s3:smbd: s/EVENT_FD/TEVENT_FD
[Samba/gebeck_regimport.git] / source4 / heimdal / kdc / krb5tgs.c
blob45681775f88f0664174081caf64ac1d735c71df9
1 /*
2 * Copyright (c) 1997-2008 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
3 * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
4 * All rights reserved.
6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
8 * are met:
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
13 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
15 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
17 * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
18 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
19 * without specific prior written permission.
21 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
22 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
23 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
24 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
25 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
26 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
27 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
28 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
29 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
30 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
31 * SUCH DAMAGE.
34 #include "kdc_locl.h"
37 * return the realm of a krbtgt-ticket or NULL
40 static Realm
41 get_krbtgt_realm(const PrincipalName *p)
43 if(p->name_string.len == 2
44 && strcmp(p->name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) == 0)
45 return p->name_string.val[1];
46 else
47 return NULL;
51 * The KDC might add a signed path to the ticket authorization data
52 * field. This is to avoid server impersonating clients and the
53 * request constrained delegation.
55 * This is done by storing a KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT with a single
56 * entry of type KRB5SignedPath.
59 static krb5_error_code
60 find_KRB5SignedPath(krb5_context context,
61 const AuthorizationData *ad,
62 krb5_data *data)
64 AuthorizationData child;
65 krb5_error_code ret;
66 int pos;
68 if (ad == NULL || ad->len == 0)
69 return KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP;
71 pos = ad->len - 1;
73 if (ad->val[pos].ad_type != KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT)
74 return KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP;
76 ret = decode_AuthorizationData(ad->val[pos].ad_data.data,
77 ad->val[pos].ad_data.length,
78 &child,
79 NULL);
80 if (ret) {
81 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "Failed to decode "
82 "IF_RELEVANT with %d", ret);
83 return ret;
86 if (child.len != 1) {
87 free_AuthorizationData(&child);
88 return KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP;
91 if (child.val[0].ad_type != KRB5_AUTHDATA_SIGNTICKET) {
92 free_AuthorizationData(&child);
93 return KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP;
96 if (data)
97 ret = der_copy_octet_string(&child.val[0].ad_data, data);
98 free_AuthorizationData(&child);
99 return ret;
102 krb5_error_code
103 _kdc_add_KRB5SignedPath(krb5_context context,
104 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
105 hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt,
106 krb5_enctype enctype,
107 krb5_principal client,
108 krb5_const_principal server,
109 krb5_principals principals,
110 EncTicketPart *tkt)
112 krb5_error_code ret;
113 KRB5SignedPath sp;
114 krb5_data data;
115 krb5_crypto crypto = NULL;
116 size_t size = 0;
118 if (server && principals) {
119 ret = add_Principals(principals, server);
120 if (ret)
121 return ret;
125 KRB5SignedPathData spd;
127 spd.client = client;
128 spd.authtime = tkt->authtime;
129 spd.delegated = principals;
130 spd.method_data = NULL;
132 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(KRB5SignedPathData, data.data, data.length,
133 &spd, &size, ret);
134 if (ret)
135 return ret;
136 if (data.length != size)
137 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
141 Key *key;
142 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &krbtgt->entry, enctype, &key);
143 if (ret == 0)
144 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &key->key, 0, &crypto);
145 if (ret) {
146 free(data.data);
147 return ret;
152 * Fill in KRB5SignedPath
155 sp.etype = enctype;
156 sp.delegated = principals;
157 sp.method_data = NULL;
159 ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, crypto, KRB5_KU_KRB5SIGNEDPATH, 0,
160 data.data, data.length, &sp.cksum);
161 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
162 free(data.data);
163 if (ret)
164 return ret;
166 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(KRB5SignedPath, data.data, data.length, &sp, &size, ret);
167 free_Checksum(&sp.cksum);
168 if (ret)
169 return ret;
170 if (data.length != size)
171 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
175 * Add IF-RELEVANT(KRB5SignedPath) to the last slot in
176 * authorization data field.
179 ret = _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(context, tkt,
180 KRB5_AUTHDATA_SIGNTICKET, &data);
181 krb5_data_free(&data);
183 return ret;
186 static krb5_error_code
187 check_KRB5SignedPath(krb5_context context,
188 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
189 hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt,
190 krb5_principal cp,
191 EncTicketPart *tkt,
192 krb5_principals *delegated,
193 int *signedpath)
195 krb5_error_code ret;
196 krb5_data data;
197 krb5_crypto crypto = NULL;
199 if (delegated)
200 *delegated = NULL;
202 ret = find_KRB5SignedPath(context, tkt->authorization_data, &data);
203 if (ret == 0) {
204 KRB5SignedPathData spd;
205 KRB5SignedPath sp;
206 size_t size = 0;
208 ret = decode_KRB5SignedPath(data.data, data.length, &sp, NULL);
209 krb5_data_free(&data);
210 if (ret)
211 return ret;
213 spd.client = cp;
214 spd.authtime = tkt->authtime;
215 spd.delegated = sp.delegated;
216 spd.method_data = sp.method_data;
218 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(KRB5SignedPathData, data.data, data.length,
219 &spd, &size, ret);
220 if (ret) {
221 free_KRB5SignedPath(&sp);
222 return ret;
224 if (data.length != size)
225 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
228 Key *key;
229 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &krbtgt->entry, sp.etype, &key);
230 if (ret == 0)
231 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &key->key, 0, &crypto);
232 if (ret) {
233 free(data.data);
234 free_KRB5SignedPath(&sp);
235 return ret;
238 ret = krb5_verify_checksum(context, crypto, KRB5_KU_KRB5SIGNEDPATH,
239 data.data, data.length,
240 &sp.cksum);
241 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
242 free(data.data);
243 if (ret) {
244 free_KRB5SignedPath(&sp);
245 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
246 "KRB5SignedPath not signed correctly, not marking as signed");
247 return 0;
250 if (delegated && sp.delegated) {
252 *delegated = malloc(sizeof(*sp.delegated));
253 if (*delegated == NULL) {
254 free_KRB5SignedPath(&sp);
255 return ENOMEM;
258 ret = copy_Principals(*delegated, sp.delegated);
259 if (ret) {
260 free_KRB5SignedPath(&sp);
261 free(*delegated);
262 *delegated = NULL;
263 return ret;
266 free_KRB5SignedPath(&sp);
268 *signedpath = 1;
271 return 0;
278 static krb5_error_code
279 check_PAC(krb5_context context,
280 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
281 const krb5_principal client_principal,
282 const krb5_principal delegated_proxy_principal,
283 hdb_entry_ex *client,
284 hdb_entry_ex *server,
285 hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt,
286 const EncryptionKey *server_check_key,
287 const EncryptionKey *server_sign_key,
288 const EncryptionKey *krbtgt_sign_key,
289 EncTicketPart *tkt,
290 krb5_data *rspac,
291 int *signedpath)
293 AuthorizationData *ad = tkt->authorization_data;
294 unsigned i, j;
295 krb5_error_code ret;
297 if (ad == NULL || ad->len == 0)
298 return 0;
300 for (i = 0; i < ad->len; i++) {
301 AuthorizationData child;
303 if (ad->val[i].ad_type != KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT)
304 continue;
306 ret = decode_AuthorizationData(ad->val[i].ad_data.data,
307 ad->val[i].ad_data.length,
308 &child,
309 NULL);
310 if (ret) {
311 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "Failed to decode "
312 "IF_RELEVANT with %d", ret);
313 return ret;
315 for (j = 0; j < child.len; j++) {
317 if (child.val[j].ad_type == KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC) {
318 int signed_pac = 0;
319 krb5_pac pac;
321 /* Found PAC */
322 ret = krb5_pac_parse(context,
323 child.val[j].ad_data.data,
324 child.val[j].ad_data.length,
325 &pac);
326 free_AuthorizationData(&child);
327 if (ret)
328 return ret;
330 ret = krb5_pac_verify(context, pac, tkt->authtime,
331 client_principal,
332 server_check_key, NULL);
333 if (ret) {
334 krb5_pac_free(context, pac);
335 return ret;
338 ret = _kdc_pac_verify(context, client_principal,
339 delegated_proxy_principal,
340 client, server, krbtgt, &pac, &signed_pac);
341 if (ret) {
342 krb5_pac_free(context, pac);
343 return ret;
347 * Only re-sign PAC if we could verify it with the PAC
348 * function. The no-verify case happens when we get in
349 * a PAC from cross realm from a Windows domain and
350 * that there is no PAC verification function.
