s3-rpc_server: Migrated eventlog to winreg.
[Samba/bjacke.git] / source4 / kdc / db-glue.c
blobed64685a4fc2cff11c8edcb68dd4901d9c594e52
1 /*
2 Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
4 Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
6 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
7 Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
9 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
12 (at your option) any later version.
14 This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 GNU General Public License for more details.
20 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
21 along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
24 #include "includes.h"
25 #include "libcli/security/security.h"
26 #include "auth/auth.h"
27 #include "auth/auth_sam.h"
28 #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
29 #include "dsdb/common/util.h"
30 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
31 #include "param/param.h"
32 #include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
33 #include "system/kerberos.h"
34 #include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
35 #include <hdb.h>
36 #include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
37 #include "kdc/kdc-policy.h"
39 enum samba_kdc_ent_type
40 { SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
41 SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
43 enum trust_direction {
44 UNKNOWN = 0,
45 INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
46 OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
49 static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
50 "trustPartner",
51 "trustAuthIncoming",
52 "trustAuthOutgoing",
53 "whenCreated",
54 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
55 "trustAttributes",
56 "trustDirection",
57 "trustType",
58 NULL
61 static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val)
63 const char *tmp;
64 const char *gentime;
65 struct tm tm;
67 gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
68 if (!gentime)
69 return default_val;
71 tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
72 if (tmp == NULL) {
73 return default_val;
76 return timegm(&tm);
79 static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, uint32_t userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type)
81 HDBFlags flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
83 /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
84 flags.immutable = 1;
86 /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
87 flags.invalid = 1;
89 flags.renewable = 1;
91 /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
92 flags.server = 1;
94 /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
95 if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
96 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
97 flags.client = 1;
99 flags.invalid = 0;
102 if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
103 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
104 flags.client = 1;
106 flags.invalid = 0;
108 if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
109 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
110 flags.client = 1;
112 flags.invalid = 0;
114 if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
115 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
116 flags.client = 1;
118 flags.invalid = 0;
121 /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
122 if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
123 flags.client = 0;
125 if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
126 flags.invalid = 1;
129 if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
130 flags.invalid = 1;
134 UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
136 if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
137 flags.invalid = 1;
140 /* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
143 if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
144 flags.invalid = 1;
147 if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
148 flags.require_hwauth = 1;
150 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
151 flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
153 if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
154 flags.forwardable = 1;
155 flags.proxiable = 1;
158 if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
159 flags.require_preauth = 0;
160 } else {
161 flags.require_preauth = 1;
164 return flags;
167 static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p)
169 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = p->entry_ex;
170 free_hdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry);
171 return 0;
174 static void samba_kdc_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
176 /* this function is called only from hdb_free_entry().
177 * Make sure we neutralize the destructor or we will
178 * get a double free later when hdb_free_entry() will
179 * try to call free_hdb_entry() */
180 talloc_set_destructor(entry_ex->ctx, NULL);
182 /* now proceed to free the talloc part */
183 talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx);
186 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
187 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
188 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
189 struct ldb_message *msg,
190 uint32_t rid,
191 bool is_rodc,
192 uint32_t userAccountControl,
193 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
194 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
196 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
197 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
198 struct samr_Password *hash;
199 const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
200 struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
201 struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
202 bool newer_keys = false;
203 struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
204 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL;
205 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
206 uint16_t i;
207 uint16_t allocated_keys = 0;
208 int rodc_krbtgt_number = 0;
209 uint32_t supported_enctypes
210 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
211 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
214 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT || is_rodc) {
215 /* KDCs (and KDCs on RODCs) use AES */
216 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
217 } else if (userAccountControl & (UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT|UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT)) {
218 /* DCs and RODCs comptuer accounts use AES */
219 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
220 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT ||
221 (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY)) {
222 /* for AS-REQ the client chooses the enc types it
223 * supports, and this will vary between computers a
224 * user logs in from.
