Added WirelessManager, a port of wpa_supplicant.
[AROS.git] / workbench / network / WirelessManager / src / eap_common / eap_sake_common.c
blob9002b0ca328a48b378d27f9a137f9280a60929ac
1 /*
2 * EAP server/peer: EAP-SAKE shared routines
3 * Copyright (c) 2006-2007, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
7 * published by the Free Software Foundation.
9 * Alternatively, this software may be distributed under the terms of BSD
10 * license.
12 * See README and COPYING for more details.
15 #include "includes.h"
17 #include "common.h"
18 #include "wpabuf.h"
19 #include "crypto/sha1.h"
20 #include "eap_defs.h"
21 #include "eap_sake_common.h"
24 static int eap_sake_parse_add_attr(struct eap_sake_parse_attr *attr,
25 const u8 *pos)
27 size_t i;
29 switch (pos[0]) {
30 case EAP_SAKE_AT_RAND_S:
31 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_RAND_S");
32 if (pos[1] != 2 + EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN) {
33 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: AT_RAND_S with "
34 "invalid length %d", pos[1]);
35 return -1;
37 attr->rand_s = pos + 2;
38 break;
39 case EAP_SAKE_AT_RAND_P:
40 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_RAND_P");
41 if (pos[1] != 2 + EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN) {
42 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: AT_RAND_P with "
43 "invalid length %d", pos[1]);
44 return -1;
46 attr->rand_p = pos + 2;
47 break;
48 case EAP_SAKE_AT_MIC_S:
49 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_MIC_S");
50 if (pos[1] != 2 + EAP_SAKE_MIC_LEN) {
51 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: AT_MIC_S with "
52 "invalid length %d", pos[1]);
53 return -1;
55 attr->mic_s = pos + 2;
56 break;
57 case EAP_SAKE_AT_MIC_P:
58 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_MIC_P");
59 if (pos[1] != 2 + EAP_SAKE_MIC_LEN) {
60 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: AT_MIC_P with "
61 "invalid length %d", pos[1]);
62 return -1;
64 attr->mic_p = pos + 2;
65 break;
66 case EAP_SAKE_AT_SERVERID:
67 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_SERVERID");
68 attr->serverid = pos + 2;
69 attr->serverid_len = pos[1] - 2;
70 break;
71 case EAP_SAKE_AT_PEERID:
72 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_PEERID");
73 attr->peerid = pos + 2;
74 attr->peerid_len = pos[1] - 2;
75 break;
76 case EAP_SAKE_AT_SPI_S:
77 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_SPI_S");
78 attr->spi_s = pos + 2;
79 attr->spi_s_len = pos[1] - 2;
80 break;
81 case EAP_SAKE_AT_SPI_P:
82 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_SPI_P");
83 attr->spi_p = pos + 2;
84 attr->spi_p_len = pos[1] - 2;
85 break;
86 case EAP_SAKE_AT_ANY_ID_REQ:
87 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_ANY_ID_REQ");
88 if (pos[1] != 4) {
89 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Invalid AT_ANY_ID_REQ"
90 " length %d", pos[1]);
91 return -1;
93 attr->any_id_req = pos + 2;
94 break;
95 case EAP_SAKE_AT_PERM_ID_REQ:
96 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_PERM_ID_REQ");
97 if (pos[1] != 4) {
98 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Invalid "
99 "AT_PERM_ID_REQ length %d", pos[1]);
100 return -1;
102 attr->perm_id_req = pos + 2;
103 break;
104 case EAP_SAKE_AT_ENCR_DATA:
105 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_ENCR_DATA");
106 attr->encr_data = pos + 2;
107 attr->encr_data_len = pos[1] - 2;
108 break;
109 case EAP_SAKE_AT_IV:
110 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_IV");
111 attr->iv = pos + 2;
112 attr->iv_len = pos[1] - 2;
113 break;
114 case EAP_SAKE_AT_PADDING:
115 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_PADDING");
116 for (i = 2; i < pos[1]; i++) {
117 if (pos[i]) {
118 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: AT_PADDING "
119 "with non-zero pad byte");
120 return -1;
123 break;
124 case EAP_SAKE_AT_NEXT_TMPID:
