2 Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
4 Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
6 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
7 Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
9 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
12 (at your option) any later version.
14 This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 GNU General Public License for more details.
20 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
21 along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
25 #include "libcli/security/security.h"
26 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_security.h"
27 #include "auth/auth.h"
28 #include "auth/auth_sam.h"
29 #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
30 #include "dsdb/common/util.h"
31 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
32 #include "param/param.h"
33 #include "param/secrets.h"
34 #include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
35 #include "system/kerberos.h"
36 #include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
37 #include "kdc/authn_policy_util.h"
39 #include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
40 #include "kdc/db-glue.h"
41 #include "kdc/pac-glue.h"
42 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_irpc_c.h"
43 #include "lib/messaging/irpc.h"
46 #define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_KERBEROS
51 #define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno) \
52 ((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) >> 16))
54 #define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(kvno) \
55 ((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF))
57 #define SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, krbtgt) \
58 ((krb5_kvno)((((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF) | \
59 ((((uint32_t)krbtgt) << 16) & 0xFFFF0000)))
61 enum trust_direction
{
63 INBOUND
= LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND
,
64 OUTBOUND
= LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
67 static const char *trust_attrs
[] = {
74 "msDS-TrustForestTrustInfo",
78 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
83 send a message to the drepl server telling it to initiate a
84 REPL_SECRET getncchanges extended op to fetch the users secrets
86 static void auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
,
87 struct imessaging_context
*msg_ctx
,
88 struct tevent_context
*event_ctx
,
89 struct ldb_dn
*user_dn
)
91 struct dcerpc_binding_handle
*irpc_handle
;
92 struct drepl_trigger_repl_secret r
;
93 struct tevent_req
*req
;
96 tmp_ctx
= talloc_new(mem_ctx
);
97 if (tmp_ctx
== NULL
) {
101 irpc_handle
= irpc_binding_handle_by_name(tmp_ctx
, msg_ctx
,
104 if (irpc_handle
== NULL
) {
105 DBG_WARNING("Unable to get binding handle for dreplsrv\n");
106 TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx
);
110 r
.in
.user_dn
= ldb_dn_get_linearized(user_dn
);
111 if (r
.in
.user_dn
== NULL
) {
112 DBG_WARNING("Unable to get user DN\n");
113 TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx
);
118 * This seem to rely on the current IRPC implementation,
119 * which delivers the message in the _send function.
121 * TODO: we need a ONE_WAY IRPC handle and register
122 * a callback and wait for it to be triggered!
124 req
= dcerpc_drepl_trigger_repl_secret_r_send(tmp_ctx
,
129 /* we aren't interested in a reply */
131 TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx
);
134 static time_t ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message
*msg
, const char *attr
, time_t default_val
)
136 const struct ldb_val
*gentime
= NULL
;
140 gentime
= ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg
, attr
);
141 ret
= ldb_val_to_time(gentime
, &t
);
149 static struct SDBFlags
uf2SDBFlags(krb5_context context
, uint32_t userAccountControl
, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type
)
151 struct SDBFlags flags
= {};
153 /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
156 /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
161 /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
164 /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
165 if (userAccountControl
& UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT
) {
166 if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT
|| ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY
) {
172 if (userAccountControl
& UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT
) {
173 if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT
|| ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY
) {
178 if (userAccountControl
& UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT
) {
179 if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT
|| ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY
) {
184 if (userAccountControl
& UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT
) {
185 if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT
|| ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY
) {
191 /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
192 if (userAccountControl
& UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE
) {
195 if (userAccountControl
& UF_LOCKOUT
) {
196 flags
.locked_out
= 1;
199 if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWD_NOTREQD) {
204 UF_PASSWD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevant
206 if (userAccountControl
& UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT
) {
210 /* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
213 if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
217 if (userAccountControl
& UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED
) {
218 flags
.require_hwauth
= 1;
220 if (userAccountControl
& UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
) {
221 flags
.ok_as_delegate
= 1;
223 if (userAccountControl
& UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION
) {
225 * this is confusing...
227 * UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
232 * UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION
233 * => trusted_for_delegation
235 flags
.trusted_for_delegation
= 1;
237 if (!(userAccountControl
& UF_NOT_DELEGATED
)) {
238 flags
.forwardable
= 1;
242 if (userAccountControl
& UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH
) {
243 flags
.require_preauth
= 0;
245 flags
.require_preauth
= 1;
248 if (userAccountControl
& UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED
) {
249 flags
.no_auth_data_reqd
= 1;
255 static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry
*p
)
257 if (p
->db_entry
!= NULL
) {
259 * A sdb_entry still has a reference
264 if (p
->kdc_entry
!= NULL
) {
266 * hdb_entry or krb5_db_entry still
267 * have a reference...
276 * Sort keys in descending order of strength.
278 * Explanation from Greg Hudson:
280 * To encrypt tickets only the first returned key is used by the MIT KDC. The
281 * other keys just communicate support for session key enctypes, and aren't
282 * really used. The encryption key for the ticket enc part doesn't have
283 * to be of a type requested by the client. The session key enctype is chosen
284 * based on the client preference order, limited by the set of enctypes present
285 * in the server keys (unless the string attribute is set on the server
286 * principal overriding that set).
289 static int sdb_key_strength_priority(krb5_enctype etype
)
291 static const krb5_enctype etype_list
[] = {
292 ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
,
293 ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
,
294 ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1
,
295 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC
,
303 for (i
= 0; i
< ARRAY_SIZE(etype_list
); i
++) {
304 if (etype
== etype_list
[i
]) {
309 return ARRAY_SIZE(etype_list
) - i
;
312 static int sdb_key_strength_cmp(const struct sdb_key
*k1
, const struct sdb_key
*k2
)
314 int p1
= sdb_key_strength_priority(KRB5_KEY_TYPE(&k1
->key
));
315 int p2
= sdb_key_strength_priority(KRB5_KEY_TYPE(&k2
->key
));
323 * Higher priority comes first
331 static void samba_kdc_sort_keys(struct sdb_keys
*keys
)
337 TYPESAFE_QSORT(keys
->val
, keys
->len
, sdb_key_strength_cmp
);
340 int samba_kdc_set_fixed_keys(krb5_context context
,
341 const struct ldb_val
*secretbuffer
,
342 uint32_t supported_enctypes
,
343 struct sdb_keys
*keys
)
345 uint16_t allocated_keys
= 0;
350 keys
->val
= calloc(allocated_keys
, sizeof(struct sdb_key
));
351 if (keys
->val
== NULL
) {
352 memset(secretbuffer
->data
, 0, secretbuffer
->length
);
357 if (supported_enctypes
& ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256
) {
358 struct sdb_key key
= {};
360 ret
= smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context
,
361 ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
,
363 MIN(secretbuffer
->length
, 32),
366 memset(secretbuffer
->data
, 0, secretbuffer
->length
);
370 keys
->val
[keys
->len
] = key
;
374 if (supported_enctypes
& ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128
) {
375 struct sdb_key key
= {};
377 ret
= smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context
,
378 ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
,
380 MIN(secretbuffer
->length
, 16),
383 memset(secretbuffer
->data
, 0, secretbuffer
->length
);
387 keys
->val
[keys
->len
] = key
;
391 if (supported_enctypes
& ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
) {
392 struct sdb_key key
= {};
394 ret
= smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context
,
395 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC
,
397 MIN(secretbuffer
->length
, 16),
400 memset(secretbuffer
->data
, 0, secretbuffer
->length
);
404 keys
->val
[keys
->len
] = key
;
413 static int samba_kdc_set_random_keys(krb5_context context
,
414 uint32_t supported_enctypes
,
415 struct sdb_keys
*keys
)
417 struct ldb_val secret_val
;
418 uint8_t secretbuffer
[32];
421 * Fake keys until we have a better way to reject
422 * non-pkinit requests.
424 * We just need to indicate which encryption types are
427 generate_secret_buffer(secretbuffer
, sizeof(secretbuffer
));
429 secret_val
= data_blob_const(secretbuffer
,
430 sizeof(secretbuffer
));
431 return samba_kdc_set_fixed_keys(context
,
437 struct samba_kdc_user_keys
{
438 struct sdb_keys
*skeys
;
440 uint32_t *returned_kvno
;
441 uint32_t supported_enctypes
;
442 uint32_t *available_enctypes
;
443 const struct samr_Password
*nthash
;
444 const char *salt_string
;
446 const struct package_PrimaryKerberosKey4
*pkeys
;
449 static krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_fill_user_keys(krb5_context context
,
450 struct samba_kdc_user_keys
*p
)
453 * Make sure we'll never reveal DES keys
455 uint32_t supported_enctypes
= p
->supported_enctypes
&= ~(ENC_CRC32
| ENC_RSA_MD5
);
456 uint32_t _available_enctypes
= 0;
457 uint32_t *available_enctypes
= p
->available_enctypes
;
458 uint32_t _returned_kvno
= 0;
459 uint32_t *returned_kvno
= p
->returned_kvno
;
460 uint32_t num_pkeys
= p
->num_pkeys
;
461 uint32_t allocated_keys
= num_pkeys
;
465 if (available_enctypes
== NULL
) {
466 available_enctypes
= &_available_enctypes
;
469 *available_enctypes
= 0;
471 if (returned_kvno
== NULL
) {
472 returned_kvno
= &_returned_kvno
;
475 *returned_kvno
= p
->kvno
;
477 if (p
->nthash
!= NULL
) {
481 allocated_keys
= MAX(1, allocated_keys
);
483 /* allocate space to decode into */
485 p
->skeys
->val
= calloc(allocated_keys
, sizeof(struct sdb_key
));
486 if (p
->skeys
->val
== NULL
) {
490 for (i
=0; i
< num_pkeys
; i
++) {
491 struct sdb_key key
= {};
492 uint32_t enctype_bit
;
494 if (p
->pkeys
[i
].value
== NULL
) {
498 enctype_bit
= kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(p
->pkeys
[i
].keytype
);
499 if (!(enctype_bit
& supported_enctypes
)) {
503 if (p
->salt_string
!= NULL
) {
506 salt
= data_blob_string_const(p
->salt_string
);
508 key
.salt
= calloc(1, sizeof(*key
.salt
));
509 if (key
.salt
== NULL
) {
514 key
.salt
->type
= KRB5_PW_SALT
;
516 ret
= smb_krb5_copy_data_contents(&key
.salt
->salt
,
520 *key
.salt
= (struct sdb_salt
) {};
526 ret
= smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context
,
528 p
->pkeys
[i
].value
->data
,
529 p
->pkeys
[i
].value
->length
,
532 p
->skeys
->val
[p
->skeys
->len
++] = key
;
533 *available_enctypes
|= enctype_bit
;
536 ZERO_STRUCT(key
.key
);
538 if (ret
== KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP
) {
539 DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
540 p
->pkeys
[i
].keytype
));
548 if (p
->nthash
!= NULL
&& (supported_enctypes
& ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
)) {
549 struct sdb_key key
= {};
551 ret
= smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context
,
552 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC
,
554 sizeof(p
->nthash
->hash
),
557 p
->skeys
->val
[p
->skeys
->len
++] = key
