?  search:
summary | log | graphiclog1 | graphiclog2 | commit | commitdiff | tree | refs | edit | fork
blame | history | raw | HEAD
script/autobuild: make use of --with-perl-{arch,lib}-install-dir
[Samba.git] / source4 / kdc / db-glue.c
blobe64fae956524b24d73496578e2ac55a43b71e6f0
1 /*
2 Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
3
4 Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
5
6 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
7 Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
8
9 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
12 (at your option) any later version.
13
14 This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 GNU General Public License for more details.
18
19
20 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
21 along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
22 */
23
24 #include "includes.h"
25 #include "libcli/security/security.h"
26 #include "auth/auth.h"
27 #include "auth/auth_sam.h"
28 #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
29 #include "dsdb/common/util.h"
30 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
31 #include "param/param.h"
32 #include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
33 #include "system/kerberos.h"
34 #include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
35 #include <hdb.h>
36 #include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
37 #include "kdc/kdc-glue.h"
38 #include "kdc/db-glue.h"
39
40 #define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno) \
41 ((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) >> 16))
42
43 #define SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, krbtgt) \
44 ((krb5_kvno)((((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF) | \
45 ((((uint32_t)krbtgt) << 16) & 0xFFFF0000)))
46
47 enum samba_kdc_ent_type
48 { SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
49 SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
50
51 enum trust_direction {
52 UNKNOWN = 0,
53 INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
54 OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
55 };
56
57 static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
58 "trustPartner",
59 "trustAuthIncoming",
60 "trustAuthOutgoing",
61 "whenCreated",
62 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
63 "trustAttributes",
64 "trustDirection",
65 "trustType",
66 NULL
67 };
68
69
70 static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val)
71 {
72 const char *tmp;
73 const char *gentime;
74 struct tm tm;
75
76 gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
77 if (!gentime)
78 return default_val;
79
80 tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
81 if (tmp == NULL) {
82 return default_val;
83 }
84
85 return timegm(&tm);
86 }
87
88 static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, uint32_t userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type)
89 {
90 HDBFlags flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
91
92 /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
93 flags.immutable = 1;
94
95 /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
96 flags.invalid = 1;
97
98 flags.renewable = 1;
99
100 /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
101 flags.server = 1;
102
103 /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
104 if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
105 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
106 flags.client = 1;
107 }
108 flags.invalid = 0;
109 }
110
111 if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
112 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
113 flags.client = 1;
114 }
115 flags.invalid = 0;
116 }
117 if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
118 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
119 flags.client = 1;
120 }
121 flags.invalid = 0;
122 }
123 if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
124 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
125 flags.client = 1;
126 }
127 flags.invalid = 0;
128 }
129
130 /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
131 if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
132 flags.client = 0;
133 }
134 if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
135 flags.locked_out = 1;
136 }
137 /*
138 if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
139 flags.invalid = 1;
140 }
141 */
142 /*
143 UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
144 */
145 if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
146 flags.invalid = 1;
147 }
148
149 /* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
150
151 /*
152 if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
153 flags.invalid = 1;
154 }
155 */
156 if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
157 flags.require_hwauth = 1;
158 }
159 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
160 flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
161 }
162 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION) {
163 /*
164 * this is confusing...
165 *
166 * UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
167 * => ok_as_delegate
168 *
169 * and
170 *
171 * UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION
172 * => trusted_for_delegation
173 */
174 flags.trusted_for_delegation = 1;
175 }
176 if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
177 flags.forwardable = 1;
178 flags.proxiable = 1;
179 }
180
181 if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
182 flags.require_preauth = 0;
183 } else {
184 flags.require_preauth = 1;
185
186 }
187 return flags;
188 }
189
190 static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p)
191 {
192 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = p->entry_ex;
193 free_hdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry);
194 return 0;
195 }
196
197 static void samba_kdc_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
198 {
199 /* this function is called only from hdb_free_entry().
200 * Make sure we neutralize the destructor or we will
201 * get a double free later when hdb_free_entry() will
202 * try to call free_hdb_entry() */
203 talloc_set_destructor(entry_ex->ctx, NULL);
204
205 /* now proceed to free the talloc part */
206 talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx);
207 }
208
209 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
210 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
211 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
212 struct ldb_message *msg,
213 uint32_t rid,
214 bool is_rodc,
215 uint32_t userAccountControl,
216 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
217 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
218 {
219 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
220 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
221 struct samr_Password *hash;
222 const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
223 struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
224 struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
225 bool newer_keys = false;
226 struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
227 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL;
228 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
229 uint16_t i;
230 uint16_t allocated_keys = 0;
231 int rodc_krbtgt_number = 0;
232 int kvno = 0;
233 uint32_t supported_enctypes
234 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
235 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
236 0);
237
238 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT || is_rodc) {
239 /* KDCs (and KDCs on RODCs) use AES */
240 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
241 } else if (userAccountControl & (UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT|UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT)) {
242 /* DCs and RODCs comptuer accounts use AES */
243 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
244 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT ||
245 (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY)) {
246 /* for AS-REQ the client chooses the enc types it
247 * supports, and this will vary between computers a
248 * user logs in from.
