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kerberos: Return enc data on PREAUTH_FAILED
[Samba.git] / source4 / heimdal / kdc / kerberos5.c
blobb8bb5fa6609bc0f181fc41dc4074be2441818709
1 /*
2 * Copyright (c) 1997-2007 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
3 * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
4 * All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
8 * are met:
9 *
10 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12 *
13 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
15 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
16 *
17 * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
18 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
19 * without specific prior written permission.
20 *
21 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
22 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
23 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
24 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
25 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
26 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
27 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
28 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
29 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
30 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
31 * SUCH DAMAGE.
32 */
33
34 #include "kdc_locl.h"
35
36 #define MAX_TIME ((time_t)((1U << 31) - 1))
37
38 void
39 _kdc_fix_time(time_t **t)
40 {
41 if(*t == NULL){
42 ALLOC(*t);
43 **t = MAX_TIME;
44 }
45 if(**t == 0) **t = MAX_TIME; /* fix for old clients */
46 }
47
48 static int
49 realloc_method_data(METHOD_DATA *md)
50 {
51 PA_DATA *pa;
52 pa = realloc(md->val, (md->len + 1) * sizeof(*md->val));
53 if(pa == NULL)
54 return ENOMEM;
55 md->val = pa;
56 md->len++;
57 return 0;
58 }
59
60 static void
61 set_salt_padata(METHOD_DATA *md, Salt *salt)
62 {
63 if (salt) {
64 realloc_method_data(md);
65 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = salt->type;
66 der_copy_octet_string(&salt->salt,
67 &md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value);
68 }
69 }
70
71 const PA_DATA*
72 _kdc_find_padata(const KDC_REQ *req, int *start, int type)
73 {
74 if (req->padata == NULL)
75 return NULL;
76
77 while((size_t)*start < req->padata->len){
78 (*start)++;
79 if(req->padata->val[*start - 1].padata_type == (unsigned)type)
80 return &req->padata->val[*start - 1];
81 }
82 return NULL;
83 }
84
85 /*
86 * This is a hack to allow predefined weak services, like afs to
87 * still use weak types
88 */
89
90 krb5_boolean
91 _kdc_is_weak_exception(krb5_principal principal, krb5_enctype etype)
92 {
93 if (principal->name.name_string.len > 0 &&
94 strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "afs") == 0 &&
95 (etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC
96 || etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4
97 || etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5))
98 return TRUE;
99 return FALSE;
100 }
101
102
103 /*
104 * Detect if `key' is the using the the precomputed `default_salt'.
105 */
106
107 static krb5_boolean
108 is_default_salt_p(const krb5_salt *default_salt, const Key *key)
109 {
110 if (key->salt == NULL)
111 return TRUE;
112 if (default_salt->salttype != key->salt->type)
113 return FALSE;
114 if (krb5_data_cmp(&default_salt->saltvalue, &key->salt->salt))
115 return FALSE;
116 return TRUE;
117 }
118
119 /*
120 * return the first appropriate key of `princ' in `ret_key'. Look for
121 * all the etypes in (`etypes', `len'), stopping as soon as we find
122 * one, but preferring one that has default salt
123 */
124
125 krb5_error_code
126 _kdc_find_etype(krb5_context context, krb5_boolean use_strongest_session_key,
127 krb5_boolean is_preauth, hdb_entry_ex *princ,
128 krb5_enctype *etypes, unsigned len,
129 krb5_enctype *ret_enctype, Key **ret_key)
130 {
131 krb5_error_code ret;
132 krb5_salt def_salt;
133 krb5_enctype enctype = ETYPE_NULL;
134 Key *key;
135 int i;
136
137 /* We'll want to avoid keys with v4 salted keys in the pre-auth case... */
138 ret = krb5_get_pw_salt(context, princ->entry.principal, &def_salt);
139 if (ret)
140 return ret;
141
142 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
143
144 if (use_strongest_session_key) {
145 const krb5_enctype *p;
146 krb5_enctype clientbest = ETYPE_NULL;
147 int j;
148
149 /*
150 * Pick the strongest key that the KDC, target service, and
151 * client all support, using the local cryptosystem enctype
152 * list in strongest-to-weakest order to drive the search.
153 *
154 * This is not what RFC4120 says to do, but it encourages
155 * adoption of stronger enctypes. This doesn't play well with
156 * clients that have multiple Kerberos client implementations
157 * available with different supported enctype lists.
158 */
159
160 /* drive the search with local supported enctypes list */
161 p = krb5_kerberos_enctypes(context);
162 for (i = 0; p[i] != ETYPE_NULL && enctype == ETYPE_NULL; i++) {
163 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, p[i]) != 0)
164 continue;
165
166 /* check that the client supports it too */
167 for (j = 0; j < len && enctype == ETYPE_NULL; j++) {
168 if (p[i] != etypes[j])
169 continue;
170 /* save best of union of { client, crypto system } */
171 if (clientbest == ETYPE_NULL)
172 clientbest = p[i];
173 /* check target princ support */
174 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &princ->entry, p[i], &key);
175 if (ret)
176 continue;
177 if (is_preauth && !is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
178 continue;
179 enctype = p[i];
180 }
181 }
182 if (clientbest != ETYPE_NULL && enctype == ETYPE_NULL)
183 enctype = clientbest;
184 else if (enctype == ETYPE_NULL)
185 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
186 if (ret == 0 && ret_enctype != NULL)
187 *ret_enctype = enctype;
188 if (ret == 0 && ret_key != NULL)
189 *ret_key = key;
190 } else {
191 /*
192 * Pick the first key from the client's enctype list that is
193 * supported by the cryptosystem and by the given principal.
194 *
195 * RFC4120 says we SHOULD pick the first _strong_ key from the
196 * client's list... not the first key... If the admin disallows
197 * weak enctypes in krb5.conf and selects this key selection
198 * algorithm, then we get exactly what RFC4120 says.
