2 * Copyright 2006 Juan Lang
4 * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
5 * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
6 * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
7 * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
9 * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
10 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
11 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
12 * Lesser General Public License for more details.
14 * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
15 * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
16 * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
20 #define NONAMELESSUNION
23 #define CERT_CHAIN_PARA_HAS_EXTRA_FIELDS
24 #define CERT_REVOCATION_PARA_HAS_EXTRA_FIELDS
26 #include "wine/debug.h"
27 #include "wine/unicode.h"
28 #include "crypt32_private.h"
30 WINE_DEFAULT_DEBUG_CHANNEL(crypt
);
31 WINE_DECLARE_DEBUG_CHANNEL(chain
);
33 #define DEFAULT_CYCLE_MODULUS 7
35 static HCERTCHAINENGINE CRYPT_defaultChainEngine
;
37 /* This represents a subset of a certificate chain engine: it doesn't include
38 * the "hOther" store described by MSDN, because I'm not sure how that's used.
39 * It also doesn't include the "hTrust" store, because I don't yet implement
40 * CTLs or complex certificate chains.
42 typedef struct _CertificateChainEngine
48 DWORD dwUrlRetrievalTimeout
;
49 DWORD MaximumCachedCertificates
;
50 DWORD CycleDetectionModulus
;
51 } CertificateChainEngine
, *PCertificateChainEngine
;
53 static inline void CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(HCERTSTORE collection
,
54 DWORD cStores
, HCERTSTORE
*stores
)
58 for (i
= 0; i
< cStores
; i
++)
59 CertAddStoreToCollection(collection
, stores
[i
], 0, 0);
62 static inline void CRYPT_CloseStores(DWORD cStores
, HCERTSTORE
*stores
)
66 for (i
= 0; i
< cStores
; i
++)
67 CertCloseStore(stores
[i
], 0);
70 static const WCHAR rootW
[] = { 'R','o','o','t',0 };
72 /* Finds cert in store by comparing the cert's hashes. */
73 static PCCERT_CONTEXT
CRYPT_FindCertInStore(HCERTSTORE store
,
76 PCCERT_CONTEXT matching
= NULL
;
78 DWORD size
= sizeof(hash
);
80 if (CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert
, CERT_HASH_PROP_ID
, hash
, &size
))
82 CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob
= { sizeof(hash
), hash
};
84 matching
= CertFindCertificateInStore(store
, cert
->dwCertEncodingType
,
85 0, CERT_FIND_SHA1_HASH
, &blob
, NULL
);
90 static BOOL
CRYPT_CheckRestrictedRoot(HCERTSTORE store
)
96 HCERTSTORE rootStore
= CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, rootW
);
97 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
= NULL
, check
;
100 cert
= CertEnumCertificatesInStore(store
, cert
);
103 if (!(check
= CRYPT_FindCertInStore(rootStore
, cert
)))
106 CertFreeCertificateContext(check
);
108 } while (ret
&& cert
);
110 CertFreeCertificateContext(cert
);
111 CertCloseStore(rootStore
, 0);
116 HCERTCHAINENGINE
CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(HCERTSTORE root
,
117 PCERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG pConfig
)
119 static const WCHAR caW
[] = { 'C','A',0 };
120 static const WCHAR myW
[] = { 'M','y',0 };
121 static const WCHAR trustW
[] = { 'T','r','u','s','t',0 };
122 PCertificateChainEngine engine
=
123 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChainEngine
));
127 HCERTSTORE worldStores
[4];
130 engine
->hRoot
= root
;
131 engine
->hWorld
= CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_COLLECTION
, 0, 0,
132 CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG
, NULL
);
133 worldStores
[0] = CertDuplicateStore(engine
->hRoot
);
134 worldStores
[1] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, caW
);
135 worldStores
[2] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, myW
);
136 worldStores
[3] = CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, trustW
);
137 CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(engine
->hWorld
,
138 sizeof(worldStores
) / sizeof(worldStores
[0]), worldStores
);
139 CRYPT_AddStoresToCollection(engine
->hWorld
,
140 pConfig
->cAdditionalStore
, pConfig
->rghAdditionalStore
);
141 CRYPT_CloseStores(sizeof(worldStores
) / sizeof(worldStores
[0]),
143 engine
->dwFlags
= pConfig
->dwFlags
;
144 engine
->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout
= pConfig
->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout
;
145 engine
->MaximumCachedCertificates
=
146 pConfig
->MaximumCachedCertificates
;
147 if (pConfig
->CycleDetectionModulus
)
148 engine
->CycleDetectionModulus
= pConfig
->CycleDetectionModulus
;
150 engine
->CycleDetectionModulus
= DEFAULT_CYCLE_MODULUS
;
155 BOOL WINAPI
CertCreateCertificateChainEngine(PCERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG pConfig
,
156 HCERTCHAINENGINE
*phChainEngine
)
160 TRACE("(%p, %p)\n", pConfig
, phChainEngine
);
162 if (pConfig
->cbSize
!= sizeof(*pConfig
))
164 SetLastError(E_INVALIDARG
);
167 *phChainEngine
= NULL
;
168 ret
= CRYPT_CheckRestrictedRoot(pConfig
->hRestrictedRoot
);
172 HCERTCHAINENGINE engine
;
174 if (pConfig
->hRestrictedRoot
)
175 root
= CertDuplicateStore(pConfig
->hRestrictedRoot
);
177 root
= CertOpenSystemStoreW(0, rootW
);
178 engine
= CRYPT_CreateChainEngine(root
, pConfig
);
181 *phChainEngine
= engine
;
190 VOID WINAPI
CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine
)
192 PCertificateChainEngine engine
= (PCertificateChainEngine
)hChainEngine
;
194 TRACE("(%p)\n", hChainEngine
);
196 if (engine
&& InterlockedDecrement(&engine
->ref
) == 0)
198 CertCloseStore(engine
->hWorld
, 0);
199 CertCloseStore(engine
->hRoot
, 0);
200 CryptMemFree(engine
);
204 static HCERTCHAINENGINE
CRYPT_GetDefaultChainEngine(void)
206 if (!CRYPT_defaultChainEngine
)
208 CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG config
= { 0 };
209 HCERTCHAINENGINE engine
;
211 config
.cbSize
= sizeof(config
);
212 CertCreateCertificateChainEngine(&config
, &engine
);
213 InterlockedCompareExchangePointer(&CRYPT_defaultChainEngine
, engine
,
215 if (CRYPT_defaultChainEngine
!= engine
)
216 CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(engine
);
218 return CRYPT_defaultChainEngine
;
221 void default_chain_engine_free(void)
223 CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(CRYPT_defaultChainEngine
);
226 typedef struct _CertificateChain
228 CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT context
;
231 } CertificateChain
, *PCertificateChain
;
233 static inline BOOL
CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
)
235 return CertCompareCertificateName(cert
->dwCertEncodingType
,
236 &cert
->pCertInfo
->Subject
, &cert
->pCertInfo
->Issuer
);
239 static void CRYPT_FreeChainElement(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element
)
241 CertFreeCertificateContext(element
->pCertContext
);
242 CryptMemFree(element
);
245 static void CRYPT_CheckSimpleChainForCycles(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
)
247 DWORD i
, j
, cyclicCertIndex
= 0;
249 /* O(n^2) - I don't think there's a faster way */
250 for (i
= 0; !cyclicCertIndex
&& i
< chain
->cElement
; i
++)
251 for (j
= i
+ 1; !cyclicCertIndex
&& j
< chain
->cElement
; j
++)
252 if (CertCompareCertificate(X509_ASN_ENCODING
,
253 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
->pCertInfo
,
254 chain
->rgpElement
[j
]->pCertContext
->pCertInfo
))
258 chain
->rgpElement
[cyclicCertIndex
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
259 |= CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC
| CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
260 /* Release remaining certs */
261 for (i
= cyclicCertIndex
+ 1; i
< chain
->cElement
; i
++)
262 CRYPT_FreeChainElement(chain
->rgpElement
[i
]);
264 chain
->cElement
= cyclicCertIndex
+ 1;
268 /* Checks whether the chain is cyclic by examining the last element's status */
269 static inline BOOL
CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(const CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
*chain
)
272 return chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 1]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
273 & CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC
;
278 static inline void CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(CERT_TRUST_STATUS
*chainStatus
,
279 const CERT_TRUST_STATUS
*elementStatus
)
281 /* Any error that applies to an element also applies to a chain.. */
282 chainStatus
->dwErrorStatus
|= elementStatus
->dwErrorStatus
;
283 /* but the bottom nibble of an element's info status doesn't apply to the
286 chainStatus
->dwInfoStatus
|= (elementStatus
->dwInfoStatus
& 0xfffffff0);
289 static BOOL
CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(const CertificateChainEngine
*engine
,
290 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
, DWORD subjectInfoStatus
)
293 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
297 if (!chain
->cElement
)
298 chain
->rgpElement
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
300 chain
->rgpElement
= CryptMemRealloc(chain
->rgpElement
,
301 (chain
->cElement
+ 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
302 if (chain
->rgpElement
)
304 chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
++] = element
;
305 memset(element
, 0, sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
306 element
->cbSize
= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
);
307 element
->pCertContext
= CertDuplicateCertificateContext(cert
);
308 if (chain
->cElement
> 1)
309 chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 2]->TrustStatus
.dwInfoStatus
311 /* FIXME: initialize the rest of element */
312 if (!(chain
->cElement
% engine
->CycleDetectionModulus
))
314 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChainForCycles(chain
);
315 /* Reinitialize the element pointer in case the chain is
316 * cyclic, in which case the chain is truncated.
318 element
= chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 1];
320 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain
->TrustStatus
,
321 &element
->TrustStatus
);
325 CryptMemFree(element
);
330 static void CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
)
334 for (i
= 0; i
< chain
->cElement
; i
++)
335 CRYPT_FreeChainElement(chain
->rgpElement
[i
]);
336 CryptMemFree(chain
->rgpElement
);
340 static void CRYPT_CheckTrustedStatus(HCERTSTORE hRoot
,
341 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement
)
343 PCCERT_CONTEXT trustedRoot
= CRYPT_FindCertInStore(hRoot
,
344 rootElement
->pCertContext
);
347 rootElement
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
348 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT
;
350 CertFreeCertificateContext(trustedRoot
);
353 static void CRYPT_CheckRootCert(HCERTCHAINENGINE hRoot
,
354 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement
)
356 PCCERT_CONTEXT root
= rootElement
->pCertContext
;
358 if (!CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(0, root
->dwCertEncodingType
,
359 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT
, (void *)root
,
360 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT
, (void *)root
, 0, NULL
))
362 TRACE_(chain
)("Last certificate's signature is invalid\n");
363 rootElement
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
364 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
;
366 CRYPT_CheckTrustedStatus(hRoot
, rootElement
);
369 /* Decodes a cert's basic constraints extension (either szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
370 * or szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2, whichever is present) into a
371 * CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO. If it neither extension is present, sets
372 * constraints->fCA to defaultIfNotSpecified.
373 * Returns FALSE if the extension is present but couldn't be decoded.
375 static BOOL
CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
,
376 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO
*constraints
, BOOL defaultIfNotSpecified
)
379 PCERT_EXTENSION ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
,
380 cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
, cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
);
382 constraints
->fPathLenConstraint
= FALSE
;
385 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*info
;
388 ret
= CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
,
389 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
,
393 if (info
->SubjectType
.cbData
== 1)
395 info
->SubjectType
.pbData
[0] & CERT_CA_SUBJECT_FLAG
;
401 ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2
,
402 cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
, cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
);
405 DWORD size
= sizeof(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO
);
407 ret
= CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
,
408 szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2
, ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
409 0, NULL
, constraints
, &size
);
412 constraints
->fCA
= defaultIfNotSpecified
;
417 /* Checks element's basic constraints to see if it can act as a CA, with
418 * remainingCAs CAs left in this chain. In general, a cert must include the
419 * basic constraints extension, with the CA flag asserted, in order to be
420 * allowed to be a CA. A V1 or V2 cert, which has no extensions, is also
421 * allowed to be a CA if it's installed locally (in the engine's world store.)
422 * This matches the expected usage in RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.9: a conforming
423 * CA MUST include the basic constraints extension in all certificates that are
424 * used to validate digital signatures on certificates. It also matches
425 * section 6.1.4(k): "If a certificate is a v1 or v2 certificate, then the
426 * application MUST either verify that the certificate is a CA certificate
427 * through out-of-band means or reject the certificate." Rejecting the
428 * certificate prohibits a large number of commonly used certificates, so
429 * accepting locally installed ones is a compromise.
430 * Root certificates are also allowed to be CAs even without a basic
431 * constraints extension. This is implied by RFC 5280, section 6.1: the
432 * root of a certificate chain's only requirement is that it was used to issue
433 * the next certificate in the chain.
434 * Updates chainConstraints with the element's constraints, if:
435 * 1. chainConstraints doesn't have a path length constraint, or
436 * 2. element's path length constraint is smaller than chainConstraints's
437 * Sets *pathLengthConstraintViolated to TRUE if a path length violation
439 * Returns TRUE if the element can be a CA, and the length of the remaining
442 static BOOL
CRYPT_CheckBasicConstraintsForCA(PCertificateChainEngine engine
,
443 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
, CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO
*chainConstraints
,
444 DWORD remainingCAs
, BOOL isRoot
, BOOL
*pathLengthConstraintViolated
)
446 BOOL validBasicConstraints
, implicitCA
= FALSE
;
447 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints
;
451 else if (cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
== CERT_V1
||
452 cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
== CERT_V2
)
455 DWORD size
= sizeof(hash
);
457 if (CertGetCertificateContextProperty(cert
, CERT_HASH_PROP_ID
,
460 CRYPT_HASH_BLOB blob
= { sizeof(hash
), hash
};
461 PCCERT_CONTEXT localCert
= CertFindCertificateInStore(
462 engine
->hWorld
, cert
->dwCertEncodingType
, 0, CERT_FIND_SHA1_HASH
,
467 CertFreeCertificateContext(localCert
);
472 if ((validBasicConstraints
= CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(cert
,
473 &constraints
, implicitCA
)))
475 chainConstraints
->fCA
= constraints
.fCA
;
476 if (!constraints
.fCA
)
478 TRACE_(chain
)("chain element %d can't be a CA\n", remainingCAs
+ 1);
479 validBasicConstraints
= FALSE
;
481 else if (constraints
.fPathLenConstraint
)
483 /* If the element has path length constraints, they apply to the
484 * entire remaining chain.