249 *
250 * likewise for 'any' return as much as is supported,
251 * to export into a keytab */
252 supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES;
253 }
254
255 /* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
256 if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
257 supported_enctypes = ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5;
258 } else {
259 /* Otherwise, add in the default enc types */
260 supported_enctypes |= ENC_CRC32 | ENC_RSA_MD5 | ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
261 }
262
263 /* Is this the krbtgt or a RODC krbtgt */
264 if (is_rodc) {
265 rodc_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
266
267 if (rodc_krbtgt_number == -1) {
268 return EINVAL;
269 }
270 }
271
272 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
273 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
274
275 kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
276 if (is_rodc) {
277 kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, rodc_krbtgt_number);
278 }
279 entry_ex->entry.kvno = kvno;
280
281 /* Get keys from the db */
282
283 hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
284 sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
285
286 /* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */
287 if (hash) {
288 allocated_keys++;
289 }
290
291 /* supplementalCredentials if present */
292 if (sc_val) {
293 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, &scb,
294 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
295 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
296 dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
297 ret = EINVAL;
298 goto out;
299 }
300
301 if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
302 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
303 ret = EINVAL;
304 goto out;
305 }
306
307 for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
308 if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
309 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
310 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
311 scpk = NULL;
312 continue;
313 }
314 newer_keys = true;
315 break;
316 } else if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
317 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
318 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
319 scpk = NULL;
320 }
321 /*
322 * we don't break here in hope to find
323 * a Kerberos-Newer-Keys package
324 */
325 }
326 }
327 }
328 /*
329 * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys or Primary:Kerberos element
330 * of supplementalCredentials
331 */
332 if (scpk) {
333 DATA_BLOB blob;
334
335 blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
336 if (!blob.data) {
337 ret = ENOMEM;
338 goto out;
339 }
340
341 /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
342 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &_pkb,
343 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
344 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
345 ret = EINVAL;
346 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
347 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
348 goto out;
349 }
350
351 if (newer_keys && _pkb.version != 4) {
352 ret = EINVAL;
353 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
354 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
355 goto out;
356 }
357
358 if (!newer_keys && _pkb.version != 3) {
359 ret = EINVAL;
360 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
361 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
362 goto out;
363 }
364
365 if (_pkb.version == 4) {
366 pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
367 allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys;
368 } else if (_pkb.version == 3) {
369 pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3;
370 allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys;
371 }
372 }
373
374 if (allocated_keys == 0) {
375 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
376 /* We are on an RODC, but don't have keys for this account. Signal this to the caller */
377 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
378 }
379
380 /* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
381 * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
382 * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
383 return 0;
384 }
385
386 /* allocate space to decode into */
387 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
388 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(Key));
389 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
390 ret = ENOMEM;
391 goto out;
392 }
393
394 if (hash && (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5)) {
395 Key key;
396
397 key.mkvno = 0;
398 key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
399
400 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
401 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
402 hash->hash, sizeof(hash->hash),
403 &key.key);
404 if (ret) {
405 goto out;
406 }
407
408 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
409 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
410 }
411
412 if (pkb4) {
413 for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) {
414 Key key;
415
416 if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue;
417
418 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb4->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
419 continue;
420 }
421
422 key.mkvno = 0;
423 key.salt = NULL;
424
425 if (pkb4->salt.string) {
426 DATA_BLOB salt;
427
428 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string);
429
430 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
431 if (key.salt == NULL) {
432 ret = ENOMEM;
433 goto out;
434 }
435
436 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
437
438 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
439 if (ret) {
440 free(key.salt);
441 key.salt = NULL;
442 goto out;
443 }
444 }
445
446 /* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */
447
448 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
449 pkb4->keys[i].keytype,
450 pkb4->keys[i].value->data,
451 pkb4->keys[i].value->length,
452 &key.key);
453 if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
454 DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
455 pkb4->keys[i].keytype));
456 ret = 0;
457 continue;
458 }
459 if (ret) {
460 if (key.salt) {
461 free_Salt(key.salt);
462 free(key.salt);
463 key.salt = NULL;
464 }
465 goto out;
466 }
467
468 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
469 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
470 }
471 } else if (pkb3) {
472 for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) {
473 Key key;
474
475 if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue;
476
477 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb3->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
478 continue;
479 }
480
481 key.mkvno = 0;
482 key.salt = NULL;
483
484 if (pkb3->salt.string) {
485 DATA_BLOB salt;
486
487 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string);
488
489 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
490 if (key.salt == NULL) {
491 ret = ENOMEM;
492 goto out;
493 }
494
495 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
496
497 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
498 if (ret) {
499 free(key.salt);
500 key.salt = NULL;
501 goto out;
502 }
503 }
504
505 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
506 pkb3->keys[i].keytype,
507 pkb3->keys[i].value->data,
508 pkb3->keys[i].value->length,
509 &key.key);
510 if (ret) {
511 if (key.salt) {
512 free_Salt(key.salt);
513 free(key.salt);
514 key.salt = NULL;
515 }
516 goto out;
517 }
518
519 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
520 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
521 }
522 }
523
524 out:
525 if (ret != 0) {
526 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
527 }
528 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) {
529 free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
530 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
531 }
532 return ret;
533 }
534
535 /*
536 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
537 */
538 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context,
539 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
540 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
541 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
542 unsigned flags,
543 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
544 struct ldb_message *msg,
545 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
546 {
547 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
548 uint32_t userAccountControl;
549 uint32_t msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
