drs-replica-info: level_not_supported is wrong when we do support (partialy the level)
[Samba/gbeck.git] / source3 / lib / afs.c
blob4b6e6ecaf366f6430cbb0889332da443bb7966a7
1 /*
2 * Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
3 * Generate AFS tickets
4 * Copyright (C) Volker Lendecke 2003
6 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
7 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
8 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
9 * (at your option) any later version.
11 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
12 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
14 * GNU General Public License for more details.
16 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
17 * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
20 #include "includes.h"
22 #ifdef WITH_FAKE_KASERVER
24 #define NO_ASN1_TYPEDEFS 1
26 #include "secrets.h"
27 #include "passdb.h"
28 #include "auth.h"
29 #include "../librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_netlogon.h"
31 #include <afs/param.h>
32 #include <afs/stds.h>
33 #include <afs/afs.h>
34 #include <afs/auth.h>
35 #include <afs/venus.h>
36 #include <asm/unistd.h>
37 #include <openssl/des.h>
39 struct ClearToken {
40 uint32 AuthHandle;
41 char HandShakeKey[8];
42 uint32 ViceId;
43 uint32 BeginTimestamp;
44 uint32 EndTimestamp;
47 static char *afs_encode_token(const char *cell, const DATA_BLOB ticket,
48 const struct ClearToken *ct)
50 char *base64_ticket;
51 char *result = NULL;
53 DATA_BLOB key = data_blob(ct->HandShakeKey, 8);
54 char *base64_key;
55 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
57 mem_ctx = talloc_stackframe();
58 if (mem_ctx == NULL)
59 goto done;
61 base64_ticket = base64_encode_data_blob(mem_ctx, ticket);
62 if (base64_ticket == NULL)
63 goto done;
65 base64_key = base64_encode_data_blob(mem_ctx, key);
66 if (base64_key == NULL)
67 goto done;
69 asprintf(&result, "%s\n%u\n%s\n%u\n%u\n%u\n%s\n", cell,
70 ct->AuthHandle, base64_key, ct->ViceId, ct->BeginTimestamp,
71 ct->EndTimestamp, base64_ticket);
73 DEBUG(10, ("Got ticket string:\n%s\n", result));
75 done:
76 TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
78 return result;
81 /* Create a ClearToken and an encrypted ticket. ClearToken has not yet the
82 * ViceId set, this should be set by the caller. */
84 static bool afs_createtoken(const char *username, const char *cell,
85 DATA_BLOB *ticket, struct ClearToken *ct)
87 fstring clear_ticket;
88 char *p = clear_ticket;
89 uint32 len;
90 uint32 now;
92 struct afs_key key;
93 des_key_schedule key_schedule;
95 if (!secrets_init())
96 return false;
98 if (!secrets_fetch_afs_key(cell, &key)) {
99 DEBUG(1, ("Could not fetch AFS service key\n"));
100 return false;
103 ct->AuthHandle = key.kvno;
105 /* Build the ticket. This is going to be encrypted, so in our
106 way we fill in ct while we still have the unencrypted
107 form. */
109 p = clear_ticket;
111 /* The byte-order */
112 *p = 1;
113 p += 1;
115 /* "Alice", the client username */
116 strncpy(p, username, sizeof(clear_ticket)-PTR_DIFF(p,clear_ticket)-1);
117 p += strlen(p)+1;
118 strncpy(p, "", sizeof(clear_ticket)-PTR_DIFF(p,clear_ticket)-1);
119 p += strlen(p)+1;
120 strncpy(p, cell, sizeof(clear_ticket)-PTR_DIFF(p,clear_ticket)-1);
121 p += strlen(p)+1;
123 /* Alice's network layer address. At least Openafs-1.2.10
124 ignores this, so we fill in a dummy value here. */
125 SIVAL(p, 0, 0);
126 p += 4;
128 /* We need to create a session key */
129 generate_random_buffer((uint8_t *)p, 8);
131 /* Our client code needs the the key in the clear, it does not
132 know the server-key ... */
133 memcpy(ct->HandShakeKey, p, 8);
135 p += 8;
137 /* This is a kerberos 4 life time. The life time is expressed
138 * in units of 5 minute intervals up to 38400 seconds, after
139 * that a table is used up to lifetime 0xBF. Values between
140 * 0xC0 and 0xFF is undefined. 0xFF is defined to be the
141 * infinite time that never expire.