199 */
200 for(key = NULL, i = 0; ret != 0 && i < len; i++, key = NULL) {
201
202 if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[i]) != 0 &&
203 !_kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->entry.principal, etypes[i]))
204 continue;
205
206 while (hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &princ->entry, etypes[i], &key) == 0) {
207 if (key->key.keyvalue.length == 0) {
208 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY;
209 continue;
210 }
211 if (ret_key != NULL)
212 *ret_key = key;
213 if (ret_enctype != NULL)
214 *ret_enctype = etypes[i];
215 ret = 0;
216 if (is_preauth && is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
217 goto out;
218 }
219 }
220 }
221
222 out:
223 krb5_free_salt (context, def_salt);
224 return ret;
225 }
226
227 krb5_error_code
228 _kdc_make_anonymous_principalname (PrincipalName *pn)
229 {
230 pn->name_type = KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL;
231 pn->name_string.len = 1;
232 pn->name_string.val = malloc(sizeof(*pn->name_string.val));
233 if (pn->name_string.val == NULL)
234 return ENOMEM;
235 pn->name_string.val[0] = strdup("anonymous");
236 if (pn->name_string.val[0] == NULL) {
237 free(pn->name_string.val);
238 pn->name_string.val = NULL;
239 return ENOMEM;
240 }
241 return 0;
242 }
243
244 void
245 _kdc_log_timestamp(krb5_context context,
246 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
247 const char *type,
248 KerberosTime authtime, KerberosTime *starttime,
249 KerberosTime endtime, KerberosTime *renew_till)
250 {
251 char authtime_str[100], starttime_str[100],
252 endtime_str[100], renewtime_str[100];
253
254 krb5_format_time(context, authtime,
255 authtime_str, sizeof(authtime_str), TRUE);
256 if (starttime)
257 krb5_format_time(context, *starttime,
258 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
259 else
260 strlcpy(starttime_str, "unset", sizeof(starttime_str));
261 krb5_format_time(context, endtime,
262 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
263 if (renew_till)
264 krb5_format_time(context, *renew_till,
265 renewtime_str, sizeof(renewtime_str), TRUE);
266 else
267 strlcpy(renewtime_str, "unset", sizeof(renewtime_str));
268
269 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
270 "%s authtime: %s starttime: %s endtime: %s renew till: %s",
271 type, authtime_str, starttime_str, endtime_str, renewtime_str);
272 }
273
274 static void
275 log_patypes(krb5_context context,
276 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
277 METHOD_DATA *padata)
278 {
279 struct rk_strpool *p = NULL;
280 char *str;
281 size_t i;
282
283 for (i = 0; i < padata->len; i++) {
284 switch(padata->val[i].padata_type) {
285 case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
286 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "PK-INIT(ietf)");
287 break;
288 case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN:
289 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "PK-INIT(win2k)");
290 break;
291 case KRB5_PADATA_PA_PK_OCSP_RESPONSE:
292 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "OCSP");
293 break;
294 case KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP:
295 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "encrypted-timestamp");
296 break;
297 default:
298 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%d", padata->val[i].padata_type);
299 break;
300 }
301 if (p && i + 1 < padata->len)
302 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", ");
303 if (p == NULL) {
304 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "out of memory");
305 return;
306 }
307 }
308 if (p == NULL)
309 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "none");
310
311 str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
312 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Client sent patypes: %s", str);
313 free(str);
314 }
315
316 /*
317 *
318 */
319
320
321 krb5_error_code
322 _kdc_encode_reply(krb5_context context,
323 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
324 KDC_REP *rep, const EncTicketPart *et, EncKDCRepPart *ek,
325 krb5_enctype etype,
326 int skvno, const EncryptionKey *skey,
327 int ckvno, const EncryptionKey *reply_key,
328 int rk_is_subkey,
329 const char **e_text,
330 krb5_data *reply)
331 {
332 unsigned char *buf;
333 size_t buf_size;
334 size_t len = 0;
335 krb5_error_code ret;
336 krb5_crypto crypto;
337
338 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTicketPart, buf, buf_size, et, &len, ret);
339 if(ret) {
340 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
341 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode ticket: %s", msg);
342 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
343 return ret;
344 }
345 if(buf_size != len) {
346 free(buf);
347 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
348 *e_text = "KDC internal error";
349 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
350 }
351
352 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, skey, etype, &crypto);
353 if (ret) {
354 const char *msg;
355 free(buf);
356 msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
357 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
358 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
359 return ret;
360 }
361
362 ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
363 crypto,
364 KRB5_KU_TICKET,
365 buf,
366 len,
367 skvno,
368 &rep->ticket.enc_part);
369 free(buf);
370 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
371 if(ret) {
372 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
373 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encrypt data: %s", msg);
374 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
375 return ret;
376 }
377
378 if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep && !config->encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep)
379 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncASRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
380 else
381 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTGSRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
382 if(ret) {
383 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
384 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg);
385 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
386 return ret;
387 }
388 if(buf_size != len) {
389 free(buf);
390 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
391 *e_text = "KDC internal error";
392 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
393 }
394 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, reply_key, 0, &crypto);
395 if (ret) {
396 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
397 free(buf);
398 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
399 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
400 return ret;
401 }
402 if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep) {
403 krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
404 crypto,
405 KRB5_KU_AS_REP_ENC_PART,
406 buf,
407 len,
408 ckvno,
409 &rep->enc_part);
410 free(buf);
411 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret);
412 } else {
413 krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
414 crypto,
415 rk_is_subkey ? KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SUB_KEY : KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SESSION,
416 buf,
417 len,
418 ckvno,
419 &rep->enc_part);
420 free(buf);
421 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(TGS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret);
422 }
423 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
424 if(ret) {
425 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
426 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg);
427 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
428 return ret;
429 }
430 if(buf_size != len) {
431 free(buf);
432 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
433 *e_text = "KDC internal error";
434 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
435 }
436 reply->data = buf;
437 reply->length = buf_size;
438 return 0;
439 }
440
441 /*
442 * Return 1 if the client have only older enctypes, this is for
443 * determining if the server should send ETYPE_INFO2 or not.
444 */
445
446 static int
447 older_enctype(krb5_enctype enctype)
448 {
449 switch (enctype) {
450 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
451 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
452 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
453 case ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
454 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5:
455 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56:
456 /*
457 * The following three is "old" windows enctypes and is needed for
458 * windows 2000 hosts.
459 */
460 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_MD4:
461 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD:
462 case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD_EXP:
463 return 1;
464 default:
465 return 0;
466 }
467 }
468
469 /*
470 *
471 */
472
473 static krb5_error_code
474 make_etype_info_entry(krb5_context context, ETYPE_INFO_ENTRY *ent, Key *key)
475 {
476 ent->etype = key->key.keytype;
477 if(key->salt){
478 #if 0
479 ALLOC(ent->salttype);
480
481 if(key->salt->type == hdb_pw_salt)
482 *ent->salttype = 0; /* or 1? or NULL? */
483 else if(key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt)
484 *ent->salttype = 2;
485 else {
486 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "unknown salt-type: %d",
487 key->salt->type);
488 return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
489 }
490 /* according to `the specs', we can't send a salt if
491 we have AFS3 salted key, but that requires that you
492 *know* what cell you are using (e.g by assuming
493 that the cell is the same as the realm in lower
494 case) */
495 #elif 0
496 ALLOC(ent->salttype);
497 *ent->salttype = key->salt->type;
498 #else
499 /*
500 * We shouldn't sent salttype since it is incompatible with the
501 * specification and it breaks windows clients. The afs
502 * salting problem is solved by using KRB5-PADATA-AFS3-SALT
503 * implemented in Heimdal 0.7 and later.