550 unsigned int i;
551 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
552 krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
553
554 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
555 NTTIME acct_expiry;
556 NTSTATUS status;
557
558 uint32_t rid;
559 bool is_rodc = false;
560 struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
561 struct ldb_val computer_val;
562 const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
563 computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer");
564 computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data);
565
566 if (ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber")) {
567 is_rodc = true;
568 }
569
570 if (!samAccountName) {
571 ret = ENOENT;
572 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
573 goto out;
574 }
575
576 objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
577
578 if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
579 is_computer = TRUE;
580 }
581
582 memset(entry_ex, 0, sizeof(*entry_ex));
583
584 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
585 if (!p) {
586 ret = ENOMEM;
587 goto out;
588 }
589
590 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
591 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
592 p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn);
593 if (!p->realm_dn) {
594 ret = ENOMEM;
595 goto out;
596 }
597
598 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
599
600 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
601 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
602
603 entry_ex->ctx = p;
604 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
605
606 userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
607
608 msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed
609 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
610 "msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed",
611 UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE);
612
613 /*
614 * This brings in the lockout flag, block the account if not
615 * found. We need the weird UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE check because
616 * we do not want to fail open if the value is not returned,
617 * but 0 is a valid value (all OK)
618 */
619 if (msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed == UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
620 ret = EINVAL;
621 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: "
622 "no msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed present");
623 goto out;
624 } else {
625 userAccountControl |= msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed;
626 }
627
628 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
629 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
630 krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
631 } else {
632 ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
633 if (ret) {
634 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
635 goto out;
636 }
637
638 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
639 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
640 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
641 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
642 * we determine from our records */
643
644 /* this has to be with malloc() */
645 krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
646 }
647
648 /* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
649 entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2HDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
650
651 /* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
652 * default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
653 * by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
654 * their probably patheticly insecure password) */
655
656 if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server
657 && lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
658 if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
659 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0;
660 }
661 }
662
663 if (flags & HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA) {
664 /* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
665 * of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
666 * DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
667 * we must return */
668
669 /* use 'whenCreated' */
670 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
671 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
672 krb5_make_principal(context,
673 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
674 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
675
676 entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event));
677 if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
678 ret = ENOMEM;
679 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
680 goto out;
681 }
682
683 /* use 'whenChanged' */
684 entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
685 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
686 krb5_make_principal(context,
687 &entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal,
688 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
689 }
690
691
692 /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
693 * virtue of being that particular RID */
694 status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
695
696 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
697 ret = EINVAL;
698 goto out;
699 }
700
701 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
702 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
703 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
704
705 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
706 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
707
708 /* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
709 * 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
710 * trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
711 * Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
712 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
713 && principal->name.name_string.len == 2
714 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "kadmin") == 0)
715 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], "changepw") == 0)
716 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)) {
717 entry_ex->entry.flags.change_pw = 1;
718 }
719 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
720 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
721 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
722 } else if (is_rodc) {
723 /* The RODC krbtgt account is like the main krbtgt,
724 * but it does not have a changepw or kadmin
725 * service */
726
727 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
728 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
729
730 /* Also don't allow the RODC krbtgt to be a client (it should not be needed) */
731 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
732 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
733 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
734
735 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
736 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
737 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 0;
738 } else if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
739 /* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
740 * client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
741
742 /* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
743 * it could bypass the password restrictions */
744 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
745
746 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
747 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
748
749 } else {
750 NTTIME must_change_time
751 = samdb_result_force_password_change(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
752 realm_dn, msg);
753 if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
754 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
755 } else {
756 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end));
757 if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) {
758 ret = ENOMEM;
759 goto out;
760 }
761 *entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
762 }
763
764 acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
765 if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
766 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
767 } else {
768 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end));
769 if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) {
770 ret = ENOMEM;
771 goto out;
772 }
773 *entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
774 }
775 }
776
777 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