;
559 *available_enctypes
|= ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
;
560 } else if (ret
== KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP
) {
561 DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
562 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC
));
570 samba_kdc_sort_keys(p
->skeys
);
574 sdb_keys_free(p
->skeys
);
578 krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context
,
580 struct ldb_context
*ldb
,
581 const struct ldb_message
*msg
,
584 uint32_t userAccountControl
,
585 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type
,
587 krb5_kvno requested_kvno
,
588 struct sdb_entry
*entry
,
589 const uint32_t supported_enctypes_in
,
590 uint32_t *supported_enctypes_out
)
592 krb5_error_code ret
= 0;
593 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err
;
594 struct samr_Password
*hash
;
595 unsigned int num_ntPwdHistory
= 0;
596 struct samr_Password
*ntPwdHistory
= NULL
;
597 struct samr_Password
*old_hash
= NULL
;
598 struct samr_Password
*older_hash
= NULL
;
599 const struct ldb_val
*sc_val
;
600 struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb
;
601 struct supplementalCredentialsPackage
*scpk
= NULL
;
602 struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb
;
603 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4
*pkb4
= NULL
;
604 int krbtgt_number
= 0;
605 uint32_t current_kvno
;
606 uint32_t old_kvno
= 0;
607 uint32_t older_kvno
= 0;
608 uint32_t returned_kvno
= 0;
610 struct samba_kdc_user_keys keys
= { .num_pkeys
= 0, };
611 struct samba_kdc_user_keys old_keys
= { .num_pkeys
= 0, };
612 struct samba_kdc_user_keys older_keys
= { .num_pkeys
= 0, };
613 uint32_t available_enctypes
= 0;
614 uint32_t supported_enctypes
= supported_enctypes_in
;
615 const bool exporting_keytab
= flags
& SDB_F_ADMIN_DATA
;
617 *supported_enctypes_out
= 0;
619 /* Is this the krbtgt or a RODC krbtgt */
621 krbtgt_number
= ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg
, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
623 if (krbtgt_number
== -1) {
626 if (krbtgt_number
== 0) {
631 if (flags
& SDB_F_USER2USER_PRINCIPAL
) {
633 * User2User uses the session key
634 * from the additional ticket,
635 * so we just provide random keys
636 * here in order to make sure
637 * we never expose the user password
640 ret
= samba_kdc_set_random_keys(context
,
644 *supported_enctypes_out
= supported_enctypes
& ENC_ALL_TYPES
;
649 if ((ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT
)
650 && (userAccountControl
& UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED
)) {
651 ret
= samba_kdc_set_random_keys(context
,
655 *supported_enctypes_out
= supported_enctypes
& ENC_ALL_TYPES
;
660 current_kvno
= ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg
, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
661 if (current_kvno
> 1) {
662 old_kvno
= current_kvno
- 1;
664 if (current_kvno
> 2) {
665 older_kvno
= current_kvno
- 2;
669 * Even for the main krbtgt account
670 * we have to strictly split the kvno into
671 * two 16-bit parts and the upper 16-bit
672 * need to be all zero, even if
673 * the msDS-KeyVersionNumber has a value
676 * See https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14951
678 current_kvno
= SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(current_kvno
);
679 old_kvno
= SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(old_kvno
);
680 older_kvno
= SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(older_kvno
);
681 requested_kvno
= SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(requested_kvno
);
684 /* Get keys from the db */
686 hash
= samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx
, msg
, "unicodePwd");
687 num_ntPwdHistory
= samdb_result_hashes(mem_ctx
, msg
,
690 if (num_ntPwdHistory
> 1) {
691 old_hash
= &ntPwdHistory
[1];
693 if (num_ntPwdHistory
> 2) {
694 older_hash
= &ntPwdHistory
[2];
696 sc_val
= ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg
, "supplementalCredentials");
698 /* supplementalCredentials if present */
700 ndr_err
= ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val
, mem_ctx
, &scb
,
701 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t
)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob
);
702 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err
)) {
707 if (scb
.sub
.signature
!= SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE
) {
708 if (scb
.sub
.num_packages
!= 0) {
709 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob
, &scb
);
715 for (i
=0; i
< scb
.sub
.num_packages
; i
++) {
716 if (scb
.sub
.packages
[i
].name
!= NULL
&&
717 strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb
.sub
.packages
[i
].name
) == 0)
719 scpk
= &scb
.sub
.packages
[i
];
720 if (!scpk
->data
|| !scpk
->data
[0]) {
729 * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys element
730 * of supplementalCredentials
732 * The legacy Primary:Kerberos only contains
733 * single DES keys, which are completely ignored
739 blob
= strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx
, scpk
->data
);
745 /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
746 ndr_err
= ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob
, mem_ctx
, &_pkb
,
747 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t
)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob
);
748 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err
)) {
750 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
751 krb5_warnx(context
, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
755 if (_pkb
.version
!= 4) {
757 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
758 krb5_warnx(context
, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
762 pkb4
= &_pkb
.ctr
.ctr4
;
765 keys
= (struct samba_kdc_user_keys
) {
766 .kvno
= current_kvno
,
767 .supported_enctypes
= supported_enctypes
,
769 .salt_string
= pkb4
!= NULL
? pkb4
->salt
.string
: NULL
,
770 .num_pkeys
= pkb4
!= NULL
? pkb4
->num_keys
: 0,
771 .pkeys
= pkb4
!= NULL
? pkb4
->keys
: NULL
,
774 old_keys
= (struct samba_kdc_user_keys
) {
776 .supported_enctypes
= supported_enctypes
,
778 .salt_string
= pkb4
!= NULL
? pkb4
->salt
.string
: NULL
,
779 .num_pkeys
= pkb4
!= NULL
? pkb4
->num_old_keys
: 0,
780 .pkeys
= pkb4
!= NULL
? pkb4
->old_keys
: NULL
,
782 older_keys
= (struct samba_kdc_user_keys
) {
784 .supported_enctypes
= supported_enctypes
,
785 .nthash
= older_hash
,
786 .salt_string
= pkb4
!= NULL
? pkb4
->salt
.string
: NULL
,
787 .num_pkeys
= pkb4
!= NULL
? pkb4
->num_older_keys
: 0,
788 .pkeys
= pkb4
!= NULL
? pkb4
->older_keys
: NULL
,
791 if (flags
& SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED
) {
792 if (requested_kvno
== keys
.kvno
) {
794 * The current kvno was requested,
797 keys
.skeys
= &entry
->keys
;
798 keys
.available_enctypes
= &available_enctypes
;
799 keys
.returned_kvno
= &returned_kvno
;
800 } else if (requested_kvno
== 0) {
802 * don't return any keys
804 } else if (requested_kvno
== old_keys
.kvno
) {
806 * return the old keys as default keys
807 * with the requested kvno.
809 old_keys
.skeys
= &entry
->keys
;
810 old_keys
.available_enctypes
= &available_enctypes
;
811 old_keys
.returned_kvno
= &returned_kvno
;
812 } else if (requested_kvno
== older_keys
.kvno
) {
814 * return the older keys as default keys
815 * with the requested kvno.
817 older_keys
.skeys
= &entry
->keys
;
818 older_keys
.available_enctypes
= &available_enctypes
;
819 older_keys
.returned_kvno
= &returned_kvno
;
822 * don't return any keys
826 bool include_history
= false;
828 if ((flags
& SDB_F_GET_CLIENT
) && (flags
& SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ
)) {
829 include_history
= true;
830 } else if (exporting_keytab
) {
831 include_history
= true;
834 keys
.skeys
= &entry
->keys
;
835 keys
.available_enctypes
= &available_enctypes
;
836 keys
.returned_kvno
= &returned_kvno
;
838 if (include_history
&& old_keys
.kvno
!= 0) {
839 old_keys
.skeys
= &entry
->old_keys
;
841 if (include_history
&& older_keys
.kvno
!= 0) {
842 older_keys
.skeys
= &entry
->older_keys
;
846 if (keys
.skeys
!= NULL
) {
847 ret
= samba_kdc_fill_user_keys(context
, &keys
);
853 if (old_keys
.skeys
!= NULL
) {
854 ret
= samba_kdc_fill_user_keys(context
, &old_keys
);
860 if (older_keys
.skeys
!= NULL
) {
861 ret
= samba_kdc_fill_user_keys(context
, &older_keys
);
867 *supported_enctypes_out
|= available_enctypes
;
871 * Even for the main krbtgt account
872 * we have to strictly split the kvno into
873 * two 16-bit parts and the upper 16-bit
874 * need to be all zero, even if
875 * the msDS-KeyVersionNumber has a value
878 * See https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14951
880 returned_kvno
= SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(returned_kvno
, krbtgt_number
);
882 entry
->kvno
= returned_kvno
;
888 static krb5_error_code
is_principal_component_equal_impl(krb5_context context
,
889 krb5_const_principal principal
,
890 unsigned int component
,
897 #if defined(HAVE_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_GET_COMP_STRING)
898 if (component
>= krb5_princ_size(context
, principal
)) {
899 /* A non‐existent component compares equal to no string. */
903 p
= krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context
, principal
, component
);
908 *eq
= strcasecmp(p
, string
) == 0;
910 *eq
= strcmp(p
, string
) == 0;
916 krb5_error_code ret
= 0;
918 if (component
> INT_MAX
) {
922 if (component
>= krb5_princ_size(context
, principal
)) {
923 /* A non‐existent component compares equal to no string. */
928 ret
= smb_krb5_princ_component(context
, principal
, component
, &d
);
935 len
= strlen(string
);
936 if (d
.length
!= len
) {
942 *eq
= strncasecmp(p
, string
, len
) == 0;
944 *eq
= memcmp(p
, string
, len
) == 0;
950 static krb5_error_code
is_principal_component_equal_ignoring_case(krb5_context context
,
951 krb5_const_principal principal
,
952 unsigned int component
,
956 return is_principal_component_equal_impl(context
,
960 true /* do_strcasecmp */,
964 static krb5_error_code
is_principal_component_equal(krb5_context context
,
965 krb5_const_principal principal
,
966 unsigned int component
,
970 return is_principal_component_equal_impl(context
,
974 false /* do_strcasecmp */,
978 static krb5_error_code
is_kadmin_changepw(krb5_context context
,
979 krb5_const_principal principal
,
982 krb5_error_code ret
= 0;
985 if (krb5_princ_size(context
, principal
) != 2) {
986 *is_changepw
= false;
990 ret
= is_principal_component_equal(context
, principal
, 0, "kadmin", &eq
);
996 *is_changepw
= false;
1000 ret
= is_principal_component_equal(context
, principal
, 1, "changepw", &eq
);
1009 static krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_get_entry_principal(
1010 krb5_context context
,
1011 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
1012 const char *samAccountName
,
1013 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type
,
1015 bool is_kadmin_changepw
,
1016 krb5_const_principal in_princ
,
1017 krb5_principal
*out_princ
)
1019 struct loadparm_context
*lp_ctx
= kdc_db_ctx
->lp_ctx
;
1020 krb5_error_code code
= 0;
1021 bool canon
= flags
& (SDB_F_CANON
|SDB_F_FORCE_CANON
);
1024 * If we are set to canonicalize, we get back the fixed UPPER
1025 * case realm, and the real username (ie matching LDAP
1028 * Otherwise, if we are set to enterprise, we
1029 * get back the whole principal as-sent
1031 * Finally, if we are not set to canonicalize, we get back the
1032 * fixed UPPER case realm, but the as-sent username
1036 * We need to ensure that the kadmin/changepw principal isn't able to
1037 * issue krbtgt tickets, even if canonicalization is turned on.
1039 if (!is_kadmin_changepw
) {
1040 if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT
&& canon
) {
1042 * When requested to do so, ensure that both
1043 * the realm values in the principal are set
1044 * to the upper case, canonical realm
1046 code
= smb_krb5_make_principal(context
,
1048 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx
),
1050 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx
),
1055 smb_krb5_principal_set_type(context
,
1062 if ((canon
&& flags
& (SDB_F_FORCE_CANON
|SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ
)) ||
1063 (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY
&& in_princ
== NULL
)) {
1065 * SDB_F_CANON maps from the canonicalize flag in the
1066 * packet, and has a different meaning between AS-REQ
1067 * and TGS-REQ. We only change the principal in the
1070 * The SDB_F_FORCE_CANON if for new MIT KDC code that
1071 * wants the canonical name in all lookups, and takes
1072 * care to canonicalize only when appropriate.
1074 code
= smb_krb5_make_principal(context
,
1076 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx
),
1084 * For a krbtgt entry, this appears to be required regardless of the
1085 * canonicalize flag from the client.
