2 Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
4 Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
6 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
7 Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
9 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
12 (at your option) any later version.
14 This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 GNU General Public License for more details.
20 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
21 along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
25 #include "libcli/security/security.h"
26 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_security.h"
27 #include "auth/auth.h"
28 #include "auth/auth_sam.h"
29 #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
30 #include "dsdb/common/util.h"
31 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
32 #include "param/param.h"
33 #include "param/secrets.h"
34 #include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
35 #include "system/kerberos.h"
36 #include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
37 #include "kdc/authn_policy_util.h"
39 #include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
40 #include "kdc/db-glue.h"
41 #include "kdc/pac-glue.h"
42 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_irpc_c.h"
43 #include "lib/messaging/irpc.h"
46 #define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_KERBEROS
51 #define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno) \
52 ((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) >> 16))
54 #define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(kvno) \
55 ((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF))
57 #define SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, krbtgt) \
58 ((krb5_kvno)((((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF) | \
59 ((((uint32_t)krbtgt) << 16) & 0xFFFF0000)))
61 enum trust_direction
{
63 INBOUND
= LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND
,
64 OUTBOUND
= LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
67 static const char *trust_attrs
[] = {
74 "msDS-TrustForestTrustInfo",
78 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
83 send a message to the drepl server telling it to initiate a
84 REPL_SECRET getncchanges extended op to fetch the users secrets
86 static void auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
,
87 struct imessaging_context
*msg_ctx
,
88 struct tevent_context
*event_ctx
,
89 struct ldb_dn
*user_dn
)
91 struct dcerpc_binding_handle
*irpc_handle
;
92 struct drepl_trigger_repl_secret r
;
93 struct tevent_req
*req
;
96 tmp_ctx
= talloc_new(mem_ctx
);
97 if (tmp_ctx
== NULL
) {
101 irpc_handle
= irpc_binding_handle_by_name(tmp_ctx
, msg_ctx
,
104 if (irpc_handle
== NULL
) {
105 DEBUG(1,(__location__
": Unable to get binding handle for dreplsrv\n"));
106 TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx
);
110 r
.in
.user_dn
= ldb_dn_get_linearized(user_dn
);
113 * This seem to rely on the current IRPC implementation,
114 * which delivers the message in the _send function.
116 * TODO: we need a ONE_WAY IRPC handle and register
117 * a callback and wait for it to be triggered!
119 req
= dcerpc_drepl_trigger_repl_secret_r_send(tmp_ctx
,
124 /* we aren't interested in a reply */
126 TALLOC_FREE(tmp_ctx
);
129 static time_t ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message
*msg
, const char *attr
, time_t default_val
)
135 gentime
= ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg
, attr
, NULL
);
139 tmp
= strptime(gentime
, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm
);
147 static struct SDBFlags
uf2SDBFlags(krb5_context context
, uint32_t userAccountControl
, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type
)
149 struct SDBFlags flags
= int2SDBFlags(0);
151 /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
154 /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
159 /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
162 /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
163 if (userAccountControl
& UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT
) {
164 if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT
|| ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY
) {
170 if (userAccountControl
& UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT
) {
171 if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT
|| ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY
) {
176 if (userAccountControl
& UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT
) {
177 if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT
|| ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY
) {
182 if (userAccountControl
& UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT
) {
183 if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT
|| ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY
) {
189 /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
190 if (userAccountControl
& UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE
) {
193 if (userAccountControl
& UF_LOCKOUT
) {
194 flags
.locked_out
= 1;
197 if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWD_NOTREQD) {
202 UF_PASSWD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevant
204 if (userAccountControl
& UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT
) {
208 /* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
211 if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
215 if (userAccountControl
& UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED
) {
216 flags
.require_hwauth
= 1;
218 if (userAccountControl
& UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
) {
219 flags
.ok_as_delegate
= 1;
221 if (userAccountControl
& UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION
) {
223 * this is confusing...
225 * UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
230 * UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION
231 * => trusted_for_delegation
233 flags
.trusted_for_delegation
= 1;
235 if (!(userAccountControl
& UF_NOT_DELEGATED
)) {
236 flags
.forwardable
= 1;
240 if (userAccountControl
& UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH
) {
241 flags
.require_preauth
= 0;
243 flags
.require_preauth
= 1;
246 if (userAccountControl
& UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED
) {
247 flags
.no_auth_data_reqd
= 1;
253 static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry
*p
)
255 if (p
->db_entry
!= NULL
) {
257 * A sdb_entry still has a reference
262 if (p
->kdc_entry
!= NULL
) {
264 * hdb_entry or krb5_db_entry still
265 * have a reference...
274 * Sort keys in descending order of strength.
276 * Explanaton from Greg Hudson:
278 * To encrypt tickets only the first returned key is used by the MIT KDC. The
279 * other keys just communicate support for session key enctypes, and aren't
280 * really used. The encryption key for the ticket enc part doesn't have
281 * to be of a type requested by the client. The session key enctype is chosen
282 * based on the client preference order, limited by the set of enctypes present
283 * in the server keys (unless the string attribute is set on the server
284 * principal overriding that set).
287 static int sdb_key_strength_priority(krb5_enctype etype
)
289 static const krb5_enctype etype_list
[] = {
290 ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
,
291 ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
,
292 ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1
,
293 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC
,
301 for (i
= 0; i
< ARRAY_SIZE(etype_list
); i
++) {
302 if (etype
== etype_list
[i
]) {
307 return ARRAY_SIZE(etype_list
) - i
;
310 static int sdb_key_strength_cmp(const struct sdb_key
*k1
, const struct sdb_key
*k2
)
312 int p1
= sdb_key_strength_priority(KRB5_KEY_TYPE(&k1
->key
));
313 int p2
= sdb_key_strength_priority(KRB5_KEY_TYPE(&k2
->key
));
321 * Higher priority comes first
329 static void samba_kdc_sort_keys(struct sdb_keys
*keys
)
335 TYPESAFE_QSORT(keys
->val
, keys
->len
, sdb_key_strength_cmp
);
338 int samba_kdc_set_fixed_keys(krb5_context context
,
339 const struct ldb_val
*secretbuffer
,
340 uint32_t supported_enctypes
,
341 struct sdb_keys
*keys
)
343 uint16_t allocated_keys
= 0;
348 keys
->val
= calloc(allocated_keys
, sizeof(struct sdb_key
));
349 if (keys
->val
== NULL
) {
350 memset(secretbuffer
->data
, 0, secretbuffer
->length
);
355 if (supported_enctypes
& ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256
) {
356 struct sdb_key key
= {};
358 ret
= smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context
,
359 ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
,
361 MIN(secretbuffer
->length
, 32),
364 memset(secretbuffer
->data
, 0, secretbuffer
->length
);
368 keys
->val
[keys
->len
] = key
;
372 if (supported_enctypes
& ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128
) {
373 struct sdb_key key
= {};
375 ret
= smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context
,
376 ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
,
378 MIN(secretbuffer
->length
, 16),
381 memset(secretbuffer
->data
, 0, secretbuffer
->length
);
385 keys
->val
[keys
->len
] = key
;
389 if (supported_enctypes
& ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
) {
390 struct sdb_key key
= {};
392 ret
= smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context
,
393 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC
,
395 MIN(secretbuffer
->length
, 16),
398 memset(secretbuffer
->data
, 0, secretbuffer
->length
);
402 keys
->val
[keys
->len
] = key
;
411 static int samba_kdc_set_random_keys(krb5_context context
,
412 uint32_t supported_enctypes
,
413 struct sdb_keys
*keys
)
415 struct ldb_val secret_val
;
416 uint8_t secretbuffer
[32];
419 * Fake keys until we have a better way to reject
420 * non-pkinit requests.
422 * We just need to indicate which encryption types are
425 generate_secret_buffer(secretbuffer
, sizeof(secretbuffer
));
427 secret_val
= data_blob_const(secretbuffer
,
428 sizeof(secretbuffer
));
429 return samba_kdc_set_fixed_keys(context
,
435 struct samba_kdc_user_keys
{
436 struct sdb_keys
*skeys
;
438 uint32_t *returned_kvno
;
439 uint32_t supported_enctypes
;
440 uint32_t *available_enctypes
;
441 const struct samr_Password
*nthash
;
442 const char *salt_string
;
444 const struct package_PrimaryKerberosKey4
*pkeys
;
447 static krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_fill_user_keys(krb5_context context
,
448 struct samba_kdc_user_keys
*p
)
451 * Make sure we'll never reveal DES keys
453 uint32_t supported_enctypes
= p
->supported_enctypes
&= ~(ENC_CRC32
| ENC_RSA_MD5
);
454 uint32_t _available_enctypes
= 0;
455 uint32_t *available_enctypes
= p
->available_enctypes
;
456 uint32_t _returned_kvno
= 0;
457 uint32_t *returned_kvno
= p
->returned_kvno
;
458 uint32_t num_pkeys
= p
->num_pkeys
;
459 uint32_t allocated_keys
= num_pkeys
;
463 if (available_enctypes
== NULL
) {
464 available_enctypes
= &_available_enctypes
;
467 *available_enctypes
= 0;
469 if (returned_kvno
== NULL
) {
470 returned_kvno
= &_returned_kvno
;
473 *returned_kvno
= p
->kvno
;
475 if (p
->nthash
!= NULL
) {
479 allocated_keys
= MAX(1, allocated_keys
);
481 /* allocate space to decode into */
483 p
->skeys
->val
= calloc(allocated_keys
, sizeof(struct sdb_key
));
484 if (p
->skeys
->val
== NULL
) {
488 for (i
=0; i
< num_pkeys
; i
++) {
489 struct sdb_key key
= {};
490 uint32_t enctype_bit
;
492 if (p
->pkeys
[i
].value
== NULL
) {
496 enctype_bit
= kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(p
->pkeys
[i
].keytype
);
497 if (!(enctype_bit
& supported_enctypes
)) {
501 if (p
->salt_string
!= NULL
) {
504 salt
= data_blob_string_const(p
->salt_string
);
506 key
.salt
= calloc(1, sizeof(*key
.salt
));
507 if (key
.salt
== NULL
) {
512 key
.salt
->type
= KRB5_PW_SALT
;
514 ret
= smb_krb5_copy_data_contents(&key
.salt
->salt
,
518 ZERO_STRUCTP(key
.salt
);
524 ret
= smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context
,
526 p
->pkeys
[i
].value
->data
,
527 p
->pkeys
[i
].value
->length
,
530 p
->skeys
->val
[p
->skeys
->len
++] = key
;
531 *available_enctypes
|= enctype_bit
;
534 ZERO_STRUCT(key
.key
);
536 if (ret
== KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP
) {
537 DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
538 p
->pkeys
[i
].keytype
));
546 if (p
->nthash
!= NULL
&& (supported_enctypes
& ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
)) {
547 struct sdb_key key
= {};
549 ret
= smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context
,
