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provision: introduce names.name_map = {}
[Samba/gbeck.git] / source4 / kdc / db-glue.c
blobab606e8e237f578f318c2ad74f9f71c7f39223a3
1 /*
2 Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
3
4 Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
5
6 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
7 Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
8
9 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
12 (at your option) any later version.
13
14 This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 GNU General Public License for more details.
18
19
20 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
21 along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
22 */
23
24 #include "includes.h"
25 #include "libcli/security/security.h"
26 #include "auth/auth.h"
27 #include "auth/auth_sam.h"
28 #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
29 #include "dsdb/common/util.h"
30 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
31 #include "param/param.h"
32 #include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
33 #include "system/kerberos.h"
34 #include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
35 #include <hdb.h>
36 #include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
37 #include "kdc/kdc-glue.h"
38 #include "kdc/db-glue.h"
39
40 #define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno) \
41 ((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) >> 16))
42
43 #define SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, krbtgt) \
44 ((krb5_kvno)((((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF) | \
45 ((((uint32_t)krbtgt) << 16) & 0xFFFF0000)))
46
47 enum samba_kdc_ent_type
48 { SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
49 SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
50
51 enum trust_direction {
52 UNKNOWN = 0,
53 INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
54 OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
55 };
56
57 static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
58 "trustPartner",
59 "trustAuthIncoming",
60 "trustAuthOutgoing",
61 "whenCreated",
62 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
63 "trustAttributes",
64 "trustDirection",
65 "trustType",
66 NULL
67 };
68
69
70 static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val)
71 {
72 const char *tmp;
73 const char *gentime;
74 struct tm tm;
75
76 gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
77 if (!gentime)
78 return default_val;
79
80 tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
81 if (tmp == NULL) {
82 return default_val;
83 }
84
85 return timegm(&tm);
86 }
87
88 static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, uint32_t userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type)
89 {
90 HDBFlags flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
91
92 /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
93 flags.immutable = 1;
94
95 /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
96 flags.invalid = 1;
97
98 flags.renewable = 1;
99
100 /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
101 flags.server = 1;
102
103 /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
104 if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
105 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
106 flags.client = 1;
107 }
108 flags.invalid = 0;
109 }
110
111 if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
112 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
113 flags.client = 1;
114 }
115 flags.invalid = 0;
116 }
117 if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
118 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
119 flags.client = 1;
120 }
121 flags.invalid = 0;
122 }
123 if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
124 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
125 flags.client = 1;
126 }
127 flags.invalid = 0;
128 }
129
130 /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
131 if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
132 flags.client = 0;
133 }
134 if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
135 flags.invalid = 1;
136 }
137 /*
138 if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
139 flags.invalid = 1;
140 }
141 */
142 /*
143 UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
144 */
145 if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
146 flags.invalid = 1;
147 }
148
149 /* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
150
151 /*
152 if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
153 flags.invalid = 1;
154 }
155 */
156 if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
157 flags.require_hwauth = 1;
158 }
159 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
160 flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
161 }
162 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION) {
163 /*
164 * this is confusing...
165 *
166 * UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
167 * => ok_as_delegate
168 *
169 * and
170 *
171 * UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION
172 * => trusted_for_delegation
173 */
174 flags.trusted_for_delegation = 1;
175 }
176 if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
177 flags.forwardable = 1;
178 flags.proxiable = 1;
179 }
180
181 if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
182 flags.require_preauth = 0;
183 } else {
184 flags.require_preauth = 1;
185
186 }
187 return flags;
188 }
189
190 static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p)
191 {
192 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = p->entry_ex;
193 free_hdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry);
194 return 0;
195 }
196
197 static void samba_kdc_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
198 {
199 /* this function is called only from hdb_free_entry().
200 * Make sure we neutralize the destructor or we will
201 * get a double free later when hdb_free_entry() will
202 * try to call free_hdb_entry() */
203 talloc_set_destructor(entry_ex->ctx, NULL);
204
205 /* now proceed to free the talloc part */
206 talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx);
207 }
208
209 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
210 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
211 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
212 struct ldb_message *msg,
213 uint32_t rid,
214 bool is_rodc,
215 uint32_t userAccountControl,
216 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
217 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
218 {
219 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
220 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
221 struct samr_Password *hash;
222 const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
223 struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
224 struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
225 bool newer_keys = false;
226 struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
227 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL;
228 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
229 uint16_t i;
230 uint16_t allocated_keys = 0;
231 int rodc_krbtgt_number = 0;
232 int kvno = 0;
233 uint32_t supported_enctypes
234 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
235 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
236 0);
237
238 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT || is_rodc) {
239 /* KDCs (and KDCs on RODCs) use AES */
240 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
241 } else if (userAccountControl & (UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT|UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT)) {
242 /* DCs and RODCs comptuer accounts use AES */
243 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
244 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT ||
245 (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY)) {
246 /* for AS-REQ the client chooses the enc types it
247 * supports, and this will vary between computers a
248 * user logs in from.