1087 code
= krb5_copy_principal(context
, in_princ
, out_princ
);
1093 * While we have copied the client principal, tests show that Win2k3
1094 * returns the 'corrected' realm, not the client-specified realm. This
1095 * code attempts to replace the client principal's realm with the one
1096 * we determine from our records
1098 code
= smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context
,
1100 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx
));
1106 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
1108 static krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context
,
1109 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
1110 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
,
1111 krb5_const_principal principal
,
1112 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type
,
1115 struct ldb_dn
*realm_dn
,
1116 struct ldb_message
*msg
,
1117 struct sdb_entry
*entry
)
1119 TALLOC_CTX
*tmp_ctx
= NULL
;
1120 struct loadparm_context
*lp_ctx
= kdc_db_ctx
->lp_ctx
;
1121 uint32_t userAccountControl
;
1122 uint32_t msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed
;
1123 krb5_error_code ret
= 0;
1124 krb5_boolean is_computer
= FALSE
;
1125 struct samba_kdc_entry
*p
;
1128 bool protected_user
= false;
1131 bool is_krbtgt
= false;
1132 bool is_rodc
= false;
1133 bool force_rc4
= lpcfg_kdc_force_enable_rc4_weak_session_keys(lp_ctx
);
1134 struct ldb_message_element
*objectclasses
;
1135 struct ldb_val computer_val
= data_blob_string_const("computer");
1136 struct ldb_val gmsa_oc_val
= data_blob_string_const("msDS-GroupManagedServiceAccount");
1137 uint32_t config_default_supported_enctypes
= lpcfg_kdc_default_domain_supported_enctypes(lp_ctx
);
1138 uint32_t default_supported_enctypes
=
1139 config_default_supported_enctypes
!= 0 ?
1140 config_default_supported_enctypes
:
1141 ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
| ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK
;
1142 uint32_t supported_enctypes
1143 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg
,
1144 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
1145 default_supported_enctypes
);
1146 uint32_t pa_supported_enctypes
;
1147 uint32_t supported_session_etypes
;
1148 uint32_t available_enctypes
= 0;
1150 * also legacy enctypes are announced,
1151 * but effectively restricted by kdc_enctypes
1153 uint32_t domain_enctypes
= ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
| ENC_RSA_MD5
| ENC_CRC32
;
1154 uint32_t config_kdc_enctypes
= lpcfg_kdc_supported_enctypes(lp_ctx
);
1155 uint32_t kdc_enctypes
=
1156 config_kdc_enctypes
!= 0 ?
1157 config_kdc_enctypes
:
1159 const char *samAccountName
= ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg
, "samAccountName", NULL
);
1161 const struct authn_kerberos_client_policy
*authn_client_policy
= NULL
;
1162 const struct authn_server_policy
*authn_server_policy
= NULL
;
1163 int64_t enforced_tgt_lifetime_raw
;
1164 const bool user2user
= (flags
& SDB_F_USER2USER_PRINCIPAL
);
1166 *entry
= (struct sdb_entry
) {};
1168 tmp_ctx
= talloc_new(mem_ctx
);
1169 if (tmp_ctx
== NULL
) {
1173 if (supported_enctypes
== 0) {
1174 supported_enctypes
= default_supported_enctypes
;
1177 if (dsdb_functional_level(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
) >= DS_DOMAIN_FUNCTION_2008
) {
1178 domain_enctypes
|= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128
| ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256
;
1181 if (ldb_msg_find_element(msg
, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber")) {
1185 if (!samAccountName
) {
1187 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
1191 objectclasses
= ldb_msg_find_element(msg
, "objectClass");
1193 if (objectclasses
&& ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses
, &computer_val
)) {
1197 p
= talloc_zero(tmp_ctx
, struct samba_kdc_entry
);
1203 if (objectclasses
&& ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses
, &gmsa_oc_val
)) {
1204 p
->group_managed_service_account
= true;
1207 p
->is_rodc
= is_rodc
;
1208 p
->kdc_db_ctx
= kdc_db_ctx
;
1209 p
->realm_dn
= talloc_reference(p
, realm_dn
);
1215 talloc_set_destructor(p
, samba_kdc_entry_destructor
);
1217 entry
->skdc_entry
= p
;
1219 userAccountControl
= ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg
, "userAccountControl", 0);
1221 msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed
1222 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg
,
1223 "msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed",
1227 * This brings in the lockout flag, block the account if not
1228 * found. We need the weird UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE check because
1229 * we do not want to fail open if the value is not returned,
1230 * but 0 is a valid value (all OK)
1232 if (msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed
== UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE
) {
1234 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_message2entry: "
1235 "no msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed present");
1238 userAccountControl
|= msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed
;
1241 if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT
) {
1242 p
->is_krbtgt
= true;
1245 /* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
1246 entry
->flags
= uf2SDBFlags(context
, userAccountControl
, ent_type
);
1249 * Take control of the returned principal here, rather than
1250 * allowing the Heimdal code to do it as we have specific
1251 * behaviour around the forced realm to honour
1253 entry
->flags
.force_canonicalize
= true;
1256 * Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
1257 * default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
1258 * by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
1259 * their probably pathetically insecure password)
1261 * But user2user avoids using the keys based on the password,
1262 * so we can allow it.
1265 if (entry
->flags
.server
&& !user2user
1266 && lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx
, NULL
, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
1267 if (!is_computer
&& !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg
, "servicePrincipalName", NULL
)) {
1268 entry
->flags
.server
= 0;
1273 * We restrict a 3-part SPN ending in my domain/realm to full
1274 * domain controllers.
1276 * This avoids any cases where (eg) a demoted DC still has
1277 * these more restricted SPNs.
1279 if (krb5_princ_size(context
, principal
) > 2) {
1280 char *third_part
= NULL
;
1284 ret
= smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(tmp_ctx
,
1290 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string: out of memory");
1294 is_our_realm
= lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx
,
1296 is_dc
= userAccountControl
&
1297 (UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT
| UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT
);
1298 if (is_our_realm
&& !is_dc
) {
1299 entry
->flags
.server
= 0;
1303 * To give the correct type of error to the client, we must
1304 * not just return the entry without .server set, we must
1305 * pretend the principal does not exist. Otherwise we may
1306 * return ERR_POLICY instead of
1307 * KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN
1309 if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
&& entry
->flags
.server
== 0) {
1310 ret
= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
1311 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no servicePrincipalName present for this server, refusing with no-such-entry");
1314 if (flags
& SDB_F_ADMIN_DATA
) {
1315 /* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
1316 * of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in the traditional
1317 * DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
1320 /* use 'whenCreated' */
1321 entry
->created_by
.time
= ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg
, "whenCreated", 0);
1322 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
1324 ret
= smb_krb5_make_principal(context
,
1325 &entry
->created_by
.principal
,
1326 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx
), "kadmin", NULL
);
1328 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
1332 entry
->modified_by
= calloc(1, sizeof(struct sdb_event
));
1333 if (entry
->modified_by
== NULL
) {
1335 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "calloc: out of memory");
1339 /* use 'whenChanged' */
1340 entry
->modified_by
->time
= ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg
, "whenChanged", 0);
1341 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
1342 ret
= smb_krb5_make_principal(context
,
1343 &entry
->modified_by
->principal
,
1344 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx
), "kadmin", NULL
);
1346 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
1352 /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
1353 * virtue of being that particular RID */
1354 ret
= samdb_result_dom_sid_buf(msg
, "objectSid", &sid
);
1358 status
= dom_sid_split_rid(NULL
, &sid
, NULL
, &rid
);
1359 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status
)) {
1364 if (rid
== DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT
) {
1367 entry
->valid_end
= NULL
;
1368 entry
->pw_end
= NULL
;
1370 entry
->flags
.invalid
= 0;
1371 entry
->flags
.server
= 1;
1373 realm
= smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(
1374 tmp_ctx
, context
, principal
);
1375 if (realm
== NULL
) {
1380 /* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
1381 * 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
1382 * trouble, and not enforce the password expiry.
1383 * Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
1384 if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
) {
1385 bool is_changepw
= false;
1387 ret
= is_kadmin_changepw(context
, principal
, &is_changepw
);
1392 if (is_changepw
&& lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx
, realm
)) {
1393 entry
->flags
.change_pw
= 1;
1399 entry
->flags
.client
= 0;
1400 entry
->flags
.forwardable
= 1;
1401 entry
->flags
.ok_as_delegate
= 1;
1402 } else if (is_rodc
) {
1403 /* The RODC krbtgt account is like the main krbtgt,
1404 * but it does not have a changepw or kadmin
1407 entry
->valid_end
= NULL
;
1408 entry
->pw_end
= NULL
;
1410 /* Also don't allow the RODC krbtgt to be a client (it should not be needed) */
1411 entry
->flags
.client
= 0;
1412 entry
->flags
.invalid
= 0;
1413 entry
->flags
.server
= 1;
1415 entry
->flags
.client
= 0;
1416 entry
->flags
.forwardable
= 1;
1417 entry
->flags
.ok_as_delegate
= 0;
1418 } else if (entry
->flags
.server
&& ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
) {
1419 /* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
1420 * client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
1422 /* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
1423 * it could bypass the password restrictions */
1424 entry
->flags
.client
= 0;
1426 entry
->valid_end
= NULL
;
1427 entry
->pw_end
= NULL
;
1430 NTTIME must_change_time
1431 = samdb_result_nttime(msg
,
1432 "msDS-UserPasswordExpiryTimeComputed",
1434 if (must_change_time
== 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL
) {
1435 entry
->pw_end
= NULL
;
1437 entry
->pw_end
= malloc(sizeof(*entry
->pw_end
));
1438 if (entry
->pw_end
== NULL
) {
1442 *entry
->pw_end
= nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time
);
1445 acct_expiry
= samdb_result_account_expires(msg
);
1446 if (acct_expiry
== 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL
) {
1447 entry
->valid_end
= NULL
;
1449 entry
->valid_end
= malloc(sizeof(*entry
->valid_end
));
1450 if (entry
->valid_end
== NULL
) {
1454 *entry
->valid_end
= nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry
);
1458 ret
= samba_kdc_get_entry_principal(context
,
1463 entry
->flags
.change_pw
,
1467 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
1471 entry
->valid_start
= NULL
;
1473 entry
->max_life
= malloc(sizeof(*entry
->max_life
));
1474 if (entry
->max_life
== NULL
) {
1479 if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
) {
1480 *entry
->max_life
= kdc_db_ctx
->policy
.svc_tkt_lifetime
;
1481 } else if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT
|| ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT
) {
1482 *entry
->max_life
= kdc_db_ctx
->policy
.usr_tkt_lifetime
;
1484 *entry
->max_life
= MIN(kdc_db_ctx
->policy
.svc_tkt_lifetime
,
1485 kdc_db_ctx
->policy
.usr_tkt_lifetime
);
1488 if (entry
->flags
.change_pw
) {
1489 /* Limit lifetime of kpasswd tickets to two minutes or less. */
1490 *entry
->max_life
= MIN(*entry
->max_life
, CHANGEPW_LIFETIME
);
1493 entry
->max_renew
= malloc(sizeof(*entry
->max_renew
));
1494 if (entry
->max_renew
== NULL
) {
1499 *entry
->max_renew
= kdc_db_ctx
->policy
.renewal_lifetime
;
1502 * A principal acting as a client that is not being looked up as the
1503 * principal of an armor ticket may have an authentication policy apply
1506 * We won’t get an authentication policy for the client of an S4U2Self
1507 * or S4U2Proxy request. Those clients are looked up with
1508 * SDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ instead of with SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ.