486 if (!chainConstraints
->fPathLenConstraint
||
487 constraints
.dwPathLenConstraint
<
488 chainConstraints
->dwPathLenConstraint
)
490 TRACE_(chain
)("setting path length constraint to %d\n",
491 chainConstraints
->dwPathLenConstraint
);
492 chainConstraints
->fPathLenConstraint
= TRUE
;
493 chainConstraints
->dwPathLenConstraint
=
494 constraints
.dwPathLenConstraint
;
498 if (chainConstraints
->fPathLenConstraint
&&
499 remainingCAs
> chainConstraints
->dwPathLenConstraint
)
501 TRACE_(chain
)("remaining CAs %d exceed max path length %d\n",
502 remainingCAs
, chainConstraints
->dwPathLenConstraint
);
503 validBasicConstraints
= FALSE
;
504 *pathLengthConstraintViolated
= TRUE
;
506 return validBasicConstraints
;
509 static BOOL
domain_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint
, LPCWSTR name
)
513 /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
514 * "For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name...
515 * When the constraint begins with a period, it MAY be expanded with one
516 * or more labels. That is, the constraint ".example.com" is satisfied by
517 * both host.example.com and my.host.example.com. However, the constraint
518 * ".example.com" is not satisfied by "example.com". When the constraint
519 * does not begin with a period, it specifies a host."
520 * and for email addresses,
521 * "To indicate all Internet mail addresses on a particular host, the
522 * constraint is specified as the host name. For example, the constraint
523 * "example.com" is satisfied by any mail address at the host
524 * "example.com". To specify any address within a domain, the constraint
525 * is specified with a leading period (as with URIs)."
527 if (constraint
[0] == '.')
529 /* Must be strictly greater than, a name can't begin with '.' */
530 if (lstrlenW(name
) > lstrlenW(constraint
))
531 match
= !lstrcmpiW(name
+ lstrlenW(name
) - lstrlenW(constraint
),
535 /* name is too short, no match */
540 match
= !lstrcmpiW(name
, constraint
);
544 static BOOL
url_matches(LPCWSTR constraint
, LPCWSTR name
,
545 DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
)
549 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint
), debugstr_w(name
));
552 *trustErrorStatus
|= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
;
557 LPCWSTR colon
, authority_end
, at
, hostname
= NULL
;
558 /* The maximum length for a hostname is 254 in the DNS, see RFC 1034 */
559 WCHAR hostname_buf
[255];
561 /* RFC 5280: only the hostname portion of the URL is compared. From
563 * "For URIs, the constraint applies to the host part of the name.
564 * The constraint MUST be specified as a fully qualified domain name
565 * and MAY specify a host or a domain."
566 * The format for URIs is in RFC 2396.
568 * First, remove any scheme that's present. */
569 colon
= strchrW(name
, ':');
570 if (colon
&& *(colon
+ 1) == '/' && *(colon
+ 2) == '/')
572 /* Next, find the end of the authority component. (The authority is
573 * generally just the hostname, but it may contain a username or a port.
574 * Those are removed next.)
576 authority_end
= strchrW(name
, '/');
578 authority_end
= strchrW(name
, '?');
580 authority_end
= name
+ strlenW(name
);
581 /* Remove any port number from the authority */
582 for (colon
= authority_end
; colon
>= name
&& *colon
!= ':'; colon
--)
585 authority_end
= colon
;
586 /* Remove any username from the authority */
587 if ((at
= strchrW(name
, '@')))
589 /* Ignore any path or query portion of the URL. */
592 if (authority_end
- name
< sizeof(hostname_buf
) /
593 sizeof(hostname_buf
[0]))
595 memcpy(hostname_buf
, name
,
596 (authority_end
- name
) * sizeof(WCHAR
));
597 hostname_buf
[authority_end
- name
] = 0;
598 hostname
= hostname_buf
;
600 /* else: Hostname is too long, not a match */
605 match
= domain_name_matches(constraint
, hostname
);
610 static BOOL
rfc822_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint
, LPCWSTR name
,
611 DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
)
616 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint
), debugstr_w(name
));
619 *trustErrorStatus
|= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
;
622 else if ((at
= strchrW(constraint
, '@')))
623 match
= !lstrcmpiW(constraint
, name
);
626 if ((at
= strchrW(name
, '@')))
627 match
= domain_name_matches(constraint
, at
+ 1);
629 match
= !lstrcmpiW(constraint
, name
);
634 static BOOL
dns_name_matches(LPCWSTR constraint
, LPCWSTR name
,
635 DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
)
639 TRACE("%s, %s\n", debugstr_w(constraint
), debugstr_w(name
));
642 *trustErrorStatus
|= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
;
645 /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
646 * "DNS name restrictions are expressed as host.example.com. Any DNS name
647 * that can be constructed by simply adding zero or more labels to the
648 * left-hand side of the name satisfies the name constraint. For example,
649 * www.host.example.com would satisfy the constraint but host1.example.com
652 else if (lstrlenW(name
) == lstrlenW(constraint
))
653 match
= !lstrcmpiW(name
, constraint
);
654 else if (lstrlenW(name
) > lstrlenW(constraint
))
656 match
= !lstrcmpiW(name
+ lstrlenW(name
) - lstrlenW(constraint
),
663 /* This only matches if name is a subdomain of constraint, i.e.
664 * there's a '.' between the beginning of the name and the
665 * matching portion of the name.
667 for (ptr
= name
+ lstrlenW(name
) - lstrlenW(constraint
);
668 !dot
&& ptr
>= name
; ptr
--)
674 /* else: name is too short, no match */
679 static BOOL
ip_address_matches(const CRYPT_DATA_BLOB
*constraint
,
680 const CRYPT_DATA_BLOB
*name
, DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
)
684 TRACE("(%d, %p), (%d, %p)\n", constraint
->cbData
, constraint
->pbData
,
685 name
->cbData
, name
->pbData
);
687 /* RFC5280, section 4.2.1.10, iPAddress syntax: either 8 or 32 bytes, for
688 * IPv4 or IPv6 addresses, respectively.
690 if (constraint
->cbData
!= sizeof(DWORD
) * 2 && constraint
->cbData
!= 32)
691 *trustErrorStatus
|= CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
;
692 else if (name
->cbData
== sizeof(DWORD
) &&
693 constraint
->cbData
== sizeof(DWORD
) * 2)
695 DWORD subnet
, mask
, addr
;
697 memcpy(&subnet
, constraint
->pbData
, sizeof(subnet
));
698 memcpy(&mask
, constraint
->pbData
+ sizeof(subnet
), sizeof(mask
));
699 memcpy(&addr
, name
->pbData
, sizeof(addr
));
700 /* These are really in big-endian order, but for equality matching we
701 * don't need to swap to host order
703 match
= (subnet
& mask
) == (addr
& mask
);
705 else if (name
->cbData
== 16 && constraint
->cbData
== 32)
707 const BYTE
*subnet
, *mask
, *addr
;
710 subnet
= constraint
->pbData
;
711 mask
= constraint
->pbData
+ 16;
714 for (i
= 0; match
&& i
< 16; i
++)
715 if ((subnet
[i
] & mask
[i
]) != (addr
[i
] & mask
[i
]))
718 /* else: name is wrong size, no match */
723 static BOOL
directory_name_matches(const CERT_NAME_BLOB
*constraint
,
724 const CERT_NAME_BLOB
*name
)
726 CERT_NAME_INFO
*constraintName
;
730 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_NAME
, constraint
->pbData
,
731 constraint
->cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
, NULL
, &constraintName
, &size
))
736 for (i
= 0; match
&& i
< constraintName
->cRDN
; i
++)
737 match
= CertIsRDNAttrsInCertificateName(X509_ASN_ENCODING
,
738 CERT_CASE_INSENSITIVE_IS_RDN_ATTRS_FLAG
,
739 (CERT_NAME_BLOB
*)name
, &constraintName
->rgRDN
[i
]);
740 LocalFree(constraintName
);
745 static BOOL
alt_name_matches(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY
*name
,
746 const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY
*constraint
, DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
, BOOL
*present
)
750 if (name
->dwAltNameChoice
== constraint
->dwAltNameChoice
)
754 switch (constraint
->dwAltNameChoice
)
756 case CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME
:
757 match
= rfc822_name_matches(constraint
->u
.pwszURL
,
758 name
->u
.pwszURL
, trustErrorStatus
);
760 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME
:
761 match
= dns_name_matches(constraint
->u
.pwszURL
,
762 name
->u
.pwszURL
, trustErrorStatus
);
764 case CERT_ALT_NAME_URL
:
765 match
= url_matches(constraint
->u
.pwszURL
,
766 name
->u
.pwszURL
, trustErrorStatus
);
768 case CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS
:
769 match
= ip_address_matches(&constraint
->u
.IPAddress
,
770 &name
->u
.IPAddress
, trustErrorStatus
);
772 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME
:
773 match
= directory_name_matches(&constraint
->u
.DirectoryName
,
774 &name
->u
.DirectoryName
);
777 ERR("name choice %d unsupported in this context\n",
778 constraint
->dwAltNameChoice
);
780 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
;
788 static BOOL
alt_name_matches_excluded_name(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY
*name
,
789 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*nameConstraints
, DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
)
794 for (i
= 0; !match
&& i
< nameConstraints
->cExcludedSubtree
; i
++)
795 match
= alt_name_matches(name
,
796 &nameConstraints
->rgExcludedSubtree
[i
].Base
, trustErrorStatus
, NULL
);
800 static BOOL
alt_name_matches_permitted_name(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY
*name
,
801 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*nameConstraints
, DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
,
807 for (i
= 0; !match
&& i
< nameConstraints
->cPermittedSubtree
; i
++)
808 match
= alt_name_matches(name
,
809 &nameConstraints
->rgPermittedSubtree
[i
].Base
, trustErrorStatus
,
814 static inline PCERT_EXTENSION
get_subject_alt_name_ext(const CERT_INFO
*cert
)
818 ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2
,
819 cert
->cExtension
, cert
->rgExtension
);
821 ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME
,
822 cert
->cExtension
, cert
->rgExtension
);
826 static void compare_alt_name_with_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION
*altNameExt
,
827 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*nameConstraints
, DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
)
829 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO
*subjectAltName
;
832 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME
,
833 altNameExt
->Value
.pbData
, altNameExt
->Value
.cbData
,
834 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
,
835 &subjectAltName
, &size
))
839 for (i
= 0; i
< subjectAltName
->cAltEntry
; i
++)
841 BOOL nameFormPresent
;
843 /* A name constraint only applies if the name form is present.
844 * From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
845 * "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is
846 * present. If no name of the type is in the certificate,
847 * the certificate is acceptable."
849 if (alt_name_matches_excluded_name(
850 &subjectAltName
->rgAltEntry
[i
], nameConstraints
,
853 TRACE_(chain
)("subject alternate name form %d excluded\n",
854 subjectAltName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].dwAltNameChoice
);
856 CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
;
858 nameFormPresent
= FALSE
;
859 if (!alt_name_matches_permitted_name(
860 &subjectAltName
->rgAltEntry
[i
], nameConstraints
,
861 trustErrorStatus
, &nameFormPresent
) && nameFormPresent
)
863 TRACE_(chain
)("subject alternate name form %d not permitted\n",
864 subjectAltName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].dwAltNameChoice
);
866 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
;
869 LocalFree(subjectAltName
);
873 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION
| CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
;
876 static BOOL
rfc822_attr_matches_excluded_name(const CERT_RDN_ATTR
*attr
,
877 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*nameConstraints
, DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
)
882 for (i
= 0; !match
&& i
< nameConstraints
->cExcludedSubtree
; i
++)
884 const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY
*constraint
=
885 &nameConstraints
->rgExcludedSubtree
[i
].Base
;
887 if (constraint
->dwAltNameChoice
== CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME
)
888 match
= rfc822_name_matches(constraint
->u
.pwszRfc822Name
,
889 (LPCWSTR
)attr
->Value
.pbData
, trustErrorStatus
);
894 static BOOL
rfc822_attr_matches_permitted_name(const CERT_RDN_ATTR
*attr
,
895 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*nameConstraints
, DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
,
901 for (i
= 0; !match
&& i
< nameConstraints
->cPermittedSubtree
; i
++)
903 const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY
*constraint
=
904 &nameConstraints
->rgPermittedSubtree
[i
].Base
;
906 if (constraint
->dwAltNameChoice
== CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME
)
909 match
= rfc822_name_matches(constraint
->u
.pwszRfc822Name
,
910 (LPCWSTR
)attr
->Value
.pbData
, trustErrorStatus
);
916 static void compare_subject_with_email_constraints(
917 const CERT_NAME_BLOB
*subjectName
,
918 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*nameConstraints
, DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
)
920 CERT_NAME_INFO
*name
;
923 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_UNICODE_NAME
,
924 subjectName
->pbData
, subjectName
->cbData
,
925 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
, &name
, &size
))
929 for (i
= 0; i
< name
->cRDN
; i
++)
930 for (j
= 0; j
< name
->rgRDN
[i
].cRDNAttr
; j
++)
931 if (!strcmp(name
->rgRDN
[i
].rgRDNAttr
[j
].pszObjId
,
932 szOID_RSA_emailAddr
))
934 BOOL nameFormPresent
;
936 /* A name constraint only applies if the name form is
937 * present. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
938 * "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is
939 * present. If no name of the type is in the certificate,
940 * the certificate is acceptable."
942 if (rfc822_attr_matches_excluded_name(
943 &name
->rgRDN
[i
].rgRDNAttr
[j
], nameConstraints
,
947 "email address in subject name is excluded\n");
949 CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
;
951 nameFormPresent
= FALSE
;
952 if (!rfc822_attr_matches_permitted_name(
953 &name
->rgRDN
[i
].rgRDNAttr
[j
], nameConstraints
,
954 trustErrorStatus
, &nameFormPresent
) && nameFormPresent
)
957 "email address in subject name is not permitted\n");
959 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
;
966 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION
| CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
;
969 static BOOL
CRYPT_IsEmptyName(const CERT_NAME_BLOB
*name
)
975 else if (name
->cbData
== 2 && name
->pbData
[1] == 0)
977 /* An empty sequence is also empty */
985 static void compare_subject_with_constraints(const CERT_NAME_BLOB
*subjectName
,
986 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*nameConstraints
, DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
)
988 BOOL hasEmailConstraint
= FALSE
;
991 /* In general, a subject distinguished name only matches a directory name
992 * constraint. However, an exception exists for email addresses.
