2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
125 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
129 #include "ssl_locl.h"
130 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
131 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
132 #include <openssl/rand.h>
133 #include <openssl/objects.h>
134 #include <openssl/evp.h>
135 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
136 #include <openssl/x509.h>
137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
138 #include <openssl/dh.h>
140 #include <openssl/bn.h>
141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
142 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
144 #include <openssl/md5.h>
146 static SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
);
147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
148 static int nid2curve_id(int nid
);
151 static SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
)
153 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
154 return(SSLv3_server_method());
159 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method
,
161 ssl_undefined_function
,
162 ssl3_get_server_method
)
164 int ssl3_accept(SSL
*s
)
167 unsigned long l
,Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
);
168 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type
,int val
)=NULL
;
171 int new_state
,state
,skip
=0;
173 RAND_add(&Time
,sizeof(Time
),0);
177 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
179 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
180 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
182 /* init things to blank */
184 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) SSL_clear(s
);
188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET
);
198 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
200 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
204 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
205 case SSL_ST_OK
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
208 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
,1);
210 if ((s
->version
>>8) != 3)
212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
215 s
->type
=SSL_ST_ACCEPT
;
217 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
)
219 if ((buf
=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
)
224 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
))
232 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
))
240 if (s
->state
!= SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
)
242 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
243 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
245 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
,1)) { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
247 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
248 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
249 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
253 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
254 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
255 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
256 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
;
260 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
:
261 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
:
264 ret
=ssl3_send_hello_request(s
);
265 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
266 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
;
267 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
273 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
:
277 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
278 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
279 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
:
282 ret
=ssl3_get_client_hello(s
);
283 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
285 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
289 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
290 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
291 ret
=ssl3_send_server_hello(s
);
292 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
295 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
297 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
301 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
:
302 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
:
303 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */
304 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
& SSL_aNULL
)
305 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
& SSL_aKRB5
))
307 ret
=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s
);
308 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
312 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
316 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
317 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
318 l
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
;
320 /* clear this, it may get reset by
321 * send_server_key_exchange */
322 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
)
323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
325 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
327 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
328 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
329 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
330 * be able to handle this) */
331 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
333 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=0;
336 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
337 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
339 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
340 * message only if the cipher suite is either
341 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
342 * server certificate contains the server's
343 * public key for key exchange.
345 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
347 || (l
& (SSL_DH
|SSL_kFZA
))
349 && (s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
== NULL
350 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
351 && EVP_PKEY_size(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
357 ret
=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s
);
358 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
363 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
;
367 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
:
368 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
:
369 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
370 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) ||
371 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
372 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
373 ((s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) &&
374 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
)) ||
375 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
376 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
377 * and in RFC 2246): */
378 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
& SSL_aNULL
) &&
379 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
380 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
381 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) ||
382 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
383 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
& SSL_aKRB5
))
385 /* no cert request */
387 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=0;
388 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
392 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=1;
393 ret
=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s
);
394 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
395 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
396 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
398 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
399 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
405 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
:
406 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
:
407 ret
=ssl3_send_server_done(s
);
408 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
409 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
410 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
:
415 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
416 num1
=BIO_ctrl(s
->wbio
,BIO_CTRL_INFO
,0,NULL
);
419 s
->rwstate
=SSL_WRITING
;
420 num1
=BIO_flush(s
->wbio
);
421 if (num1
<= 0) { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
422 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
425 s
->state
=s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
428 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
:
429 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B
:
430 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
431 ret
= ssl3_check_client_hello(s
);
435 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
;
437 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
439 ret
=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s
);
440 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
443 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
447 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
448 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
449 ret
=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s
);
454 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
455 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
456 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
457 * message is not sent.
