s4:kdc: split s4u2self and s4u2proxy checks
[Samba/gebeck_regimport.git] / source4 / kdc / db-glue.c
blob72262ac18b57234a254becaf276c4a0badcc4f77
1 /*
2 Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
4 Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
6 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
7 Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
9 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
12 (at your option) any later version.
14 This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 GNU General Public License for more details.
20 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
21 along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
24 #include "includes.h"
25 #include "libcli/security/security.h"
26 #include "auth/auth.h"
27 #include "auth/auth_sam.h"
28 #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
29 #include "dsdb/common/util.h"
30 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
31 #include "param/param.h"
32 #include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
33 #include "system/kerberos.h"
34 #include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
35 #include <hdb.h>
36 #include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
37 #include "kdc/kdc-glue.h"
38 #include "kdc/kdc-policy.h"
39 #include "kdc/db-glue.h"
41 #define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno) \
42 ((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) >> 16))
44 #define SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, krbtgt) \
45 ((krb5_kvno)((((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF) | \
46 ((((uint32_t)krbtgt) << 16) & 0xFFFF0000)))
48 enum samba_kdc_ent_type
49 { SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
50 SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
52 enum trust_direction {
53 UNKNOWN = 0,
54 INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
55 OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
58 static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
59 "trustPartner",
60 "trustAuthIncoming",
61 "trustAuthOutgoing",
62 "whenCreated",
63 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
64 "trustAttributes",
65 "trustDirection",
66 "trustType",
67 NULL
70 static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val)
72 const char *tmp;
73 const char *gentime;
74 struct tm tm;
76 gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
77 if (!gentime)
78 return default_val;
80 tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
81 if (tmp == NULL) {
82 return default_val;
85 return timegm(&tm);
88 static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, uint32_t userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type)
90 HDBFlags flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
92 /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
93 flags.immutable = 1;
95 /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
96 flags.invalid = 1;
98 flags.renewable = 1;
100 /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
101 flags.server = 1;
103 /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
104 if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
105 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
106 flags.client = 1;
108 flags.invalid = 0;
111 if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
112 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
113 flags.client = 1;
115 flags.invalid = 0;
117 if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
118 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
119 flags.client = 1;
121 flags.invalid = 0;
123 if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
124 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
125 flags.client = 1;
127 flags.invalid = 0;
130 /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
131 if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
132 flags.client = 0;
134 if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
135 flags.invalid = 1;
138 if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
139 flags.invalid = 1;
143 UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
145 if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
146 flags.invalid = 1;
149 /* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
152 if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
153 flags.invalid = 1;
156 if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
157 flags.require_hwauth = 1;
159 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
160 flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
162 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION) {
164 * this is confusing...
166 * UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
167 * => ok_as_delegate
169 * and
171 * UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION
172 * => trusted_for_delegation
174 flags.trusted_for_delegation = 1;
176 if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
177 flags.forwardable = 1;
178 flags.proxiable = 1;
181 if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
182 flags.require_preauth = 0;
183 } else {
184 flags.require_preauth = 1;
187 return flags;
190 static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p)
192 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = p->entry_ex;
193 free_hdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry);
194 return 0;
197 static void samba_kdc_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
199 /* this function is called only from hdb_free_entry().
200 * Make sure we neutralize the destructor or we will
201 * get a double free later when hdb_free_entry() will
202 * try to call free_hdb_entry() */
203 talloc_set_destructor(entry_ex->ctx, NULL);
205 /* now proceed to free the talloc part */
206 talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx);
209 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
210 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
211 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
212 struct ldb_message *msg,
213 uint32_t rid,
214 bool is_rodc,
215 uint32_t userAccountControl,
216 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
217 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
219 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
220 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
221 struct samr_Password *hash;
222 const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
223 struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
224 struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
225 bool newer_keys = false;
226 struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
227 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL;
228 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
229 uint16_t i;
230 uint16_t allocated_keys = 0;
231 int rodc_krbtgt_number = 0;
232 int kvno = 0;
233 uint32_t supported_enctypes
234 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
235 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
238 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT || is_rodc) {
239 /* KDCs (and KDCs on RODCs) use AES */
240 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
241 } else if (userAccountControl & (UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT|UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT)) {
242 /* DCs and RODCs comptuer accounts use AES */
243 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
244 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT ||
245 (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY)) {
246 /* for AS-REQ the client chooses the enc types it
247 * supports, and this will vary between computers a
248 * user logs in from.
