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kdc: remove KRB5SignedPath, to be replaced with PAC
[Samba.git] / source4 / heimdal / kdc / kerberos5.c
bloba400b21a652240d915670ad8ea4321ed038c6c1c
1 /*
2 * Copyright (c) 1997-2007 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
3 * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
4 * All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
8 * are met:
9 *
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12 *
13 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
15 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
16 *
17 * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
18 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
19 * without specific prior written permission.
20 *
21 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
22 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
23 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
24 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
25 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
26 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
27 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
28 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
29 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
30 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
31 * SUCH DAMAGE.
32 */
33
34 #include "kdc_locl.h"
35
36 #define MAX_TIME ((time_t)((1U << 31) - 1))
37
38 void
39 _kdc_fix_time(time_t **t)
40 {
41 if(*t == NULL){
42 ALLOC(*t);
43 **t = MAX_TIME;
44 }
45 if(**t == 0) **t = MAX_TIME; /* fix for old clients */
46 }
47
48 static int
49 realloc_method_data(METHOD_DATA *md)
50 {
51 PA_DATA *pa;
52 pa = realloc(md->val, (md->len + 1) * sizeof(*md->val));
53 if(pa == NULL)
54 return ENOMEM;
55 md->val = pa;
56 md->len++;
57 return 0;
58 }
59
60 static void
61 set_salt_padata(METHOD_DATA *md, Salt *salt)
62 {
63 if (salt) {
64 realloc_method_data(md);
65 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = salt->type;
66 der_copy_octet_string(&salt->salt,
67 &md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value);
68 }
69 }
70
71 const PA_DATA*
72 _kdc_find_padata(const KDC_REQ *req, int *start, int type)
73 {
74 if (req->padata == NULL)
75 return NULL;
76
77 while((size_t)*start < req->padata->len){
78 (*start)++;
79 if(req->padata->val[*start - 1].padata_type == (unsigned)type)
80 return &req->padata->val[*start - 1];
81 }
82 return NULL;
83 }
84
85 /*
86 * This is a hack to allow predefined weak services, like afs to
87 * still use weak types
88 */
89
90 krb5_boolean
91 _kdc_is_weak_exception(krb5_principal principal, krb5_enctype etype)
92 {
93 if (principal->name.name_string.len > 0 &&
94 strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "afs") == 0 &&
95 (etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC
96 || etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4
97 || etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5))
98 return TRUE;
99 return FALSE;
100 }
101
102
103 /*
104 * Detect if `key' is the using the the precomputed `default_salt'.
105 */
106
107 static krb5_boolean
108 is_default_salt_p(const krb5_salt *default_salt, const Key *key)
109 {
110 if (key->salt == NULL)
111 return TRUE;
112 if (default_salt->salttype != key->salt->type)
113 return FALSE;
114 if (krb5_data_cmp(&default_salt->saltvalue, &key->salt->salt))
115 return FALSE;
116 return TRUE;
117 }
118
119 /*
120 * return the first appropriate key of `princ' in `ret_key'. Look for
121 * all the etypes in (`etypes', `len'), stopping as soon as we find
122 * one, but preferring one that has default salt
123 */
124
125 krb5_error_code
126 _kdc_find_etype(krb5_context context, krb5_boolean use_strongest_session_key,
127 krb5_boolean is_preauth, hdb_entry_ex *princ,
128 krb5_enctype *etypes, unsigned len,
129 krb5_enctype *ret_enctype, Key **ret_key)
130 {
131 krb5_error_code ret;
132 krb5_salt def_salt;
133 krb5_enctype enctype = ETYPE_NULL;
134 Key *key;
135 int i;
136
137 /* We'll want to avoid keys with v4 salted keys in the pre-auth case... */
138 ret = krb5_get_pw_salt(context, princ->entry.principal, &def_salt);
139 if (ret)
140 return ret;
141
142 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
143
144 if (use_strongest_session_key) {
145 const krb5_enctype *p;
146 krb5_enctype clientbest = ETYPE_NULL;
147 int j;
148
149 /*
150 * Pick the strongest key that the KDC, target service, and
151 * client all support, using the local cryptosystem enctype
152 * list in strongest-to-weakest order to drive the search.
153 *
154 * This is not what RFC4120 says to do, but it encourages
155 * adoption of stronger enctypes. This doesn't play well with
156 * clients that have multiple Kerberos client implementations
157 * available with different supported enctype lists.
158 */
159
160 /* drive the search with local supported enctypes list */
161 p = krb5_kerberos_enctypes(context);
162 for (i = 0; p[i] != ETYPE_NULL && enctype == ETYPE_NULL; i++) {
163 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, p[i]) != 0)
164 continue;
165
166 /* check that the client supports it too */
167 for (j = 0; j < len && enctype == ETYPE_NULL; j++) {
168 if (p[i] != etypes[j])
169 continue;
170 /* save best of union of { client, crypto system } */
171 if (clientbest == ETYPE_NULL)
172 clientbest = p[i];
173 /* check target princ support */
174 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &princ->entry, p[i], &key);
175 if (ret)
176 continue;
177 if (is_preauth && !is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
178 continue;
179 enctype = p[i];
180 }
181 }
182 if (clientbest != ETYPE_NULL && enctype == ETYPE_NULL)
183 enctype = clientbest;
184 else if (enctype == ETYPE_NULL)
185 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
186 if (ret == 0 && ret_enctype != NULL)
187 *ret_enctype = enctype;
188 if (ret == 0 && ret_key != NULL)
189 *ret_key = key;
190 } else {
191 /*
192 * Pick the first key from the client's enctype list that is
193 * supported by the cryptosystem and by the given principal.
194 *
195 * RFC4120 says we SHOULD pick the first _strong_ key from the
196 * client's list... not the first key... If the admin disallows
197 * weak enctypes in krb5.conf and selects this key selection
198 * algorithm, then we get exactly what RFC4120 says.