550 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC
,
552 sizeof(p
->nthash
->hash
),
555 p
->skeys
->val
[p
->skeys
->len
++] = key
;
557 *available_enctypes
|= ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
;
558 } else if (ret
== KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP
) {
559 DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
560 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC
));
568 samba_kdc_sort_keys(p
->skeys
);
572 sdb_keys_free(p
->skeys
);
576 krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context
,
578 const struct ldb_message
*msg
,
581 uint32_t userAccountControl
,
582 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type
,
584 krb5_kvno requested_kvno
,
585 struct sdb_entry
*entry
,
586 const uint32_t supported_enctypes_in
,
587 uint32_t *supported_enctypes_out
)
589 krb5_error_code ret
= 0;
590 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err
;
591 struct samr_Password
*hash
;
592 unsigned int num_ntPwdHistory
= 0;
593 struct samr_Password
*ntPwdHistory
= NULL
;
594 struct samr_Password
*old_hash
= NULL
;
595 struct samr_Password
*older_hash
= NULL
;
596 const struct ldb_val
*sc_val
;
597 struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb
;
598 struct supplementalCredentialsPackage
*scpk
= NULL
;
599 struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb
;
600 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4
*pkb4
= NULL
;
601 int krbtgt_number
= 0;
602 uint32_t current_kvno
;
603 uint32_t old_kvno
= 0;
604 uint32_t older_kvno
= 0;
605 uint32_t returned_kvno
= 0;
607 struct samba_kdc_user_keys keys
= { .num_pkeys
= 0, };
608 struct samba_kdc_user_keys old_keys
= { .num_pkeys
= 0, };
609 struct samba_kdc_user_keys older_keys
= { .num_pkeys
= 0, };
610 uint32_t available_enctypes
= 0;
611 uint32_t supported_enctypes
= supported_enctypes_in
;
613 *supported_enctypes_out
= 0;
615 /* Is this the krbtgt or a RODC krbtgt */
617 krbtgt_number
= ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg
, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
619 if (krbtgt_number
== -1) {
622 if (krbtgt_number
== 0) {
627 if (flags
& SDB_F_USER2USER_PRINCIPAL
) {
629 * User2User uses the session key
630 * from the additional ticket,
631 * so we just provide random keys
632 * here in order to make sure
633 * we never expose the user password
636 ret
= samba_kdc_set_random_keys(context
,
640 *supported_enctypes_out
= supported_enctypes
& ENC_ALL_TYPES
;
645 if ((ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT
)
646 && (userAccountControl
& UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED
)) {
647 ret
= samba_kdc_set_random_keys(context
,
651 *supported_enctypes_out
= supported_enctypes
& ENC_ALL_TYPES
;
656 current_kvno
= ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg
, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
657 if (current_kvno
> 1) {
658 old_kvno
= current_kvno
- 1;
660 if (current_kvno
> 2) {
661 older_kvno
= current_kvno
- 2;
665 * Even for the main krbtgt account
666 * we have to strictly split the kvno into
667 * two 16-bit parts and the upper 16-bit
668 * need to be all zero, even if
669 * the msDS-KeyVersionNumber has a value
672 * See https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14951
674 current_kvno
= SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(current_kvno
);
675 old_kvno
= SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(old_kvno
);
676 older_kvno
= SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(older_kvno
);
677 requested_kvno
= SAMBA_KVNO_GET_VALUE(requested_kvno
);
680 /* Get keys from the db */
682 hash
= samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx
, msg
, "unicodePwd");
683 num_ntPwdHistory
= samdb_result_hashes(mem_ctx
, msg
,
686 if (num_ntPwdHistory
> 1) {
687 old_hash
= &ntPwdHistory
[1];
689 if (num_ntPwdHistory
> 2) {
690 older_hash
= &ntPwdHistory
[1];
692 sc_val
= ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg
, "supplementalCredentials");
694 /* supplementalCredentials if present */
696 ndr_err
= ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val
, mem_ctx
, &scb
,
697 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t
)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob
);
698 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err
)) {
699 dump_data(0, sc_val
->data
, sc_val
->length
);
704 if (scb
.sub
.signature
!= SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE
) {
705 if (scb
.sub
.num_packages
!= 0) {
706 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob
, &scb
);
712 for (i
=0; i
< scb
.sub
.num_packages
; i
++) {
713 if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb
.sub
.packages
[i
].name
) == 0) {
714 scpk
= &scb
.sub
.packages
[i
];
715 if (!scpk
->data
|| !scpk
->data
[0]) {
724 * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys element
725 * of supplementalCredentials
727 * The legacy Primary:Kerberos only contains
728 * single DES keys, which are completely ignored
734 blob
= strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx
, scpk
->data
);
740 /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
741 ndr_err
= ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob
, mem_ctx
, &_pkb
,
742 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t
)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob
);
743 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err
)) {
745 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
746 krb5_warnx(context
, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
750 if (_pkb
.version
!= 4) {
752 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
753 krb5_warnx(context
, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
757 pkb4
= &_pkb
.ctr
.ctr4
;
760 keys
= (struct samba_kdc_user_keys
) {
761 .kvno
= current_kvno
,
762 .supported_enctypes
= supported_enctypes
,
764 .salt_string
= pkb4
!= NULL
? pkb4
->salt
.string
: NULL
,
765 .num_pkeys
= pkb4
!= NULL
? pkb4
->num_keys
: 0,
766 .pkeys
= pkb4
!= NULL
? pkb4
->keys
: NULL
,
769 old_keys
= (struct samba_kdc_user_keys
) {
771 .supported_enctypes
= supported_enctypes
,
773 .salt_string
= pkb4
!= NULL
? pkb4
->salt
.string
: NULL
,
774 .num_pkeys
= pkb4
!= NULL
? pkb4
->num_old_keys
: 0,
775 .pkeys
= pkb4
!= NULL
? pkb4
->old_keys
: NULL
,
777 older_keys
= (struct samba_kdc_user_keys
) {
779 .supported_enctypes
= supported_enctypes
,
780 .nthash
= older_hash
,
781 .salt_string
= pkb4
!= NULL
? pkb4
->salt
.string
: NULL
,
782 .num_pkeys
= pkb4
!= NULL
? pkb4
->num_older_keys
: 0,
783 .pkeys
= pkb4
!= NULL
? pkb4
->older_keys
: NULL
,
786 if (flags
& SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED
) {
787 if (requested_kvno
== keys
.kvno
) {
789 * The current kvno was requested,
792 keys
.skeys
= &entry
->keys
;
793 keys
.available_enctypes
= &available_enctypes
;
794 keys
.returned_kvno
= &returned_kvno
;
795 } else if (requested_kvno
== 0) {
797 * don't return any keys
799 } else if (requested_kvno
== old_keys
.kvno
) {
801 * return the old keys as default keys
802 * with the requested kvno.
804 old_keys
.skeys
= &entry
->keys
;
805 old_keys
.available_enctypes
= &available_enctypes
;
806 old_keys
.returned_kvno
= &returned_kvno
;
807 } else if (requested_kvno
== older_keys
.kvno
) {
809 * return the older keys as default keys
810 * with the requested kvno.
812 older_keys
.skeys
= &entry
->keys
;
813 older_keys
.available_enctypes
= &available_enctypes
;
814 older_keys
.returned_kvno
= &returned_kvno
;
817 * don't return any keys
821 bool include_history
= false;
823 if ((flags
& SDB_F_GET_CLIENT
) && (flags
& SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ
)) {
824 include_history
= true;
825 } else if (flags
& SDB_F_ADMIN_DATA
) {
826 include_history
= true;
829 keys
.skeys
= &entry
->keys
;
830 keys
.available_enctypes
= &available_enctypes
;
831 keys
.returned_kvno
= &returned_kvno
;
833 if (include_history
&& old_keys
.kvno
!= 0) {
834 old_keys
.skeys
= &entry
->old_keys
;
836 if (include_history
&& older_keys
.kvno
!= 0) {
837 older_keys
.skeys
= &entry
->older_keys
;
841 if (keys
.skeys
!= NULL
) {
842 ret
= samba_kdc_fill_user_keys(context
, &keys
);
848 if (old_keys
.skeys
!= NULL
) {
849 ret
= samba_kdc_fill_user_keys(context
, &old_keys
);
855 if (older_keys
.skeys
!= NULL
) {
856 ret
= samba_kdc_fill_user_keys(context
, &older_keys
);
862 *supported_enctypes_out
|= available_enctypes
;
866 * Even for the main krbtgt account
867 * we have to strictly split the kvno into
868 * two 16-bit parts and the upper 16-bit
869 * need to be all zero, even if
870 * the msDS-KeyVersionNumber has a value
873 * See https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14951
875 returned_kvno
= SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(returned_kvno
, krbtgt_number
);
877 entry
->kvno
= returned_kvno
;
883 static int principal_comp_strcmp_int(krb5_context context
,
884 krb5_const_principal principal
,
885 unsigned int component
,
891 #if defined(HAVE_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_GET_COMP_STRING)
892 p
= krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context
, principal
, component
);
897 return strcasecmp(p
, string
);
899 return strcmp(p
, string
);
904 if (component
>= krb5_princ_size(context
, principal
)) {
908 d
= krb5_princ_component(context
, principal
, component
);
915 len
= strlen(string
);
918 * We explicitly return -1 or 1. Subtracting of the two lengths might
919 * give the wrong result if the result overflows or loses data when
922 if (d
->length
< len
) {
924 } else if (d
->length
> len
) {
929 return strncasecmp(p
, string
, len
);
931 return memcmp(p
, string
, len
);
936 static int principal_comp_strcasecmp(krb5_context context
,
937 krb5_const_principal principal
,
938 unsigned int component
,
941 return principal_comp_strcmp_int(context
, principal
,
942 component
, string
, true);
945 static int principal_comp_strcmp(krb5_context context
,
946 krb5_const_principal principal
,
947 unsigned int component
,
950 return principal_comp_strcmp_int(context
, principal
,
951 component
, string
, false);
954 static bool is_kadmin_changepw(krb5_context context
,
955 krb5_const_principal principal
)
957 return krb5_princ_size(context
, principal
) == 2 &&
958 (principal_comp_strcmp(context
, principal
, 0, "kadmin") == 0) &&
959 (principal_comp_strcmp(context
, principal
, 1, "changepw") == 0);
962 static krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_get_entry_principal(
963 krb5_context context
,
964 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
965 const char *samAccountName
,
966 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type
,
968 bool is_kadmin_changepw
,
969 krb5_const_principal in_princ
,
970 krb5_principal
*out_princ
)
972 struct loadparm_context
*lp_ctx
= kdc_db_ctx
->lp_ctx
;
973 krb5_error_code code
= 0;
974 bool canon
= flags
& (SDB_F_CANON
|SDB_F_FORCE_CANON
);
977 * If we are set to canonicalize, we get back the fixed UPPER
978 * case realm, and the real username (ie matching LDAP
981 * Otherwise, if we are set to enterprise, we
982 * get back the whole principal as-sent
984 * Finally, if we are not set to canonicalize, we get back the
985 * fixed UPPER case realm, but the as-sent username
989 * We need to ensure that the kadmin/changepw principal isn't able to
990 * issue krbtgt tickets, even if canonicalization is turned on.
992 if (!is_kadmin_changepw
) {
993 if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT
&& canon
) {
995 * When requested to do so, ensure that the
996 * both realm values in the principal are set
997 * to the upper case, canonical realm
999 code
= smb_krb5_make_principal(context
,
1001 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx
),
1003 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx
),
1008 smb_krb5_principal_set_type(context
,
1015 if ((canon
&& flags
& (SDB_F_FORCE_CANON
|SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ
)) ||
1016 (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY
&& in_princ
== NULL
)) {
1018 * SDB_F_CANON maps from the canonicalize flag in the
1019 * packet, and has a different meaning between AS-REQ
1020 * and TGS-REQ. We only change the principal in the
1023 * The SDB_F_FORCE_CANON if for new MIT KDC code that
1024 * wants the canonical name in all lookups, and takes
1025 * care to canonicalize only when appropriate.
1027 code
= smb_krb5_make_principal(context
,
1029 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx
),
1037 * For a krbtgt entry, this appears to be required regardless of the
1038 * canonicalize flag from the client.