250 * likewise for 'any' return as much as is supported,
251 * to export into a keytab */
252 supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES;
255 /* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
256 if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
257 supported_enctypes = ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5;
258 } else {
259 /* Otherwise, add in the default enc types */
260 supported_enctypes |= ENC_CRC32 | ENC_RSA_MD5 | ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
263 /* Is this the krbtgt or a RODC krbtgt */
264 if (is_rodc) {
265 rodc_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
267 if (rodc_krbtgt_number == -1) {
268 return EINVAL;
272 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
273 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
275 kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
276 if (is_rodc) {
277 kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, rodc_krbtgt_number);
279 entry_ex->entry.kvno = kvno;
281 /* Get keys from the db */
283 hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
284 sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
286 /* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */
287 if (hash) {
288 allocated_keys++;
291 /* supplementalCredentials if present */
292 if (sc_val) {
293 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, &scb,
294 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
295 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
296 dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
297 ret = EINVAL;
298 goto out;
301 if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
302 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
303 ret = EINVAL;
304 goto out;
307 for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
308 if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
309 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
310 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
311 scpk = NULL;
312 continue;
314 newer_keys = true;
315 break;
316 } else if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
317 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
318 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
319 scpk = NULL;
322 * we don't break here in hope to find
323 * a Kerberos-Newer-Keys package
329 * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys or Primary:Kerberos element
330 * of supplementalCredentials
332 if (scpk) {
333 DATA_BLOB blob;
335 blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
336 if (!blob.data) {
337 ret = ENOMEM;
338 goto out;
341 /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
342 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &_pkb,
343 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
344 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
345 ret = EINVAL;
346 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
347 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
348 goto out;
351 if (newer_keys && _pkb.version != 4) {
352 ret = EINVAL;
353 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
354 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
355 goto out;
358 if (!newer_keys && _pkb.version != 3) {
359 ret = EINVAL;
360 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
361 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
362 goto out;
365 if (_pkb.version == 4) {
366 pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
367 allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys;
368 } else if (_pkb.version == 3) {
369 pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3;
370 allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys;
374 if (allocated_keys == 0) {
375 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
376 /* We are on an RODC, but don't have keys for this account. Signal this to the caller */
377 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
380 /* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
381 * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
382 * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
383 return 0;
386 /* allocate space to decode into */
387 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
388 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(Key));
389 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
390 ret = ENOMEM;
391 goto out;
394 if (hash && (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5)) {
395 Key key;
397 key.mkvno = 0;
398 key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
400 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
401 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
402 hash->hash, sizeof(hash->hash),
403 &key.key);
404 if (ret) {
405 goto out;
408 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
409 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
412 if (pkb4) {
413 for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) {
414 Key key;
416 if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue;
418 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb4->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
419 continue;
422 key.mkvno = 0;
423 key.salt = NULL;
425 if (pkb4->salt.string) {
426 DATA_BLOB salt;
428 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string);
430 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
431 if (key.salt == NULL) {
432 ret = ENOMEM;
433 goto out;
436 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
438 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
439 if (ret) {
440 free(key.salt);
441 key.salt = NULL;
442 goto out;
446 /* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */
448 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
449 pkb4->keys[i].keytype,
450 pkb4->keys[i].value->data,
451 pkb4->keys[i].value->length,
452 &key.key);
453 if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
454 DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
455 pkb4->keys[i].keytype));
456 ret = 0;
457 continue;
459 if (ret) {
460 if (key.salt) {
461 free_Salt(key.salt);
462 free(key.salt);
463 key.salt = NULL;
465 goto out;
468 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
469 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
471 } else if (pkb3) {
472 for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) {
473 Key key;
475 if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue;
477 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb3->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
478 continue;
481 key.mkvno = 0;
482 key.salt = NULL;
484 if (pkb3->salt.string) {
485 DATA_BLOB salt;
487 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string);
489 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
490 if (key.salt == NULL) {
491 ret = ENOMEM;
492 goto out;
495 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
497 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
498 if (ret) {
499 free(key.salt);
500 key.salt = NULL;
501 goto out;
505 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
506 pkb3->keys[i].keytype,
507 pkb3->keys[i].value->data,
508 pkb3->keys[i].value->length,
509 &key.key);
510 if (ret) {
511 if (key.salt) {
512 free_Salt(key.salt);
513 free(key.salt);
514 key.salt = NULL;
516 goto out;
519 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
520 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
524 out:
525 if (ret != 0) {
526 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
528 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) {
529 free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
530 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
532 return ret;
536 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
538 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context,
539 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
540 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
541 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
542 unsigned flags,
543 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
544 struct ldb_message *msg,
545 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
547 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
548 uint32_t userAccountControl;
549 unsigned int i;
550 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
551 krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
553 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
554 NTTIME acct_expiry;
555 NTSTATUS status;
557 uint32_t rid;
