s3:include: change smb_request->vuid to uint64_t

[Samba/gebeck_regimport.git] / source4 / heimdal / lib / hdb / mkey.c

/*
 * Copyright (c) 2000 - 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
 * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
 * All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 *
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 *
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 *
 * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
 *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
 *    without specific prior written permission.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 * SUCH DAMAGE.
 */

#include "hdb_locl.h"
#ifndef O_BINARY
#define O_BINARY 0
#endif

struct hdb_master_key_data {
    krb5_keytab_entry keytab;
    krb5_crypto crypto;
    struct hdb_master_key_data *next;
};

void
hdb_free_master_key(krb5_context context, hdb_master_key mkey)
{
    struct hdb_master_key_data *ptr;
    while(mkey) {
        krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &mkey->keytab);
        if (mkey->crypto)
            krb5_crypto_destroy(context, mkey->crypto);
        ptr = mkey;
        mkey = mkey->next;
        free(ptr);
    }
}

krb5_error_code
hdb_process_master_key(krb5_context context,
                       int kvno, krb5_keyblock *key, krb5_enctype etype,
                       hdb_master_key *mkey)
{
    krb5_error_code ret;

    *mkey = calloc(1, sizeof(**mkey));
    if(*mkey == NULL) {
        krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOMEM, "malloc: out of memory");
        return ENOMEM;
    }
    (*mkey)->keytab.vno = kvno;
    ret = krb5_parse_name(context, "K/M", &(*mkey)->keytab.principal);
    if(ret)
        goto fail;
    ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(context, key, &(*mkey)->keytab.keyblock);
    if(ret)
        goto fail;
    if(etype != 0)
        (*mkey)->keytab.keyblock.keytype = etype;
    (*mkey)->keytab.timestamp = time(NULL);
    ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, etype, &(*mkey)->crypto);
    if(ret)
        goto fail;
    return 0;
 fail:
    hdb_free_master_key(context, *mkey);
    *mkey = NULL;
    return ret;
}

krb5_error_code
hdb_add_master_key(krb5_context context, krb5_keyblock *key,
                   hdb_master_key *inout)
{
    int vno = 0;
    hdb_master_key p;
    krb5_error_code ret;

    for(p = *inout; p; p = p->next)
        vno = max(vno, p->keytab.vno);
    vno++;
    ret = hdb_process_master_key(context, vno, key, 0, &p);
    if(ret)
        return ret;
    p->next = *inout;
    *inout = p;
    return 0;
}

static krb5_error_code
read_master_keytab(krb5_context context, const char *filename,
                   hdb_master_key *mkey)
{
    krb5_error_code ret;
    krb5_keytab id;
    krb5_kt_cursor cursor;
    krb5_keytab_entry entry;
    hdb_master_key p;

    ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, filename, &id);
    if(ret)
        return ret;

    ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(context, id, &cursor);
    if(ret)
        goto out;
    *mkey = NULL;
    while(krb5_kt_next_entry(context, id, &entry, &cursor) == 0) {
        p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p));
        if(p == NULL) {
            krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, id, &cursor);
            ret = ENOMEM;
            goto out;
        }
        p->keytab = entry;
        ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &p->keytab.keyblock, 0, &p->crypto);
        p->next = *mkey;
        *mkey = p;
    }
    krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, id, &cursor);
  out:
    krb5_kt_close(context, id);
    return ret;
}

/* read a MIT master keyfile */
static krb5_error_code
read_master_mit(krb5_context context, const char *filename,
                int byteorder, hdb_master_key *mkey)
{
    int fd;
    krb5_error_code ret;
    krb5_storage *sp;
    int16_t enctype;
    krb5_keyblock key;

    fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY);
    if(fd < 0) {
        int save_errno = errno;
        krb5_set_error_message(context, save_errno, "failed to open %s: %s",
                               filename, strerror(save_errno));
        return save_errno;
    }
    sp = krb5_storage_from_fd(fd);
    if(sp == NULL) {
        close(fd);
        return errno;
    }
    krb5_storage_set_flags(sp, byteorder);
    /* could possibly use ret_keyblock here, but do it with more
       checks for now */
    {
        ret = krb5_ret_int16(sp, &enctype);
        if (ret)
            goto out;
        ret = krb5_enctype_valid(context, enctype);
        if (ret)
           goto out;
        key.keytype = enctype;
        ret = krb5_ret_data(sp, &key.keyvalue);
        if(ret)
            goto out;
    }
    ret = hdb_process_master_key(context, 1, &key, 0, mkey);
    krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &key);
  out:
    krb5_storage_free(sp);
    close(fd);
    return ret;
}