249 *
250 * likewise for 'any' return as much as is supported,
251 * to export into a keytab */
252 supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES;
253 }
254
255 /* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
256 if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
257 supported_enctypes = ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5;
258 } else {
259 /* Otherwise, add in the default enc types */
260 supported_enctypes |= ENC_CRC32 | ENC_RSA_MD5 | ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
261 }
262
263 /* Is this the krbtgt or a RODC krbtgt */
264 if (is_rodc) {
265 rodc_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
266
267 if (rodc_krbtgt_number == -1) {
268 return EINVAL;
269 }
270 }
271
272 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
273 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
274
275 kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
276 if (is_rodc) {
277 kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, rodc_krbtgt_number);
278 }
279 entry_ex->entry.kvno = kvno;
280
281 /* Get keys from the db */
282
283 hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
284 sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
285
286 /* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */
287 if (hash) {
288 allocated_keys++;
289 }
290
291 /* supplementalCredentials if present */
292 if (sc_val) {
293 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, &scb,
294 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
295 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
296 dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
297 ret = EINVAL;
298 goto out;
299 }
300
301 if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
302 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
303 ret = EINVAL;
304 goto out;
305 }
306
307 for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
308 if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
309 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
310 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
311 scpk = NULL;
312 continue;
313 }
314 newer_keys = true;
315 break;
316 } else if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
317 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
318 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
319 scpk = NULL;
320 }
321 /*
322 * we don't break here in hope to find
323 * a Kerberos-Newer-Keys package
324 */
325 }
326 }
327 }
328 /*
329 * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys or Primary:Kerberos element
330 * of supplementalCredentials
331 */
332 if (scpk) {
333 DATA_BLOB blob;
334
335 blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
336 if (!blob.data) {
337 ret = ENOMEM;
338 goto out;
339 }
340
341 /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
342 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &_pkb,
343 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
344 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
345 ret = EINVAL;
346 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
347 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
348 goto out;
349 }
350
351 if (newer_keys && _pkb.version != 4) {
352 ret = EINVAL;
353 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
354 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
355 goto out;
356 }
357
358 if (!newer_keys && _pkb.version != 3) {
359 ret = EINVAL;
360 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
361 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
362 goto out;
363 }
364
365 if (_pkb.version == 4) {
366 pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
367 allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys;
368 } else if (_pkb.version == 3) {
369 pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3;
370 allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys;
371 }
372 }
373
374 if (allocated_keys == 0) {
375 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
376 /* We are on an RODC, but don't have keys for this account. Signal this to the caller */
377 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
378 }
379
380 /* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
381 * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
382 * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
383 return 0;
384 }
385
386 /* allocate space to decode into */
387 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
388 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(Key));
389 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
390 ret = ENOMEM;
391 goto out;
392 }
393
394 if (hash && (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5)) {
395 Key key;
396
397 key.mkvno = 0;
398 key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
399
400 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
401 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
402 hash->hash, sizeof(hash->hash),
403 &key.key);
404 if (ret) {
405 goto out;
406 }
407
408 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
409 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
410 }
411
412 if (pkb4) {
413 for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) {
414 Key key;
415
416 if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue;
417
418 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb4->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
419 continue;
420 }
421
422 key.mkvno = 0;
423 key.salt = NULL;
424
425 if (pkb4->salt.string) {
426 DATA_BLOB salt;
427
428 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string);
429
430 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
431 if (key.salt == NULL) {
432 ret = ENOMEM;
433 goto out;
434 }
435
436 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
437
438 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
439 if (ret) {
440 free(key.salt);
441 key.salt = NULL;
442 goto out;
443 }
444 }
445
446 /* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */
447
448 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
449 pkb4->keys[i].keytype,
450 pkb4->keys[i].value->data,
451 pkb4->keys[i].value->length,
452 &key.key);
453 if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
454 DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
455 pkb4->keys[i].keytype));
456 ret = 0;
457 continue;
458 }
459 if (ret) {
460 if (key.salt) {
461 free_Salt(key.salt);
462 free(key.salt);
463 key.salt = NULL;
464 }
465 goto out;
466 }
467
468 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
469 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
470 }
471 } else if (pkb3) {
472 for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) {
473 Key key;
474
475 if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue;
476
477 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb3->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
478 continue;
479 }
480
481 key.mkvno = 0;
482 key.salt = NULL;
483
484 if (pkb3->salt.string) {
485 DATA_BLOB salt;
486
487 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string);
488
489 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
490 if (key.salt == NULL) {
491 ret = ENOMEM;
492 goto out;
493 }
494
495 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
496
497 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
498 if (ret) {
499 free(key.salt);
500 key.salt = NULL;
501 goto out;
502 }
503 }
504
505 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
506 pkb3->keys[i].keytype,
507 pkb3->keys[i].value->data,
508 pkb3->keys[i].value->length,
509 &key.key);
510 if (ret) {
511 if (key.salt) {
512 free_Salt(key.salt);
513 free(key.salt);
514 key.salt = NULL;
515 }
516 goto out;
517 }
518
519 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
520 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
521 }
522 }
523
524 out:
525 if (ret != 0) {
526 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
527 }
528 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) {
529 free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
530 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
531 }
532 return ret;
533 }
534
535 /*
536 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
537 */
538 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context,
539 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
540 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
541 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
542 unsigned flags,
543 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