226 * likewise for 'any' return as much as is supported,
227 * to export into a keytab */
228 supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES;
231 /* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
232 if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
233 supported_enctypes = ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5;
234 } else {
235 /* Otherwise, add in the default enc types */
236 supported_enctypes |= ENC_CRC32 | ENC_RSA_MD5 | ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
239 /* Is this the krbtgt or a RODC krbtgt */
240 if (is_rodc) {
241 rodc_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
243 if (rodc_krbtgt_number == -1) {
244 return EINVAL;
249 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
250 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
252 entry_ex->entry.kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
253 if (is_rodc) {
254 entry_ex->entry.kvno |= (rodc_krbtgt_number << 16);
257 /* Get keys from the db */
259 hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
260 sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
262 /* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */
263 if (hash) {
264 allocated_keys++;
267 /* supplementalCredentials if present */
268 if (sc_val) {
269 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, &scb,
270 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
271 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
272 dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
273 ret = EINVAL;
274 goto out;
277 if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
278 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
279 ret = EINVAL;
280 goto out;
283 for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
284 if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
285 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
286 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
287 scpk = NULL;
288 continue;
290 newer_keys = true;
291 break;
292 } else if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
293 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
294 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
295 scpk = NULL;
298 * we don't break here in hope to find
299 * a Kerberos-Newer-Keys package
305 * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys or Primary:Kerberos element
306 * of supplementalCredentials
308 if (scpk) {
309 DATA_BLOB blob;
311 blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
312 if (!blob.data) {
313 ret = ENOMEM;
314 goto out;
317 /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
318 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &_pkb,
319 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
320 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
321 ret = EINVAL;
322 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
323 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
324 goto out;
327 if (newer_keys && _pkb.version != 4) {
328 ret = EINVAL;
329 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
330 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
331 goto out;
334 if (!newer_keys && _pkb.version != 3) {
335 ret = EINVAL;
336 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
337 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
338 goto out;
341 if (_pkb.version == 4) {
342 pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
343 allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys;
344 } else if (_pkb.version == 3) {
345 pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3;
346 allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys;
350 if (allocated_keys == 0) {
351 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
352 /* We are on an RODC, but don't have keys for this account. Signal this to the caller */
353 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
356 /* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
357 * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
358 * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
359 return 0;
362 /* allocate space to decode into */
363 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
364 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(Key));
365 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
366 ret = ENOMEM;
367 goto out;
370 if (hash && (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5)) {
371 Key key;
373 key.mkvno = 0;
374 key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
376 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
377 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
378 hash->hash, sizeof(hash->hash),
379 &key.key);
380 if (ret) {
381 goto out;
384 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
385 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
388 if (pkb4) {
389 for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) {
390 Key key;
392 if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue;
394 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb4->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
395 continue;
398 key.mkvno = 0;
399 key.salt = NULL;
401 if (pkb4->salt.string) {
402 DATA_BLOB salt;
404 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string);
406 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
407 if (key.salt == NULL) {
408 ret = ENOMEM;
409 goto out;
412 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
414 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
415 if (ret) {
416 free(key.salt);
417 key.salt = NULL;
418 goto out;
422 /* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */
424 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
425 pkb4->keys[i].keytype,
426 pkb4->keys[i].value->data,
427 pkb4->keys[i].value->length,
428 &key.key);
429 if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
430 DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
431 pkb4->keys[i].keytype));
432 ret = 0;
433 continue;
435 if (ret) {
436 if (key.salt) {
437 free_Salt(key.salt);
438 free(key.salt);
439 key.salt = NULL;
441 goto out;
444 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
445 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
447 } else if (pkb3) {
448 for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) {
449 Key key;
451 if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue;
453 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb3->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
454 continue;
457 key.mkvno = 0;
458 key.salt = NULL;
460 if (pkb3->salt.string) {
461 DATA_BLOB salt;
463 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string);
465 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
466 if (key.salt == NULL) {
467 ret = ENOMEM;
468 goto out;
471 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
473 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
474 if (ret) {
475 free(key.salt);
476 key.salt = NULL;
477 goto out;
481 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
482 pkb3->keys[i].keytype,
483 pkb3->keys[i].value->data,
484 pkb3->keys[i].value->length,
485 &key.key);
486 if (ret) {
487 if (key.salt) {
488 free_Salt(key.salt);
489 free(key.salt);
490 key.salt = NULL;
492 goto out;
495 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
496 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
500 out:
501 if (ret != 0) {
502 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
504 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) {
505 free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
506 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
508 return ret;
512 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
514 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context,
515 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
516 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
517 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
518 unsigned flags,
519 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
520 struct ldb_message *msg,
521 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
523 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
524 uint32_t userAccountControl;
525 unsigned int i;
526 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
527 krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
529 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
530 NTTIME acct_expiry;
531 NTSTATUS status;