558 bool is_rodc = false;
559 struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
560 struct ldb_val computer_val;
561 const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
562 computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer");
563 computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data);
565 if (ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber")) {
566 is_rodc = true;
569 if (!samAccountName) {
570 ret = ENOENT;
571 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
572 goto out;
575 objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
577 if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
578 is_computer = TRUE;
581 memset(entry_ex, 0, sizeof(*entry_ex));
583 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
584 if (!p) {
585 ret = ENOMEM;
586 goto out;
589 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
590 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
591 p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn);
592 if (!p->realm_dn) {
593 ret = ENOMEM;
594 goto out;
597 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
599 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
600 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
602 entry_ex->ctx = p;
603 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
605 userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
608 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
609 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
610 krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
611 } else {
612 ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
613 if (ret) {
614 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
615 goto out;
618 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
619 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
620 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
621 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
622 * we determine from our records */
624 /* this has to be with malloc() */
625 krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
628 /* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
629 entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2HDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
631 /* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
632 * default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
633 * by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
634 * their probably patheticly insecure password) */
636 if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server
637 && lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
638 if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
639 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0;
643 if (flags & HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA) {
644 /* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
645 * of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
646 * DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
647 * we must return */
649 /* use 'whenCreated' */
650 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
651 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
652 krb5_make_principal(context,
653 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
654 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
656 entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event));
657 if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
658 ret = ENOMEM;
659 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
660 goto out;
663 /* use 'whenChanged' */
664 entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
665 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
666 krb5_make_principal(context,
667 &entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal,
668 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
672 /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
673 * virtue of being that particular RID */
674 status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
676 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
677 ret = EINVAL;
678 goto out;
681 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
682 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
683 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
685 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
686 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
688 /* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
689 * 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
690 * trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
691 * Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
692 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
693 && principal->name.name_string.len == 2
694 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "kadmin") == 0)
695 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], "changepw") == 0)
696 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)) {
697 entry_ex->entry.flags.change_pw = 1;
699 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
700 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
701 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
702 } else if (is_rodc) {
703 /* The RODC krbtgt account is like the main krbtgt,
704 * but it does not have a changepw or kadmin
705 * service */
707 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
708 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
710 /* Also don't allow the RODC krbtgt to be a client (it should not be needed) */
711 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
712 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
713 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
715 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
716 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
717 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 0;
718 } else if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
719 /* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
720 * client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
722 /* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
723 * it could bypass the password restrictions */
724 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
726 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
727 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
729 } else {
730 NTTIME must_change_time
731 = samdb_result_force_password_change(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
732 realm_dn, msg);
733 if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
734 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
735 } else {
736 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end));
737 if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) {
738 ret = ENOMEM;
739 goto out;
741 *entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
744 acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
745 if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
746 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
747 } else {
748 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end));
749 if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) {
750 ret = ENOMEM;
751 goto out;
753 *entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
757 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
759 entry_ex->entry.max_life = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
760 if (entry_ex->entry.max_life == NULL) {
761 ret = ENOMEM;
762 goto out;
765 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
766 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = nt_time_to_unix(kdc_db_ctx->policy.service_tkt_lifetime);
767 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT) {
768 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = nt_time_to_unix(kdc_db_ctx->policy.user_tkt_lifetime);
769 } else {
770 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = MIN(nt_time_to_unix(kdc_db_ctx->policy.service_tkt_lifetime),
771 nt_time_to_unix(kdc_db_ctx->policy.user_tkt_lifetime));
774 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
775 if (entry_ex->entry.max_renew == NULL) {
776 ret = ENOMEM;
777 goto out;
780 *entry_ex->entry.max_renew = nt_time_to_unix(kdc_db_ctx->policy.user_tkt_renewaltime);
782 entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
784 /* Get keys from the db */
785 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, kdc_db_ctx, p, msg,
786 rid, is_rodc, userAccountControl,