1040 code
= krb5_copy_principal(context
, in_princ
, out_princ
);
1046 * While we have copied the client principal, tests show that Win2k3
1047 * returns the 'corrected' realm, not the client-specified realm. This
1048 * code attempts to replace the client principal's realm with the one
1049 * we determine from our records
1051 code
= smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context
,
1053 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx
));
1059 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
1061 static krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context
,
1062 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
1063 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
,
1064 krb5_const_principal principal
,
1065 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type
,
1068 struct ldb_dn
*realm_dn
,
1069 struct ldb_message
*msg
,
1070 struct sdb_entry
*entry
)
1072 struct loadparm_context
*lp_ctx
= kdc_db_ctx
->lp_ctx
;
1073 uint32_t userAccountControl
;
1074 uint32_t msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed
;
1075 krb5_error_code ret
= 0;
1076 krb5_boolean is_computer
= FALSE
;
1077 struct samba_kdc_entry
*p
;
1080 bool protected_user
= false;
1082 bool is_krbtgt
= false;
1083 bool is_rodc
= false;
1084 bool force_rc4
= lpcfg_kdc_force_enable_rc4_weak_session_keys(lp_ctx
);
1085 struct ldb_message_element
*objectclasses
;
1086 struct ldb_val computer_val
= data_blob_string_const("computer");
1087 uint32_t config_default_supported_enctypes
= lpcfg_kdc_default_domain_supported_enctypes(lp_ctx
);
1088 uint32_t default_supported_enctypes
=
1089 config_default_supported_enctypes
!= 0 ?
1090 config_default_supported_enctypes
:
1091 ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
| ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK
;
1092 uint32_t supported_enctypes
1093 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg
,
1094 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
1095 default_supported_enctypes
);
1096 uint32_t pa_supported_enctypes
;
1097 uint32_t supported_session_etypes
;
1098 uint32_t available_enctypes
= 0;
1100 * also lagacy enctypes are announced,
1101 * but effectively restricted by kdc_enctypes
1103 uint32_t domain_enctypes
= ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
| ENC_RSA_MD5
| ENC_CRC32
;
1104 uint32_t config_kdc_enctypes
= lpcfg_kdc_supported_enctypes(lp_ctx
);
1105 uint32_t kdc_enctypes
=
1106 config_kdc_enctypes
!= 0 ?
1107 config_kdc_enctypes
:
1109 const char *samAccountName
= ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg
, "samAccountName", NULL
);
1111 const struct authn_kerberos_client_policy
*authn_client_policy
= NULL
;
1112 const struct authn_server_policy
*authn_server_policy
= NULL
;
1113 int64_t enforced_tgt_lifetime_raw
;
1114 const bool user2user
= (flags
& SDB_F_USER2USER_PRINCIPAL
);
1116 ZERO_STRUCTP(entry
);
1118 if (supported_enctypes
== 0) {
1119 supported_enctypes
= default_supported_enctypes
;
1122 if (dsdb_functional_level(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
) >= DS_DOMAIN_FUNCTION_2008
) {
1123 domain_enctypes
|= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128
| ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256
;
1126 if (ldb_msg_find_element(msg
, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber")) {
1130 if (!samAccountName
) {
1132 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
1136 objectclasses
= ldb_msg_find_element(msg
, "objectClass");
1138 if (objectclasses
&& ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses
, &computer_val
)) {
1142 p
= talloc_zero(mem_ctx
, struct samba_kdc_entry
);
1148 p
->is_rodc
= is_rodc
;
1149 p
->kdc_db_ctx
= kdc_db_ctx
;
1150 p
->realm_dn
= talloc_reference(p
, realm_dn
);
1156 talloc_set_destructor(p
, samba_kdc_entry_destructor
);
1158 entry
->skdc_entry
= p
;
1160 userAccountControl
= ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg
, "userAccountControl", 0);
1162 msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed
1163 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg
,
1164 "msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed",
1168 * This brings in the lockout flag, block the account if not
1169 * found. We need the weird UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE check because
1170 * we do not want to fail open if the value is not returned,
1171 * but 0 is a valid value (all OK)
1173 if (msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed
== UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE
) {
1175 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_message2entry: "
1176 "no msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed present");
1179 userAccountControl
|= msDS_User_Account_Control_Computed
;
1182 if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT
) {
1183 p
->is_krbtgt
= true;
1186 /* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
1187 entry
->flags
= uf2SDBFlags(context
, userAccountControl
, ent_type
);
1190 * Take control of the returned principal here, rather than
1191 * allowing the Heimdal code to do it as we have specific
1192 * behaviour around the forced realm to honour
1194 entry
->flags
.force_canonicalize
= true;
1197 * Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
1198 * default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
1199 * by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
1200 * their probably pathetically insecure password)
1202 * But user2user avoids using the keys bases on the password,
1203 * so we can allow it.
1206 if (entry
->flags
.server
&& !user2user
1207 && lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx
, NULL
, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
1208 if (!is_computer
&& !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg
, "servicePrincipalName", NULL
)) {
1209 entry
->flags
.server
= 0;
1214 * We restrict a 3-part SPN ending in my domain/realm to full
1215 * domain controllers.
1217 * This avoids any cases where (eg) a demoted DC still has
1218 * these more restricted SPNs.
1220 if (krb5_princ_size(context
, principal
) > 2) {
1222 = smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx
,
1227 lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx
,
1229 bool is_dc
= userAccountControl
&
1230 (UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT
| UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT
);
1231 if (is_our_realm
&& !is_dc
) {
1232 entry
->flags
.server
= 0;
1236 * To give the correct type of error to the client, we must
1237 * not just return the entry without .server set, we must
1238 * pretend the principal does not exist. Otherwise we may
1239 * return ERR_POLICY instead of
1240 * KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN
1242 if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
&& entry
->flags
.server
== 0) {
1243 ret
= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
1244 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no servicePrincipalName present for this server, refusing with no-such-entry");
1247 if (flags
& SDB_F_ADMIN_DATA
) {
1248 /* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
1249 * of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
1250 * DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
1253 /* use 'whenCreated' */
1254 entry
->created_by
.time
= ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg
, "whenCreated", 0);
1255 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
1257 ret
= smb_krb5_make_principal(context
,
1258 &entry
->created_by
.principal
,
1259 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx
), "kadmin", NULL
);
1261 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
1265 entry
->modified_by
= (struct sdb_event
*) malloc(sizeof(struct sdb_event
));
1266 if (entry
->modified_by
== NULL
) {
1268 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "malloc: out of memory");
1272 /* use 'whenChanged' */
1273 entry
->modified_by
->time
= ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg
, "whenChanged", 0);
1274 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
1275 ret
= smb_krb5_make_principal(context
,
1276 &entry
->modified_by
->principal
,
1277 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx
), "kadmin", NULL
);
1279 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
1285 /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
1286 * virtue of being that particular RID */
1287 status
= dom_sid_split_rid(NULL
, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx
, msg
, "objectSid"), NULL
, &rid
);
1289 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status
)) {
1294 if (rid
== DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT
) {
1297 entry
->valid_end
= NULL
;
1298 entry
->pw_end
= NULL
;
1300 entry
->flags
.invalid
= 0;
1301 entry
->flags
.server
= 1;
1303 realm
= smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(
1304 mem_ctx
, context
, principal
);
1305 if (realm
== NULL
) {
1310 /* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
1311 * 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
1312 * trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
1313 * Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
1314 if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
&&
1315 is_kadmin_changepw(context
, principal
) &&
1316 lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx
, realm
)) {
1317 entry
->flags
.change_pw
= 1;
1322 entry
->flags
.client
= 0;
1323 entry
->flags
.forwardable
= 1;
1324 entry
->flags
.ok_as_delegate
= 1;
1325 } else if (is_rodc
) {
1326 /* The RODC krbtgt account is like the main krbtgt,
1327 * but it does not have a changepw or kadmin
1330 entry
->valid_end
= NULL
;
1331 entry
->pw_end
= NULL
;
1333 /* Also don't allow the RODC krbtgt to be a client (it should not be needed) */
1334 entry
->flags
.client
= 0;
1335 entry
->flags
.invalid
= 0;
1336 entry
->flags
.server
= 1;
1338 entry
->flags
.client
= 0;
1339 entry
->flags
.forwardable
= 1;
1340 entry
->flags
.ok_as_delegate
= 0;
1341 } else if (entry
->flags
.server
&& ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
) {
1342 /* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
1343 * client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
1345 /* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
1346 * it could bypass the password restrictions */
1347 entry
->flags
.client
= 0;
1349 entry
->valid_end
= NULL
;
1350 entry
->pw_end
= NULL
;
1353 NTTIME must_change_time
1354 = samdb_result_nttime(msg
,
1355 "msDS-UserPasswordExpiryTimeComputed",
1357 if (must_change_time
== 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL
) {
1358 entry
->pw_end
= NULL
;
1360 entry
->pw_end
= malloc(sizeof(*entry
->pw_end
));
1361 if (entry
->pw_end
== NULL
) {
1365 *entry
->pw_end
= nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time
);
1368 acct_expiry
= samdb_result_account_expires(msg
);
1369 if (acct_expiry
== 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL
) {
1370 entry
->valid_end
= NULL
;
1372 entry
->valid_end
= malloc(sizeof(*entry
->valid_end
));
1373 if (entry
->valid_end
== NULL
) {
1377 *entry
->valid_end
= nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry
);
1381 ret
= samba_kdc_get_entry_principal(context
,
1386 entry
->flags
.change_pw
,
1390 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
1394 entry
->valid_start
= NULL
;
1396 entry
->max_life
= malloc(sizeof(*entry
->max_life
));
1397 if (entry
->max_life
== NULL
) {
1402 if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
) {
1403 *entry
->max_life
= kdc_db_ctx
->policy
.svc_tkt_lifetime
;
1404 } else if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT
|| ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT
) {
1405 *entry
->max_life
= kdc_db_ctx
->policy
.usr_tkt_lifetime
;
1407 *entry
->max_life
= MIN(kdc_db_ctx
->policy
.svc_tkt_lifetime
,
1408 kdc_db_ctx
->policy
.usr_tkt_lifetime
);
1411 if (entry
->flags
.change_pw
) {
1412 /* Limit lifetime of kpasswd tickets to two minutes or less. */
1413 *entry
->max_life
= MIN(*entry
->max_life
, CHANGEPW_LIFETIME
);
1416 entry
->max_renew
= malloc(sizeof(*entry
->max_renew
));
1417 if (entry
->max_renew
== NULL
) {
1422 *entry
->max_renew
= kdc_db_ctx
->policy
.renewal_lifetime
;
1425 * A principal acting as a client that is not being looked up as the
1426 * principal of an armor ticket may have an authentication policy apply
1429 * We won’t get an authentication policy for the client of an S4U2Self
1430 * or S4U2Proxy request. Those clients are looked up with
1431 * SDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ instead of with SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ.
1433 if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT
&&
1434 (flags
& SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ
) &&
1435 !(flags
& SDB_F_ARMOR_PRINCIPAL
))
1437 ret
= authn_policy_kerberos_client(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
, mem_ctx
, msg
,
1438 &authn_client_policy
);
1445 * A principal acting as a server may have an authentication policy
1448 if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
) {
1449 ret
= authn_policy_server(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
, mem_ctx
, msg
,
1450 &authn_server_policy
);
1456 enforced_tgt_lifetime_raw
= authn_policy_enforced_tgt_lifetime_raw(authn_client_policy
);
1457 if (enforced_tgt_lifetime_raw
!= 0) {
1458 int64_t lifetime_secs
= enforced_tgt_lifetime_raw
;
1460 lifetime_secs
/= INT64_C(1000) * 1000 * 10;
1461 lifetime_secs
= MIN(lifetime_secs
, INT_MAX
);
1462 lifetime_secs
= MAX(lifetime_secs
, INT_MIN
);
1465 * Set both lifetime and renewal time based only on the
1466 * configured maximum lifetime — not on the configured renewal
1467 * time. Yes, this is what Windows does.