143 * So here we cheat and use the infinite time */
144 *p = 255;
145 p += 1;
147 /* Ticket creation time */
148 now = time(NULL);
149 SIVAL(p, 0, now);
150 ct->BeginTimestamp = now;
152 if(lp_afs_token_lifetime() == 0)
153 ct->EndTimestamp = NEVERDATE;
154 else
155 ct->EndTimestamp = now + lp_afs_token_lifetime();
157 if (((ct->EndTimestamp - ct->BeginTimestamp) & 1) == 1) {
158 ct->BeginTimestamp += 1; /* Lifetime must be even */
160 p += 4;
162 /* And here comes Bob's name and instance, in this case the
163 AFS server. */
164 strncpy(p, "afs", sizeof(clear_ticket)-PTR_DIFF(p,clear_ticket)-1);
165 p += strlen(p)+1;
166 strncpy(p, "", sizeof(clear_ticket)-PTR_DIFF(p,clear_ticket)-1);
167 p += strlen(p)+1;
169 /* And zero-pad to a multiple of 8 bytes */
170 len = PTR_DIFF(p, clear_ticket);
171 if (len & 7) {
172 uint32 extra_space = 8-(len & 7);
173 memset(p, 0, extra_space);
174 p+=extra_space;
176 len = PTR_DIFF(p, clear_ticket);
178 des_key_sched((const_des_cblock *)key.key, key_schedule);
179 des_pcbc_encrypt((const unsigned char*) clear_ticket,
180 (unsigned char*) clear_ticket,
181 len, key_schedule, (C_Block *)key.key, 1);
183 ZERO_STRUCT(key);
185 *ticket = data_blob(clear_ticket, len);
187 return true;
190 char *afs_createtoken_str(const char *username, const char *cell)
192 DATA_BLOB ticket;
193 struct ClearToken ct;
194 char *result;
196 if (!afs_createtoken(username, cell, &ticket, &ct))
197 return NULL;
199 result = afs_encode_token(cell, ticket, &ct);
201 data_blob_free(&ticket);
203 return result;
207 This routine takes a radical approach completely bypassing the
208 Kerberos idea of security and using AFS simply as an intelligent
209 file backend. Samba has persuaded itself somehow that the user is
210 actually correctly identified and then we create a ticket that the
211 AFS server hopefully accepts using its KeyFile that the admin has
212 kindly stored to our secrets.tdb.
214 Thanks to the book "Network Security -- PRIVATE Communication in a
215 PUBLIC World" by Charlie Kaufman, Radia Perlman and Mike Speciner
216 Kerberos 4 tickets are not really hard to construct.
218 For the comments "Alice" is the User to be auth'ed, and "Bob" is the
219 AFS server. */
221 bool afs_login(connection_struct *conn)
223 DATA_BLOB ticket;
224 char *afs_username = NULL;
225 char *cell = NULL;
226 bool result;
227 char *ticket_str = NULL;
228 const struct dom_sid *user_sid;
229 TALLOC_CTX *ctx = talloc_tos();
231 struct ClearToken ct;
233 afs_username = talloc_strdup(ctx,
234 lp_afs_username_map());
235 if (!afs_username) {
236 return false;
239 afs_username = talloc_sub_advanced(ctx,
240 lp_servicename(SNUM(conn)),
241 conn->session_info->unix_info->unix_name,
242 conn->connectpath,
243 conn->session_info->unix_token->gid,
244 conn->session_info->unix_info->sanitized_username,
245 conn->session_info->info->domain_name,
246 afs_username);
247 if (!afs_username) {
248 return false;
251 user_sid = &conn->session_info->security_token->sids[0];
252 afs_username = talloc_string_sub(talloc_tos(),
253 afs_username,
254 "%s",
255 sid_string_tos(user_sid));
256 if (!afs_username) {
257 return false;
260 /* The pts command always generates completely lower-case user
261 * names. */
262 if (!strlower_m(afs_username)) {
263 return false;
266 cell = strchr(afs_username, '@');
268 if (cell == NULL) {
269 DEBUG(1, ("AFS username doesn't contain a @, "
270 "could not find cell\n"));
271 return false;
274 *cell = '\0';
275 cell += 1;
277 DEBUG(10, ("Trying to log into AFS for user %s@%s\n",
278 afs_username, cell));
280 if (!afs_createtoken(afs_username, cell, &ticket, &ct))
281 return false;
283 /* For which Unix-UID do we want to set the token? */
284 ct.ViceId = getuid();
286 ticket_str = afs_encode_token(cell, ticket, &ct);
288 result = afs_settoken_str(ticket_str);
290 SAFE_FREE(ticket_str);
292 data_blob_free(&ticket);
294 return result;
297 #else
299 bool afs_login(connection_struct *conn)
301 return true;
304 char *afs_createtoken_str(const char *username, const char *cell)
306 return NULL;
309 #endif /* WITH_FAKE_KASERVER */