533 uint32_t rid;
534 bool is_rodc = false;
535 struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
536 struct ldb_val computer_val;
537 const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
538 computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer");
539 computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data);
541 if (ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber")) {
542 is_rodc = true;
545 if (!samAccountName) {
546 ret = ENOENT;
547 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
548 goto out;
551 objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
553 if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
554 is_computer = TRUE;
557 memset(entry_ex, 0, sizeof(*entry_ex));
559 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
560 if (!p) {
561 ret = ENOMEM;
562 goto out;
565 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
566 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
567 p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn);
568 if (!p->realm_dn) {
569 ret = ENOMEM;
570 goto out;
573 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
575 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
576 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
578 entry_ex->ctx = p;
579 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
581 userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
584 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
585 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
586 krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
587 } else {
588 ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
589 if (ret) {
590 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
591 goto out;
594 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
595 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
596 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
597 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
598 * we determine from our records */
600 /* this has to be with malloc() */
601 krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
604 /* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
605 entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2HDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
607 /* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
608 * default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
609 * by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
610 * their probably patheticly insecure password) */
612 if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server
613 && lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
614 if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
615 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0;
619 if (flags & HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA) {
620 /* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
621 * of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
622 * DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
623 * we must return */
625 /* use 'whenCreated' */
626 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
627 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
628 krb5_make_principal(context,
629 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
630 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
632 entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event));
633 if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
634 ret = ENOMEM;
635 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
636 goto out;
639 /* use 'whenChanged' */
640 entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
641 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
642 krb5_make_principal(context,
643 &entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal,
644 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
648 /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
649 * virtue of being that particular RID */
650 status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
652 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
653 ret = EINVAL;
654 goto out;
657 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
658 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
659 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
661 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
662 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
664 /* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
665 * 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
666 * trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
667 * Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
668 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
669 && principal->name.name_string.len == 2
670 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "kadmin") == 0)
671 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], "changepw") == 0)
672 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)) {
673 entry_ex->entry.flags.change_pw = 1;
675 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
676 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
677 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
678 } else if (is_rodc) {
679 /* The RODC krbtgt account is like the main krbtgt,
680 * but it does not have a changepw or kadmin
681 * service */
683 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
684 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
686 /* Also don't allow the RODC krbtgt to be a client (it should not be needed) */
687 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
688 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
689 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
691 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
692 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
693 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 0;
694 } else if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
695 /* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
696 * client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
698 /* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
699 * it could bypass the password restrictions */
700 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
702 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
703 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
705 } else {
706 NTTIME must_change_time
707 = samdb_result_force_password_change(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
708 realm_dn, msg);
709 if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
710 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
711 } else {
712 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end));
713 if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) {
714 ret = ENOMEM;
715 goto out;
717 *entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
720 acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
721 if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
722 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
723 } else {
724 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end));
725 if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) {
726 ret = ENOMEM;
727 goto out;
729 *entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
733 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
735 entry_ex->entry.max_life = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
736 if (entry_ex->entry.max_life == NULL) {
737 ret = ENOMEM;
738 goto out;
741 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
742 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = nt_time_to_unix(kdc_db_ctx->policy.service_tkt_lifetime);
743 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT) {
744 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = nt_time_to_unix(kdc_db_ctx->policy.user_tkt_lifetime);
745 } else {
746 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = MIN(nt_time_to_unix(kdc_db_ctx->policy.service_tkt_lifetime),
747 nt_time_to_unix(kdc_db_ctx->policy.user_tkt_lifetime));
750 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
751 if (entry_ex->entry.max_renew == NULL) {
752 ret = ENOMEM;
753 goto out;
756 *entry_ex->entry.max_renew = nt_time_to_unix(kdc_db_ctx->policy.user_tkt_renewaltime);
758 entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
760 /* Get keys from the db */
761 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, kdc_db_ctx, p, msg,
