey
)
289 unsigned char buf
[16];
297 filename
= HDB_DB_DIR
"/m-key";
299 f
= fopen(filename
, "r");
301 int save_errno
= errno
;
302 krb5_set_error_message(context
, save_errno
, "failed to open %s: %s",
303 filename
, strerror(save_errno
));
307 if(fread(buf
, 1, 2, f
) != 2) {
309 krb5_set_error_message(context
, HEIM_ERR_EOF
, "end of file reading %s", filename
);
313 fseek(f
, 0, SEEK_END
);
323 ret
= read_master_krb4(context
, filename
, mkey
);
324 } else if(buf
[0] == 0x30 && len
<= 127 && buf
[1] == len
- 2) {
325 ret
= read_master_encryptionkey(context
, filename
, mkey
);
326 } else if(buf
[0] == 5 && buf
[1] >= 1 && buf
[1] <= 2) {
327 ret
= read_master_keytab(context
, filename
, mkey
);
330 * Check both LittleEndian and BigEndian since they key file
331 * might be moved from a machine with diffrent byte order, or
332 * its running on MacOS X that always uses BE master keys.
334 ret
= read_master_mit(context
, filename
, KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_LE
, mkey
);
336 ret
= read_master_mit(context
, filename
, KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_BE
, mkey
);
342 hdb_write_master_key(krb5_context context
, const char *filename
,
350 filename
= HDB_DB_DIR
"/m-key";
352 ret
= krb5_kt_resolve(context
, filename
, &kt
);
356 for(p
= mkey
; p
; p
= p
->next
) {
357 ret
= krb5_kt_add_entry(context
, kt
, &p
->keytab
);
360 krb5_kt_close(context
, kt
);
366 _hdb_find_master_key(uint32_t *mkvno
, hdb_master_key mkey
)
368 hdb_master_key ret
= NULL
;
370 if(ret
== NULL
&& mkey
->keytab
.vno
== 0)
373 if(ret
== NULL
|| mkey
->keytab
.vno
> ret
->keytab
.vno
)
375 } else if((uint32_t)mkey
->keytab
.vno
== *mkvno
)
383 _hdb_mkey_version(hdb_master_key mkey
)
385 return mkey
->keytab
.vno
;
389 _hdb_mkey_decrypt(krb5_context context
, hdb_master_key key
,
390 krb5_key_usage usage
,
391 void *ptr
, size_t size
, krb5_data
*res
)
393 return krb5_decrypt(context
, key
->crypto
, usage
,
398 _hdb_mkey_encrypt(krb5_context context
, hdb_master_key key
,
399 krb5_key_usage usage
,
400 const void *ptr
, size_t size
, krb5_data
*res
)
402 return krb5_encrypt(context
, key
->crypto
, usage
,
407 hdb_unseal_key_mkey(krb5_context context
, Key
*k
, hdb_master_key mkey
)
419 key
= _hdb_find_master_key(k
->mkvno
, mkey
);
422 return HDB_ERR_NO_MKEY
;
424 ret
= _hdb_mkey_decrypt(context
, key
, HDB_KU_MKEY
,
425 k
->key
.keyvalue
.data
,
426 k
->key
.keyvalue
.length
,
428 if(ret
== KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY
) {
429 /* try to decrypt with MIT key usage */
430 ret
= _hdb_mkey_decrypt(context
, key
, 0,
431 k
->key
.keyvalue
.data
,
432 k
->key
.keyvalue
.length
,
438 /* fixup keylength if the key got padded when encrypting it */
439 ret
= krb5_enctype_keysize(context
, k
->key
.keytype
, &keysize
);
441 krb5_data_free(&res
);
444 if (keysize
> res
.length
) {
445 krb5_data_free(&res
);
446 return KRB5_BAD_KEYSIZE
;
449 memset(k
->key
.keyvalue
.data
, 0, k
->key
.keyvalue
.length
);
450 free(k
->key
.keyvalue
.data
);
451 k
->key
.keyvalue
= res
;
452 k
->key
.keyvalue
.length
= keysize
;
460 hdb_unseal_keys_mkey(krb5_context context
, hdb_entry