993 * From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.6:
994 * "Legacy implementations exist where an electronic mail address is
995 * embedded in the subject distinguished name as an emailAddress
996 * attribute [RFC2985]."
997 * If an email address constraint exists, check that constraint separately.
999 for (i
= 0; !hasEmailConstraint
&& i
< nameConstraints
->cExcludedSubtree
;
1001 if (nameConstraints
->rgExcludedSubtree
[i
].Base
.dwAltNameChoice
==
1002 CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME
)
1003 hasEmailConstraint
= TRUE
;
1004 for (i
= 0; !hasEmailConstraint
&& i
< nameConstraints
->cPermittedSubtree
;
1006 if (nameConstraints
->rgPermittedSubtree
[i
].Base
.dwAltNameChoice
==
1007 CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME
)
1008 hasEmailConstraint
= TRUE
;
1009 if (hasEmailConstraint
)
1010 compare_subject_with_email_constraints(subjectName
, nameConstraints
,
1012 for (i
= 0; i
< nameConstraints
->cExcludedSubtree
; i
++)
1014 CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY
*constraint
=
1015 &nameConstraints
->rgExcludedSubtree
[i
].Base
;
1017 if (constraint
->dwAltNameChoice
== CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME
&&
1018 directory_name_matches(&constraint
->u
.DirectoryName
, subjectName
))
1020 TRACE_(chain
)("subject name is excluded\n");
1021 *trustErrorStatus
|=
1022 CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
;
1025 /* RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1026 * "Restrictions apply only when the specified name form is present.
1027 * If no name of the type is in the certificate, the certificate is
1029 * An empty name can't have the name form present, so don't check it.
1031 if (nameConstraints
->cPermittedSubtree
&& !CRYPT_IsEmptyName(subjectName
))
1033 BOOL match
= FALSE
, hasDirectoryConstraint
= FALSE
;
1035 for (i
= 0; !match
&& i
< nameConstraints
->cPermittedSubtree
; i
++)
1037 CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY
*constraint
=
1038 &nameConstraints
->rgPermittedSubtree
[i
].Base
;
1040 if (constraint
->dwAltNameChoice
== CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME
)
1042 hasDirectoryConstraint
= TRUE
;
1043 match
= directory_name_matches(&constraint
->u
.DirectoryName
,
1047 if (hasDirectoryConstraint
&& !match
)
1049 TRACE_(chain
)("subject name is not permitted\n");
1050 *trustErrorStatus
|= CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
;
1055 static void CRYPT_CheckNameConstraints(
1056 const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*nameConstraints
, const CERT_INFO
*cert
,
1057 DWORD
*trustErrorStatus
)
1059 CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
= get_subject_alt_name_ext(cert
);
1062 compare_alt_name_with_constraints(ext
, nameConstraints
,
1064 /* Name constraints apply to the subject alternative name as well as the
1065 * subject name. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1066 * "Restrictions apply to the subject distinguished name and apply to
1067 * subject alternative names."
1069 compare_subject_with_constraints(&cert
->Subject
, nameConstraints
,
1073 /* Gets cert's name constraints, if any. Free with LocalFree. */
1074 static CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*CRYPT_GetNameConstraints(CERT_INFO
*cert
)
1076 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*info
= NULL
;
1078 CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
;
1080 if ((ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
, cert
->cExtension
,
1081 cert
->rgExtension
)))
1085 CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
,
1086 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
1087 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
, &info
,
1093 static BOOL
CRYPT_IsValidNameConstraint(const CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*info
)
1098 /* Make sure at least one permitted or excluded subtree is present. From
1099 * RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1100 * "Conforming CAs MUST NOT issue certificates where name constraints is an
1101 * empty sequence. That is, either the permittedSubtrees field or the
1102 * excludedSubtrees MUST be present."
1104 if (!info
->cPermittedSubtree
&& !info
->cExcludedSubtree
)
1106 WARN_(chain
)("constraints contain no permitted nor excluded subtree\n");
1109 /* Check that none of the constraints specifies a minimum or a maximum.
1110 * See RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.10:
1111 * "Within this profile, the minimum and maximum fields are not used with
1112 * any name forms, thus, the minimum MUST be zero, and maximum MUST be
1113 * absent. However, if an application encounters a critical name
1114 * constraints extension that specifies other values for minimum or
1115 * maximum for a name form that appears in a subsequent certificate, the
1116 * application MUST either process these fields or reject the
1118 * Since it gives no guidance as to how to process these fields, we
1119 * reject any name constraint that contains them.
1121 for (i
= 0; ret
&& i
< info
->cPermittedSubtree
; i
++)
1122 if (info
->rgPermittedSubtree
[i
].dwMinimum
||
1123 info
->rgPermittedSubtree
[i
].fMaximum
)
1125 TRACE_(chain
)("found a minimum or maximum in permitted subtrees\n");
1128 for (i
= 0; ret
&& i
< info
->cExcludedSubtree
; i
++)
1129 if (info
->rgExcludedSubtree
[i
].dwMinimum
||
1130 info
->rgExcludedSubtree
[i
].fMaximum
)
1132 TRACE_(chain
)("found a minimum or maximum in excluded subtrees\n");
1138 static void CRYPT_CheckChainNameConstraints(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
)
1142 /* Microsoft's implementation appears to violate RFC 3280: according to
1143 * MSDN, the various CERT_TRUST_*_NAME_CONSTRAINT errors are set if a CA's
1144 * name constraint is violated in the end cert. According to RFC 3280,
1145 * the constraints should be checked against every subsequent certificate
1146 * in the chain, not just the end cert.
1147 * Microsoft's implementation also sets the name constraint errors on the
1148 * certs whose constraints were violated, not on the certs that violated
1150 * In order to be error-compatible with Microsoft's implementation, while
1151 * still adhering to RFC 3280, I use a O(n ^ 2) algorithm to check name
1154 for (i
= chain
->cElement
- 1; i
> 0; i
--)
1156 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*nameConstraints
;
1158 if ((nameConstraints
= CRYPT_GetNameConstraints(
1159 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
->pCertInfo
)))
1161 if (!CRYPT_IsValidNameConstraint(nameConstraints
))
1162 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1163 CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT
;
1166 for (j
= i
- 1; j
>= 0; j
--)
1168 DWORD errorStatus
= 0;
1170 /* According to RFC 3280, self-signed certs don't have name
1171 * constraints checked unless they're the end cert.
1173 if (j
== 0 || !CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(
1174 chain
->rgpElement
[j
]->pCertContext
))
1176 CRYPT_CheckNameConstraints(nameConstraints
,
1177 chain
->rgpElement
[j
]->pCertContext
->pCertInfo
,
1181 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1183 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain
->TrustStatus
,
1184 &chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
);
1187 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwInfoStatus
|=
1188 CERT_TRUST_HAS_VALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
;
1192 LocalFree(nameConstraints
);
1197 static LPWSTR
name_value_to_str(const CERT_NAME_BLOB
*name
)
1199 DWORD len
= cert_name_to_str_with_indent(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, 0, name
,
1200 CERT_SIMPLE_NAME_STR
, NULL
, 0);
1205 str
= CryptMemAlloc(len
* sizeof(WCHAR
));
1207 cert_name_to_str_with_indent(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, 0, name
,
1208 CERT_SIMPLE_NAME_STR
, str
, len
);
1213 static void dump_alt_name_entry(const CERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY
*entry
)
1217 switch (entry
->dwAltNameChoice
)
1219 case CERT_ALT_NAME_OTHER_NAME
:
1220 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_OTHER_NAME, oid = %s\n",
1221 debugstr_a(entry
->u
.pOtherName
->pszObjId
));
1223 case CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME
:
1224 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_RFC822_NAME: %s\n",
1225 debugstr_w(entry
->u
.pwszRfc822Name
));
1227 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME
:
1228 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME: %s\n",
1229 debugstr_w(entry
->u
.pwszDNSName
));
1231 case CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME
:
1232 str
= name_value_to_str(&entry
->u
.DirectoryName
);
1233 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME: %s\n", debugstr_w(str
));
1236 case CERT_ALT_NAME_URL
:
1237 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_URL: %s\n", debugstr_w(entry
->u
.pwszURL
));
1239 case CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS
:
1240 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_IP_ADDRESS: %d bytes\n",
1241 entry
->u
.IPAddress
.cbData
);
1243 case CERT_ALT_NAME_REGISTERED_ID
:
1244 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_ALT_NAME_REGISTERED_ID: %s\n",
1245 debugstr_a(entry
->u
.pszRegisteredID
));
1248 TRACE_(chain
)("dwAltNameChoice = %d\n", entry
->dwAltNameChoice
);
1252 static void dump_alt_name(LPCSTR type
, const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
1254 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO
*name
;
1257 TRACE_(chain
)("%s:\n", type
);
1258 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME
,
1259 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
1260 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
, &name
, &size
))
1264 TRACE_(chain
)("%d alt name entries:\n", name
->cAltEntry
);
1265 for (i
= 0; i
< name
->cAltEntry
; i
++)
1266 dump_alt_name_entry(&name
->rgAltEntry
[i
]);
1271 static void dump_basic_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
1273 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*info
;
1276 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
,
1277 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
,
1278 NULL
, &info
, &size
))
1280 TRACE_(chain
)("SubjectType: %02x\n", info
->SubjectType
.pbData
[0]);
1281 TRACE_(chain
)("%s path length constraint\n",
1282 info
->fPathLenConstraint
? "has" : "doesn't have");
1283 TRACE_(chain
)("path length=%d\n", info
->dwPathLenConstraint
);
1288 static void dump_basic_constraints2(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
1290 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints
;
1291 DWORD size
= sizeof(CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO
);
1293 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
,
1294 szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2
, ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
1295 0, NULL
, &constraints
, &size
))
1297 TRACE_(chain
)("basic constraints:\n");
1298 TRACE_(chain
)("can%s be a CA\n", constraints
.fCA
? "" : "not");
1299 TRACE_(chain
)("%s path length constraint\n",
1300 constraints
.fPathLenConstraint
? "has" : "doesn't have");
1301 TRACE_(chain
)("path length=%d\n", constraints
.dwPathLenConstraint
);
1305 static void dump_key_usage(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
1307 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage
;
1308 DWORD size
= sizeof(usage
);
1310 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_BITS
, ext
->Value
.pbData
,
1311 ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
, &usage
, &size
))
1313 #define trace_usage_bit(bits, bit) \
1314 if ((bits) & (bit)) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", #bit)
1317 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE_KEY_USAGE
);
1318 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_NON_REPUDIATION_KEY_USAGE
);
1319 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE
);
1320 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT_KEY_USAGE
);
1321 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_KEY_AGREEMENT_KEY_USAGE
);
1322 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE
);
1323 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_CRL_SIGN_KEY_USAGE
);
1324 trace_usage_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], CERT_ENCIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE
);
1326 #undef trace_usage_bit
1327 if (usage
.cbData
> 1 && usage
.pbData
[1] & CERT_DECIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE
)
1328 TRACE_(chain
)("CERT_DECIPHER_ONLY_KEY_USAGE\n");
1332 static void dump_general_subtree(const CERT_GENERAL_SUBTREE
*subtree
)
1334 dump_alt_name_entry(&subtree
->Base
);
1335 TRACE_(chain
)("dwMinimum = %d, fMaximum = %d, dwMaximum = %d\n",
1336 subtree
->dwMinimum
, subtree
->fMaximum
, subtree
->dwMaximum
);
1339 static void dump_name_constraints(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
1341 CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_INFO
*nameConstraints
;
1344 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
,
1345 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
1346 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
, &nameConstraints
,
1351 TRACE_(chain
)("%d permitted subtrees:\n",
1352 nameConstraints
->cPermittedSubtree
);
1353 for (i
= 0; i
< nameConstraints
->cPermittedSubtree
; i
++)
1354 dump_general_subtree(&nameConstraints
->rgPermittedSubtree
[i
]);
1355 TRACE_(chain
)("%d excluded subtrees:\n",
1356 nameConstraints
->cExcludedSubtree
);
1357 for (i
= 0; i
< nameConstraints
->cExcludedSubtree
; i
++)
1358 dump_general_subtree(&nameConstraints
->rgExcludedSubtree
[i
]);
1359 LocalFree(nameConstraints
);
1363 static void dump_cert_policies(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
1365 CERT_POLICIES_INFO
*policies
;
1368 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_CERT_POLICIES
,
1369 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
, NULL
,
1374 TRACE_(chain
)("%d policies:\n", policies
->cPolicyInfo
);
1375 for (i
= 0; i
< policies
->cPolicyInfo
; i
++)
1377 TRACE_(chain
)("policy identifier: %s\n",
1378 debugstr_a(policies
->rgPolicyInfo
[i
].pszPolicyIdentifier
));
1379 TRACE_(chain
)("%d policy qualifiers:\n",
1380 policies
->rgPolicyInfo
[i
].cPolicyQualifier
);
1381 for (j
= 0; j
< policies
->rgPolicyInfo
[i
].cPolicyQualifier
; j
++)
1382 TRACE_(chain
)("%s\n", debugstr_a(
1383 policies
->rgPolicyInfo
[i
].rgPolicyQualifier
[j
].