762 rid, is_rodc, userAccountControl,
763 ent_type, entry_ex);
764 if (ret) {
765 /* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */
766 goto out;
769 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
770 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
771 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
772 ret = ENOMEM;
773 goto out;
775 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
776 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
777 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
778 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
779 ret = ENOMEM;
780 goto out;
782 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
783 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
787 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
789 out:
790 if (ret != 0) {
791 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
792 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
793 } else {
794 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
797 return ret;
801 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
803 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
804 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
805 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
806 enum trust_direction direction,
807 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
808 struct ldb_message *msg,
809 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
811 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
812 const char *dnsdomain;
813 const char *realm = lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx);
814 DATA_BLOB password_utf16;
815 struct samr_Password password_hash;
816 const struct ldb_val *password_val;
817 struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
818 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
820 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
821 int ret, trust_direction_flags;
822 unsigned int i;
824 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
825 if (!p) {
826 ret = ENOMEM;
827 goto out;
830 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
831 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
832 p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
834 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
836 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
837 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
839 entry_ex->ctx = p;
840 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
842 /* use 'whenCreated' */
843 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
844 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
845 krb5_make_principal(context,
846 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
847 realm, "kadmin", NULL);
849 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
851 trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0);
853 if (direction == INBOUND) {
854 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
856 } else { /* OUTBOUND */
857 dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL);
858 /* replace realm */
859 realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
860 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
863 if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) {
864 ret = ENOENT;
865 goto out;
868 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, &password_blob,
869 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
870 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
871 ret = EINVAL;
872 goto out;
875 entry_ex->entry.kvno = -1;
876 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
877 if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
878 entry_ex->entry.kvno = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.version.version;
882 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
883 if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
884 password_utf16 = data_blob_const(password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
885 password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
886 /* In the future, generate all sorts of
887 * hashes, but for now we can't safely convert
888 * the random strings windows uses into
889 * utf8 */
891 /* but as it is utf16 already, we can get the NT password/arcfour-hmac-md5 key */
892 mdfour(password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
893 break;
894 } else if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
895 password_hash = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
896 break;
900 if (i < password_blob.count) {
901 Key key;
902 /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
903 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(1, sizeof(Key));
905 key.mkvno = 0;
906 key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
908 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
909 ret = ENOMEM;
910 goto out;
913 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
914 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
915 password_hash.hash, sizeof(password_hash.hash),
916 &key.key);
918 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
919 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
922 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
924 ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
925 if (ret) {
926 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
927 goto out;
930 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
931 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
932 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
933 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
934 * we determine from our records */
936 krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
937 entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
938 entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
939 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
940 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
941 entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
943 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
945 entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
947 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
949 entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
951 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
952 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
953 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
954 ret = ENOMEM;
955 goto out;
957 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
958 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
959 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
960 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
961 ret = ENOMEM;
962 goto out;
964 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
965 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
969 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
971 out:
972 if (ret != 0) {
973 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
974 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
975 } else {
976 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
979 return ret;
983 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
984 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
985 const char *realm,
986 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
987 struct ldb_message **pmsg)
989 int lret;
990 krb5_error_code ret;
991 char *filter = NULL;
992 const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
994 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
995 filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=trustedDomain)(|(flatname=%s)(trustPartner=%s)))", realm, realm);
997 if (!filter) {
998 ret = ENOMEM;
999 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory");
1000 return ret;
1003 lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx, &res,
1004 ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx),
1005 LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs, "%s", filter);
1006 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1007 DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search for %s: %s\n", filter, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx)));
1008 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1009 } else if (res->count == 0 || res->count > 1) {
1010 DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for %s: got %d\n", filter, res->count));
