6 <script type=
"text/javascript">
7 <SCRIPT TYPE
="text/ssperl" SRC
="./JavaScript/CGIscriptorSession.js"></SCRIPT
>
9 window
.onload = function() {
10 loadSessionData (CGIscriptorSessionType
, CGIscriptorChallengeTicket
);
15 <script type=
"text/javascript">
16 <SCRIPT TYPE
="text/ssperl" SRC
="./JavaScript/sha.js"></SCRIPT
>
20 <p ALIGN=RIGHT
><a href=
"?LOGOUT">Logout
</a></p>
21 <p ALIGN=RIGHT
><a href=
"ChangePassword.html">Change Password
</a><br />
22 <a href=
"CreateUser.html">Create New User Account
</a>
24 <h1 align=CENTER
>Manual
</h1>
25 <p align=CENTER
>Logged in from
<script type=
"text/ssperl" CGI='$
LOGINIPADDRESS=
"" $
LOGINPATH=
""'
>"$LOGINIPADDRESS $LOGINPATH"</script></p>
26 <p align=CENTER
><form method=GET
action=
"index.html">
27 <p align=CENTER
><input type=
"submit" value=
"Go back to home page" /></p>
28 <input type=
"hidden" name=
"SESSIONTICKET" id=
"SESSIONTICKET" value=
"" />
29 <input type=
"hidden" name=
"CHALLENGETICKET" id=
"CHALLENGETICKET" value=
"" /><br />
34 <A NAME=
"SESSIONTICKETS"><H2 ALIGN=
"CENTER">SERVER SIDE SESSIONS AND ACCESS CONTROL (LOGIN)
</H2></A>
36 An infrastructure for user acount authorization and file access control
37 is available. Each request is matched against a list of URL path patterns.
38 If the request matches, a Session Ticket is required to access the URL.
39 This Session Ticket should be present as a CGI parameter or Cookie, eg:
42 CGI: SESSIONTICKET=
<value
><br />
43 Cookie: CGIscriptorSESSION=
<value
></p>
45 The example implementation stores Session Tickets as files in a local
46 directory. To create Session Tickets, a Login request must be given
47 with a LOGIN=
<value
> CGI parameter, a user name and a (doubly hashed)
48 password. The user name and (singly hashed) password are stored in a
49 PASSWORD ticket with the same name as the user account (name cleaned up
53 The example session model implements
3 functions:
56 The password is hashed with the user name and server side salt, and then
57 hashed with a random salt. Client and Server both perform these actions
58 and the Server only grants access if restults are the same. The server
59 side only stores the password hashed with the user name and
60 server side salt. Neither the plain password, nor the hashed password is
61 ever exchanged. Only values hashed with the one-time salt are exchanged.
64 For every access to a restricted URL, the Session Ticket is checked before
65 access is granted. There are three session modes. The first uses a fixed
66 Session Ticket that is stored as a cookie value in the browser (actually,
67 as a sessionStorage value). The second uses only the IP address at login
68 to authenticate requests. The third
69 is a Challenge mode, where the client has to calculate the value of the
70 next one-time Session Ticket from a value derived from the password and
73 <li>Password Change
<br />
74 A new password is hashed with the user name and server side salt, and
75 then encrypted (XORed)
76 with the old password hashed with the user name and salt. That value is
77 exchanged and XORed with the stored old hashed(salt+password+username).
78 Again, the stored password value is never exchanged unencrypted.
82 <H3 ALIGN=
"CENTER">Implementation
</H3>
84 The session authentication mechanism is based on the exchange of ticket
85 identifiers. A ticket identifier is just a string of characters, a name
86 or a random
64 character hexadecimal string. Ticket identifiers should be
87 "safe" filenames (except user names). There are four types of tickets:
89 <li>PASSWORD: User account descriptors, including a user name and password
</li>
90 <li>LOGIN: Temporary anonymous tickets used during login
</li>
91 <li>IPADDRESS: Authetication tokens that allow access based on the IP address of the request
</li>
92 <li>SESSION: Reusable authetication tokens
</li>
93 <li>CHALLENGE: One-time authetication tokens
</li>
95 All tickets can have an expiration date in the form of a time duration
96 from creation, in seconds, minutes, hours, or days (
<em>+duration
</em>[smhd]).