1384 pszPolicyQualifierId
));
1386 LocalFree(policies
);
1390 static void dump_enhanced_key_usage(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
1392 CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE
*usage
;
1395 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE
,
1396 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
, NULL
,
1401 TRACE_(chain
)("%d usages:\n", usage
->cUsageIdentifier
);
1402 for (i
= 0; i
< usage
->cUsageIdentifier
; i
++)
1403 TRACE_(chain
)("%s\n", usage
->rgpszUsageIdentifier
[i
]);
1408 static void dump_netscape_cert_type(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
1410 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage
;
1411 DWORD size
= sizeof(usage
);
1413 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_BITS
, ext
->Value
.pbData
,
1414 ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
, &usage
, &size
))
1416 #define trace_cert_type_bit(bits, bit) \
1417 if ((bits) & (bit)) TRACE_(chain)("%s\n", #bit)
1420 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0],
1421 NETSCAPE_SSL_CLIENT_AUTH_CERT_TYPE
);
1422 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0],
1423 NETSCAPE_SSL_SERVER_AUTH_CERT_TYPE
);
1424 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], NETSCAPE_SMIME_CERT_TYPE
);
1425 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], NETSCAPE_SIGN_CERT_TYPE
);
1426 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], NETSCAPE_SSL_CA_CERT_TYPE
);
1427 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], NETSCAPE_SMIME_CA_CERT_TYPE
);
1428 trace_cert_type_bit(usage
.pbData
[0], NETSCAPE_SIGN_CA_CERT_TYPE
);
1430 #undef trace_cert_type_bit
1434 static void dump_extension(const CERT_EXTENSION
*ext
)
1436 TRACE_(chain
)("%s (%scritical)\n", debugstr_a(ext
->pszObjId
),
1437 ext
->fCritical
? "" : "not ");
1438 if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME
))
1439 dump_alt_name("subject alt name", ext
);
1440 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME
))
1441 dump_alt_name("issuer alt name", ext
);
1442 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
))
1443 dump_basic_constraints(ext
);
1444 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_KEY_USAGE
))
1445 dump_key_usage(ext
);
1446 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2
))
1447 dump_alt_name("subject alt name 2", ext
);
1448 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME2
))
1449 dump_alt_name("issuer alt name 2", ext
);
1450 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2
))
1451 dump_basic_constraints2(ext
);
1452 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
))
1453 dump_name_constraints(ext
);
1454 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_CERT_POLICIES
))
1455 dump_cert_policies(ext
);
1456 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE
))
1457 dump_enhanced_key_usage(ext
);
1458 else if (!strcmp(ext
->pszObjId
, szOID_NETSCAPE_CERT_TYPE
))
1459 dump_netscape_cert_type(ext
);
1462 static LPCWSTR
filetime_to_str(const FILETIME
*time
)
1464 static WCHAR date
[80];
1465 WCHAR dateFmt
[80]; /* sufficient for all versions of LOCALE_SSHORTDATE */
1468 if (!time
) return NULL
;
1470 GetLocaleInfoW(LOCALE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT
, LOCALE_SSHORTDATE
, dateFmt
,
1471 sizeof(dateFmt
) / sizeof(dateFmt
[0]));
1472 FileTimeToSystemTime(time
, &sysTime
);
1473 GetDateFormatW(LOCALE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT
, 0, &sysTime
, dateFmt
, date
,
1474 sizeof(date
) / sizeof(date
[0]));
1478 static void dump_element(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
)
1483 TRACE_(chain
)("%p: version %d\n", cert
, cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
);
1484 len
= CertGetNameStringW(cert
, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE
,
1485 CERT_NAME_ISSUER_FLAG
, NULL
, NULL
, 0);
1486 name
= CryptMemAlloc(len
* sizeof(WCHAR
));
1489 CertGetNameStringW(cert
, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE
,
1490 CERT_NAME_ISSUER_FLAG
, NULL
, name
, len
);
1491 TRACE_(chain
)("issued by %s\n", debugstr_w(name
));
1494 len
= CertGetNameStringW(cert
, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE
, 0, NULL
,
1496 name
= CryptMemAlloc(len
* sizeof(WCHAR
));
1499 CertGetNameStringW(cert
, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE
, 0, NULL
,
1501 TRACE_(chain
)("issued to %s\n", debugstr_w(name
));
1504 TRACE_(chain
)("valid from %s to %s\n",
1505 debugstr_w(filetime_to_str(&cert
->pCertInfo
->NotBefore
)),
1506 debugstr_w(filetime_to_str(&cert
->pCertInfo
->NotAfter
)));
1507 TRACE_(chain
)("%d extensions\n", cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
);
1508 for (i
= 0; i
< cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
; i
++)
1509 dump_extension(&cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
[i
]);
1512 static BOOL
CRYPT_KeyUsageValid(PCertificateChainEngine engine
,
1513 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
, BOOL isRoot
, BOOL isCA
, DWORD index
)
1515 PCERT_EXTENSION ext
;
1519 ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_KEY_USAGE
, cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
,
1520 cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
);
1523 CRYPT_BIT_BLOB usage
;
1524 DWORD size
= sizeof(usage
);
1526 ret
= CryptDecodeObjectEx(cert
->dwCertEncodingType
, X509_BITS
,
1527 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
, CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
,
1531 else if (usage
.cbData
> 2)
1533 /* The key usage extension only defines 9 bits => no more than 2
1534 * bytes are needed to encode all known usages.
1540 /* The only bit relevant to chain validation is the keyCertSign
1541 * bit, which is always in the least significant byte of the
1544 usageBits
= usage
.pbData
[usage
.cbData
- 1];
1551 /* MS appears to violate RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.3 (Key Usage)
1552 * here. Quoting the RFC:
1553 * "This [key usage] extension MUST appear in certificates that
1554 * contain public keys that are used to validate digital signatures
1555 * on other public key certificates or CRLs."
1556 * MS appears to accept certs that do not contain key usage
1557 * extensions as CA certs. V1 and V2 certificates did not have
1558 * extensions, and many root certificates are V1 certificates, so
1559 * perhaps this is prudent. On the other hand, MS also accepts V3
1560 * certs without key usage extensions. We are more restrictive:
1561 * we accept locally installed V1 or V2 certs as CA certs.
1562 * We also accept a lack of key usage extension on root certs,
1563 * which is implied in RFC 5280, section 6.1: the trust anchor's
1564 * only requirement is that it was used to issue the next
1565 * certificate in the chain.
1569 else if (cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
== CERT_V1
||
1570 cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
== CERT_V2
)
1572 PCCERT_CONTEXT localCert
= CRYPT_FindCertInStore(
1573 engine
->hWorld
, cert
);
1575 ret
= localCert
!= NULL
;
1576 CertFreeCertificateContext(localCert
);
1581 WARN_(chain
)("no key usage extension on a CA cert\n");
1585 if (!(usageBits
& CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE
))
1587 WARN_(chain
)("keyCertSign not asserted on a CA cert\n");
1596 if (ext
&& (usageBits
& CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE
))
1598 WARN_(chain
)("keyCertSign asserted on a non-CA cert\n");
1607 static BOOL
CRYPT_CriticalExtensionsSupported(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
)
1612 for (i
= 0; ret
&& i
< cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
; i
++)
1614 if (cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
[i
].fCritical
)
1616 LPCSTR oid
= cert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
[i
].pszObjId
;
1618 if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
))
1620 else if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2
))
1622 else if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
))
1624 else if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_KEY_USAGE
))
1626 else if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME
))
1628 else if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME2
))
1630 else if (!strcmp(oid
, szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE
))
1634 FIXME("unsupported critical extension %s\n",
1643 static BOOL
CRYPT_IsCertVersionValid(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
)
1647 /* Checks whether the contents of the cert match the cert's version. */
1648 switch (cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
)
1651 /* A V1 cert may not contain unique identifiers. See RFC 5280,
1653 * "These fields MUST only appear if the version is 2 or 3 (Section
1654 * 4.1.2.1). These fields MUST NOT appear if the version is 1."
1656 if (cert
->pCertInfo
->IssuerUniqueId
.cbData
||
1657 cert
->pCertInfo
->SubjectUniqueId
.cbData
)
1659 /* A V1 cert may not contain extensions. See RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9:
1660 * "This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (Section 4.1.2.1)."
1662 if (cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
)
1666 /* A V2 cert may not contain extensions. See RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.9:
1667 * "This field MUST only appear if the version is 3 (Section 4.1.2.1)."
1669 if (cert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
)
1673 /* Do nothing, all fields are allowed for V3 certs */
1676 WARN_(chain
)("invalid cert version %d\n", cert
->pCertInfo
->dwVersion
);
1682 static void CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(PCertificateChainEngine engine
,
1683 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
, LPFILETIME time
)
1685 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT rootElement
= chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 1];
1687 BOOL pathLengthConstraintViolated
= FALSE
;
1688 CERT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS2_INFO constraints
= { FALSE
, FALSE
, 0 };
1690 TRACE_(chain
)("checking chain with %d elements for time %s\n",
1691 chain
->cElement
, debugstr_w(filetime_to_str(time
)));
1692 for (i
= chain
->cElement
- 1; i
>= 0; i
--)
1696 if (TRACE_ON(chain
))
1697 dump_element(chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
);
1698 if (i
== chain
->cElement
- 1)
1699 isRoot
= CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(
1700 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
);
1703 if (!CRYPT_IsCertVersionValid(chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
))
1705 /* MS appears to accept certs whose versions don't match their
1706 * contents, so there isn't an appropriate error code.
1708 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1709 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION
;
1711 if (CertVerifyTimeValidity(time
,
1712 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
->pCertInfo
) != 0)
1713 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1714 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID
;
1717 /* Check the signature of the cert this issued */
1718 if (!CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureEx(0, X509_ASN_ENCODING
,
1719 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_SUBJECT_CERT
,
1720 (void *)chain
->rgpElement
[i
- 1]->pCertContext
,
1721 CRYPT_VERIFY_CERT_SIGN_ISSUER_CERT
,
1722 (void *)chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
, 0, NULL
))
1723 chain
->rgpElement
[i
- 1]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1724 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
;
1725 /* Once a path length constraint has been violated, every remaining
1726 * CA cert's basic constraints is considered invalid.
1728 if (pathLengthConstraintViolated
)
1729 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1730 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
1731 else if (!CRYPT_CheckBasicConstraintsForCA(engine
,
1732 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
, &constraints
, i
- 1, isRoot
,
1733 &pathLengthConstraintViolated
))
1734 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1735 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
1736 else if (constraints
.fPathLenConstraint
&&
1737 constraints
.dwPathLenConstraint
)
1739 /* This one's valid - decrement max length */
1740 constraints
.dwPathLenConstraint
--;
1745 /* Check whether end cert has a basic constraints extension */
1746 if (!CRYPT_DecodeBasicConstraints(
1747 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
, &constraints
, FALSE
))
1748 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1749 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
1751 if (!CRYPT_KeyUsageValid(engine
, chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
,
1752 isRoot
, constraints
.fCA
, i
))
1753 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1754 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE
;
1755 if (CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(chain
))
1757 /* If the chain is cyclic, then the path length constraints
1758 * are violated, because the chain is infinitely long.
1760 pathLengthConstraintViolated
= TRUE
;
1761 chain
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1762 CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN
|
1763 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
1765 /* Check whether every critical extension is supported */
1766 if (!CRYPT_CriticalExtensionsSupported(
1767 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
))
1768 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
1769 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION
;
1770 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain
->TrustStatus
,
1771 &chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->TrustStatus
);
1773 CRYPT_CheckChainNameConstraints(chain
);
1774 if (CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(rootElement
->pCertContext
))
1776 rootElement
->TrustStatus
.dwInfoStatus
|=
1777 CERT_TRUST_IS_SELF_SIGNED
| CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER
;
1778 CRYPT_CheckRootCert(engine
->hRoot
, rootElement
);
1780 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&chain
->TrustStatus
, &rootElement
->TrustStatus
);
1783 static PCCERT_CONTEXT
CRYPT_GetIssuer(HCERTSTORE store
, PCCERT_CONTEXT subject
,
1784 PCCERT_CONTEXT prevIssuer
, DWORD
*infoStatus
)
1786 PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer
= NULL
;
1787 PCERT_EXTENSION ext
;
1791 if ((ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER
,
1792 subject
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
, subject
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
)))
1794 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID_INFO
*info
;
1797 ret
= CryptDecodeObjectEx(subject
->dwCertEncodingType
,
1798 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID
, ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
1799 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
,
1805 if (info
->CertIssuer
.cbData
&& info
->CertSerialNumber
.cbData
)
1807 id
.dwIdChoice
= CERT_ID_ISSUER_SERIAL_NUMBER
;
1808 memcpy(&id
.u
.IssuerSerialNumber
.Issuer
, &info
->CertIssuer
,
1809 sizeof(CERT_NAME_BLOB
));
1810 memcpy(&id
.u
.IssuerSerialNumber
.SerialNumber
,
1811 &info
->CertSerialNumber
, sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB
));
1812 issuer
= CertFindCertificateInStore(store
,
1813 subject
->dwCertEncodingType
, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID
, &id
,
1817 TRACE_(chain
)("issuer found by issuer/serial number\n");
1818 *infoStatus
= CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXACT_MATCH_ISSUER
;
1821 else if (info
->KeyId
.cbData
)
1823 id
.dwIdChoice
= CERT_ID_KEY_IDENTIFIER
;
1824 memcpy(&id
.u
.KeyId
, &info
->KeyId
, sizeof(CRYPT_HASH_BLOB
));
1825 issuer
= CertFindCertificateInStore(store
,
1826 subject
->dwCertEncodingType
, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID
, &id
,
1830 TRACE_(chain
)("issuer found by key id\n");
1831 *infoStatus
= CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER
;
1837 else if ((ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER2
,
1838 subject
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
, subject
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
)))
1840 CERT_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2_INFO
*info
;
1843 ret
= CryptDecodeObjectEx(subject
->dwCertEncodingType
,
1844 X509_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID2
, ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
1845 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
,
1851 if (info
->AuthorityCertIssuer
.cAltEntry
&&
1852 info
->AuthorityCertSerialNumber
.cbData
)
1854 PCERT_ALT_NAME_ENTRY directoryName
= NULL
;
1857 for (i
= 0; !directoryName
&&
1858 i
< info
->AuthorityCertIssuer
.cAltEntry
; i
++)
1859 if (info
->AuthorityCertIssuer
.rgAltEntry
[i
].dwAltNameChoice
1860 == CERT_ALT_NAME_DIRECTORY_NAME
)
1862 &info
->AuthorityCertIssuer
.rgAltEntry
[i
];
1865 id
.dwIdChoice
= CERT_ID_ISSUER_SERIAL_NUMBER
;
1866 memcpy(&id
.u
.IssuerSerialNumber
.Issuer
,
1867 &directoryName
->u
.DirectoryName
, sizeof(CERT_NAME_BLOB
));
1868 memcpy(&id
.u
.IssuerSerialNumber
.SerialNumber
,
1869 &info
->AuthorityCertSerialNumber
,
1870 sizeof(CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB
));
1871 issuer
= CertFindCertificateInStore(store
,
1872 subject
->dwCertEncodingType
, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID
, &id
,
1876 TRACE_(chain
)("issuer found by directory name\n");
1877 *infoStatus
= CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXACT_MATCH_ISSUER
;
1881 FIXME("no supported name type in authority key id2\n");
1883 else if (info
->KeyId
.cbData
)
1885 id
.dwIdChoice
= CERT_ID_KEY_IDENTIFIER
;
1886 memcpy(&id
.u
.KeyId
, &info
->KeyId
, sizeof(CRYPT_HASH_BLOB
));
1887 issuer
= CertFindCertificateInStore(store
,
1888 subject
->dwCertEncodingType
, 0, CERT_FIND_CERT_ID
, &id
,
1892 TRACE_(chain
)("issuer found by key id\n");
1893 *infoStatus
= CERT_TRUST_HAS_KEY_MATCH_ISSUER
;
1901 issuer
= CertFindCertificateInStore(store
,
1902 subject
->dwCertEncodingType
, 0, CERT_FIND_SUBJECT_NAME
,
1903 &subject
->pCertInfo
->Issuer
, prevIssuer
);
1904 TRACE_(chain
)("issuer found by name\n");
1905 *infoStatus
= CERT_TRUST_HAS_NAME_MATCH_ISSUER
;
1910 /* Builds a simple chain by finding an issuer for the last cert in the chain,
1911 * until reaching a self-signed cert, or until no issuer can be found.