1469 lifetime_secs
= MIN(*entry
->max_life
, lifetime_secs
);
1470 *entry
->max_life
= lifetime_secs
;
1471 *entry
->max_renew
= lifetime_secs
;
1474 if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT
&& (flags
& SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ
)) {
1476 const struct auth_user_info_dc
*user_info_dc
= NULL
;
1478 * These protections only apply to clients, so servers in the
1479 * Protected Users group may still have service tickets to them
1480 * encrypted with RC4. For accounts looked up as servers, note
1481 * that 'msg' does not contain the 'memberOf' attribute for
1482 * determining whether the account is a member of Protected
1485 * Additionally, Microsoft advises that accounts for services
1486 * and computers should never be members of Protected Users, or
1487 * they may fail to authenticate.
1489 status
= samba_kdc_get_user_info_from_db(p
, msg
, &user_info_dc
);
1490 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status
)) {
1495 result
= dsdb_is_protected_user(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
,
1497 user_info_dc
->num_sids
);
1503 protected_user
= result
;
1505 if (protected_user
&& enforced_tgt_lifetime_raw
== 0)
1508 * If a TGT lifetime hasn’t been set, Protected Users
1509 * enforces a four hour TGT lifetime.
1511 *entry
->max_life
= MIN(*entry
->max_life
, 4 * 60 * 60);
1512 *entry
->max_renew
= MIN(*entry
->max_renew
, 4 * 60 * 60);
1514 entry
->flags
.forwardable
= 0;
1515 entry
->flags
.proxiable
= 0;
1519 if (rid
== DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT
|| is_rodc
) {
1525 * KDCs (and KDCs on RODCs)
1526 * ignore msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes completely
1527 * but support all supported enctypes by the domain.
1529 supported_enctypes
= domain_enctypes
;
1531 enable_fast
= lpcfg_kdc_enable_fast(kdc_db_ctx
->lp_ctx
);
1533 supported_enctypes
|= ENC_FAST_SUPPORTED
;
1536 supported_enctypes
|= ENC_CLAIMS_SUPPORTED
;
1537 supported_enctypes
|= ENC_COMPOUND_IDENTITY_SUPPORTED
;
1540 * Resource SID compression is enabled implicitly, unless
1541 * disabled in msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes.
1544 } else if (userAccountControl
& (UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT
|UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT
)) {
1546 * DCs and RODCs computer accounts take
1547 * msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes unmodified, but
1548 * force all enctypes supported by the domain.
1550 supported_enctypes
|= domain_enctypes
;
1552 } else if (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT
||
1553 (ent_type
== SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY
)) {
1555 * for AS-REQ the client chooses the enc types it
1556 * supports, and this will vary between computers a
1557 * user logs in from. Therefore, so that we accept any
1558 * of the client's keys for decrypting padata,
1559 * supported_enctypes should not restrict etype usage.
1561 * likewise for 'any' return as much as is supported,
1562 * to export into a keytab.
1564 supported_enctypes
|= ENC_ALL_TYPES
;
1567 /* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
1568 if (userAccountControl
& UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY
) {
1569 supported_enctypes
&= ~ENC_ALL_TYPES
;
1572 if (protected_user
) {
1573 supported_enctypes
&= ~ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
;
1576 pa_supported_enctypes
= supported_enctypes
;
1577 supported_session_etypes
= supported_enctypes
;
1578 if (supported_session_etypes
& ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK
) {
1579 supported_session_etypes
|= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256
;
1580 supported_session_etypes
|= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128
;
1583 supported_session_etypes
|= ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
;
1586 * now that we remembered what to announce in pa_supported_enctypes
1587 * and normalized ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK, we restrict the
1588 * rest to the enc types the local kdc supports.
1590 supported_enctypes
&= kdc_enctypes
;
1591 supported_session_etypes
&= kdc_enctypes
;
1593 /* Get keys from the db */
1594 ret
= samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context
, p
, msg
,
1597 ent_type
, flags
, kvno
, entry
,
1599 &available_enctypes
);
1601 /* Could be bogus data in the entry, or out of memory */
1606 * If we only have a nthash stored,
1607 * but a better session key would be
1608 * available, we fallback to fetching the
1609 * RC4_HMAC_MD5, which implicitly also
1610 * would allow an RC4_HMAC_MD5 session key.
1611 * But only if the kdc actually supports
1614 if (available_enctypes
== 0 &&
1615 (supported_enctypes
& ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
) == 0 &&
1616 (supported_enctypes
& ~ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
) != 0 &&
1617 (kdc_enctypes
& ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
) != 0)
1619 supported_enctypes
= ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
;
1620 ret
= samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context
, p
, msg
,
1623 ent_type
, flags
, kvno
, entry
,
1625 &available_enctypes
);
1627 /* Could be bogus data in the entry, or out of memory */
1633 * We need to support all session keys enctypes for
1634 * all keys we provide
1636 supported_session_etypes
|= available_enctypes
;
1638 ret
= sdb_entry_set_etypes(entry
);
1643 if (entry
->flags
.server
) {
1645 supported_session_etypes
& KERB_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
;
1647 supported_session_etypes
& KERB_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
;
1649 supported_session_etypes
& ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
;
1650 ret
= sdb_entry_set_session_etypes(entry
,
1659 if (entry
->keys
.len
!= 0) {
1661 * FIXME: Currently limited to Heimdal so as not to
1662 * break MIT KDCs, for which no fix is available.
1664 #ifdef SAMBA4_USES_HEIMDAL
1667 * The krbtgt account, having no reason to
1668 * issue tickets encrypted in weaker keys,
1669 * shall only make available its strongest
1670 * key. All weaker keys are stripped out. This
1671 * makes it impossible for an RC4-encrypted
1672 * TGT to be accepted when AES KDC keys exist.
1674 * This controls the ticket key and so the PAC
1675 * signature algorithms indirectly, preventing
1676 * a weak KDC checksum from being accepted
1677 * when we verify the signatures for an
1678 * S4U2Proxy evidence ticket. As such, this is
1679 * indispensable for addressing
1682 * Being strict here also provides protection
1683 * against possible future attacks on weak
1686 entry
->keys
.len
= 1;
1687 if (entry
->etypes
!= NULL
) {
1688 entry
->etypes
->len
= 1;
1690 entry
->old_keys
.len
= MIN(entry
->old_keys
.len
, 1);
1691 entry
->older_keys
.len
= MIN(entry
->older_keys
.len
, 1);
1694 } else if (kdc_db_ctx
->rodc
) {
1696 * We are on an RODC, but don't have keys for this
1697 * account. Signal this to the caller
1699 auth_sam_trigger_repl_secret(kdc_db_ctx
,
1700 kdc_db_ctx
->msg_ctx
,
1703 return SDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE
;
1706 * oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
1707 * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
1708 * allows an entry with no keys (yet).
1712 p
->msg
= talloc_steal(p
, msg
);
1713 p
->supported_enctypes
= pa_supported_enctypes
;
1715 p
->client_policy
= talloc_steal(p
, authn_client_policy
);
1716 p
->server_policy
= talloc_steal(p
, authn_server_policy
);
1720 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
1721 sdb_entry_free(entry
);
1723 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx
, p
);
1730 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
1731 * The kvno is what the remote client asked for
1733 static krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context
,
1734 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
1735 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
,
1736 enum trust_direction direction
,
1737 struct ldb_dn
*realm_dn
,
1740 struct ldb_message
*msg
,
1741 struct sdb_entry
*entry
)
1743 struct loadparm_context
*lp_ctx
= kdc_db_ctx
->lp_ctx
;
1744 const char *our_realm
= lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx
);
1745 char *partner_realm
= NULL
;
1746 const char *realm
= NULL
;
1747 const char *krbtgt_realm
= NULL
;
1748 DATA_BLOB password_utf16
= data_blob_null
;
1749 DATA_BLOB password_utf8
= data_blob_null
;
1750 struct samr_Password _password_hash
;
1751 const struct samr_Password
*password_hash
= NULL
;
1752 const struct ldb_val
*password_val
;
1753 struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob
;
1754 struct samba_kdc_entry
*p
;
1755 bool use_previous
= false;
1756 uint32_t current_kvno
;
1757 uint32_t previous_kvno
;
1758 uint32_t num_keys
= 0;
1759 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err
;
1762 struct AuthenticationInformationArray
*auth_array
;
1765 uint32_t *auth_kvno
;
1766 bool preferr_current
= false;
1767 bool force_rc4
= lpcfg_kdc_force_enable_rc4_weak_session_keys(lp_ctx
);
1768 uint32_t supported_enctypes
= ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
;
1769 uint32_t pa_supported_enctypes
;
1770 uint32_t supported_session_etypes
;
1771 uint32_t config_kdc_enctypes
= lpcfg_kdc_supported_enctypes(lp_ctx
);
1772 uint32_t kdc_enctypes
=
1773 config_kdc_enctypes
!= 0 ?
1774 config_kdc_enctypes
:
1776 struct lsa_TrustDomainInfoInfoEx
*tdo
= NULL
;
1779 ZERO_STRUCTP(entry
);
1781 if (dsdb_functional_level(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
) >= DS_DOMAIN_FUNCTION_2008
) {
1782 /* If not told otherwise, Windows now assumes that trusts support AES. */
1783 supported_enctypes
= ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg
,
1784 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
1785 ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256
);
1788 pa_supported_enctypes
= supported_enctypes
;
1789 supported_session_etypes
= supported_enctypes
;
1790 if (supported_session_etypes
& ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK
) {
1791 supported_session_etypes
|= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256
;
1792 supported_session_etypes
|= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128
;
1795 supported_session_etypes
|= ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
;
1798 * now that we remembered what to announce in pa_supported_enctypes
1799 * and normalized ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK, we restrict the
1800 * rest to the enc types the local kdc supports.
1802 supported_enctypes
&= kdc_enctypes
;
1803 supported_session_etypes
&= kdc_enctypes
;
1805 status
= dsdb_trust_parse_tdo_info(mem_ctx
, msg
, &tdo
);
1806 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status
)) {
1807 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
1812 if (!(tdo
->trust_direction
& direction
)) {
1813 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
1814 ret
= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
1818 if (tdo
->trust_type
!= LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL
) {
1820 * Only UPLEVEL domains support kerberos here,
1821 * as we don't support LSA_TRUST_TYPE_MIT.
1823 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
1824 ret
= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
1828 if (tdo
->trust_attributes
& LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_CROSS_ORGANIZATION
) {
1830 * We don't support selective authentication yet.