544 struct ldb_message *msg,
545 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
546 {
547 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
548 uint32_t userAccountControl;
549 unsigned int i;
550 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
551 krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
552
553 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
554 NTTIME acct_expiry;
555 NTSTATUS status;
556
557 uint32_t rid;
558 bool is_rodc = false;
559 struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
560 struct ldb_val computer_val;
561 const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
562 computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer");
563 computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data);
564
565 if (ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber")) {
566 is_rodc = true;
567 }
568
569 if (!samAccountName) {
570 ret = ENOENT;
571 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
572 goto out;
573 }
574
575 objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
576
577 if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
578 is_computer = TRUE;
579 }
580
581 memset(entry_ex, 0, sizeof(*entry_ex));
582
583 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
584 if (!p) {
585 ret = ENOMEM;
586 goto out;
587 }
588
589 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
590 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
591 p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn);
592 if (!p->realm_dn) {
593 ret = ENOMEM;
594 goto out;
595 }
596
597 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
598
599 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
600 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
601
602 entry_ex->ctx = p;
603 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
604
605 userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
606
607
608 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
609 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
610 krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
611 } else {
612 ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
613 if (ret) {
614 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
615 goto out;
616 }
617
618 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
619 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
620 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
621 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
622 * we determine from our records */
623
624 /* this has to be with malloc() */
625 krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
626 }
627
628 /* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
629 entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2HDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
630
631 /* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
632 * default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
633 * by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
634 * their probably patheticly insecure password) */
635
636 if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server
637 && lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
638 if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
639 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0;
640 }
641 }
642
643 if (flags & HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA) {
644 /* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
645 * of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
646 * DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
647 * we must return */
648
649 /* use 'whenCreated' */
650 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
651 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
652 krb5_make_principal(context,
653 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
654 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
655
656 entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event));
657 if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
658 ret = ENOMEM;
659 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
660 goto out;
661 }
662
663 /* use 'whenChanged' */
664 entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
665 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
666 krb5_make_principal(context,
667 &entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal,
668 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
669 }
670
671
672 /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
673 * virtue of being that particular RID */
674 status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
675
676 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
677 ret = EINVAL;
678 goto out;
679 }
680
681 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
682 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
683 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
684
685 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
686 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
687
688 /* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
689 * 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
690 * trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
691 * Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
692 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
693 && principal->name.name_string.len == 2
694 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "kadmin") == 0)
695 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], "changepw") == 0)
696 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)) {
697 entry_ex->entry.flags.change_pw = 1;
698 }
699 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
700 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
701 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
702 } else if (is_rodc) {
703 /* The RODC krbtgt account is like the main krbtgt,
704 * but it does not have a changepw or kadmin
705 * service */
706
707 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
708 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
709
710 /* Also don't allow the RODC krbtgt to be a client (it should not be needed) */
711 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
712 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
713 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
714
715 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
716 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
717 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 0;
718 } else if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
719 /* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
720 * client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
721
722 /* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
723 * it could bypass the password restrictions */
724 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
725
726 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
727 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
728
729 } else {
730 NTTIME must_change_time
731 = samdb_result_force_password_change(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
732 realm_dn, msg);
733 if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
734 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
735 } else {
736 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end));
737 if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) {
738 ret = ENOMEM;
739 goto out;
740 }
741 *entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
742 }
743
744 acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
745 if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
746 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
747 } else {
748 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end));
749 if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) {
750 ret = ENOMEM;
751 goto out;
752 }
753 *entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
754 }
755 }
756
757 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
758
759 entry_ex->entry.max_life = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
760 if (entry_ex->entry.max_life == NULL) {
761 ret = ENOMEM;
762 goto out;
763 }
764
765 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
766 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime;
767 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT) {
768 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime;
769 } else {