1011 talloc_free(res);
1012 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1014 talloc_steal(mem_ctx, res->msgs);
1015 *pmsg = res->msgs[0];
1016 talloc_free(res);
1017 return 0;
1020 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
1021 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1022 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1023 krb5_const_principal principal,
1024 const char **attrs,
1025 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1026 struct ldb_message **msg) {
1027 NTSTATUS nt_status;
1028 char *principal_string;
1029 krb5_error_code ret;
1031 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string);
1033 if (ret != 0) {
1034 return ret;
1037 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1038 mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
1039 realm_dn, msg);
1040 free(principal_string);
1041 if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
1042 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1043 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1044 return ENOMEM;
1045 } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1046 return EINVAL;
1049 return ret;
1052 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context,
1053 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1054 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1055 krb5_const_principal principal,
1056 unsigned flags,
1057 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
1058 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1059 krb5_error_code ret;
1060 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1062 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1063 mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
1064 &realm_dn, &msg);
1065 if (ret != 0) {
1066 return ret;
1069 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1070 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
1071 flags,
1072 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1073 return ret;
1076 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context,
1077 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1078 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1079 krb5_const_principal principal,
1080 unsigned flags,
1081 uint32_t krbtgt_number,
1082 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1084 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
1085 krb5_error_code ret;
1086 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1087 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1089 krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL;
1090 if (principal->name.name_string.len != 2
1091 || (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
1092 /* Not a krbtgt */
1093 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1096 /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
1098 if (lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)
1099 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1])) {
1100 /* us, or someone quite like us */
1101 /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
1102 * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
1103 * krbtgt */
1105 int lret;
1107 if (krbtgt_number == kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1108 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1109 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1110 krbtgt_attrs, 0,
1111 "(objectClass=user)");
1112 } else {
1113 /* We need to look up an RODC krbtgt (perhaps
1114 * ours, if we are an RODC, perhaps another
1115 * RODC if we are a read-write DC */
1116 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1117 &msg, realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1118 krbtgt_attrs,
1119 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN,
1120 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=%u))", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1123 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1124 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1125 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1126 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1127 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1128 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1129 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1130 } else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1131 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1132 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1133 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1134 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1135 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1136 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1139 if (flags & HDB_F_CANON) {
1140 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &alloc_principal);
1141 if (ret) {
1142 return ret;
1145 /* When requested to do so, ensure that the
1146 * both realm values in the principal are set
1147 * to the upper case, canonical realm */
1148 free(alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1149 alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1] = strdup(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
1150 if (!alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]) {
1151 ret = ENOMEM;
1152 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: strdup() failed!");
1153 return ret;
1155 principal = alloc_principal;
1158 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1159 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
1160 flags, realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1161 if (flags & HDB_F_CANON) {
1162 /* This is again copied in the message2entry call */
1163 krb5_free_principal(context, alloc_principal);
1165 if (ret != 0) {
1166 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
1168 return ret;
1170 } else {
1171 enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
1172 const char *realm = NULL;
1174 /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
1176 if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->realm) == 0) {
1177 /* look for inbound trust */
1178 direction = INBOUND;
1179 realm = principal->name.name_string.val[1];
1180 } else if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->name.name_string.val[1]) == 0) {
1181 /* look for outbound trust */
1182 direction = OUTBOUND;
1183 realm = principal->realm;
1184 } else {
1185 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1186 principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1187 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1188 principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1189 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1192 /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
1194 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1195 mem_ctx,
1196 realm, realm_dn, &msg);
1198 if (ret != 0) {
1199 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1200 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1201 return ret;
1204 ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1205 principal, direction,
1206 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1207 if (ret != 0) {
1208 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed");
1210 return ret;
1215 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context,
1216 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1217 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1218 krb5_const_principal principal,
1219 const char **attrs,
1220 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1221 struct ldb_message **msg)
1223 krb5_error_code ret;
1224 if (principal->name.name_string.len >= 2) {
1225 /* 'normal server' case */
1226 int ldb_ret;
1227 NTSTATUS nt_status;
1228 struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
1229 char *principal_string;
1231 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
1232 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
1233 &principal_string);
1234 if (ret != 0) {
1235 return ret;
1238 /* At this point we may find the host is known to be
1239 * in a different realm, so we should generate a
1240 * referral instead */
1241 nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1242 mem_ctx, principal_string,
1243 &user_dn, realm_dn);
1244 free(principal_string);
1246 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1247 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1250 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1251 mem_ctx,