778
779 entry_ex->entry.max_life = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
780 if (entry_ex->entry.max_life == NULL) {
781 ret = ENOMEM;
782 goto out;
783 }
784
785 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
786 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime;
787 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT) {
788 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime;
789 } else {
790 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = MIN(kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
791 kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime);
792 }
793
794 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
795 if (entry_ex->entry.max_renew == NULL) {
796 ret = ENOMEM;
797 goto out;
798 }
799
800 *entry_ex->entry.max_renew = kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime;
801
802 entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
803
804 /* Get keys from the db */
805 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, kdc_db_ctx, p, msg,
806 rid, is_rodc, userAccountControl,
807 ent_type, entry_ex);
808 if (ret) {
809 /* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */
810 goto out;
811 }
812
813 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
814 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
815 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
816 ret = ENOMEM;
817 goto out;
818 }
819 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
820 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
821 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
822 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
823 ret = ENOMEM;
824 goto out;
825 }
826 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
827 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
828 }
829
830
831 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
832
833 out:
834 if (ret != 0) {
835 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
836 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
837 } else {
838 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
839 }
840
841 return ret;
842 }
843
844 /*
845 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
846 * The kvno is what the remote client asked for
847 */
848 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
849 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
850 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
851 enum trust_direction direction,
852 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
853 unsigned flags,
854 uint32_t kvno,
855 struct ldb_message *msg,
856 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
857 {
858 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
859 const char *dnsdomain;
860 const char *realm = lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx);
861 DATA_BLOB password_utf16;
862 struct samr_Password password_hash;
863 const struct ldb_val *password_val;
864 struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
865 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
866 bool use_previous;
867 uint32_t current_kvno;
868 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
869 int ret, trust_direction_flags;
870 unsigned int i;
871 struct AuthenticationInformationArray *auth_array;
872
873 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
874 if (!p) {
875 ret = ENOMEM;
876 goto out;
877 }
878
879 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
880 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
881 p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
882
883 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
884
885 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
886 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
887
888 entry_ex->ctx = p;
889 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
890
891 /* use 'whenCreated' */
892 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
893 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
894 krb5_make_principal(context,
895 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
896 realm, "kadmin", NULL);
897
898 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
899
900 trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0);
901
902 if (direction == INBOUND) {
903 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
904
905 } else { /* OUTBOUND */
906 dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL);
907 /* replace realm */
908 realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
909 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
910 }
911
912 if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) {
913 ret = ENOENT;
914 goto out;
915 }
916
917 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, &password_blob,
918 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
919 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
920 ret = EINVAL;
921 goto out;
922 }
923
924
925 /* we need to work out if we are going to use the current or
926 * the previous password hash.
927 * We base this on the kvno the client passes in. If the kvno
928 * passed in is equal to the current kvno in our database then
929 * we use the current structure. If it is the current kvno-1,
930 * then we use the previous substrucure.
931 */
932
933 /* first work out the current kvno */
934 current_kvno = 0;
935 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
936 if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
937 current_kvno = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.version.version;
938 }
939 }
940
941 /* work out whether we will use the previous or current
942 password */
943 if (password_blob.previous.count == 0) {
944 /* there is no previous password */
945 use_previous = false;
946 } else if (!(flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) ||
947 kvno == current_kvno) {
948 use_previous = false;
949 } else if ((kvno+1 == current_kvno) ||
950 (kvno == 255 && current_kvno == 0)) {
951 use_previous = true;
952 } else {
953 DEBUG(1,(__location__ ": Request for unknown kvno %u - current kvno is %u\n",
954 kvno, current_kvno));
955 ret = ENOENT;
956 goto out;
957 }
958
959 if (use_previous) {
960 auth_array = &password_blob.previous;
961 } else {
962 auth_array = &password_blob.current;
963 }
964
965 /* use the kvno the client specified, if available */
966 if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
967 entry_ex->entry.kvno = kvno;
968 } else {
969 entry_ex->entry.kvno = current_kvno;
970 }
971
972 for (i=0; i < auth_array->count; i++) {
973 if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
974 password_utf16 = data_blob_const(auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
975 auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
976 /* In the future, generate all sorts of
977 * hashes, but for now we can't safely convert
978 * the random strings windows uses into
979 * utf8 */
980
981 /* but as it is utf16 already, we can get the NT password/arcfour-hmac-md5 key */
982 mdfour(password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
983 break;
984 } else if (auth_array->array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
985 password_hash = auth_array->array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
986 break;
987 }
988 }
989
990 if (i < auth_array->count) {
991 Key key;
992 /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
993 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(1, sizeof(Key));
994
995 key.mkvno = 0;
996 key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
997
998 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
999 ret = ENOMEM;
1000 goto out;
1001 }
1002
1003 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
1004 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
1005 password_hash.hash, sizeof(password_hash.hash),
1006 &key.key);
1007 if (ret != 0) {
1008 goto out;
1009 }
1010
1011 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
1012 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
1013 }
1014
1015 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
1016
1017 ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
1018 if (ret) {
1019 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1020 goto out;
1021 }
1022
1023 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
1024 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
1025 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
1026 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
1027 * we determine from our records */
1028
1029 krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
1030 entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
1031 entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
1032 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