787 ent_type, entry_ex);
788 if (ret) {
789 /* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */
790 goto out;
793 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
794 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
795 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
796 ret = ENOMEM;
797 goto out;
799 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
800 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
801 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
802 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
803 ret = ENOMEM;
804 goto out;
806 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
807 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
811 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
813 out:
814 if (ret != 0) {
815 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
816 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
817 } else {
818 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
821 return ret;
825 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
827 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
828 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
829 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
830 enum trust_direction direction,
831 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
832 struct ldb_message *msg,
833 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
835 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
836 const char *dnsdomain;
837 const char *realm = lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx);
838 DATA_BLOB password_utf16;
839 struct samr_Password password_hash;
840 const struct ldb_val *password_val;
841 struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
842 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
844 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
845 int ret, trust_direction_flags;
846 unsigned int i;
848 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
849 if (!p) {
850 ret = ENOMEM;
851 goto out;
854 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
855 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
856 p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
858 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
860 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
861 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
863 entry_ex->ctx = p;
864 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
866 /* use 'whenCreated' */
867 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
868 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
869 krb5_make_principal(context,
870 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
871 realm, "kadmin", NULL);
873 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
875 trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0);
877 if (direction == INBOUND) {
878 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
880 } else { /* OUTBOUND */
881 dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL);
882 /* replace realm */
883 realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
884 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
887 if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) {
888 ret = ENOENT;
889 goto out;
892 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, &password_blob,
893 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
894 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
895 ret = EINVAL;
896 goto out;
899 entry_ex->entry.kvno = -1;
900 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
901 if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
902 entry_ex->entry.kvno = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.version.version;
906 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
907 if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
908 password_utf16 = data_blob_const(password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
909 password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
910 /* In the future, generate all sorts of
911 * hashes, but for now we can't safely convert
912 * the random strings windows uses into
913 * utf8 */
915 /* but as it is utf16 already, we can get the NT password/arcfour-hmac-md5 key */
916 mdfour(password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
917 break;
918 } else if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
919 password_hash = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
920 break;
924 if (i < password_blob.count) {
925 Key key;
926 /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
927 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(1, sizeof(Key));
929 key.mkvno = 0;
930 key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
932 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
933 ret = ENOMEM;
934 goto out;
937 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
938 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
939 password_hash.hash, sizeof(password_hash.hash),
940 &key.key);
942 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
943 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
946 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
948 ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
949 if (ret) {
950 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
951 goto out;
954 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
955 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
956 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
957 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
958 * we determine from our records */
960 krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
961 entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
962 entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
963 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
964 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
965 entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
967 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
969 entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
971 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
973 entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
975 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
976 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
977 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
978 ret = ENOMEM;
979 goto out;
981 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
982 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
983 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
984 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
985 ret = ENOMEM;
986 goto out;
988 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
989 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
993 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
995 out:
996 if (ret != 0) {
997 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
998 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
999 } else {
1000 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
1003 return ret;
1007 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
1008 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1009 const char *realm,
1010 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
1011 struct ldb_message **pmsg)
1013 int lret;
1014 krb5_error_code ret;
1015 char *filter = NULL;
1016 const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
1018 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
1019 char *realm_encoded = ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, realm);
1020 if (!realm_encoded) {
1021 if (!filter) {
1022 ret = ENOMEM;
1023 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory");
1024 return ret;
1027 filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=trustedDomain)(|(flatname=%s)(trustPartner=%s)))",
1028 realm_encoded, realm_encoded);
1030 if (!filter) {
1031 talloc_free(realm_encoded);
1032 ret = ENOMEM;
1033 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory");
1034 return ret;
1037 lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx, &res,
1038 ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx),
1039 LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs, "%s", filter);
1040 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1041 DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search for %s: %s\n", filter, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx)));