1913 static BOOL
CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(const CertificateChainEngine
*engine
,
1914 HCERTSTORE world
, PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
)
1917 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
= chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 1]->pCertContext
;
1919 while (ret
&& !CRYPT_IsSimpleChainCyclic(chain
) &&
1920 !CRYPT_IsCertificateSelfSigned(cert
))
1922 PCCERT_CONTEXT issuer
= CRYPT_GetIssuer(world
, cert
, NULL
,
1923 &chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 1]->TrustStatus
.dwInfoStatus
);
1927 ret
= CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine
, chain
, issuer
,
1928 chain
->rgpElement
[chain
->cElement
- 1]->TrustStatus
.dwInfoStatus
);
1929 /* CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain add-ref's the issuer, so free it to
1930 * close the enumeration that found it
1932 CertFreeCertificateContext(issuer
);
1937 TRACE_(chain
)("Couldn't find issuer, halting chain creation\n");
1938 chain
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|= CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN
;
1945 static BOOL
CRYPT_GetSimpleChainForCert(PCertificateChainEngine engine
,
1946 HCERTSTORE world
, PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
, LPFILETIME pTime
,
1947 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
*ppChain
)
1950 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN chain
;
1952 TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %p)\n", engine
, world
, cert
, pTime
);
1954 chain
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
1957 memset(chain
, 0, sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
1958 chain
->cbSize
= sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
);
1959 ret
= CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine
, chain
, cert
, 0);
1962 ret
= CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(engine
, world
, chain
);
1964 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(engine
, chain
, pTime
);
1968 CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(chain
);
1976 static BOOL
CRYPT_BuildCandidateChainFromCert(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine
,
1977 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
, LPFILETIME pTime
, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore
,
1978 PCertificateChain
*ppChain
)
1980 PCertificateChainEngine engine
= (PCertificateChainEngine
)hChainEngine
;
1981 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN simpleChain
= NULL
;
1985 world
= CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_COLLECTION
, 0, 0,
1986 CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG
, NULL
);
1987 CertAddStoreToCollection(world
, engine
->hWorld
, 0, 0);
1988 if (hAdditionalStore
)
1989 CertAddStoreToCollection(world
, hAdditionalStore
, 0, 0);
1990 /* FIXME: only simple chains are supported for now, as CTLs aren't
1993 if ((ret
= CRYPT_GetSimpleChainForCert(engine
, world
, cert
, pTime
,
1996 PCertificateChain chain
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChain
));
2001 chain
->world
= world
;
2002 chain
->context
.cbSize
= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
);
2003 chain
->context
.TrustStatus
= simpleChain
->TrustStatus
;
2004 chain
->context
.cChain
= 1;
2005 chain
->context
.rgpChain
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
2006 chain
->context
.rgpChain
[0] = simpleChain
;
2007 chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
= 0;
2008 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
= NULL
;
2009 chain
->context
.fHasRevocationFreshnessTime
= FALSE
;
2010 chain
->context
.dwRevocationFreshnessTime
= 0;
2019 /* Makes and returns a copy of chain, up to and including element iElement. */
2020 static PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(
2021 const CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
*chain
, DWORD iElement
)
2023 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN copy
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
2027 memset(copy
, 0, sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
2028 copy
->cbSize
= sizeof(CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
);
2030 CryptMemAlloc((iElement
+ 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
2031 if (copy
->rgpElement
)
2036 memset(copy
->rgpElement
, 0,
2037 (iElement
+ 1) * sizeof(PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
2038 for (i
= 0; ret
&& i
<= iElement
; i
++)
2040 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element
=
2041 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
));
2045 *element
= *chain
->rgpElement
[i
];
2046 element
->pCertContext
= CertDuplicateCertificateContext(
2047 chain
->rgpElement
[i
]->pCertContext
);
2048 /* Reset the trust status of the copied element, it'll get
2049 * rechecked after the new chain is done.
2051 memset(&element
->TrustStatus
, 0, sizeof(CERT_TRUST_STATUS
));
2052 copy
->rgpElement
[copy
->cElement
++] = element
;
2059 for (i
= 0; i
<= iElement
; i
++)
2060 CryptMemFree(copy
->rgpElement
[i
]);
2061 CryptMemFree(copy
->rgpElement
);
2075 static void CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(PCertificateChain chain
)
2079 for (i
= 0; i
< chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
; i
++)
2080 CertFreeCertificateChain(chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
[i
]);
2081 CryptMemFree(chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
);
2082 chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
= 0;
2083 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
= NULL
;
2086 static void CRYPT_FreeChainContext(PCertificateChain chain
)
2090 CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(chain
);
2091 for (i
= 0; i
< chain
->context
.cChain
; i
++)
2092 CRYPT_FreeSimpleChain(chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]);
2093 CryptMemFree(chain
->context
.rgpChain
);
2094 CertCloseStore(chain
->world
, 0);
2095 CryptMemFree(chain
);
2098 /* Makes and returns a copy of chain, up to and including element iElement of
2099 * simple chain iChain.
2101 static PCertificateChain
CRYPT_CopyChainToElement(PCertificateChain chain
,
2102 DWORD iChain
, DWORD iElement
)
2104 PCertificateChain copy
= CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(CertificateChain
));
2109 copy
->world
= CertDuplicateStore(chain
->world
);
2110 copy
->context
.cbSize
= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
);
2111 /* Leave the trust status of the copied chain unset, it'll get
2112 * rechecked after the new chain is done.
2114 memset(©
->context
.TrustStatus
, 0, sizeof(CERT_TRUST_STATUS
));
2115 copy
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
= 0;
2116 copy
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
= NULL
;
2117 copy
->context
.fHasRevocationFreshnessTime
= FALSE
;
2118 copy
->context
.dwRevocationFreshnessTime
= 0;
2119 copy
->context
.rgpChain
= CryptMemAlloc(
2120 (iChain
+ 1) * sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
2121 if (copy
->context
.rgpChain
)
2126 memset(copy
->context
.rgpChain
, 0,
2127 (iChain
+ 1) * sizeof(PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN
));
2130 for (i
= 0; ret
&& iChain
&& i
< iChain
- 1; i
++)
2132 copy
->context
.rgpChain
[i
] =
2133 CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
],
2134 chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]->cElement
- 1);
2135 if (!copy
->context
.rgpChain
[i
])
2143 copy
->context
.rgpChain
[i
] =
2144 CRYPT_CopySimpleChainToElement(chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
],
2146 if (!copy
->context
.rgpChain
[i
])
2151 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(copy
);
2155 copy
->context
.cChain
= iChain
+ 1;
2166 static PCertificateChain
CRYPT_BuildAlternateContextFromChain(
2167 HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine
, LPFILETIME pTime
, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore
,
2168 PCertificateChain chain
)
2170 PCertificateChainEngine engine
= (PCertificateChainEngine
)hChainEngine
;
2171 PCertificateChain alternate
;
2173 TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %p)\n", hChainEngine
, pTime
, hAdditionalStore
, chain
);
2175 /* Always start with the last "lower quality" chain to ensure a consistent
2176 * order of alternate creation:
2178 if (chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
)
2179 chain
= (PCertificateChain
)chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
[
2180 chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
- 1];
2181 /* A chain with only one element can't have any alternates */
2182 if (chain
->context
.cChain
<= 1 && chain
->context
.rgpChain
[0]->cElement
<= 1)
2186 DWORD i
, j
, infoStatus
;
2187 PCCERT_CONTEXT alternateIssuer
= NULL
;
2190 for (i
= 0; !alternateIssuer
&& i
< chain
->context
.cChain
; i
++)
2191 for (j
= 0; !alternateIssuer
&&
2192 j
< chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]->cElement
- 1; j
++)
2194 PCCERT_CONTEXT subject
=
2195 chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]->rgpElement
[j
]->pCertContext
;
2196 PCCERT_CONTEXT prevIssuer
= CertDuplicateCertificateContext(
2197 chain
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]->rgpElement
[j
+ 1]->pCertContext
);
2199 alternateIssuer
= CRYPT_GetIssuer(prevIssuer
->hCertStore
,
2200 subject
, prevIssuer
, &infoStatus
);
2202 if (alternateIssuer
)
2206 alternate
= CRYPT_CopyChainToElement(chain
, i
, j
);
2209 BOOL ret
= CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain(engine
,
2210 alternate
->context
.rgpChain
[i
], alternateIssuer
, infoStatus
);
2212 /* CRYPT_AddCertToSimpleChain add-ref's the issuer, so free it
2213 * to close the enumeration that found it
2215 CertFreeCertificateContext(alternateIssuer
);
2218 ret
= CRYPT_BuildSimpleChain(engine
, alternate
->world
,
2219 alternate
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]);
2221 CRYPT_CheckSimpleChain(engine
,
2222 alternate
->context
.rgpChain
[i
], pTime
);
2223 CRYPT_CombineTrustStatus(&alternate
->context
.TrustStatus
,
2224 &alternate
->context
.rgpChain
[i
]->TrustStatus
);
2228 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(alternate
);
2234 TRACE("%p\n", alternate
);
2238 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID 0x16
2239 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID 8
2240 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN 4
2241 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS 2
2242 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT 1
2244 #define CHAIN_QUALITY_HIGHEST \
2245 CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID | CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID | \
2246 CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN | CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS | \
2247 CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT
2249 #define IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(TrustStatus, bits) \
2250 (TrustStatus)->dwErrorStatus & (bits)
2252 static DWORD
CRYPT_ChainQuality(const CertificateChain
*chain
)
2254 DWORD quality
= CHAIN_QUALITY_HIGHEST
;
2256 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain
->context
.TrustStatus
,
2257 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT
))
2258 quality
&= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_TRUSTED_ROOT
;
2259 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain
->context
.TrustStatus
,
2260 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
))
2261 quality
&= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
2262 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain
->context
.TrustStatus
,
2263 CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN
))
2264 quality
&= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_COMPLETE_CHAIN
;
2265 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain
->context
.TrustStatus
,
2266 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID
| CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_NESTED
))
2267 quality
&= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_TIME_VALID
;
2268 if (IS_TRUST_ERROR_SET(&chain
->context
.TrustStatus
,
2269 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
))
2270 quality
&= ~CHAIN_QUALITY_SIGNATURE_VALID
;
2274 /* Chooses the highest quality chain among chain and its "lower quality"
2275 * alternate chains. Returns the highest quality chain, with all other
2276 * chains as lower quality chains of it.
2278 static PCertificateChain
CRYPT_ChooseHighestQualityChain(
2279 PCertificateChain chain
)
2283 /* There are always only two chains being considered: chain, and an
2284 * alternate at chain->rgpLowerQualityChainContext[i]. If the alternate
2285 * has a higher quality than chain, the alternate gets assigned the lower
2286 * quality contexts, with chain taking the alternate's place among the
2287 * lower quality contexts.