770 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = MIN(kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
771 kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime);
772 }
773
774 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
775 if (entry_ex->entry.max_renew == NULL) {
776 ret = ENOMEM;
777 goto out;
778 }
779
780 *entry_ex->entry.max_renew = kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime;
781
782 entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
783
784 /* Get keys from the db */
785 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, kdc_db_ctx, p, msg,
786 rid, is_rodc, userAccountControl,
787 ent_type, entry_ex);
788 if (ret) {
789 /* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */
790 goto out;
791 }
792
793 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
794 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
795 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
796 ret = ENOMEM;
797 goto out;
798 }
799 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
800 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
801 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
802 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
803 ret = ENOMEM;
804 goto out;
805 }
806 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
807 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
808 }
809
810
811 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
812
813 out:
814 if (ret != 0) {
815 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
816 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
817 } else {
818 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
819 }
820
821 return ret;
822 }
823
824 /*
825 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
826 * The kvno is what the remote client asked for
827 */
828 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
829 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
830 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
831 enum trust_direction direction,
832 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
833 unsigned flags,
834 uint32_t kvno,
835 struct ldb_message *msg,
836 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
837 {
838 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
839 const char *dnsdomain;
840 const char *realm = lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx);
841 DATA_BLOB password_utf16;
842 struct samr_Password password_hash;
843 const struct ldb_val *password_val;
844 struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
845 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
846 bool use_previous;
847 uint32_t current_kvno;
848 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
849 int ret, trust_direction_flags;
850 unsigned int i;
851 struct AuthenticationInformationArray *auth_array;
852
853 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
854 if (!p) {
855 ret = ENOMEM;
856 goto out;
857 }
858
859 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
860 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
861 p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
862
863 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
864
865 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
866 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
867
868 entry_ex->ctx = p;
869 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
870
871 /* use 'whenCreated' */
872 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
873 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
874 krb5_make_principal(context,
875 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
876 realm, "kadmin", NULL);
877
878 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
879
880 trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0);
881
882 if (direction == INBOUND) {
883 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
884
885 } else { /* OUTBOUND */
886 dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL);
887 /* replace realm */
888 realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
889 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
890 }
891
892 if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) {
893 ret = ENOENT;
894 goto out;
895 }
896
897 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, &password_blob,
898 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
899 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
900 ret = EINVAL;
901 goto out;
902 }
903
904
905 /* we need to work out if we are going to use the current or
906 * the previous password hash.
907 * We base this on the kvno the client passes in. If the kvno
908 * passed in is equal to the current kvno in our database then
909 * we use the current structure. If it is the current kvno-1,
910 * then we use the previous substrucure.
911 */
912
913 /* first work out the current kvno */
914 current_kvno = 0;
915 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
916 if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
917 current_kvno = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.version.version;
918 }
919 }
920
921 /* work out whether we will use the previous or current
922 password */
923 if (password_blob.previous.count == 0) {
924 /* there is no previous password */
925 use_previous = false;
926 } else if (!(flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) ||
927 kvno == current_kvno) {
928 use_previous = false;
929 } else if ((kvno+1 == current_kvno) ||
930 (kvno == 255 && current_kvno == 0)) {
931 use_previous = true;
932 } else {
933 DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": Request for unknown kvno %u - current kvno is %u\n",
934 kvno, current_kvno));
935 ret = ENOENT;
936 goto out;
937 }
938
939 if (use_previous) {
940 auth_array = &password_blob.previous;
941 } else {
942 auth_array = &password_blob.current;
943 }
944
945 /* use the kvno the client specified, if available */
946 if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
947 entry_ex->entry.kvno = kvno;
948 } else {
949 entry_ex->entry.kvno = current_kvno;
950 }
951
952 for (i=0; i < auth_array->count; i++) {
953 if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
954 password_utf16 = data_blob_const(auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
955 auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
956 /* In the future, generate all sorts of
957 * hashes, but for now we can't safely convert
958 * the random strings windows uses into
959 * utf8 */
960
961 /* but as it is utf16 already, we can get the NT password/arcfour-hmac-md5 key */
962 mdfour(password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
963 break;
964 } else if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
965 password_hash = auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
966 break;
967 }
968 }
969
970 if (i < auth_array->count) {
971 Key key;
972 /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
973 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(1, sizeof(Key));
974
975 key.mkvno = 0;
976 key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
977
978 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
979 ret = ENOMEM;
980 goto out;
981 }
982
983 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
984 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
985 password_hash.hash, sizeof(password_hash.hash),
986 &key.key);
987 if (ret != 0) {
988 goto out;
989 }
990
991 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
992 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
993 }
994
995 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
996
997 ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
998 if (ret) {
999 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1000 goto out;
1001 }
1002
1003 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
1004 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
1005 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
1006 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
1007 * we determine from our records */
1008
1009 krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
1010 entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
1011 entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
1012 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
1013 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
1014 entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
1015
1016 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
1017
1018 entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