1832 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
1833 ret
= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
1837 if (tdo
->domain_name
.string
== NULL
) {
1838 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
1839 ret
= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
1842 partner_realm
= strupper_talloc(mem_ctx
, tdo
->domain_name
.string
);
1843 if (partner_realm
== NULL
) {
1844 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
1849 if (direction
== INBOUND
) {
1851 krbtgt_realm
= partner_realm
;
1853 password_val
= ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg
, "trustAuthIncoming");
1854 } else { /* OUTBOUND */
1855 realm
= partner_realm
;
1856 krbtgt_realm
= our_realm
;
1858 password_val
= ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg
, "trustAuthOutgoing");
1861 if (password_val
== NULL
) {
1862 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
1863 ret
= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
1867 ndr_err
= ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val
, mem_ctx
, &password_blob
,
1868 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t
)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob
);
1869 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err
)) {
1870 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
1875 p
= talloc_zero(mem_ctx
, struct samba_kdc_entry
);
1882 p
->kdc_db_ctx
= kdc_db_ctx
;
1883 p
->realm_dn
= realm_dn
;
1884 p
->supported_enctypes
= pa_supported_enctypes
;
1886 talloc_set_destructor(p
, samba_kdc_entry_destructor
);
1888 entry
->skdc_entry
= p
;
1890 /* use 'whenCreated' */
1891 entry
->created_by
.time
= ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg
, "whenCreated", 0);
1892 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
1893 ret
= smb_krb5_make_principal(context
,
1894 &entry
->created_by
.principal
,
1895 realm
, "kadmin", NULL
);
1897 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
1902 * We always need to generate the canonicalized principal
1903 * with the values of our database.
1905 ret
= smb_krb5_make_principal(context
, &entry
->principal
, realm
,
1906 "krbtgt", krbtgt_realm
, NULL
);
1908 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
1911 smb_krb5_principal_set_type(context
, entry
->principal
,
1914 entry
->valid_start
= NULL
;
1916 /* we need to work out if we are going to use the current or
1917 * the previous password hash.
1918 * We base this on the kvno the client passes in. If the kvno
1919 * passed in is equal to the current kvno in our database then
1920 * we use the current structure. If it is the current kvno-1,
1921 * then we use the previous substrucure.
1925 * Windows preferrs the previous key for one hour.
1927 tv
= timeval_current();
1928 if (tv
.tv_sec
> 3600) {
1931 an_hour_ago
= timeval_to_nttime(&tv
);
1933 /* first work out the current kvno */
1935 for (i
=0; i
< password_blob
.count
; i
++) {
1936 struct AuthenticationInformation
*a
=
1937 &password_blob
.current
.array
[i
];
1939 if (a
->LastUpdateTime
<= an_hour_ago
) {
1940 preferr_current
= true;
1943 if (a
->AuthType
== TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION
) {
1944 current_kvno
= a
->AuthInfo
.version
.version
;
1947 if (current_kvno
== 0) {
1948 previous_kvno
= 255;
1950 previous_kvno
= current_kvno
- 1;
1952 for (i
=0; i
< password_blob
.count
; i
++) {
1953 struct AuthenticationInformation
*a
=
1954 &password_blob
.previous
.array
[i
];
1956 if (a
->AuthType
== TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION
) {
1957 previous_kvno
= a
->AuthInfo
.version
.version
;
1961 /* work out whether we will use the previous or current
1963 if (password_blob
.previous
.count
== 0) {
1964 /* there is no previous password */
1965 use_previous
= false;
1966 } else if (!(flags
& SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED
)) {
1968 * If not specified we use the lowest kvno
1969 * for the first hour after an update.
1971 if (preferr_current
) {
1972 use_previous
= false;
1973 } else if (previous_kvno
< current_kvno
) {
1974 use_previous
= true;
1976 use_previous
= false;
1978 } else if (kvno
== current_kvno
) {
1982 use_previous
= false;
1983 } else if (kvno
== previous_kvno
) {
1987 use_previous
= true;
1990 * Fallback to the current one for anything else
1992 use_previous
= false;
1996 auth_array
= &password_blob
.previous
;
1997 auth_kvno
= &previous_kvno
;
1999 auth_array
= &password_blob
.current
;
2000 auth_kvno
= ¤t_kvno
;
2003 /* use the kvno the client specified, if available */
2004 if (flags
& SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED
) {
2007 entry
->kvno
= *auth_kvno
;
2010 for (i
=0; i
< auth_array
->count
; i
++) {
2011 if (auth_array
->array
[i
].AuthType
== TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR
) {
2014 password_utf16
= data_blob_const(auth_array
->array
[i
].AuthInfo
.clear
.password
,
2015 auth_array
->array
[i
].AuthInfo
.clear
.size
);
2016 if (password_utf16
.length
== 0) {
2020 if (supported_enctypes
& ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
) {
2021 mdfour(_password_hash
.hash
, password_utf16
.data
, password_utf16
.length
);
2022 if (password_hash
== NULL
) {
2025 password_hash
= &_password_hash
;
2028 if (!(supported_enctypes
& (ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128
|ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256
))) {
2032 ok
= convert_string_talloc(mem_ctx
,
2033 CH_UTF16MUNGED
, CH_UTF8
,
2034 password_utf16
.data
,
2035 password_utf16
.length
,
2036 (void *)&password_utf8
.data
,
2037 &password_utf8
.length
);
2039 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
2044 if (supported_enctypes
& ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128
) {
2047 if (supported_enctypes
& ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256
) {
2051 } else if (auth_array
->array
[i
].AuthType
== TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF
) {
2052 if (supported_enctypes
& ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
) {
2053 password_hash
= &auth_array
->array
[i
].AuthInfo
.nt4owf
.password
;
2059 /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
2060 if (num_keys
== 0) {
2061 DEBUG(1,(__location__
": no usable key found\n"));
2062 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
2063 ret
= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2067 entry
->keys
.val
= calloc(num_keys
, sizeof(struct sdb_key
));
2068 if (entry
->keys
.val
== NULL
) {
2069 krb5_clear_error_message(context
);
2074 if (password_utf8
.length
!= 0) {
2075 struct sdb_key key
= {};
2076 krb5_const_principal salt_principal
= entry
->principal
;
2078 krb5_data cleartext_data
;
2080 cleartext_data
.data
= discard_const_p(char, password_utf8
.data
);
2081 cleartext_data
.length
= password_utf8
.length
;
2083 ret
= smb_krb5_get_pw_salt(context
,
2090 if (supported_enctypes
& ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256
) {
2091 ret
= smb_krb5_create_key_from_string(context
,
2095 ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
,
2098 smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context
, &salt
);
2102 entry
->keys
.val
[entry
->keys
.len
] = key
;
2106 if (supported_enctypes
& ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128
) {
2107 ret
= smb_krb5_create_key_from_string(context
,
2111 ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
,
2114 smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context
, &salt
);
2118 entry
->keys
.val
[entry
->keys
.len
] = key
;
2122 smb_krb5_free_data_contents(context
, &salt
);
2125 if (password_hash
!= NULL
) {
2126 struct sdb_key key
= {};
2128 ret
= smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(context
,
2129 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC
,
2130 password_hash
->hash
,
2131 sizeof(password_hash
->hash
),
2137 entry
->keys
.val
[entry
->keys
.len
] = key
;
2141 entry
->flags
= int2SDBFlags(0);
2142 entry
->flags
.immutable
= 1;
2143 entry
->flags
.invalid
= 0;
2144 entry
->flags
.server
= 1;
2145 entry
->flags
.require_preauth
= 1;
2147 entry
->pw_end
= NULL
;
2149 entry
->max_life
= NULL
;
2151 entry
->max_renew
= NULL
;
2153 /* Match Windows behavior and allow forwardable flag in cross-realm. */
2154 entry
->flags
.forwardable
= 1;
2156 samba_kdc_sort_keys(&entry
->keys
);
2158 ret
= sdb_entry_set_etypes(entry
);
2165 supported_session_etypes
& KERB_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
;
2167 supported_session_etypes
& KERB_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
;
2169 supported_session_etypes
& ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5
;
2170 ret
= sdb_entry_set_session_etypes(entry
,
2179 p
->msg
= talloc_steal(p
, msg
);
2182 TALLOC_FREE(partner_realm
);
2185 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
2186 sdb_entry_free(entry
);
2188 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx
, p
);
2195 static krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context
, struct ldb_context
*ldb_ctx
,
2196 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
,
2198 struct ldb_dn
*realm_dn
,
2199 struct ldb_message
**pmsg
)
2202 const char * const *attrs
= trust_attrs
;
2204 status
= dsdb_trust_search_tdo(ldb_ctx
, realm
, realm
,
2205 attrs
, mem_ctx
, pmsg
);
2206 if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status
)) {
2208 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status
, NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
)) {
2209 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2210 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status
, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY
)) {
2212 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_lookup_trust: out of memory");
2216 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_lookup_trust: %s", nt_errstr(status
));
2221 static krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context
,
2222 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
2223 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
,
2224 krb5_const_principal principal
,
2226 struct ldb_dn
**realm_dn
,
2227 struct ldb_message
**msg
)
2230 char *principal_string
= NULL
;
2232 if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context
, principal
) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL
) {
2233 principal_string
= smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx
, context
,
2235 if (principal_string
== NULL
) {
2239 char *principal_string_m
= NULL
;
2240 krb5_error_code ret
;
2242 ret
= krb5_unparse_name(context
, principal
, &principal_string_m
);
2247 principal_string
= talloc_strdup(mem_ctx
, principal_string_m
);
2248 SAFE_FREE(principal_string_m
);
2249 if (principal_string
== NULL
) {
2254 nt_status
= sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
,
2255 mem_ctx
, principal_string
, attrs
,
2257 if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status
, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER
)) {
2258 krb5_principal fallback_principal
= NULL
;
2259 unsigned int num_comp
;
2260 char *fallback_realm
= NULL
;
2261 char *fallback_account
= NULL
;
2262 krb5_error_code ret
;
2264 ret
= krb5_parse_name(context
, principal_string
,
2265 &fallback_principal
);
2266 TALLOC_FREE(principal_string
);
2271 num_comp
= krb5_princ_size(context
, fallback_principal
);
2272 fallback_realm
= smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(
2273 mem_ctx
, context
, fallback_principal
);
2274 if (fallback_realm
== NULL
) {
2275 krb5_free_principal(context
, fallback_principal
);
2279 if (num_comp
== 1) {
2282 fallback_account
= smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx
,
2283 context
, fallback_principal
, 0);
2284 if (fallback_account
== NULL
) {
2285 krb5_free_principal(context
, fallback_principal
);
2286 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm
);
2290 len
= strlen(fallback_account
);
2291 if (len
>= 2 && fallback_account
[len
- 1] == '$') {
2292 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_account
);
2295 krb5_free_principal(context
, fallback_principal
);
2296 fallback_principal
= NULL
;
2298 if (fallback_account
!= NULL
) {
2301 with_dollar
= talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx
, "%s$",
2303 if (with_dollar
== NULL
) {
2304 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm
);
2307 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_account
);
2309 ret
= smb_krb5_make_principal(context
,
2310 &fallback_principal
,
2313 TALLOC_FREE(with_dollar
);
2315 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm
);
2319 TALLOC_FREE(fallback_realm
);
2321 if (fallback_principal
!= NULL
) {
2322 char *fallback_string
= NULL
;
2324 ret
= krb5_unparse_name(context
,
2328 krb5_free_principal(context
, fallback_principal
);
2332 nt_status
= sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
,
2337 SAFE_FREE(fallback_string
);
2339 krb5_free_principal(context
, fallback_principal
);
2340 fallback_principal
= NULL
;
2342 TALLOC_FREE(principal_string
);
2344 if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status
, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER
)) {
2345 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2346 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status
, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY
)) {
2348 } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status
)) {
2355 static krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context
,
2356 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
2357 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
,
2358 krb5_const_principal principal
,
2361 struct sdb_entry
*entry
)
2363 struct ldb_dn
*realm_dn
;
2364 krb5_error_code ret
;
2365 struct ldb_message
*msg
= NULL
;
2367 ret
= samba_kdc_lookup_client(context
, kdc_db_ctx
,
2368 mem_ctx
, principal
, user_attrs
,
2374 ret
= samba_kdc_message2entry(context
, kdc_db_ctx
, mem_ctx
,
2375 principal
, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT
,
2377 realm_dn
, msg
, entry
);
2381 static krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context
,
2382 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
2383 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
,
2384 krb5_const_principal principal
,
2387 struct sdb_entry
*entry
)
