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src: Add support for running with address sanitizer.
[Samba.git] / source4 / kdc / db-glue.c
blobaa7364182ac0521593f02b845d06ad4012d2d2ea
1 /*
2 Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
3
4 Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
5
6 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
7 Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
8
9 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
12 (at your option) any later version.
13
14 This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 GNU General Public License for more details.
18
19
20 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
21 along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
22 */
23
24 #include "includes.h"
25 #include "libcli/security/security.h"
26 #include "auth/auth.h"
27 #include "auth/auth_sam.h"
28 #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
29 #include "dsdb/common/util.h"
30 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
31 #include "param/param.h"
32 #include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
33 #include "system/kerberos.h"
34 #include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
35 #include <hdb.h>
36 #include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
37 #include "kdc/kdc-glue.h"
38 #include "kdc/db-glue.h"
39
40 #define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno) \
41 ((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) >> 16))
42
43 #define SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, krbtgt) \
44 ((krb5_kvno)((((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF) | \
45 ((((uint32_t)krbtgt) << 16) & 0xFFFF0000)))
46
47 enum samba_kdc_ent_type
48 { SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
49 SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
50
51 enum trust_direction {
52 UNKNOWN = 0,
53 INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
54 OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
55 };
56
57 static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
58 "trustPartner",
59 "trustAuthIncoming",
60 "trustAuthOutgoing",
61 "whenCreated",
62 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
63 "trustAttributes",
64 "trustDirection",
65 "trustType",
66 NULL
67 };
68
69
70 static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val)
71 {
72 const char *tmp;
73 const char *gentime;
74 struct tm tm;
75
76 gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
77 if (!gentime)
78 return default_val;
79
80 tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
81 if (tmp == NULL) {
82 return default_val;
83 }
84
85 return timegm(&tm);
86 }
87
88 static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, uint32_t userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type)
89 {
90 HDBFlags flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
91
92 /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
93 flags.immutable = 1;
94
95 /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
96 flags.invalid = 1;
97
98 flags.renewable = 1;
99
100 /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
101 flags.server = 1;
102
103 /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
104 if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
105 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
106 flags.client = 1;
107 }
108 flags.invalid = 0;
109 }
110
111 if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
112 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
113 flags.client = 1;
114 }
115 flags.invalid = 0;
116 }
117 if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
118 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
119 flags.client = 1;
120 }
121 flags.invalid = 0;
122 }
123 if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
124 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
125 flags.client = 1;
126 }
127 flags.invalid = 0;
128 }
129
130 /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
131 if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
132 flags.client = 0;
133 }
134 if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
135 flags.locked_out = 1;
136 }
137 /*
138 if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
139 flags.invalid = 1;
140 }
141 */
142 /*
143 UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
144 */
145 if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
146 flags.invalid = 1;
147 }
148
149 /* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
150
151 /*
152 if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
153 flags.invalid = 1;
154 }
155 */
156 if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
157 flags.require_hwauth = 1;
158 }
159 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
160 flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
161 }
162 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION) {
163 /*
164 * this is confusing...
165 *
166 * UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
167 * => ok_as_delegate
168 *
169 * and
170 *
171 * UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION
172 * => trusted_for_delegation
173 */
174 flags.trusted_for_delegation = 1;
175 }
176 if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
177 flags.forwardable = 1;
178 flags.proxiable = 1;
179 }
180
181 if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
182 flags.require_preauth = 0;
183 } else {
184 flags.require_preauth = 1;
185
186 }
187 return flags;
188 }
189
190 static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p)
191 {
192 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = p->entry_ex;
193 free_hdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry);
194 return 0;
195 }
196
197 static void samba_kdc_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
198 {
199 /* this function is called only from hdb_free_entry().
200 * Make sure we neutralize the destructor or we will
201 * get a double free later when hdb_free_entry() will
202 * try to call free_hdb_entry() */
203 talloc_set_destructor(entry_ex->ctx, NULL);
204
205 /* now proceed to free the talloc part */
206 talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx);
207 }
208
209 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
210 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
211 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
212 struct ldb_message *msg,
213 uint32_t rid,
214 bool is_rodc,
215 uint32_t userAccountControl,
216 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
217 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
218 {
219 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
220 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
221 struct samr_Password *hash;
222 const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
223 struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
224 struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
225 bool newer_keys = false;
226 struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
227 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL;
228 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
229 uint16_t i;
230 uint16_t allocated_keys = 0;
231 int rodc_krbtgt_number = 0;
232 int kvno = 0;
233 uint32_t supported_enctypes
234 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
235 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
236 0);
237
238 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT || is_rodc) {
239 /* KDCs (and KDCs on RODCs) use AES */
240 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
241 } else if (userAccountControl & (UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT|UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT)) {
242 /* DCs and RODCs comptuer accounts use AES */
243 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
244 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT ||
245 (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY)) {
246 /* for AS-REQ the client chooses the enc types it
247 * supports, and this will vary between computers a
248 * user logs in from.