459 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
464 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
467 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
468 * a client cert, it can be verified
470 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
471 &(s
->s3
->finish_dgst1
),
472 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[0]));
473 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
474 &(s
->s3
->finish_dgst2
),
475 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]));
479 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
:
480 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
:
482 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
483 ret
=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s
);
484 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
486 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
490 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
:
491 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
:
492 ret
=ssl3_get_finished(s
,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
,
493 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
);
494 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
498 else if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
499 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
502 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
507 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
508 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
509 ret
=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s
);
510 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
511 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
517 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
:
518 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
:
520 s
->session
->cipher
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
521 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
522 { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
524 ret
=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
525 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
);
527 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
528 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
;
531 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
532 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
540 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
:
541 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
:
542 ret
=ssl3_send_finished(s
,
543 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
,
544 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
545 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
546 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
547 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
549 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
551 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL_ST_OK
;
556 /* clean a few things up */
557 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
559 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
562 /* remove buffering on output */
563 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
567 if (s
->new_session
== 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
569 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
570 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
574 ssl_update_cache(s
,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
576 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
578 s
->handshake_func
=ssl3_accept
;
580 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
,1);
588 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
594 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
)
598 if ((ret
=BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
603 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
))
607 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP
,1);
614 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
618 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT
,ret
);
622 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
626 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
)
628 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
629 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
634 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
;
635 /* number of bytes to write */
640 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
641 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
644 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
649 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
650 * so permit appropriate message length */
651 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
657 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
658 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
659 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
)
661 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
662 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
663 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
664 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
666 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
668 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
669 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
677 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
679 int i
,j
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
680 unsigned int cookie_len
;
683 unsigned char *p
,*d
,*q
;
685 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
688 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
=NULL
;
690 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
691 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
692 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
693 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
696 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
)
698 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
701 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
702 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
,
703 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
,
704 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
705 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
708 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
710 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
712 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
713 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
714 s
->client_version
=(((int)p
[0])<<8)|(int)p
[1];
717 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
> s
->version
) ||
718 (s
->version
!= DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
< s
->version
))
720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
721 if ((s
->client_version
>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
)
723 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
724 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
726 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
730 /* load the client random */
731 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
,p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
734 /* get the session-id */
738 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
739 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
740 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
741 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
742 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
743 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
744 * an earlier library version)
746 if ((s
->new_session
&& (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
)))
748 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
753 i
=ssl_get_prev_session(s
, p
, j
, d
+ n
);
755 { /* previous session */
762 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
769 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
)
774 if ( (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) &&
775 s
->d1
->send_cookie
== 0)
777 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
778 if ( cookie_len
!= s
->d1
->cookie_len
)
780 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
787 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
788 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
789 * does not cause an overflow.
791 if ( cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
))
794 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
799 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
800 if ( (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) &&
803 memcpy(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, p
, cookie_len
);
805 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
)
807 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
,
810 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
812 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
815 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
817 else if ( memcmp(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
818 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) /* default verification */
820 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
822 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
831 if ((i
== 0) && (j
!= 0))
833 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
834 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
840 /* not enough data */
841 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
845 if ((i
> 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
,p
,i
,&(ciphers
))
852 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
853 if ((s
->hit
) && (i
> 0))
856 id
=s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
859 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers
));
861 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++)
863 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
,i
);
865 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
866 i
,sk_num(ciphers
),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
876 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
) == 1))
878 /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
879 s
->session
->cipher
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, 0);
883 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
884 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
885 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
896 /* not enough data */
897 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
898 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
904 if (p
[j
] == 0) break;
911 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
912 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
918 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
)
920 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
,&p
,d
,n
, &al
))
922 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
923 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
927 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
932 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
933 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
934 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
935 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=NULL
;
936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
937 if (s
->ctx
->comp_methods
!= NULL
)
938 { /* See if we have a match */
941 nn
=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
944 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
957 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
963 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
964 #if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
965 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
966 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
967 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
971 /* wrong number of bytes,
972 * there could be more to follow */
973 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
980 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
985 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
986 s
->session
->compress_meth
=0;
988 s
->session
->compress_meth
=(comp
== NULL
)?0:comp
->id
;
990 if (s
->session
->ciphers
!= NULL
)
991 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
992 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
995 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED
);
1000 c
=ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,s
->session
->ciphers
,
1001 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1005 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1006 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1009 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=c
;
1013 /* Session-id reuse */
1014 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1015 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1016 SSL_CIPHER
*nc
=NULL
;
1017 SSL_CIPHER
*ec
=NULL
;
1019 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
)
1021 sk
=s
->session
->ciphers
;
1022 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++)
1024 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
,i
);
1025 if (c
->algorithms
& SSL_eNULL
)
1027 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c
))
1031 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=nc
;
1032 else if (ec
!= NULL
)
1033 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=ec
;
1035 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1039 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1042 /* we now have the following setup.