2389 struct loadparm_context
*lp_ctx
= kdc_db_ctx
->lp_ctx
;
2390 krb5_error_code ret
;
2391 struct ldb_message
*msg
= NULL
;
2392 struct ldb_dn
*realm_dn
= ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
);
2393 char *realm_from_princ
;
2394 char *realm_princ_comp
= smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx
, context
, principal
, 1);
2396 realm_from_princ
= smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(
2397 mem_ctx
, context
, principal
);
2398 if (realm_from_princ
== NULL
) {
2400 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2403 if (krb5_princ_size(context
, principal
) != 2
2404 || (principal_comp_strcmp(context
, principal
, 0, KRB5_TGS_NAME
) != 0)) {
2406 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2409 /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
2411 if (lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx
, realm_from_princ
)
2412 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx
, realm_princ_comp
)) {
2413 /* us, or someone quite like us */
2414 /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
2415 * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
2419 unsigned int krbtgt_number
;
2420 /* w2k8r2 sometimes gives us a kvno of 255 for inter-domain
2421 trust tickets. We don't yet know what this means, but we do
2422 seem to need to treat it as unspecified */
2423 if (flags
& SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED
) {
2424 krbtgt_number
= SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno
);
2425 if (kdc_db_ctx
->rodc
) {
2426 if (krbtgt_number
!= kdc_db_ctx
->my_krbtgt_number
) {
2427 return SDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE
;
2431 krbtgt_number
= kdc_db_ctx
->my_krbtgt_number
;
2434 if (krbtgt_number
== kdc_db_ctx
->my_krbtgt_number
) {
2435 lret
= dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
, mem_ctx
,
2436 &msg
, kdc_db_ctx
->krbtgt_dn
, LDB_SCOPE_BASE
,
2437 krbtgt_attrs
, DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG
,
2438 "(objectClass=user)");
2440 /* We need to look up an RODC krbtgt (perhaps
2441 * ours, if we are an RODC, perhaps another
2442 * RODC if we are a read-write DC */
2443 lret
= dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
, mem_ctx
,
2444 &msg
, realm_dn
, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE
,
2446 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN
| DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG
,
2447 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=%u))", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number
));
2450 if (lret
== LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT
) {
2451 krb5_warnx(context
, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
2452 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number
));
2453 krb5_set_error_message(context
, SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
,
2454 "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
2455 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number
));
2456 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2457 } else if (lret
!= LDB_SUCCESS
) {
2458 krb5_warnx(context
, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
2459 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number
));
2460 krb5_set_error_message(context
, SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
,
2461 "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
2462 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number
));
2463 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2466 ret
= samba_kdc_message2entry(context
, kdc_db_ctx
, mem_ctx
,
2467 principal
, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT
,
2468 flags
, kvno
, realm_dn
, msg
, entry
);
2470 krb5_warnx(context
, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
2475 enum trust_direction direction
= UNKNOWN
;
2476 const char *realm
= NULL
;
2478 /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
2480 if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx
), realm_from_princ
) == 0) {
2481 /* look for inbound trust */
2482 direction
= INBOUND
;
2483 realm
= realm_princ_comp
;
2484 } else if (principal_comp_strcasecmp(context
, principal
, 1, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx
)) == 0) {
2485 /* look for outbound trust */
2486 direction
= OUTBOUND
;
2487 realm
= realm_from_princ
;
2489 krb5_warnx(context
, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
2492 krb5_set_error_message(context
, SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
2495 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2498 /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
2500 ret
= samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context
, kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
,
2502 realm
, realm_dn
, &msg
);
2505 krb5_warnx(context
, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: could not find principal in DB");
2506 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: could not find principal in DB");
2510 ret
= samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context
, kdc_db_ctx
, mem_ctx
,
2512 realm_dn
, flags
, kvno
, msg
, entry
);
2514 krb5_warnx(context
, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: trust_message2entry failed for %s",
2515 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg
->dn
));
2516 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt: "
2517 "trust_message2entry failed for %s",
2518 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg
->dn
));
2525 static krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context
,
2526 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
2527 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
,
2528 krb5_const_principal principal
,
2531 struct ldb_dn
**realm_dn
,
2532 struct ldb_message
**msg
)
2534 krb5_error_code ret
;
2535 if ((smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context
, principal
) != KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL
)
2536 && krb5_princ_size(context
, principal
) >= 2) {
2537 /* 'normal server' case */
2540 struct ldb_dn
*user_dn
;
2541 char *principal_string
;
2543 ret
= krb5_unparse_name_flags(context
, principal
,
2544 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM
,
2550 /* At this point we may find the host is known to be
2551 * in a different realm, so we should generate a
2552 * referral instead */
2553 nt_status
= crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
,
2554 mem_ctx
, principal_string
,
2555 &user_dn
, realm_dn
);
2556 free(principal_string
);
2558 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status
)) {
2559 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2562 ldb_ret
= dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
,
2564 msg
, user_dn
, LDB_SCOPE_BASE
,
2566 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN
| DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG
,
2568 if (ldb_ret
!= LDB_SUCCESS
) {
2569 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2572 } else if (!(flags
& SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ
)
2573 && smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context
, principal
) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL
) {
2575 * The behaviour of accepting an
2576 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL server principal
2577 * containing a UPN only applies to TGS-REQ packets,
2578 * not AS-REQ packets.
2580 return samba_kdc_lookup_client(context
, kdc_db_ctx
,
2581 mem_ctx
, principal
, attrs
,
2586 * - the AS-REQ, where we only accept
2587 * samAccountName based lookups for the server, no
2588 * matter if the name is an
2589 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL or not
2590 * - for the TGS-REQ when we are not given an
2591 * KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL, which also must
2592 * only lookup samAccountName based names.
2596 krb5_principal enterprise_principal
= NULL
;
2597 krb5_const_principal used_principal
= NULL
;
2600 char *filter
= NULL
;
2602 if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context
, principal
) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL
) {
2604 /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
2605 if (krb5_princ_size(context
, principal
) != 1) {
2606 ret
= KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED
;
2607 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_lookup_server: request for an "
2608 "enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
2609 krb5_princ_size(context
, principal
));
2612 str
= smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(mem_ctx
, context
, principal
, 0);
2614 return KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED
;
2616 ret
= krb5_parse_name(context
, str
,
2617 &enterprise_principal
);
2622 used_principal
= enterprise_principal
;
2624 used_principal
= principal
;
2627 /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
2628 *realm_dn
= ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
);
2630 /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referral */
2632 ret
= krb5_unparse_name_flags(context
, used_principal
,
2633 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM
|
2634 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY
,
2636 used_principal
= NULL
;
2637 krb5_free_principal(context
, enterprise_principal
);
2638 enterprise_principal
= NULL
;
2641 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_lookup_server: could not parse principal");
2642 krb5_warnx(context
, "samba_kdc_lookup_server: could not parse principal");
2646 name1
= ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx
, short_princ
);
2647 SAFE_FREE(short_princ
);
2648 if (name1
== NULL
) {
2651 len1
= strlen(name1
);
2652 if (len1
>= 1 && name1
[len1
- 1] != '$') {
2653 filter
= talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx
,
2654 "(&(objectClass=user)(|(samAccountName=%s)(samAccountName=%s$)))",
2656 if (filter
== NULL
) {
2660 filter
= talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx
,
2661 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
2663 if (filter
== NULL
) {
2668 lret
= dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
, mem_ctx
, msg
,
2669 *realm_dn
, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE
,
2671 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN
| DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG
,
2673 if (lret
== LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT
) {
2674 DEBUG(10, ("Failed to find an entry for %s filter:%s\n",
2676 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2678 if (lret
== LDB_ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION
) {
2679 DEBUG(10, ("Failed to find unique entry for %s filter:%s\n",
2681 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2683 if (lret
!= LDB_SUCCESS
) {
2684 DEBUG(0, ("Failed single search for %s - %s\n",
2685 name1
, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
)));
2686 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2690 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2695 static krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context
,
2696 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
2697 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
,
2698 krb5_const_principal principal
,
2701 struct sdb_entry
*entry
)
2703 krb5_error_code ret
;
2704 struct ldb_dn
*realm_dn
;
2705 struct ldb_message
*msg
;
2707 ret
= samba_kdc_lookup_server(context
, kdc_db_ctx
, mem_ctx
, principal
,
2708 flags
, server_attrs
, &realm_dn
, &msg
);
2713 ret
= samba_kdc_message2entry(context
, kdc_db_ctx
, mem_ctx
,
2714 principal
, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
,
2716 realm_dn
, msg
, entry
);
2718 char *client_name
= NULL
;
2719 krb5_error_code code
;
2721 code
= krb5_unparse_name(context
, principal
, &client_name
);
2724 "samba_kdc_fetch_server: message2entry failed for "
2729 "samba_kdc_fetch_server: message2entry and "
2730 "krb5_unparse_name failed");
2732 SAFE_FREE(client_name
);
2738 static krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_lookup_realm(krb5_context context
,
2739 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
2740 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
,
2741 krb5_const_principal principal
,
2743 struct sdb_entry
*entry
)
2745 TALLOC_CTX
*frame
= talloc_stackframe();
2747 krb5_error_code ret
;
2748 bool check_realm
= false;
2749 const char *realm
= NULL
;
2750 struct dsdb_trust_routing_table
*trt
= NULL
;
2751 const struct lsa_TrustDomainInfoInfoEx
*tdo
= NULL
;
2752 unsigned int num_comp
;
2756 num_comp
= krb5_princ_size(context
, principal
);
2758 if (flags
& SDB_F_GET_CLIENT
) {
2759 if (flags
& SDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ
) {
2763 if (flags
& SDB_F_GET_SERVER
) {
2764 if (flags
& SDB_F_FOR_TGS_REQ
) {
2774 realm
= smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(frame
, context
, principal
);
2775 if (realm
== NULL
) {
2781 * The requested realm needs to be our own
2783 ok
= lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(kdc_db_ctx
->lp_ctx
, realm
);
2786 * The request is not for us...
2789 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2792 if (smb_krb5_principal_get_type(context
, principal
) == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL
) {
2793 char *principal_string
= NULL
;
2794 krb5_principal enterprise_principal
= NULL
;
2795 char *enterprise_realm
= NULL
;
2797 if (num_comp
!= 1) {
2799 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2802 principal_string
= smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(frame
, context
,
2804 if (principal_string
== NULL
) {
2809 ret
= krb5_parse_name(context
, principal_string
,
2810 &enterprise_principal
);
2811 TALLOC_FREE(principal_string
);
2817 enterprise_realm
= smb_krb5_principal_get_realm(
2818 frame
, context
, enterprise_principal
);
2819 krb5_free_principal(context
, enterprise_principal
);
2820 if (enterprise_realm
!= NULL
) {
2821 realm
= enterprise_realm
;
2825 if (flags
& SDB_F_GET_SERVER
) {
2826 char *service_realm
= NULL
;
2828 ret
= principal_comp_strcmp(context
, principal
, 0, KRB5_TGS_NAME
);
2831 * we need to search krbtgt/ locally
2838 * We need to check the last component against the routing table.