2289 for (i
= 0; i
< chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
; i
++)
2291 PCertificateChain alternate
=
2292 (PCertificateChain
)chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
[i
];
2294 if (CRYPT_ChainQuality(alternate
) > CRYPT_ChainQuality(chain
))
2296 alternate
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
=
2297 chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
;
2298 alternate
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
=
2299 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
;
2300 alternate
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
[i
] =
2301 (PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
)chain
;
2302 chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
= 0;
2303 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
= NULL
;
2310 static BOOL
CRYPT_AddAlternateChainToChain(PCertificateChain chain
,
2311 const CertificateChain
*alternate
)
2315 if (chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
)
2316 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
=
2317 CryptMemRealloc(chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
,
2318 (chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
+ 1) *
2319 sizeof(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
));
2321 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
=
2322 CryptMemAlloc(sizeof(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
));
2323 if (chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
)
2325 chain
->context
.rgpLowerQualityChainContext
[
2326 chain
->context
.cLowerQualityChainContext
++] =
2327 (PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
)alternate
;
2335 static PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT
CRYPT_FindIthElementInChain(
2336 const CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
*chain
, DWORD i
)
2339 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element
= NULL
;
2341 for (j
= 0, iElement
= 0; !element
&& j
< chain
->cChain
; j
++)
2343 if (iElement
+ chain
->rgpChain
[j
]->cElement
< i
)
2344 iElement
+= chain
->rgpChain
[j
]->cElement
;
2346 element
= chain
->rgpChain
[j
]->rgpElement
[i
- iElement
];
2351 typedef struct _CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS
{
2353 CERT_USAGE_MATCH RequestedUsage
;
2354 } CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS
, *PCERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS
;
2356 static void CRYPT_VerifyChainRevocation(PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain
,
2357 LPFILETIME pTime
, const CERT_CHAIN_PARA
*pChainPara
, DWORD chainFlags
)
2361 if (chainFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_END_CERT
)
2363 else if ((chainFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN
) ||
2364 (chainFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN_EXCLUDE_ROOT
))
2368 for (i
= 0, cContext
= 0; i
< chain
->cChain
; i
++)
2370 if (i
< chain
->cChain
- 1 ||
2371 chainFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN
)
2372 cContext
+= chain
->rgpChain
[i
]->cElement
;
2374 cContext
+= chain
->rgpChain
[i
]->cElement
- 1;
2381 PCCERT_CONTEXT
*contexts
=
2382 CryptMemAlloc(cContext
* sizeof(PCCERT_CONTEXT
));
2386 DWORD i
, j
, iContext
, revocationFlags
;
2387 CERT_REVOCATION_PARA revocationPara
= { sizeof(revocationPara
), 0 };
2388 CERT_REVOCATION_STATUS revocationStatus
=
2389 { sizeof(revocationStatus
), 0 };
2392 for (i
= 0, iContext
= 0; iContext
< cContext
&& i
< chain
->cChain
;
2395 for (j
= 0; iContext
< cContext
&&
2396 j
< chain
->rgpChain
[i
]->cElement
; j
++)
2397 contexts
[iContext
++] =
2398 chain
->rgpChain
[i
]->rgpElement
[j
]->pCertContext
;
2400 revocationFlags
= CERT_VERIFY_REV_CHAIN_FLAG
;
2401 if (chainFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY
)
2402 revocationFlags
|= CERT_VERIFY_CACHE_ONLY_BASED_REVOCATION
;
2403 if (chainFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_ACCUMULATIVE_TIMEOUT
)
2404 revocationFlags
|= CERT_VERIFY_REV_ACCUMULATIVE_TIMEOUT_FLAG
;
2405 revocationPara
.pftTimeToUse
= pTime
;
2406 if (pChainPara
->cbSize
== sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA
))
2408 revocationPara
.dwUrlRetrievalTimeout
=
2409 pChainPara
->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout
;
2410 revocationPara
.fCheckFreshnessTime
=
2411 pChainPara
->fCheckRevocationFreshnessTime
;
2412 revocationPara
.dwFreshnessTime
=
2413 pChainPara
->dwRevocationFreshnessTime
;
2415 ret
= CertVerifyRevocation(X509_ASN_ENCODING
,
2416 CERT_CONTEXT_REVOCATION_TYPE
, cContext
, (void **)contexts
,
2417 revocationFlags
, &revocationPara
, &revocationStatus
);
2420 PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT element
=
2421 CRYPT_FindIthElementInChain(chain
, revocationStatus
.dwIndex
);
2424 switch (revocationStatus
.dwError
)
2426 case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK
:
2427 case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_DLL
:
2428 case CRYPT_E_NOT_IN_REVOCATION_DATABASE
:
2429 /* If the revocation status is unknown, it's assumed to be
2432 error
= CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN
|
2433 CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION
;
2435 case CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE
:
2436 error
= CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION
;
2438 case CRYPT_E_REVOKED
:
2439 error
= CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED
;
2442 WARN("unmapped error %08x\n", revocationStatus
.dwError
);
2447 /* FIXME: set element's pRevocationInfo member */
2448 element
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|= error
;
2450 chain
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|= error
;
2452 CryptMemFree(contexts
);
2457 static void CRYPT_CheckUsages(PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain
,
2458 const CERT_CHAIN_PARA
*pChainPara
)
2460 if (pChainPara
->cbSize
>= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS
) &&
2461 pChainPara
->RequestedUsage
.Usage
.cUsageIdentifier
)
2463 PCCERT_CONTEXT endCert
;
2464 PCERT_EXTENSION ext
;
2467 /* A chain, if created, always includes the end certificate */
2468 endCert
= chain
->rgpChain
[0]->rgpElement
[0]->pCertContext
;
2469 /* The extended key usage extension specifies how a certificate's
2470 * public key may be used. From RFC 5280, section 4.2.1.12:
2471 * "This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the
2472 * certified public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the
2473 * basic purposes indicated in the key usage extension."
2474 * If the extension is present, it only satisfies the requested usage
2475 * if that usage is included in the extension:
2476 * "If the extension is present, then the certificate MUST only be used
2477 * for one of the purposes indicated."
2478 * There is also the special anyExtendedKeyUsage OID, but it doesn't
2479 * have to be respected:
2480 * "Applications that require the presence of a particular purpose
2481 * MAY reject certificates that include the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID
2482 * but not the particular OID expected for the application."
2483 * For now, I'm being more conservative and ignoring the presence of
2484 * the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID.
2486 if ((ext
= CertFindExtension(szOID_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE
,
2487 endCert
->pCertInfo
->cExtension
, endCert
->pCertInfo
->rgExtension
)))
2489 const CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE
*requestedUsage
=
2490 &pChainPara
->RequestedUsage
.Usage
;
2491 CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE
*usage
;
2494 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
,
2495 X509_ENHANCED_KEY_USAGE
, ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
2496 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
, NULL
, &usage
, &size
))
2498 if (pChainPara
->RequestedUsage
.dwType
== USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND
)
2502 /* For AND matches, all usages must be present */
2503 validForUsage
= TRUE
;
2504 for (i
= 0; validForUsage
&&
2505 i
< requestedUsage
->cUsageIdentifier
; i
++)
2509 for (j
= 0; !match
&& j
< usage
->cUsageIdentifier
; j
++)
2510 match
= !strcmp(usage
->rgpszUsageIdentifier
[j
],
2511 requestedUsage
->rgpszUsageIdentifier
[i
]);
2513 validForUsage
= FALSE
;
2520 /* For OR matches, any matching usage suffices */
2521 validForUsage
= FALSE
;
2522 for (i
= 0; !validForUsage
&&
2523 i
< requestedUsage
->cUsageIdentifier
; i
++)
2525 for (j
= 0; !validForUsage
&&
2526 j
< usage
->cUsageIdentifier
; j
++)
2528 !strcmp(usage
->rgpszUsageIdentifier
[j
],
2529 requestedUsage
->rgpszUsageIdentifier
[i
]);
2535 validForUsage
= FALSE
;
2539 /* If the extension isn't present, any interpretation is valid:
2540 * "Certificate using applications MAY require that the extended
2541 * key usage extension be present and that a particular purpose
2542 * be indicated in order for the certificate to be acceptable to
2543 * that application."
2544 * Not all web sites include the extended key usage extension, so
2545 * accept chains without it.
2547 TRACE_(chain
)("requested usage from certificate with no usages\n");
2548 validForUsage
= TRUE
;
2552 chain
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
2553 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE
;
2554 chain
->rgpChain
[0]->rgpElement
[0]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
|=
2555 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE
;
2558 if (pChainPara
->cbSize
>= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA
) &&
2559 pChainPara
->RequestedIssuancePolicy
.Usage
.cUsageIdentifier
)
2560 FIXME("unimplemented for RequestedIssuancePolicy\n");
2563 static void dump_usage_match(LPCSTR name
, const CERT_USAGE_MATCH
*usageMatch
)
2565 if (usageMatch
->Usage
.cUsageIdentifier
)
2569 TRACE_(chain
)("%s: %s\n", name
,
2570 usageMatch
->dwType
== USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND
? "AND" : "OR");
2571 for (i
= 0; i
< usageMatch
->Usage
.cUsageIdentifier
; i
++)
2572 TRACE_(chain
)("%s\n", usageMatch
->Usage
.rgpszUsageIdentifier
[i
]);
2576 static void dump_chain_para(const CERT_CHAIN_PARA
*pChainPara
)
2578 TRACE_(chain
)("%d\n", pChainPara
->cbSize
);
2579 if (pChainPara
->cbSize
>= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA_NO_EXTRA_FIELDS
))
2580 dump_usage_match("RequestedUsage", &pChainPara
->RequestedUsage
);
2581 if (pChainPara
->cbSize
>= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_PARA
))
2583 dump_usage_match("RequestedIssuancePolicy",
2584 &pChainPara
->RequestedIssuancePolicy
);
2585 TRACE_(chain
)("%d\n", pChainPara
->dwUrlRetrievalTimeout
);
2586 TRACE_(chain
)("%d\n", pChainPara
->fCheckRevocationFreshnessTime
);
2587 TRACE_(chain
)("%d\n", pChainPara
->dwRevocationFreshnessTime
);
2591 BOOL WINAPI
CertGetCertificateChain(HCERTCHAINENGINE hChainEngine
,
2592 PCCERT_CONTEXT pCertContext
, LPFILETIME pTime
, HCERTSTORE hAdditionalStore
,
2593 PCERT_CHAIN_PARA pChainPara
, DWORD dwFlags
, LPVOID pvReserved
,
2594 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
* ppChainContext
)
2597 PCertificateChain chain
= NULL
;
2599 TRACE("(%p, %p, %p, %p, %p, %08x, %p, %p)\n", hChainEngine
, pCertContext
,
2600 pTime
, hAdditionalStore
, pChainPara
, dwFlags
, pvReserved
, ppChainContext
);
2603 *ppChainContext
= NULL
;
2606 SetLastError(E_INVALIDARG
);
2609 if (!pCertContext
->pCertInfo
->SignatureAlgorithm
.pszObjId
)
2611 SetLastError(ERROR_INVALID_DATA
);
2616 hChainEngine
= CRYPT_GetDefaultChainEngine();
2617 if (TRACE_ON(chain
))
2618 dump_chain_para(pChainPara
);
2619 /* FIXME: what about HCCE_LOCAL_MACHINE? */
2620 ret
= CRYPT_BuildCandidateChainFromCert(hChainEngine
, pCertContext
, pTime
,
2621 hAdditionalStore
, &chain
);
2624 PCertificateChain alternate
= NULL
;
2625 PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChain
;
2628 alternate
= CRYPT_BuildAlternateContextFromChain(hChainEngine
,
2629 pTime
, hAdditionalStore
, chain
);
2631 /* Alternate contexts are added as "lower quality" contexts of
2632 * chain, to avoid loops in alternate chain creation.
2633 * The highest-quality chain is chosen at the end.
2636 ret
= CRYPT_AddAlternateChainToChain(chain
, alternate
);
2637 } while (ret
&& alternate
);
2638 chain
= CRYPT_ChooseHighestQualityChain(chain
);
2639 if (!(dwFlags
& CERT_CHAIN_RETURN_LOWER_QUALITY_CONTEXTS
))
2640 CRYPT_FreeLowerQualityChains(chain
);
2641 pChain
= (PCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT
)chain
;
2642 if (!pChain
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
)
2643 CRYPT_VerifyChainRevocation(pChain
, pTime
, pChainPara
, dwFlags
);
2644 CRYPT_CheckUsages(pChain
, pChainPara
);
2645 TRACE_(chain
)("error status: %08x\n",
2646 pChain
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
);
2648 *ppChainContext
= pChain
;
2650 CertFreeCertificateChain(pChain
);
2652 TRACE("returning %d\n", ret
);
2656 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT WINAPI
CertDuplicateCertificateChain(
2657 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
)
2659 PCertificateChain chain
= (PCertificateChain
)pChainContext
;
2661 TRACE("(%p)\n", pChainContext
);
2664 InterlockedIncrement(&chain
->ref
);
2665 return pChainContext
;
2668 VOID WINAPI
CertFreeCertificateChain(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
)
2670 PCertificateChain chain
= (PCertificateChain
)pChainContext
;
2672 TRACE("(%p)\n", pChainContext
);
2676 if (InterlockedDecrement(&chain
->ref
) == 0)
2677 CRYPT_FreeChainContext(chain
);
2681 static void find_element_with_error(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain
, DWORD error
,
2682 LONG
*iChain
, LONG
*iElement
)
2686 for (i
= 0; i
< chain
->cChain
; i
++)
2687 for (j
= 0; j
< chain
->rgpChain
[i
]->cElement
; j
++)
2688 if (chain
->rgpChain
[i
]->rgpElement
[j
]->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
2697 static BOOL WINAPI
verify_base_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
2698 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
2699 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
)
2701 pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
= pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= -1;
2702 if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
2703 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
)
2705 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE
;
2706 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
2707 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
2708 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2710 else if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
2711 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT
)
2713 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT
;
2714 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
2715 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
2716 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2718 else if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
& CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC
)
2720 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_CHAINING
;
2721 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
, CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC
,
2722 &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
, &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2723 /* For a cyclic chain, which element is a cycle isn't meaningful */
2724 pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= -1;
2727 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= NO_ERROR
;
2731 static BYTE msTestPubKey1
[] = {
2732 0x30,0x47,0x02,0x40,0x81,0x55,0x22,0xb9,0x8a,0xa4,0x6f,0xed,0xd6,0xe7,0xd9,
2733 0x66,0x0f,0x55,0xbc,0xd7,0xcd,0xd5,0xbc,0x4e,0x40,0x02,0x21,0xa2,0xb1,0xf7,
2734 0x87,0x30,0x85,0x5e,0xd2,0xf2,0x44,0xb9,0xdc,0x9b,0x75,0xb6,0xfb,0x46,0x5f,
2735 0x42,0xb6,0x9d,0x23,0x36,0x0b,0xde,0x54,0x0f,0xcd,0xbd,0x1f,0x99,0x2a,0x10,
2736 0x58,0x11,0xcb,0x40,0xcb,0xb5,0xa7,0x41,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
2737 static BYTE msTestPubKey2
[] = {
2738 0x30,0x47,0x02,0x40,0x9c,0x50,0x05,0x1d,0xe2,0x0e,0x4c,0x53,0xd8,0xd9,0xb5,
2739 0xe5,0xfd,0xe9,0xe3,0xad,0x83,0x4b,0x80,0x08,0xd9,0xdc,0xe8,0xe8,0x35,0xf8,
2740 0x11,0xf1,0xe9,0x9b,0x03,0x7a,0x65,0x64,0x76,0x35,0xce,0x38,0x2c,0xf2,0xb6,
2741 0x71,0x9e,0x06,0xd9,0xbf,0xbb,0x31,0x69,0xa3,0xf6,0x30,0xa0,0x78,0x7b,0x18,
2742 0xdd,0x50,0x4d,0x79,0x1e,0xeb,0x61,0xc1,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
2744 static BOOL WINAPI
verify_authenticode_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
2745 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
2746 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
)
2748 BOOL ret
= verify_base_policy(szPolicyOID
, pChainContext
, pPolicyPara
,
2751 if (ret
&& pPolicyStatus
->dwError
== CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT
)
2753 CERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO msPubKey
= { { 0 } };
2754 BOOL isMSTestRoot
= FALSE
;
2755 PCCERT_CONTEXT failingCert
=
2756 pChainContext
->rgpChain
[pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
]->
2757 rgpElement
[pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
]->pCertContext
;
2759 CRYPT_DATA_BLOB keyBlobs
[] = {
2760 { sizeof(msTestPubKey1
), msTestPubKey1
},
2761 { sizeof(msTestPubKey2
), msTestPubKey2
},
2764 /* Check whether the root is an MS test root */
2765 for (i
= 0; !isMSTestRoot
&& i
< sizeof(keyBlobs
) / sizeof(keyBlobs
[0]);
2768 msPubKey
.PublicKey
.cbData
= keyBlobs
[i
].cbData
;
2769 msPubKey
.PublicKey
.pbData
= keyBlobs
[i
].pbData
;
2770 if (CertComparePublicKeyInfo(
2771 X509_ASN_ENCODING
| PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING
,
2772 &failingCert
->pCertInfo
->SubjectPublicKeyInfo
, &msPubKey
))
2773 isMSTestRoot
= TRUE
;
2776 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDTESTROOT
;
2781 static BOOL WINAPI
verify_basic_constraints_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
2782 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
2783 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
)
2785 pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
= pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= -1;
2786 if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
2787 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
)
2789 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= TRUST_E_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
;
2790 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
2791 CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
2792 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
2795 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= NO_ERROR
;
2799 static BOOL
match_dns_to_subject_alt_name(PCERT_EXTENSION ext
,
2800 LPCWSTR server_name
)
2802 BOOL matches
= FALSE
;
2803 CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO
*subjectName
;
2806 TRACE_(chain
)("%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name
));
2807 /* This could be spoofed by the embedded NULL vulnerability, since the
2808 * returned CERT_ALT_NAME_INFO doesn't have a way to indicate the
2809 * encoded length of a name. Fortunately CryptDecodeObjectEx fails if
2810 * the encoded form of the name contains a NULL.