1019
1020 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
1021
1022 entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
1023
1024 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
1025 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
1026 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1027 ret = ENOMEM;
1028 goto out;
1029 }
1030 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
1031 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
1032 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
1033 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1034 ret = ENOMEM;
1035 goto out;
1036 }
1037 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
1038 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
1039 }
1040
1041
1042 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
1043
1044 out:
1045 if (ret != 0) {
1046 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
1047 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
1048 } else {
1049 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
1050 }
1051
1052 return ret;
1053
1054 }
1055
1056 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
1057 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1058 const char *realm,
1059 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
1060 struct ldb_message **pmsg)
1061 {
1062 int lret;
1063 krb5_error_code ret;
1064 char *filter = NULL;
1065 const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
1066
1067 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
1068 char *realm_encoded = ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, realm);
1069 if (!realm_encoded) {
1070 if (!filter) {
1071 ret = ENOMEM;
1072 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory");
1073 return ret;
1074 }
1075 }
1076 filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=trustedDomain)(|(flatname=%s)(trustPartner=%s)))",
1077 realm_encoded, realm_encoded);
1078
1079 if (!filter) {
1080 talloc_free(realm_encoded);
1081 ret = ENOMEM;
1082 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory");
1083 return ret;
1084 }
1085
1086 lret = dsdb_search(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx, &res,
1087 ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx),
1088 LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs,
1089 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1090 "%s", filter);
1091 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1092 DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search for %s: %s\n", filter, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx)));
1093 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1094 } else if (res->count == 0 || res->count > 1) {
1095 DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for %s: got %d\n", filter, res->count));
1096 talloc_free(res);
1097 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1098 }
1099 talloc_steal(mem_ctx, res->msgs);
1100 *pmsg = res->msgs[0];
1101 talloc_free(res);
1102 return 0;
1103 }
1104
1105 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
1106 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1107 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1108 krb5_const_principal principal,
1109 const char **attrs,
1110 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1111 struct ldb_message **msg) {
1112 NTSTATUS nt_status;
1113 char *principal_string;
1114 krb5_error_code ret;
1115
1116 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string);
1117
1118 if (ret != 0) {
1119 return ret;
1120 }
1121
1122 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1123 mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
1124 realm_dn, msg);
1125 free(principal_string);
1126 if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
1127 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1128 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1129 return ENOMEM;
1130 } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1131 return EINVAL;
1132 }
1133
1134 return ret;
1135 }
1136
1137 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context,
1138 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1139 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1140 krb5_const_principal principal,
1141 unsigned flags,
1142 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
1143 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1144 krb5_error_code ret;
1145 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1146
1147 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1148 mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
1149 &realm_dn, &msg);
1150 if (ret != 0) {
1151 return ret;
1152 }
1153
1154 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1155 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
1156 flags,
1157 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1158 return ret;
1159 }
1160
1161 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context,
1162 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1163 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1164 krb5_const_principal principal,
1165 unsigned flags,
1166 uint32_t kvno,
1167 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1168 {
1169 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
1170 krb5_error_code ret;
1171 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1172 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1173
1174 krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL;
1175 if (principal->name.name_string.len != 2
1176 || (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
1177 /* Not a krbtgt */
1178 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1179 }
1180
1181 /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
1182
1183 if (lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)
1184 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1])) {
1185 /* us, or someone quite like us */
1186 /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
1187 * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
1188 * krbtgt */
1189
1190 int lret;
1191 unsigned int krbtgt_number;
1192 /* w2k8r2 sometimes gives us a kvno of 255 for inter-domain
1193 trust tickets. We don't yet know what this means, but we do
1194 seem to need to treat it as unspecified */
1195 if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
1196 krbtgt_number = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno);
1197 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
1198 if (krbtgt_number != kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1199 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
1200 }
1201 }
1202 } else {
1203 krbtgt_number = kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number;
1204 }
1205
1206 if (krbtgt_number == kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1207 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1208 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1209 krbtgt_attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1210 "(objectClass=user)");
1211 } else {
1212 /* We need to look up an RODC krbtgt (perhaps
1213 * ours, if we are an RODC, perhaps another
1214 * RODC if we are a read-write DC */
1215 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1216 &msg, realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1217 krbtgt_attrs,
1218 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1219 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=%u))", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1220 }
1221
1222 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1223 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1224 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1225 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1226 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1227 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1228 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1229 } else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1230 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1231 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1232 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1233 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1234 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1235 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1236 }
1237
1238 /*
1239 * Windows seems to canonicalize the principal
1240 * in a TGS REP even if the client did not specify
1241 * the canonicalize flag.