2840 * Note this works only with 2 or 3 component principals, e.g:
2842 * servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base
2843 * servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base/bla.base
2844 * servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base/ForestDnsZones.bla.base
2845 * servicePrincipalName: ldap/W2K8R2-219.bla.base/DomainDnsZones.bla.base
2848 if (num_comp
== 2 || num_comp
== 3) {
2849 service_realm
= smb_krb5_principal_get_comp_string(frame
,
2855 if (service_realm
!= NULL
) {
2856 realm
= service_realm
;
2860 ok
= lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(kdc_db_ctx
->lp_ctx
, realm
);
2863 * skip the expensive routing lookup
2869 status
= dsdb_trust_routing_table_load(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
,
2871 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status
)) {
2876 tdo
= dsdb_trust_routing_by_name(trt
, realm
);
2879 * This principal has to be local
2885 if (tdo
->trust_attributes
& LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_WITHIN_FOREST
) {
2887 * TODO: handle the routing within the forest
2889 * This should likely be handled in
2890 * samba_kdc_message2entry() in case we're
2891 * a global catalog. We'd need to check
2892 * if realm_dn is our own domain and derive
2893 * the dns domain name from realm_dn and check that
2894 * against the routing table or fallback to
2895 * the tdo we found here.
2897 * But for now we don't support multiple domains
2898 * in our forest correctly anyway.
2900 * Just search in our local database.
2906 ZERO_STRUCTP(entry
);
2908 ret
= krb5_copy_principal(context
, principal
,
2915 upper
= strupper_talloc(frame
, tdo
->domain_name
.string
);
2916 if (upper
== NULL
) {
2921 ret
= smb_krb5_principal_set_realm(context
,
2930 return SDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM
;
2933 krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context
,
2934 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
2935 krb5_const_principal principal
,
2938 struct sdb_entry
*entry
)
2940 krb5_error_code ret
= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2941 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
;
2943 mem_ctx
= talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx
, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
2946 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
2950 ret
= samba_kdc_lookup_realm(context
, kdc_db_ctx
, mem_ctx
,
2951 principal
, flags
, entry
);
2956 ret
= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
2958 if (flags
& SDB_F_GET_CLIENT
) {
2959 ret
= samba_kdc_fetch_client(context
, kdc_db_ctx
, mem_ctx
, principal
, flags
, kvno
, entry
);
2960 if (ret
!= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
) goto done
;
2962 if (flags
& SDB_F_GET_SERVER
) {
2963 /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
2964 ret
= samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context
, kdc_db_ctx
, mem_ctx
, principal
, flags
, kvno
, entry
);
2965 if (ret
!= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
) goto done
;
2967 /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
2968 ret
= samba_kdc_fetch_server(context
, kdc_db_ctx
, mem_ctx
, principal
, flags
, kvno
, entry
);
2969 if (ret
!= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
) goto done
;
2971 if (flags
& SDB_F_GET_KRBTGT
) {
2972 ret
= samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context
, kdc_db_ctx
, mem_ctx
, principal
, flags
, kvno
, entry
);
2973 if (ret
!= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
) goto done
;
2977 talloc_free(mem_ctx
);
2981 struct samba_kdc_seq
{
2984 struct ldb_message
**msgs
;
2985 struct ldb_dn
*realm_dn
;
2988 static krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context
,
2989 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
2990 struct sdb_entry
*entry
)
2992 krb5_error_code ret
;
2993 struct samba_kdc_seq
*priv
= kdc_db_ctx
->seq_ctx
;
2994 const char *realm
= lpcfg_realm(kdc_db_ctx
->lp_ctx
);
2995 struct ldb_message
*msg
= NULL
;
2996 const char *sAMAccountName
= NULL
;
2997 krb5_principal principal
= NULL
;
2998 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
;
3001 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
3004 mem_ctx
= talloc_named(priv
, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
3008 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
3012 while (priv
->index
< priv
->count
) {
3013 msg
= priv
->msgs
[priv
->index
++];
3015 sAMAccountName
= ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg
, "sAMAccountName", NULL
);
3016 if (sAMAccountName
!= NULL
) {
3021 if (sAMAccountName
== NULL
) {
3022 ret
= SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
3026 ret
= smb_krb5_make_principal(context
, &principal
,
3027 realm
, sAMAccountName
, NULL
);
3032 ret
= samba_kdc_message2entry(context
, kdc_db_ctx
, mem_ctx
,
3033 principal
, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY
,
3034 SDB_F_ADMIN_DATA
|SDB_F_GET_ANY
,
3036 priv
->realm_dn
, msg
, entry
);
3039 if (principal
!= NULL
) {
3040 krb5_free_principal(context
, principal
);
3045 kdc_db_ctx
->seq_ctx
= NULL
;
3047 talloc_free(mem_ctx
);
3053 krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context
,
3054 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
3055 struct sdb_entry
*entry
)
3057 struct ldb_context
*ldb_ctx
= kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
;
3058 struct samba_kdc_seq
*priv
= kdc_db_ctx
->seq_ctx
;
3060 struct ldb_result
*res
= NULL
;
3061 krb5_error_code ret
;
3062 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
;
3067 kdc_db_ctx
->seq_ctx
= NULL
;
3070 priv
= (struct samba_kdc_seq
*) talloc(kdc_db_ctx
, struct samba_kdc_seq
);
3073 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "talloc: out of memory");
3079 priv
->realm_dn
= ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx
);
3082 mem_ctx
= talloc_named(priv
, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context");
3086 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
3091 ret
= krb5_get_default_realm(context
, &realm
);
3096 krb5_free_default_realm(context
, realm
);
3098 lret
= dsdb_search(ldb_ctx
, priv
, &res
,
3099 priv
->realm_dn
, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE
, user_attrs
,
3100 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG
,
3101 "(objectClass=user)");
3103 if (lret
!= LDB_SUCCESS
) {
3105 return SDB_ERR_NOENTRY
;
3108 priv
->count
= res
->count
;
3109 priv
->msgs
= talloc_steal(priv
, res
->msgs
);
3112 kdc_db_ctx
->seq_ctx
= priv
;
3114 ret
= samba_kdc_seq(context
, kdc_db_ctx
, entry
);
3118 kdc_db_ctx
->seq_ctx
= NULL
;
3120 talloc_free(mem_ctx
);
3125 krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context
,
3126 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
3127 struct sdb_entry
*entry
)
3129 return samba_kdc_seq(context
, kdc_db_ctx
, entry
);
3132 /* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal
3134 * The safest way to determine 'self' is to check the DB record made at
3135 * the time the principal was presented to the KDC.
3138 samba_kdc_check_client_matches_target_service(krb5_context context
,
3139 struct samba_kdc_entry
*skdc_entry_client
,
3140 struct samba_kdc_entry
*skdc_entry_server_target
)
3142 struct dom_sid
*orig_sid
;
3143 struct dom_sid
*target_sid
;
3144 TALLOC_CTX
*frame
= talloc_stackframe();
3146 orig_sid
= samdb_result_dom_sid(frame
,
3147 skdc_entry_client
->msg
,
3149 target_sid
= samdb_result_dom_sid(frame
,
3150 skdc_entry_server_target
->msg
,
3154 * Allow delegation to the same record (representing a
3155 * principal), even if by a different name. The easy and safe
3156 * way to prove this is by SID comparison
3158 if (!(orig_sid
&& target_sid
&& dom_sid_equal(orig_sid
, target_sid
))) {
3160 return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH
;
3167 /* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
3168 * slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
3169 * database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
3173 samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context
,
3174 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
3175 struct samba_kdc_entry
*skdc_entry
,
3176 krb5_const_principal certificate_principal
)
3178 krb5_error_code ret
;
3179 struct ldb_dn
*realm_dn
;
3180 struct ldb_message
*msg
;
3181 struct dom_sid
*orig_sid
;
3182 struct dom_sid
*target_sid
;
3183 const char *ms_upn_check_attrs
[] = {
3187 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
= talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx
, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
3191 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match: talloc_named() failed!");
3195 ret
= samba_kdc_lookup_client(context
, kdc_db_ctx
,
3196 mem_ctx
, certificate_principal
,
3197 ms_upn_check_attrs
, &realm_dn
, &msg
);
3200 talloc_free(mem_ctx
);
3204 orig_sid
= samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx
, skdc_entry
->msg
, "objectSid");
3205 target_sid
= samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx
, msg
, "objectSid");
3207 /* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
3208 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
3210 if (!(orig_sid
&& target_sid
&& dom_sid_equal(orig_sid
, target_sid
))) {
3211 talloc_free(mem_ctx
);
3212 #if defined(KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH) /* MIT */
3213 return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH
;
3214 #else /* Heimdal (where this is an enum) */
3215 return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH
;
3219 talloc_free(mem_ctx
);
3224 * Check if a given entry may delegate to this target principal
3228 samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy(krb5_context context
,
3229 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
3230 struct samba_kdc_entry
*skdc_entry
,
3231 krb5_const_principal target_principal
)
3233 krb5_error_code ret
;
3235 const char *client_dn
= NULL
;
3236 const char *target_principal_name
= NULL
;
3237 struct ldb_message_element
*el
;
3242 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
= talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx
, 0, "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy");
3246 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
,
3247 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
3248 " talloc_named() failed!");
3252 client_dn
= ldb_dn_get_linearized(skdc_entry
->msg
->dn
);
3258 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
,
3259 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
3260 " ldb_dn_get_linearized() failed!");
3261 talloc_free(mem_ctx
);
3265 el
= ldb_msg_find_element(skdc_entry
->msg
, "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo");
3270 SMB_ASSERT(el
->num_values
!= 0);
3273 * This is the Microsoft forwardable flag behavior.
3275 * If the proxy (target) principal is NULL, and we have any authorized
3276 * delegation target, allow to forward.
3278 if (target_principal
== NULL
) {
3279 talloc_free(mem_ctx
);
3285 * The main heimdal code already checked that the target_principal
3286 * belongs to the same realm as the client.
3288 * So we just need the principal without the realm,
3289 * as that is what is configured in the "msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo"
3292 ret
= krb5_unparse_name_flags(context
, target_principal
,
3293 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM
, &tmp
);
3295 talloc_free(mem_ctx
);
3296 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
,
3297 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
3298 " krb5_unparse_name() failed!");
3301 DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] for target[%s]\n",
3304 target_principal_name
= talloc_strdup(mem_ctx
, tmp
);
3306 if (target_principal_name
== NULL
) {
3308 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
,
3309 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy:"
3310 " talloc_strdup() failed!");
3311 talloc_free(mem_ctx
);
3315 val
= data_blob_string_const(target_principal_name
);
3317 for (i
=0; i
<el
->num_values
; i
++) {
3318 struct ldb_val
*val1
= &val
;
3319 struct ldb_val
*val2
= &el
->values
[i
];
3322 if (val1
->length
!= val2
->length
) {
3326 cmp
= strncasecmp((const char *)val1
->data
,
3327 (const char *)val2
->data
,
3342 DEBUG(10,("samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] allowed target[%s]\n",
3343 client_dn
, target_principal_name
));
3344 talloc_free(mem_ctx
);
3348 krb5_set_error_message(context
, ret
,
3349 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy: client[%s] "
3350 "not allowed for delegation to target[%s]",
3352 target_principal_name
);
3353 talloc_free(mem_ctx
);
3354 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION
;
3358 * This method is called for S4U2Proxy requests and implements the
3359 * resource-based constrained delegation variant, which can support
3360 * cross-realm delegation.