1042 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1043 } else if (res->count == 0 || res->count > 1) {
1044 DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for %s: got %d\n", filter, res->count));
1045 talloc_free(res);
1046 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1048 talloc_steal(mem_ctx, res->msgs);
1049 *pmsg = res->msgs[0];
1050 talloc_free(res);
1051 return 0;
1054 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
1055 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1056 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1057 krb5_const_principal principal,
1058 const char **attrs,
1059 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1060 struct ldb_message **msg) {
1061 NTSTATUS nt_status;
1062 char *principal_string;
1063 krb5_error_code ret;
1065 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string);
1067 if (ret != 0) {
1068 return ret;
1071 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1072 mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
1073 realm_dn, msg);
1074 free(principal_string);
1075 if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
1076 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1077 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1078 return ENOMEM;
1079 } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1080 return EINVAL;
1083 return ret;
1086 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context,
1087 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1088 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1089 krb5_const_principal principal,
1090 unsigned flags,
1091 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
1092 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1093 krb5_error_code ret;
1094 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1096 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1097 mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
1098 &realm_dn, &msg);
1099 if (ret != 0) {
1100 return ret;
1103 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1104 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
1105 flags,
1106 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1107 return ret;
1110 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context,
1111 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1112 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1113 krb5_const_principal principal,
1114 unsigned flags,
1115 uint32_t krbtgt_number,
1116 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1118 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
1119 krb5_error_code ret;
1120 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1121 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1123 krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL;
1124 if (principal->name.name_string.len != 2
1125 || (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
1126 /* Not a krbtgt */
1127 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1130 /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
1132 if (lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)
1133 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1])) {
1134 /* us, or someone quite like us */
1135 /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
1136 * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
1137 * krbtgt */
1139 int lret;
1141 if (krbtgt_number == kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1142 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1143 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1144 krbtgt_attrs, 0,
1145 "(objectClass=user)");
1146 } else {
1147 /* We need to look up an RODC krbtgt (perhaps
1148 * ours, if we are an RODC, perhaps another
1149 * RODC if we are a read-write DC */
1150 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1151 &msg, realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1152 krbtgt_attrs,
1153 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN,
1154 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=%u))", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1157 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1158 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1159 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1160 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1161 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1162 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1163 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1164 } else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1165 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1166 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1167 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1168 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1169 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1170 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1173 if (flags & HDB_F_CANON) {
1174 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &alloc_principal);
1175 if (ret) {
1176 return ret;
1179 /* When requested to do so, ensure that the
1180 * both realm values in the principal are set
1181 * to the upper case, canonical realm */
1182 free(alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1183 alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1] = strdup(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
1184 if (!alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]) {
1185 ret = ENOMEM;
1186 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: strdup() failed!");
1187 return ret;
1189 principal = alloc_principal;
1192 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1193 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
1194 flags, realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1195 if (flags & HDB_F_CANON) {
1196 /* This is again copied in the message2entry call */
1197 krb5_free_principal(context, alloc_principal);
1199 if (ret != 0) {
1200 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
1202 return ret;
1204 } else {
1205 enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
1206 const char *realm = NULL;
1208 /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
1210 if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->realm) == 0) {
1211 /* look for inbound trust */
1212 direction = INBOUND;
1213 realm = principal->name.name_string.val[1];
1214 } else if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->name.name_string.val[1]) == 0) {
1215 /* look for outbound trust */
1216 direction = OUTBOUND;
1217 realm = principal->realm;
1218 } else {
1219 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1220 principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1221 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1222 principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1223 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1226 /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
1228 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1229 mem_ctx,
1230 realm, realm_dn, &msg);
1232 if (ret != 0) {
1233 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1234 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1235 return ret;
1238 ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1239 principal, direction,
1240 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1241 if (ret != 0) {
1242 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed");
1244 return ret;
1249 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context,
1250 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1251 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1252 krb5_const_principal principal,
1253 const char **attrs,
1254 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1255 struct ldb_message **msg)
1257 krb5_error_code ret;
1258 if (principal->name.name_string.len >= 2) {
1259 /* 'normal server' case */
1260 int ldb_ret;
1261 NTSTATUS nt_status;
1262 struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
1263 char *principal_string;
1265 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
1266 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
1267 &principal_string);
1268 if (ret != 0) {
1269 return ret;
1272 /* At this point we may find the host is known to be
1273 * in a different realm, so we should generate a
1274 * referral instead */
1275 nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1276 mem_ctx, principal_string,
1277 &user_dn, realm_dn);
1278 free(principal_string);