/* read an old master key file */
static krb5_error_code
read_master_encryptionkey(krb5_context context, const char *filename,
                          hdb_master_key *mkey)
{
    int fd;
    krb5_keyblock key;
    krb5_error_code ret;
    unsigned char buf[256];
    ssize_t len;
    size_t ret_len;

    fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY);
    if(fd < 0) {
        int save_errno = errno;
        krb5_set_error_message(context, save_errno, "failed to open %s: %s",
                              filename, strerror(save_errno));
        return save_errno;
    }

    len = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
    close(fd);
    if(len < 0) {
        int save_errno = errno;
        krb5_set_error_message(context, save_errno, "error reading %s: %s",
                              filename, strerror(save_errno));
        return save_errno;
    }

    ret = decode_EncryptionKey(buf, len, &key, &ret_len);
    memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
    if(ret)
        return ret;

    /* Originally, the keytype was just that, and later it got changed
       to des-cbc-md5, but we always used des in cfb64 mode. This
       should cover all cases, but will break if someone has hacked
       this code to really use des-cbc-md5 -- but then that's not my
       problem. */
    if(key.keytype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC || key.keytype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5)
        key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_CFB64_NONE;

    ret = hdb_process_master_key(context, 0, &key, 0, mkey);
    krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &key);
    return ret;
}

/* read a krb4 /.k style file */
static krb5_error_code
read_master_krb4(krb5_context context, const char *filename,
                 hdb_master_key *mkey)
{
    int fd;
    krb5_keyblock key;
    krb5_error_code ret;
    unsigned char buf[256];
    ssize_t len;

    fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY);
    if(fd < 0) {
        int save_errno = errno;
        krb5_set_error_message(context, save_errno, "failed to open %s: %s",
                               filename, strerror(save_errno));
        return save_errno;
    }

    len = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
    close(fd);
    if(len < 0) {
        int save_errno = errno;
        krb5_set_error_message(context, save_errno, "error reading %s: %s",
                               filename, strerror(save_errno));
        return save_errno;
    }
    if(len != 8) {
        krb5_set_error_message(context, HEIM_ERR_EOF,
                               "bad contents of %s", filename);
        return HEIM_ERR_EOF; /* XXX file might be too large */
    }

    memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key));
    key.keytype = ETYPE_DES_PCBC_NONE;
    ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.keyvalue, buf, len);
    memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
    if(ret)
        return ret;

    ret = hdb_process_master_key(context, 0, &key, 0, mkey);
    krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &key);
    return ret;
}

krb5_error_code
hdb_read_master_key(krb5_context context, const char *filename,
                    hdb_master_key *mkey)
{
    FILE *f;
    unsigned char buf[16];
    krb5_error_code ret;

    off_t len;

    *mkey = NULL;

    if(filename == NULL)
        filename = HDB_DB_DIR "/m-key";

    f = fopen(filename, "r");
    if(f == NULL) {
        int save_errno = errno;
        krb5_set_error_message(context, save_errno, "failed to open %s: %s",
                               filename, strerror(save_errno));
        return save_errno;
    }

    if(fread(buf, 1, 2, f) != 2) {
        fclose(f);
        krb5_set_error_message(context, HEIM_ERR_EOF, "end of file reading %s", filename);
        return HEIM_ERR_EOF;
    }

    fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END);
    len = ftell(f);

    if(fclose(f) != 0)
        return errno;

    if(len < 0)
        return errno;

    if(len == 8) {
        ret = read_master_krb4(context, filename, mkey);
    } else if(buf[0] == 0x30 && len <= 127 && buf[1] == len - 2) {
        ret = read_master_encryptionkey(context, filename, mkey);
    } else if(buf[0] == 5 && buf[1] >= 1 && buf[1] <= 2) {
        ret = read_master_keytab(context, filename, mkey);
    } else {
      /*
       * Check both LittleEndian and BigEndian since they key file
       * might be moved from a machine with diffrent byte order, or
       * its running on MacOS X that always uses BE master keys.
       */
      ret = read_master_mit(context, filename, KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_LE, mkey);
      if (ret)
          ret = read_master_mit(context, filename, KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_BE, mkey);
    }
    return ret;
}