97 An absolute time can be given in seconds since the epoch of the server host.
98 Note that expiration times of CHALLENGE authetication tokens are calculated
99 from the last access time. Accounts can include a maximal lifetime
100 for session tickets (MaxLifetime).
103 A Login page should create a LOGIN ticket file locally and send a
104 server specific salt, a Random salt, and a LOGIN ticket
105 identifier. The server side compares the username and hashed password,
106 actually hashed(Random salt+hashed(serversalt+password)) from the client with
107 the values it calculates from the stored Random salt from the LOGIN
108 ticket and the hashed(serversalt+password) from the PASSWORD ticket. If
109 successful, a new SESSION ticket is generated as a hash sum of the LOGIN
110 ticket and the stored password. This SESSION ticket should also be
111 generated by the client and stored as sessionStorage and cookie values
112 as needed. The Username, IP address and Path are available as
113 $LoginUsername, $LoginIPaddress, and $LoginPath, respectively.
116 The CHALLENGE protocol stores the same value as the SESSION tickets.
117 However, this value is not exchanged, but kept secret in the JavaScript
118 <em>sessionStorage
</em> object. Instead, every page returned from the
119 server will contain a one-time Challenge value ($CHALLENGETICKET) which
120 has to be hashed with the stored value to return the current ticket
124 In the current example implementation, all random values are created as
125 full,
256 bit SHA256 hash values (Hex strings) of
64 bytes read from
129 <H3 ALIGN=
"CENTER">Security considerations with Session tickets
</H3>
131 For strong security, please use end-to-end encryption. This can be
132 achieved using a VPN (Virtual Private Network), SSH tunnel, or a HTTPS
133 capable server with OpenSSL. The session ticket system of CGIscriptor.pl
134 is intended to be used as a simple authentication mechanism WITHOUT
135 END-TO-END ENCRYPTION. The authenticating mechanism tries to use some
136 simple means to protect the authentication process from eavesdropping.
137 For this it uses a secure hash function, SHA256. For all practial purposes,
138 it is impossible to
"decrypt" a SHA256 sum. But this login scheme is
139 only as secure as your browser. Which, in general, is not very secure.
142 Humans tend to reuse passwords. A compromise of a site running
143 CGIscriptor.pl could therefore lead to a compromise of user accounts at
144 other sites. Therefore, plain text passwords are never stored, used, or
145 exchanged. Instead, a server site salt value is
"encrypted" with
146 the plain password and user name. Actually, all are concatenated and hashed
147 with a one-way secure hash function (SHA256) into a single string.