352 if (signed_pac) {
353 *signedpath = 1;
354 ret = _krb5_pac_sign(context, pac, tkt->authtime,
355 client_principal,
356 server_sign_key, krbtgt_sign_key, rspac);
358 krb5_pac_free(context, pac);
360 return ret;
363 free_AuthorizationData(&child);
365 return 0;
372 static krb5_error_code
373 check_tgs_flags(krb5_context context,
374 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
375 KDC_REQ_BODY *b, const EncTicketPart *tgt, EncTicketPart *et)
377 KDCOptions f = b->kdc_options;
379 if(f.validate){
380 if(!tgt->flags.invalid || tgt->starttime == NULL){
381 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
382 "Bad request to validate ticket");
383 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
385 if(*tgt->starttime > kdc_time){
386 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
387 "Early request to validate ticket");
388 return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV;
390 /* XXX tkt = tgt */
391 et->flags.invalid = 0;
392 }else if(tgt->flags.invalid){
393 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
394 "Ticket-granting ticket has INVALID flag set");
395 return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_INVALID;
398 if(f.forwardable){
399 if(!tgt->flags.forwardable){
400 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
401 "Bad request for forwardable ticket");
402 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
404 et->flags.forwardable = 1;
406 if(f.forwarded){
407 if(!tgt->flags.forwardable){
408 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
409 "Request to forward non-forwardable ticket");
410 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
412 et->flags.forwarded = 1;
413 et->caddr = b->addresses;
415 if(tgt->flags.forwarded)
416 et->flags.forwarded = 1;
418 if(f.proxiable){
419 if(!tgt->flags.proxiable){
420 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
421 "Bad request for proxiable ticket");
422 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
424 et->flags.proxiable = 1;
426 if(f.proxy){
427 if(!tgt->flags.proxiable){
428 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
429 "Request to proxy non-proxiable ticket");
430 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
432 et->flags.proxy = 1;
433 et->caddr = b->addresses;
435 if(tgt->flags.proxy)
436 et->flags.proxy = 1;
438 if(f.allow_postdate){
439 if(!tgt->flags.may_postdate){
440 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
441 "Bad request for post-datable ticket");
442 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
444 et->flags.may_postdate = 1;
446 if(f.postdated){
447 if(!tgt->flags.may_postdate){
448 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
449 "Bad request for postdated ticket");
450 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
452 if(b->from)
453 *et->starttime = *b->from;
454 et->flags.postdated = 1;
455 et->flags.invalid = 1;
456 }else if(b->from && *b->from > kdc_time + context->max_skew){
457 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Ticket cannot be postdated");
458 return KRB5KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE;
461 if(f.renewable){
462 if(!tgt->flags.renewable || tgt->renew_till == NULL){
463 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
464 "Bad request for renewable ticket");
465 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
467 et->flags.renewable = 1;
468 ALLOC(et->renew_till);
469 _kdc_fix_time(&b->rtime);
470 *et->renew_till = *b->rtime;
472 if(f.renew){
473 time_t old_life;
474 if(!tgt->flags.renewable || tgt->renew_till == NULL){
475 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
476 "Request to renew non-renewable ticket");
477 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
479 old_life = tgt->endtime;
480 if(tgt->starttime)
481 old_life -= *tgt->starttime;
482 else
483 old_life -= tgt->authtime;
484 et->endtime = *et->starttime + old_life;
485 if (et->renew_till != NULL)
486 et->endtime = min(*et->renew_till, et->endtime);
489 #if 0
490 /* checks for excess flags */
491 if(f.request_anonymous && !config->allow_anonymous){
492 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
493 "Request for anonymous ticket");
494 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
496 #endif
497 return 0;
501 * Determine if constrained delegation is allowed from this client to this server
504 static krb5_error_code
505 check_constrained_delegation(krb5_context context,
506 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
507 HDB *clientdb,
508 hdb_entry_ex *client,
509 hdb_entry_ex *server,
510 krb5_const_principal target)
512 const HDB_Ext_Constrained_delegation_acl *acl;
513 krb5_error_code ret;
514 size_t i;
517 * constrained_delegation (S4U2Proxy) only works within
518 * the same realm. We use the already canonicalized version
519 * of the principals here, while "target" is the principal
520 * provided by the client.
522 if(!krb5_realm_compare(context, client->entry.principal, server->entry.principal)) {
523 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
524 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
525 "Bad request for constrained delegation");
526 return ret;
529 if (clientdb->hdb_check_constrained_delegation) {
530 ret = clientdb->hdb_check_constrained_delegation(context, clientdb, client, target);
531 if (ret == 0)
532 return 0;
533 } else {
534 /* if client delegates to itself, that ok */
535 if (krb5_principal_compare(context, client->entry.principal, server->entry.principal) == TRUE)
536 return 0;
538 ret = hdb_entry_get_ConstrainedDelegACL(&client->entry, &acl);
539 if (ret) {
540 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
541 return ret;
544 if (acl) {
545 for (i = 0; i < acl->len; i++) {
546 if (krb5_principal_compare(context, target, &acl->val[i]) == TRUE)
547 return 0;
550 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
552 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
553 "Bad request for constrained delegation");
554 return ret;
558 * Determine if s4u2self is allowed from this client to this server
560 * For example, regardless of the principal being impersonated, if the
561 * 'client' and 'server' are the same, then it's safe.
564 static krb5_error_code
565 check_s4u2self(krb5_context context,
566 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
567 HDB *clientdb,
568 hdb_entry_ex *client,
569 krb5_const_principal server)
571 krb5_error_code ret;
573 /* if client does a s4u2self to itself, that ok */
574 if (krb5_principal_compare(context, client->entry.principal, server) == TRUE)
575 return 0;
577 if (clientdb->hdb_check_s4u2self) {
578 ret = clientdb->hdb_check_s4u2self(context, clientdb, client, server);
579 if (ret == 0)
580 return 0;
581 } else {
582 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
584 return ret;
591 static krb5_error_code
592 verify_flags (krb5_context context,
593 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
594 const EncTicketPart *et,
595 const char *pstr)
597 if(et->endtime < kdc_time){
598 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Ticket expired (%s)", pstr);
599 return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED;
601 if(et->flags.invalid){
602 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Ticket not valid (%s)", pstr);
603 return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV;
605 return 0;
612 static krb5_error_code
613 fix_transited_encoding(krb5_context context,
614 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
615 krb5_boolean check_policy,
616 const TransitedEncoding *tr,
617 EncTicketPart *et,
618 const char *client_realm,
619 const char *server_realm,
620 const char *tgt_realm)
622 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
623 char **realms, **tmp;
624 unsigned int num_realms;
625 size_t i;
627 switch (tr->tr_type) {
628 case DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS:
629 break;
630 case 0:
632 * Allow empty content of type 0 because that is was Microsoft
633 * generates in their TGT.