krb5_error_code
hdb_write_master_key(krb5_context context, const char *filename,
                     hdb_master_key mkey)
{
    krb5_error_code ret;
    hdb_master_key p;
    krb5_keytab kt;

    if(filename == NULL)
        filename = HDB_DB_DIR "/m-key";

    ret = krb5_kt_resolve(context, filename, &kt);
    if(ret)
        return ret;

    for(p = mkey; p; p = p->next) {
        ret = krb5_kt_add_entry(context, kt, &p->keytab);
    }

    krb5_kt_close(context, kt);

    return ret;
}

hdb_master_key
_hdb_find_master_key(uint32_t *mkvno, hdb_master_key mkey)
{
    hdb_master_key ret = NULL;
    while(mkey) {
        if(ret == NULL && mkey->keytab.vno == 0)
            ret = mkey;
        if(mkvno == NULL) {
            if(ret == NULL || mkey->keytab.vno > ret->keytab.vno)
                ret = mkey;
        } else if((uint32_t)mkey->keytab.vno == *mkvno)
            return mkey;
        mkey = mkey->next;
    }
    return ret;
}

int
_hdb_mkey_version(hdb_master_key mkey)
{
    return mkey->keytab.vno;
}

int
_hdb_mkey_decrypt(krb5_context context, hdb_master_key key,
                  krb5_key_usage usage,
                  void *ptr, size_t size, krb5_data *res)
{
    return krb5_decrypt(context, key->crypto, usage,
                        ptr, size, res);
}

int
_hdb_mkey_encrypt(krb5_context context, hdb_master_key key,
                  krb5_key_usage usage,
                  const void *ptr, size_t size, krb5_data *res)
{
    return krb5_encrypt(context, key->crypto, usage,
                        ptr, size, res);
}

krb5_error_code
hdb_unseal_key_mkey(krb5_context context, Key *k, hdb_master_key mkey)
{

    krb5_error_code ret;
    krb5_data res;
    size_t keysize;

    hdb_master_key key;

    if(k->mkvno == NULL)
        return 0;

    key = _hdb_find_master_key(k->mkvno, mkey);

    if (key == NULL)
        return HDB_ERR_NO_MKEY;

    ret = _hdb_mkey_decrypt(context, key, HDB_KU_MKEY,
                            k->key.keyvalue.data,
                            k->key.keyvalue.length,
                            &res);
    if(ret == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY) {
        /* try to decrypt with MIT key usage */
        ret = _hdb_mkey_decrypt(context, key, 0,
                                k->key.keyvalue.data,
                                k->key.keyvalue.length,
                                &res);
    }
    if (ret)
        return ret;

    /* fixup keylength if the key got padded when encrypting it */
    ret = krb5_enctype_keysize(context, k->key.keytype, &keysize);
    if (ret) {
        krb5_data_free(&res);
        return ret;
    }
    if (keysize > res.length) {
        krb5_data_free(&res);
        return KRB5_BAD_KEYSIZE;
    }

    memset(k->key.keyvalue.data, 0, k->key.keyvalue.length);
    free(k->key.keyvalue.data);
    k->key.keyvalue = res;
    k->key.keyvalue.length = keysize;
    free(k->mkvno);
    k->mkvno = NULL;

    return 0;
}

krb5_error_code
hdb_unseal_keys_mkey(krb5_context context, hdb_entry *ent, hdb_master_key mkey)
{
    size_t i;

    for(i = 0; i < ent->keys.len; i++){
        krb5_error_code ret;

        ret = hdb_unseal_key_mkey(context, &ent->keys.val[i], mkey);
        if (ret)
            return ret;
    }
    return 0;
}

krb5_error_code
hdb_unseal_keys(krb5_context context, HDB *db, hdb_entry *ent)
{
    if (db->hdb_master_key_set == 0)
        return 0;
    return hdb_unseal_keys_mkey(context, ent, db->hdb_master_key);
}