504 */
505 ent->salttype = NULL;
506 #endif
507 krb5_copy_data(context, &key->salt->salt,
508 &ent->salt);
509 } else {
510 /* we return no salt type at all, as that should indicate
511 * the default salt type and make everybody happy. some
512 * systems (like w2k) dislike being told the salt type
513 * here. */
514
515 ent->salttype = NULL;
516 ent->salt = NULL;
517 }
518 return 0;
519 }
520
521 static krb5_error_code
522 get_pa_etype_info(krb5_context context,
523 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
524 METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey)
525 {
526 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
527 ETYPE_INFO pa;
528 unsigned char *buf;
529 size_t len;
530
531
532 pa.len = 1;
533 pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
534 if(pa.val == NULL)
535 return ENOMEM;
536
537 ret = make_etype_info_entry(context, &pa.val[0], ckey);
538 if (ret) {
539 free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
540 return ret;
541 }
542
543 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
544 free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
545 if(ret)
546 return ret;
547 ret = realloc_method_data(md);
548 if(ret) {
549 free(buf);
550 return ret;
551 }
552 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO;
553 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.length = len;
554 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.data = buf;
555 return 0;
556 }
557
558 /*
559 *
560 */
561
562 extern int _krb5_AES_string_to_default_iterator;
563
564 static krb5_error_code
565 make_etype_info2_entry(ETYPE_INFO2_ENTRY *ent, Key *key)
566 {
567 ent->etype = key->key.keytype;
568 if(key->salt) {
569 ALLOC(ent->salt);
570 if (ent->salt == NULL)
571 return ENOMEM;
572 *ent->salt = malloc(key->salt->salt.length + 1);
573 if (*ent->salt == NULL) {
574 free(ent->salt);
575 ent->salt = NULL;
576 return ENOMEM;
577 }
578 memcpy(*ent->salt, key->salt->salt.data, key->salt->salt.length);
579 (*ent->salt)[key->salt->salt.length] = '\0';
580 } else
581 ent->salt = NULL;
582
583 ent->s2kparams = NULL;
584
585 switch (key->key.keytype) {
586 case ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
587 case ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
588 ALLOC(ent->s2kparams);
589 if (ent->s2kparams == NULL)
590 return ENOMEM;
591 ent->s2kparams->length = 4;
592 ent->s2kparams->data = malloc(ent->s2kparams->length);
593 if (ent->s2kparams->data == NULL) {
594 free(ent->s2kparams);
595 ent->s2kparams = NULL;
596 return ENOMEM;
597 }
598 _krb5_put_int(ent->s2kparams->data,
599 _krb5_AES_string_to_default_iterator,
600 ent->s2kparams->length);
601 break;
602 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
603 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
604 case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
605 /* Check if this was a AFS3 salted key */
606 if(key->salt && key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt){
607 ALLOC(ent->s2kparams);
608 if (ent->s2kparams == NULL)
609 return ENOMEM;
610 ent->s2kparams->length = 1;
611 ent->s2kparams->data = malloc(ent->s2kparams->length);
612 if (ent->s2kparams->data == NULL) {
613 free(ent->s2kparams);
614 ent->s2kparams = NULL;
615 return ENOMEM;
616 }
617 _krb5_put_int(ent->s2kparams->data,
618 1,
619 ent->s2kparams->length);
620 }
621 break;
622 default:
623 break;
624 }
625 return 0;
626 }
627
628 /*
629 * Return an ETYPE-INFO2. Enctypes are storted the same way as in the
630 * database (client supported enctypes first, then the unsupported
631 * enctypes).
632 */
633
634 static krb5_error_code
635 get_pa_etype_info2(krb5_context context,
636 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
637 METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey)
638 {
639 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
640 ETYPE_INFO2 pa;
641 unsigned char *buf;
642 size_t len;
643
644 pa.len = 1;
645 pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
646 if(pa.val == NULL)
647 return ENOMEM;
648
649 ret = make_etype_info2_entry(&pa.val[0], ckey);
650 if (ret) {
651 free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
652 return ret;
653 }
654
655 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO2, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
656 free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
657 if(ret)
658 return ret;
659 ret = realloc_method_data(md);
660 if(ret) {
661 free(buf);
662 return ret;
663 }
664 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO2;
665 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.length = len;
666 md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.data = buf;
667 return 0;
668 }
669
670 /*
671 *
672 */
673
674 static void
675 log_as_req(krb5_context context,
676 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
677 krb5_enctype cetype,
678 krb5_enctype setype,
679 const KDC_REQ_BODY *b)
680 {
681 krb5_error_code ret;
682 struct rk_strpool *p;
683 char *str;
684 size_t i;
685
686 p = rk_strpoolprintf(NULL, "%s", "Client supported enctypes: ");
687
688 for (i = 0; i < b->etype.len; i++) {
689 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, b->etype.val[i], &str);
690 if (ret == 0) {
691 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%s", str);
692 free(str);
693 } else
694 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%d", b->etype.val[i]);
695 if (p && i + 1 < b->etype.len)
696 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", ");
697 if (p == NULL) {
698 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "out of memory");
699 return;
700 }
701 }
702 if (p == NULL)
703 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "no encryption types");
704
705 {
706 char *cet;
707 char *set;
708
709 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, cetype, &cet);
710 if(ret == 0) {
711 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, setype, &set);
712 if (ret == 0) {
713 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using %s/%s", cet, set);
714 free(set);
715 }
716 free(cet);
717 }
718 if (ret != 0)
719 p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using enctypes %d/%d",
720 cetype, setype);
721 }
722
723 str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
724 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s", str);
725 free(str);
726
727 {
728 char fixedstr[128];
729 unparse_flags(KDCOptions2int(b->kdc_options), asn1_KDCOptions_units(),
730 fixedstr, sizeof(fixedstr));
731 if(*fixedstr)
732 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Requested flags: %s", fixedstr);
733 }
734 }
735
736 /*
737 * verify the flags on `client' and `server', returning 0
738 * if they are OK and generating an error messages and returning
739 * and error code otherwise.