1033 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
1034 entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
1035
1036 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
1037
1038 entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
1039
1040 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
1041
1042 entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
1043
1044 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
1045 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
1046 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1047 ret = ENOMEM;
1048 goto out;
1049 }
1050 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
1051 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
1052 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
1053 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
1054 ret = ENOMEM;
1055 goto out;
1056 }
1057 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
1058 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
1059 }
1060
1061
1062 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
1063
1064 out:
1065 if (ret != 0) {
1066 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
1067 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
1068 } else {
1069 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
1070 }
1071
1072 return ret;
1073
1074 }
1075
1076 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
1077 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1078 const char *realm,
1079 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
1080 struct ldb_message **pmsg)
1081 {
1082 int lret;
1083 krb5_error_code ret;
1084 char *filter = NULL;
1085 const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
1086
1087 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
1088 char *realm_encoded = ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, realm);
1089 if (!realm_encoded) {
1090 if (!filter) {
1091 ret = ENOMEM;
1092 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory");
1093 return ret;
1094 }
1095 }
1096 filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=trustedDomain)(|(flatname=%s)(trustPartner=%s)))",
1097 realm_encoded, realm_encoded);
1098
1099 if (!filter) {
1100 talloc_free(realm_encoded);
1101 ret = ENOMEM;
1102 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory");
1103 return ret;
1104 }
1105
1106 lret = dsdb_search(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx, &res,
1107 ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx),
1108 LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs,
1109 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1110 "%s", filter);
1111 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1112 DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search for %s: %s\n", filter, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx)));
1113 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1114 } else if (res->count == 0 || res->count > 1) {
1115 DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for %s: got %d\n", filter, res->count));
1116 talloc_free(res);
1117 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1118 }
1119 talloc_steal(mem_ctx, res->msgs);
1120 *pmsg = res->msgs[0];
1121 talloc_free(res);
1122 return 0;
1123 }
1124
1125 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
1126 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1127 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1128 krb5_const_principal principal,
1129 const char **attrs,
1130 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1131 struct ldb_message **msg) {
1132 NTSTATUS nt_status;
1133 char *principal_string;
1134 krb5_error_code ret;
1135
1136 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string);
1137
1138 if (ret != 0) {
1139 return ret;
1140 }
1141
1142 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1143 mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
1144 realm_dn, msg);
1145 free(principal_string);
1146 if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
1147 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1148 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1149 return ENOMEM;
1150 } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1151 return EINVAL;
1152 }
1153
1154 return ret;
1155 }
1156
1157 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context,
1158 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1159 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1160 krb5_const_principal principal,
1161 unsigned flags,
1162 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
1163 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1164 krb5_error_code ret;
1165 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1166
1167 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1168 mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
1169 &realm_dn, &msg);
1170 if (ret != 0) {
1171 return ret;
1172 }
1173
1174 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1175 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
1176 flags,
1177 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1178 return ret;
1179 }
1180
1181 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context,
1182 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1183 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1184 krb5_const_principal principal,
1185 unsigned flags,
1186 uint32_t kvno,
1187 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1188 {
1189 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
1190 krb5_error_code ret;
1191 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1192 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1193
1194 krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL;
1195 if (principal->name.name_string.len != 2
1196 || (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
1197 /* Not a krbtgt */
1198 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1199 }
1200
1201 /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
1202
1203 if (lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)
1204 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1])) {
1205 /* us, or someone quite like us */
1206 /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
1207 * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
1208 * krbtgt */
1209
1210 int lret;
1211 unsigned int krbtgt_number;
1212 /* w2k8r2 sometimes gives us a kvno of 255 for inter-domain
1213 trust tickets. We don't yet know what this means, but we do
1214 seem to need to treat it as unspecified */
1215 if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
1216 krbtgt_number = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno);
1217 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
1218 if (krbtgt_number != kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1219 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
1220 }
1221 }
1222 } else {
1223 krbtgt_number = kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number;
1224 }
1225
1226 if (krbtgt_number == kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1227 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1228 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1229 krbtgt_attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1230 "(objectClass=user)");
1231 } else {
1232 /* We need to look up an RODC krbtgt (perhaps
1233 * ours, if we are an RODC, perhaps another
1234 * RODC if we are a read-write DC */
1235 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1236 &msg, realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1237 krbtgt_attrs,
1238 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1239 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=%u))", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1240 }
1241
1242 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1243 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1244 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1245 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1246 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1247 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1248 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1249 } else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1250 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1251 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1252 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1253 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1254 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1255 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1256 }
1257
1258 /*
1259 * Windows seems to canonicalize the principal
1260 * in a TGS REP even if the client did not specify
1261 * the canonicalize flag.