125 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_NEXT_TMPID");
126 attr->next_tmpid = pos + 2;
127 attr->next_tmpid_len = pos[1] - 2;
128 break;
129 case EAP_SAKE_AT_MSK_LIFE:
130 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Parse: AT_IV");
131 if (pos[1] != 6) {
132 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Invalid "
133 "AT_MSK_LIFE length %d", pos[1]);
134 return -1;
136 attr->msk_life = pos + 2;
137 break;
138 default:
139 if (pos[0] < 128) {
140 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Unknown non-skippable"
141 " attribute %d", pos[0]);
142 return -1;
144 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Ignoring unknown skippable "
145 "attribute %d", pos[0]);
146 break;
149 if (attr->iv && !attr->encr_data) {
150 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: AT_IV included without "
151 "AT_ENCR_DATA");
152 return -1;
155 return 0;
160 * eap_sake_parse_attributes - Parse EAP-SAKE attributes
161 * @buf: Packet payload (starting with the first attribute)
162 * @len: Payload length
163 * @attr: Structure to be filled with found attributes
164 * Returns: 0 on success or -1 on failure
166 int eap_sake_parse_attributes(const u8 *buf, size_t len,
167 struct eap_sake_parse_attr *attr)
169 const u8 *pos = buf, *end = buf + len;
171 os_memset(attr, 0, sizeof(*attr));
172 while (pos < end) {
173 if (end - pos < 2) {
174 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Too short attribute");
175 return -1;
178 if (pos[1] < 2) {
179 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Invalid attribute "
180 "length (%d)", pos[1]);
181 return -1;
184 if (pos + pos[1] > end) {
185 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Attribute underflow");
186 return -1;
189 if (eap_sake_parse_add_attr(attr, pos))
190 return -1;
192 pos += pos[1];
195 return 0;
200 * eap_sake_kdf - EAP-SAKE Key Derivation Function (KDF)
201 * @key: Key for KDF
202 * @key_len: Length of the key in bytes
203 * @label: A unique label for each purpose of the KDF
204 * @data: Extra data (start) to bind into the key
205 * @data_len: Length of the data
206 * @data2: Extra data (end) to bind into the key
207 * @data2_len: Length of the data2
208 * @buf: Buffer for the generated pseudo-random key
209 * @buf_len: Number of bytes of key to generate
211 * This function is used to derive new, cryptographically separate keys from a
212 * given key (e.g., SMS). This is identical to the PRF used in IEEE 802.11i.
214 static void eap_sake_kdf(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, const char *label,
215 const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
216 const u8 *data2, size_t data2_len,
217 u8 *buf, size_t buf_len)
219 u8 counter = 0;
220 size_t pos, plen;
221 u8 hash[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
222 size_t label_len = os_strlen(label) + 1;
223 const unsigned char *addr[4];
224 size_t len[4];
226 addr[0] = (u8 *) label; /* Label | Y */
227 len[0] = label_len;
228 addr[1] = data; /* Msg[start] */
229 len[1] = data_len;
230 addr[2] = data2; /* Msg[end] */
231 len[2] = data2_len;
232 addr[3] = &counter; /* Length */
233 len[3] = 1;
235 pos = 0;
236 while (pos < buf_len) {
237 plen = buf_len - pos;
238 if (plen >= SHA1_MAC_LEN) {
239 hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, 4, addr, len,
240 &buf[pos]);
241 pos += SHA1_MAC_LEN;
242 } else {
243 hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, 4, addr, len,
244 hash);
245 os_memcpy(&buf[pos], hash, plen);
246 break;
248 counter++;
254 * eap_sake_derive_keys - Derive EAP-SAKE keys
255 * @root_secret_a: 16-byte Root-Secret-A
256 * @root_secret_b: 16-byte Root-Secret-B
257 * @rand_s: 16-byte RAND_S
258 * @rand_p: 16-byte RAND_P
259 * @tek: Buffer for Temporary EAK Keys (TEK-Auth[16] | TEK-Cipher[16])
260 * @msk: Buffer for 64-byte MSK
261 * @emsk: Buffer for 64-byte EMSK
263 * This function derives EAP-SAKE keys as defined in RFC 4763, section 3.2.6.