199 */
200 for(key = NULL, i = 0; ret != 0 && i < len; i++, key = NULL) {
201
202 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[i]) != 0 &&
203 !_kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->entry.principal, etypes[i]))
204 continue;
205
206 while (hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &princ->entry, etypes[i], &key) == 0) {
207 if (key->key.keyvalue.length == 0) {
208 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY;
209 continue;
210 }
211 if (ret_key != NULL)
212 *ret_key = key;
213 if (ret_enctype != NULL)
214 *ret_enctype = etypes[i];
215 ret = 0;
216 if (is_preauth && is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
217 goto out;
218 }
219 }
220 }
221
222 out:
223 krb5_free_salt (context, def_salt);
224 return ret;
225 }
226
227 krb5_error_code
228 _kdc_make_anonymous_principalname (PrincipalName *pn)
229 {
230 pn->name_type = KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL;
231 pn->name_string.len = 1;
232 pn->name_string.val = malloc(sizeof(*pn->name_string.val));
233 if (pn->name_string.val == NULL)
234 return ENOMEM;
235 pn->name_string.val[0] = strdup("anonymous");
236 if (pn->name_string.val[0] == NULL) {
237 free(pn->name_string.val);
238 pn->name_string.val = NULL;
239 return ENOMEM;
240 }
241 return 0;
242 }
243
244 void
245 _kdc_log_timestamp(krb5_context context,
246 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
247 const char *type,
248 KerberosTime authtime, KerberosTime *starttime,
249 KerberosTime endtime, KerberosTime *renew_till)
250 {
251 char authtime_str[100], starttime_str[100],
252 endtime_str[100], renewtime_str[100];
253
254 krb5_format_time(context, authtime,
255 authtime_str, sizeof(authtime_str), TRUE);
256 if (starttime)
257 krb5_format_time(context, *starttime,
258 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
259 else
260 strlcpy(starttime_str, "unset", sizeof(starttime_str));
261 krb5_format_time(context, endtime,
262 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
263 if (renew_till)
264 krb5_format_time(context, *renew_till,
265 renewtime_str, sizeof(renewtime_str), TRUE);
266 else
267 strlcpy(renewtime_str, "unset", sizeof(renewtime_str));
268
269 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
270 "%s authtime: %s starttime: %s endtime: %s renew till: %s",
271 type, authtime_str, starttime_str, endtime_str, renewtime_str);
272 }
273
274 static void
275 log_patypes(krb5_context context,
276 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
277 METHOD_DATA *padata)
278 {
279 struct rk_strpool *p = NULL;
280 char *str;
281 size_t i;
282
283 for (i = 0; i < padata->len; i++) {
284 switch(padata->val[i].padata_type) {
285 case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
286 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "PK-INIT(ietf)");
287 break;
288 case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN:
289 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "PK-INIT(win2k)");
290 break;
291 case KRB5_PADATA_PA_PK_OCSP_RESPONSE:
292 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "OCSP");
293 break;
294 case KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP:
295 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "encrypted-timestamp");
296 break;
297 default:
298 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%d", padata->val[i].padata_type);
299 break;
300 }
301 if (p && i + 1 < padata->len)
302 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", ");
303 if (p == NULL) {
304 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "out of memory");
305 return;
306 }
307 }
308 if (p == NULL)
309 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "none");
310
311 str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
312 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Client sent patypes: %s", str);
313 free(str);
314 }
315
316 /*
317 *
318 */
319
320
321 krb5_error_code
322 _kdc_encode_reply(krb5_context context,
323 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
324 KDC_REP *rep, const EncTicketPart *et, EncKDCRepPart *ek,
325 krb5_enctype etype,
326 int skvno, const EncryptionKey *skey,
327 int ckvno, const EncryptionKey *reply_key,
328 int rk_is_subkey,
329 const char **e_text,
330 krb5_data *reply)
331 {
332 unsigned char *buf;
333 size_t buf_size;
334 size_t len = 0;
335 krb5_error_code ret;
336 krb5_crypto crypto;
337
338 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTicketPart, buf, buf_size, et, &len, ret);
339 if(ret) {
340 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
341 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode ticket: %s", msg);
342 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
343 return ret;
344 }
345 if(buf_size != len) {
346 free(buf);
347 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
348 *e_text = "KDC internal error";
349 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
350 }
351
352 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, skey, etype, &crypto);
353 if (ret) {
354 const char *msg;
355 free(buf);
356 msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
357 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
358 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
359 return ret;
360 }
361
362 ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
363 crypto,
364 KRB5_KU_TICKET,
365 buf,
366 len,
367 skvno,
368 &rep->ticket.enc_part);
369 free(buf);
370 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
371 if(ret) {
372 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
373 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encrypt data: %s", msg);
374 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
375 return ret;
376 }
377
378 if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep && !config->encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep)
379 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncASRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
380 else
381 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTGSRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
382 if(ret) {
383 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
384 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg);
385 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
386 return ret;
387 }
388 if(buf_size != len) {
389 free(buf);
390 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
391 *e_text = "KDC internal error";
392 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
393 }
394 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, reply_key, 0, &crypto);
395 if (ret) {
396 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
397 free(buf);
398 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
399 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
400 return ret;
401 }
402 if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep) {
403 krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
404 crypto,
405 KRB5_KU_AS_REP_ENC_PART,
406 buf,
407 len,
408 ckvno,
409 &rep->enc_part);
410 free(buf);
411 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret);
412 } else {
413 krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
414 crypto,
415 rk_is_subkey ? KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SUB_KEY : KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SESSION,
416 buf,
417 len,
418 ckvno,
419 &rep->enc_part);
420 free(buf);
421 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(TGS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret);
422 }
423 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
424 if(ret) {
425 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
426 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg);
427 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
428 return ret;
429 }
430 if(buf_size != len) {
431 free(buf);
432 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
433 *e_text = "KDC internal error";
434 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
435 }
436 reply->data = buf;
437 reply->length = buf_size;
438 return 0;
439 }
440
441 /*
442 * Return 1 if the client have only older enctypes, this is for
443 * determining if the server should send ETYPE_INFO2 or not.
444 */
445
446 static int
447 older_enctype(krb5_enctype enctype)
448 {
449 switch (enctype) {
450 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
451 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
452 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
453 case ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
454 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5:
455 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56:
456 /*
457 * The following three is "old" windows enctypes and is needed for
458 * windows 2000 hosts.
459 */
460 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_MD4:
461 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD:
462 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD_EXP:
463 return 1;
464 default:
465 return 0;
466 }
467 }
468
469 /*
470 *
471 */
472
473 static krb5_error_code
474 make_etype_info_entry(krb5_context context, ETYPE_INFO_ENTRY *ent, Key *key)
475 {
476 ent->etype = key->key.keytype;
477 if(key->salt){
478 #if 0
479 ALLOC(ent->salttype);
480
481 if(key->salt->type == hdb_pw_salt)
482 *ent->salttype = 0; /* or 1? or NULL? */
483 else if(key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt)
484 *ent->salttype = 2;
485 else {
486 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "unknown salt-type: %d",
487 key->salt->type);
488 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
489 }
490 /* according to `the specs', we can't send a salt if
491 we have AFS3 salted key, but that requires that you
492 *know* what cell you are using (e.g by assuming
493 that the cell is the same as the realm in lower
494 case) */
495 #elif 0
496 ALLOC(ent->salttype);
497 *ent->salttype = key->salt->type;
498 #else
499 /*
500 * We shouldn't sent salttype since it is incompatible with the
501 * specification and it breaks windows clients. The afs
502 * salting problem is solved by using KRB5-PADATA-AFS3-SALT
503 * implemented in Heimdal 0.7 and later.