1280 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1281 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1284 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1285 mem_ctx,
1286 msg, user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1287 attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN, "(objectClass=*)");
1288 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1289 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1292 } else {
1293 int lret;
1294 char *filter = NULL;
1295 char *short_princ;
1296 const char *realm;
1297 /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
1298 *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1299 realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal);
1301 /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referall */
1303 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &short_princ);
1305 if (ret != 0) {
1306 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1307 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1308 return ret;
1311 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg,
1312 *realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1313 attrs,
1314 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN,
1315 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
1316 ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ));
1317 free(short_princ);
1318 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1319 DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a entry for %s\n", filter));
1320 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1322 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1323 DEBUG(3, ("Failed single search for for %s - %s\n",
1324 filter, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1325 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1329 return 0;
1332 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
1333 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1334 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1335 krb5_const_principal principal,
1336 unsigned flags,
1337 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1339 krb5_error_code ret;
1340 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1341 struct ldb_message *msg;
1343 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
1344 server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1345 if (ret != 0) {
1346 return ret;
1349 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1350 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
1351 flags,
1352 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1353 if (ret != 0) {
1354 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed");
1357 return ret;
1360 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context,
1361 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1362 krb5_const_principal principal,
1363 unsigned flags,
1364 krb5_kvno kvno,
1365 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1367 krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1368 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1369 unsigned int krbtgt_number;
1370 if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
1371 krbtgt_number = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno);
1372 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
1373 if (krbtgt_number != kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1374 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
1377 } else {
1378 krbtgt_number = kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number;
1381 mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
1382 if (!mem_ctx) {
1383 ret = ENOMEM;
1384 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1385 return ret;
1388 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
1389 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1390 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1392 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
1393 /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
1394 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, krbtgt_number, entry_ex);
1395 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1397 /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
1398 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1399 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1401 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
1402 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, krbtgt_number, entry_ex);
1403 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1406 done:
1407 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1408 return ret;
1411 struct samba_kdc_seq {
1412 unsigned int index;
1413 unsigned int count;
1414 struct ldb_message **msgs;
1415 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1418 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context,
1419 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1420 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1422 krb5_error_code ret;
1423 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1424 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1425 hdb_entry_ex entry_ex;
1426 memset(&entry_ex, '\0', sizeof(entry_ex));
1428 if (!priv) {
1429 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1432 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
1434 if (!mem_ctx) {
1435 ret = ENOMEM;
1436 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
1437 return ret;
1440 if (priv->index < priv->count) {
1441 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1442 NULL, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
1443 HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA|HDB_F_GET_ANY,
1444 priv->realm_dn, priv->msgs[priv->index++], entry);
1445 } else {
1446 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1449 if (ret != 0) {
1450 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1451 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1452 } else {
1453 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1456 return ret;
1459 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context,
1460 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1461 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1463 struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb;
1464 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1465 char *realm;
1466 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
1467 krb5_error_code ret;
1468 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1469 int lret;
1471 if (priv) {
1472 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1473 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1476 priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq);
1477 if (!priv) {
1478 ret = ENOMEM;
1479 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
1480 return ret;
1483 priv->index = 0;
1484 priv->msgs = NULL;
1485 priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx);
1486 priv->count = 0;
1488 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context");
1490 if (!mem_ctx) {
1491 ret = ENOMEM;
1492 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
1493 return ret;
1496 ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
1497 if (ret != 0) {
1498 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1499 return ret;
1502 lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
1503 priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
1504 "(objectClass=user)");
1506 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1507 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1508 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1511 priv->count = res->count;
1512 priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
1513 talloc_free(res);
1515 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv;
1517 ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1519 if (ret != 0) {
1520 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1521 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1522 } else {
1523 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1525 return ret;
1528 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context,
1529 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1530 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1532 return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1535 /* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal
1537 * This is currently a very nasty hack - allowing only delegation to itself.