1510 if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT
&&
1511 (flags
& SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ
) &&
1512 !(flags
& SDB_F_ARMOR_PRINCIPAL
))
1514 ret
= authn_policy_kerberos_client(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
, tmp_ctx
, msg
,
1515 &authn_client_policy
);
1522 * A principal acting as a server may have an authentication policy
1525 if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
) {
1526 ret
= authn_policy_server(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
, tmp_ctx
, msg
,
1527 &authn_server_policy
);
1533 enforced_tgt_lifetime_raw
= authn_policy_enforced_tgt_lifetime_raw(authn_client_policy
);
1534 if (enforced_tgt_lifetime_raw
!= 0) {
1535 int64_t lifetime_secs
= enforced_tgt_lifetime_raw
;
1537 lifetime_secs
/= INT64_C(1000) * 1000 * 10;
1538 lifetime_secs
= MIN(lifetime_secs
, INT_MAX
);
1539 lifetime_secs
= MAX(lifetime_secs
, INT_MIN
);
1542 * Set both lifetime and renewal time based only on the
1543 * configured maximum lifetime — not on the configured renewal
1544 * time. Yes, this is what Windows does.
1546 lifetime_secs
= MIN(*entry
->max_life
, lifetime_secs
);
1547 *entry
->max_life
= lifetime_secs
;
1548 *entry
->max_renew
= lifetime_secs
;
1551 if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT
&& (flags
& SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ
)) {
1553 const struct auth_user_info_dc
*user_info_dc
= NULL
;
1555 * These protections only apply to clients, so servers in the
1556 * Protected Users group may still have service tickets to them
1557 * encrypted with RC4. For accounts looked up as servers, note
1558 * that 'msg' does not contain the 'memberOf' attribute for
1559 * determining whether the account is a member of Protected
1562 * Additionally, Microsoft advises that accounts for services
1563 * and computers should never be members of Protected Users, or
1564 * they may fail to authenticate.
1566 ret
= samba_kdc_get_user_info_from_db(tmp_ctx
,
1575 result
= dsdb_is_protected_user(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
,
1577 user_info_dc
->num_sids
);
1583 protected_user
= result
;
1585 if (protected_user
) {
1586 entry
->flags
.forwardable
= 0;
1587 entry
->flags
.proxiable
= 0;
1589 if (enforced_tgt_lifetime_raw
== 0) {
1591 * If a TGT lifetime hasn’t been set, Protected
1592 * Users enforces a four hour TGT lifetime.
1594 *entry
->max_life
= MIN(*entry
->max_life
, 4 * 60 * 60);
1595 *entry
->max_renew
= MIN(*entry
->max_renew
, 4 * 60 * 60);
1600 if (rid
== DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT
|| is_rodc
) {
1606 * KDCs (and KDCs on RODCs)
1607 * ignore msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes completely
1608 * but support all supported enctypes by the domain.
1610 supported_enctypes
= domain_enctypes
;
1612 enable_fast
= lpcfg_kdc_enable_fast(kdc_db_ctx
->lp_ctx
);
1614 supported_enctypes
|= ENC_FAST_SUPPORTED
;
1617 supported_enctypes
|= ENC_CLAIMS_SUPPORTED
;
1618 supported_enctypes
|= ENC_COMPOUND_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED
;
1621 * Resource SID compression is enabled implicitly, unless
1622 * disabled in msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes.
1625 } else if (userAccountControl
& (UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT
|UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT
)) {
1627 * DCs and RODCs computer accounts take
1628 * msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes unmodified, but
1629 * force all enctypes supported by the domain.
1631 supported_enctypes
|= domain_enctypes
;
1633 } else if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT
||
1634 (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY
)) {
1636 * for AS-REQ the client chooses the enc types it
1637 * supports, and this will vary between computers a
1638 * user logs in from. Therefore, so that we accept any
1639 * of the client's keys for decrypting padata,
1640 * supported_enctypes should not restrict etype usage.
1642 * likewise for 'any' return as much as is supported,
1643 * to export into a keytab.
1645 supported_enctypes
|= ENC_ALL_TYPES
;
1648 /* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
1649 if (userAccountControl
& UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY
) {
1650 supported_enctypes
&= ~ENC_ALL_TYPES
;
1653 if (protected_user
) {
1654 supported_enctypes
&= ~ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
;
1657 pa_supported_enctypes
= supported_enctypes
;
1658 supported_session_etypes
= supported_enctypes
;
1659 if (supported_session_etypes
& ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK
) {
1660 supported_session_etypes
|= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256
;
1661 supported_session_etypes
|= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128
;
1664 supported_session_etypes
|= ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
;
1667 * now that we remembered what to announce in pa_supported_enctypes
1668 * and normalized ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK, we restrict the
1669 * rest to the enc types the local kdc supports.
1671 supported_enctypes
&= kdc_enctypes
;
1672 supported_session_etypes
&= kdc_enctypes
;
1674 /* Get keys from the db */
1675 ret
= samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context
, p
,
1676 kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
, msg
,
1679 ent_type
, flags
, kvno
, entry
,
1681 &available_enctypes
);
1683 /* Could be bogus data in the entry, or out of memory */
1688 * If we only have a nthash stored,
1689 * but a better session key would be
1690 * available, we fallback to fetching the
1691 * RC4_HMAC_MD5, which implicitly also
1692 * would allow an RC4_HMAC_MD5 session key.
1693 * But only if the kdc actually supports
1696 if (available_enctypes
== 0 &&
1697 (supported_enctypes
& ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
) == 0 &&
1698 (supported_enctypes
& ~ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
) != 0 &&
1699 (kdc_enctypes
& ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
) != 0)
1701 supported_enctypes
= ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
;
1702 ret
= samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context
, p
,
1703 kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
, msg
,
1706 ent_type
, flags
, kvno
, entry
,
1708 &available_enctypes
);
1710 /* Could be bogus data in the entry, or out of memory */
1716 * We need to support all session keys enctypes for
1717 * all keys we provide
1719 supported_session_etypes
|= available_enctypes
;
1721 ret
= sdb_entry_set_etypes(entry
);
1726 if (entry
->flags
.server
) {
1728 supported_session_etypes
& KERB_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
;
1730 supported_session_etypes
& KERB_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
;
1732 supported_session_etypes
& ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
;
1733 ret
= sdb_entry_set_session_etypes(entry
,
1742 if (entry
->keys
.len
!= 0) {
1744 * FIXME: Currently limited to Heimdal so as not to
1745 * break MIT KDCs, for which no fix is available.
1747 #ifdef SAMBA4_USES_HEIMDAL
1750 * The krbtgt account, having no reason to
1751 * issue tickets encrypted in weaker keys,
1752 * shall only make available its strongest
1753 * key. All weaker keys are stripped out. This
1754 * makes it impossible for an RC4-encrypted
1755 * TGT to be accepted when AES KDC keys exist.
1757 * This controls the ticket key and so the PAC
1758 * signature algorithms indirectly, preventing
1759 * a weak KDC checksum from being accepted
1760 * when we verify the signatures for an
1761 * S4U2Proxy evidence ticket. As such, this is
1762 * indispensable for addressing
1765 * Being strict here also provides protection
1766 * against possible future attacks on weak
1769 entry
->keys
.len
= 1;
1770 if (entry
->etypes
!= NULL
) {
1771 entry
->etypes
->len
= MIN(entry
->etypes
->len
, 1);
1773 entry
->old_keys
.len
= MIN(entry
->old_keys
.len
, 1);
1774 entry
->older_keys
.len
= MIN(entry
->older_keys
.len
, 1);
1777 } else if (kdc_db_ctx
->rodc
) {
1779 * We are on an RODC, but don't have keys for this
1780 * account. Signal this to the caller
1782 auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(kdc_db_ctx
,
1783 kdc_db_ctx
->msg_ctx
,
1786 ret
= SDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE
;
1790 * oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
1791 * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
1792 * allows an entry with no keys (yet).
1796 p
->msg
= talloc_steal(p
, msg
);
1797 p
->supported_enctypes
= pa_supported_enctypes
;
1799 p
->client_policy
= talloc_steal(p
, authn_client_policy
);
1800 p
->server_policy
= talloc_steal(p
, authn_server_policy
);
1802 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx
, p
);
1806 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
1807 sdb_entry_free(entry
);
1810 talloc_free(tmp_ctx
);
1815 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
1816 * The kvno is what the remote client asked for
1818 static krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context
,
1819 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
1820 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
,
1821 enum trust_direction direction
,
1822 struct ldb_dn
*realm_dn
,
1825 struct ldb_message
*msg
,
1826 struct sdb_entry
*entry
)
1828 TALLOC_CTX
*tmp_ctx
= NULL
;
1829 struct loadparm_context
*lp_ctx
= kdc_db_ctx
->lp_ctx
;
1830 const char *our_realm
= lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx
);
1831 char *partner_realm
= NULL
;
1832 const char *realm
= NULL
;
1833 const char *krbtgt_realm
= NULL
;
1834 DATA_BLOB password_utf16
= data_blob_null
;
1835 DATA_BLOB password_utf8
= data_blob_null
;
1836 struct samr_Password _password_hash
;
1837 const struct samr_Password
*password_hash
= NULL
;
1838 const struct ldb_val
*password_val
;
1839 struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob
;
1840 struct samba_kdc_entry
*p
;
1841 bool use_previous
= false;
1842 uint32_t current_kvno
;
1843 uint32_t previous_kvno
;
1844 uint32_t num_keys
= 0;
1845 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err
;
1848 struct AuthenticationInformationArray
*auth_array
;
1851 uint32_t *auth_kvno
;
1852 bool prefer_current
= false;
1853 bool force_rc4
= lpcfg_kdc_force_enable_rc4_weak_session_keys(lp_ctx
);
1854 uint32_t supported_enctypes
= ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
;
1855 uint32_t pa_supported_enctypes
;
1856 uint32_t supported_session_etypes
;
1857 uint32_t config_kdc_enctypes
= lpcfg_kdc_supported_enctypes(lp_ctx
);
1858 uint32_t kdc_enctypes
=
1859 config_kdc_enctypes
!= 0 ?
1860 config_kdc_enctypes
:
1862 struct lsa_TrustDomainInfoInfoEx
*tdo
= NULL
;
1865 *entry
= (struct sdb_entry
) {};
1867 tmp_ctx
= talloc_new(mem_ctx
);
1868 if (tmp_ctx
== NULL
) {
1872 if (dsdb_functional_level(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
) >= DS_DOMAIN_FUNCTION_2008
) {
1873 /* If not told otherwise, Windows now assumes that trusts support AES. */
1874 supported_enctypes
= ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg
,
1875 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
1876 ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256
);
1879 pa_supported_enctypes
= supported_enctypes
;
1880 supported_session_etypes
= supported_enctypes
;
1881 if (supported_session_etypes
& ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK
) {
1882 supported_session_etypes
|= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256
;
1883 supported_session_etypes
|= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128
;
1886 supported_session_etypes
|= ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
;
1889 * now that we remembered what to announce in pa_supported_enctypes
1890 * and normalized ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK, we restrict the
1891 * rest to the enc types the local kdc supports.
1893 supported_enctypes
&= kdc_enctypes
;
1894 supported_session_etypes
&= kdc_enctypes
;
1896 status
= dsdb_trust_parse_tdo_info(tmp_ctx
, msg
, &tdo
);
1897 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status
)) {
1898 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
1903 if (!(tdo
->trust_direction
& direction
)) {
1904 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
1905 ret
= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
1909 if (tdo
->trust_type
!= LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL
) {
1911 * Only UPLEVEL domains support kerberos here,
1912 * as we don't support LSA_TRUST_TYPE_MIT.
1914 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
1915 ret
= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
1919 if (tdo
->trust_attributes
& LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION
) {
1921 * We don't support selective authentication yet.