1262 */
1263 if (flags & (HDB_F_CANON|HDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ)) {
1264 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &alloc_principal);
1265 if (ret) {
1266 return ret;
1267 }
1268
1269 /* When requested to do so, ensure that the
1270 * both realm values in the principal are set
1271 * to the upper case, canonical realm */
1272 free(alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1273 alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1] = strdup(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
1274 if (!alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]) {
1275 ret = ENOMEM;
1276 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: strdup() failed!");
1277 return ret;
1278 }
1279 principal = alloc_principal;
1280 }
1281
1282 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1283 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
1284 flags, realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1285 if (alloc_principal) {
1286 /* This is again copied in the message2entry call */
1287 krb5_free_principal(context, alloc_principal);
1288 }
1289 if (ret != 0) {
1290 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
1291 }
1292 return ret;
1293
1294 } else {
1295 enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
1296 const char *realm = NULL;
1297
1298 /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
1299
1300 if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->realm) == 0) {
1301 /* look for inbound trust */
1302 direction = INBOUND;
1303 realm = principal->name.name_string.val[1];
1304 } else if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->name.name_string.val[1]) == 0) {
1305 /* look for outbound trust */
1306 direction = OUTBOUND;
1307 realm = principal->realm;
1308 } else {
1309 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1310 principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1311 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1312 principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1313 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1314 }
1315
1316 /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
1317
1318 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1319 mem_ctx,
1320 realm, realm_dn, &msg);
1321
1322 if (ret != 0) {
1323 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1324 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1325 return ret;
1326 }
1327
1328 ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1329 principal, direction,
1330 realm_dn, flags, kvno, msg, entry_ex);
1331 if (ret != 0) {
1332 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed");
1333 }
1334 return ret;
1335 }
1336
1337 }
1338
1339 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context,
1340 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1341 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1342 krb5_const_principal principal,
1343 const char **attrs,
1344 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1345 struct ldb_message **msg)
1346 {
1347 krb5_error_code ret;
1348 if (principal->name.name_string.len >= 2) {
1349 /* 'normal server' case */
1350 int ldb_ret;
1351 NTSTATUS nt_status;
1352 struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
1353 char *principal_string;
1354
1355 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
1356 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
1357 &principal_string);
1358 if (ret != 0) {
1359 return ret;
1360 }
1361
1362 /* At this point we may find the host is known to be
1363 * in a different realm, so we should generate a
1364 * referral instead */
1365 nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1366 mem_ctx, principal_string,
1367 &user_dn, realm_dn);
1368 free(principal_string);
1369
1370 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1371 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1372 }
1373
1374 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1375 mem_ctx,
1376 msg, user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1377 attrs,
1378 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1379 "(objectClass=*)");
1380 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1381 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1382 }
1383
1384 } else {
1385 int lret;
1386 char *short_princ;
1387 const char *realm;
1388 /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
1389 *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1390 realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal);
1391
1392 /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referral */
1393
1394 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &short_princ);
1395
1396 if (ret != 0) {
1397 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1398 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1399 return ret;
1400 }
1401
1402 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg,
1403 *realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1404 attrs,
1405 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN | DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1406 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
1407 ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ));
1408 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1409 DEBUG(3, ("Failed to find an entry for %s\n", short_princ));
1410 free(short_princ);
1411 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1412 }
1413 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1414 DEBUG(3, ("Failed single search for %s - %s\n",
1415 short_princ, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1416 free(short_princ);
1417 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1418 }
1419 free(short_princ);
1420 }
1421
1422 return 0;
1423 }
1424
1425 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
1426 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1427 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1428 krb5_const_principal principal,
1429 unsigned flags,
1430 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1431 {
1432 krb5_error_code ret;
1433 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1434 struct ldb_message *msg;
1435
1436 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
1437 server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1438 if (ret != 0) {
1439 return ret;
1440 }
1441
1442 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1443 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
1444 flags,
1445 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1446 if (ret != 0) {
1447 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed");
1448 }
1449
1450 return ret;
1451 }
1452
1453 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context,
1454 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1455 krb5_const_principal principal,
1456 unsigned flags,
1457 krb5_kvno kvno,
1458 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1459 {
1460 krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1461 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1462
1463 mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
1464 if (!mem_ctx) {
1465 ret = ENOMEM;
1466 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1467 return ret;
1468 }
1469
1470 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
1471 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1472 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1473 }
1474 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
1475 /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
1476 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry_ex);
1477 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1478
1479 /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
1480 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1481 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1482 }
1483 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
1484 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, kvno, entry_ex);
1485 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1486 }
1487
1488 done:
1489 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1490 return ret;
1491 }
1492
1493 struct samba_kdc_seq {
1494 unsigned int index;
1495 unsigned int count;
1496 struct ldb_message **msgs;
1497 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1498 };
1499
1500 static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context,
1501 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1502 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1503 {
1504 krb5_error_code ret;
1505 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1506 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1507 hdb_entry_ex entry_ex;
1508 memset(&entry_ex, '\0', sizeof(entry_ex));
1509
1510 if (!priv) {
1511 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1512 }
1513
1514 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
1515
1516 if (!mem_ctx) {
1517 ret = ENOMEM;
1518 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
1519 return ret;
1520 }
1521
1522 if (priv->index < priv->count) {
1523 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1524 NULL, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
1525 HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA|HDB_F_GET_ANY,
1526 priv->realm_dn, priv->msgs[priv->index++], entry);
1527 } else {
1528 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1529 }
1530
1531 if (ret != 0) {
1532 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1533 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1534 } else {
1535 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1536 }
1537
1538 return ret;
1539 }
1540
1541 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context,
1542 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1543 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1544 {
1545 struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb;
1546 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1547 char *realm;
1548 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
1549 krb5_error_code ret;
1550 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1551 int lret;
1552
1553 if (priv) {
1554 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1555 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1556 }
1557
1558 priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq);
1559 if (!priv) {
1560 ret = ENOMEM;
1561 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
1562 return ret;
1563 }
1564
1565 priv->index = 0;
1566 priv->msgs = NULL;
1567 priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx);
1568 priv->count = 0;
1569
1570 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context");
1571
1572 if (!mem_ctx) {
1573 ret = ENOMEM;
1574 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
1575 return ret;
1576 }
1577
1578 ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
1579 if (ret != 0) {
1580 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1581 return ret;
1582 }
1583 krb5_free_default_realm(context, realm);
1584
1585 lret = dsdb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
1586 priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
1587 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1588 "(objectClass=user)");
1589
1590 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1591 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1592 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1593 }
1594
1595 priv->count = res->count;
1596 priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
1597 talloc_free(res);
1598
1599 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv;
1600
1601 ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1602
1603 if (ret != 0) {
1604 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1605 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1606 } else {
1607 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1608 }
1609 return ret;
1610 }
1611
1612 krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context,
1613 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1614 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1615 {
1616 return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1617 }
1618
1619 /* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal
1620 *
1621 * This is currently a very nasty hack - allowing only delegation to itself.