249 *
250 * likewise for 'any' return as much as is supported,
251 * to export into a keytab */
252 supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES;
253 }
254
255 /* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
256 if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
257 supported_enctypes = ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5;
258 } else {
259 /* Otherwise, add in the default enc types */
260 supported_enctypes |= ENC_CRC32 | ENC_RSA_MD5 | ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
261 }
262
263 /* Is this the krbtgt or a RODC krbtgt */
264 if (is_rodc) {
265 rodc_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
266
267 if (rodc_krbtgt_number == -1) {
268 return EINVAL;
269 }
270 }
271
272 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
273 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
274
275 kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
276 if (is_rodc) {
277 kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, rodc_krbtgt_number);
278 }
279 entry_ex->entry.kvno = kvno;
280
281 /* Get keys from the db */
282
283 hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
284 sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
285
286 /* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */
287 if (hash) {
288 allocated_keys++;
289 }
290
291 /* supplementalCredentials if present */
292 if (sc_val) {
293 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, &scb,
294 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
295 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
296 dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
297 ret = EINVAL;
298 goto out;
299 }
300
301 if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
302 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
303 ret = EINVAL;
304 goto out;
305 }
306
307 for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
308 if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
309 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
310 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
311 scpk = NULL;
312 continue;
313 }
314 newer_keys = true;
315 break;
316 } else if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
317 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
318 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
319 scpk = NULL;
320 }
321 /*
322 * we don't break here in hope to find
323 * a Kerberos-Newer-Keys package
324 */
325 }
326 }
327 }
328 /*
329 * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys or Primary:Kerberos element
330 * of supplementalCredentials
331 */
332 if (scpk) {
333 DATA_BLOB blob;
334
335 blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
336 if (!blob.data) {
337 ret = ENOMEM;
338 goto out;
339 }
340
341 /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
342 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &_pkb,
343 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
344 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
345 ret = EINVAL;
346 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
347 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
348 goto out;
349 }
350
351 if (newer_keys && _pkb.version != 4) {
352 ret = EINVAL;
353 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
354 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
355 goto out;
356 }
357
358 if (!newer_keys && _pkb.version != 3) {
359 ret = EINVAL;
360 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
361 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
362 goto out;
363 }
364
365 if (_pkb.version == 4) {
366 pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
367 allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys;
368 } else if (_pkb.version == 3) {
369 pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3;
370 allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys;
371 }
372 }
373
374 if (allocated_keys == 0) {
375 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
376 /* We are on an RODC, but don't have keys for this account. Signal this to the caller */
377 /* TODO: We need to call a generalised version of auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret from here */
378 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
379 }
380
381 /* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
382 * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
383 * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
384 return 0;
385 }
386
387 /* allocate space to decode into */
388 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
389 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(Key));
390 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
391 ret = ENOMEM;
392 goto out;
393 }
394
395 if (hash && (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5)) {
396 Key key;
397
398 key.mkvno = 0;
399 key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
400
401 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
402 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
403 hash->hash, sizeof(hash->hash),
404 &key.key);
405 if (ret) {
406 goto out;
407 }
408
409 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
410 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
411 }
412
413 if (pkb4) {
414 for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) {
415 Key key;
416
417 if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue;
418
419 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb4->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
420 continue;
421 }
422
423 key.mkvno = 0;
424 key.salt = NULL;
425
426 if (pkb4->salt.string) {
427 DATA_BLOB salt;
428
429 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string);
430
431 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
432 if (key.salt == NULL) {
433 ret = ENOMEM;
434 goto out;
435 }
436
437 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
438
439 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
440 if (ret) {
441 free(key.salt);
442 key.salt = NULL;
443 goto out;
444 }
445 }
446
447 /* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */
448
449 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
450 pkb4->keys[i].keytype,
451 pkb4->keys[i].value->data,
452 pkb4->keys[i].value->length,
453 &key.key);
454 if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
455 DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
456 pkb4->keys[i].keytype));
457 ret = 0;
458 continue;
459 }
460 if (ret) {
461 if (key.salt) {
462 free_Salt(key.salt);
463 free(key.salt);
464 key.salt = NULL;
465 }
466 goto out;
467 }
468
469 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
470 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
471 }
472 } else if (pkb3) {
473 for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) {
474 Key key;
475
476 if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue;
477
478 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb3->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
479 continue;
480 }
481
482 key.mkvno = 0;
483 key.salt = NULL;
484
485 if (pkb3->salt.string) {
486 DATA_BLOB salt;
487
488 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string);
489
490 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
491 if (key.salt == NULL) {
492 ret = ENOMEM;
493 goto out;
494 }
495
496 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
497
498 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
499 if (ret) {
500 free(key.salt);
501 key.salt = NULL;
502 goto out;
503 }
504 }
505
506 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
507 pkb3->keys[i].keytype,
508 pkb3->keys[i].value->data,
509 pkb3->keys[i].value->length,
510 &key.key);
511 if (ret) {
512 if (key.salt) {
513 free_Salt(key.salt);
514 free(key.salt);
515 key.salt = NULL;
516 }
517 goto out;
518 }
519
520 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
521 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
522 }
523 }
524
525 out:
526 if (ret != 0) {
527 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
528 }
529 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) {
530 free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
531 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
532 }
533 return ret;
534 }
535
536 /*
537 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
538 */
539 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context,
540 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
541 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
542 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
543 unsigned flags,
544 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
545 struct ldb_message *msg,
546 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
547 {
548 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
549 uint32_t userAccountControl;
550 uint32_t msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
551 unsigned int i;
552 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
553 krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
554
555 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
556 NTTIME acct_expiry;
557 NTSTATUS status;
558
559 uint32_t rid;
560 bool is_rodc = false;
561 struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
562 struct ldb_val computer_val;
563 const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
564 computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer");
565 computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data);
566
567 if (ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber")) {
568 is_rodc = true;
569 }
570
571 if (!samAccountName) {
572 ret = ENOENT;
573 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
574 goto out;
575 }
576
577 objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
578
579 if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
580 is_computer = TRUE;
581 }
582
583 memset(entry_ex, 0, sizeof(*entry_ex));
584
585 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
586 if (!p) {
587 ret = ENOMEM;
588 goto out;
589 }
590
591 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