*ent
, hdb_master_key mkey
)
464 for(i
= 0; i
< ent
->keys
.len
; i
++){
467 ret
= hdb_unseal_key_mkey(context
, &ent
->keys
.val
[i
], mkey
);
475 hdb_unseal_keys(krb5_context context
, HDB
*db
, hdb_entry
*ent
)
477 if (db
->hdb_master_key_set
== 0)
479 return hdb_unseal_keys_mkey(context
, ent
, db
->hdb_master_key
);
483 hdb_unseal_keys_kvno(krb5_context context
, HDB
*db
, krb5_kvno kvno
,
484 unsigned flags
, hdb_entry
*ent
)
486 krb5_error_code ret
= HDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
488 HDB_Ext_KeySet
*hist_keys
;
491 unsigned int tmp_len
;
492 unsigned int kvno_diff
= 0;
495 int exclude_dead
= 0;
496 KerberosTime now
= 0;
502 if ((flags
& HDB_F_LIVE_CLNT_KVNOS
) || (flags
& HDB_F_LIVE_SVC_KVNOS
)) {
505 if (HDB_F_LIVE_CLNT_KVNOS
)
506 kvno_diff
= hdb_entry_get_kvno_diff_clnt(ent
);
508 kvno_diff
= hdb_entry_get_kvno_diff_svc(ent
);
511 ext
= hdb_find_extension(ent
, choice_HDB_extension_data_hist_keys
);
515 /* For swapping; see below */
516 tmp_len
= ent
->keys
.len
;
517 tmp_val
= ent
->keys
.val
;
518 tmp_kvno
= ent
->kvno
;
519 (void) hdb_entry_get_pw_change_time(ent
, &tmp_set_time
);
521 hist_keys
= &ext
->data
.u
.hist_keys
;
523 for (i
= 0; i
< hist_keys
->len
; i
++) {
524 if (kvno
!= 0 && hist_keys
->val
[i
].kvno
!= kvno
)
528 ((ent
->max_life
!= NULL
&&
529 hist_keys
->val
[i
].set_time
!= NULL
&&
530 (*hist_keys
->val
[i
].set_time
) < (now
- (*ent
->max_life
))) ||
531 (hist_keys
->val
[i
].kvno
< kvno
&&
532 (kvno
- hist_keys
->val
[i
].kvno
) > kvno_diff
)))
534 * The KDC may want to to check for this keyset's set_time
535 * is within the TGS principal's max_life, say. But we stop
540 /* Either the keys we want, or all the keys */
541 for (k
= 0; k
< hist_keys
->val
[i
].keys
.len
; k
++) {
542 ret
= hdb_unseal_key_mkey(context
,
543 &hist_keys
->val
[i
].keys
.val
[k
],
546 * If kvno == 0 we might not want to bail here! E.g., if we
547 * no longer have the right master key, so just ignore this.
549 * We could filter out keys that we can't decrypt here
550 * because of HDB_ERR_NO_MKEY. However, it seems safest to
551 * filter them out only where necessary, say, in kadm5.
553 if (ret
&& kvno
!= 0)
555 if (ret
&& ret
!= HDB_ERR_NO_MKEY
)
563 * What follows is a bit of a hack.
565 * This is the keyset we're being asked for, but it's not the
566 * current keyset. So we add the current keyset to the history,
567 * leave the one we were asked for in the history, and pretend
568 * the one we were asked for is also the current keyset.
570 * This is a bit of a defensive hack in case an entry fetched
571 * this way ever gets modified then stored: if the keyset is not
572 * changed we can detect this and put things back, else we won't
573 * drop any keysets from history by accident.
575 * Note too that we only ever get called with a non-zero kvno
576 * either in the KDC or in cases where we aren't changing the
577 * HDB entry anyways, which is why this is just a defensive
578 * hack. We also don't fetch specific kvnos in the dump case,
579 * so there's no danger that we'll dump this entry and load it
580 * again, repeatedly causing the history to grow boundelessly.