504 */
505 ent->salttype = NULL;
506 #endif
507 krb5_copy_data(context, &key->salt->salt,
508 &ent->salt);
509 } else {
510 /* we return no salt type at all, as that should indicate
511 * the default salt type and make everybody happy. some
512 * systems (like w2k) dislike being told the salt type
513 * here. */
514
515 ent->salttype = NULL;
516 ent->salt = NULL;
517 }
518 return 0;
519 }
520
521 static krb5_error_code
522 get_pa_etype_info(krb5_context context,
523 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
524 METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey)
525 {
526 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
527 ETYPE_INFO pa;
528 unsigned char *buf;
529 size_t len;
530
531
532 pa.len = 1;
533 pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
534 if(pa.val == NULL)
535 return ENOMEM;
536
537 ret = make_etype_info_entry(context, &pa.val[0], ckey);
538 if (ret) {
539 free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
540 return ret;
541 }
542
543 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
544 free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
545 if(ret)
546 return ret;
547 ret = realloc_method_data(md);
548 if(ret) {
549 free(buf);
550 return ret;
551 }
552 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO;
553 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.length = len;
554 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.data = buf;
555 return 0;
556 }
557
558 /*
559 *
560 */
561
562 extern int _krb5_AES_string_to_default_iterator;
563
564 static krb5_error_code
565 make_etype_info2_entry(ETYPE_INFO2_ENTRY *ent, Key *key)
566 {
567 ent->etype = key->key.keytype;
568 if(key->salt) {
569 ALLOC(ent->salt);
570 if (ent->salt == NULL)
571 return ENOMEM;
572 *ent->salt = malloc(key->salt->salt.length + 1);
573 if (*ent->salt == NULL) {
574 free(ent->salt);
575 ent->salt = NULL;
576 return ENOMEM;
577 }
578 memcpy(*ent->salt, key->salt->salt.data, key->salt->salt.length);
579 (*ent->salt)[key->salt->salt.length] = '\0';
580 } else
581 ent->salt = NULL;
582
583 ent->s2kparams = NULL;
584
585 switch (key->key.keytype) {
586 case ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
587 case ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
588 ALLOC(ent->s2kparams);
589 if (ent->s2kparams == NULL)
590 return ENOMEM;
591 ent->s2kparams->length = 4;
592 ent->s2kparams->data = malloc(ent->s2kparams->length);
593 if (ent->s2kparams->data == NULL) {
594 free(ent->s2kparams);
595 ent->s2kparams = NULL;
596 return ENOMEM;
597 }
598 _krb5_put_int(ent->s2kparams->data,
599 _krb5_AES_string_to_default_iterator,
600 ent->s2kparams->length);
601 break;
602 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
603 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
604 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
605 /* Check if this was a AFS3 salted key */
606 if(key->salt && key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt){
607 ALLOC(ent->s2kparams);
608 if (ent->s2kparams == NULL)
609 return ENOMEM;
610 ent->s2kparams->length = 1;
611 ent->s2kparams->data = malloc(ent->s2kparams->length);
612 if (ent->s2kparams->data == NULL) {
613 free(ent->s2kparams);
614 ent->s2kparams = NULL;
615 return ENOMEM;
616 }
617 _krb5_put_int(ent->s2kparams->data,
618 1,
619 ent->s2kparams->length);
620 }
621 break;
622 default:
623 break;
624 }
625 return 0;
626 }
627
628 /*
629 * Return an ETYPE-INFO2. Enctypes are storted the same way as in the
630 * database (client supported enctypes first, then the unsupported
631 * enctypes).
632 */
633
634 static krb5_error_code
635 get_pa_etype_info2(krb5_context context,
636 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
637 METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey)
638 {
639 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
640 ETYPE_INFO2 pa;
641 unsigned char *buf;
642 size_t len;
643
644 pa.len = 1;
645 pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
646 if(pa.val == NULL)
647 return ENOMEM;
648
649 ret = make_etype_info2_entry(&pa.val[0], ckey);
650 if (ret) {
651 free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
652 return ret;
653 }
654
655 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO2, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
656 free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
657 if(ret)
658 return ret;
659 ret = realloc_method_data(md);
660 if(ret) {
661 free(buf);
662 return ret;
663 }
664 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO2;
665 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.length = len;
666 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.data = buf;
667 return 0;
668 }
669
670 /*
671 *
672 */
673
674 static void
675 log_as_req(krb5_context context,
676 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
677 krb5_enctype cetype,
678 krb5_enctype setype,
679 const KDC_REQ_BODY *b)
680 {
681 krb5_error_code ret;
682 struct rk_strpool *p;
683 char *str;
684 size_t i;
685
686 p = rk_strpoolprintf(NULL, "%s", "Client supported enctypes: ");
687
688 for (i = 0; i < b->etype.len; i++) {
689 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, b->etype.val[i], &str);
690 if (ret == 0) {
691 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%s", str);
692 free(str);
693 } else
694 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%d", b->etype.val[i]);
695 if (p && i + 1 < b->etype.len)
696 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", ");
697 if (p == NULL) {
698 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "out of memory");
699 return;
700 }
701 }
702 if (p == NULL)
703 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "no encryption types");
704
705 {
706 char *cet;
707 char *set;
708
709 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, cetype, &cet);
710 if(ret == 0) {
711 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, setype, &set);
712 if (ret == 0) {
713 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using %s/%s", cet, set);
714 free(set);
715 }
716 free(cet);
717 }
718 if (ret != 0)
719 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using enctypes %d/%d",
720 cetype, setype);
721 }
722
723 str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
724 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s", str);
725 free(str);
726
727 {
728 char fixedstr[128];
729 unparse_flags(KDCOptions2int(b->kdc_options), asn1_KDCOptions_units(),
730 fixedstr, sizeof(fixedstr));
731 if(*fixedstr)
732 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Requested flags: %s", fixedstr);
733 }
734 }
735
736 /*
737 * verify the flags on `client' and `server', returning 0
738 * if they are OK and generating an error messages and returning
739 * and error code otherwise.