592 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
593 p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn);
594 if (!p->realm_dn) {
595 ret = ENOMEM;
596 goto out;
597 }
598
599 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
600
601 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
602 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
603
604 entry_ex->ctx = p;
605 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
606
607 userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
608
609 msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed
610 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
611 "msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed",
612 UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE);
613
614 /*
615 * This brings in the lockout flag, block the account if not
616 * found. We need the weird UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE check because
617 * we do not want to fail open if the value is not returned,
618 * but 0 is a valid value (all OK)
619 */
620 if (msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed == UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
621 ret = EINVAL;
622 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: "
623 "no msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed present");
624 goto out;
625 } else {
626 userAccountControl |= msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
627 }
628
629 /*
630 * If we are set to canonicalize, we get back the fixed UPPER
631 * case realm, and the real username (ie matching LDAP
632 * samAccountName)
633 *
634 * Otherwise, if we are set to enterprise, we
635 * get back the whole principal as-sent
636 *
637 * Finally, if we are not set to canonicalize, we get back the
638 * fixed UPPER case realm, but the as-sent username
639 */
640
641 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
642 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT) {
643 if (flags & (HDB_F_CANON)) {
644 /*
645 * When requested to do so, ensure that the
646 * both realm values in the principal are set
647 * to the upper case, canonical realm
648 */
649 ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal,
650 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "krbtgt",
651 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), NULL);
652 if (ret) {
653 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
654 goto out;
655 }
656 krb5_principal_set_type(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, KRB5_NT_SRV_INST);
657 } else {
658 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &entry_ex->entry.principal);
659 if (ret) {
660 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
661 goto out;
662 }
663 /*
664 * this appears to be required regardless of
665 * the canonicalize flag from the client
666 */
667 ret = krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
668 if (ret) {
669 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
670 goto out;
671 }
672 }
673
674 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
675 ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
676 if (ret) {
677 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
678 goto out;
679 }
680 } else if (flags & HDB_F_CANON && flags & HDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ) {
681 /*
682 * HDB_F_CANON maps from the canonicalize flag in the
683 * packet, and has a different meaning between AS-REQ
684 * and TGS-REQ. We only change the principal in the AS-REQ case
685 */
686 ret = krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
687 if (ret) {
688 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
689 goto out;
690 }
691 } else {
692 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &entry_ex->entry.principal);
693 if (ret) {
694 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
695 goto out;
696 }
697
698 if (krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) != KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
699 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
700 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
701 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
702 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
703 * we determine from our records */
704
705 /* this has to be with malloc() */
706 ret = krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
707 if (ret) {
708 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
709 goto out;
710 }
711 }
712 }
713
714 /* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
715 entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2HDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
716
717 /* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
718 * default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
719 * by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
720 * their probably patheticly insecure password) */
721
722 if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server
723 && lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
724 if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
725 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0;
726 }
727 }
728 /*
729 * To give the correct type of error to the client, we must
730 * not just return the entry without .server set, we must
731 * pretend the principal does not exist. Otherwise we may
732 * return ERR_POLICY instead of
733 * KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN
734 */
735 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER && entry_ex->entry.flags.server == 0) {
736 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
737 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no servicePrincipalName present for this server, refusing with no-such-entry");
738 goto out;
739 }
740 if (flags & HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA) {
741 /* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
742 * of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
743 * DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
744 * we must return */
745
746 /* use 'whenCreated' */
747 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
748 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
749 ret = krb5_make_principal(context,
750 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
751 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
752 if (ret) {
753 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
754 goto out;
755 }
756
757 entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event));
758 if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
759 ret = ENOMEM;
760 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
761 goto out;
762 }
763
764 /* use 'whenChanged' */
765 entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
766 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
767 ret = krb5_make_principal(context,
768 &entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal,
769 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
770 if (ret) {
771 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
772 goto out;
773 }
774 }
775
776
777 /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
778 * virtue of being that particular RID */
779 status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
780
781 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
782 ret = EINVAL;
783 goto out;
784 }
785
786 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
787 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
788 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
789
790 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
791 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
792
793 /* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
794 * 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
795 * trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
796 * Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
797 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
798 && principal->name.name_string.len == 2
799 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "kadmin") == 0)
800 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], "changepw") == 0)
801 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)) {
802 entry_ex->entry.flags.change_pw = 1;
803 }
804 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
805 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
806 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
807 } else if (is_rodc) {
808 /* The RODC krbtgt account is like the main krbtgt,
809 * but it does not have a changepw or kadmin
810 * service */
811
812 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
813 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
814
815 /* Also don't allow the RODC krbtgt to be a client (it should not be needed) */
816 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
817 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
818 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
819
820 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
821 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
822 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 0;
823 } else if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
824 /* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
825 * client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
826
827 /* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
828 * it could bypass the password restrictions */
829 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
830
831 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
832 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
833
834 } else {
835 NTTIME must_change_time
836 = samdb_result_force_password_change(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
837 realm_dn, msg);
838 if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
839 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
840 } else {
841 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end));
842 if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) {
843 ret = ENOMEM;
844 goto out;
845 }
846 *entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