2812 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_ALTERNATE_NAME
,
2813 ext
->Value
.pbData
, ext
->Value
.cbData
,
2814 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
,
2815 &subjectName
, &size
))
2819 /* RFC 5280 states that multiple instances of each name type may exist,
2820 * in section 4.2.1.6:
2821 * "Multiple name forms, and multiple instances of each name form,
2823 * It doesn't specify the behavior in such cases, but both RFC 2818
2824 * and RFC 2595 explicitly accept a certificate if any name matches.
2826 for (i
= 0; !matches
&& i
< subjectName
->cAltEntry
; i
++)
2828 if (subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].dwAltNameChoice
==
2829 CERT_ALT_NAME_DNS_NAME
)
2831 TRACE_(chain
)("dNSName: %s\n", debugstr_w(
2832 subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].u
.pwszDNSName
));
2833 if (!strcmpiW(server_name
,
2834 subjectName
->rgAltEntry
[i
].u
.pwszDNSName
))
2838 LocalFree(subjectName
);
2843 static BOOL
find_matching_domain_component(CERT_NAME_INFO
*name
,
2846 BOOL matches
= FALSE
;
2849 for (i
= 0; !matches
&& i
< name
->cRDN
; i
++)
2850 for (j
= 0; j
< name
->rgRDN
[i
].cRDNAttr
; j
++)
2851 if (!strcmp(szOID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT
,
2852 name
->rgRDN
[i
].rgRDNAttr
[j
].pszObjId
))
2854 PCERT_RDN_ATTR attr
;
2856 attr
= &name
->rgRDN
[i
].rgRDNAttr
[j
];
2857 /* Compare with memicmpW rather than strcmpiW in order to avoid
2858 * a match with a string with an embedded NULL. The component
2859 * must match one domain component attribute's entire string
2860 * value with a case-insensitive match.
2862 matches
= !memicmpW(component
, (LPWSTR
)attr
->Value
.pbData
,
2863 attr
->Value
.cbData
/ sizeof(WCHAR
));
2868 static BOOL
match_domain_component(LPCWSTR allowed_component
, DWORD allowed_len
,
2869 LPCWSTR server_component
, DWORD server_len
, BOOL allow_wildcards
,
2872 LPCWSTR allowed_ptr
, server_ptr
;
2873 BOOL matches
= TRUE
;
2875 *see_wildcard
= FALSE
;
2876 if (server_len
< allowed_len
)
2878 WARN_(chain
)("domain component %s too short for %s\n",
2879 debugstr_wn(server_component
, server_len
),
2880 debugstr_wn(allowed_component
, allowed_len
));
2881 /* A domain component can't contain a wildcard character, so a domain
2882 * component shorter than the allowed string can't produce a match.
2886 for (allowed_ptr
= allowed_component
, server_ptr
= server_component
;
2887 matches
&& allowed_ptr
- allowed_component
< allowed_len
;
2888 allowed_ptr
++, server_ptr
++)
2890 if (*allowed_ptr
== '*')
2892 if (allowed_ptr
- allowed_component
< allowed_len
- 1)
2894 WARN_(chain
)("non-wildcard characters after wildcard not supported\n");
2897 else if (!allow_wildcards
)
2899 WARN_(chain
)("wildcard after non-wildcard component\n");
2904 /* the preceding characters must have matched, so the rest of
2905 * the component also matches.
2907 *see_wildcard
= TRUE
;
2911 matches
= tolowerW(*allowed_ptr
) == tolowerW(*server_ptr
);
2913 if (matches
&& server_ptr
- server_component
< server_len
)
2915 /* If there are unmatched characters in the server domain component,
2916 * the server domain only matches if the allowed string ended in a '*'.
2918 matches
= *allowed_ptr
== '*';
2923 static BOOL
match_common_name(LPCWSTR server_name
, PCERT_RDN_ATTR nameAttr
)
2925 LPCWSTR allowed
= (LPCWSTR
)nameAttr
->Value
.pbData
;
2926 LPCWSTR allowed_component
= allowed
;
2927 DWORD allowed_len
= nameAttr
->Value
.cbData
/ sizeof(WCHAR
);
2928 LPCWSTR server_component
= server_name
;
2929 DWORD server_len
= strlenW(server_name
);
2930 BOOL matches
= TRUE
, allow_wildcards
= TRUE
;
2932 TRACE_(chain
)("CN = %s\n", debugstr_wn(allowed_component
, allowed_len
));
2934 /* From RFC 2818 (HTTP over TLS), section 3.1:
2935 * "Names may contain the wildcard character * which is considered to match
2936 * any single domain name component or component fragment. E.g.,
2937 * *.a.com matches foo.a.com but not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com
2940 * And from RFC 2595 (Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP), section 2.4:
2941 * "A "*" wildcard character MAY be used as the left-most name component in
2942 * the certificate. For example, *.example.com would match a.example.com,
2943 * foo.example.com, etc. but would not match example.com."
2945 * There are other protocols which use TLS, and none of them is
2946 * authoritative. This accepts certificates in common usage, e.g.
2947 * *.domain.com matches www.domain.com but not domain.com, and
2948 * www*.domain.com matches www1.domain.com but not mail.domain.com.
2951 LPCWSTR allowed_dot
, server_dot
;
2953 allowed_dot
= memchrW(allowed_component
, '.',
2954 allowed_len
- (allowed_component
- allowed
));
2955 server_dot
= memchrW(server_component
, '.',
2956 server_len
- (server_component
- server_name
));
2957 /* The number of components must match */
2958 if ((!allowed_dot
&& server_dot
) || (allowed_dot
&& !server_dot
))
2961 WARN_(chain
)("%s: too many components for CN=%s\n",
2962 debugstr_w(server_name
), debugstr_wn(allowed
, allowed_len
));
2964 WARN_(chain
)("%s: not enough components for CN=%s\n",
2965 debugstr_w(server_name
), debugstr_wn(allowed
, allowed_len
));
2970 LPCWSTR allowed_end
, server_end
;
2973 allowed_end
= allowed_dot
? allowed_dot
: allowed
+ allowed_len
;
2974 server_end
= server_dot
? server_dot
: server_name
+ server_len
;
2975 matches
= match_domain_component(allowed_component
,
2976 allowed_end
- allowed_component
, server_component
,
2977 server_end
- server_component
, allow_wildcards
, &has_wildcard
);
2978 /* Once a non-wildcard component is seen, no wildcard components
2982 allow_wildcards
= FALSE
;
2985 allowed_component
= allowed_dot
? allowed_dot
+ 1 : allowed_end
;
2986 server_component
= server_dot
? server_dot
+ 1 : server_end
;
2989 } while (matches
&& allowed_component
&&
2990 allowed_component
- allowed
< allowed_len
&&
2991 server_component
&& server_component
- server_name
< server_len
);
2992 TRACE_(chain
)("returning %d\n", matches
);
2996 static BOOL
match_dns_to_subject_dn(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
, LPCWSTR server_name
)
2998 BOOL matches
= FALSE
;
2999 CERT_NAME_INFO
*name
;
3002 TRACE_(chain
)("%s\n", debugstr_w(server_name
));
3003 if (CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING
, X509_UNICODE_NAME
,
3004 cert
->pCertInfo
->Subject
.pbData
, cert
->pCertInfo
->Subject
.cbData
,
3005 CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG
| CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG
, NULL
,
3008 /* If the subject distinguished name contains any name components,
3009 * make sure all of them are present.
3011 if (CertFindRDNAttr(szOID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT
, name
))
3013 LPCWSTR ptr
= server_name
;
3017 LPCWSTR dot
= strchrW(ptr
, '.'), end
;
3018 /* 254 is the maximum DNS label length, see RFC 1035 */
3019 WCHAR component
[255];
3022 end
= dot
? dot
: ptr
+ strlenW(ptr
);
3024 if (len
>= sizeof(component
) / sizeof(component
[0]))
3026 WARN_(chain
)("domain component %s too long\n",
3027 debugstr_wn(ptr
, len
));
3032 memcpy(component
, ptr
, len
* sizeof(WCHAR
));
3034 matches
= find_matching_domain_component(name
, component
);
3036 ptr
= dot
? dot
+ 1 : end
;
3037 } while (matches
&& ptr
&& *ptr
);
3041 PCERT_RDN_ATTR attr
;
3043 /* If the certificate isn't using a DN attribute in the name, make
3044 * make sure the common name matches.
3046 if ((attr
= CertFindRDNAttr(szOID_COMMON_NAME
, name
)))
3047 matches
= match_common_name(server_name
, attr
);
3054 static BOOL WINAPI
verify_ssl_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
3055 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
3056 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
)
3058 pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
= pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= -1;
3059 if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
3060 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
)
3062 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= TRUST_E_CERT_SIGNATURE
;
3063 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
3064 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
3065 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
3067 else if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
3068 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT
)
3070 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT
;
3071 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
3072 CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
3073 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
3075 else if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
& CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC
)
3077 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT
;
3078 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
3079 CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
3080 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
3081 /* For a cyclic chain, which element is a cycle isn't meaningful */
3082 pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= -1;
3084 else if (pChainContext
->TrustStatus
.dwErrorStatus
&
3085 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID
)
3087 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_EXPIRED
;
3088 find_element_with_error(pChainContext
,
3089 CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID
, &pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
,
3090 &pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
);
3093 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= NO_ERROR
;
3094 /* We only need bother checking whether the name in the end certificate
3095 * matches if the chain is otherwise okay.
3097 if (!pPolicyStatus
->dwError
&& pPolicyPara
&&
3098 pPolicyPara
->cbSize
>= sizeof(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA
))
3100 HTTPSPolicyCallbackData
*sslPara
= pPolicyPara
->pvExtraPolicyPara
;
3102 if (sslPara
&& sslPara
->u
.cbSize
>= sizeof(HTTPSPolicyCallbackData
))
3104 if (sslPara
->dwAuthType
== AUTHTYPE_SERVER
&&
3105 sslPara
->pwszServerName
)
3107 PCCERT_CONTEXT cert
;
3108 PCERT_EXTENSION altNameExt
;
3111 cert
= pChainContext
->rgpChain
[0]->rgpElement
[0]->pCertContext
;
3112 altNameExt
= get_subject_alt_name_ext(cert
->pCertInfo
);
3113 /* If the alternate name extension exists, the name it contains
3114 * is bound to the certificate, so make sure the name matches
3115 * it. Otherwise, look for the server name in the subject
3116 * distinguished name. RFC5280, section 4.2.1.6:
3117 * "Whenever such identities are to be bound into a
3118 * certificate, the subject alternative name (or issuer
3119 * alternative name) extension MUST be used; however, a DNS
3120 * name MAY also be represented in the subject field using the
3121 * domainComponent attribute."