krb5_error_code
hdb_unseal_keys_kvno(krb5_context context, HDB *db, krb5_kvno kvno,
                     unsigned flags, hdb_entry *ent)
{
    krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
    HDB_extension *ext;
    HDB_Ext_KeySet *hist_keys;
    Key *tmp_val;
    time_t tmp_set_time;
    unsigned int tmp_len;
    unsigned int kvno_diff = 0;
    krb5_kvno tmp_kvno;
    size_t i, k;
    int exclude_dead = 0;
    KerberosTime now = 0;
    time_t *set_time;

    if (kvno == 0)
        ret = 0;

    if ((flags & HDB_F_LIVE_CLNT_KVNOS) || (flags & HDB_F_LIVE_SVC_KVNOS)) {
        exclude_dead = 1;
        now = time(NULL);
        if (HDB_F_LIVE_CLNT_KVNOS)
            kvno_diff = hdb_entry_get_kvno_diff_clnt(ent);
        else
            kvno_diff = hdb_entry_get_kvno_diff_svc(ent);
    }

    ext = hdb_find_extension(ent, choice_HDB_extension_data_hist_keys);
    if (ext == NULL)
        return ret;

    /* For swapping; see below */
    tmp_len = ent->keys.len;
    tmp_val = ent->keys.val;
    tmp_kvno = ent->kvno;
    (void) hdb_entry_get_pw_change_time(ent, &tmp_set_time);

    hist_keys = &ext->data.u.hist_keys;

    for (i = 0; i < hist_keys->len; i++) {
        if (kvno != 0 && hist_keys->val[i].kvno != kvno)
            continue;

        if (exclude_dead &&
            ((ent->max_life != NULL &&
              hist_keys->val[i].set_time != NULL &&
              (*hist_keys->val[i].set_time) < (now - (*ent->max_life))) ||
            (hist_keys->val[i].kvno < kvno &&
             (kvno - hist_keys->val[i].kvno) > kvno_diff)))
            /*
             * The KDC may want to to check for this keyset's set_time
             * is within the TGS principal's max_life, say.  But we stop
             * here.
             */
            continue;

        /* Either the keys we want, or all the keys */
        for (k = 0; k < hist_keys->val[i].keys.len; k++) {
            ret = hdb_unseal_key_mkey(context,
                                      &hist_keys->val[i].keys.val[k],
                                      db->hdb_master_key);
            /*
             * If kvno == 0 we might not want to bail here!  E.g., if we
             * no longer have the right master key, so just ignore this.
             *
             * We could filter out keys that we can't decrypt here
             * because of HDB_ERR_NO_MKEY.  However, it seems safest to
             * filter them out only where necessary, say, in kadm5.
             */
            if (ret && kvno != 0)
                return ret;
            if (ret && ret != HDB_ERR_NO_MKEY)
                return (ret);
        }

        if (kvno == 0)
            continue;

        /*
         * What follows is a bit of a hack.
         *
         * This is the keyset we're being asked for, but it's not the
         * current keyset.  So we add the current keyset to the history,
         * leave the one we were asked for in the history, and pretend
         * the one we were asked for is also the current keyset.
         *
         * This is a bit of a defensive hack in case an entry fetched
         * this way ever gets modified then stored: if the keyset is not
         * changed we can detect this and put things back, else we won't
         * drop any keysets from history by accident.
         *
         * Note too that we only ever get called with a non-zero kvno
         * either in the KDC or in cases where we aren't changing the
         * HDB entry anyways, which is why this is just a defensive
         * hack.  We also don't fetch specific kvnos in the dump case,
         * so there's no danger that we'll dump this entry and load it
         * again, repeatedly causing the history to grow boundelessly.
         */
        set_time = malloc(sizeof (*set_time));
        if (set_time == NULL)
            return ENOMEM;