740 */
741
742 krb5_error_code
743 kdc_check_flags(krb5_context context,
744 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
745 hdb_entry_ex *client_ex, const char *client_name,
746 hdb_entry_ex *server_ex, const char *server_name,
747 krb5_boolean is_as_req)
748 {
749 if(client_ex != NULL) {
750 hdb_entry *client = &client_ex->entry;
751
752 /* check client */
753 if (client->flags.locked_out) {
754 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
755 "Client (%s) is locked out", client_name);
756 return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
757 }
758
759 if (client->flags.invalid) {
760 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
761 "Client (%s) has invalid bit set", client_name);
762 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
763 }
764
765 if(!client->flags.client){
766 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
767 "Principal may not act as client -- %s", client_name);
768 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
769 }
770
771 if (client->valid_start && *client->valid_start > kdc_time) {
772 char starttime_str[100];
773 krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_start,
774 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
775 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
776 "Client not yet valid until %s -- %s",
777 starttime_str, client_name);
778 return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
779 }
780
781 if (client->valid_end && *client->valid_end < kdc_time) {
782 char endtime_str[100];
783 krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_end,
784 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
785 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
786 "Client expired at %s -- %s",
787 endtime_str, client_name);
788 return KRB5KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP;
789 }
790
791 if (client->pw_end && *client->pw_end < kdc_time
792 && (server_ex == NULL || !server_ex->entry.flags.change_pw)) {
793 char pwend_str[100];
794 krb5_format_time(context, *client->pw_end,
795 pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
796 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
797 "Client's key has expired at %s -- %s",
798 pwend_str, client_name);
799 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
800 }
801 }
802
803 /* check server */
804
805 if (server_ex != NULL) {
806 hdb_entry *server = &server_ex->entry;
807
808 if (server->flags.locked_out) {
809 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
810 "Client server locked out -- %s", server_name);
811 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
812 }
813 if (server->flags.invalid) {
814 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
815 "Server has invalid flag set -- %s", server_name);
816 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
817 }
818
819 if(!server->flags.server){
820 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
821 "Principal may not act as server -- %s", server_name);
822 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
823 }
824
825 if(!is_as_req && server->flags.initial) {
826 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
827 "AS-REQ is required for server -- %s", server_name);
828 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
829 }
830
831 if (server->valid_start && *server->valid_start > kdc_time) {
832 char starttime_str[100];
833 krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_start,
834 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
835 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
836 "Server not yet valid until %s -- %s",
837 starttime_str, server_name);
838 return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET;
839 }
840
841 if (server->valid_end && *server->valid_end < kdc_time) {
842 char endtime_str[100];
843 krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_end,
844 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
845 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
846 "Server expired at %s -- %s",
847 endtime_str, server_name);
848 return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP;
849 }
850
851 if (server->pw_end && *server->pw_end < kdc_time) {
852 char pwend_str[100];
853 krb5_format_time(context, *server->pw_end,
854 pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
855 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
856 "Server's key has expired at -- %s",
857 pwend_str, server_name);
858 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
859 }
860 }
861 return 0;
862 }
863
864 /*
865 * Return TRUE if `from' is part of `addresses' taking into consideration
866 * the configuration variables that tells us how strict we should be about
867 * these checks
868 */
869
870 krb5_boolean
871 _kdc_check_addresses(krb5_context context,
872 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
873 HostAddresses *addresses, const struct sockaddr *from)
874 {
875 krb5_error_code ret;
876 krb5_address addr;
877 krb5_boolean result;
878 krb5_boolean only_netbios = TRUE;
879 size_t i;
880
881 if(config->check_ticket_addresses == 0)
882 return TRUE;
883
884 if(addresses == NULL)
885 return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
886
887 for (i = 0; i < addresses->len; ++i) {
888 if (addresses->val[i].addr_type != KRB5_ADDRESS_NETBIOS) {
889 only_netbios = FALSE;
890 }
891 }
892
893 /* Windows sends it's netbios name, which I can only assume is
894 * used for the 'allowed workstations' check. This is painful,
895 * but we still want to check IP addresses if they happen to be
896 * present.
897 */
898
899 if(only_netbios)
900 return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
901
902 ret = krb5_sockaddr2address (context, from, &addr);
903 if(ret)
904 return FALSE;
905
906 result = krb5_address_search(context, &addr, addresses);
907 krb5_free_address (context, &addr);
908 return result;
909 }
910
911 /*
912 *
913 */
914
915 static krb5_boolean
916 send_pac_p(krb5_context context, KDC_REQ *req)
917 {
918 krb5_error_code ret;
919 PA_PAC_REQUEST pacreq;
920 const PA_DATA *pa;
921 int i = 0;
922
923 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PA_PAC_REQUEST);
924 if (pa == NULL)
925 return TRUE;
926
927 ret = decode_PA_PAC_REQUEST(pa->padata_value.data,
928 pa->padata_value.length,
929 &pacreq,
930 NULL);
931 if (ret)
932 return TRUE;
933 i = pacreq.include_pac;
934 free_PA_PAC_REQUEST(&pacreq);
935 if (i == 0)
936 return FALSE;
937 return TRUE;
938 }
939
940 krb5_boolean
941 _kdc_is_anonymous(krb5_context context, krb5_principal principal)
942 {
943 if (principal->name.name_type != KRB5_NT_WELLKNOWN ||
944 principal->name.name_string.len != 2 ||
945 strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_WELLKNOWN_NAME) != 0 ||
946 strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], KRB5_ANON_NAME) != 0)
947 return 0;
948 return 1;
949 }
950
951 /*
952 *
953 */
954
955 krb5_error_code
956 _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context,
957 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
958 KDC_REQ *req,
959 const krb5_data *req_buffer,
960 krb5_data *reply,
961 const char *from,
962 struct sockaddr *from_addr,
963 int datagram_reply)
964 {
965 KDC_REQ_BODY *b = &req->req_body;
966 AS_REP rep;
967 KDCOptions f = b->kdc_options;
968 hdb_entry_ex *client = NULL, *server = NULL;
969 HDB *clientdb = NULL;
970 krb5_enctype setype, sessionetype;
971 krb5_data e_data;
972 EncTicketPart et;
973 EncKDCRepPart ek;
974 krb5_principal client_princ = NULL, server_princ = NULL;
975 char *client_name = NULL, *server_name = NULL;
976 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
977 const char *e_text = NULL;
978 krb5_crypto crypto;
979 Key *skey = NULL;
980 EncryptionKey *reply_key = NULL, session_key;
981 int flags = HDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ;
982 #ifdef PKINIT
983 pk_client_params *pkp = NULL;
984 #endif
985 const EncryptionKey *pk_reply_key = NULL;
986
987 memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
988 memset(&session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
989 krb5_data_zero(&e_data);
990
991 ALLOC(rep.padata);
992 rep.padata->len = 0;
993 rep.padata->val = NULL;
994
995 if (f.canonicalize)
996 flags |= HDB_F_CANON;
997
998 if(b->sname == NULL){
999 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1000 e_text = "No server in request";
1001 } else{
1002 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
1003 &server_princ,
1004 *(b->sname),
1005 b->realm);
1006 if (ret == 0)
1007 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, server_princ, &server_name);
1008 }
1009 if (ret) {
1010 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1011 "AS-REQ malformed server name from %s", from);
1012 goto out;
1013 }
1014 if(b->cname == NULL){
1015 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1016 e_text = "No client in request";
1017 } else {
1018 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
1019 &client_princ,
1020 *(b->cname),
1021 b->realm);
1022 if (ret)
1023 goto out;
1024