1923 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
1924 ret
= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
1928 if (tdo
->domain_name
.string
== NULL
) {
1929 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
1930 ret
= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
1933 partner_realm
= strupper_talloc(tmp_ctx
, tdo
->domain_name
.string
);
1934 if (partner_realm
== NULL
) {
1935 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
1940 if (direction
== INBOUND
) {
1942 krbtgt_realm
= partner_realm
;
1944 password_val
= ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg
, "trustAuthIncoming");
1945 } else { /* OUTBOUND */
1946 realm
= partner_realm
;
1947 krbtgt_realm
= our_realm
;
1949 password_val
= ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg
, "trustAuthOutgoing");
1952 if (password_val
== NULL
) {
1953 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
1954 ret
= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
1958 ndr_err
= ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val
, tmp_ctx
, &password_blob
,
1959 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t
)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob
);
1960 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err
)) {
1961 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
1966 p
= talloc_zero(tmp_ctx
, struct samba_kdc_entry
);
1973 p
->kdc_db_ctx
= kdc_db_ctx
;
1974 p
->realm_dn
= realm_dn
;
1975 p
->supported_enctypes
= pa_supported_enctypes
;
1977 talloc_set_destructor(p
, samba_kdc_entry_destructor
);
1979 entry
->skdc_entry
= p
;
1981 /* use 'whenCreated' */
1982 entry
->created_by
.time
= ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg
, "whenCreated", 0);
1983 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
1984 ret
= smb_krb5_make_principal(context
,
1985 &entry
->created_by
.principal
,
1986 realm
, "kadmin", NULL
);
1988 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
1993 * We always need to generate the canonicalized principal
1994 * with the values of our database.
1996 ret
= smb_krb5_make_principal(context
, &entry
->principal
, realm
,
1997 "krbtgt", krbtgt_realm
, NULL
);
1999 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
2002 smb_krb5_principal_set_type(context
, entry
->principal
,
2005 entry
->valid_start
= NULL
;
2007 /* we need to work out if we are going to use the current or
2008 * the previous password hash.
2009 * We base this on the kvno the client passes in. If the kvno
2010 * passed in is equal to the current kvno in our database then
2011 * we use the current structure. If it is the current kvno-1,
2012 * then we use the previous substructure.
2016 * Windows prefers the previous key for one hour.
2018 tv
= timeval_current();
2019 if (tv
.tv_sec
> 3600) {
2022 an_hour_ago
= timeval_to_nttime(&tv
);
2024 /* first work out the current kvno */
2026 for (i
=0; i
< password_blob
.count
; i
++) {
2027 struct AuthenticationInformation
*a
=
2028 &password_blob
.current
.array
[i
];
2030 if (a
->LastUpdateTime
<= an_hour_ago
) {
2031 prefer_current
= true;
2034 if (a
->AuthType
== TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION
) {
2035 current_kvno
= a
->AuthInfo
.version
.version
;
2038 if (current_kvno
== 0) {
2039 previous_kvno
= 255;
2041 previous_kvno
= current_kvno
- 1;
2043 for (i
=0; i
< password_blob
.count
; i
++) {
2044 struct AuthenticationInformation
*a
=
2045 &password_blob
.previous
.array
[i
];
2047 if (a
->AuthType
== TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION
) {
2048 previous_kvno
= a
->AuthInfo
.version
.version
;
2052 /* work out whether we will use the previous or current
2054 if (password_blob
.previous
.count
== 0) {
2055 /* there is no previous password */
2056 use_previous
= false;
2057 } else if (!(flags
& SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED
)) {
2059 * If not specified we use the lowest kvno
2060 * for the first hour after an update.
2062 if (prefer_current
) {
2063 use_previous
= false;
2064 } else if (previous_kvno
< current_kvno
) {
2065 use_previous
= true;
2067 use_previous
= false;
2069 } else if (kvno
== current_kvno
) {
2073 use_previous
= false;
2074 } else if (kvno
== previous_kvno
) {
2078 use_previous
= true;
2081 * Fallback to the current one for anything else
2083 use_previous
= false;
2087 auth_array
= &password_blob
.previous
;
2088 auth_kvno
= &previous_kvno
;
2090 auth_array
= &password_blob
.current
;
2091 auth_kvno
= ¤t_kvno
;
2094 /* use the kvno the client specified, if available */
2095 if (flags
& SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED
) {
2098 entry
->kvno
= *auth_kvno
;
2101 for (i
=0; i
< auth_array
->count
; i
++) {
2102 if (auth_array
->array
[i
].AuthType
== TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR
) {
2105 password_utf16
= data_blob_const(auth_array
->array
[i
].AuthInfo
.clear
.password
,
2106 auth_array
->array
[i
].AuthInfo
.clear
.size
);
2107 if (password_utf16
.length
== 0) {
2111 if (supported_enctypes
& ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
) {
2112 mdfour(_password_hash
.hash
, password_utf16
.data
, password_utf16
.length
);
2113 if (password_hash
== NULL
) {
2116 password_hash
= &_password_hash
;
2119 if (!(supported_enctypes
& (ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128
|ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256
))) {
2123 ok
= convert_string_talloc(tmp_ctx
,
2124 CH_UTF16MUNGED
, CH_UTF8
,
2125 password_utf16
.data
,
2126 password_utf16
.length
,
2127 &password_utf8
.data
,
2128 &password_utf8
.length
);
2130 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
2135 if (supported_enctypes
& ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128
) {
2138 if (supported_enctypes
& ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256
) {
2142 } else if (auth_array
->array
[i
].AuthType
== TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF
) {
2143 if (supported_enctypes
& ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
) {
2144 password_hash
= &auth_array
->array
[i
].AuthInfo
.nt4owf
.password
;
2150 /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
2151 if (num_keys
== 0) {
2152 DBG_WARNING("no usable key found\n");
2153 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
2154 ret
= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2158 entry
->keys
.val
= calloc(num_keys
, sizeof(struct sdb_key
));
2159 if (entry
->keys
.val
== NULL
) {
2160 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
2165 if (password_utf8
.length
!= 0) {
2166 struct sdb_key key
= {};
2167 krb5_const_principal salt_principal
= entry
->principal
;
2169 krb5_data cleartext_data
;
2171 cleartext_data
.data
= discard_const_p(char, password_utf8
.data
);
2172 cleartext_data
.length
= password_utf8
.length
;
2174 ret
= smb_krb5_get_pw_salt(context
,
2181 if (supported_enctypes
& ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256
) {
2182 ret
= smb_krb5_create_key_from_string(context
,
2186 ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
,
2189 smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context
, &salt
);
2193 entry
->keys
.val
[entry
->keys
.len
] = key
;
2197 if (supported_enctypes
& ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128
) {
2198 ret
= smb_krb5_create_key_from_string(context
,
2202 ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
,
2205 smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context
, &salt
);
2209 entry
->keys
.val
[entry
->keys
.len
] = key
;
2213 smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context
, &salt
);
2216 if (password_hash
!= NULL
) {
2217 struct sdb_key key
= {};
2219 ret
= smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context
,
2220 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC
,
2221 password_hash
->hash
,
2222 sizeof(password_hash
->hash
),
2228 entry
->keys
.val
[entry
->keys
.len
] = key
;
2232 entry
->flags
= (struct SDBFlags
) {};
2233 entry
->flags
.immutable
= 1;
2234 entry
->flags
.invalid
= 0;
2235 entry
->flags
.server
= 1;
2236 entry
->flags
.require_preauth
= 1;
2238 entry
->pw_end
= NULL
;
2240 entry
->max_life
= NULL
;
2242 entry
->max_renew
= NULL
;
2244 /* Match Windows behavior and allow forwardable flag in cross-realm. */
2245 entry
->flags
.forwardable
= 1;
2247 samba_kdc_sort_keys(&entry
->keys
);
2249 ret
= sdb_entry_set_etypes(entry
);
2256 supported_session_etypes
& KERB_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
;
2258 supported_session_etypes
& KERB_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
;
2260 supported_session_etypes
& ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
;
2261 ret
= sdb_entry_set_session_etypes(entry
,
2270 p
->msg
= talloc_steal(p
, msg
);
2272 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx
, p
);
2275 TALLOC_FREE(partner_realm
);
2278 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
2279 sdb_entry_free(entry
);
2282 talloc_free(tmp_ctx
);
2287 static krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context
, struct ldb_context
*ldb_ctx
,
2288 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
,
2290 struct ldb_dn
*realm_dn
,
2291 struct ldb_message
**pmsg
)
2294 const char * const *attrs
= trust_attrs
;
2296 status
= dsdb_trust_search_tdo(ldb_ctx
, realm
, realm
,
2297 attrs
, mem_ctx
, pmsg
);
2298 if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status
)) {
2300 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status
, NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
)) {
2301 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2302 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status
, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY
)) {
2304 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_lookup_trust: out of memory");
2308 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_lookup_trust: %s", nt_errstr(status
));
2313 static krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context
,
2314 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
2315 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
,
2316 krb5_const_principal principal
,
2318 const uint32_t dsdb_flags
,
2319 struct ldb_dn
**realm_dn
,
2320 struct ldb_message
**msg
)
2323 char *principal_string
= NULL
;
2325 if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context
, principal
) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL
) {
2326 krb5_error_code ret
= 0;
2328 ret
= smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx
, context
,
2329 principal
, 0, &principal_string
);
2334 char *principal_string_m
= NULL
;
2335 krb5_error_code ret
;
2337 ret
= krb5_unparse_name(context
, principal
, &principal_string_m
);
2342 principal_string
= talloc_strdup(mem_ctx
, principal_string_m
);
2343 SAFE_FREE(principal_string_m
);
2344 if (principal_string
== NULL
) {
2349 nt_status
= sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
,
2350 mem_ctx
, principal_string
, attrs
, dsdb_flags
,
2352 if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status
, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER
)) {
2353 krb5_principal fallback_principal
= NULL
;
2354 unsigned int num_comp
;
2355 char *fallback_realm
= NULL
;
2356 char *fallback_account
= NULL
;
2357 krb5_error_code ret
;
2359 ret
= krb5_parse_name(context
, principal_string
,
2360 &fallback_principal
);
2361 TALLOC_FREE(principal_string
);
2366 num_comp
= krb5_princ_size(context
, fallback_principal
);
2367 fallback_realm
= smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(
2368 mem_ctx
, context
, fallback_principal
);
2369 if (fallback_realm
== NULL
) {
2370 krb5_free_principal(context
, fallback_principal
);
2374 if (num_comp
== 1) {
2377 ret
= smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx
,
2378 context
, fallback_principal
, 0, &fallback_account
);
2380 krb5_free_principal(context
, fallback_principal
);
2381 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm
);
2385 len
= strlen(fallback_account
);
2386 if (len
>= 2 && fallback_account
[len
- 1] == '$') {
2387 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_account
);
2390 krb5_free_principal(context
, fallback_principal
);
2391 fallback_principal
= NULL
;
2393 if (fallback_account
!= NULL
) {
2396 with_dollar
= talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx
, "%s$",
2398 if (with_dollar
== NULL
) {
2399 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm
);
2402 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_account
);
2404 ret
= smb_krb5_make_principal(context
,
2405 &fallback_principal
,
2408 TALLOC_FREE(with_dollar
);
2410 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm
);
2414 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm
);
2416 if (fallback_principal
!= NULL
) {
2417 char *fallback_string
= NULL
;
2419 ret
= krb5_unparse_name(context
,
2423 krb5_free_principal(context
, fallback_principal
);
2427 nt_status
= sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
,
2432 SAFE_FREE(fallback_string
);
2434 krb5_free_principal(context
, fallback_principal
);
2435 fallback_principal
= NULL
;
2437 TALLOC_FREE(principal_string
);
2439 if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status
, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER
)) {
2440 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2441 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status
, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY
)) {
2443 } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status
)) {
2450 static krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context
,
2451 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
2452 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
,
2453 krb5_const_principal principal
,
2456 struct sdb_entry
*entry
)
2458 struct ldb_dn
*realm_dn
;
2459 krb5_error_code ret
;
2460 struct ldb_message
*msg
= NULL
;
2462 ret
= samba_kdc_lookup_client(context
, kdc_db_ctx
,
2463 mem_ctx
, principal
, user_attrs
, DSDB_SEARCH_UPDATE_MANAGED_PASSWORDS
,
2469 ret
= samba_kdc_message2entry(context
, kdc_db_ctx
, mem_ctx
,
2470 principal
, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT
,
2472 realm_dn
, msg
, entry
);
2476 static krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context
,
2477 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
2478 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
,
2479 krb5_const_principal principal
,
2482 struct sdb_entry
*entry
)
2484 TALLOC_CTX
*tmp_ctx
= NULL
;
2485 struct loadparm_context
*lp_ctx
= kdc_db_ctx
->lp_ctx
;
2486 krb5_error_code ret
= 0;
2488 struct ldb_message
*msg
= NULL
;
2489 struct ldb_dn
*realm_dn
= ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
);
2490 char *realm_from_princ
;
2491 char *realm_princ_comp
= NULL
;
2493 tmp_ctx
= talloc_new(mem_ctx
);
2494 if (tmp_ctx
== NULL
) {
2499 realm_from_princ
= smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(
2500 tmp_ctx
, context
, principal
);
2501 if (realm_from_princ
== NULL
) {
2503 ret
= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2507 is_krbtgt
= smb_krb5_principal_is_tgs(context
, principal
);
2508 if (is_krbtgt
== -1) {
2511 } else if (!is_krbtgt
) {
2513 ret
= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2517 /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
2519 ret
= smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(tmp_ctx
, context
, principal
, 1, &realm_princ_comp
);
2520 if (ret
== ENOENT
) {
2526 if (lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx
, realm_from_princ
)
2527 && (realm_princ_comp
== NULL
|| lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx
, realm_princ_comp
))) {
2528 /* us, or someone quite like us */
2529 /* Kludge, kludge, kludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
2530 * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
2534 unsigned int krbtgt_number
;
2535 /* w2k8r2 sometimes gives us a kvno of 255 for inter-domain
2536 trust tickets. We don't yet know what this means, but we do
2537 seem to need to treat it as unspecified */
2538 if (flags
& (SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED
|SDB_F_RODC_NUMBER_SPECIFIED
)) {
2539 krbtgt_number
= SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno
);
2540 if (kdc_db_ctx
->rodc
) {
2541 if (krbtgt_number
!= kdc_db_ctx
->my_krbtgt_number
) {
2542 ret
= SDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE
;
2547 krbtgt_number
= kdc_db_ctx
->my_krbtgt_number
;
2550 if (krbtgt_number
== kdc_db_ctx
->my_krbtgt_number
) {
2551 lret
= dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
, tmp_ctx
,
2552 &msg
, kdc_db_ctx
->krbtgt_dn
, LDB_SCOPE_BASE
,
2553 krbtgt_attrs
, DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG
| DSDB_SEARCH_UPDATE_MANAGED_PASSWORDS
,
2554 "(objectClass=user)");
2556 /* We need to look up an RODC krbtgt (perhaps
2557 * ours, if we are an RODC, perhaps another
2558 * RODC if we are a read-write DC */
2559 lret
= dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
, tmp_ctx
,
2560 &msg
, realm_dn
, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE
,
2562 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN
| DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG
| DSDB_SEARCH_UPDATE_MANAGED_PASSWORDS
,
2563 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=%u))", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number
));
2566 if (lret
== LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT
) {
2567 krb5_warnx(context
, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
2568 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number
));
2569 krb5_set_error_message(context
, SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
,
2570 "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
2571 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number
));
2572 ret
= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2574 } else if (lret
!= LDB_SUCCESS
) {
2575 krb5_warnx(context
, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
2576 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number
));
2577 krb5_set_error_message(context
, SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
,
2578 "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
2579 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number
));
2580 ret
= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2584 ret
= samba_kdc_message2entry(context
, kdc_db_ctx
, mem_ctx
,
2585 principal
, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT
,
2586 flags
, kvno
, realm_dn
, msg
, entry
);
2588 krb5_warnx(context
, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
2591 enum trust_direction direction
= UNKNOWN
;
2592 const char *realm
= NULL
;
2594 /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
2596 if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx
), realm_from_princ
) == 0) {
2597 /* look for inbound trust */
2598 direction
= INBOUND
;
2599 realm
= realm_princ_comp
;
2603 ret
= is_principal_component_equal_ignoring_case(context
, principal
, 1, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx
), &eq
);
2609 /* look for outbound trust */
2610 direction
= OUTBOUND
;
2611 realm
= realm_from_princ
;
2613 krb5_warnx(context
, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
2616 krb5_set_error_message(context
, SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
2619 ret
= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2624 /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
2626 ret
= samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context
, kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
,
2628 realm
, realm_dn
, &msg
);
2631 krb5_warnx(context
, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: could not find principal in DB");
2632 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: could not find principal in DB");
2636 ret
= samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context
, kdc_db_ctx
, mem_ctx
,
2638 realm_dn
, flags
, kvno
, msg
, entry
);
2640 krb5_warnx(context
, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: trust_message2entry failed for %s",
2641 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg
->dn
));
2642 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: "
2643 "trust_message2entry failed for %s",
2644 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg
->dn
));
2649 talloc_free(tmp_ctx
);
2653 static krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context
,
2654 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
2655 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
,
2656 krb5_const_principal principal
,
2658 struct ldb_dn
**realm_dn
,
2659 struct ldb_message
**msg
)
2661 krb5_error_code ret
;
2662 if ((smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context
, principal
) != KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL
)
2663 && krb5_princ_size(context
, principal
) >= 2) {
2664 /* 'normal server' case */
2667 struct ldb_dn
*user_dn
;
2668 char *principal_string
;
2670 ret
= krb5_unparse_name_flags(context
, principal
,
2671 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM
,
2677 /* At this point we may find the host is known to be
2678 * in a different realm, so we should generate a
2679 * referral instead */
2680 nt_status
= crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
,
2681 mem_ctx
, principal_string
,
2682 &user_dn
, realm_dn
);
2683 free(principal_string
);
2685 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status
)) {
2686 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2689 ldb_ret
= dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
,
2691 msg
, user_dn
, LDB_SCOPE_BASE
,
2693 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN
| DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG
| DSDB_SEARCH_UPDATE_MANAGED_PASSWORDS
,
2695 if (ldb_ret
!= LDB_SUCCESS
) {
2696 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2699 } else if (!(flags
& SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ
)
2700 && smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context
, principal
) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL
) {
2702 * The behaviour of accepting an
2703 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL server principal
2704 * containing a UPN only applies to TGS-REQ packets,
2705 * not AS-REQ packets.
2707 return samba_kdc_lookup_client(context
, kdc_db_ctx
,
2708 mem_ctx
, principal
, server_attrs
, DSDB_SEARCH_UPDATE_MANAGED_PASSWORDS
,
2713 * - the AS-REQ, where we only accept
2714 * samAccountName based lookups for the server, no
2715 * matter if the name is an
2716 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL or not
2717 * - for the TGS-REQ when we are not given an
2718 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL, which also must
2719 * only lookup samAccountName based names.
2723 krb5_principal enterprise_principal
= NULL
;
2724 krb5_const_principal used_principal
= NULL
;
2727 char *filter
= NULL
;
2729 if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context
, principal
) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL
) {
2731 /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
2732 if (krb5_princ_size(context
, principal
) != 1) {
2733 ret
= KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED
;
2734 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_lookup_server: request for an "
2735 "enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
2736 krb5_princ_size(context
, principal
));
2739 ret
= smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx
, context
, principal
, 0, &str
);
2741 return KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED
;
2743 ret
= krb5_parse_name(context
, str
,
2744 &enterprise_principal
);
2749 used_principal
= enterprise_principal
;
2751 used_principal
= principal
;
2754 /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
2755 *realm_dn
= ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
);
2757 /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referral */
2759 ret
= krb5_unparse_name_flags(context
, used_principal
,
2760 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM
|
2761 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY
,
2763 used_principal
= NULL
;
2764 krb5_free_principal(context
, enterprise_principal
);
2765 enterprise_principal
= NULL
;
2768 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_lookup_server: could not parse principal");
2769 krb5_warnx(context
, "samba_kdc_lookup_server: could not parse principal");
2773 name1
= ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx
, short_princ
);
2774 SAFE_FREE(short_princ
);
2775 if (name1
== NULL
) {
2778 len1
= strlen(name1
);
2779 if (len1
>= 1 && name1
[len1
- 1] != '$') {
2780 filter
= talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx
,
2781 "(&(objectClass=user)(|(samAccountName=%s)(samAccountName=%s$)))",
2783 if (filter
== NULL
) {
2787 filter
= talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx
,
2788 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
2790 if (filter
== NULL
) {
2795 lret
= dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
, mem_ctx
, msg
,
2796 *realm_dn
, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE
,
2798 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN
| DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG
| DSDB_SEARCH_UPDATE_MANAGED_PASSWORDS
,
2800 if (lret
== LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT
) {
2801 DBG_DEBUG("Failed to find an entry for %s filter:%s\n",
2803 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2805 if (lret
== LDB_ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION
) {
2806 DBG_DEBUG("Failed to find unique entry for %s filter:%s\n",
2808 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2810 if (lret
!= LDB_SUCCESS
) {
2811 DBG_ERR("Failed single search for %s - %s\n",
2812 name1
, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
));
2813 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2817 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2822 static krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context
,
2823 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
2824 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
,
2825 krb5_const_principal principal
,
2828 struct sdb_entry
*entry
)
2830 krb5_error_code ret
;
2831 struct ldb_dn
*realm_dn
;
2832 struct ldb_message
*msg
;
2834 ret
= samba_kdc_lookup_server(context
, kdc_db_ctx
, mem_ctx
, principal
,
2835 flags
, &realm_dn
, &msg
);
2840 ret
= samba_kdc_message2entry(context
, kdc_db_ctx
, mem_ctx
,
2841 principal
, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
,
2843 realm_dn
, msg
, entry
);
2845 char *client_name
= NULL
;
2846 krb5_error_code code
;
2848 code
= krb5_unparse_name(context
, principal
, &client_name
);
2851 "samba_kdc_fetch_server: message2entry failed for "
2856 "samba_kdc_fetch_server: message2entry and "
2857 "krb5_unparse_name failed");
2859 SAFE_FREE(client_name
);
2865 static krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_lookup_realm(krb5_context context
,
2866 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
2867 krb5_const_principal principal
,
2869 struct sdb_entry
*entry
)
2871 TALLOC_CTX
*frame
= talloc_stackframe();
2873 krb5_error_code ret
;
2874 bool check_realm
= false;
2875 const char *realm
= NULL
;
2876 struct dsdb_trust_routing_table
*trt
= NULL
;
2877 const struct lsa_TrustDomainInfoInfoEx
*tdo
= NULL
;
2878 unsigned int num_comp
;
2882 *entry
= (struct sdb_entry
) {};
2884 num_comp
= krb5_princ_size(context
, principal
);
2886 if (flags
& SDB_F_GET_CLIENT
) {
2887 if (flags
& SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ
) {
2891 if (flags
& SDB_F_GET_SERVER
) {
2892 if (flags
& SDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ
) {
2902 realm
= smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(frame
, context
, principal
);
2903 if (realm
== NULL
) {
2909 * The requested realm needs to be our own
2911 ok
= lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(kdc_db_ctx
->lp_ctx
, realm
);
2914 * The request is not for us...
2917 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2920 if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context
, principal
) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL
) {
2921 char *principal_string
= NULL
;
2922 krb5_principal enterprise_principal
= NULL
;
2923 char *enterprise_realm
= NULL
;
2925 if (num_comp
!= 1) {
2927 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2930 ret
= smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(frame
, context
,
2931 principal
, 0, &principal_string
);
2937 ret
= krb5_parse_name(context
, principal_string
,
2938 &enterprise_principal
);
2939 TALLOC_FREE(principal_string
);
2945 enterprise_realm
= smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(
2946 frame
, context
, enterprise_principal
);
2947 krb5_free_principal(context
, enterprise_principal
);
2948 if (enterprise_realm
!= NULL
) {
2949 realm
= enterprise_realm
;
2953 if (flags
& SDB_F_GET_SERVER
) {
2954 bool is_krbtgt
= false;
2956 ret
= is_principal_component_equal(context
, principal
, 0, KRB5_TGS_NAME
, &is_krbtgt
);
2964 * we need to search krbtgt/ locally
2971 * We need to check the last component against the routing table.