740 */
741
742 krb5_error_code
743 kdc_check_flags(krb5_context context,
744 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
745 hdb_entry_ex *client_ex, const char *client_name,
746 hdb_entry_ex *server_ex, const char *server_name,
747 krb5_boolean is_as_req)
748 {
749 if(client_ex != NULL) {
750 hdb_entry *client = &client_ex->entry;
751
752 /* check client */
753 if (client->flags.locked_out) {
754 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
755 "Client (%s) is locked out", client_name);
756 return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
757 }
758
759 if (client->flags.invalid) {
760 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
761 "Client (%s) has invalid bit set", client_name);
762 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
763 }
764
765 if (!is_as_req && !client->flags.client){
766 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
767 "Principal may only act as client in AS-REQ -- %s", client_name);
768 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
769 }
770
771 if (client->valid_start && *client->valid_start > kdc_time) {
772 char starttime_str[100];
773 krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_start,
774 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
775 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
776 "Client not yet valid until %s -- %s",
777 starttime_str, client_name);
778 return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
779 }
780
781 if (client->valid_end && *client->valid_end < kdc_time) {
782 char endtime_str[100];
783 krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_end,
784 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
785 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
786 "Client expired at %s -- %s",
787 endtime_str, client_name);
788 return KRB5KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP;
789 }
790
791 if (client->pw_end && *client->pw_end < kdc_time
792 && (server_ex == NULL || !server_ex->entry.flags.change_pw)) {
793 char pwend_str[100];
794 krb5_format_time(context, *client->pw_end,
795 pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
796 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
797 "Client's key has expired at %s -- %s",
798 pwend_str, client_name);
799 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
800 }
801 }
802
803 /* check server */
804
805 if (server_ex != NULL) {
806 hdb_entry *server = &server_ex->entry;
807
808 if (server->flags.locked_out) {
809 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
810 "Client server locked out -- %s", server_name);
811 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
812 }
813 if (server->flags.invalid) {
814 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
815 "Server has invalid flag set -- %s", server_name);
816 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
817 }
818
819 if(!server->flags.server){
820 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
821 "Principal may not act as server -- %s", server_name);
822 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
823 }
824
825 if(!is_as_req && server->flags.initial) {
826 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
827 "AS-REQ is required for server -- %s", server_name);
828 return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
829 }
830
831 if (server->valid_start && *server->valid_start > kdc_time) {
832 char starttime_str[100];
833 krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_start,
834 starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
835 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
836 "Server not yet valid until %s -- %s",
837 starttime_str, server_name);
838 return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET;
839 }
840
841 if (server->valid_end && *server->valid_end < kdc_time) {
842 char endtime_str[100];
843 krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_end,
844 endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
845 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
846 "Server expired at %s -- %s",
847 endtime_str, server_name);
848 return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP;
849 }
850
851 if (server->pw_end && *server->pw_end < kdc_time) {
852 char pwend_str[100];
853 krb5_format_time(context, *server->pw_end,
854 pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
855 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
856 "Server's key has expired at -- %s",
857 pwend_str, server_name);
858 return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
859 }
860 }
861 return 0;
862 }
863
864 /*
865 * Return TRUE if `from' is part of `addresses' taking into consideration
866 * the configuration variables that tells us how strict we should be about
867 * these checks
868 */
869
870 krb5_boolean
871 _kdc_check_addresses(krb5_context context,
872 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
873 HostAddresses *addresses, const struct sockaddr *from)
874 {
875 krb5_error_code ret;
876 krb5_address addr;
877 krb5_boolean result;
878 krb5_boolean only_netbios = TRUE;
879 size_t i;
880
881 if(config->check_ticket_addresses == 0)
882 return TRUE;
883
884 if(addresses == NULL)
885 return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
886
887 for (i = 0; i < addresses->len; ++i) {
888 if (addresses->val[i].addr_type != KRB5_ADDRESS_NETBIOS) {
889 only_netbios = FALSE;
890 }
891 }
892
893 /* Windows sends it's netbios name, which I can only assume is
894 * used for the 'allowed workstations' check. This is painful,
895 * but we still want to check IP addresses if they happen to be
896 * present.
897 */
898
899 if(only_netbios)
900 return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
901
902 ret = krb5_sockaddr2address (context, from, &addr);
903 if(ret)
904 return FALSE;
905
906 result = krb5_address_search(context, &addr, addresses);
907 krb5_free_address (context, &addr);
908 return result;
909 }
910
911 /*
912 *
913 */
914
915 static krb5_boolean
916 send_pac_p(krb5_context context, KDC_REQ *req)
917 {
918 krb5_error_code ret;
919 PA_PAC_REQUEST pacreq;
920 const PA_DATA *pa;
921 int i = 0;
922
923 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PA_PAC_REQUEST);
924 if (pa == NULL)
925 return TRUE;
926
927 ret = decode_PA_PAC_REQUEST(pa->padata_value.data,
928 pa->padata_value.length,
929 &pacreq,
930 NULL);
931 if (ret)
932 return TRUE;
933 i = pacreq.include_pac;
934 free_PA_PAC_REQUEST(&pacreq);
935 if (i == 0)
936 return FALSE;
937 return TRUE;
938 }
939
940 krb5_boolean
941 _kdc_is_anonymous(krb5_context context, krb5_principal principal)
942 {
943 if (principal->name.name_type != KRB5_NT_WELLKNOWN ||
944 principal->name.name_string.len != 2 ||
945 strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_WELLKNOWN_NAME) != 0 ||
946 strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], KRB5_ANON_NAME) != 0)
947 return 0;
948 return 1;
949 }
950
951 /*
952 *
953 */
954
955 krb5_error_code
956 _kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context,
957 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
958 KDC_REQ *req,
959 const krb5_data *req_buffer,
960 krb5_data *reply,
961 const char *from,
962 struct sockaddr *from_addr,
963 int datagram_reply)
964 {
965 KDC_REQ_BODY *b = &req->req_body;
966 AS_REP rep;
967 KDCOptions f = b->kdc_options;
968 hdb_entry_ex *client = NULL, *server = NULL;
969 HDB *clientdb;
970 krb5_enctype setype, sessionetype;
971 krb5_data e_data;
972 EncTicketPart et;
973 EncKDCRepPart ek;
974 krb5_principal client_princ = NULL, server_princ = NULL;
975 char *client_name = NULL, *server_name = NULL;
976 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
977 const char *e_text = NULL;
978 krb5_crypto crypto;
979 Key *skey;
980 EncryptionKey *reply_key = NULL, session_key;
981 int flags = HDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ;
982 #ifdef PKINIT
983 pk_client_params *pkp = NULL;
984 #endif
985
986 memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
987 memset(&session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
988 krb5_data_zero(&e_data);
989
990 ALLOC(rep.padata);
991 rep.padata->len = 0;
992 rep.padata->val = NULL;
993
994 if (f.canonicalize)
995 flags |= HDB_F_CANON;
996
997 if(b->sname == NULL){
998 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
999 e_text = "No server in request";
1000 } else{
1001 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
1002 &server_princ,
1003 *(b->sname),
1004 b->realm);
1005 if (ret == 0)
1006 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, server_princ, &server_name);
1007 }
1008 if (ret) {
1009 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1010 "AS-REQ malformed server name from %s", from);
1011 goto out;
1012 }
1013 if(b->cname == NULL){
1014 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1015 e_text = "No client in request";