1539 krb5_error_code
1540 samba_kdc_check_s4u2self(krb5_context context,
1541 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1542 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1543 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
1545 krb5_error_code ret;
1546 krb5_principal enterprise_prinicpal = NULL;
1547 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1548 struct ldb_message *msg;
1549 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1550 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1551 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1552 const char *delegation_check_attrs[] = {
1553 "objectSid", NULL
1556 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self");
1558 if (!mem_ctx) {
1559 ret = ENOMEM;
1560 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self: talloc_named() failed!");
1561 return ret;
1564 if (target_principal->name.name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1565 /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
1566 if (target_principal->name.name_string.len != 1) {
1567 ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
1568 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self: request for delegation to enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
1569 target_principal->name.name_string.len);
1570 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1571 return ret;
1573 ret = krb5_parse_name(context, target_principal->name.name_string.val[0],
1574 &enterprise_prinicpal);
1575 if (ret) {
1576 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1577 return ret;
1579 target_principal = enterprise_prinicpal;
1582 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, target_principal,
1583 delegation_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1585 krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_prinicpal);
1587 if (ret != 0) {
1588 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1589 return ret;
1592 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1593 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1595 /* Allow delegation to the same principal, even if by a different
1596 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1597 * comparison */
1598 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1599 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1600 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1603 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1604 return ret;
1607 /* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
1608 * slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
1609 * database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
1610 * SID */
1612 krb5_error_code
1613 samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context,
1614 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1615 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1616 krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
1618 krb5_error_code ret;
1619 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1620 struct ldb_message *msg;
1621 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1622 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1623 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1624 const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
1625 "objectSid", NULL
1628 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
1630 if (!mem_ctx) {
1631 ret = ENOMEM;
1632 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1633 return ret;
1636 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1637 mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
1638 ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1640 if (ret != 0) {
1641 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1642 return ret;
1645 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1646 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1648 /* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
1649 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1650 * comparison */
1651 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1652 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1653 return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
1656 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1657 return ret;
1661 * Check if a given entry may delegate to this target principal
1662 * with S4U2Proxy.
1664 krb5_error_code
1665 samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy(krb5_context context,
1666 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1667 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1668 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
1670 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1673 NTSTATUS samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_base_context *base_ctx,
1674 struct samba_kdc_db_context **kdc_db_ctx_out)
1676 int ldb_ret;
1677 struct ldb_message *msg;
1678 struct auth_session_info *session_info;
1679 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
1680 /* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to
1681 * authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is higly likely to
1682 * be circular.
1684 * In future we may set this up to use EXERNAL and SSL
1685 * certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP_SET_USERNAME
1688 kdc_db_ctx = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_db_context);
1689 if (kdc_db_ctx == NULL) {
1690 return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
1692 kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx = base_ctx->ev_ctx;
1693 kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx = base_ctx->lp_ctx;
1695 kdc_get_policy(base_ctx->lp_ctx, NULL, &kdc_db_ctx->policy);
1697 session_info = system_session(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
1698 if (session_info == NULL) {
1699 return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1702 /* Setup the link to LDB */
1703 kdc_db_ctx->samdb = samdb_connect(kdc_db_ctx, base_ctx->ev_ctx,
1704 base_ctx->lp_ctx, session_info, 0);
1705 if (kdc_db_ctx->samdb == NULL) {
1706 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!"));
1707 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1708 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1711 /* Find out our own krbtgt kvno */
1712 ldb_ret = samdb_rodc(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, &kdc_db_ctx->rodc);
1713 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1714 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine if we are an RODC in KDC backend: %s\n",
1715 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1716 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1717 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1719 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
1720 int my_krbtgt_number;
1721 const char *secondary_keytab[] = { "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", NULL };
1722 struct ldb_dn *account_dn;
1723 struct ldb_dn *server_dn = samdb_server_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx);
1724 if (!server_dn) {
1725 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine server DN in KDC backend: %s\n",
1726 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1727 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1728 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1731 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, server_dn,
1732 "serverReference", &account_dn);
1733 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1734 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine server account in KDC backend: %s\n",
1735 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1736 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1737 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1740 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, account_dn,
1741 "msDS-KrbTgtLink", &kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn);
1742 talloc_free(account_dn);
1743 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1744 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine RODC krbtgt account in KDC backend: %s\n",
1745 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1746 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1747 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1750 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
1751 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1752 secondary_keytab,
1754 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=*))");
1755 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1756 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot read krbtgt account %s in KDC backend to get msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber: %s: %s\n",
1757 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
1758 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
1759 ldb_strerror(ldb_ret)));
1760 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1761 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1763 my_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
1764 if (my_krbtgt_number == -1) {
1765 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot read msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber from krbtgt account %s in KDC backend: got %d\n",
1766 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
1767 my_krbtgt_number));
1768 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1769 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1771 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = my_krbtgt_number;
1773 } else {
1774 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
1775 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
1776 &msg, NULL, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1777 krbtgt_attrs,
1779 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
1781 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1782 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1783 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1784 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1786 kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn = talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, msg->dn);
1787 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
1788 talloc_free(msg);
1790 *kdc_db_ctx_out = kdc_db_ctx;
1791 return NT_STATUS_OK;