3124 matches
= match_dns_to_subject_alt_name(altNameExt
,
3125 sslPara
->pwszServerName
);
3127 matches
= match_dns_to_subject_dn(cert
,
3128 sslPara
->pwszServerName
);
3131 pPolicyStatus
->dwError
= CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH
;
3132 pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
= 0;
3133 pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= 0;
3141 static BYTE msPubKey1
[] = {
3142 0x30,0x82,0x01,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x01,0x01,0x00,0xdf,0x08,0xba,0xe3,0x3f,0x6e,
3143 0x64,0x9b,0xf5,0x89,0xaf,0x28,0x96,0x4a,0x07,0x8f,0x1b,0x2e,0x8b,0x3e,0x1d,
3144 0xfc,0xb8,0x80,0x69,0xa3,0xa1,0xce,0xdb,0xdf,0xb0,0x8e,0x6c,0x89,0x76,0x29,
3145 0x4f,0xca,0x60,0x35,0x39,0xad,0x72,0x32,0xe0,0x0b,0xae,0x29,0x3d,0x4c,0x16,
3146 0xd9,0x4b,0x3c,0x9d,0xda,0xc5,0xd3,0xd1,0x09,0xc9,0x2c,0x6f,0xa6,0xc2,0x60,
3147 0x53,0x45,0xdd,0x4b,0xd1,0x55,0xcd,0x03,0x1c,0xd2,0x59,0x56,0x24,0xf3,0xe5,
3148 0x78,0xd8,0x07,0xcc,0xd8,0xb3,0x1f,0x90,0x3f,0xc0,0x1a,0x71,0x50,0x1d,0x2d,
3149 0xa7,0x12,0x08,0x6d,0x7c,0xb0,0x86,0x6c,0xc7,0xba,0x85,0x32,0x07,0xe1,0x61,
3150 0x6f,0xaf,0x03,0xc5,0x6d,0xe5,0xd6,0xa1,0x8f,0x36,0xf6,0xc1,0x0b,0xd1,0x3e,
3151 0x69,0x97,0x48,0x72,0xc9,0x7f,0xa4,0xc8,0xc2,0x4a,0x4c,0x7e,0xa1,0xd1,0x94,
3152 0xa6,0xd7,0xdc,0xeb,0x05,0x46,0x2e,0xb8,0x18,0xb4,0x57,0x1d,0x86,0x49,0xdb,
3153 0x69,0x4a,0x2c,0x21,0xf5,0x5e,0x0f,0x54,0x2d,0x5a,0x43,0xa9,0x7a,0x7e,0x6a,
3154 0x8e,0x50,0x4d,0x25,0x57,0xa1,0xbf,0x1b,0x15,0x05,0x43,0x7b,0x2c,0x05,0x8d,
3155 0xbd,0x3d,0x03,0x8c,0x93,0x22,0x7d,0x63,0xea,0x0a,0x57,0x05,0x06,0x0a,0xdb,
3156 0x61,0x98,0x65,0x2d,0x47,0x49,0xa8,0xe7,0xe6,0x56,0x75,0x5c,0xb8,0x64,0x08,
3157 0x63,0xa9,0x30,0x40,0x66,0xb2,0xf9,0xb6,0xe3,0x34,0xe8,0x67,0x30,0xe1,0x43,
3158 0x0b,0x87,0xff,0xc9,0xbe,0x72,0x10,0x5e,0x23,0xf0,0x9b,0xa7,0x48,0x65,0xbf,
3159 0x09,0x88,0x7b,0xcd,0x72,0xbc,0x2e,0x79,0x9b,0x7b,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
3160 static BYTE msPubKey2
[] = {
3161 0x30,0x82,0x01,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x01,0x01,0x00,0xa9,0x02,0xbd,0xc1,0x70,0xe6,
3162 0x3b,0xf2,0x4e,0x1b,0x28,0x9f,0x97,0x78,0x5e,0x30,0xea,0xa2,0xa9,0x8d,0x25,
3163 0x5f,0xf8,0xfe,0x95,0x4c,0xa3,0xb7,0xfe,0x9d,0xa2,0x20,0x3e,0x7c,0x51,0xa2,
3164 0x9b,0xa2,0x8f,0x60,0x32,0x6b,0xd1,0x42,0x64,0x79,0xee,0xac,0x76,0xc9,0x54,
3165 0xda,0xf2,0xeb,0x9c,0x86,0x1c,0x8f,0x9f,0x84,0x66,0xb3,0xc5,0x6b,0x7a,0x62,
3166 0x23,0xd6,0x1d,0x3c,0xde,0x0f,0x01,0x92,0xe8,0x96,0xc4,0xbf,0x2d,0x66,0x9a,
3167 0x9a,0x68,0x26,0x99,0xd0,0x3a,0x2c,0xbf,0x0c,0xb5,0x58,0x26,0xc1,0x46,0xe7,
3168 0x0a,0x3e,0x38,0x96,0x2c,0xa9,0x28,0x39,0xa8,0xec,0x49,0x83,0x42,0xe3,0x84,
3169 0x0f,0xbb,0x9a,0x6c,0x55,0x61,0xac,0x82,0x7c,0xa1,0x60,0x2d,0x77,0x4c,0xe9,
3170 0x99,0xb4,0x64,0x3b,0x9a,0x50,0x1c,0x31,0x08,0x24,0x14,0x9f,0xa9,0xe7,0x91,
3171 0x2b,0x18,0xe6,0x3d,0x98,0x63,0x14,0x60,0x58,0x05,0x65,0x9f,0x1d,0x37,0x52,
3172 0x87,0xf7,0xa7,0xef,0x94,0x02,0xc6,0x1b,0xd3,0xbf,0x55,0x45,0xb3,0x89,0x80,
3173 0xbf,0x3a,0xec,0x54,0x94,0x4e,0xae,0xfd,0xa7,0x7a,0x6d,0x74,0x4e,0xaf,0x18,
3174 0xcc,0x96,0x09,0x28,0x21,0x00,0x57,0x90,0x60,0x69,0x37,0xbb,0x4b,0x12,0x07,
3175 0x3c,0x56,0xff,0x5b,0xfb,0xa4,0x66,0x0a,0x08,0xa6,0xd2,0x81,0x56,0x57,0xef,
3176 0xb6,0x3b,0x5e,0x16,0x81,0x77,0x04,0xda,0xf6,0xbe,0xae,0x80,0x95,0xfe,0xb0,
3177 0xcd,0x7f,0xd6,0xa7,0x1a,0x72,0x5c,0x3c,0xca,0xbc,0xf0,0x08,0xa3,0x22,0x30,
3178 0xb3,0x06,0x85,0xc9,0xb3,0x20,0x77,0x13,0x85,0xdf,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,0x01 };
3179 static BYTE msPubKey3
[] = {
3180 0x30,0x82,0x02,0x0a,0x02,0x82,0x02,0x01,0x00,0xf3,0x5d,0xfa,0x80,0x67,0xd4,
3181 0x5a,0xa7,0xa9,0x0c,0x2c,0x90,0x20,0xd0,0x35,0x08,0x3c,0x75,0x84,0xcd,0xb7,
3182 0x07,0x89,0x9c,0x89,0xda,0xde,0xce,0xc3,0x60,0xfa,0x91,0x68,0x5a,0x9e,0x94,
3183 0x71,0x29,0x18,0x76,0x7c,0xc2,0xe0,0xc8,0x25,0x76,0x94,0x0e,0x58,0xfa,0x04,
3184 0x34,0x36,0xe6,0xdf,0xaf,0xf7,0x80,0xba,0xe9,0x58,0x0b,0x2b,0x93,0xe5,0x9d,
3185 0x05,0xe3,0x77,0x22,0x91,0xf7,0x34,0x64,0x3c,0x22,0x91,0x1d,0x5e,0xe1,0x09,
3186 0x90,0xbc,0x14,0xfe,0xfc,0x75,0x58,0x19,0xe1,0x79,0xb7,0x07,0x92,0xa3,0xae,
3187 0x88,0x59,0x08,0xd8,0x9f,0x07,0xca,0x03,0x58,0xfc,0x68,0x29,0x6d,0x32,0xd7,
3188 0xd2,0xa8,0xcb,0x4b,0xfc,0xe1,0x0b,0x48,0x32,0x4f,0xe6,0xeb,0xb8,0xad,0x4f,
3189 0xe4,0x5c,0x6f,0x13,0x94,0x99,0xdb,0x95,0xd5,0x75,0xdb,0xa8,0x1a,0xb7,0x94,
3190 0x91,0xb4,0x77,0x5b,0xf5,0x48,0x0c,0x8f,0x6a,0x79,0x7d,0x14,0x70,0x04,0x7d,
3191 0x6d,0xaf,0x90,0xf5,0xda,0x70,0xd8,0x47,0xb7,0xbf,0x9b,0x2f,0x6c,0xe7,0x05,
3192 0xb7,0xe1,0x11,0x60,0xac,0x79,0x91,0x14,0x7c,0xc5,0xd6,0xa6,0xe4,0xe1,0x7e,
3193 0xd5,0xc3,0x7e,0xe5,0x92,0xd2,0x3c,0x00,0xb5,0x36,0x82,0xde,0x79,0xe1,0x6d,
3194 0xf3,0xb5,0x6e,0xf8,0x9f,0x33,0xc9,0xcb,0x52,0x7d,0x73,0x98,0x36,0xdb,0x8b,
3195 0xa1,0x6b,0xa2,0x95,0x97,0x9b,0xa3,0xde,0xc2,0x4d,0x26,0xff,0x06,0x96,0x67,
3196 0x25,0x06,0xc8,0xe7,0xac,0xe4,0xee,0x12,0x33,0x95,0x31,0x99,0xc8,0x35,0x08,
3197 0x4e,0x34,0xca,0x79,0x53,0xd5,0xb5,0xbe,0x63,0x32,0x59,0x40,0x36,0xc0,0xa5,
3198 0x4e,0x04,0x4d,0x3d,0xdb,0x5b,0x07,0x33,0xe4,0x58,0xbf,0xef,0x3f,0x53,0x64,
3199 0xd8,0x42,0x59,0x35,0x57,0xfd,0x0f,0x45,0x7c,0x24,0x04,0x4d,0x9e,0xd6,0x38,
3200 0x74,0x11,0x97,0x22,0x90,0xce,0x68,0x44,0x74,0x92,0x6f,0xd5,0x4b,0x6f,0xb0,
3201 0x86,0xe3,0xc7,0x36,0x42,0xa0,0xd0,0xfc,0xc1,0xc0,0x5a,0xf9,0xa3,0x61,0xb9,
3202 0x30,0x47,0x71,0x96,0x0a,0x16,0xb0,0x91,0xc0,0x42,0x95,0xef,0x10,0x7f,0x28,
3203 0x6a,0xe3,0x2a,0x1f,0xb1,0xe4,0xcd,0x03,0x3f,0x77,0x71,0x04,0xc7,0x20,0xfc,
3204 0x49,0x0f,0x1d,0x45,0x88,0xa4,0xd7,0xcb,0x7e,0x88,0xad,0x8e,0x2d,0xec,0x45,
3205 0xdb,0xc4,0x51,0x04,0xc9,0x2a,0xfc,0xec,0x86,0x9e,0x9a,0x11,0x97,0x5b,0xde,
3206 0xce,0x53,0x88,0xe6,0xe2,0xb7,0xfd,0xac,0x95,0xc2,0x28,0x40,0xdb,0xef,0x04,
3207 0x90,0xdf,0x81,0x33,0x39,0xd9,0xb2,0x45,0xa5,0x23,0x87,0x06,0xa5,0x55,0x89,
3208 0x31,0xbb,0x06,0x2d,0x60,0x0e,0x41,0x18,0x7d,0x1f,0x2e,0xb5,0x97,0xcb,0x11,
3209 0xeb,0x15,0xd5,0x24,0xa5,0x94,0xef,0x15,0x14,0x89,0xfd,0x4b,0x73,0xfa,0x32,
3210 0x5b,0xfc,0xd1,0x33,0x00,0xf9,0x59,0x62,0x70,0x07,0x32,0xea,0x2e,0xab,0x40,
3211 0x2d,0x7b,0xca,0xdd,0x21,0x67,0x1b,0x30,0x99,0x8f,0x16,0xaa,0x23,0xa8,0x41,
3212 0xd1,0xb0,0x6e,0x11,0x9b,0x36,0xc4,0xde,0x40,0x74,0x9c,0xe1,0x58,0x65,0xc1,
3213 0x60,0x1e,0x7a,0x5b,0x38,0xc8,0x8f,0xbb,0x04,0x26,0x7c,0xd4,0x16,0x40,0xe5,
3214 0xb6,0x6b,0x6c,0xaa,0x86,0xfd,0x00,0xbf,0xce,0xc1,0x35,0x02,0x03,0x01,0x00,
3217 static BOOL WINAPI
verify_ms_root_policy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
3218 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
3219 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
)
3221 BOOL ret
= verify_base_policy(szPolicyOID
, pChainContext
, pPolicyPara
,
3224 if (ret
&& !pPolicyStatus
->dwError
)
3226 CERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO msPubKey
= { { 0 } };
3227 BOOL isMSRoot
= FALSE
;
3229 CRYPT_DATA_BLOB keyBlobs
[] = {
3230 { sizeof(msPubKey1
), msPubKey1
},
3231 { sizeof(msPubKey2
), msPubKey2
},
3232 { sizeof(msPubKey3
), msPubKey3
},
3234 PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN rootChain
=
3235 pChainContext
->rgpChain
[pChainContext
->cChain
-1 ];
3236 PCCERT_CONTEXT root
=
3237 rootChain
->rgpElement
[rootChain
->cElement
- 1]->pCertContext
;
3239 for (i
= 0; !isMSRoot
&& i
< sizeof(keyBlobs
) / sizeof(keyBlobs
[0]);
3242 msPubKey
.PublicKey
.cbData
= keyBlobs
[i
].cbData
;
3243 msPubKey
.PublicKey
.pbData
= keyBlobs
[i
].pbData
;
3244 if (CertComparePublicKeyInfo(
3245 X509_ASN_ENCODING
| PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING
,
3246 &root
->pCertInfo
->SubjectPublicKeyInfo
, &msPubKey
))
3250 pPolicyStatus
->lChainIndex
= pPolicyStatus
->lElementIndex
= 0;
3255 typedef BOOL (WINAPI
*CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicyFunc
)(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
3256 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
3257 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
);
3259 BOOL WINAPI
CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy(LPCSTR szPolicyOID
,
3260 PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT pChainContext
, PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA pPolicyPara
,
3261 PCERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS pPolicyStatus
)
3263 static HCRYPTOIDFUNCSET set
= NULL
;
3265 CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicyFunc verifyPolicy
= NULL
;
3266 HCRYPTOIDFUNCADDR hFunc
= NULL
;
3268 TRACE("(%s, %p, %p, %p)\n", debugstr_a(szPolicyOID
), pChainContext
,
3269 pPolicyPara
, pPolicyStatus
);
3271 if (!HIWORD(szPolicyOID
))
3273 switch (LOWORD(szPolicyOID
))
3275 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_BASE
):
3276 verifyPolicy
= verify_base_policy
;
3278 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_AUTHENTICODE
):
3279 verifyPolicy
= verify_authenticode_policy
;
3281 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL
):
3282 verifyPolicy
= verify_ssl_policy
;
3284 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
):
3285 verifyPolicy
= verify_basic_constraints_policy
;
3287 case LOWORD(CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_MICROSOFT_ROOT
):
3288 verifyPolicy
= verify_ms_root_policy
;
3291 FIXME("unimplemented for %d\n", LOWORD(szPolicyOID
));
3297 set
= CryptInitOIDFunctionSet(
3298 CRYPT_OID_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_POLICY_FUNC
, 0);
3299 CryptGetOIDFunctionAddress(set
, X509_ASN_ENCODING
, szPolicyOID
, 0,
3300 (void **)&verifyPolicy
, &hFunc
);
3303 ret
= verifyPolicy(szPolicyOID
, pChainContext
, pPolicyPara
,
3306 CryptFreeOIDFunctionAddress(hFunc
, 0);
3307 TRACE("returning %d (%08x)\n", ret
, pPolicyStatus
->dwError
);