635 if (tr->contents.length == 0)
636 break;
637 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
638 "Transited type 0 with non empty content");
639 return KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
640 default:
641 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
642 "Unknown transited type: %u", tr->tr_type);
643 return KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
646 ret = krb5_domain_x500_decode(context,
647 tr->contents,
648 &realms,
649 &num_realms,
650 client_realm,
651 server_realm);
652 if(ret){
653 krb5_warn(context, ret,
654 "Decoding transited encoding");
655 return ret;
657 if(strcmp(client_realm, tgt_realm) && strcmp(server_realm, tgt_realm)) {
658 /* not us, so add the previous realm to transited set */
659 if (num_realms + 1 > UINT_MAX/sizeof(*realms)) {
660 ret = ERANGE;
661 goto free_realms;
663 tmp = realloc(realms, (num_realms + 1) * sizeof(*realms));
664 if(tmp == NULL){
665 ret = ENOMEM;
666 goto free_realms;
668 realms = tmp;
669 realms[num_realms] = strdup(tgt_realm);
670 if(realms[num_realms] == NULL){
671 ret = ENOMEM;
672 goto free_realms;
674 num_realms++;
676 if(num_realms == 0) {
677 if(strcmp(client_realm, server_realm))
678 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
679 "cross-realm %s -> %s", client_realm, server_realm);
680 } else {
681 size_t l = 0;
682 char *rs;
683 for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++)
684 l += strlen(realms[i]) + 2;
685 rs = malloc(l);
686 if(rs != NULL) {
687 *rs = '\0';
688 for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++) {
689 if(i > 0)
690 strlcat(rs, ", ", l);
691 strlcat(rs, realms[i], l);
693 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
694 "cross-realm %s -> %s via [%s]",
695 client_realm, server_realm, rs);
696 free(rs);
699 if(check_policy) {
700 ret = krb5_check_transited(context, client_realm,
701 server_realm,
702 realms, num_realms, NULL);
703 if(ret) {
704 krb5_warn(context, ret, "cross-realm %s -> %s",
705 client_realm, server_realm);
706 goto free_realms;
708 et->flags.transited_policy_checked = 1;
710 et->transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
711 ret = krb5_domain_x500_encode(realms, num_realms, &et->transited.contents);
712 if(ret)
713 krb5_warn(context, ret, "Encoding transited encoding");
714 free_realms:
715 for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++)
716 free(realms[i]);
717 free(realms);
718 return ret;
722 static krb5_error_code
723 tgs_make_reply(krb5_context context,
724 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
725 KDC_REQ_BODY *b,
726 krb5_const_principal tgt_name,
727 const EncTicketPart *tgt,
728 const krb5_keyblock *replykey,
729 int rk_is_subkey,
730 const EncryptionKey *serverkey,
731 const krb5_keyblock *sessionkey,
732 krb5_kvno kvno,
733 AuthorizationData *auth_data,
734 hdb_entry_ex *server,
735 krb5_principal server_principal,
736 const char *server_name,
737 hdb_entry_ex *client,
738 krb5_principal client_principal,
739 hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt,
740 krb5_enctype krbtgt_etype,
741 krb5_principals spp,
742 const krb5_data *rspac,
743 const METHOD_DATA *enc_pa_data,
744 const char **e_text,
745 krb5_data *reply)
747 KDC_REP rep;
748 EncKDCRepPart ek;
749 EncTicketPart et;
750 KDCOptions f = b->kdc_options;
751 krb5_error_code ret;
752 int is_weak = 0;
754 memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
755 memset(&et, 0, sizeof(et));
756 memset(&ek, 0, sizeof(ek));
758 rep.pvno = 5;
759 rep.msg_type = krb_tgs_rep;
761 et.authtime = tgt->authtime;
762 _kdc_fix_time(&b->till);
763 et.endtime = min(tgt->endtime, *b->till);
764 ALLOC(et.starttime);
765 *et.starttime = kdc_time;
767 ret = check_tgs_flags(context, config, b, tgt, &et);
768 if(ret)
769 goto out;
771 /* We should check the transited encoding if:
772 1) the request doesn't ask not to be checked
773 2) globally enforcing a check
774 3) principal requires checking
775 4) we allow non-check per-principal, but principal isn't marked as allowing this
776 5) we don't globally allow this
779 #define GLOBAL_FORCE_TRANSITED_CHECK \
780 (config->trpolicy == TRPOLICY_ALWAYS_CHECK)
781 #define GLOBAL_ALLOW_PER_PRINCIPAL \
782 (config->trpolicy == TRPOLICY_ALLOW_PER_PRINCIPAL)
783 #define GLOBAL_ALLOW_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK \
784 (config->trpolicy == TRPOLICY_ALWAYS_HONOUR_REQUEST)
786 /* these will consult the database in future release */
787 #define PRINCIPAL_FORCE_TRANSITED_CHECK(P) 0
788 #define PRINCIPAL_ALLOW_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK(P) 0
790 ret = fix_transited_encoding(context, config,
791 !f.disable_transited_check ||
792 GLOBAL_FORCE_TRANSITED_CHECK ||
793 PRINCIPAL_FORCE_TRANSITED_CHECK(server) ||
794 !((GLOBAL_ALLOW_PER_PRINCIPAL &&
795 PRINCIPAL_ALLOW_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK(server)) ||
796 GLOBAL_ALLOW_DISABLE_TRANSITED_CHECK),
797 &tgt->transited, &et,
798 krb5_principal_get_realm(context, client_principal),
799 krb5_principal_get_realm(context, server->entry.principal),
800 krb5_principal_get_realm(context, krbtgt->entry.principal));
801 if(ret)
802 goto out;
804 copy_Realm(&server_principal->realm, &rep.ticket.realm);
805 _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname, server_principal);
806 copy_Realm(&tgt_name->realm, &rep.crealm);
808 if (f.request_anonymous)
809 _kdc_make_anonymous_principalname (&rep.cname);
810 else */
812 copy_PrincipalName(&tgt_name->name, &rep.cname);
813 rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5;
815 ek.caddr = et.caddr;
816 if(et.caddr == NULL)
817 et.caddr = tgt->caddr;
820 time_t life;
821 life = et.endtime - *et.starttime;
822 if(client && client->entry.max_life)
823 life = min(life, *client->entry.max_life);
824 if(server->entry.max_life)
825 life = min(life, *server->entry.max_life);
826 et.endtime = *et.starttime + life;
828 if(f.renewable_ok && tgt->flags.renewable &&
829 et.renew_till == NULL && et.endtime < *b->till &&
830 tgt->renew_till != NULL)
832 et.flags.renewable = 1;
833 ALLOC(et.renew_till);
834 *et.renew_till = *b->till;
836 if(et.renew_till){
837 time_t renew;
838 renew = *et.renew_till - et.authtime;
839 if(client && client->entry.max_renew)
840 renew = min(renew, *client->entry.max_renew);
841 if(server->entry.max_renew)
842 renew = min(renew, *server->entry.max_renew);
843 *et.renew_till = et.authtime + renew;
846 if(et.renew_till){
847 *et.renew_till = min(*et.renew_till, *tgt->renew_till);
848 *et.starttime = min(*et.starttime, *et.renew_till);
849 et.endtime = min(et.endtime, *et.renew_till);
852 *et.starttime = min(*et.starttime, et.endtime);
854 if(*et.starttime == et.endtime){
855 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID;
856 goto out;
858 if(et.renew_till && et.endtime == *et.renew_till){
859 free(et.renew_till);
860 et.renew_till = NULL;
861 et.flags.renewable = 0;
864 et.flags.pre_authent = tgt->flags.pre_authent;
865 et.flags.hw_authent = tgt->flags.hw_authent;
866 et.flags.anonymous = tgt->flags.anonymous;
867 et.flags.ok_as_delegate = server->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate;
869 if(rspac->length) {
871 * No not need to filter out the any PAC from the
872 * auth_data since it's signed by the KDC.