1622 */
1623 krb5_error_code
1624 samba_kdc_check_s4u2self(krb5_context context,
1625 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1626 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1627 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
1628 {
1629 krb5_error_code ret;
1630 krb5_principal enterprise_prinicpal = NULL;
1631 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1632 struct ldb_message *msg;
1633 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1634 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1635 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1636 const char *delegation_check_attrs[] = {
1637 "objectSid", NULL
1638 };
1639
1640 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self");
1641
1642 if (!mem_ctx) {
1643 ret = ENOMEM;
1644 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self: talloc_named() failed!");
1645 return ret;
1646 }
1647
1648 if (target_principal->name.name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1649 /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
1650 if (target_principal->name.name_string.len != 1) {
1651 ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
1652 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2self: request for delegation to enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
1653 target_principal->name.name_string.len);
1654 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1655 return ret;
1656 }
1657 ret = krb5_parse_name(context, target_principal->name.name_string.val[0],
1658 &enterprise_prinicpal);
1659 if (ret) {
1660 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1661 return ret;
1662 }
1663 target_principal = enterprise_prinicpal;
1664 }
1665
1666 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, target_principal,
1667 delegation_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1668
1669 krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_prinicpal);
1670
1671 if (ret != 0) {
1672 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1673 return ret;
1674 }
1675
1676 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1677 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1678
1679 /* Allow delegation to the same principal, even if by a different
1680 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1681 * comparison */
1682 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1683 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1684 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1685 }
1686
1687 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1688 return ret;
1689 }
1690
1691 /* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
1692 * slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
1693 * database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
1694 * SID */
1695
1696 krb5_error_code
1697 samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context,
1698 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1699 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1700 krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
1701 {
1702 krb5_error_code ret;
1703 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1704 struct ldb_message *msg;
1705 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1706 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1707 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1708 const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
1709 "objectSid", NULL
1710 };
1711
1712 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
1713
1714 if (!mem_ctx) {
1715 ret = ENOMEM;
1716 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1717 return ret;
1718 }
1719
1720 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1721 mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
1722 ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1723
1724 if (ret != 0) {
1725 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1726 return ret;
1727 }
1728
1729 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1730 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1731
1732 /* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
1733 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1734 * comparison */
1735 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1736 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1737 return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
1738 }
1739
1740 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1741 return ret;
1742 }
1743
1744 /*
1745 * Check if a given entry may delegate to this target principal
1746 * with S4U2Proxy.
1747 */
1748 krb5_error_code
1749 samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy(krb5_context context,
1750 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1751 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1752 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
1753 {
1754 krb5_error_code ret;
1755 char *tmp = NULL;
1756 const char *client_dn = NULL;
1757 const char *target_principal_name = NULL;
1758 struct ldb_message_element *el;
1759 struct ldb_val val;
1760 unsigned int i;
1761 bool found = false;
1762 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1763
1764 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy");
1765
1766 if (!mem_ctx) {
1767 ret = ENOMEM;
1768 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1769 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
1770 " talloc_named() failed!");
1771 return ret;
1772 }
1773
1774 client_dn = ldb_dn_get_linearized(p->msg->dn);
1775 if (!client_dn) {
1776 if (errno == 0) {
1777 errno = ENOMEM;
1778 }
1779 ret = errno;
1780 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1781 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
1782 " ldb_dn_get_linearized() failed!");
1783 return ret;
1784 }
1785
1786 /*
1787 * The main heimdal code already checked that the target_principal
1788 * belongs to the same realm as the client.
1789 *
1790 * So we just need the principal without the realm,
1791 * as that is what is configured in the "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo"
1792 * attribute.