1025 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client_princ, &client_name);
1026 }
1027 if (ret) {
1028 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1029 "AS-REQ malformed client name from %s", from);
1030 goto out;
1031 }
1032
1033 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "AS-REQ %s from %s for %s",
1034 client_name, from, server_name);
1035
1036 /*
1037 *
1038 */
1039
1040 if (_kdc_is_anonymous(context, client_princ)) {
1041 if (!b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
1042 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Anonymous ticket w/o anonymous flag");
1043 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1044 goto out;
1045 }
1046 } else if (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
1047 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1048 "Request for a anonymous ticket with non "
1049 "anonymous client name: %s", client_name);
1050 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1051 goto out;
1052 }
1053
1054 /*
1055 *
1056 */
1057
1058 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, client_princ,
1059 HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags, NULL,
1060 &clientdb, &client);
1061 if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1062 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "client %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy", client_name);
1063 goto out;
1064 } else if (ret == HDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM) {
1065 char *fixed_client_name = NULL;
1066
1067 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client->entry.principal,
1068 &fixed_client_name);
1069 if (ret) {
1070 goto out;
1071 }
1072
1073 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "WRONG_REALM - %s -> %s",
1074 client_name, fixed_client_name);
1075 free(fixed_client_name);
1076
1077 ret = krb5_mk_error_ext(context,
1078 KRB5_KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM,
1079 NULL, /* e_text */
1080 NULL, /* e_data */
1081 server_princ,
1082 NULL, /* client_name */
1083 &client->entry.principal->realm,
1084 NULL, /* client_time */
1085 NULL, /* client_usec */
1086 reply);
1087 goto out;
1088 } else if(ret){
1089 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1090 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", client_name, msg);
1091 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1092 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1093
1094 if (config->db[0] && config->db[0]->hdb_auth_status)
1095 (config->db[0]->hdb_auth_status)(context, config->db[0], NULL,
1096 from_addr,
1097 &_kdc_now,
1098 client_name,
1099 NULL,
1100 HDB_AUTH_CLIENT_UNKNOWN);
1101 goto out;
1102 }
1103 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, server_princ,
1104 HDB_F_GET_SERVER|HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT | flags,
1105 NULL, NULL, &server);
1106 if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1107 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "target %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy", server_name);
1108 goto out;
1109 } else if(ret){
1110 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1111 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", server_name, msg);
1112 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1113 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1114 goto out;
1115 }
1116
1117 memset(&et, 0, sizeof(et));
1118 memset(&ek, 0, sizeof(ek));
1119
1120 /*
1121 * Select a session enctype from the list of the crypto system
1122 * supported enctypes that is supported by the client and is one of
1123 * the enctype of the enctype of the service (likely krbtgt).
1124 *
1125 * The latter is used as a hint of what enctypes all KDC support,
1126 * to make sure a newer version of KDC won't generate a session
1127 * enctype that an older version of a KDC in the same realm can't
1128 * decrypt.
1129 */
1130 ret = _kdc_find_etype(context, config->as_use_strongest_session_key, FALSE,
1131 client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len, &sessionetype,
1132 NULL);
1133 if (ret) {
1134 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1135 "Client (%s) from %s has no common enctypes with KDC "
1136 "to use for the session key",
1137 client_name, from);
1138 goto out;
1139 }
1140 /*
1141 * But if the KDC admin is paranoid and doesn't want to have "not
1142 * the best" enctypes on the krbtgt, lets save the best pick from
1143 * the client list and hope that that will work for any other
1144 * KDCs.
1145 */
1146
1147 /*
1148 * Pre-auth processing
1149 */
1150
1151 if(req->padata){
1152 int i;
1153 const PA_DATA *pa;
1154 int found_pa = 0;
1155
1156 log_patypes(context, config, req->padata);
1157
1158 #ifdef PKINIT
1159 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1160 "Looking for PKINIT pa-data -- %s", client_name);
1161
1162 e_text = "No PKINIT PA found";
1163
1164 i = 0;
1165 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ);
1166 if (pa == NULL) {
1167 i = 0;
1168 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN);
1169 }
1170 if (pa) {
1171 char *client_cert = NULL;
1172
1173 ret = _kdc_pk_rd_padata(context, config, req, pa, client, &pkp);
1174 if (ret) {
1175 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
1176 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1177 "Failed to decode PKINIT PA-DATA -- %s",
1178 client_name);
1179 goto ts_enc;
1180 }
1181 if (ret == 0 && pkp == NULL)
1182 goto ts_enc;
1183
1184 ret = _kdc_pk_check_client(context,
1185 config,
1186 clientdb,
1187 client,
1188 pkp,
1189 &client_cert);
1190 if (ret) {
1191 e_text = "PKINIT certificate not allowed to "
1192 "impersonate principal";
1193 _kdc_pk_free_client_param(context, pkp);
1194
1195 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s", e_text);
1196 pkp = NULL;
1197 goto out;
1198 }
1199
1200 found_pa = 1;
1201 et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
1202 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1203 "PKINIT pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
1204 client_name, client_cert);
1205 if (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
1206 (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)(context, clientdb, client,
1207 from_addr,
1208 &_kdc_now,
1209 client_name,
1210 "PKINIT",
1211 HDB_AUTH_PKINIT_SUCCESS);
1212 free(client_cert);
1213 if (pkp)
1214 goto preauth_done;
1215 }
1216 ts_enc:
1217 #endif
1218
1219 if (client->entry.flags.locked_out) {
1220 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
1221 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1222 "Client (%s) is locked out", client_name);
1223 goto out;
1224 }
1225
1226 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Looking for ENC-TS pa-data -- %s",
1227 client_name);
1228
1229 i = 0;
1230 e_text = "No ENC-TS found";
1231 while((pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP))){
1232 krb5_data ts_data;
1233 PA_ENC_TS_ENC p;
1234 size_t len;
1235 EncryptedData enc_data;
1236 Key *pa_key;
1237 char *str;
1238
1239 found_pa = 1;
1240
1241 if (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
1242 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
1243 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "ENC-TS doesn't support anon");
1244 goto out;
1245 }
1246
1247 ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
1248 pa->padata_value.length,
1249 &enc_data,
1250 &len);
1251 if (ret) {
1252 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
1253 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
1254 client_name);
1255 goto out;
1256 }
1257
1258 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
1259 enc_data.etype, &pa_key);
1260 if(ret){
1261 char *estr;
1262 e_text = "No key matches pa-data";
1263 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
1264 if(krb5_enctype_to_string(context, enc_data.etype, &estr))
1265 estr = NULL;
1266 if(estr == NULL)
1267 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1268 "No client key matching pa-data (%d) -- %s",
1269 enc_data.etype, client_name);
1270 else
1271 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1272 "No client key matching pa-data (%s) -- %s",
1273 estr, client_name);
1274 free(estr);
1275 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
1276
1277 continue;
1278 }
1279
1280 try_next_key:
1281 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &pa_key->key, 0, &crypto);
1282 if (ret) {
1283 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1284 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
1285 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1286 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
1287 continue;
1288 }
1289
1290 ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context,
1291 crypto,
1292 KRB5_KU_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP,
1293 &enc_data,
1294 &ts_data);
1295 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
1296 /*
1297 * Since the user might have several keys with the same
1298 * enctype but with diffrent salting, we need to try all
1299 * the keys with the same enctype.