1242 */
1243 if (flags & (HDB_F_CANON|HDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ)) {
1244 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &alloc_principal);
1245 if (ret) {
1246 return ret;
1247 }
1248
1249 /* When requested to do so, ensure that the
1250 * both realm values in the principal are set
1251 * to the upper case, canonical realm */
1252 free(alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1253 alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1] = strdup(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
1254 if (!alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]) {
1255 ret = ENOMEM;
1256 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: strdup() failed!");
1257 return ret;
1258 }
1259 principal = alloc_principal;
1260 }
1261
1262 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1263 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
1264 flags, realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1265 if (alloc_principal) {
1266 /* This is again copied in the message2entry call */
1267 krb5_free_principal(context, alloc_principal);
1268 }
1269 if (ret != 0) {
1270 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
1271 }
1272 return ret;
1273
1274 } else {
1275 enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
1276 const char *realm = NULL;
1277
1278 /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
1279
1280 if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->realm) == 0) {
1281 /* look for inbound trust */
1282 direction = INBOUND;
1283 realm = principal->name.name_string.val[1];
1284 } else if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->name.name_string.val[1]) == 0) {
1285 /* look for outbound trust */
1286 direction = OUTBOUND;
1287 realm = principal->realm;
1288 } else {
1289 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1290 principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1291 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1292 principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1293 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1294 }
1295
1296 /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
1297
1298 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1299 mem_ctx,
1300 realm, realm_dn, &msg);
1301
1302 if (ret != 0) {
1303 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1304 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1305 return ret;
1306 }
1307
1308 ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1309 principal, direction,
1310 realm_dn, flags, kvno, msg, entry_ex);
1311 if (ret != 0) {
1312 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed");
1313 }
1314 return ret;
1315 }
1316
1317 }
1318
1319 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context,
1320 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1321 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1322 krb5_const_principal principal,
1323 const char **attrs,
1324 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1325 struct ldb_message **msg)
1326 {
1327 krb5_error_code ret;
1328 if (principal->name.name_string.len >= 2) {
1329 /* 'normal server' case */
1330 int ldb_ret;
1331 NTSTATUS nt_status;
1332 struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
1333 char *principal_string;
1334
1335 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
1336 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
1337 &principal_string);
1338 if (ret != 0) {
1339 return ret;
1340 }
1341
1342 /* At this point we may find the host is known to be
1343 * in a different realm, so we should generate a
1344 * referral instead */
1345 nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1346 mem_ctx, principal_string,
1347 &user_dn, realm_dn);
1348 free(principal_string);
1349
1350 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1351 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1352 }
1353
1354 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1355 mem_ctx,
1356 msg, user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1357 attrs,
1358 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1359 "(objectClass=*)");
1360 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1361 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1362 }
1363
1364 } else {
1365 int lret;
1366 char *short_princ;
1367 const char *realm;
1368 /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
1369 *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1370 realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal);
1371
1372 /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referral */
1373
1374 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &short_princ);
1375
1376 if (ret != 0) {
1377 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1378 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1379 return ret;
1380 }
1381
1382 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg,
1383 *realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1384 attrs,
1385 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1386 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
1387 ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ));
1388 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1389 DEBUG(3, ("Failed to find an entry for %s\n", short_princ));
1390 free(short_princ);
1391 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1392 }
1393 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1394 DEBUG(3, ("Failed single search for %s - %s\n",
1395 short_princ, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1396 free(short_princ);
1397 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1398 }
1399 free(short_princ);
1400 }
1401
1402 return 0;
1403 }
1404
1405 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
1406 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1407 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1408 krb5_const_principal principal,
1409 unsigned flags,
1410 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1411 {
1412 krb5_error_code ret;
1413 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1414 struct ldb_message *msg;
1415
1416 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
1417 server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1418 if (ret != 0) {
1419 return ret;
1420 }
1421
1422 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1423 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
1424 flags,
1425 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1426 if (ret != 0) {
1427 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed");
1428 }
1429
1430 return ret;
1431 }
1432
1433 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context,
1434 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1435 krb5_const_principal principal,
1436 unsigned flags,
1437 krb5_kvno kvno,
1438 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1439 {
1440 krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1441 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1442
1443 mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
1444 if (!mem_ctx) {
1445 ret = ENOMEM;
1446 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1447 return ret;
1448 }
1449
1450 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
1451 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1452 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1453 }
1454 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
1455 /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
1456 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry_ex);
1457 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1458
1459 /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
1460 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1461 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1462 }
1463 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
1464 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry_ex);
1465 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1466 }
1467
1468 done:
1469 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1470 return ret;
1471 }
1472
1473 struct samba_kdc_seq {
1474 unsigned int index;
1475 unsigned int count;
1476 struct ldb_message **msgs;
1477 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1478 };
1479
1480 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context,
1481 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1482 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1483 {
1484 krb5_error_code ret;
1485 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1486 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1487 hdb_entry_ex entry_ex;
1488 memset(&entry_ex, '\0', sizeof(entry_ex));
1489
1490 if (!priv) {
1491 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1492 }
1493
1494 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
1495
1496 if (!mem_ctx) {
1497 ret = ENOMEM;
1498 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
1499 return ret;
1500 }
1501
1502 if (priv->index < priv->count) {
1503 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1504 NULL, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
1505 HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA|HDB_F_GET_ANY,
1506 priv->realm_dn, priv->msgs[priv->index++], entry);
1507 } else {
1508 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1509 }
1510
1511 if (ret != 0) {
1512 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1513 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1514 } else {
1515 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1516 }
1517
1518 return ret;
1519 }
1520
1521 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context,
1522 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1523 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1524 {
1525 struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb;
1526 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1527 char *realm;
1528 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
1529 krb5_error_code ret;
1530 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1531 int lret;
1532
1533 if (priv) {
1534 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1535 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1536 }
1537
1538 priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq);
1539 if (!priv) {
1540 ret = ENOMEM;
1541 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
1542 return ret;
1543 }
1544
1545 priv->index = 0;
1546 priv->msgs = NULL;
1547 priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx);
1548 priv->count = 0;
1549
1550 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context");
1551
1552 if (!mem_ctx) {
1553 ret = ENOMEM;
1554 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
1555 return ret;
1556 }
1557
1558 ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
1559 if (ret != 0) {
1560 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1561 return ret;
1562 }
1563
1564 lret = dsdb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
1565 priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
1566 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1567 "(objectClass=user)");
1568
1569 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1570 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1571 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1572 }
1573
1574 priv->count = res->count;
1575 priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
1576 talloc_free(res);
1577
1578 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv;
1579
1580 ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1581
1582 if (ret != 0) {
1583 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1584 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1585 } else {
1586 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1587 }
1588 return ret;
1589 }
1590
1591 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context,
1592 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1593 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1594 {
1595 return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1596 }
1597
1598 /* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal
1599 *
1600 * This is currently a very nasty hack - allowing only delegation to itself.