2973 * Note this works only with 2 or 3 component principals, e.g:
2975 * servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base
2976 * servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base/bla.base
2977 * servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base/ForestDnsZones.bla.base
2978 * servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base/DomainDnsZones.bla.base
2981 if (num_comp
== 2 || num_comp
== 3) {
2982 char *service_realm
= NULL
;
2984 ret
= smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(frame
,
2993 realm
= service_realm
;
2998 ok
= lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(kdc_db_ctx
->lp_ctx
, realm
);
3001 * skip the expensive routing lookup
3007 status
= dsdb_trust_routing_table_load(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
,
3009 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status
)) {
3014 tdo
= dsdb_trust_routing_by_name(trt
, realm
);
3017 * This principal has to be local
3023 if (tdo
->trust_attributes
& LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST
) {
3025 * TODO: handle the routing within the forest
3027 * This should likely be handled in
3028 * samba_kdc_message2entry() in case we're
3029 * a global catalog. We'd need to check
3030 * if realm_dn is our own domain and derive
3031 * the dns domain name from realm_dn and check that
3032 * against the routing table or fallback to
3033 * the tdo we found here.
3035 * But for now we don't support multiple domains
3036 * in our forest correctly anyway.
3038 * Just search in our local database.
3044 ret
= krb5_copy_principal(context
, principal
,
3051 upper
= strupper_talloc(frame
, tdo
->domain_name
.string
);
3052 if (upper
== NULL
) {
3057 ret
= smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context
,
3066 return SDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM
;
3069 krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context
,
3070 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
3071 krb5_const_principal principal
,
3074 struct sdb_entry
*entry
)
3076 krb5_error_code ret
= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
3077 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
;
3079 mem_ctx
= talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx
, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
3082 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
3086 ret
= samba_kdc_lookup_realm(context
, kdc_db_ctx
,
3087 principal
, flags
, entry
);
3092 ret
= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
3094 if (flags
& SDB_F_GET_CLIENT
) {
3095 ret
= samba_kdc_fetch_client(context
, kdc_db_ctx
, mem_ctx
, principal
, flags
, kvno
, entry
);
3096 if (ret
!= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
) goto done
;
3098 if (flags
& SDB_F_GET_SERVER
) {
3099 /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
3100 ret
= samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context
, kdc_db_ctx
, mem_ctx
, principal
, flags
, kvno
, entry
);
3101 if (ret
!= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
) goto done
;
3103 /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
3104 ret
= samba_kdc_fetch_server(context
, kdc_db_ctx
, mem_ctx
, principal
, flags
, kvno
, entry
);
3105 if (ret
!= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
) goto done
;
3107 if (flags
& SDB_F_GET_KRBTGT
) {
3108 ret
= samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context
, kdc_db_ctx
, mem_ctx
, principal
, flags
, kvno
, entry
);
3109 if (ret
!= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
) goto done
;
3113 talloc_free(mem_ctx
);
3117 struct samba_kdc_seq
{
3120 struct ldb_message
**msgs
;
3121 struct ldb_dn
*realm_dn
;
3124 static krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context
,
3125 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
3126 struct sdb_entry
*entry
)
3128 krb5_error_code ret
;
3129 struct samba_kdc_seq
*priv
= kdc_db_ctx
->seq_ctx
;
3130 const char *realm
= lpcfg_realm(kdc_db_ctx
->lp_ctx
);
3131 struct ldb_message
*msg
= NULL
;
3132 const char *sAMAccountName
= NULL
;
3133 krb5_principal principal
= NULL
;
3134 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
;
3137 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
3140 mem_ctx
= talloc_named(priv
, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
3144 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
3148 while (priv
->index
< priv
->count
) {
3149 msg
= priv
->msgs
[priv
->index
++];
3151 sAMAccountName
= ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg
, "sAMAccountName", NULL
);
3152 if (sAMAccountName
!= NULL
) {
3157 if (sAMAccountName
== NULL
) {
3158 ret
= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
3162 ret
= smb_krb5_make_principal(context
, &principal
,
3163 realm
, sAMAccountName
, NULL
);
3168 ret
= samba_kdc_message2entry(context
, kdc_db_ctx
, mem_ctx
,
3169 principal
, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY
,
3170 SDB_F_ADMIN_DATA
|SDB_F_GET_ANY
,
3172 priv
->realm_dn
, msg
, entry
);
3173 krb5_free_principal(context
, principal
);
3178 kdc_db_ctx
->seq_ctx
= NULL
;
3180 talloc_free(mem_ctx
);
3186 krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context
,
3187 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
3188 struct sdb_entry
*entry
)
3190 struct ldb_context
*ldb_ctx
= kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
;
3191 struct samba_kdc_seq
*priv
= kdc_db_ctx
->seq_ctx
;
3193 struct ldb_result
*res
= NULL
;
3194 krb5_error_code ret
;
3199 kdc_db_ctx
->seq_ctx
= NULL
;
3202 priv
= (struct samba_kdc_seq
*) talloc(kdc_db_ctx
, struct samba_kdc_seq
);
3205 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "talloc: out of memory");
3211 priv
->realm_dn
= ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx
);
3214 ret
= krb5_get_default_realm(context
, &realm
);
3219 krb5_free_default_realm(context
, realm
);
3221 lret
= dsdb_search(ldb_ctx
, priv
, &res
,
3222 priv
->realm_dn
, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE
, user_attrs
,
3223 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG
| DSDB_SEARCH_UPDATE_MANAGED_PASSWORDS
,
3224 "(objectClass=user)");
3226 if (lret
!= LDB_SUCCESS
) {
3228 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
3231 priv
->count
= res
->count
;
3232 priv
->msgs
= talloc_steal(priv
, res
->msgs
);
3235 kdc_db_ctx
->seq_ctx
= priv
;
3237 ret
= samba_kdc_seq(context
, kdc_db_ctx
, entry
);
3241 kdc_db_ctx
->seq_ctx
= NULL
;
3246 krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context
,
3247 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
3248 struct sdb_entry
*entry
)
3250 return samba_kdc_seq(context
, kdc_db_ctx
, entry
);
3253 /* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal
3255 * The safest way to determine 'self' is to check the DB record made at
3256 * the time the principal was presented to the KDC.
3259 samba_kdc_check_client_matches_target_service(krb5_context context
,
3260 struct samba_kdc_entry
*skdc_entry_client
,
3261 struct samba_kdc_entry
*skdc_entry_server_target
)
3263 struct dom_sid
*orig_sid
;
3264 struct dom_sid
*target_sid
;
3265 TALLOC_CTX
*frame
= talloc_stackframe();
3267 orig_sid
= samdb_result_dom_sid(frame
,
3268 skdc_entry_client
->msg
,
3270 target_sid
= samdb_result_dom_sid(frame
,
3271 skdc_entry_server_target
->msg
,
3275 * Allow delegation to the same record (representing a
3276 * principal), even if by a different name. The easy and safe
3277 * way to prove this is by SID comparison
3279 if (!(orig_sid
&& target_sid
&& dom_sid_equal(orig_sid
, target_sid
))) {
3281 return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH
;
3288 /* Certificates printed by the Certificate Authority might have a
3289 * slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
3290 * database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
3294 samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context
,
3295 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
3296 struct samba_kdc_entry
*skdc_entry
,
3297 krb5_const_principal certificate_principal
)
3299 krb5_error_code ret
;
3300 struct ldb_dn
*realm_dn
;
3301 struct ldb_message
*msg
;
3302 struct dom_sid
*orig_sid
;
3303 struct dom_sid
*target_sid
;
3304 const char *ms_upn_check_attrs
[] = {
3308 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
= talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx
, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
3312 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match: talloc_named() failed!");
3316 ret
= samba_kdc_lookup_client(context
, kdc_db_ctx
,
3317 mem_ctx
, certificate_principal
,
3318 ms_upn_check_attrs
, 0, &realm_dn
, &msg
);
3321 talloc_free(mem_ctx
);
3325 orig_sid
= samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx
, skdc_entry
->msg
, "objectSid");
3326 target_sid
= samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx
, msg
, "objectSid");
3328 /* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
3329 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
3331 if (!(orig_sid
&& target_sid
&& dom_sid_equal(orig_sid
, target_sid
))) {
3332 talloc_free(mem_ctx
);
3333 #if defined(KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH) /* MIT */
3334 return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH
;
3335 #else /* Heimdal (where this is an enum) */
3336 return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH
;
3340 talloc_free(mem_ctx
);
3345 * Check if a given entry may delegate to this target principal
3349 samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy(krb5_context context
,
3350 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
3351 struct samba_kdc_entry
*skdc_entry
,
3352 krb5_const_principal target_principal
)
3354 krb5_error_code ret
;
3356 const char *client_dn
= NULL
;
3357 const char *target_principal_name
= NULL
;
3358 struct ldb_message_element
*el
;
3363 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
= talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx
, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy");
3367 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
,
3368 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
3369 " talloc_named() failed!");
3373 client_dn
= ldb_dn_get_linearized(skdc_entry
->msg
->dn
);
3379 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
,
3380 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
3381 " ldb_dn_get_linearized() failed!");
3382 talloc_free(mem_ctx
);
3386 el
= ldb_msg_find_element(skdc_entry
->msg
, "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo");
3391 SMB_ASSERT(el
->num_values
!= 0);
3394 * This is the Microsoft forwardable flag behavior.
3396 * If the proxy (target) principal is NULL, and we have any authorized
3397 * delegation target, allow to forward.
3399 if (target_principal
== NULL
) {
3400 talloc_free(mem_ctx
);
3406 * The main heimdal code already checked that the target_principal
3407 * belongs to the same realm as the client.
3409 * So we just need the principal without the realm,
3410 * as that is what is configured in the "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo"
3413 ret
= krb5_unparse_name_flags(context
, target_principal
,
3414 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM
, &tmp
);
3416 talloc_free(mem_ctx
);
3417 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
,
3418 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
3419 " krb5_unparse_name_flags() failed!");
3422 DBG_DEBUG("client[%s] for target[%s]\n",
3425 target_principal_name
= talloc_strdup(mem_ctx
, tmp
);
3427 if (target_principal_name
== NULL
) {
3429 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
,
3430 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
3431 " talloc_strdup() failed!");
3432 talloc_free(mem_ctx
);
3436 val
= data_blob_string_const(target_principal_name
);
3438 for (i
=0; i
<el
->num_values
; i
++) {
3439 struct ldb_val
*val1
= &val
;
3440 struct ldb_val
*val2
= &el
->values
[i
];
3443 if (val1
->length
!= val2
->length
) {
3447 cmp
= strncasecmp((const char *)val1
->data
,
3448 (const char *)val2
->data
,
3463 DBG_DEBUG("client[%s] allowed target[%s]\n",
3464 client_dn
, target_principal_name
);
3465 talloc_free(mem_ctx
);
3469 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
,
3470 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] "
3471 "not allowed for delegation to target[%s]",
3473 target_principal_name
);
3474 talloc_free(mem_ctx
);
3475 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION
;
3479 * This method is called for S4U2Proxy requests and implements the
3480 * resource-based constrained delegation variant, which can support
3481 * cross-realm delegation.
