source3/lib/afs.c

   1 /*
   2  *  Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
   3  *  Generate AFS tickets
   4  *  Copyright (C) Volker Lendecke 2003
   5  *
   6  *  This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   7  *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
   8  *  the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
   9  *  (at your option) any later version.
  10  *
  11  *  This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
  12  *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
  13  *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
  14  *  GNU General Public License for more details.
  15  *
  16  *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
  17  *  along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
  18  *  Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
  19  */
  20
  21 #include "includes.h"
  22
  23 #ifdef WITH_FAKE_KASERVER
  24
  25 #include <afs/stds.h>
  26 #include <afs/afs.h>
  27 #include <afs/auth.h>
  28 #include <afs/venus.h>
  29 #include <asm/unistd.h>
  30 #include <openssl/des.h>
  31
  32 _syscall5(int, afs_syscall, int, subcall,
  33           char *, path,
  34           int, cmd,
  35           char *, cmarg,
  36           int, follow);
  37
  38 struct ClearToken {
  39         uint32 AuthHandle;
  40         char HandShakeKey[8];
  41         uint32 ViceId;
  42         uint32 BeginTimestamp;
  43         uint32 EndTimestamp;
  44 };
  45
  46 /*
  47   Put an AFS token into the Kernel so that it can authenticate against
  48   the AFS server. This assumes correct local uid settings.
  49
  50   This is currently highly Linux and OpenAFS-specific. The correct API
  51   call for this would be ktc_SetToken. But to do that we would have to
  52   import a REALLY big bunch of libraries which I would currently like
  53   to avoid.
  54 */
  55
  56 static BOOL afs_settoken(const char *username, const char *cell,
  57                          const struct ClearToken *ctok,
  58                          char *v4tkt_data, int v4tkt_length)
  59 {
  60         int ret;
  61         struct {
  62                 char *in, *out;
  63                 uint16 in_size, out_size;
  64         } iob;
  65
  66         char buf[1024];
  67         char *p = buf;
  68         int tmp;
  69
  70         memcpy(p, &v4tkt_length, sizeof(uint32));
  71         p += sizeof(uint32);
  72         memcpy(p, v4tkt_data, v4tkt_length);
  73         p += v4tkt_length;
  74
  75         tmp = sizeof(struct ClearToken);
  76         memcpy(p, &tmp, sizeof(uint32));
  77         p += sizeof(uint32);
  78         memcpy(p, ctok, tmp);
  79         p += tmp;
  80
  81         tmp = 0;
  82
  83         memcpy(p, &tmp, sizeof(uint32));
  84         p += sizeof(uint32);
  85
  86         tmp = strlen(cell);
  87         if (tmp >= MAXKTCREALMLEN) {
  88                 DEBUG(1, ("Realm too long\n"));
  89                 return False;
  90         }
  91
  92         strncpy(p, cell, tmp);
  93         p += tmp;
  94         *p = 0;
  95         p +=1;
  96
  97         iob.in = buf;
  98         iob.in_size = PTR_DIFF(p,buf);
  99         iob.out = buf;
 100         iob.out_size = sizeof(buf);
 101
 102 #if 0
 103         file_save("/tmp/ioctlbuf", iob.in, iob.in_size);
 104 #endif
 105
 106         ret = afs_syscall(AFSCALL_PIOCTL, 0, VIOCSETTOK, (char *)&iob, 0);
 107
 108         DEBUG(10, ("afs VIOCSETTOK returned %d\n", ret));
 109         return (ret == 0);
 110 }
 111
 112 /*
 113   This routine takes a radical approach completely defeating the
 114   Kerberos idea of security and using AFS simply as an intelligent
 115   file backend. Samba has persuaded itself somehow that the user is
 116   actually correctly identified and then we create a ticket that the
 117   AFS server hopefully accepts using its KeyFile that the admin has
 118   kindly stored to our secrets.tdb.