874 ret = _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(context, &et,
875 KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC, rspac);
876 if (ret)
877 goto out;
880 if (auth_data) {
881 unsigned int i = 0;
883 /* XXX check authdata */
885 if (et.authorization_data == NULL) {
886 et.authorization_data = calloc(1, sizeof(*et.authorization_data));
887 if (et.authorization_data == NULL) {
888 ret = ENOMEM;
889 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
890 goto out;
893 for(i = 0; i < auth_data->len ; i++) {
894 ret = add_AuthorizationData(et.authorization_data, &auth_data->val[i]);
895 if (ret) {
896 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
897 goto out;
901 /* Filter out type KRB5SignedPath */
902 ret = find_KRB5SignedPath(context, et.authorization_data, NULL);
903 if (ret == 0) {
904 if (et.authorization_data->len == 1) {
905 free_AuthorizationData(et.authorization_data);
906 free(et.authorization_data);
907 et.authorization_data = NULL;
908 } else {
909 AuthorizationData *ad = et.authorization_data;
910 free_AuthorizationDataElement(&ad->val[ad->len - 1]);
911 ad->len--;
916 ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(context, sessionkey, &et.key);
917 if (ret)
918 goto out;
919 et.crealm = tgt_name->realm;
920 et.cname = tgt_name->name;
922 ek.key = et.key;
923 /* MIT must have at least one last_req */
924 ek.last_req.len = 1;
925 ek.last_req.val = calloc(1, sizeof(*ek.last_req.val));
926 if (ek.last_req.val == NULL) {
927 ret = ENOMEM;
928 goto out;
930 ek.nonce = b->nonce;
931 ek.flags = et.flags;
932 ek.authtime = et.authtime;
933 ek.starttime = et.starttime;
934 ek.endtime = et.endtime;
935 ek.renew_till = et.renew_till;
936 ek.srealm = rep.ticket.realm;
937 ek.sname = rep.ticket.sname;
939 _kdc_log_timestamp(context, config, "TGS-REQ", et.authtime, et.starttime,
940 et.endtime, et.renew_till);
942 /* Don't sign cross realm tickets, they can't be checked anyway */
944 char *r = get_krbtgt_realm(&ek.sname);
946 if (r == NULL || strcmp(r, ek.srealm) == 0) {
947 ret = _kdc_add_KRB5SignedPath(context,
948 config,
949 krbtgt,
950 krbtgt_etype,
951 client_principal,
952 NULL,
953 spp,
954 &et);
955 if (ret)
956 goto out;
960 if (enc_pa_data->len) {
961 rep.padata = calloc(1, sizeof(*rep.padata));
962 if (rep.padata == NULL) {
963 ret = ENOMEM;
964 goto out;
966 ret = copy_METHOD_DATA(enc_pa_data, rep.padata);
967 if (ret)
968 goto out;
971 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, et.key.keytype) != 0
972 && _kdc_is_weak_exception(server->entry.principal, et.key.keytype))
974 krb5_enctype_enable(context, et.key.keytype);
975 is_weak = 1;
979 /* It is somewhat unclear where the etype in the following
980 encryption should come from. What we have is a session
981 key in the passed tgt, and a list of preferred etypes
982 *for the new ticket*. Should we pick the best possible
983 etype, given the keytype in the tgt, or should we look
984 at the etype list here as well? What if the tgt
985 session key is DES3 and we want a ticket with a (say)
986 CAST session key. Should the DES3 etype be added to the
987 etype list, even if we don't want a session key with
988 DES3? */
989 ret = _kdc_encode_reply(context, config,
990 &rep, &et, &ek, et.key.keytype,
991 kvno,
992 serverkey, 0, replykey, rk_is_subkey,
993 e_text, reply);
994 if (is_weak)
995 krb5_enctype_disable(context, et.key.keytype);
997 out:
998 free_TGS_REP(&rep);
999 free_TransitedEncoding(&et.transited);
1000 if(et.starttime)
1001 free(et.starttime);
1002 if(et.renew_till)
1003 free(et.renew_till);
1004 if(et.authorization_data) {
1005 free_AuthorizationData(et.authorization_data);
1006 free(et.authorization_data);
1008 free_LastReq(&ek.last_req);
1009 memset(et.key.keyvalue.data, 0, et.key.keyvalue.length);
1010 free_EncryptionKey(&et.key);
1011 return ret;
1014 static krb5_error_code
1015 tgs_check_authenticator(krb5_context context,
1016 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1017 krb5_auth_context ac,
1018 KDC_REQ_BODY *b,
1019 const char **e_text,
1020 krb5_keyblock *key)
1022 krb5_authenticator auth;
1023 size_t len = 0;
1024 unsigned char *buf;
1025 size_t buf_size;
1026 krb5_error_code ret;
1027 krb5_crypto crypto;
1029 krb5_auth_con_getauthenticator(context, ac, &auth);
1030 if(auth->cksum == NULL){
1031 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "No authenticator in request");
1032 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM;
1033 goto out;
1036 * according to RFC1510 it doesn't need to be keyed,
1037 * but according to the latest draft it needs to.
1039 if (
1040 #if 0
1041 !krb5_checksum_is_keyed(context, auth->cksum->cksumtype)
1043 #endif
1044 !krb5_checksum_is_collision_proof(context, auth->cksum->cksumtype)) {
1045 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Bad checksum type in authenticator: %d",
1046 auth->cksum->cksumtype);
1047 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM;
1048 goto out;
1051 /* XXX should not re-encode this */
1052 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(KDC_REQ_BODY, buf, buf_size, b, &len, ret);
1053 if(ret){
1054 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1055 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REQ-BODY: %s", msg);
1056 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1057 goto out;
1059 if(buf_size != len) {
1060 free(buf);
1061 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
1062 *e_text = "KDC internal error";
1063 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1064 goto out;
1066 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto);
1067 if (ret) {
1068 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1069 free(buf);
1070 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
1071 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1072 goto out;
1074 ret = krb5_verify_checksum(context,
1075 crypto,
1076 KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM,
1077 buf,
1078 len,
1079 auth->cksum);
1080 free(buf);
1081 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
1082 if(ret){
1083 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1084 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1085 "Failed to verify authenticator checksum: %s", msg);
1086 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1088 out:
1089 free_Authenticator(auth);
1090 free(auth);
1091 return ret;
1098 static const char *
1099 find_rpath(krb5_context context, Realm crealm, Realm srealm)
1101 const char *new_realm = krb5_config_get_string(context,
1102 NULL,
1103 "capaths",
1104 crealm,
1105 srealm,
1106 NULL);
1107 return new_realm;
1111 static krb5_boolean
1112 need_referral(krb5_context context, krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1113 const KDCOptions * const options, krb5_principal server,
1114 krb5_realm **realms)
1116 const char *name;
1118 if(!options->canonicalize && server->name.name_type != KRB5_NT_SRV_INST)
1119 return FALSE;
1121 if (server->name.name_string.len == 1)
1122 name = server->name.name_string.val[0];
1123 else if (server->name.name_string.len == 3 &&
1124 strcasecmp("E3514235-4B06-11D1-AB04-00C04FC2DCD2", server->name.name_string.val[0]) == 0) {
1126 This is used to give referrals for the
1127 E3514235-4B06-11D1-AB04-00C04FC2DCD2/NTDSGUID/DNSDOMAIN
1128 SPN form, which is used for inter-domain communication in AD
1130 name = server->name.name_string.val[2];
1131 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Giving 3 part DRSUAPI referral for %s", name);
1132 *realms = malloc(sizeof(char *)*2);
1133 if (*realms == NULL) {
1134 krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOMEM, N_("malloc: out of memory", ""));
1135 return FALSE;
1137 (*realms)[0] = strdup(name);
1138 (*realms)[1] = NULL;
1139 return TRUE;
1140 } else if (server->name.name_string.len > 1)
1141 name = server->name.name_string.val[1];
1142 else
1143 return FALSE;
1145 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Searching referral for %s", name);
1147 return _krb5_get_host_realm_int(context, name, FALSE, realms) == 0;
1150 static krb5_error_code
1151 tgs_parse_request(krb5_context context,
1152 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1153 KDC_REQ_BODY *b,
1154 const PA_DATA *tgs_req,
1155 hdb_entry_ex **krbtgt,
1156 krb5_enctype *krbtgt_etype,
1157 krb5_ticket **ticket,
1158 const char **e_text,
1159 const char *from,
1160 const struct sockaddr *from_addr,
1161 time_t **csec,
1162 int **cusec,
1163 AuthorizationData **auth_data,
1164 krb5_keyblock **replykey,
1165 int *rk_is_subkey)
1167 static char failed[] = "<unparse_name failed>";