3362 krb5_error_code
samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy_rbcd(
3363 krb5_context context
,
3364 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
,
3365 krb5_const_principal client_principal
,
3366 krb5_const_principal server_principal
,
3367 krb5_const_pac header_pac
,
3368 struct samba_kdc_entry
*proxy_skdc_entry
)
3370 krb5_error_code code
;
3371 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err
;
3372 char *client_name
= NULL
;
3373 char *server_name
= NULL
;
3374 const char *proxy_dn
= NULL
;
3375 const DATA_BLOB
*data
= NULL
;
3376 struct security_descriptor
*rbcd_security_descriptor
= NULL
;
3377 struct auth_user_info_dc
*user_info_dc
= NULL
;
3378 struct security_token
*security_token
= NULL
;
3379 uint32_t session_info_flags
=
3380 AUTH_SESSION_INFO_DEFAULT_GROUPS
|
3381 AUTH_SESSION_INFO_SIMPLE_PRIVILEGES
;
3383 * Testing shows that although Windows grants SEC_ADS_GENERIC_ALL access
3384 * in security descriptors it creates for RBCD, its KDC only requires
3385 * SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS for the access check to succeed.
3387 uint32_t access_desired
= SEC_ADS_CONTROL_ACCESS
;
3388 uint32_t access_granted
= 0;
3390 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
= NULL
;
3392 mem_ctx
= talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx
,
3394 "samba_kdc_check_s4u2proxy_rbcd");
3395 if (mem_ctx
== NULL
) {
3402 proxy_dn
= ldb_dn_get_linearized(proxy_skdc_entry
->msg
->dn
);
3403 if (proxy_dn
== NULL
) {
3404 DBG_ERR("ldb_dn_get_linearized failed for proxy_dn!\n");
3413 rbcd_security_descriptor
= talloc_zero(mem_ctx
,
3414 struct security_descriptor
);
3415 if (rbcd_security_descriptor
== NULL
) {
3422 code
= krb5_unparse_name_flags(context
,
3424 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY
,
3427 DBG_ERR("Unable to parse client_principal!\n");
3431 code
= krb5_unparse_name_flags(context
,
3433 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_DISPLAY
,
3436 DBG_ERR("Unable to parse server_principal!\n");
3440 DBG_INFO("Check delegation from client[%s] to server[%s] via "
3446 code
= kerberos_pac_to_user_info_dc(mem_ctx
,
3450 AUTH_INCLUDE_RESOURCE_GROUPS
,
3458 if (!(user_info_dc
->info
->user_flags
& NETLOGON_GUEST
)) {
3459 session_info_flags
|= AUTH_SESSION_INFO_AUTHENTICATED
;
3462 nt_status
= auth_generate_security_token(mem_ctx
,
3468 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status
)) {
3469 code
= map_errno_from_nt_status(nt_status
);
3473 data
= ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(proxy_skdc_entry
->msg
,
3474 "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity");
3476 DBG_WARNING("Could not find security descriptor "
3477 "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity in "
3480 code
= KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION
;
3484 ndr_err
= ndr_pull_struct_blob(
3487 rbcd_security_descriptor
,
3488 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t
)ndr_pull_security_descriptor
);
3489 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err
)) {
3490 errno
= ndr_map_error2errno(ndr_err
);
3491 DBG_ERR("Failed to unmarshall "
3492 "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity "
3493 "security descriptor of proxy[%s]\n",
3495 code
= KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION
;
3499 if (DEBUGLEVEL
>= 10) {
3500 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_token
, security_token
);
3501 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(security_descriptor
, rbcd_security_descriptor
);
3504 nt_status
= sec_access_check_ds(rbcd_security_descriptor
,
3511 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status
)) {
3512 DBG_WARNING("RBCD: sec_access_check_ds(access_desired=%#08x, "
3513 "access_granted:%#08x) failed with: %s\n",
3516 nt_errstr(nt_status
));
3518 code
= KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION
;
3522 DBG_NOTICE("RBCD: Access granted for client[%s]\n", client_name
);
3526 SAFE_FREE(client_name
);
3527 SAFE_FREE(server_name
);
3529 TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx
);
3533 NTSTATUS
samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx(TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
, struct samba_kdc_base_context
*base_ctx
,
3534 struct samba_kdc_db_context
**kdc_db_ctx_out
)
3537 struct ldb_message
*msg
;
3538 struct auth_session_info
*session_info
;
3539 struct samba_kdc_db_context
*kdc_db_ctx
;
3540 /* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to
3541 * authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is highly likely to
3544 * In future we may set this up to use EXERNAL and SSL
3545 * certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP_SET_USERNAME
3548 kdc_db_ctx
= talloc_zero(mem_ctx
, struct samba_kdc_db_context
);
3549 if (kdc_db_ctx
== NULL
) {
3550 return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY
;
3552 kdc_db_ctx
->ev_ctx
= base_ctx
->ev_ctx
;
3553 kdc_db_ctx
->lp_ctx
= base_ctx
->lp_ctx
;
3554 kdc_db_ctx
->msg_ctx
= base_ctx
->msg_ctx
;
3556 /* get default kdc policy */
3557 lpcfg_default_kdc_policy(mem_ctx
,
3559 &kdc_db_ctx
->policy
.svc_tkt_lifetime
,
3560 &kdc_db_ctx
->policy
.usr_tkt_lifetime
,
3561 &kdc_db_ctx
->policy
.renewal_lifetime
);
3563 session_info
= system_session(kdc_db_ctx
->lp_ctx
);
3564 if (session_info
== NULL
) {
3565 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx
);
3566 return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3569 /* Setup the link to LDB */
3570 kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
= samdb_connect(kdc_db_ctx
,
3576 if (kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
== NULL
) {
3577 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!"));
3578 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx
);
3579 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO
;
3582 /* Find out our own krbtgt kvno */
3583 ldb_ret
= samdb_rodc(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
, &kdc_db_ctx
->rodc
);
3584 if (ldb_ret
!= LDB_SUCCESS
) {
3585 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine if we are an RODC in KDC backend: %s\n",
3586 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
)));
3587 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx
);
3588 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO
;
3590 if (kdc_db_ctx
->rodc
) {
3591 int my_krbtgt_number
;
3592 const char *secondary_keytab
[] = { "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", NULL
};
3593 struct ldb_dn
*account_dn
;
3594 struct ldb_dn
*server_dn
= samdb_server_dn(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
, kdc_db_ctx
);
3596 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine server DN in KDC backend: %s\n",
3597 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
)));
3598 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx
);
3599 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO
;
3602 ldb_ret
= samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
, kdc_db_ctx
, server_dn
,
3603 "serverReference", &account_dn
);
3604 if (ldb_ret
!= LDB_SUCCESS
) {
3605 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine server account in KDC backend: %s\n",
3606 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
)));
3607 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx
);
3608 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO
;
3611 ldb_ret
= samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
, kdc_db_ctx
, account_dn
,
3612 "msDS-KrbTgtLink", &kdc_db_ctx
->krbtgt_dn
);
3613 talloc_free(account_dn
);
3614 if (ldb_ret
!= LDB_SUCCESS
) {
3615 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot determine RODC krbtgt account in KDC backend: %s\n",
3616 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
)));
3617 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx
);
3618 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO
;
3621 ldb_ret
= dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
, kdc_db_ctx
,
3622 &msg
, kdc_db_ctx
->krbtgt_dn
, LDB_SCOPE_BASE
,
3624 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG
,
3625 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=*))");
3626 if (ldb_ret
!= LDB_SUCCESS
) {
3627 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot read krbtgt account %s in KDC backend to get msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber: %s: %s\n",
3628 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx
->krbtgt_dn
),
3629 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
),
3630 ldb_strerror(ldb_ret
)));
3631 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx
);
3632 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO
;
3634 my_krbtgt_number
= ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg
, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
3635 if (my_krbtgt_number
== -1) {
3636 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: Cannot read msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber from krbtgt account %s in KDC backend: got %d\n",
3637 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx
->krbtgt_dn
),
3639 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx
);
3640 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO
;
3642 kdc_db_ctx
->my_krbtgt_number
= my_krbtgt_number
;
3645 kdc_db_ctx
->my_krbtgt_number
= 0;
3646 ldb_ret
= dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
, kdc_db_ctx
,
3648 ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
),
3651 DSDB_SEARCH_NO_GLOBAL_CATALOG
,
3652 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
3654 if (ldb_ret
!= LDB_SUCCESS
) {
3655 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx
->samdb
)));
3656 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx
);
3657 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO
;
3659 kdc_db_ctx
->krbtgt_dn
= talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx
, msg
->dn
);
3660 kdc_db_ctx
->my_krbtgt_number
= 0;
3663 *kdc_db_ctx_out
= kdc_db_ctx
;
3664 return NT_STATUS_OK
;
3667 krb5_error_code
dsdb_extract_aes_256_key(krb5_context context
,
3668 TALLOC_CTX
*mem_ctx
,
3669 const struct ldb_message
*msg
,
3670 uint32_t user_account_control
,
3671 const uint32_t *kvno
,
3673 DATA_BLOB
*aes_256_key
,
3676 krb5_error_code krb5_ret
;
3677 uint32_t supported_enctypes
;
3678 unsigned flags
= SDB_F_GET_CLIENT
;
3679 struct sdb_entry sentry
= {};
3682 flags
|= SDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED
;
3685 krb5_ret
= samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context
,
3688 false, /* is_krbtgt */
3689 false, /* is_rodc */
3690 user_account_control
,
3691 SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT
,
3693 (kvno
!= NULL
) ? *kvno
: 0,
3695 ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256
,
3696 &supported_enctypes
);
3697 if (krb5_ret
!= 0) {
3698 DBG_ERR("Failed to parse supplementalCredentials "
3699 "of %s with %s kvno using "
3700 "ENCTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256 "
3701 "Kerberos Key: %s\n",
3702 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg
->dn
),
3703 (kvno
!= NULL
) ? "previous" : "current",
3704 krb5_get_error_message(context
,
3709 if ((supported_enctypes
& ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256
) == 0 ||
3710 sentry
.keys
.len
!= 1) {
3711 DBG_INFO("Failed to find a ENCTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256 "
3712 "key in supplementalCredentials "
3713 "of %s at KVNO %u (got %u keys, expected 1)\n",
3714 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg
->dn
),
3717 sdb_entry_free(&sentry
);
3721 if (sentry
.keys
.val
[0].salt
== NULL
) {
3722 DBG_INFO("Failed to find a salt in "
3723 "supplementalCredentials "
3724 "of %s at KVNO %u\n",
3725 ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg
->dn
),
3727 sdb_entry_free(&sentry
);
3731 if (aes_256_key
!= NULL
) {
3732 *aes_256_key
= data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx
,
3733 KRB5_KEY_DATA(&sentry
.keys
.val
[0].key
),
3734 KRB5_KEY_LENGTH(&sentry
.keys
.val
[0].key
));
3735 if (aes_256_key
->data
== NULL
) {
3736 sdb_entry_free(&sentry
);
3739 talloc_keep_secret(aes_256_key
->data
);
3743 *salt
= data_blob_talloc(mem_ctx
,
3744 sentry
.keys
.val
[0].salt
->salt
.data
,
3745 sentry
.keys
.val
[0].salt
->salt
.length
);
3746 if (salt
->data
== NULL
) {
3747 sdb_entry_free(&sentry
);
3752 if (kvno_out
!= NULL
) {
3753 *kvno_out
= sentry
.kvno
;
3756 sdb_entry_free(&sentry
);