1601 */
1602 krb5_error_code
1603 samba_kdc_check_s4u2self(krb5_context context,
1604 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1605 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1606 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
1607 {
1608 krb5_error_code ret;
1609 krb5_principal enterprise_prinicpal = NULL;
1610 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1611 struct ldb_message *msg;
1612 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1613 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1614 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1615 const char *delegation_check_attrs[] = {
1616 "objectSid", NULL
1617 };
1618
1619 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self");
1620
1621 if (!mem_ctx) {
1622 ret = ENOMEM;
1623 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self: talloc_named() failed!");
1624 return ret;
1625 }
1626
1627 if (target_principal->name.name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1628 /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
1629 if (target_principal->name.name_string.len != 1) {
1630 ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
1631 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self: request for delegation to enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
1632 target_principal->name.name_string.len);
1633 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1634 return ret;
1635 }
1636 ret = krb5_parse_name(context, target_principal->name.name_string.val[0],
1637 &enterprise_prinicpal);
1638 if (ret) {
1639 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1640 return ret;
1641 }
1642 target_principal = enterprise_prinicpal;
1643 }
1644
1645 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, target_principal,
1646 delegation_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1647
1648 krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_prinicpal);
1649
1650 if (ret != 0) {
1651 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1652 return ret;
1653 }
1654
1655 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1656 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1657
1658 /* Allow delegation to the same principal, even if by a different
1659 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1660 * comparison */
1661 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1662 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1663 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1664 }
1665
1666 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1667 return ret;
1668 }
1669
1670 /* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
1671 * slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
1672 * database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
1673 * SID */
1674
1675 krb5_error_code
1676 samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context,
1677 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1678 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1679 krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
1680 {
1681 krb5_error_code ret;
1682 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1683 struct ldb_message *msg;
1684 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1685 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1686 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1687 const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
1688 "objectSid", NULL
1689 };
1690
1691 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
1692
1693 if (!mem_ctx) {
1694 ret = ENOMEM;
1695 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1696 return ret;
1697 }
1698
1699 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1700 mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
1701 ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1702
1703 if (ret != 0) {
1704 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1705 return ret;
1706 }
1707
1708 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1709 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1710
1711 /* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
1712 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1713 * comparison */
1714 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1715 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1716 return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
1717 }
1718
1719 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1720 return ret;
1721 }
1722
1723 /*
1724 * Check if a given entry may delegate to this target principal
1725 * with S4U2Proxy.
1726 */
1727 krb5_error_code
1728 samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy(krb5_context context,
1729 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1730 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1731 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
1732 {
1733 krb5_error_code ret;
1734 char *tmp = NULL;
1735 const char *client_dn = NULL;
1736 const char *target_principal_name = NULL;
1737 struct ldb_message_element *el;
1738 struct ldb_val val;
1739 unsigned int i;
1740 bool found = false;
1741 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1742
1743 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy");
1744
1745 if (!mem_ctx) {
1746 ret = ENOMEM;
1747 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1748 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
1749 " talloc_named() failed!");
1750 return ret;
1751 }
1752
1753 client_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(p->msg->dn);
1754 if (!client_dn) {
1755 if (errno == 0) {
1756 errno = ENOMEM;
1757 }
1758 ret = errno;
1759 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1760 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
1761 " ldb_dn_get_linearized() failed!");
1762 return ret;
1763 }
1764
1765 /*
1766 * The main heimdal code already checked that the target_principal
1767 * belongs to the same realm as the client.
1768 *
1769 * So we just need the principal without the realm,
1770 * as that is what is configured in the "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo"
1771 * attribute.