 119
 120   Thanks to the book "Network Security -- PRIVATE Communication in a
 121   PUBLIC World" by Charlie Kaufman, Radia Perlman and Mike Speciner
 122   Kerberos 4 tickets are not really hard to construct.
 123
 124   For the comments "Alice" is the User to be auth'ed, and "Bob" is the
 125   AFS server.  */
 126
 127 BOOL afs_login(connection_struct *conn)
 128 {
 129         fstring ticket;
 130         char *p = ticket;
 131         uint32 len;
 132         struct afs_key key;
 133         pstring afs_username;
 134         char *cell;
 135
 136         struct ClearToken ct;
 137
 138         uint32 now;             /* I assume time() returns 32 bit */
 139
 140         des_key_schedule key_schedule;
 141
 142         pstrcpy(afs_username, lp_afs_username_map());
 143         standard_sub_conn(conn, afs_username, sizeof(afs_username));
 144
 145         cell = strchr(afs_username, '@');
 146
 147         if (cell == NULL) {
 148                 DEBUG(1, ("AFS username doesn't contain a @, "
 149                           "could not find cell\n"));
 150                 return False;
 151         }
 152
 153         *cell = '\0';
 154         cell += 1;
 155         strlower_m(cell);
 156
 157         DEBUG(10, ("Trying to log into AFS for user %s@%s\n",
 158                    afs_username, cell));
 159
 160         if (!secrets_init())
 161                 return False;
 162
 163         if (!secrets_fetch_afs_key(cell, &key)) {
 164                 DEBUG(5, ("Could not fetch AFS service key\n"));
 165                 return False;
 166         }
 167
 168         ct.AuthHandle = key.kvno;
 169
 170         /* Build the ticket. This is going to be encrypted, so in our
 171            way we fill in ct while we still have the unencrypted
 172            form. */
 173
 174         p = ticket;
 175
 176         /* The byte-order */
 177         *p = 1;
 178         p += 1;
 179
 180         /* "Alice", the client username */
 181         strncpy(p, afs_username, sizeof(ticket)-PTR_DIFF(p,ticket)-1);
 182         p += strlen(p)+1;
 183         strncpy(p, "", sizeof(ticket)-PTR_DIFF(p,ticket)-1);
 184         p += strlen(p)+1;
 185         strncpy(p, cell, sizeof(ticket)-PTR_DIFF(p,ticket)-1);
 186         p += strlen(p)+1;
 187
 188         /* As long as we still only use the effective UID we need to set the
 189          * token for it here as well. This involves patching AFS in two
 190          * places. Once we start using the real uid where we have the
 191          * setresuid function, we can use getuid() here which would be more
 192          * correct. */
 193
 194         ct.ViceId = geteuid();
 195         DEBUG(10, ("Creating Token for uid %d\n", ct.ViceId));
 196
 197         /* Alice's network layer address. At least Openafs-1.2.10
 198            ignores this, so we fill in a dummy value here. */
 199         SIVAL(p, 0, 0);
 200         p += 4;
 201
 202         /* We need to create a session key */
 203         generate_random_buffer(p, 8, False);
 204
 205         /* Our client code needs the the key in the clear, it does not
 206            know the server-key ... */
 207         memcpy(ct.HandShakeKey, p, 8);
 208
 209         p += 8;
 210
 211         /* Ticket lifetime. We fake everything here, so go as long as
 212            possible. This is in 5-minute intervals, so 255 is 21 hours
 213            and 15 minutes.*/
 214         *p = 255;
 215         p += 1;
 216
 217         /* Ticket creation time */
 218         now = time(NULL);
 219         SIVAL(p, 0, now);
 220         ct.BeginTimestamp = now;
 221
 222         ct.EndTimestamp = now + (255*60*5);
 223         if (((ct.EndTimestamp - ct.BeginTimestamp) & 1) == 1) {
 224                 ct.BeginTimestamp += 1; /* Lifetime must be even */
 225         }
 226         p += 4;
 227
 228         /* And here comes Bob's name and instance, in this case the
 229            AFS server. */
 230         strncpy(p, "afs", sizeof(ticket)-PTR_DIFF(p,ticket)-1);
 231         p += strlen(p)+1;
 232         strncpy(p, "", sizeof(ticket)-PTR_DIFF(p,ticket)-1);
 233         p += strlen(p)+1;
 234
 235         /* And zero-pad to a multiple of 8 bytes */
 236         len = PTR_DIFF(p, ticket);
 237         if (len & 7) {
 238                 uint32 extra_space = 8-(len & 7);
 239                 memset(p, 0, extra_space);
 240                 p+=extra_space;
 241         }
 242         len = PTR_DIFF(p, ticket);
 243
 244         des_key_sched((const_des_cblock *)key.key, key_schedule);
 245         des_pcbc_encrypt(ticket, ticket,
 246                          len, key_schedule, (C_Block *)key.key, 1);
 247
 248         ZERO_STRUCT(key);
 249
 250         return afs_settoken(afs_username, cell, &ct, ticket, len);
 251 }
 252
 253 #else
 254
 255 BOOL afs_login(connection_struct *conn)
 256 {
 257         return True;
 258 }
 259
 260 #endif /* WITH_FAKE_KASERVER */