1300 */
1301 if(ret){
1302 krb5_error_code ret2;
1303 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1304
1305 ret2 = krb5_enctype_to_string(context,
1306 pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
1307 if (ret2)
1308 str = NULL;
1309
1310 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1311 "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA -- %s "
1312 "(enctype %s) error %s",
1313 client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype", msg);
1314 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1315
1316 if(hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
1317 enc_data.etype, &pa_key) == 0) {
1318 free(str);
1319 goto try_next_key;
1320 }
1321 e_text = "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA";
1322
1323 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
1324
1325 if (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
1326 (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)(context, clientdb, client,
1327 from_addr,
1328 &_kdc_now,
1329 client_name,
1330 str ? str : "unknown enctype",
1331 HDB_AUTH_WRONG_PASSWORD);
1332
1333 free(str);
1334
1335 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
1336 continue;
1337 }
1338 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
1339 ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data,
1340 ts_data.length,
1341 &p,
1342 &len);
1343 krb5_data_free(&ts_data);
1344 if(ret){
1345 e_text = "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS-ENC";
1346 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
1347 kdc_log(context, config,
1348 5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s",
1349 client_name);
1350 continue;
1351 }
1352 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
1353 if (abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > context->max_skew) {
1354 char client_time[100];
1355
1356 krb5_format_time(context, p.patimestamp,
1357 client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE);
1358
1359 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
1360 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1361 "Too large time skew, "
1362 "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
1363 client_time,
1364 (unsigned)abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp),
1365 context->max_skew,
1366 client_name);
1367
1368 /*
1369 * The following is needed to make windows clients to
1370 * retry using the timestamp in the error message, if
1371 * there is a e_text, they become unhappy.
1372 */
1373 e_text = NULL;
1374 goto out;
1375 }
1376 et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
1377
1378 set_salt_padata(rep.padata, pa_key->salt);
1379
1380 reply_key = &pa_key->key;
1381
1382 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
1383 if (ret)
1384 str = NULL;
1385
1386 kdc_log(context, config, 2,
1387 "ENC-TS Pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
1388 client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype");
1389 if (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
1390 (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)(context, clientdb, client,
1391 from_addr,
1392 &_kdc_now,
1393 client_name,
1394 str ? str : "unknown enctype",
1395 HDB_AUTH_CORRECT_PASSWORD);
1396
1397 free(str);
1398 break;
1399 }
1400 #ifdef PKINIT
1401 preauth_done:
1402 #endif
1403 if(found_pa == 0 && config->require_preauth)
1404 goto use_pa;
1405 /* We come here if we found a pa-enc-timestamp, but if there
1406 was some problem with it, other than too large skew */
1407 if(found_pa && et.flags.pre_authent == 0){
1408 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s -- %s", e_text, client_name);
1409 if (!prepare_enc_data(context, config, &e_data, b, client)) {
1410 goto out;
1411 }
1412 e_text = NULL;
1413 goto out;
1414 }
1415 }else if (config->require_preauth
1416 || b->kdc_options.request_anonymous /* hack to force anon */
1417 || client->entry.flags.require_preauth
1418 || server->entry.flags.require_preauth) {
1419 use_pa:
1420 if (!prepare_enc_data(context, config, &e_data, b, client)) {
1421 goto out;
1422 }
1423
1424 e_text ="Need to use PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP/PA-PK-AS-REQ",
1425
1426 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED;
1427
1428 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1429 "No preauth found, returning PREAUTH-REQUIRED -- %s",
1430 client_name);
1431 goto out;
1432 }
1433
1434 e_text = NULL;
1435
1436 /*
1437 * Verify flags after the user been required to prove its identity
1438 * with in a preauth mech.
1439 */
1440
1441 ret = _kdc_check_access(context, config, client, client_name,
1442 server, server_name,
1443 req, &e_data);
1444 if(ret)
1445 goto out;
1446
1447 if (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
1448 (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)(context, clientdb, client,
1449 from_addr,
1450 &_kdc_now,
1451 client_name,
1452 NULL,
1453 HDB_AUTHZ_SUCCESS);
1454
1455 /*
1456 * Selelct the best encryption type for the KDC with out regard to
1457 * the client since the client never needs to read that data.
1458 */
1459
1460 ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(context, config,
1461 server, server_name,
1462 &setype, &skey);
1463 if(ret)
1464 goto out;
1465
1466 if(f.renew || f.validate || f.proxy || f.forwarded || f.enc_tkt_in_skey
1467 || (f.request_anonymous && !config->allow_anonymous)) {
1468 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1469 e_text = "Bad KDC options";
1470 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Bad KDC options -- %s", client_name);
1471 goto out;
1472 }
1473
1474 rep.pvno = 5;
1475 rep.msg_type = krb_as_rep;
1476
1477 ret = copy_Realm(&client->entry.principal->realm, &rep.crealm);
1478 if (ret)
1479 goto out;
1480 ret = _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.cname, client->entry.principal);
1481 if (ret)
1482 goto out;
1483
1484 rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5;
1485 copy_Realm(&server->entry.principal->realm, &rep.ticket.realm);
1486 _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname,
1487 server->entry.principal);
1488 /* java 1.6 expects the name to be the same type, lets allow that
1489 * uncomplicated name-types, when f.canonicalize is not set (to
1490 * match Windows Server 1709). */