1252 msg, user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1253 attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN, "(objectClass=*)");
1254 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1255 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1258 } else {
1259 int lret;
1260 char *filter = NULL;
1261 char *short_princ;
1262 const char *realm;
1263 /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
1264 *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1265 realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal);
1267 /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referall */
1269 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &short_princ);
1271 if (ret != 0) {
1272 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1273 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1274 return ret;
1277 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg,
1278 *realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1279 attrs,
1280 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN,
1281 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
1282 ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ));
1283 free(short_princ);
1284 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1285 DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a entry for %s\n", filter));
1286 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1288 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1289 DEBUG(3, ("Failed single search for for %s - %s\n",
1290 filter, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1291 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1295 return 0;
1298 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
1299 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1300 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1301 krb5_const_principal principal,
1302 unsigned flags,
1303 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1305 krb5_error_code ret;
1306 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1307 struct ldb_message *msg;
1309 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
1310 server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1311 if (ret != 0) {
1312 return ret;
1315 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1316 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
1317 flags,
1318 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1319 if (ret != 0) {
1320 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed");
1323 return ret;
1326 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context,
1327 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1328 krb5_const_principal principal,
1329 unsigned flags,
1330 krb5_kvno kvno,
1331 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1333 krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1334 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1335 unsigned int krbtgt_number;
1336 if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
1337 krbtgt_number = kvno >> 16;
1338 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
1339 if (krbtgt_number != kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1340 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
1343 } else {
1344 krbtgt_number = kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number;
1347 mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
1348 if (!mem_ctx) {
1349 ret = ENOMEM;
1350 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1351 return ret;
1354 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
1355 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1356 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1358 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
1359 /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
1360 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, krbtgt_number, entry_ex);
1361 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1363 /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
1364 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1365 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1367 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
1368 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, krbtgt_number, entry_ex);
1369 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1372 done:
1373 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1374 return ret;
1377 struct samba_kdc_seq {
1378 unsigned int index;
1379 unsigned int count;
1380 struct ldb_message **msgs;
1381 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1384 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context,
1385 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1386 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1388 krb5_error_code ret;
1389 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1390 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1391 hdb_entry_ex entry_ex;
1392 memset(&entry_ex, '\0', sizeof(entry_ex));
1394 if (!priv) {
1395 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1398 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
1400 if (!mem_ctx) {
1401 ret = ENOMEM;
1402 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
1403 return ret;
1406 if (priv->index < priv->count) {
1407 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1408 NULL, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
1409 HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA|HDB_F_GET_ANY,
1410 priv->realm_dn, priv->msgs[priv->index++], entry);
1411 } else {
1412 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1415 if (ret != 0) {
1416 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1417 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1418 } else {
1419 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1422 return ret;
1425 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context,
1426 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1427 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1429 struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb;
1430 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1431 char *realm;
1432 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
1433 krb5_error_code ret;
1434 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1435 int lret;
1437 if (priv) {
1438 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1439 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1442 priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq);
1443 if (!priv) {
1444 ret = ENOMEM;
1445 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
1446 return ret;
1449 priv->index = 0;
1450 priv->msgs = NULL;
1451 priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx);
1452 priv->count = 0;
1454 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context");
1456 if (!mem_ctx) {
1457 ret = ENOMEM;
1458 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
1459 return ret;
1462 ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
1463 if (ret != 0) {
1464 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1465 return ret;
1468 lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
1469 priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
1470 "(objectClass=user)");
1472 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1473 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1474 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1477 priv->count = res->count;
1478 priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
1479 talloc_free(res);
1481 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv;
1483 ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1485 if (ret != 0) {
1486 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1487 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1488 } else {
1489 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1491 return ret;
1494 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context,
1495 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1496 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1498 return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1501 /* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal
1503 * This is currently a very nasty hack - allowing only delegation to itself.
1505 * This is shared between the constrained delegation and S4U2Self code.