265 void eap_sake_derive_keys(const u8 *root_secret_a, const u8 *root_secret_b,
266 const u8 *rand_s, const u8 *rand_p, u8 *tek, u8 *msk,
267 u8 *emsk)
269 u8 sms_a[EAP_SAKE_SMS_LEN];
270 u8 sms_b[EAP_SAKE_SMS_LEN];
271 u8 key_buf[EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN];
273 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Deriving keys");
275 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Root-Secret-A",
276 root_secret_a, EAP_SAKE_ROOT_SECRET_LEN);
277 eap_sake_kdf(root_secret_a, EAP_SAKE_ROOT_SECRET_LEN,
278 "SAKE Master Secret A",
279 rand_p, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN, rand_s, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN,
280 sms_a, EAP_SAKE_SMS_LEN);
281 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: SMS-A", sms_a, EAP_SAKE_SMS_LEN);
282 eap_sake_kdf(sms_a, EAP_SAKE_SMS_LEN, "Transient EAP Key",
283 rand_s, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN, rand_p, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN,
284 tek, EAP_SAKE_TEK_LEN);
285 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: TEK-Auth",
286 tek, EAP_SAKE_TEK_AUTH_LEN);
287 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: TEK-Cipher",
288 tek + EAP_SAKE_TEK_AUTH_LEN, EAP_SAKE_TEK_CIPHER_LEN);
290 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: Root-Secret-B",
291 root_secret_b, EAP_SAKE_ROOT_SECRET_LEN);
292 eap_sake_kdf(root_secret_b, EAP_SAKE_ROOT_SECRET_LEN,
293 "SAKE Master Secret B",
294 rand_p, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN, rand_s, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN,
295 sms_b, EAP_SAKE_SMS_LEN);
296 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: SMS-B", sms_b, EAP_SAKE_SMS_LEN);
297 eap_sake_kdf(sms_b, EAP_SAKE_SMS_LEN, "Master Session Key",
298 rand_s, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN, rand_p, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN,
299 key_buf, sizeof(key_buf));
300 os_memcpy(msk, key_buf, EAP_MSK_LEN);
301 os_memcpy(emsk, key_buf + EAP_MSK_LEN, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
302 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: MSK", msk, EAP_MSK_LEN);
303 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SAKE: EMSK", emsk, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
308 * eap_sake_compute_mic - Compute EAP-SAKE MIC for an EAP packet
309 * @tek_auth: 16-byte TEK-Auth
310 * @rand_s: 16-byte RAND_S
311 * @rand_p: 16-byte RAND_P
312 * @serverid: SERVERID
313 * @serverid_len: SERVERID length
314 * @peerid: PEERID
315 * @peerid_len: PEERID length
316 * @peer: MIC calculation for 0 = Server, 1 = Peer message
317 * @eap: EAP packet
318 * @eap_len: EAP packet length
319 * @mic_pos: MIC position in the EAP packet (must be [eap .. eap + eap_len])
320 * @mic: Buffer for the computed 16-byte MIC
322 int eap_sake_compute_mic(const u8 *tek_auth,
323 const u8 *rand_s, const u8 *rand_p,
324 const u8 *serverid, size_t serverid_len,
325 const u8 *peerid, size_t peerid_len,
326 int peer, const u8 *eap, size_t eap_len,
327 const u8 *mic_pos, u8 *mic)
329 u8 _rand[2 * EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN];
330 u8 *tmp, *pos;
331 size_t tmplen;
333 tmplen = serverid_len + 1 + peerid_len + 1 + eap_len;
334 tmp = os_malloc(tmplen);
335 if (tmp == NULL)
336 return -1;
337 pos = tmp;
338 if (peer) {
339 if (peerid) {
340 os_memcpy(pos, peerid, peerid_len);
341 pos += peerid_len;
343 *pos++ = 0x00;
344 if (serverid) {
345 os_memcpy(pos, serverid, serverid_len);
346 pos += serverid_len;
348 *pos++ = 0x00;
350 os_memcpy(_rand, rand_s, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN);
351 os_memcpy(_rand + EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN, rand_p,
352 EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN);
353 } else {
354 if (serverid) {
355 os_memcpy(pos, serverid, serverid_len);
356 pos += serverid_len;
358 *pos++ = 0x00;
359 if (peerid) {
360 os_memcpy(pos, peerid, peerid_len);
361 pos += peerid_len;
363 *pos++ = 0x00;
365 os_memcpy(_rand, rand_p, EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN);
366 os_memcpy(_rand + EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN, rand_s,
367 EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN);
370 os_memcpy(pos, eap, eap_len);
371 os_memset(pos + (mic_pos - eap), 0, EAP_SAKE_MIC_LEN);
373 eap_sake_kdf(tek_auth, EAP_SAKE_TEK_AUTH_LEN,
374 peer ? "Peer MIC" : "Server MIC",
375 _rand, 2 * EAP_SAKE_RAND_LEN, tmp, tmplen,
376 mic, EAP_SAKE_MIC_LEN);
378 os_free(tmp);
380 return 0;
384 void eap_sake_add_attr(struct wpabuf *buf, u8 type, const u8 *data,
385 size_t len)
387 wpabuf_put_u8(buf, type);
388 wpabuf_put_u8(buf, 2 + len); /* Length; including attr header */
389 if (data)
390 wpabuf_put_data(buf, data, len);
391 else
392 os_memset(wpabuf_put(buf, len), 0, len);