847 }
848
849 acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
850 if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
851 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
852 } else {
853 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end));
854 if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) {
855 ret = ENOMEM;
856 goto out;
857 }
858 *entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
859 }
860 }
861
862 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
863
864 entry_ex->entry.max_life = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
865 if (entry_ex->entry.max_life == NULL) {
866 ret = ENOMEM;
867 goto out;
868 }
869
870 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
871 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime;
872 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT) {
873 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime;
874 } else {
875 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = MIN(kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
876 kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime);
877 }
878
879 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
880 if (entry_ex->entry.max_renew == NULL) {
881 ret = ENOMEM;
882 goto out;
883 }
884
885 *entry_ex->entry.max_renew = kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime;
886
887 entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
888
889 /* Get keys from the db */
890 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, kdc_db_ctx, p, msg,
891 rid, is_rodc, userAccountControl,
892 ent_type, entry_ex);
893 if (ret) {
894 /* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */
895 goto out;
896 }
897
898 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
899 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
900 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
901 ret = ENOMEM;
902 goto out;
903 }
904 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
905 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
906 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
907 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
908 ret = ENOMEM;
909 goto out;
910 }
911 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
912 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
913 }
914
915
916 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
917
918 out:
919 if (ret != 0) {
920 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
921 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
922 } else {
923 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
924 }
925
926 return ret;
927 }
928
929 /*
930 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
931 * The kvno is what the remote client asked for
932 */
933 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
934 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
935 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
936 enum trust_direction direction,
937 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
938 unsigned flags,
939 uint32_t kvno,
940 struct ldb_message *msg,
941 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
942 {
943 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
944 const char *dnsdomain;
945 const char *realm = lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx);
946 DATA_BLOB password_utf16 = data_blob_null;
947 DATA_BLOB password_utf8 = data_blob_null;
948 struct samr_Password _password_hash;
949 const struct samr_Password *password_hash = NULL;
950 const struct ldb_val *password_val;
951 struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
952 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
953 bool use_previous;
954 uint32_t current_kvno;
955 uint32_t num_keys = 0;
956 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
957 int ret, trust_direction_flags;
958 unsigned int i;
959 struct AuthenticationInformationArray *auth_array;
960 uint32_t supported_enctypes = ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
961
962 if (dsdb_functional_level(kdc_db_ctx->samdb) >= DS_DOMAIN_FUNCTION_2008) {
963 supported_enctypes = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
964 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
965 supported_enctypes);
966 }
967
968 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
969 if (!p) {
970 ret = ENOMEM;
971 goto out;
972 }
973
974 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
975 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
976 p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
977
978 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
979
980 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
981 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
982
983 entry_ex->ctx = p;
984 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
985
986 /* use 'whenCreated' */
987 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
988 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
989 ret = krb5_make_principal(context,
990 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
991 realm, "kadmin", NULL);
992 if (ret) {
993 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
994 goto out;
995 }
996
997 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
998 if (entry_ex->entry.principal == NULL) {
999 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1000 ret = ENOMEM;
1001 goto out;
1002 }
1003
1004 ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
1005 if (ret) {
1006 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1007 goto out;
1008 }
1009
1010 /*
1011 * While we have copied the client principal, tests
1012 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
1013 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
1014 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
1015 * we determine from our records
1016 */
1017
1018 ret = krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
1019 if (ret) {
1020 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1021 goto out;
1022 }
1023
1024 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
1025
1026 trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0);
1027
1028 if (direction == INBOUND) {
1029 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
1030
1031 } else { /* OUTBOUND */
1032 dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL);
1033 /* replace realm */
1034 realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
1035 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
1036 }
1037
1038 if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) {
1039 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1040 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1041 goto out;
1042 }
1043
1044 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, &password_blob,
1045 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
1046 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
1047 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1048 ret = EINVAL;
1049 goto out;
1050 }
1051
1052
1053 /* we need to work out if we are going to use the current or
1054 * the previous password hash.
1055 * We base this on the kvno the client passes in. If the kvno
1056 * passed in is equal to the current kvno in our database then
1057 * we use the current structure. If it is the current kvno-1,
1058 * then we use the previous substrucure.
1059 */
1060
1061 /* first work out the current kvno */
1062 current_kvno = 0;
1063 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
1064 if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
1065 current_kvno = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.version.version;
1066 }
1067 }
1068
1069 /* work out whether we will use the previous or current
1070 password */
1071 if (password_blob.previous.count == 0) {
1072 /* there is no previous password */
1073 use_previous = false;
1074 } else if (!(flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) ||
1075 kvno == current_kvno) {
1076 use_previous = false;
1077 } else if ((kvno+1 == current_kvno) ||
1078 (kvno == 255 && current_kvno == 0)) {
1079 use_previous = true;
1080 } else {
1081 DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": Request for unknown kvno %u - current kvno is %u\n",
1082 kvno, current_kvno));
1083 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1084 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1085 goto out;
1086 }
1087
1088 if (use_previous) {
1089 auth_array = &password_blob.previous;
1090 } else {
1091 auth_array = &password_blob.current;
1092 }
1093
1094 /* use the kvno the client specified, if available */
1095 if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
1096 entry_ex->entry.kvno = kvno;
1097 } else {
1098 entry_ex->entry.kvno = current_kvno;
1099 }
1100
1101 for (i=0; i < auth_array->count; i++) {
1102 if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
1103 bool ok;
1104
1105 password_utf16 = data_blob_const(auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
1106 auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
1107 if (password_utf16.length == 0) {
1108 break;
1109 }
1110
1111 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) {
1112 mdfour(_password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
1113 if (password_hash == NULL) {
1114 num_keys += 1;
1115 }
1116 password_hash = &_password_hash;
1117 }
1118
1119 if (!(supported_enctypes & (ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128|ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256))) {
1120 break;
1121 }
1122
1123 ok = convert_string_talloc(mem_ctx,
1124 CH_UTF16MUNGED, CH_UTF8,
1125 password_utf16.data,
1126 password_utf16.length,
1127 (void *)&password_utf8.data,
1128 &password_utf8.length);
1129 if (!ok) {
1130 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1131 ret = ENOMEM;
1132 goto out;
1133 }
1134
1135 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
1136 num_keys += 1;
1137 }
1138 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
1139 num_keys += 1;
1140 }
1141 break;
1142 } else if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
1143 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5) {