1507 krb5_error_code
1508 samba_kdc_check_identical_client_and_server(krb5_context context,
1509 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1510 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1511 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
1513 krb5_error_code ret;
1514 krb5_principal enterprise_prinicpal = NULL;
1515 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1516 struct ldb_message *msg;
1517 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1518 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1519 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1520 const char *delegation_check_attrs[] = {
1521 "objectSid", NULL
1524 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation");
1526 if (!mem_ctx) {
1527 ret = ENOMEM;
1528 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1529 return ret;
1532 if (target_principal->name.name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1533 /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
1534 if (target_principal->name.name_string.len != 1) {
1535 ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
1536 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation: request for delegation to enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
1537 target_principal->name.name_string.len);
1538 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1539 return ret;
1541 ret = krb5_parse_name(context, target_principal->name.name_string.val[0],
1542 &enterprise_prinicpal);
1543 if (ret) {
1544 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1545 return ret;
1547 target_principal = enterprise_prinicpal;
1550 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, target_principal,
1551 delegation_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1553 krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_prinicpal);
1555 if (ret != 0) {
1556 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1557 return ret;
1560 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1561 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1563 /* Allow delegation to the same principal, even if by a different
1564 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1565 * comparison */
1566 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1567 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1568 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1571 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1572 return ret;
1575 /* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
1576 * slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
1577 * database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
1578 * SID */
1580 krb5_error_code
1581 samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context,
1582 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1583 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1584 krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
1586 krb5_error_code ret;
1587 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1588 struct ldb_message *msg;
1589 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1590 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1591 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1592 const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
1593 "objectSid", NULL
1596 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
1598 if (!mem_ctx) {
1599 ret = ENOMEM;
1600 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1601 return ret;
1604 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1605 mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
1606 ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1608 if (ret != 0) {
1609 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1610 return ret;
1613 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1614 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1616 /* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
1617 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1618 * comparison */
1619 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1620 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1621 return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
1624 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1625 return ret;
1628 NTSTATUS samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_base_context *base_ctx,
1629 struct samba_kdc_db_context **kdc_db_ctx_out)
1631 int ldb_ret;
1632 struct ldb_message *msg;
1633 struct auth_session_info *session_info;
1634 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
1635 /* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to
1636 * authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is higly likely to
1637 * be circular.
1639 * In future we may set this up to use EXERNAL and SSL
1640 * certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP_SET_USERNAME
1643 kdc_db_ctx = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_db_context);
1644 if (kdc_db_ctx == NULL) {
1645 return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
1647 kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx = base_ctx->ev_ctx;
1648 kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx = base_ctx->lp_ctx;
1650 kdc_get_policy(base_ctx->lp_ctx, NULL, &kdc_db_ctx->policy);
1652 session_info = system_session(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
1653 if (session_info == NULL) {
1654 return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1657 /* Setup the link to LDB */
1658 kdc_db_ctx->samdb = samdb_connect(kdc_db_ctx, base_ctx->ev_ctx,
1659 base_ctx->lp_ctx, session_info, 0);
1660 if (kdc_db_ctx->samdb == NULL) {
1661 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!"));
1662 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1663 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1666 /* Find out our own krbtgt kvno */
1667 ldb_ret = samdb_rodc(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, &kdc_db_ctx->rodc);
1668 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1669 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine if we are an RODC in KDC backend: %s\n",
1670 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1671 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1672 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1674 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
1675 int my_krbtgt_number;
1676 const char *secondary_keytab[] = { "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", NULL };
1677 struct ldb_dn *account_dn;
1678 struct ldb_dn *server_dn = samdb_server_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx);
1679 if (!server_dn) {
1680 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine server DN in KDC backend: %s\n",
1681 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1682 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1683 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1686 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, server_dn,
1687 "serverReference", &account_dn);
1688 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1689 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine server account in KDC backend: %s\n",
1690 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1691 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1692 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1695 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, account_dn,
1696 "msDS-KrbTgtLink", &kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn);
1697 talloc_free(account_dn);
1698 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1699 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine RODC krbtgt account in KDC backend: %s\n",
1700 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1701 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1702 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1705 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
1706 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1707 secondary_keytab,
1709 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=*))");
1710 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1711 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot read krbtgt account %s in KDC backend to get msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber: %s: %s\n",
1712 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
1713 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
1714 ldb_strerror(ldb_ret)));
1715 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1716 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1718 my_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
1719 if (my_krbtgt_number == -1) {
1720 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot read msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber from krbtgt account %s in KDC backend: got %d\n",
1721 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
1722 my_krbtgt_number));
1723 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1724 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1726 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = my_krbtgt_number;
1728 } else {
1729 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
1730 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
1731 &msg, NULL, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1732 krbtgt_attrs,
1734 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
1736 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1737 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1738 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1739 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1741 kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn = talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, msg->dn);
1742 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
1743 talloc_free(msg);
1745 *kdc_db_ctx_out = kdc_db_ctx;
1746 return NT_STATUS_OK;