        /* Swap key sets */
        ent->kvno = hist_keys->val[i].kvno;
        ent->keys.val = hist_keys->val[i].keys.val;
        ent->keys.len = hist_keys->val[i].keys.len;
        if (hist_keys->val[i].set_time != NULL)
            /* Sloppy, but the callers we expect won't care */
            (void) hdb_entry_set_pw_change_time(context, ent,
                                                *hist_keys->val[i].set_time);
        hist_keys->val[i].kvno = tmp_kvno;
        hist_keys->val[i].keys.val = tmp_val;
        hist_keys->val[i].keys.len = tmp_len;
        if (hist_keys->val[i].set_time != NULL)
            /* Sloppy, but the callers we expect won't care */
            *hist_keys->val[i].set_time = tmp_set_time;

        return 0;
    }

    return (ret);
}

krb5_error_code
hdb_unseal_key(krb5_context context, HDB *db, Key *k)
{
    if (db->hdb_master_key_set == 0)
        return 0;
    return hdb_unseal_key_mkey(context, k, db->hdb_master_key);
}

krb5_error_code
hdb_seal_key_mkey(krb5_context context, Key *k, hdb_master_key mkey)
{
    krb5_error_code ret;
    krb5_data res;
    hdb_master_key key;

    if(k->mkvno != NULL)
        return 0;

    key = _hdb_find_master_key(k->mkvno, mkey);

    if (key == NULL)
        return HDB_ERR_NO_MKEY;

    ret = _hdb_mkey_encrypt(context, key, HDB_KU_MKEY,
                            k->key.keyvalue.data,
                            k->key.keyvalue.length,
                            &res);
    if (ret)
        return ret;

    memset(k->key.keyvalue.data, 0, k->key.keyvalue.length);
    free(k->key.keyvalue.data);
    k->key.keyvalue = res;

    if (k->mkvno == NULL) {
        k->mkvno = malloc(sizeof(*k->mkvno));
        if (k->mkvno == NULL)
            return ENOMEM;
    }
    *k->mkvno = key->keytab.vno;

    return 0;
}

krb5_error_code
hdb_seal_keys_mkey(krb5_context context, hdb_entry *ent, hdb_master_key mkey)
{
    HDB_extension *ext;
    HDB_Ext_KeySet *hist_keys;
    size_t i, k;
    krb5_error_code ret;

    for(i = 0; i < ent->keys.len; i++){
        ret = hdb_seal_key_mkey(context, &ent->keys.val[i], mkey);
        if (ret)
            return ret;
    }

    ext = hdb_find_extension(ent, choice_HDB_extension_data_hist_keys);
    if (ext == NULL)
        return 0;
    hist_keys = &ext->data.u.hist_keys;

    for (i = 0; i < hist_keys->len; i++) {
        for (k = 0; k < hist_keys->val[i].keys.len; k++) {
            ret = hdb_seal_key_mkey(context, &hist_keys->val[i].keys.val[k],
                                    mkey);
            if (ret)
                return ret;
        }
    }

    return 0;
}

krb5_error_code
hdb_seal_keys(krb5_context context, HDB *db, hdb_entry *ent)
{
    if (db->hdb_master_key_set == 0)
        return 0;

    return hdb_seal_keys_mkey(context, ent, db->hdb_master_key);
}

krb5_error_code
hdb_seal_key(krb5_context context, HDB *db, Key *k)
{
    if (db->hdb_master_key_set == 0)
        return 0;

    return hdb_seal_key_mkey(context, k, db->hdb_master_key);
}

krb5_error_code
hdb_set_master_key (krb5_context context,
                    HDB *db,
                    krb5_keyblock *key)
{
    krb5_error_code ret;
    hdb_master_key mkey;

    ret = hdb_process_master_key(context, 0, key, 0, &mkey);
    if (ret)
        return ret;
    db->hdb_master_key = mkey;
#if 0 /* XXX - why? */
    des_set_random_generator_seed(key.keyvalue.data);
#endif
    db->hdb_master_key_set = 1;
    return 0;
}

krb5_error_code
hdb_set_master_keyfile (krb5_context context,
                        HDB *db,
                        const char *keyfile)
{
    hdb_master_key key;
    krb5_error_code ret;

    ret = hdb_read_master_key(context, keyfile, &key);
    if (ret) {
        if (ret != ENOENT)
            return ret;
        krb5_clear_error_message(context);
        return 0;
    }
    db->hdb_master_key = key;
    db->hdb_master_key_set = 1;
    return ret;
}

krb5_error_code
hdb_clear_master_key (krb5_context context,
                      HDB *db)
{
    if (db->hdb_master_key_set) {
        hdb_free_master_key(context, db->hdb_master_key);
        db->hdb_master_key_set = 0;
    }
    return 0;
}