1793 */
1794 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, target_principal,
1795 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &tmp);
1796 if (ret) {
1797 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1798 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1799 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
1800 " krb5_unparse_name() failed!");
1801 return ret;
1802 }
1803 DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] for target[%s]\n",
1804 client_dn, tmp));
1805
1806 target_principal_name = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, tmp);
1807 SAFE_FREE(tmp);
1808 if (target_principal_name == NULL) {
1809 ret = ENOMEM;
1810 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1811 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
1812 " talloc_strdup() failed!");
1813 return ret;
1814 }
1815
1816 el = ldb_msg_find_element(p->msg, "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo");
1817 if (el == NULL) {
1818 goto bad_option;
1819 }
1820
1821 val = data_blob_string_const(target_principal_name);
1822
1823 for (i=0; i<el->num_values; i++) {
1824 struct ldb_val *val1 = &val;
1825 struct ldb_val *val2 = &el->values[i];
1826 int cmp;
1827
1828 if (val1->length != val2->length) {
1829 continue;
1830 }
1831
1832 cmp = strncasecmp((const char *)val1->data,
1833 (const char *)val2->data,
1834 val1->length);
1835 if (cmp != 0) {
1836 continue;
1837 }
1838
1839 found = true;
1840 break;
1841 }
1842
1843 if (!found) {
1844 goto bad_option;
1845 }
1846
1847 DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] allowed target[%s]\n",
1848 client_dn, tmp));
1849 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1850 return 0;
1851
1852 bad_option:
1853 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret,
1854 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] "
1855 "not allowed for delegation to target[%s]",
1856 client_dn,
1857 target_principal_name);
1858 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1859 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1860 }
1861
1862 NTSTATUS samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_base_context *base_ctx,
1863 struct samba_kdc_db_context **kdc_db_ctx_out)
1864 {
1865 int ldb_ret;
1866 struct ldb_message *msg;
1867 struct auth_session_info *session_info;
1868 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
1869 /* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to
1870 * authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is higly likely to
1871 * be circular.
1872 *
1873 * In future we may set this up to use EXERNAL and SSL
1874 * certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP_SET_USERNAME
1875 */
1876
1877 kdc_db_ctx = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_db_context);
1878 if (kdc_db_ctx == NULL) {
1879 return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
1880 }
1881 kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx = base_ctx->ev_ctx;
1882 kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx = base_ctx->lp_ctx;
1883
1884 /* get default kdc policy */
1885 lpcfg_default_kdc_policy(base_ctx->lp_ctx,
1886 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.svc_tkt_lifetime,
1887 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.usr_tkt_lifetime,
1888 &kdc_db_ctx->policy.renewal_lifetime);
1889
1890 session_info = system_session(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
1891 if (session_info == NULL) {
1892 return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1893 }
1894
1895 /* Setup the link to LDB */
1896 kdc_db_ctx->samdb = samdb_connect(kdc_db_ctx, base_ctx->ev_ctx,
1897 base_ctx->lp_ctx, session_info, 0);
1898 if (kdc_db_ctx->samdb == NULL) {
1899 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!"));
1900 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1901 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1902 }
1903
1904 /* Find out our own krbtgt kvno */
1905 ldb_ret = samdb_rodc(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, &kdc_db_ctx->rodc);
1906 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1907 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine if we are an RODC in KDC backend: %s\n",
1908 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1909 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1910 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1911 }
1912 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
1913 int my_krbtgt_number;
1914 const char *secondary_keytab[] = { "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", NULL };
1915 struct ldb_dn *account_dn;
1916 struct ldb_dn *server_dn = samdb_server_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx);
1917 if (!server_dn) {
1918 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine server DN in KDC backend: %s\n",
1919 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1920 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1921 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1922 }
1923
1924 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, server_dn,
1925 "serverReference", &account_dn);
1926 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1927 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine server account in KDC backend: %s\n",
1928 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1929 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1930 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1931 }
1932
1933 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, account_dn,
1934 "msDS-KrbTgtLink", &kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn);
1935 talloc_free(account_dn);
1936 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1937 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine RODC krbtgt account in KDC backend: %s\n",
1938 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1939 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1940 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1941 }
1942
1943 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
1944 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1945 secondary_keytab,
1946 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1947 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=*))");
1948 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1949 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot read krbtgt account %s in KDC backend to get msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber: %s: %s\n",
1950 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
1951 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
1952 ldb_strerror(ldb_ret)));
1953 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1954 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1955 }
1956 my_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
1957 if (my_krbtgt_number == -1) {
1958 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot read msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber from krbtgt account %s in KDC backend: got %d\n",
1959 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
1960 my_krbtgt_number));
1961 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1962 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1963 }
1964 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = my_krbtgt_number;
1965
1966 } else {
1967 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
1968 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
1969 &msg,
1970 ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
1971 LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1972 krbtgt_attrs,
1973 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG,
1974 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
1975
1976 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1977 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1978 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1979 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1980 }
1981 kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn = talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, msg->dn);
1982 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
1983 talloc_free(msg);
1984 }
1985 *kdc_db_ctx_out = kdc_db_ctx;
1986 return NT_STATUS_OK;
1987 }
Samba GIT mirror