582 set_time
= malloc(sizeof (*set_time
));
583 if (set_time
== NULL
)
587 ent
->kvno
= hist_keys
->val
[i
].kvno
;
588 ent
->keys
.val
= hist_keys
->val
[i
].keys
.val
;
589 ent
->keys
.len
= hist_keys
->val
[i
].keys
.len
;
590 if (hist_keys
->val
[i
].set_time
!= NULL
)
591 /* Sloppy, but the callers we expect won't care */
592 (void) hdb_entry_set_pw_change_time(context
, ent
,
593 *hist_keys
->val
[i
].set_time
);
594 hist_keys
->val
[i
].kvno
= tmp_kvno
;
595 hist_keys
->val
[i
].keys
.val
= tmp_val
;
596 hist_keys
->val
[i
].keys
.len
= tmp_len
;
597 if (hist_keys
->val
[i
].set_time
!= NULL
)
598 /* Sloppy, but the callers we expect won't care */
599 *hist_keys
->val
[i
].set_time
= tmp_set_time
;
608 hdb_unseal_key(krb5_context context
, HDB
*db
, Key
*k
)
610 if (db
->hdb_master_key_set
== 0)
612 return hdb_unseal_key_mkey(context
, k
, db
->hdb_master_key
);
616 hdb_seal_key_mkey(krb5_context context
, Key
*k
, hdb_master_key mkey
)
625 key
= _hdb_find_master_key(k
->mkvno
, mkey
);
628 return HDB_ERR_NO_MKEY
;
630 ret
= _hdb_mkey_encrypt(context
, key
, HDB_KU_MKEY
,
631 k
->key
.keyvalue
.data
,
632 k
->key
.keyvalue
.length
,
637 memset(k
->key
.keyvalue
.data
, 0, k
->key
.keyvalue
.length
);
638 free(k
->key
.keyvalue
.data
);
639 k
->key
.keyvalue
= res
;
641 if (k
->mkvno
== NULL
) {
642 k
->mkvno
= malloc(sizeof(*k
->mkvno
));
643 if (k
->mkvno
== NULL
)
646 *k
->mkvno
= key
->keytab
.vno
;
652 hdb_seal_keys_mkey(krb5_context context
, hdb_entry
*ent
, hdb_master_key mkey
)
655 HDB_Ext_KeySet
*hist_keys
;
659 for(i
= 0; i
< ent
->keys
.len
; i
++){
660 ret
= hdb_seal_key_mkey(context
, &ent
->keys
.val
[i
], mkey
);
665 ext
= hdb_find_extension(ent
, choice_HDB_extension_data_hist_keys
);
668 hist_keys
= &ext
->data
.u
.hist_keys
;
670 for (i
= 0; i
< hist_keys
->len
; i
++) {
671 for (k
= 0; k
< hist_keys
->val
[i
].keys
.len
; k
++) {
672 ret
= hdb_seal_key_mkey(context
, &hist_keys
->val
[i
].keys
.val
[k
],
683 hdb_seal_keys(krb5_context context
, HDB
*db
, hdb_entry
*ent
)
685 if (db
->hdb_master_key_set
== 0)
688 return hdb_seal_keys_mkey(context
, ent
, db
->hdb_master_key
);
692 hdb_seal_key(krb5_context context
, HDB
*db
, Key
*k
)
694 if (db
->hdb_master_key_set
== 0)
697 return hdb_seal_key_mkey(context
, k
, db
->hdb_master_key
);
701 hdb_set_master_key (krb5_context context
,
708 ret
= hdb_process_master_key(context
, 0, key
, 0, &mkey
);
711 db
->hdb_master_key
= mkey
;
712 #if 0 /* XXX - why? */
713 des_set_random_generator_seed(key
.keyvalue
.data
);
715 db
->hdb_master_key_set
= 1;
720 hdb_set_master_keyfile (krb5_context context
,
727 ret
= hdb_read_master_key(context
, keyfile
, &key
);
731 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
734 db
->hdb_master_key
= key
;
735 db
->hdb_master_key_set
= 1;
740 hdb_clear_master_key (krb5_context context
,
743 if (db
->hdb_master_key_set
) {
744 hdb_free_master_key(context
, db
->hdb_master_key
);
745 db
->hdb_master_key_set
= 0;