1144 password_hash = &auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
1145 num_keys += 1;
1146 }
1147 }
1148 }
1149
1150 /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
1151 if (num_keys == 0) {
1152 DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": no usable key found\n"));
1153 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1154 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1155 goto out;
1156 }
1157
1158 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(num_keys, sizeof(Key));
1159 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
1160 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1161 ret = ENOMEM;
1162 goto out;
1163 }
1164
1165 if (password_utf8.length != 0) {
1166 Key key = {};
1167 krb5_const_principal salt_principal = principal;
1168 krb5_salt salt;
1169 krb5_data cleartext_data;
1170
1171 cleartext_data.data = password_utf8.data;
1172 cleartext_data.length = password_utf8.length;
1173
1174 ret = krb5_get_pw_salt(context,
1175 salt_principal,
1176 &salt);
1177 if (ret != 0) {
1178 goto out;
1179 }
1180
1181 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256) {
1182 ret = krb5_string_to_key_data_salt(context,
1183 ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
1184 cleartext_data,
1185 salt,
1186 &key.key);
1187 if (ret != 0) {
1188 krb5_free_salt(context, salt);
1189 goto out;
1190 }
1191
1192 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
1193 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
1194 }
1195
1196 if (supported_enctypes & ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128) {
1197 ret = krb5_string_to_key_data_salt(context,
1198 ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
1199 cleartext_data,
1200 salt,
1201 &key.key);
1202 if (ret != 0) {
1203 krb5_free_salt(context, salt);
1204 goto out;
1205 }
1206
1207 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
1208 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
1209 }
1210
1211 krb5_free_salt(context, salt);
1212 }
1213
1214 if (password_hash != NULL) {
1215 Key key = {};
1216
1217 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
1218 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
1219 password_hash->hash,
1220 sizeof(password_hash->hash),
1221 &key.key);
1222 if (ret != 0) {
1223 goto out;
1224 }
1225
1226 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
1227 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
1228 }
1229
1230 entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
1231 entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
1232 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
1233 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
1234 entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
1235
1236 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
1237
1238 entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
1239
1240 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
1241
1242 entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
1243
1244 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
1245 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
1246 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1247 ret = ENOMEM;
1248 goto out;
1249 }
1250 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
1251 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
1252 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
1253 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1254 ret = ENOMEM;
1255 goto out;
1256 }
1257 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
1258 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
1259 }
1260
1261
1262 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
1263
1264 out:
1265 if (ret != 0) {
1266 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
1267 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
1268 } else {
1269 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
1270 }
1271
1272 return ret;
1273
1274 }
1275
1276 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
1277 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1278 const char *realm,
1279 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
1280 struct ldb_message **pmsg)
1281 {
1282 NTSTATUS status;
1283 const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
1284
1285 status = sam_get_results_trust(ldb_ctx,
1286 mem_ctx, realm, realm, attrs,
1287 pmsg);
1288 if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
1289 return 0;
1290 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND)) {
1291 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1292 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1293 int ret = ENOMEM;
1294 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "get_sam_result_trust: out of memory");
1295 return ret;
1296 } else {
1297 int ret = EINVAL;
1298 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "get_sam_result_trust: %s", nt_errstr(status));
1299 return ret;
1300 }
1301 }
1302
1303 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
1304 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1305 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1306 krb5_const_principal principal,
1307 const char **attrs,
1308 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1309 struct ldb_message **msg) {
1310 NTSTATUS nt_status;
1311 char *principal_string;
1312
1313 if (krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1314 principal_string = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx, context,
1315 principal, 0);
1316 if (principal_string == NULL) {
1317 return ENOMEM;
1318 }
1319 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1320 mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
1321 realm_dn, msg);
1322 TALLOC_FREE(principal_string);
1323 } else {
1324 krb5_error_code ret;
1325 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string);
1326 if (ret != 0) {
1327 return ret;
1328 }
1329 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1330 mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
1331 realm_dn, msg);
1332 free(principal_string);
1333 }
1334
1335 if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
1336 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1337 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1338 return ENOMEM;
1339 } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1340 return EINVAL;
1341 }
1342
1343 return 0;
1344 }
1345
1346 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context,
1347 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1348 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1349 krb5_const_principal principal,
1350 unsigned flags,
1351 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
1352 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1353 krb5_error_code ret;
1354 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1355
1356 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1357 mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
1358 &realm_dn, &msg);
1359 if (ret != 0) {
1360 return ret;
1361 }
1362
1363 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1364 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
1365 flags,
1366 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1367 return ret;
1368 }
1369
1370 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context,
1371 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1372 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1373 krb5_const_principal principal,
1374 unsigned flags,
1375 uint32_t kvno,
1376 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1377 {
1378 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
1379 krb5_error_code ret;
1380 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1381 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1382
1383 krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL;
1384 if (principal->name.name_string.len != 2
1385 || (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
1386 /* Not a krbtgt */
1387 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1388 }
1389
1390 /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
1391
1392 if (lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)
1393 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1])) {
1394 /* us, or someone quite like us */
1395 /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
1396 * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
1397 * krbtgt */
1398
1399 int lret;
1400 unsigned int krbtgt_number;
1401 /* w2k8r2 sometimes gives us a kvno of 255 for inter-domain
1402 trust tickets. We don't yet know what this means, but we do
1403 seem to need to treat it as unspecified */
1404 if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
1405 krbtgt_number = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno);
1406 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
1407 if (krbtgt_number != kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1408 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
1409 }
1410 }
1411 } else {
1412 krbtgt_number = kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number;
1413 }
1414
1415 if (krbtgt_number == kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1416 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1417 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1418 krbtgt_attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1419 "(objectClass=user)");
1420 } else {
1421 /* We need to look up an RODC krbtgt (perhaps
1422 * ours, if we are an RODC, perhaps another
1423 * RODC if we are a read-write DC */
1424 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1425 &msg, realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1426 krbtgt_attrs,
1427 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1428 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=%u))", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1429 }
1430