1168 krb5_ap_req ap_req;
1169 krb5_error_code ret;
1170 krb5_principal princ;
1171 krb5_auth_context ac = NULL;
1172 krb5_flags ap_req_options;
1173 krb5_flags verify_ap_req_flags;
1174 krb5_crypto crypto;
1175 Key *tkey;
1176 krb5_keyblock *subkey = NULL;
1177 unsigned usage;
1179 *auth_data = NULL;
1180 *csec = NULL;
1181 *cusec = NULL;
1182 *replykey = NULL;
1184 memset(&ap_req, 0, sizeof(ap_req));
1185 ret = krb5_decode_ap_req(context, &tgs_req->padata_value, &ap_req);
1186 if(ret){
1187 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1188 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to decode AP-REQ: %s", msg);
1189 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1190 goto out;
1193 if(!get_krbtgt_realm(&ap_req.ticket.sname)){
1194 /* XXX check for ticket.sname == req.sname */
1195 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PA-DATA is not a ticket-granting ticket");
1196 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; /* ? */
1197 goto out;
1200 _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
1201 &princ,
1202 ap_req.ticket.sname,
1203 ap_req.ticket.realm);
1205 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, princ, HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT, ap_req.ticket.enc_part.kvno, NULL, krbtgt);
1207 if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1208 char *p;
1209 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, princ, &p);
1210 if (ret != 0)
1211 p = failed;
1212 krb5_free_principal(context, princ);
1213 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Ticket-granting ticket account %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy", p);
1214 if (ret == 0)
1215 free(p);
1216 ret = HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
1217 goto out;
1218 } else if(ret){
1219 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1220 char *p;
1221 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, princ, &p);
1222 if (ret != 0)
1223 p = failed;
1224 krb5_free_principal(context, princ);
1225 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1226 "Ticket-granting ticket not found in database: %s", msg);
1227 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1228 if (ret == 0)
1229 free(p);
1230 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US;
1231 goto out;
1234 if(ap_req.ticket.enc_part.kvno &&
1235 *ap_req.ticket.enc_part.kvno != (*krbtgt)->entry.kvno){
1236 char *p;
1238 ret = krb5_unparse_name (context, princ, &p);
1239 krb5_free_principal(context, princ);
1240 if (ret != 0)
1241 p = failed;
1242 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1243 "Ticket kvno = %d, DB kvno = %d (%s)",
1244 *ap_req.ticket.enc_part.kvno,
1245 (*krbtgt)->entry.kvno,
1247 if (ret == 0)
1248 free (p);
1249 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER;
1250 goto out;
1253 *krbtgt_etype = ap_req.ticket.enc_part.etype;
1255 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &(*krbtgt)->entry,
1256 ap_req.ticket.enc_part.etype, &tkey);
1257 if(ret){
1258 char *str = NULL, *p = NULL;
1260 krb5_enctype_to_string(context, ap_req.ticket.enc_part.etype, &str);
1261 krb5_unparse_name(context, princ, &p);
1262 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1263 "No server key with enctype %s found for %s",
1264 str ? str : "<unknown enctype>",
1265 p ? p : "<unparse_name failed>");
1266 free(str);
1267 free(p);
1268 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER;
1269 goto out;
1272 if (b->kdc_options.validate)
1273 verify_ap_req_flags = KRB5_VERIFY_AP_REQ_IGNORE_INVALID;
1274 else
1275 verify_ap_req_flags = 0;
1277 ret = krb5_verify_ap_req2(context,
1278 &ac,
1279 &ap_req,
1280 princ,
1281 &tkey->key,
1282 verify_ap_req_flags,
1283 &ap_req_options,
1284 ticket,
1285 KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH);
1287 krb5_free_principal(context, princ);
1288 if(ret) {
1289 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1290 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to verify AP-REQ: %s", msg);
1291 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1292 goto out;
1296 krb5_authenticator auth;
1298 ret = krb5_auth_con_getauthenticator(context, ac, &auth);
1299 if (ret == 0) {
1300 *csec = malloc(sizeof(**csec));
1301 if (*csec == NULL) {
1302 krb5_free_authenticator(context, &auth);
1303 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "malloc failed");
1304 goto out;
1306 **csec = auth->ctime;
1307 *cusec = malloc(sizeof(**cusec));
1308 if (*cusec == NULL) {
1309 krb5_free_authenticator(context, &auth);
1310 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "malloc failed");
1311 goto out;
1313 **cusec = auth->cusec;
1314 krb5_free_authenticator(context, &auth);
1318 ret = tgs_check_authenticator(context, config,
1319 ac, b, e_text, &(*ticket)->ticket.key);
1320 if (ret) {
1321 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1322 goto out;
1325 usage = KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH_DAT_SUBKEY;
1326 *rk_is_subkey = 1;
1328 ret = krb5_auth_con_getremotesubkey(context, ac, &subkey);
1329 if(ret){
1330 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1331 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1332 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to get remote subkey: %s", msg);
1333 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1334 goto out;
1336 if(subkey == NULL){
1337 usage = KRB5_KU_TGS_REQ_AUTH_DAT_SESSION;
1338 *rk_is_subkey = 0;
1340 ret = krb5_auth_con_getkey(context, ac, &subkey);
1341 if(ret) {
1342 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1343 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1344 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to get session key: %s", msg);
1345 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1346 goto out;
1349 if(subkey == NULL){
1350 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1351 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1352 "Failed to get key for enc-authorization-data");
1353 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; /* ? */
1354 goto out;
1357 *replykey = subkey;
1359 if (b->enc_authorization_data) {
1360 krb5_data ad;
1362 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, subkey, 0, &crypto);
1363 if (ret) {
1364 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1365 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1366 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
1367 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1368 goto out;
1370 ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context,
1371 crypto,
1372 usage,
1373 b->enc_authorization_data,
1374 &ad);
1375 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
1376 if(ret){
1377 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1378 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1379 "Failed to decrypt enc-authorization-data");
1380 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; /* ? */
1381 goto out;
1383 ALLOC(*auth_data);
1384 if (*auth_data == NULL) {
1385 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1386 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; /* ? */
1387 goto out;
1389 ret = decode_AuthorizationData(ad.data, ad.length, *auth_data, NULL);
1390 if(ret){
1391 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1392 free(*auth_data);
1393 *auth_data = NULL;
1394 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to decode authorization data");
1395 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; /* ? */
1396 goto out;
1400 krb5_auth_con_free(context, ac);
1402 out:
1403 free_AP_REQ(&ap_req);
1405 return ret;
1408 static krb5_error_code
1409 build_server_referral(krb5_context context,
1410 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1411 krb5_crypto session,
1412 krb5_const_realm referred_realm,
1413 const PrincipalName *true_principal_name,
1414 const PrincipalName *requested_principal,
1415 krb5_data *outdata)
1417 PA_ServerReferralData ref;
1418 krb5_error_code ret;
1419 EncryptedData ed;
1420 krb5_data data;
1421 size_t size = 0;
1423 memset(&ref, 0, sizeof(ref));
1425 if (referred_realm) {
1426 ALLOC(ref.referred_realm);
1427 if (ref.referred_realm == NULL)
1428 goto eout;
1429 *ref.referred_realm = strdup(referred_realm);
1430 if (*ref.referred_realm == NULL)
1431 goto eout;
1433 if (true_principal_name) {
1434 ALLOC(ref.true_principal_name);
1435 if (ref.true_principal_name == NULL)
1436 goto eout;
1437 ret = copy_PrincipalName(true_principal_name, ref.true_principal_name);
1438 if (ret)
1439 goto eout;
1441 if (requested_principal) {