1016 } else {
1017 ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
1018 &client_princ,
1019 *(b->cname),
1020 b->realm);
1021 if (ret)
1022 goto out;
1023
1024 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client_princ, &client_name);
1025 }
1026 if (ret) {
1027 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1028 "AS-REQ malformed client name from %s", from);
1029 goto out;
1030 }
1031
1032 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "AS-REQ %s from %s for %s",
1033 client_name, from, server_name);
1034
1035 /*
1036 *
1037 */
1038
1039 if (_kdc_is_anonymous(context, client_princ)) {
1040 if (!b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
1041 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Anonymous ticket w/o anonymous flag");
1042 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1043 goto out;
1044 }
1045 } else if (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
1046 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1047 "Request for a anonymous ticket with non "
1048 "anonymous client name: %s", client_name);
1049 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1050 goto out;
1051 }
1052
1053 /*
1054 *
1055 */
1056
1057 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, client_princ,
1058 HDB_F_GET_ANY | flags, NULL,
1059 &clientdb, &client);
1060 if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1061 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "client %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy", client_name);
1062 goto out;
1063 } else if (ret == HDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM) {
1064 char *fixed_client_name = NULL;
1065
1066 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client->entry.principal,
1067 &fixed_client_name);
1068 if (ret) {
1069 goto out;
1070 }
1071
1072 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "WRONG_REALM - %s -> %s",
1073 client_name, fixed_client_name);
1074 free(fixed_client_name);
1075
1076 ret = krb5_mk_error_ext(context,
1077 KRB5_KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM,
1078 NULL, /* e_text */
1079 NULL, /* e_data */
1080 server_princ,
1081 NULL, /* client_name */
1082 &client->entry.principal->realm,
1083 NULL, /* client_time */
1084 NULL, /* client_usec */
1085 reply);
1086 goto out;
1087 } else if(ret){
1088 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1089 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", client_name, msg);
1090 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1091 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1092 goto out;
1093 }
1094 ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, server_princ,
1095 HDB_F_GET_SERVER|HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT | flags,
1096 NULL, NULL, &server);
1097 if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1098 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "target %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy", server_name);
1099 goto out;
1100 } else if(ret){
1101 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1102 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", server_name, msg);
1103 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1104 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1105 goto out;
1106 }
1107
1108 memset(&et, 0, sizeof(et));
1109 memset(&ek, 0, sizeof(ek));
1110
1111 /*
1112 * Select a session enctype from the list of the crypto system
1113 * supported enctypes that is supported by the client and is one of
1114 * the enctype of the enctype of the service (likely krbtgt).
1115 *
1116 * The latter is used as a hint of what enctypes all KDC support,
1117 * to make sure a newer version of KDC won't generate a session
1118 * enctype that an older version of a KDC in the same realm can't
1119 * decrypt.
1120 */
1121 ret = _kdc_find_etype(context, config->as_use_strongest_session_key, FALSE,
1122 client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len, &sessionetype,
1123 NULL);
1124 if (ret) {
1125 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1126 "Client (%s) from %s has no common enctypes with KDC "
1127 "to use for the session key",
1128 client_name, from);
1129 goto out;
1130 }
1131 /*
1132 * But if the KDC admin is paranoid and doesn't want to have "not
1133 * the best" enctypes on the krbtgt, lets save the best pick from
1134 * the client list and hope that that will work for any other
1135 * KDCs.
1136 */
1137
1138 /*
1139 * Pre-auth processing
1140 */
1141
1142 if(req->padata){
1143 int i;
1144 const PA_DATA *pa;
1145 int found_pa = 0;
1146
1147 log_patypes(context, config, req->padata);
1148
1149 #ifdef PKINIT
1150 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1151 "Looking for PKINIT pa-data -- %s", client_name);
1152
1153 e_text = "No PKINIT PA found";
1154
1155 i = 0;
1156 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ);
1157 if (pa == NULL) {
1158 i = 0;
1159 pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN);
1160 }
1161 if (pa) {
1162 char *client_cert = NULL;
1163
1164 ret = _kdc_pk_rd_padata(context, config, req, pa, client, &pkp);
1165 if (ret) {
1166 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
1167 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1168 "Failed to decode PKINIT PA-DATA -- %s",
1169 client_name);
1170 goto ts_enc;
1171 }
1172 if (ret == 0 && pkp == NULL)
1173 goto ts_enc;
1174
1175 ret = _kdc_pk_check_client(context,
1176 config,
1177 clientdb,
1178 client,
1179 pkp,
1180 &client_cert);
1181 if (ret) {
1182 e_text = "PKINIT certificate not allowed to "
1183 "impersonate principal";
1184 _kdc_pk_free_client_param(context, pkp);
1185
1186 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s", e_text);
1187 pkp = NULL;
1188 goto out;
1189 }
1190
1191 found_pa = 1;
1192 et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
1193 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1194 "PKINIT pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
1195 client_name, client_cert);
1196 free(client_cert);
1197 if (pkp)
1198 goto preauth_done;
1199 }
1200 ts_enc:
1201 #endif
1202
1203 if (client->entry.flags.locked_out) {
1204 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
1205 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1206 "Client (%s) is locked out", client_name);
1207 goto out;
1208 }
1209
1210 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Looking for ENC-TS pa-data -- %s",
1211 client_name);
1212
1213 i = 0;
1214 e_text = "No ENC-TS found";
1215 while((pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP))){
1216 krb5_data ts_data;
1217 PA_ENC_TS_ENC p;
1218 size_t len;
1219 EncryptedData enc_data;
1220 Key *pa_key;
1221 char *str;
1222
1223 found_pa = 1;
1224
1225 if (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
1226 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
1227 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "ENC-TS doesn't support anon");
1228 goto out;
1229 }
1230
1231 ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
1232 pa->padata_value.length,
1233 &enc_data,
1234 &len);
1235 if (ret) {
1236 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
1237 kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
1238 client_name);
1239 goto out;
1240 }
1241
1242 ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
1243 enc_data.etype, &pa_key);
1244 if(ret){
1245 char *estr;
1246 e_text = "No key matches pa-data";
1247 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
1248 if(krb5_enctype_to_string(context, enc_data.etype, &estr))
1249 estr = NULL;
1250 if(estr == NULL)
1251 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1252 "No client key matching pa-data (%d) -- %s",
1253 enc_data.etype, client_name);
1254 else
1255 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1256 "No client key matching pa-data (%s) -- %s",
1257 estr, client_name);
1258 free(estr);
1259 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
1260
1261 continue;
1262 }
1263
1264 try_next_key:
1265 ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &pa_key->key, 0, &crypto);
1266 if (ret) {
1267 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1268 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
1269 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1270 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
1271 continue;
1272 }
1273
1274 ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context,
1275 crypto,
1276 KRB5_KU_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP,
1277 &enc_data,
1278 &ts_data);
1279 krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
1280 /*
1281 * Since the user might have several keys with the same
1282 * enctype but with diffrent salting, we need to try all
1283 * the keys with the same enctype.