1772 */
1773 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, target_principal,
1774 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &tmp);
1775 if (ret) {
1776 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1777 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1778 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
1779 " krb5_unparse_name() failed!");
1780 return ret;
1781 }
1782 DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] for target[%s]\n",
1783 client_dn, tmp));
1784
1785 target_principal_name = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, tmp);
1786 SAFE_FREE(tmp);
1787 if (target_principal_name == NULL) {
1788 ret = ENOMEM;
1789 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1790 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
1791 " talloc_strdup() failed!");
1792 return ret;
1793 }
1794
1795 el = ldb_msg_find_element(p->msg, "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo");
1796 if (el == NULL) {
1797 goto bad_option;
1798 }
1799
1800 val = data_blob_string_const(target_principal_name);
1801
1802 for (i=0; i<el->num_values; i++) {
1803 struct ldb_val *val1 = &val;
1804 struct ldb_val *val2 = &el->values[i];
1805 int cmp;
1806
1807 if (val1->length != val2->length) {
1808 continue;
1809 }
1810
1811 cmp = strncasecmp((const char *)val1->data,
1812 (const char *)val2->data,
1813 val1->length);
1814 if (cmp != 0) {
1815 continue;
1816 }
1817
1818 found = true;
1819 break;
1820 }
1821
1822 if (!found) {
1823 goto bad_option;
1824 }
1825
1826 DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] allowed target[%s]\n",
1827 client_dn, tmp));
1828 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1829 return 0;
1830
1831 bad_option:
1832 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1833 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] "
1834 "not allowed for delegation to target[%s]",
1835 client_dn,
1836 target_principal_name);
1837 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1838 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1839 }
1840
1841 NTSTATUS samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_base_context *base_ctx,
1842 struct samba_kdc_db_context **kdc_db_ctx_out)
1843 {
1844 int ldb_ret;
1845 struct ldb_message *msg;
1846 struct auth_session_info *session_info;
1847 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
1848 /* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to
1849 * authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is higly likely to
1850 * be circular.
1851 *
1852 * In future we may set this up to use EXERNAL and SSL
1853 * certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP_SET_USERNAME
1854 */
1855
1856 kdc_db_ctx = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_db_context);
1857 if (kdc_db_ctx == NULL) {
1858 return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
1859 }
1860 kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx = base_ctx->ev_ctx;
1861 kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx = base_ctx->lp_ctx;
1862
1863 /* get default kdc policy */
1864 lpcfg_default_kdc_policy(base_ctx->lp_ctx,
1865 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
1866 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime,
1867 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime);
1868
1869 session_info = system_session(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
1870 if (session_info == NULL) {
1871 return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1872 }
1873
1874 /* Setup the link to LDB */
1875 kdc_db_ctx->samdb = samdb_connect(kdc_db_ctx, base_ctx->ev_ctx,
1876 base_ctx->lp_ctx, session_info, 0);
1877 if (kdc_db_ctx->samdb == NULL) {
1878 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!"));
1879 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1880 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1881 }
1882
1883 /* Find out our own krbtgt kvno */
1884 ldb_ret = samdb_rodc(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, &kdc_db_ctx->rodc);
1885 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1886 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine if we are an RODC in KDC backend: %s\n",
1887 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1888 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1889 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1890 }
1891 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
1892 int my_krbtgt_number;
1893 const char *secondary_keytab[] = { "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", NULL };
1894 struct ldb_dn *account_dn;
1895 struct ldb_dn *server_dn = samdb_server_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx);
1896 if (!server_dn) {
1897 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine server DN in KDC backend: %s\n",
1898 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1899 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1900 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1901 }
1902
1903 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, server_dn,
1904 "serverReference", &account_dn);
1905 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1906 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine server account in KDC backend: %s\n",
1907 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1908 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1909 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1910 }
1911
1912 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, account_dn,
1913 "msDS-KrbTgtLink", &kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn);
1914 talloc_free(account_dn);
1915 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1916 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine RODC krbtgt account in KDC backend: %s\n",
1917 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1918 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1919 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1920 }
1921
1922 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
1923 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1924 secondary_keytab,
1925 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1926 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=*))");
1927 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1928 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot read krbtgt account %s in KDC backend to get msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber: %s: %s\n",
1929 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
1930 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
1931 ldb_strerror(ldb_ret)));
1932 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1933 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1934 }
1935 my_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
1936 if (my_krbtgt_number == -1) {
1937 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot read msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber from krbtgt account %s in KDC backend: got %d\n",
1938 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
1939 my_krbtgt_number));
1940 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1941 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1942 }
1943 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = my_krbtgt_number;
1944
1945 } else {
1946 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
1947 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
1948 &msg,
1949 ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
1950 LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1951 krbtgt_attrs,
1952 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1953 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
1954
1955 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1956 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1957 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1958 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1959 }
1960 kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn = talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, msg->dn);
1961 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
1962 talloc_free(msg);
1963 }
1964 *kdc_db_ctx_out = kdc_db_ctx;
1965 return NT_STATUS_OK;
1966 }
WIP