1442 ALLOC(ref.requested_principal_name);
1443 if (ref.requested_principal_name == NULL)
1444 goto eout;
1445 ret = copy_PrincipalName(requested_principal,
1446 ref.requested_principal_name);
1447 if (ret)
1448 goto eout;
1451 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ServerReferralData,
1452 data.data, data.length,
1453 &ref, &size, ret);
1454 free_PA_ServerReferralData(&ref);
1455 if (ret)
1456 return ret;
1457 if (data.length != size)
1458 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
1460 ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context, session,
1461 KRB5_KU_PA_SERVER_REFERRAL,
1462 data.data, data.length,
1463 0 /* kvno */, &ed);
1464 free(data.data);
1465 if (ret)
1466 return ret;
1468 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncryptedData,
1469 outdata->data, outdata->length,
1470 &ed, &size, ret);
1471 free_EncryptedData(&ed);
1472 if (ret)
1473 return ret;
1474 if (outdata->length != size)
1475 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
1477 return 0;
1478 eout:
1479 free_PA_ServerReferralData(&ref);
1480 krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOMEM, "malloc: out of memory");
1481 return ENOMEM;
1484 static krb5_error_code
1485 tgs_build_reply(krb5_context context,
1486 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1487 KDC_REQ *req,
1488 KDC_REQ_BODY *b,
1489 hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt,
1490 krb5_enctype krbtgt_etype,
1491 const krb5_keyblock *replykey,
1492 int rk_is_subkey,
1493 krb5_ticket *ticket,
1494 krb5_data *reply,
1495 const char *from,
1496 const char **e_text,
1497 AuthorizationData **auth_data,
1498 const struct sockaddr *from_addr)
1500 krb5_error_code ret;
1501 krb5_principal cp = NULL, sp = NULL, tp = NULL, dp = NULL;
1502 krb5_principal krbtgt_principal = NULL;
1503 char *spn = NULL, *cpn = NULL, *tpn = NULL, *dpn = NULL;
1504 hdb_entry_ex *server = NULL, *client = NULL, *s4u2self_impersonated_client = NULL;
1505 HDB *clientdb, *s4u2self_impersonated_clientdb;
1506 krb5_realm ref_realm = NULL;
1507 EncTicketPart *tgt = &ticket->ticket;
1508 krb5_principals spp = NULL;
1509 const EncryptionKey *ekey;
1510 krb5_keyblock sessionkey;
1511 krb5_kvno kvno;
1512 krb5_data rspac;
1514 hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt_out = NULL;
1516 METHOD_DATA enc_pa_data;
1518 PrincipalName *s;
1519 Realm r;
1520 int nloop = 0;
1521 EncTicketPart adtkt;
1522 char opt_str[128];
1523 int signedpath = 0;
1525 Key *tkey_check;
1526 Key *tkey_sign;
1527 int flags = HDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ;
1529 memset(&sessionkey, 0, sizeof(sessionkey));
1530 memset(&adtkt, 0, sizeof(adtkt));
1531 krb5_data_zero(&rspac);
1532 memset(&enc_pa_data, 0, sizeof(enc_pa_data));
1534 s = b->sname;
1535 r = b->realm;
1537 if (b->kdc_options.canonicalize)
1538 flags |= HDB_F_CANON;
1540 if(b->kdc_options.enc_tkt_in_skey){
1541 Ticket *t;
1542 hdb_entry_ex *uu;
1543 krb5_principal p;
1544 Key *uukey;
1546 if(b->additional_tickets == NULL ||
1547 b->additional_tickets->len == 0){
1548 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; /* ? */
1549 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1550 "No second ticket present in request");
1551 goto out;
1553 t = &b->additional_tickets->val[0];
1554 if(!get_krbtgt_realm(&t->sname)){
1555 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1556 "Additional ticket is not a ticket-granting ticket");
1557 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1558 goto out;
1560 _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context, &p, t->sname, t->realm);
1561 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, p,
1562 HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT, t->enc_part.kvno,
1563 NULL, &uu);
1564 krb5_free_principal(context, p);
1565 if(ret){
1566 if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
1567 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1568 goto out;
1570 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &uu->entry,
1571 t->enc_part.etype, &uukey);
1572 if(ret){
1573 _kdc_free_ent(context, uu);
1574 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; /* XXX */
1575 goto out;
1577 ret = krb5_decrypt_ticket(context, t, &uukey->key, &adtkt, 0);
1578 _kdc_free_ent(context, uu);
1579 if(ret)
1580 goto out;
1582 ret = verify_flags(context, config, &adtkt, spn);
1583 if (ret)
1584 goto out;
1586 s = &adtkt.cname;
1587 r = adtkt.crealm;
1590 _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context, &sp, *s, r);
1591 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn);
1592 if (ret)
1593 goto out;
1594 _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context, &cp, tgt->cname, tgt->crealm);
1595 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, cp, &cpn);
1596 if (ret)
1597 goto out;
1598 unparse_flags (KDCOptions2int(b->kdc_options),
1599 asn1_KDCOptions_units(),
1600 opt_str, sizeof(opt_str));
1601 if(*opt_str)
1602 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1603 "TGS-REQ %s from %s for %s [%s]",
1604 cpn, from, spn, opt_str);
1605 else
1606 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1607 "TGS-REQ %s from %s for %s", cpn, from, spn);
1610 * Fetch server
1613 server_lookup:
1614 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, sp, HDB_F_GET_SERVER | flags,
1615 NULL, NULL, &server);
1617 if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1618 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "target %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy", sp);
1619 goto out;
1620 } else if(ret){
1621 const char *new_rlm, *msg;
1622 Realm req_rlm;
1623 krb5_realm *realms;
1625 if ((req_rlm = get_krbtgt_realm(&sp->name)) != NULL) {
1626 if(nloop++ < 2) {
1627 new_rlm = find_rpath(context, tgt->crealm, req_rlm);
1628 if(new_rlm) {
1629 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "krbtgt for realm %s "
1630 "not found, trying %s",
1631 req_rlm, new_rlm);
1632 krb5_free_principal(context, sp);
1633 free(spn);
1634 krb5_make_principal(context, &sp, r,
1635 KRB5_TGS_NAME, new_rlm, NULL);
1636 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn);
1637 if (ret)
1638 goto out;
1640 if (ref_realm)
1641 free(ref_realm);
1642 ref_realm = strdup(new_rlm);
1643 goto server_lookup;
1646 } else if(need_referral(context, config, &b->kdc_options, sp, &realms)) {
1647 if (strcmp(realms[0], sp->realm) != 0) {
1648 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1649 "Returning a referral to realm %s for "
1650 "server %s that was not found",
1651 realms[0], spn);
1652 krb5_free_principal(context, sp);
1653 free(spn);
1654 krb5_make_principal(context, &sp, r, KRB5_TGS_NAME,
1655 realms[0], NULL);
1656 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, sp, &spn);
1657 if (ret)
1658 goto out;
1660 if (ref_realm)
1661 free(ref_realm);
1662 ref_realm = strdup(realms[0]);
1664 krb5_free_host_realm(context, realms);
1665 goto server_lookup;
1667 krb5_free_host_realm(context, realms);
1669 msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1670 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1671 "Server not found in database: %s: %s", spn, msg);
1672 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1673 if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
1674 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1675 goto out;
1679 * Select enctype, return key and kvno.
1683 krb5_enctype etype;
1685 if(b->kdc_options.enc_tkt_in_skey) {
1686 size_t i;
1687 ekey = &adtkt.key;
1688 for(i = 0; i < b->etype.len; i++)
1689 if (b->etype.val[i] == adtkt.key.keytype)
1690 break;
1691 if(i == b->etype.len) {
1692 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1693 "Addition ticket have not matching etypes");
1694 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1695 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
1696 goto out;
1698 etype = b->etype.val[i];
1699 kvno = 0;
1700 } else {
1701 Key *skey;
1703 ret = _kdc_find_etype(context,
1704 config->tgs_use_strongest_session_key, FALSE,
1705 server, b->etype.val, b->etype.len, NULL,
1706 &skey);
1707 if(ret) {
1708 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1709 "Server (%s) has no support for etypes", spn);
1710 goto out;
1712 ekey = &skey->key;
1713 etype = skey->key.keytype;
1714 kvno = server->entry.kvno;
1717 ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, etype, &sessionkey);
1718 if (ret)
1719 goto out;
1723 * Check that service is in the same realm as the krbtgt. If it's
1724 * not the same, it's someone that is using a uni-directional trust
1725 * backward.