1284 */
1285 if(ret){
1286 krb5_error_code ret2;
1287 const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1288
1289 ret2 = krb5_enctype_to_string(context,
1290 pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
1291 if (ret2)
1292 str = NULL;
1293 kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1294 "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA -- %s "
1295 "(enctype %s) error %s",
1296 client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype", msg);
1297 krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1298 free(str);
1299
1300 if(hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
1301 enc_data.etype, &pa_key) == 0)
1302 goto try_next_key;
1303 e_text = "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA";
1304
1305 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
1306
1307 if (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
1308 (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)(context, clientdb, client, HDB_AUTH_WRONG_PASSWORD);
1309
1310 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
1311 continue;
1312 }
1313 free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
1314 ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data,
1315 ts_data.length,
1316 &p,
1317 &len);
1318 krb5_data_free(&ts_data);
1319 if(ret){
1320 e_text = "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS-ENC";
1321 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
1322 kdc_log(context, config,
1323 5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s",
1324 client_name);
1325 continue;
1326 }
1327 free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
1328 if (abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > context->max_skew) {
1329 char client_time[100];
1330
1331 krb5_format_time(context, p.patimestamp,
1332 client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE);
1333
1334 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
1335 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1336 "Too large time skew, "
1337 "client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
1338 client_time,
1339 (unsigned)abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp),
1340 context->max_skew,
1341 client_name);
1342
1343 /*
1344 * The following is needed to make windows clients to
1345 * retry using the timestamp in the error message, if
1346 * there is a e_text, they become unhappy.
1347 */
1348 e_text = NULL;
1349 goto out;
1350 }
1351 et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
1352
1353 set_salt_padata(rep.padata, pa_key->salt);
1354
1355 reply_key = &pa_key->key;
1356
1357 ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
1358 if (ret)
1359 str = NULL;
1360
1361 kdc_log(context, config, 2,
1362 "ENC-TS Pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
1363 client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype");
1364 free(str);
1365 break;
1366 }
1367 #ifdef PKINIT
1368 preauth_done:
1369 #endif
1370 if(found_pa == 0 && config->require_preauth)
1371 goto use_pa;
1372 /* We come here if we found a pa-enc-timestamp, but if there
1373 was some problem with it, other than too large skew */
1374 if(found_pa && et.flags.pre_authent == 0){
1375 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s -- %s", e_text, client_name);
1376 if (!prepare_enc_data(context, config, &e_data, b, client)) {
1377 goto out;
1378 }
1379 e_text = NULL;
1380 goto out;
1381 }
1382 }else if (config->require_preauth
1383 || b->kdc_options.request_anonymous /* hack to force anon */
1384 || client->entry.flags.require_preauth
1385 || server->entry.flags.require_preauth) {
1386 use_pa:
1387 if (!prepare_enc_data(context, config, &e_data, b, client)) {
1388 goto out;
1389 }
1390
1391 e_text ="Need to use PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP/PA-PK-AS-REQ",
1392
1393 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED;
1394
1395 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1396 "No preauth found, returning PREAUTH-REQUIRED -- %s",
1397 client_name);
1398 goto out;
1399 }
1400
1401 /*
1402 * Verify flags after the user been required to prove its identity
1403 * with in a preauth mech.
1404 */
1405
1406 ret = _kdc_check_access(context, config, client, client_name,
1407 server, server_name,
1408 req, &e_data);
1409 if(ret)
1410 goto out;
1411
1412 if (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
1413 (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)(context, clientdb, client,
1414 HDB_AUTH_SUCCESS);
1415
1416 /*
1417 * Selelct the best encryption type for the KDC with out regard to
1418 * the client since the client never needs to read that data.
1419 */
1420
1421 ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(context, config,
1422 server, server_name,
1423 &setype, &skey);
1424 if(ret)
1425 goto out;
1426
1427 if(f.renew || f.validate || f.proxy || f.forwarded || f.enc_tkt_in_skey
1428 || (f.request_anonymous && !config->allow_anonymous)) {
1429 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1430 e_text = "Bad KDC options";
1431 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Bad KDC options -- %s", client_name);
1432 goto out;
1433 }
1434
1435 rep.pvno = 5;
1436 rep.msg_type = krb_as_rep;
1437
1438 ret = copy_Realm(&client->entry.principal->realm, &rep.crealm);
1439 if (ret)
1440 goto out;
1441 ret = _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.cname, client->entry.principal);
1442 if (ret)
1443 goto out;
1444
1445 rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5;
1446 copy_Realm(&server->entry.principal->realm, &rep.ticket.realm);
1447 _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname,
1448 server->entry.principal);
1449 /* java 1.6 expects the name to be the same type, lets allow that
1450 * uncomplicated name-types. */
1451 #define CNT(sp,t) (((sp)->sname->name_type) == KRB5_NT_##t)
1452 if (CNT(b, UNKNOWN) || CNT(b, PRINCIPAL) || CNT(b, SRV_INST) || CNT(b, SRV_HST) || CNT(b, SRV_XHST))
1453 rep.ticket.sname.name_type = b->sname->name_type;
1454 #undef CNT
1455
1456 et.flags.initial = 1;
1457 if(client->entry.flags.forwardable && server->entry.flags.forwardable)
1458 et.flags.forwardable = f.forwardable;
1459 else if (f.forwardable) {
1460 e_text = "Ticket may not be forwardable";
1461 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1462 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1463 "Ticket may not be forwardable -- %s", client_name);
1464 goto out;
1465 }
1466 if(client->entry.flags.proxiable && server->entry.flags.proxiable)
1467 et.flags.proxiable = f.proxiable;
1468 else if (f.proxiable) {
1469 e_text = "Ticket may not be proxiable";