1431 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1432 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1433 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1434 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1435 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1436 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1437 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1438 } else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1439 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1440 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1441 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1442 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1443 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1444 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1445 }
1446
1447 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1448 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
1449 flags, realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1450 if (alloc_principal) {
1451 /* This is again copied in the message2entry call */
1452 krb5_free_principal(context, alloc_principal);
1453 }
1454 if (ret != 0) {
1455 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
1456 }
1457 return ret;
1458
1459 } else {
1460 enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
1461 const char *realm = NULL;
1462
1463 /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
1464
1465 if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->realm) == 0) {
1466 /* look for inbound trust */
1467 direction = INBOUND;
1468 realm = principal->name.name_string.val[1];
1469 } else if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->name.name_string.val[1]) == 0) {
1470 /* look for outbound trust */
1471 direction = OUTBOUND;
1472 realm = principal->realm;
1473 } else {
1474 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1475 principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1476 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1477 principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1478 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1479 }
1480
1481 /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
1482
1483 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1484 mem_ctx,
1485 realm, realm_dn, &msg);
1486
1487 if (ret != 0) {
1488 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1489 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1490 return ret;
1491 }
1492
1493 ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1494 principal, direction,
1495 realm_dn, flags, kvno, msg, entry_ex);
1496 if (ret != 0) {
1497 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed for %s",
1498 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
1499 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: "
1500 "trust_message2entry failed for %s",
1501 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn));
1502 }
1503 return ret;
1504 }
1505
1506 }
1507
1508 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context,
1509 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1510 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1511 krb5_const_principal principal,
1512 unsigned flags,
1513 const char **attrs,
1514 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1515 struct ldb_message **msg)
1516 {
1517 krb5_error_code ret;
1518 if ((smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) != KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL)
1519 && krb5_princ_size(context, principal) >= 2) {
1520 /* 'normal server' case */
1521 int ldb_ret;
1522 NTSTATUS nt_status;
1523 struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
1524 char *principal_string;
1525
1526 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
1527 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
1528 &principal_string);
1529 if (ret != 0) {
1530 return ret;
1531 }
1532
1533 /* At this point we may find the host is known to be
1534 * in a different realm, so we should generate a
1535 * referral instead */
1536 nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1537 mem_ctx, principal_string,
1538 &user_dn, realm_dn);
1539 free(principal_string);
1540
1541 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1542 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1543 }
1544
1545 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1546 mem_ctx,
1547 msg, user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1548 attrs,
1549 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1550 "(objectClass=*)");
1551 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1552 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1553 }
1554 return 0;
1555 } else if (!(flags & HDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ)
1556 && smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1557 /*
1558 * The behaviour of accepting an
1559 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL server principal
1560 * containing a UPN only applies to TGS-REQ packets,
1561 * not AS-REQ packets.
1562 */
1563 return samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1564 mem_ctx, principal, attrs,
1565 realm_dn, msg);
1566 } else {
1567 /*
1568 * This case is for:
1569 * - the AS-REQ, where we only accept
1570 * samAccountName based lookups for the server, no
1571 * matter if the name is an
1572 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL or not
1573 * - for the TGS-REQ when we are not given an
1574 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL, which also must
1575 * only lookup samAccountName based names.
1576 */
1577 int lret;
1578 char *short_princ;
1579 krb5_principal enterprise_prinicpal = NULL;
1580
1581 if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context, principal) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1582 /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
1583 if (principal->name.name_string.len != 1) {
1584 ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
1585 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_server: request for an "
1586 "enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
1587 principal->name.name_string.len);
1588 return ret;
1589 }
1590 ret = krb5_parse_name(context, principal->name.name_string.val[0],
1591 &enterprise_prinicpal);
1592 if (ret) {
1593 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1594 return ret;
1595 }
1596 principal = enterprise_prinicpal;
1597 }
1598
1599 /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
1600 *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1601
1602 /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referral */
1603
1604 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &short_princ);
1605
1606 if (ret != 0) {
1607 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1608 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1609 return ret;
1610 }
1611
1612 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg,
1613 *realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1614 attrs,
1615 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1616 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
1617 ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ));
1618 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1619 DEBUG(3, ("Failed to find an entry for %s\n", short_princ));
1620 free(short_princ);
1621 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1622 }
1623 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1624 DEBUG(3, ("Failed single search for %s - %s\n",
1625 short_princ, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1626 free(short_princ);
1627 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1628 }
1629 free(short_princ);
1630 return 0;
1631 }
1632 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1633 }
1634
1635
1636
1637 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
1638 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1639 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1640 krb5_const_principal principal,
1641 unsigned flags,
1642 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1643 {
1644 krb5_error_code ret;
1645 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1646 struct ldb_message *msg;
1647
1648 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
1649 flags, server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1650 if (ret != 0) {
1651 return ret;
1652 }
1653
1654 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1655 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
1656 flags,
1657 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1658 if (ret != 0) {
1659 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed");
1660 }
1661
1662 return ret;
1663 }
1664
1665 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context,
1666 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1667 krb5_const_principal principal,
1668 unsigned flags,
1669 krb5_kvno kvno,
1670 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1671 {
1672 krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1673 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1674
1675 mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
1676 if (!mem_ctx) {
1677 ret = ENOMEM;
1678 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1679 return ret;
1680 }
1681
1682 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
1683 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1684 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1685 }
1686 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
1687 /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
1688 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry_ex);
1689 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1690
1691 /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
1692 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1693 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1694 }
1695 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
1696 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry_ex);
1697 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1698 }
1699
1700 done:
1701 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1702 return ret;
1703 }
1704
1705 struct samba_kdc_seq {
1706 unsigned int index;
1707 unsigned int count;