1729 * Validate authoriation data
1732 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &krbtgt->entry,
1733 krbtgt_etype, &tkey_check);
1734 if(ret) {
1735 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1736 "Failed to find key for krbtgt PAC check");
1737 goto out;
1740 /* Now refetch the primary krbtgt, and get the current kvno (the
1741 * sign check may have been on an old kvno, and the server may
1742 * have been an incoming trust) */
1743 ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &krbtgt_principal,
1744 krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context,
1745 krbtgt->entry.principal,
1747 KRB5_TGS_NAME,
1748 krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context,
1749 krbtgt->entry.principal,
1750 1), NULL);
1751 if(ret) {
1752 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1753 "Failed to generate krbtgt principal");
1754 goto out;
1757 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, krbtgt_principal, HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT, NULL, NULL, &krbtgt_out);
1758 krb5_free_principal(context, krbtgt_principal);
1759 if (ret) {
1760 krb5_error_code ret2;
1761 char *ktpn, *ktpn2;
1762 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, krbtgt->entry.principal, &ktpn);
1763 ret2 = krb5_unparse_name(context, krbtgt_principal, &ktpn2);
1764 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1765 "Request with wrong krbtgt: %s, %s not found in our database",
1766 (ret == 0) ? ktpn : "<unknown>", (ret2 == 0) ? ktpn2 : "<unknown>");
1767 if(ret == 0)
1768 free(ktpn);
1769 if(ret2 == 0)
1770 free(ktpn2);
1771 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US;
1772 goto out;
1775 /* The first realm is the realm of the service, the second is
1776 * krbtgt/<this>/@REALM component of the krbtgt DN the request was
1777 * encrypted to. The redirection via the krbtgt_out entry allows
1778 * the DB to possibly correct the case of the realm (Samba4 does
1779 * this) before the strcmp() */
1780 if (strcmp(krb5_principal_get_realm(context, server->entry.principal),
1781 krb5_principal_get_realm(context, krbtgt_out->entry.principal)) != 0) {
1782 char *ktpn;
1783 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, krbtgt_out->entry.principal, &ktpn);
1784 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1785 "Request with wrong krbtgt: %s",
1786 (ret == 0) ? ktpn : "<unknown>");
1787 if(ret == 0)
1788 free(ktpn);
1789 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US;
1792 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &krbtgt_out->entry,
1793 krbtgt_etype, &tkey_sign);
1794 if(ret) {
1795 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1796 "Failed to find key for krbtgt PAC signature");
1797 goto out;
1800 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, cp, HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags,
1801 NULL, &clientdb, &client);
1802 if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1803 /* This is OK, we are just trying to find out if they have
1804 * been disabled or deleted in the meantime, missing secrets
1805 * is OK */
1806 } else if(ret){
1807 const char *krbtgt_realm, *msg;
1810 * If the client belongs to the same realm as our krbtgt, it
1811 * should exist in the local database.
1815 krbtgt_realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, krbtgt_out->entry.principal);
1817 if(strcmp(krb5_principal_get_realm(context, cp), krbtgt_realm) == 0) {
1818 if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
1819 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1820 kdc_log(context, config, 1, "Client no longer in database: %s",
1821 cpn);
1822 goto out;
1825 msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1826 kdc_log(context, config, 1, "Client not found in database: %s", msg);
1827 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1830 ret = check_PAC(context, config, cp, NULL,
1831 client, server, krbtgt,
1832 &tkey_check->key,
1833 ekey, &tkey_sign->key,
1834 tgt, &rspac, &signedpath);
1835 if (ret) {
1836 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1837 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1838 "Verify PAC failed for %s (%s) from %s with %s",
1839 spn, cpn, from, msg);
1840 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1841 goto out;
1844 /* also check the krbtgt for signature */
1845 ret = check_KRB5SignedPath(context,
1846 config,
1847 krbtgt,
1849 tgt,
1850 &spp,
1851 &signedpath);
1852 if (ret) {
1853 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1854 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1855 "KRB5SignedPath check failed for %s (%s) from %s with %s",
1856 spn, cpn, from, msg);
1857 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1858 goto out;
1862 * Process request
1865 /* by default the tgt principal matches the client principal */
1866 tp = cp;
1867 tpn = cpn;
1869 if (client) {
1870 const PA_DATA *sdata;
1871 int i = 0;
1873 sdata = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_FOR_USER);
1874 if (sdata) {
1875 krb5_crypto crypto;
1876 krb5_data datack;
1877 PA_S4U2Self self;
1878 const char *str;
1880 ret = decode_PA_S4U2Self(sdata->padata_value.data,
1881 sdata->padata_value.length,
1882 &self, NULL);
1883 if (ret) {
1884 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to decode PA-S4U2Self");
1885 goto out;
1888 ret = _krb5_s4u2self_to_checksumdata(context, &self, &datack);
1889 if (ret)
1890 goto out;
1892 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &tgt->key, 0, &crypto);
1893 if (ret) {
1894 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1895 free_PA_S4U2Self(&self);
1896 krb5_data_free(&datack);
1897 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
1898 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1899 goto out;
1902 ret = krb5_verify_checksum(context,
1903 crypto,
1904 KRB5_KU_OTHER_CKSUM,
1905 datack.data,
1906 datack.length,
1907 &self.cksum);
1908 krb5_data_free(&datack);
1909 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
1910 if (ret) {
1911 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1912 free_PA_S4U2Self(&self);
1913 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1914 "krb5_verify_checksum failed for S4U2Self: %s", msg);
1915 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1916 goto out;
1919 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
1920 &tp,
1921 self.name,
1922 self.realm);
1923 free_PA_S4U2Self(&self);
1924 if (ret)
1925 goto out;
1927 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, tp, &tpn);
1928 if (ret)
1929 goto out;
1931 /* If we were about to put a PAC into the ticket, we better fix it to be the right PAC */
1932 if(rspac.data) {
1933 krb5_pac p = NULL;
1934 krb5_data_free(&rspac);
1935 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, tp, HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags,
1936 NULL, &s4u2self_impersonated_clientdb, &s4u2self_impersonated_client);
1937 if (ret) {
1938 const char *msg;
1941 * If the client belongs to the same realm as our krbtgt, it
1942 * should exist in the local database.
1946 if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
1947 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1948 msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1949 kdc_log(context, config, 1,
1950 "S2U4Self principal to impersonate %s not found in database: %s",
1951 tpn, msg);
1952 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1953 goto out;
1955 ret = _kdc_pac_generate(context, s4u2self_impersonated_client, &p);
1956 if (ret) {
1957 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
1958 tpn);
1959 goto out;
1961 if (p != NULL) {
1962 ret = _krb5_pac_sign(context, p, ticket->ticket.authtime,
1963 s4u2self_impersonated_client->entry.principal,
1964 ekey, &tkey_sign->key,
1965 &rspac);
1966 krb5_pac_free(context, p);
1967 if (ret) {
1968 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
1969 tpn);
1970 goto out;
1976 * Check that service doing the impersonating is
1977 * requesting a ticket to it-self.
1979 ret = check_s4u2self(context, config, clientdb, client, sp);
1980 if (ret) {
1981 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "S4U2Self: %s is not allowed "
1982 "to impersonate to service "
1983 "(tried for user %s to service %s)",
1984 cpn, tpn, spn);
1985 goto out;
1989 * If the service isn't trusted for authentication to
1990 * delegation, remove the forward flag.
1993 if (client->entry.flags.trusted_for_delegation) {
1994 str = "[forwardable]";
1995 } else {
1996 b->kdc_options.forwardable = 0;
1997 str = "";
1999 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "s4u2self %s impersonating %s to "
2000 "service %s %s", cpn, tpn, spn, str);
2005 * Constrained delegation
2008 if (client != NULL
2009 && b->additional_tickets != NULL
2010 && b->additional_tickets->len != 0
2011 && b->kdc_options.enc_tkt_in_skey == 0)
2013 int ad_signedpath = 0;
2014 Key *clientkey;
2015 Ticket *t;
2018 * Require that the KDC have issued the service's krbtgt (not
2019 * self-issued ticket with kimpersonate(1).
2021 if (!signedpath) {
2022 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
2023 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2024 "Constrained delegation done on service ticket %s/%s",
2025 cpn, spn);
2026 goto out;
2029 t = &b->additional_tickets->val[0];
2031 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
2032 t->enc_part.etype, &clientkey);
2033 if(ret){
2034 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP; /* XXX */
2035 goto out;
2038 ret = krb5_decrypt_ticket(context, t, &clientkey->key, &adtkt, 0);
2039 if (ret) {
2040 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2041 "failed to decrypt ticket for "
2042 "constrained delegation from %s to %s ", cpn, spn);
2043 goto out;
2046 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
2047 &tp,
2048 adtkt.cname,
2049 adtkt.crealm);
2050 if (ret)
2051 goto out;
2053 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, tp, &tpn);
2054 if (ret)
2055 goto out;
2057 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal(context,
2058 &dp,
2059 t->sname,
2060 t->realm);
2061 if (ret)
2062 goto out;
2064 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, dp, &dpn);
2065 if (ret)
2066 goto out;
2068 /* check that ticket is valid */
2069 if (adtkt.flags.forwardable == 0) {
2070 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2071 "Missing forwardable flag on ticket for "
2072 "constrained delegation from %s (%s) as %s to %s ",
2073 cpn, dpn, tpn, spn);
2074 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
2075 goto out;
2078 ret = check_constrained_delegation(context, config, clientdb,
2079 client, server, sp);
2080 if (ret) {
2081 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2082 "constrained delegation from %s (%s) as %s to %s not allowed",
2083 cpn, dpn, tpn, spn);
2084 goto out;
2087 ret = verify_flags(context, config, &adtkt, tpn);
2088 if (ret) {
2089 goto out;
2092 krb5_data_free(&rspac);
2095 * generate the PAC for the user.