1470 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1471 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1472 "Ticket may not be proxiable -- %s", client_name);
1473 goto out;
1474 }
1475 if(client->entry.flags.postdate && server->entry.flags.postdate)
1476 et.flags.may_postdate = f.allow_postdate;
1477 else if (f.allow_postdate){
1478 e_text = "Ticket may not be postdate";
1479 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1480 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1481 "Ticket may not be postdatable -- %s", client_name);
1482 goto out;
1483 }
1484
1485 /* check for valid set of addresses */
1486 if(!_kdc_check_addresses(context, config, b->addresses, from_addr)) {
1487 e_text = "Bad address list in requested";
1488 ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR;
1489 kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1490 "Bad address list requested -- %s", client_name);
1491 goto out;
1492 }
1493
1494 ret = copy_PrincipalName(&rep.cname, &et.cname);
1495 if (ret)
1496 goto out;
1497 ret = copy_Realm(&rep.crealm, &et.crealm);
1498 if (ret)
1499 goto out;
1500
1501 {
1502 time_t start;
1503 time_t t;
1504
1505 start = et.authtime = kdc_time;
1506
1507 if(f.postdated && req->req_body.from){
1508 ALLOC(et.starttime);
1509 start = *et.starttime = *req->req_body.from;
1510 et.flags.invalid = 1;
1511 et.flags.postdated = 1; /* XXX ??? */
1512 }
1513 _kdc_fix_time(&b->till);
1514 t = *b->till;
1515
1516 /* be careful not overflowing */
1517
1518 if(client->entry.max_life)
1519 t = start + min(t - start, *client->entry.max_life);
1520 if(server->entry.max_life)
1521 t = start + min(t - start, *server->entry.max_life);
1522 #if 0
1523 t = min(t, start + realm->max_life);
1524 #endif
1525 et.endtime = t;
1526 if(f.renewable_ok && et.endtime < *b->till){
1527 f.renewable = 1;
1528 if(b->rtime == NULL){
1529 ALLOC(b->rtime);
1530 *b->rtime = 0;
1531 }
1532 if(*b->rtime < *b->till)
1533 *b->rtime = *b->till;
1534 }
1535 if(f.renewable && b->rtime){
1536 t = *b->rtime;
1537 if(t == 0)
1538 t = MAX_TIME;
1539 if(client->entry.max_renew)
1540 t = start + min(t - start, *client->entry.max_renew);
1541 if(server->entry.max_renew)
1542 t = start + min(t - start, *server->entry.max_renew);
1543 #if 0
1544 t = min(t, start + realm->max_renew);
1545 #endif
1546 ALLOC(et.renew_till);
1547 *et.renew_till = t;
1548 et.flags.renewable = 1;
1549 }
1550 }
1551
1552 if (f.request_anonymous)
1553 et.flags.anonymous = 1;
1554
1555 if(b->addresses){
1556 ALLOC(et.caddr);
1557 copy_HostAddresses(b->addresses, et.caddr);
1558 }
1559
1560 et.transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
1561 krb5_data_zero(&et.transited.contents);
1562
1563 /* The MIT ASN.1 library (obviously) doesn't tell lengths encoded
1564 * as 0 and as 0x80 (meaning indefinite length) apart, and is thus
1565 * incapable of correctly decoding SEQUENCE OF's of zero length.
1566 *
1567 * To fix this, always send at least one no-op last_req
1568 *
1569 * If there's a pw_end or valid_end we will use that,
1570 * otherwise just a dummy lr.
1571 */
1572 ek.last_req.val = malloc(2 * sizeof(*ek.last_req.val));
1573 if (ek.last_req.val == NULL) {
1574 ret = ENOMEM;
1575 goto out;
1576 }
1577 ek.last_req.len = 0;
1578 if (client->entry.pw_end
1579 && (config->kdc_warn_pwexpire == 0
1580 || kdc_time + config->kdc_warn_pwexpire >= *client->entry.pw_end)) {
1581 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_PW_EXPTIME;
1582 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *client->entry.pw_end;
1583 ++ek.last_req.len;
1584 }
1585 if (client->entry.valid_end) {
1586 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_ACCT_EXPTIME;
1587 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *client->entry.valid_end;
1588 ++ek.last_req.len;
1589 }
1590 if (ek.last_req.len == 0) {
1591 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_NONE;
1592 ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = 0;
1593 ++ek.last_req.len;
1594 }
1595 ek.nonce = b->nonce;
1596 if (client->entry.valid_end || client->entry.pw_end) {
1597 ALLOC(ek.key_expiration);
1598 if (client->entry.valid_end) {
1599 if (client->entry.pw_end)
1600 *ek.key_expiration = min(*client->entry.valid_end,
1601 *client->entry.pw_end);
1602 else
1603 *ek.key_expiration = *client->entry.valid_end;
1604 } else
1605 *ek.key_expiration = *client->entry.pw_end;
1606 } else
1607 ek.key_expiration = NULL;
1608 ek.flags = et.flags;
1609 ek.authtime = et.authtime;
1610 if (et.starttime) {
1611 ALLOC(ek.starttime);
1612 *ek.starttime = *et.starttime;
1613 }
1614 ek.endtime = et.endtime;
1615 if (et.renew_till) {
1616 ALLOC(ek.renew_till);
1617 *ek.renew_till = *et.renew_till;
1618 }
1619 copy_Realm(&rep.ticket.realm, &ek.srealm);
1620 copy_PrincipalName(&rep.ticket.sname, &ek.sname);
1621 if(et.caddr){
1622 ALLOC(ek.caddr);
1623 copy_HostAddresses(et.caddr, ek.caddr);
1624 }
1625
1626 #if PKINIT
1627 if (pkp) {
1628 e_text = "Failed to build PK-INIT reply";
1629 ret = _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(context, config, pkp, client,
1630 sessionetype, req, req_buffer,
1631 &reply_key, &et.key, rep.padata);
1632 if (ret)
1633 goto out;
1634 ret = _kdc_add_inital_verified_cas(context,
1635 config,
1636 pkp,
1637 &et);
1638 if (ret)
1639 goto out;
1640
1641 } else
1642 #endif
1643 {
1644 ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, sessionetype, &et.key);
1645 if (ret)
1646 goto out;
1647 }
1648
1649 if (reply_key == NULL) {
1650 e_text = "Client have no reply key";
1651 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
1652 goto out;
1653 }
1654
1655 ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&et.key, &ek.key);
1656 if (ret)
1657 goto out;
1658
1659 if (rep.padata->len == 0) {
1660 free(rep.padata);
1661 rep.padata = NULL;
1662 }
1663
1664 /* Add the PAC */
1665 if (send_pac_p(context, req)) {
1666 krb5_pac p = NULL;
1667 krb5_data data;
1668
1669 ret = _kdc_pac_generate(context, client, &p);
1670 if (ret) {
1671 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
1672 client_name);
1673 goto out;
1674 }
1675 if (p != NULL) {
1676 ret = _krb5_pac_sign(context, p, et.authtime,
1677 client->entry.principal,
1678 &skey->key, /* Server key */
1679 &skey->key, /* FIXME: should be krbtgt key */
1680 &data);
1681 krb5_pac_free(context, p);
1682 if (ret) {
1683 kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
1684 client_name);
1685 goto out;
1686 }
1687
1688 ret = _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(context, &et,
1689 KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC,
1690 &data);
1691 krb5_data_free(&data);
1692 if (ret)