3483 krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy_rbcd(
3484 krb5_context context
,
3485 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
3486 krb5_const_principal client_principal
,
3487 krb5_const_principal server_principal
,
3488 const struct auth_user_info_dc
*user_info_dc
,
3489 const struct auth_user_info_dc
*device_info_dc
,
3490 const struct auth_claims auth_claims
,
3491 struct samba_kdc_entry
*proxy_skdc_entry
)
3493 krb5_error_code code
;
3494 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err
;
3495 char *client_name
= NULL
;
3496 char *server_name
= NULL
;
3497 const char *proxy_dn
= NULL
;
3498 const DATA_BLOB
*data
= NULL
;
3499 struct security_descriptor
*rbcd_security_descriptor
= NULL
;
3500 struct security_token
*security_token
= NULL
;
3501 uint32_t session_info_flags
=
3502 AUTH_SESSION_INFO_DEFAULT_GROUPS
|
3503 AUTH_SESSION_INFO_DEVICE_DEFAULT_GROUPS
|
3504 AUTH_SESSION_INFO_SIMPLE_PRIVILEGES
|
3505 AUTH_SESSION_INFO_FORCE_COMPOUNDED_AUTHENTICATION
;
3507 * Testing shows that although Windows grants SEC_ADS_GENERIC_ALL access
3508 * in security descriptors it creates for RBCD, its KDC only requires
3509 * SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS for the access check to succeed.
3511 uint32_t access_desired
= SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS
;
3512 uint32_t access_granted
= 0;
3514 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
= NULL
;
3516 mem_ctx
= talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx
,
3518 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy_rbcd");
3519 if (mem_ctx
== NULL
) {
3526 proxy_dn
= ldb_dn_get_linearized(proxy_skdc_entry
->msg
->dn
);
3527 if (proxy_dn
== NULL
) {
3528 DBG_ERR("ldb_dn_get_linearized failed for proxy_dn!\n");
3537 rbcd_security_descriptor
= talloc_zero(mem_ctx
,
3538 struct security_descriptor
);
3539 if (rbcd_security_descriptor
== NULL
) {
3546 code
= krb5_unparse_name_flags(context
,
3548 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY
,
3551 DBG_ERR("Unable to parse client_principal!\n");
3555 code
= krb5_unparse_name_flags(context
,
3557 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY
,
3560 DBG_ERR("Unable to parse server_principal!\n");
3564 DBG_INFO("Check delegation from client[%s] to server[%s] via "
3570 if (!(user_info_dc
->info
->user_flags
& NETLOGON_GUEST
)) {
3571 session_info_flags
|= AUTH_SESSION_INFO_AUTHENTICATED
;
3574 if (device_info_dc
!= NULL
&& !(device_info_dc
->info
->user_flags
& NETLOGON_GUEST
)) {
3575 session_info_flags
|= AUTH_SESSION_INFO_DEVICE_AUTHENTICATED
;
3578 nt_status
= auth_generate_security_token(mem_ctx
,
3586 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status
)) {
3587 code
= map_errno_from_nt_status(nt_status
);
3591 data
= ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(proxy_skdc_entry
->msg
,
3592 "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity");
3594 DBG_WARNING("Could not find security descriptor "
3595 "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity in "
3598 code
= KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION
;
3602 ndr_err
= ndr_pull_struct_blob(
3605 rbcd_security_descriptor
,
3606 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t
)ndr_pull_security_descriptor
);
3607 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err
)) {
3608 errno
= ndr_map_error2errno(ndr_err
);
3609 DBG_ERR("Failed to unmarshall "
3610 "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity "
3611 "security descriptor of proxy[%s]\n",
3613 code
= KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION
;
3617 if (DEBUGLEVEL
>= 10) {
3618 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_token
, security_token
);
3619 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor
, rbcd_security_descriptor
);
3622 nt_status
= sec_access_check_ds(rbcd_security_descriptor
,
3629 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status
)) {
3630 DBG_WARNING("RBCD: sec_access_check_ds(access_desired=%#08x, "
3631 "access_granted:%#08x) failed with: %s\n",
3634 nt_errstr(nt_status
));
3636 code
= KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION
;
3640 DBG_NOTICE("RBCD: Access granted for client[%s]\n", client_name
);
3644 SAFE_FREE(client_name
);
3645 SAFE_FREE(server_name
);
3647 TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx
);
3651 NTSTATUS
samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx(TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
, struct samba_kdc_base_context
*base_ctx
,
3652 struct samba_kdc_db_context
**kdc_db_ctx_out
)
3655 struct ldb_message
*msg
= NULL
;
3656 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
= NULL
;
3657 /* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to
3658 * authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is highly likely to
3661 * In future we may set this up to use EXTERNAL and SSL
3662 * certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP_SET_USERNAME
3665 kdc_db_ctx
= talloc_zero(mem_ctx
, struct samba_kdc_db_context
);
3666 if (kdc_db_ctx
== NULL
) {
3667 return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY
;
3669 kdc_db_ctx
->ev_ctx
= base_ctx
->ev_ctx
;
3670 kdc_db_ctx
->lp_ctx
= base_ctx
->lp_ctx
;
3671 kdc_db_ctx
->msg_ctx
= base_ctx
->msg_ctx
;
3673 /* get default kdc policy */
3674 lpcfg_default_kdc_policy(mem_ctx
,
3676 &kdc_db_ctx
->policy
.svc_tkt_lifetime
,
3677 &kdc_db_ctx
->policy
.usr_tkt_lifetime
,
3678 &kdc_db_ctx
->policy
.renewal_lifetime
);
3680 /* This is to allow "samba-tool domain exportkeytab to take a -H */
3681 if (base_ctx
->samdb
!= NULL
) {
3683 * Caller is responsible for lifetimes. In reality
3684 * the whole thing is destroyed before leaving the
3685 * function the samdb was passed into
3687 kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
= base_ctx
->samdb
;
3689 struct auth_session_info
*session_info
= NULL
;
3690 session_info
= system_session(kdc_db_ctx
->lp_ctx
);
3691 if (session_info
== NULL
) {
3692 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx
);
3693 return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3696 /* Setup the link to LDB */
3697 kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
= samdb_connect(kdc_db_ctx
,
3703 if (kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
== NULL
) {
3704 DBG_WARNING("Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!\n");
3705 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx
);
3706 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO
;
3710 /* Find out our own krbtgt kvno */
3711 ldb_ret
= samdb_rodc(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
, &kdc_db_ctx
->rodc
);
3712 if (ldb_ret
!= LDB_SUCCESS
) {
3713 DBG_WARNING("Cannot determine if we are an RODC in KDC backend: %s\n",
3714 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
));
3715 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx
);
3716 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO
;
3718 if (kdc_db_ctx
->rodc
) {
3719 int my_krbtgt_number
;
3720 const char *secondary_keytab
[] = { "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", NULL
};
3721 struct ldb_dn
*account_dn
= NULL
;
3722 struct ldb_dn
*server_dn
= samdb_server_dn(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
, kdc_db_ctx
);
3724 DBG_WARNING("Cannot determine server DN in KDC backend: %s\n",
3725 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
));
3726 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx
);
3727 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO
;
3730 ldb_ret
= samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
, kdc_db_ctx
, server_dn
,
3731 "serverReference", &account_dn
);
3732 if (ldb_ret
!= LDB_SUCCESS
) {
3733 DBG_WARNING("Cannot determine server account in KDC backend: %s\n",
3734 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
));
3735 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx
);
3736 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO
;
3739 ldb_ret
= samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
, kdc_db_ctx
, account_dn
,
3740 "msDS-KrbTgtLink", &kdc_db_ctx
->krbtgt_dn
);
3741 talloc_free(account_dn
);
3742 if (ldb_ret
!= LDB_SUCCESS
) {
3743 DBG_WARNING("Cannot determine RODC krbtgt account in KDC backend: %s\n",
3744 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
));
3745 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx
);
3746 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO
;
3749 ldb_ret
= dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
, kdc_db_ctx
,
3750 &msg
, kdc_db_ctx
->krbtgt_dn
, LDB_SCOPE_BASE
,
3752 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG
,
3753 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=*))");
3754 if (ldb_ret
!= LDB_SUCCESS
) {
3755 DBG_WARNING("Cannot read krbtgt account %s in KDC backend to get msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber: %s: %s\n",
3756 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx
->krbtgt_dn
),
3757 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
),
3758 ldb_strerror(ldb_ret
));
3759 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx
);
3760 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO
;
3762 my_krbtgt_number
= ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg
, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
3763 if (my_krbtgt_number
== -1) {
3764 DBG_WARNING("Cannot read msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber from krbtgt account %s in KDC backend: got %d\n",
3765 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx
->krbtgt_dn
),
3767 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx
);
3768 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO
;
3770 kdc_db_ctx
->my_krbtgt_number
= my_krbtgt_number
;
3773 kdc_db_ctx
->my_krbtgt_number
= 0;
3774 ldb_ret
= dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
, kdc_db_ctx
,
3776 ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
),
3779 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG
| DSDB_SEARCH_UPDATE_MANAGED_PASSWORDS
,
3780 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
3782 if (ldb_ret
!= LDB_SUCCESS
) {
3783 DBG_WARNING("could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
));
3784 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx
);
3785 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO
;
3787 kdc_db_ctx
->krbtgt_dn
= talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx
, msg
->dn
);
3788 kdc_db_ctx
->my_krbtgt_number
= 0;
3791 *kdc_db_ctx_out
= kdc_db_ctx
;
3792 return NT_STATUS_OK
;
3795 krb5_error_code
dsdb_extract_aes_256_key(krb5_context context
,
3796 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
,
3797 struct ldb_context
*ldb
,
3798 const struct ldb_message
*msg
,
3799 uint32_t user_account_control
,
3800 const uint32_t *kvno
,
3802 DATA_BLOB
*aes_256_key
,
3805 krb5_error_code krb5_ret
;
3806 uint32_t supported_enctypes
;
3807 unsigned flags
= SDB_F_GET_CLIENT
;
3808 struct sdb_entry sentry
= {};
3811 flags
|= SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED
;
3814 krb5_ret
= samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context
,
3818 false, /* is_krbtgt */
3819 false, /* is_rodc */
3820 user_account_control
,
3821 SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT
,
3823 (kvno
!= NULL
) ? *kvno
: 0,
3825 ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256
,
3826 &supported_enctypes
);
3827 if (krb5_ret
!= 0) {
3828 const char *krb5_err
= krb5_get_error_message(context
, krb5_ret
);
3830 DBG_ERR("Failed to parse supplementalCredentials "
3831 "of %s with %s kvno using "
3832 "ENCTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256 "
3833 "Kerberos Key: %s\n",
3834 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg
->dn
),
3835 (kvno
!= NULL
) ? "previous" : "current",
3836 krb5_err
!= NULL
? krb5_err
: "<unknown>");
3838 krb5_free_error_message(context
, krb5_err
);
3843 if ((supported_enctypes
& ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256
) == 0 ||
3844 sentry
.keys
.len
!= 1) {
3845 DBG_INFO("Failed to find a ENCTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256 "
3846 "key in supplementalCredentials "
3847 "of %s at KVNO %u (got %u keys, expected 1)\n",
3848 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg
->dn
),
3851 sdb_entry_free(&sentry
);
3855 if (sentry
.keys
.val
[0].salt
== NULL
) {
3856 DBG_INFO("Failed to find a salt in "
3857 "supplementalCredentials "
3858 "of %s at KVNO %u\n",
3859 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg
->dn
),
3861 sdb_entry_free(&sentry
);
3865 if (aes_256_key
!= NULL
) {
3866 *aes_256_key
= data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx
,
3867 KRB5_KEY_DATA(&sentry
.keys
.val
[0].key
),
3868 KRB5_KEY_LENGTH(&sentry
.keys
.val
[0].key
));
3869 if (aes_256_key
->data
== NULL
) {
3870 sdb_entry_free(&sentry
);
3873 talloc_keep_secret(aes_256_key
->data
);
3877 *salt
= data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx
,
3878 sentry
.keys
.val
[0].salt
->salt
.data
,
3879 sentry
.keys
.val
[0].salt
->salt
.length
);
3880 if (salt
->data
== NULL
) {
3881 sdb_entry_free(&sentry
);
3886 if (kvno_out
!= NULL
) {
3887 *kvno_out
= sentry
.kvno
;
3890 sdb_entry_free(&sentry
);