2097 * TODO: pass in t->sname and t->realm and build
2098 * a S4U_DELEGATION_INFO blob to the PAC.
2100 ret = check_PAC(context, config, tp, dp,
2101 client, server, krbtgt,
2102 &clientkey->key,
2103 ekey, &tkey_sign->key,
2104 &adtkt, &rspac, &ad_signedpath);
2105 if (ret) {
2106 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
2107 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2108 "Verify delegated PAC failed to %s for client"
2109 "%s (%s) as %s from %s with %s",
2110 spn, cpn, dpn, tpn, from, msg);
2111 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
2112 goto out;
2116 * Check that the KDC issued the user's ticket.
2118 ret = check_KRB5SignedPath(context,
2119 config,
2120 krbtgt,
2122 &adtkt,
2123 NULL,
2124 &ad_signedpath);
2125 if (ret) {
2126 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
2127 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2128 "KRB5SignedPath check from service %s failed "
2129 "for delegation to %s for client %s (%s)"
2130 "from %s failed with %s",
2131 spn, tpn, dpn, cpn, from, msg);
2132 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
2133 goto out;
2136 if (!ad_signedpath) {
2137 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
2138 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2139 "Ticket not signed with PAC nor SignedPath service %s failed "
2140 "for delegation to %s for client %s (%s)"
2141 "from %s",
2142 spn, tpn, dpn, cpn, from);
2143 goto out;
2146 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "constrained delegation for %s "
2147 "from %s (%s) to %s", tpn, cpn, dpn, spn);
2151 * Check flags
2154 ret = kdc_check_flags(context, config,
2155 client, cpn,
2156 server, spn,
2157 FALSE);
2158 if(ret)
2159 goto out;
2161 if((b->kdc_options.validate || b->kdc_options.renew) &&
2162 !krb5_principal_compare(context,
2163 krbtgt->entry.principal,
2164 server->entry.principal)){
2165 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Inconsistent request.");
2166 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
2167 goto out;
2170 /* check for valid set of addresses */
2171 if(!_kdc_check_addresses(context, config, tgt->caddr, from_addr)) {
2172 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR;
2173 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Request from wrong address");
2174 goto out;
2178 * If this is an referral, add server referral data to the
2179 * auth_data reply .
2181 if (ref_realm) {
2182 PA_DATA pa;
2183 krb5_crypto crypto;
2185 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2186 "Adding server referral to %s", ref_realm);
2188 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &sessionkey, 0, &crypto);
2189 if (ret)
2190 goto out;
2192 ret = build_server_referral(context, config, crypto, ref_realm,
2193 NULL, s, &pa.padata_value);
2194 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
2195 if (ret) {
2196 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2197 "Failed building server referral");
2198 goto out;
2200 pa.padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_SERVER_REFERRAL;
2202 ret = add_METHOD_DATA(&enc_pa_data, &pa);
2203 krb5_data_free(&pa.padata_value);
2204 if (ret) {
2205 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2206 "Add server referral METHOD-DATA failed");
2207 goto out;
2215 ret = tgs_make_reply(context,
2216 config,
2219 tgt,
2220 replykey,
2221 rk_is_subkey,
2222 ekey,
2223 &sessionkey,
2224 kvno,
2225 *auth_data,
2226 server,
2227 server->entry.principal,
2228 spn,
2229 client,
2231 krbtgt_out,
2232 krbtgt_etype,
2233 spp,
2234 &rspac,
2235 &enc_pa_data,
2236 e_text,
2237 reply);
2239 out:
2240 if (tpn != cpn)
2241 free(tpn);
2242 free(spn);
2243 free(cpn);
2244 if (dpn)
2245 free(dpn);
2247 krb5_data_free(&rspac);
2248 krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &sessionkey);
2249 if(krbtgt_out)
2250 _kdc_free_ent(context, krbtgt_out);
2251 if(server)
2252 _kdc_free_ent(context, server);
2253 if(client)
2254 _kdc_free_ent(context, client);
2255 if(s4u2self_impersonated_client)
2256 _kdc_free_ent(context, s4u2self_impersonated_client);
2258 if (tp && tp != cp)
2259 krb5_free_principal(context, tp);
2260 if (cp)
2261 krb5_free_principal(context, cp);
2262 if (dp)
2263 krb5_free_principal(context, dp);
2264 if (sp)
2265 krb5_free_principal(context, sp);
2266 if (ref_realm)
2267 free(ref_realm);
2268 free_METHOD_DATA(&enc_pa_data);
2270 free_EncTicketPart(&adtkt);
2272 return ret;
2279 krb5_error_code
2280 _kdc_tgs_rep(krb5_context context,
2281 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
2282 KDC_REQ *req,
2283 krb5_data *data,
2284 const char *from,
2285 struct sockaddr *from_addr,
2286 int datagram_reply)
2288 AuthorizationData *auth_data = NULL;
2289 krb5_error_code ret;
2290 int i = 0;
2291 const PA_DATA *tgs_req;
2293 hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt = NULL;
2294 krb5_ticket *ticket = NULL;
2295 const char *e_text = NULL;
2296 krb5_enctype krbtgt_etype = ETYPE_NULL;
2298 krb5_keyblock *replykey = NULL;
2299 int rk_is_subkey = 0;
2300 time_t *csec = NULL;
2301 int *cusec = NULL;
2303 if(req->padata == NULL){
2304 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED; /* XXX ??? */
2305 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2306 "TGS-REQ from %s without PA-DATA", from);
2307 goto out;
2310 tgs_req = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_TGS_REQ);
2312 if(tgs_req == NULL){
2313 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP;
2315 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2316 "TGS-REQ from %s without PA-TGS-REQ", from);
2317 goto out;
2319 ret = tgs_parse_request(context, config,
2320 &req->req_body, tgs_req,
2321 &krbtgt,
2322 &krbtgt_etype,
2323 &ticket,
2324 &e_text,
2325 from, from_addr,
2326 &csec, &cusec,
2327 &auth_data,
2328 &replykey,
2329 &rk_is_subkey);
2330 if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
2331 /* kdc_log() is called in tgs_parse_request() */
2332 goto out;
2334 if (ret) {
2335 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2336 "Failed parsing TGS-REQ from %s", from);
2337 goto out;
2340 ret = tgs_build_reply(context,
2341 config,
2342 req,
2343 &req->req_body,
2344 krbtgt,
2345 krbtgt_etype,
2346 replykey,
2347 rk_is_subkey,
2348 ticket,
2349 data,
2350 from,
2351 &e_text,
2352 &auth_data,
2353 from_addr);
2354 if (ret) {
2355 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
2356 "Failed building TGS-REP to %s", from);
2357 goto out;
2360 /* */
2361 if (datagram_reply && data->length > config->max_datagram_reply_length) {
2362 krb5_data_free(data);
2363 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG;
2364 e_text = "Reply packet too large";
2367 out:
2368 if (replykey)
2369 krb5_free_keyblock(context, replykey);
2370 if(ret && ret != HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE && data->data == NULL){
2371 krb5_mk_error(context,
2372 ret,
2373 NULL,
2374 NULL,
2375 NULL,
2376 NULL,
2377 csec,
2378 cusec,
2379 data);
2380 ret = 0;
2382 free(csec);
2383 free(cusec);
2384 if (ticket)
2385 krb5_free_ticket(context, ticket);
2386 if(krbtgt)
2387 _kdc_free_ent(context, krbtgt);
2389 if (auth_data) {
2390 free_AuthorizationData(auth_data);
2391 free(auth_data);
2394 return ret;