1693 goto out;
1694 }
1695 }
1696
1697 _kdc_log_timestamp(context, config, "AS-REQ", et.authtime, et.starttime,
1698 et.endtime, et.renew_till);
1699
1700 /* do this as the last thing since this signs the EncTicketPart */
1701 ret = _kdc_add_KRB5SignedPath(context,
1702 config,
1703 server,
1704 setype,
1705 client->entry.principal,
1706 NULL,
1707 NULL,
1708 &et);
1709 if (ret)
1710 goto out;
1711
1712 log_as_req(context, config, reply_key->keytype, setype, b);
1713
1714 ret = _kdc_encode_reply(context, config,
1715 &rep, &et, &ek, setype, server->entry.kvno,
1716 &skey->key, client->entry.kvno,
1717 reply_key, 0, &e_text, reply);
1718 free_EncTicketPart(&et);
1719 free_EncKDCRepPart(&ek);
1720 if (ret)
1721 goto out;
1722
1723 /* */
1724 if (datagram_reply && reply->length > config->max_datagram_reply_length) {
1725 krb5_data_free(reply);
1726 ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG;
1727 e_text = "Reply packet too large";
1728 }
1729
1730 out:
1731 free_AS_REP(&rep);
1732 if(ret != 0 && ret != HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE && reply->length == 0) {
1733 krb5_mk_error(context,
1734 ret,
1735 e_text,
1736 (e_data.data ? &e_data : NULL),
1737 client_princ,
1738 server_princ,
1739 NULL,
1740 NULL,
1741 reply);
1742 ret = 0;
1743 }
1744 #ifdef PKINIT
1745 if (pkp)
1746 _kdc_pk_free_client_param(context, pkp);
1747 #endif
1748 if (e_data.data)
1749 free(e_data.data);
1750 if (client_princ)
1751 krb5_free_principal(context, client_princ);
1752 free(client_name);
1753 if (server_princ)
1754 krb5_free_principal(context, server_princ);
1755 free(server_name);
1756 if(client)
1757 _kdc_free_ent(context, client);
1758 if(server)
1759 _kdc_free_ent(context, server);
1760 return ret;
1761 }
1762
1763 krb5_boolean
1764 prepare_enc_data(krb5_context context,
1765 krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
1766 krb5_data *e_data,
1767 KDC_REQ_BODY *b,
1768 hdb_entry_ex *client)
1769 {
1770 METHOD_DATA method_data;
1771 PA_DATA *pa;
1772 unsigned char *buf;
1773 size_t len;
1774 Key *ckey;
1775 krb5_error_code ret;
1776
1777 method_data.len = 0;
1778 method_data.val = NULL;
1779
1780 ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
1781 if (ret) {
1782 free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
1783 return FALSE;
1784 }
1785 pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
1786 pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP;
1787 pa->padata_value.length = 0;
1788 pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
1789
1790 #ifdef PKINIT
1791 ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
1792 if (ret) {
1793 free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
1794 return FALSE;
1795 }
1796 pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
1797 pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ;
1798 pa->padata_value.length = 0;
1799 pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
1800
1801 ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
1802 if (ret) {
1803 free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
1804 return FALSE;
1805 }
1806 pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
1807 pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN;
1808 pa->padata_value.length = 0;
1809 pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
1810 #endif
1811
1812 /*
1813 * If there is a client key, send ETYPE_INFO{,2}
1814 */
1815 ret = _kdc_find_etype(context,
1816 config->preauth_use_strongest_session_key, TRUE,
1817 client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len, NULL, &ckey);
1818 if (ret == 0) {
1819
1820 /*
1821 * RFC4120 requires:
1822 * - If the client only knows about old enctypes, then send
1823 * both info replies (we send 'info' first in the list).
1824 * - If the client is 'modern', because it knows about 'new'
1825 * enctype types, then only send the 'info2' reply.
1826 *
1827 * Before we send the full list of etype-info data, we pick
1828 * the client key we would have used anyway below, just pick
1829 * that instead.
1830 */
1831
1832 if (older_enctype(ckey->key.keytype)) {
1833 ret = get_pa_etype_info(context, config,
1834 &method_data, ckey);
1835 if (ret) {
1836 free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
1837 return FALSE;
1838 }
1839 }
1840 ret = get_pa_etype_info2(context, config,
1841 &method_data, ckey);
1842 if (ret) {
1843 free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
1844 return FALSE;
1845 }
1846 }
1847
1848 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(METHOD_DATA, buf, len, &method_data, &len, ret);
1849 free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
1850
1851 e_data->data = buf;
1852 e_data->length = len;
1853
1854 return TRUE;
1855 }
1856
1857 /*
1858 * Add the AuthorizationData `data´ of `type´ to the last element in
1859 * the sequence of authorization_data in `tkt´ wrapped in an IF_RELEVANT
1860 */
1861
1862 krb5_error_code
1863 _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(krb5_context context,
1864 EncTicketPart *tkt,
1865 int type,
1866 const krb5_data *data)
1867 {
1868 krb5_error_code ret;
1869 size_t size = 0;
1870
1871 if (tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
1872 tkt->authorization_data = calloc(1, sizeof(*tkt->authorization_data));
1873 if (tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
1874 krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOMEM, "out of memory");
1875 return ENOMEM;
1876 }
1877 }
1878
1879 /* add the entry to the last element */
1880 {
1881 AuthorizationData ad = { 0, NULL };
1882 AuthorizationDataElement ade;
1883
1884 ade.ad_type = type;
1885 ade.ad_data = *data;
1886
1887 ret = add_AuthorizationData(&ad, &ade);
1888 if (ret) {
1889 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "add AuthorizationData failed");
1890 return ret;
1891 }
1892
1893 ade.ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT;
1894
1895 ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AuthorizationData,
1896 ade.ad_data.data, ade.ad_data.length,
1897 &ad, &size, ret);
1898 free_AuthorizationData(&ad);
1899 if (ret) {
1900 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "ASN.1 encode of "
1901 "AuthorizationData failed");
1902 return ret;
1903 }
1904 if (ade.ad_data.length != size)
1905 krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
1906
1907 ret = add_AuthorizationData(tkt->authorization_data, &ade);
1908 der_free_octet_string(&ade.ad_data);
1909 if (ret) {
1910 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "add AuthorizationData failed");
1911 return ret;
1912 }
1913 }
1914
1915 return 0;
1916 }
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