1491 #define CNT(sp,t) (((sp)->sname->name_type) == KRB5_NT_##t)
1492 if (!f.canonicalize
1493 && (CNT(b, UNKNOWN) || CNT(b, PRINCIPAL) || CNT(b, SRV_INST) || CNT(b, SRV_HST) || CNT(b, SRV_XHST))) {
1494 rep.ticket.sname.name_type = b->sname->name_type;
1495 }
1496 #undef CNT
1497
1498 et.flags.initial = 1;
1499 if(client->entry.flags.forwardable && server->entry.flags.forwardable)
1500 et.flags.forwardable = f.forwardable;
1501 else if (f.forwardable) {
1502 e_text = "Ticket may not be forwardable";
1503 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1504 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1505 "Ticket may not be forwardable -- %s", client_name);
1506 goto out;
1507 }
1508 if(client->entry.flags.proxiable && server->entry.flags.proxiable)
1509 et.flags.proxiable = f.proxiable;
1510 else if (f.proxiable) {
1511 e_text = "Ticket may not be proxiable";
1512 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1513 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1514 "Ticket may not be proxiable -- %s", client_name);
1515 goto out;
1516 }
1517 if(client->entry.flags.postdate && server->entry.flags.postdate)
1518 et.flags.may_postdate = f.allow_postdate;
1519 else if (f.allow_postdate){
1520 e_text = "Ticket may not be postdate";
1521 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1522 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1523 "Ticket may not be postdatable -- %s", client_name);
1524 goto out;
1525 }
1526
1527 /* check for valid set of addresses */
1528 if(!_kdc_check_addresses(context, config, b->addresses, from_addr)) {
1529 e_text = "Bad address list in requested";
1530 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR;
1531 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1532 "Bad address list requested -- %s", client_name);
1533 goto out;
1534 }
1535
1536 ret = copy_PrincipalName(&rep.cname, &et.cname);
1537 if (ret)
1538 goto out;
1539 ret = copy_Realm(&rep.crealm, &et.crealm);
1540 if (ret)
1541 goto out;
1542
1543 {
1544 time_t start;
1545 time_t t;
1546
1547 start = et.authtime = kdc_time;
1548
1549 if(f.postdated && req->req_body.from){
1550 ALLOC(et.starttime);
1551 start = *et.starttime = *req->req_body.from;
1552 et.flags.invalid = 1;
1553 et.flags.postdated = 1; /* XXX ??? */
1554 }
1555 _kdc_fix_time(&b->till);
1556 t = *b->till;
1557
1558 /* be careful not overflowing */
1559
1560 if(client->entry.max_life)
1561 t = start + min(t - start, *client->entry.max_life);
1562 if(server->entry.max_life)
1563 t = start + min(t - start, *server->entry.max_life);
1564 #if 0
1565 t = min(t, start + realm->max_life);
1566 #endif
1567 et.endtime = t;
1568 if(f.renewable_ok && et.endtime < *b->till){
1569 f.renewable = 1;
1570 if(b->rtime == NULL){
1571 ALLOC(b->rtime);
1572 *b->rtime = 0;
1573 }
1574 if(*b->rtime < *b->till)
1575 *b->rtime = *b->till;
1576 }
1577 if(f.renewable && b->rtime){
1578 t = *b->rtime;
1579 if(t == 0)
1580 t = MAX_TIME;
1581 if(client->entry.max_renew)
1582 t = start + min(t - start, *client->entry.max_renew);
1583 if(server->entry.max_renew)
1584 t = start + min(t - start, *server->entry.max_renew);
1585 #if 0
1586 t = min(t, start + realm->max_renew);
1587 #endif
1588 ALLOC(et.renew_till);
1589 *et.renew_till = t;
1590 et.flags.renewable = 1;
1591 }
1592 }
1593
1594 if (f.request_anonymous)
1595 et.flags.anonymous = 1;
1596
1597 if(b->addresses){
1598 ALLOC(et.caddr);
1599 copy_HostAddresses(b->addresses, et.caddr);
1600 }
1601
1602 et.transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
1603 krb5_data_zero(&et.transited.contents);
1604
1605 /* The MIT ASN.1 library (obviously) doesn't tell lengths encoded
1606 * as 0 and as 0x80 (meaning indefinite length) apart, and is thus
1607 * incapable of correctly decoding SEQUENCE OF's of zero length.
1608 *
1609 * To fix this, always send at least one no-op last_req
1610 *
1611 * If there's a pw_end or valid_end we will use that,
1612 * otherwise just a dummy lr.
1613 */
1614 ek.last_req.val = malloc(2 * sizeof(*ek.last_req.val));
1615 if (ek.last_req.val == NULL) {
1616 ret = ENOMEM;
1617 goto out;
1618 }
1619 ek.last_req.len = 0;
1620 if (client->entry.pw_end
1621 && (config->kdc_warn_pwexpire == 0
1622 || kdc_time + config->kdc_warn_pwexpire >= *client->entry.pw_end)) {
1623 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_PW_EXPTIME;
1624 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *client->entry.pw_end;
1625 ++ek.last_req.len;
1626 }
1627 if (client->entry.valid_end) {
1628 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_ACCT_EXPTIME;
1629 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *client->entry.valid_end;
1630 ++ek.last_req.len;
1631 }
1632 if (ek.last_req.len == 0) {
1633 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_NONE;
1634 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = 0;
1635 ++ek.last_req.len;
1636 }
1637 ek.nonce = b->nonce;
1638 if (client->entry.valid_end || client->entry.pw_end) {
1639 ALLOC(ek.key_expiration);
1640 if (client->entry.valid_end) {
1641 if (client->entry.pw_end)
1642 *ek.key_expiration = min(*client->entry.valid_end,
1643 *client->entry.pw_end);
1644 else
1645 *ek.key_expiration = *client->entry.valid_end;
1646 } else
1647 *ek.key_expiration = *client->entry.pw_end;
1648 } else
1649 ek.key_expiration = NULL;
1650 ek.flags = et.flags;
1651 ek.authtime = et.authtime;
1652 if (et.starttime) {
1653 ALLOC(ek.starttime);
1654 *ek.starttime = *et.starttime;
1655 }
1656 ek.endtime = et.endtime;
1657 if (et.renew_till) {
1658 ALLOC(ek.renew_till);
1659 *ek.renew_till = *et.renew_till;
1660 }
1661 copy_Realm(&rep.ticket.realm, &ek.srealm);
1662 copy_PrincipalName(&rep.ticket.sname, &ek.sname);
1663 if(et.caddr){
1664 ALLOC(ek.caddr);
1665 copy_HostAddresses(et.caddr, ek.caddr);
1666 }
1667
1668 #ifdef PKINIT
1669 if (pkp) {
1670 e_text = "Failed to build PK-INIT reply";
1671 ret = _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(context, config, pkp, client,
1672 sessionetype, req, req_buffer,
1673 &reply_key, &et.key, rep.padata);
1674 if (ret)
1675 goto out;
1676 ret = _kdc_add_inital_verified_cas(context,
1677 config,
1678 pkp,
1679 &et);
1680 if (ret)
1681 goto out;
1682
1683 /*
1684 * Send reply key as constant value to pac generate which allows
1685 * parts of the buffer to be encrypted (i.e., PAC_CREDENTIAL_DATA).