148 Whenever the word
"password" is used, this hash sum is meant. Note that
149 the salts are generated from /dev/urandom. You should check whether the
150 implementation of /dev/urandom on your platform is secure before
151 relying on it. This might be a problem when running CGIscriptor under
152 Cygwin on MS Windows.
<br />
153 <em>Note: no attempt is made to slow down the password hash, so bad
154 passwords can be cracked by brute force
</em>
157 As the (hashed) passwords are all that is needed to identify at the site,
158 these should not be stored in this form. A site specific passphrase
159 can be entered as an environment variable ($ENV{'CGIMasterKey'}). This
160 phrase is hashed with the server site salt and the result is hashed with
161 the user name and then XORed with the password when it is stored. Also, to
162 detect changes to the account (PASSWORD) and session tickets, a
163 hash of some of the contents of the ticket with the server salt and
164 CGIMasterKey is stored in each ticket.
167 Creating a valid (hashed) password, encrypt it with the CGIMasterKey and
168 construct a signature of the ticket are non-trivial. This has to be redone
169 with every change of the ticket file or CGIMasterKey change. CGIscriptor
170 can do this from the command line with the command:
172 perl CGIscriptor.pl --managelogin salt=Private/.Passwords/SALT \
173 masterkey='Sherlock investigates oleander curry in Bath' \
174 password='There is no password like more password' \
177 CGIscriptor will exit after this command with the first option being
178 <em>--managelogin
</em>. Options have the form:
180 <li>salt=[file or string]
<br />Server salt value to use io the value
181 stored in the ticket file. Will replace the stored value if a new
182 password is given. If you change the server salt, you have to
183 reset all the passwords. There is
<em>absolutely no
</em> procedure known
184 to recover plaintext passwords, except asking the account holders.
185 You are strongly adviced to make a backup before you apply such a change
</li>
186 <li>masterkey=[file or string]
<br />CGIMasterKey used to read and decrypt
188 <li>newmasterkey=[file or string]
<br />CGIMasterKey used to encrypt, sign,
189 and write the ticket. Defaults to the masterkey. If you change
190 the masterkey, you will have to reset all the accounts. You are strongly
191 adviced to make a backup before you apply such a change
</li>
192 <li>password=[file or string]
<br />New plaintext password
</li>
194 When the value of an option is a existing file path, the first line of
195 that file is used. Options are followed by one or more paths plus names
196 of existing ticket files. Each password option is only used for a single
197 ticket file. It is most definitely a bad idea to use a password that is
198 identical to an existing filepath, as the file will be read instead. Be
199 aware that the name of the file should be a cleaned up version of the
200 Username.This will not be checked.
203 For the authentication and a change of password, the (old) password
204 is used to
"encrypt" a random one-time token or the new password,
205 respectively. For authentication, decryption is not needed, so a secure
206 hash function (SHA256) is used to create a one-way hash sum
"encryption".
207 A new password must be decrypted. New passwords are encryped by XORing
208 them with the old password.
211 <h3 align=CENTER
>Strong Passwords: It is so easy
</h3>
212 <p align=CENTER
><em>If you only could see what you are typing
</em></p>
214 Your password might be vulnerable to
215 <a href=
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brute_force_attack">
216 <em>brute force
</em></a> guessing. Protections against such attacks are
217 costly in terms of code complexity, bugs, and execution time.
218 However, there is a very simple and secure counter measure. See the
219 <a href=
"http://xkcd.com/936/" target=
"_blank">XKCD comic
</a>. The phrase,
220 <em>There is no password like more password
</em> would
221 be both much easier to remember, and still stronger than
222 <em>h4]D%@m:
49</em>, at least before this phrase was pasted as an example
223 on the Internet.
<br />
224 For the procedures used at this site, a basic computer setup can check
225 in the order of a billion passwords per second. You need a password (or
226 phrase) strength in the order of
56 bits to be a little secure (one year
227 on a single computer). One of the largest network in the world, Bitcoin
228 mining, can check some
12 terahashes per second (June
2012). This
229 corresponds to checking
6 times
10<sup>12</sup> passwords per second.
230 It would take a passwords strength of ~
68 bits to keep the equivalent of
231 the Bitcoin computer network occupied for around a year before it found
233 Please be so kind and add the name of your favorite flower, dish,
234 fictional character, or small town to your password. Say,
235 <em>Oleander
</em>,
<em>Curry
</em>,
<em>Sherlock
</em>, or
<em>Bath
</em> (each adds
236 ~
12 bits) or even the phrase
<em>Sherlock investigates oleander curry in
237 Bath
</em> (adds
> 56 bits, note that oleander is
<em>poisonous
</em>, so
238 do not try this curry at home). That would be more effective than adding
239 a thousand rounds of encryption.
<br />
240 Typing long passwords without seeing what you are typing is problematic.
241 So a button should be included to make password visible.