1708 struct ldb_message **msgs;
1709 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1710 };
1711
1712 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context,
1713 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1714 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1715 {
1716 krb5_error_code ret;
1717 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1718 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1719 hdb_entry_ex entry_ex;
1720 memset(&entry_ex, '\0', sizeof(entry_ex));
1721
1722 if (!priv) {
1723 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1724 }
1725
1726 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
1727
1728 if (!mem_ctx) {
1729 ret = ENOMEM;
1730 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
1731 return ret;
1732 }
1733
1734 if (priv->index < priv->count) {
1735 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1736 NULL, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
1737 HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA|HDB_F_GET_ANY,
1738 priv->realm_dn, priv->msgs[priv->index++], entry);
1739 } else {
1740 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1741 }
1742
1743 if (ret != 0) {
1744 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1745 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1746 } else {
1747 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1748 }
1749
1750 return ret;
1751 }
1752
1753 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context,
1754 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1755 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1756 {
1757 struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb;
1758 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1759 char *realm;
1760 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
1761 krb5_error_code ret;
1762 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1763 int lret;
1764
1765 if (priv) {
1766 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1767 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1768 }
1769
1770 priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq);
1771 if (!priv) {
1772 ret = ENOMEM;
1773 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
1774 return ret;
1775 }
1776
1777 priv->index = 0;
1778 priv->msgs = NULL;
1779 priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx);
1780 priv->count = 0;
1781
1782 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context");
1783
1784 if (!mem_ctx) {
1785 ret = ENOMEM;
1786 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
1787 return ret;
1788 }
1789
1790 ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
1791 if (ret != 0) {
1792 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1793 return ret;
1794 }
1795 krb5_free_default_realm(context, realm);
1796
1797 lret = dsdb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
1798 priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
1799 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1800 "(objectClass=user)");
1801
1802 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1803 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1804 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1805 }
1806
1807 priv->count = res->count;
1808 priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
1809 talloc_free(res);
1810
1811 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv;
1812
1813 ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1814
1815 if (ret != 0) {
1816 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1817 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1818 } else {
1819 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1820 }
1821 return ret;
1822 }
1823
1824 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context,
1825 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1826 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1827 {
1828 return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1829 }
1830
1831 /* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal
1832 *
1833 * This is currently a very nasty hack - allowing only delegation to itself.
1834 */
1835 krb5_error_code
1836 samba_kdc_check_s4u2self(krb5_context context,
1837 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1838 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1839 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
1840 {
1841 krb5_error_code ret;
1842 krb5_principal enterprise_prinicpal = NULL;
1843 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1844 struct ldb_message *msg;
1845 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1846 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1847 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1848 const char *delegation_check_attrs[] = {
1849 "objectSid", NULL
1850 };
1851
1852 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self");
1853
1854 if (!mem_ctx) {
1855 ret = ENOMEM;
1856 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self: talloc_named() failed!");
1857 return ret;
1858 }
1859
1860 if (target_principal->name.name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1861 /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
1862 if (target_principal->name.name_string.len != 1) {
1863 ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
1864 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self: request for delegation to enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
1865 target_principal->name.name_string.len);
1866 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1867 return ret;
1868 }
1869 ret = krb5_parse_name(context, target_principal->name.name_string.val[0],
1870 &enterprise_prinicpal);
1871 if (ret) {
1872 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1873 return ret;
1874 }
1875 target_principal = enterprise_prinicpal;
1876 }
1877
1878 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, target_principal,
1879 HDB_F_GET_CLIENT|HDB_F_GET_SERVER,
1880 delegation_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1881
1882 krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_prinicpal);
1883
1884 if (ret != 0) {
1885 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1886 return ret;
1887 }
1888
1889 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1890 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1891
1892 /* Allow delegation to the same principal, even if by a different
1893 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1894 * comparison */
1895 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1896 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1897 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1898 }
1899
1900 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1901 return ret;
1902 }
1903
1904 /* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
1905 * slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
1906 * database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
1907 * SID */
1908
1909 krb5_error_code
1910 samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context,
1911 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1912 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1913 krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
1914 {
1915 krb5_error_code ret;
1916 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1917 struct ldb_message *msg;
1918 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1919 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1920 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1921 const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
1922 "objectSid", NULL
1923 };
1924
1925 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
1926
1927 if (!mem_ctx) {
1928 ret = ENOMEM;
1929 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1930 return ret;
1931 }
1932
1933 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1934 mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
1935 ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1936
1937 if (ret != 0) {
1938 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1939 return ret;
1940 }
1941
1942 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1943 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1944
1945 /* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
1946 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1947 * comparison */
1948 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1949 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1950 return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
1951 }
1952
1953 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1954 return ret;
1955 }
1956
1957 /*
1958 * Check if a given entry may delegate to this target principal
1959 * with S4U2Proxy.
1960 */
1961 krb5_error_code
1962 samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy(krb5_context context,
1963 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1964 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1965 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
1966 {
1967 krb5_error_code ret;
1968 char *tmp = NULL;
1969 const char *client_dn = NULL;
1970 const char *target_principal_name = NULL;
1971 struct ldb_message_element *el;
1972 struct ldb_val val;
1973 unsigned int i;
1974 bool found = false;
1975 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1976
1977 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy");
1978
1979 if (!mem_ctx) {
1980 ret = ENOMEM;
1981 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1982 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
1983 " talloc_named() failed!");
1984 return ret;
1985 }
1986
1987 client_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(p->msg->dn);
1988 if (!client_dn) {
1989 if (errno == 0) {
1990 errno = ENOMEM;
1991 }
1992 ret = errno;
1993 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1994 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
1995 " ldb_dn_get_linearized() failed!");
1996 return ret;
1997 }
1998
1999 /*
2000 * The main heimdal code already checked that the target_principal
2001 * belongs to the same realm as the client.