1686 */
1687 pk_reply_key = reply_key;
1688 } else
1689 #endif
1690 {
1691 ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, sessionetype, &et.key);
1692 if (ret)
1693 goto out;
1694 }
1695
1696 if (reply_key == NULL) {
1697 e_text = "Client have no reply key";
1698 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
1699 goto out;
1700 }
1701
1702 ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&et.key, &ek.key);
1703 if (ret)
1704 goto out;
1705
1706 if (rep.padata->len == 0) {
1707 free(rep.padata);
1708 rep.padata = NULL;
1709 }
1710
1711 /* Add the PAC */
1712 if (send_pac_p(context, req)) {
1713 krb5_pac p = NULL;
1714 krb5_data data;
1715
1716 ret = _kdc_pac_generate(context, client, pk_reply_key, &p);
1717 if (ret) {
1718 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
1719 client_name);
1720 goto out;
1721 }
1722 if (p != NULL) {
1723 ret = _krb5_pac_sign(context, p, et.authtime,
1724 client->entry.principal,
1725 &skey->key, /* Server key */
1726 &skey->key, /* FIXME: should be krbtgt key */
1727 &data);
1728 krb5_pac_free(context, p);
1729 if (ret) {
1730 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
1731 client_name);
1732 goto out;
1733 }
1734
1735 ret = _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(context, &et,
1736 KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC,
1737 &data);
1738 krb5_data_free(&data);
1739 if (ret)
1740 goto out;
1741 }
1742 }
1743
1744 _kdc_log_timestamp(context, config, "AS-REQ", et.authtime, et.starttime,
1745 et.endtime, et.renew_till);
1746
1747 log_as_req(context, config, reply_key->keytype, setype, b);
1748
1749 ret = _kdc_encode_reply(context, config,
1750 &rep, &et, &ek, setype, server->entry.kvno,
1751 &skey->key, client->entry.kvno,
1752 reply_key, 0, &e_text, reply);
1753 free_EncTicketPart(&et);
1754 free_EncKDCRepPart(&ek);
1755 if (ret)
1756 goto out;
1757
1758 /* */
1759 if (datagram_reply && reply->length > config->max_datagram_reply_length) {
1760 krb5_data_free(reply);
1761 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG;
1762 e_text = "Reply packet too large";
1763 }
1764
1765 out:
1766 free_AS_REP(&rep);
1767 if(ret != 0 && ret != HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE && reply->length == 0) {
1768 krb5_mk_error(context,
1769 ret,
1770 e_text,
1771 (e_data.data ? &e_data : NULL),
1772 client_princ,
1773 server_princ,
1774 NULL,
1775 NULL,
1776 reply);
1777 ret = 0;
1778 }
1779 #ifdef PKINIT
1780 if (pkp)
1781 _kdc_pk_free_client_param(context, pkp);
1782 #endif
1783 if (e_data.data)
1784 free(e_data.data);
1785 if (client_princ)
1786 krb5_free_principal(context, client_princ);
1787 free(client_name);
1788 if (server_princ)
1789 krb5_free_principal(context, server_princ);
1790 free(server_name);
1791 if(client)
1792 _kdc_free_ent(context, client);
1793 if(server)
1794 _kdc_free_ent(context, server);
1795 return ret;
1796 }
1797
1798 krb5_boolean
1799 prepare_enc_data(krb5_context context,
1800 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1801 krb5_data *e_data,
1802 KDC_REQ_BODY *b,
1803 hdb_entry_ex *client)
1804 {
1805 METHOD_DATA method_data;
1806 PA_DATA *pa;
1807 unsigned char *buf;
1808 size_t len;
1809 Key *ckey;
1810 krb5_error_code ret;
1811
1812 method_data.len = 0;
1813 method_data.val = NULL;
1814
1815 ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
1816 if (ret) {
1817 free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
1818 return FALSE;
1819 }
1820 pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
1821 pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP;
1822 pa->padata_value.length = 0;
1823 pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
1824
1825 #ifdef PKINIT
1826 ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
1827 if (ret) {
1828 free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
1829 return FALSE;
1830 }
1831 pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
1832 pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ;
1833 pa->padata_value.length = 0;
1834 pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
1835
1836 ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
1837 if (ret) {
1838 free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
1839 return FALSE;
1840 }
1841 pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
1842 pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN;
1843 pa->padata_value.length = 0;
1844 pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
1845 #endif
1846
1847 /*
1848 * If there is a client key, send ETYPE_INFO{,2}
1849 */
1850 ret = _kdc_find_etype(context,
1851 config->preauth_use_strongest_session_key, TRUE,
1852 client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len, NULL, &ckey);
1853 if (ret == 0) {
1854
1855 /*
1856 * RFC4120 requires:
1857 * - If the client only knows about old enctypes, then send
1858 * both info replies (we send 'info' first in the list).
1859 * - If the client is 'modern', because it knows about 'new'
1860 * enctype types, then only send the 'info2' reply.
1861 *
1862 * Before we send the full list of etype-info data, we pick
1863 * the client key we would have used anyway below, just pick
1864 * that instead.
1865 */
1866
1867 if (older_enctype(ckey->key.keytype)) {
1868 ret = get_pa_etype_info(context, config,
1869 &method_data, ckey);
1870 if (ret) {
1871 free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
1872 return FALSE;
1873 }
1874 }
1875 ret = get_pa_etype_info2(context, config,
1876 &method_data, ckey);
1877 if (ret) {
1878 free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
1879 return FALSE;
1880 }
1881 }
1882
1883 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(METHOD_DATA, buf, len, &method_data, &len, ret);
1884 free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
1885
1886 e_data->data = buf;
1887 e_data->length = len;
1888
1889 return TRUE;
1890 }
1891
1892 /*
1893 * Add the AuthorizationData `data´ of `type´ to the last element in
1894 * the sequence of authorization_data in `tkt´ wrapped in an IF_RELEVANT
1895 */
1896
1897 krb5_error_code
1898 _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(krb5_context context,
1899 EncTicketPart *tkt,
1900 int type,
1901 const krb5_data *data)
1902 {
1903 krb5_error_code ret;
1904 size_t size = 0;
1905
1906 if (tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
1907 tkt->authorization_data = calloc(1, sizeof(*tkt->authorization_data));
1908 if (tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
1909 krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOMEM, "out of memory");
1910 return ENOMEM;
1911 }
1912 }
1913
1914 /* add the entry to the last element */
1915 {
1916 AuthorizationData ad = { 0, NULL };
1917 AuthorizationDataElement ade;
1918
1919 ade.ad_type = type;
1920 ade.ad_data = *data;
1921
1922 ret = add_AuthorizationData(&ad, &ade);
1923 if (ret) {
1924 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "add AuthorizationData failed");
1925 return ret;
1926 }
1927
1928 ade.ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT;
1929
1930 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AuthorizationData,
1931 ade.ad_data.data, ade.ad_data.length,
1932 &ad, &size, ret);
1933 free_AuthorizationData(&ad);
1934 if (ret) {
1935 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "ASN.1 encode of "
1936 "AuthorizationData failed");
1937 return ret;
1938 }
1939 if (ade.ad_data.length != size)
1940 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
1941
1942 ret = add_AuthorizationData(tkt->authorization_data, &ade);
1943 der_free_octet_string(&ade.ad_data);
1944 if (ret) {
1945 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "add AuthorizationData failed");
1946 return ret;
1947 }
1948 }
1949
1950 return 0;
1951 }
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