2002 *
2003 * So we just need the principal without the realm,
2004 * as that is what is configured in the "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo"
2005 * attribute.
2006 */
2007 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, target_principal,
2008 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &tmp);
2009 if (ret) {
2010 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2011 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2012 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
2013 " krb5_unparse_name() failed!");
2014 return ret;
2015 }
2016 DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] for target[%s]\n",
2017 client_dn, tmp));
2018
2019 target_principal_name = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, tmp);
2020 SAFE_FREE(tmp);
2021 if (target_principal_name == NULL) {
2022 ret = ENOMEM;
2023 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2024 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
2025 " talloc_strdup() failed!");
2026 return ret;
2027 }
2028
2029 el = ldb_msg_find_element(p->msg, "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo");
2030 if (el == NULL) {
2031 goto bad_option;
2032 }
2033
2034 val = data_blob_string_const(target_principal_name);
2035
2036 for (i=0; i<el->num_values; i++) {
2037 struct ldb_val *val1 = &val;
2038 struct ldb_val *val2 = &el->values[i];
2039 int cmp;
2040
2041 if (val1->length != val2->length) {
2042 continue;
2043 }
2044
2045 cmp = strncasecmp((const char *)val1->data,
2046 (const char *)val2->data,
2047 val1->length);
2048 if (cmp != 0) {
2049 continue;
2050 }
2051
2052 found = true;
2053 break;
2054 }
2055
2056 if (!found) {
2057 goto bad_option;
2058 }
2059
2060 DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] allowed target[%s]\n",
2061 client_dn, tmp));
2062 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2063 return 0;
2064
2065 bad_option:
2066 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
2067 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] "
2068 "not allowed for delegation to target[%s]",
2069 client_dn,
2070 target_principal_name);
2071 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
2072 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
2073 }
2074
2075 NTSTATUS samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_base_context *base_ctx,
2076 struct samba_kdc_db_context **kdc_db_ctx_out)
2077 {
2078 int ldb_ret;
2079 struct ldb_message *msg;
2080 struct auth_session_info *session_info;
2081 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
2082 /* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to
2083 * authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is higly likely to
2084 * be circular.
2085 *
2086 * In future we may set this up to use EXERNAL and SSL
2087 * certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP_SET_USERNAME
2088 */
2089
2090 kdc_db_ctx = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_db_context);
2091 if (kdc_db_ctx == NULL) {
2092 return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
2093 }
2094 kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx = base_ctx->ev_ctx;
2095 kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx = base_ctx->lp_ctx;
2096
2097 /* get default kdc policy */
2098 lpcfg_default_kdc_policy(base_ctx->lp_ctx,
2099 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
2100 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime,
2101 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime);
2102
2103 session_info = system_session(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
2104 if (session_info == NULL) {
2105 return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2106 }
2107
2108 /* Setup the link to LDB */
2109 kdc_db_ctx->samdb = samdb_connect(kdc_db_ctx, base_ctx->ev_ctx,
2110 base_ctx->lp_ctx, session_info, 0);
2111 if (kdc_db_ctx->samdb == NULL) {
2112 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!"));
2113 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2114 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2115 }
2116
2117 /* Find out our own krbtgt kvno */
2118 ldb_ret = samdb_rodc(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, &kdc_db_ctx->rodc);
2119 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2120 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine if we are an RODC in KDC backend: %s\n",
2121 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2122 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2123 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2124 }
2125 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
2126 int my_krbtgt_number;
2127 const char *secondary_keytab[] = { "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", NULL };
2128 struct ldb_dn *account_dn;
2129 struct ldb_dn *server_dn = samdb_server_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx);
2130 if (!server_dn) {
2131 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine server DN in KDC backend: %s\n",
2132 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2133 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2134 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2135 }
2136
2137 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, server_dn,
2138 "serverReference", &account_dn);
2139 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2140 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine server account in KDC backend: %s\n",
2141 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2142 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2143 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2144 }
2145
2146 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, account_dn,
2147 "msDS-KrbTgtLink", &kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn);
2148 talloc_free(account_dn);
2149 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2150 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine RODC krbtgt account in KDC backend: %s\n",
2151 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2152 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2153 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2154 }
2155
2156 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
2157 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
2158 secondary_keytab,
2159 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
2160 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=*))");
2161 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2162 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot read krbtgt account %s in KDC backend to get msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber: %s: %s\n",
2163 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
2164 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
2165 ldb_strerror(ldb_ret)));
2166 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2167 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2168 }
2169 my_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
2170 if (my_krbtgt_number == -1) {
2171 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot read msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber from krbtgt account %s in KDC backend: got %d\n",
2172 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
2173 my_krbtgt_number));
2174 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2175 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2176 }
2177 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = my_krbtgt_number;
2178
2179 } else {
2180 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
2181 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
2182 &msg,
2183 ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
2184 LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
2185 krbtgt_attrs,
2186 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
2187 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
2188
2189 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
2190 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
2191 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
2192 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
2193 }
2194 kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn = talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, msg->dn);
2195 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
2196 talloc_free(msg);
2197 }
2198 *kdc_db_ctx_out = kdc_db_ctx;
2199 return NT_STATUS_OK;
2200 }
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