1044 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1045 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1046 * compression - basically ignored right now
1047 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1048 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1049 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1050 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1057 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1060 if (ciphers
!= NULL
) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1064 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1067 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1069 unsigned long l
,Time
;
1071 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1073 buf
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1074 p
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1075 Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
); /* Time */
1077 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-4) <= 0)
1079 /* Do the message type and length last */
1082 *(p
++)=s
->version
>>8;
1083 *(p
++)=s
->version
&0xff;
1086 memcpy(p
,s
->s3
->server_random
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1087 p
+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1089 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1090 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1091 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1092 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1093 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1094 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1095 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1097 if (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
))
1098 s
->session
->session_id_length
=0;
1100 sl
=s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1101 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
))
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1107 memcpy(p
,s
->session
->session_id
,sl
);
1110 /* put the cipher */
1111 i
=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,p
);
1114 /* put the compression method */
1115 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1118 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1121 *(p
++)=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1124 if ((p
= ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) == NULL
)
1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1133 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
1136 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
1137 /* number of bytes to write */
1142 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1143 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1146 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1150 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
)
1152 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1155 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1160 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
;
1161 /* number of bytes to write */
1166 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1167 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1170 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1176 unsigned char md_buf
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
1179 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1183 EC_KEY
*ecdh
=NULL
, *ecdhp
;
1184 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1187 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1190 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1200 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1201 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
)
1203 type
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
& SSL_MKEY_MASK
;
1208 r
[0]=r
[1]=r
[2]=r
[3]=NULL
;
1210 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1211 if (type
& SSL_kRSA
)
1214 if ((rsa
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1216 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb(s
,
1217 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1218 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1221 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1230 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1236 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
1240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1241 if (type
& SSL_kEDH
)
1244 if ((dhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1245 dhp
=s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
,
1246 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1247 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1250 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1255 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
1258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1262 if ((dh
=DHparams_dup(dhp
)) == NULL
)
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1269 if ((dhp
->pub_key
== NULL
||
1270 dhp
->priv_key
== NULL
||
1271 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
)))
1273 if(!DH_generate_key(dh
))
1275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1282 dh
->pub_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->pub_key
);
1283 dh
->priv_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->priv_key
);
1284 if ((dh
->pub_key
== NULL
) ||
1285 (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
))
1287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1297 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1298 if (type
& SSL_kECDHE
)
1300 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1302 ecdhp
=cert
->ecdh_tmp
;
1303 if ((ecdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1305 ecdhp
=s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb(s
,
1306 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1307 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1311 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
1316 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
1318 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1323 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1329 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp
))
1331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1336 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
=ecdh
;
1337 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1338 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1339 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
))
1341 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh
))
1343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1348 if (((group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
)) == NULL
) ||
1349 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1350 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
))
1352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1356 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1357 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163))
1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1363 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1364 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1365 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1368 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group
)))
1371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1375 /* Encode the public key.
1376 * First check the size of encoding and
1377 * allocate memory accordingly.
1379 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1380 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1381 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1384 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
1385 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen
*sizeof(unsigned char));
1386 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
1387 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
))
1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1394 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1395 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1396 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1397 encodedPoint
, encodedlen
, bn_ctx
);
1399 if (encodedlen
== 0)
1401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1405 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
); bn_ctx
=NULL
;
1407 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1408 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1409 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1410 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1415 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1416 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1424 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1426 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1430 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++)
1432 nr
[i
]=BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1436 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
& SSL_aNULL
))
1438 if ((pkey
=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
,s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
))
1441 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1444 kn
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1452 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,n
+4+kn
))
1454 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1457 d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1460 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++)
1467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1468 if (type
& SSL_kECDHE
)
1470 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1471 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1472 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1473 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1474 * the actual encoded point itself
1476 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1484 memcpy((unsigned char*)p
,
1485 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint
,
1487 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1495 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1496 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1498 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1502 for (num
=2; num
> 0; num
--)
1504 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
,(num
== 2)
1505 ?s
->ctx
->md5
:s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1506 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1507 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1508 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1509 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
,q
,
1510 (unsigned int *)&i
);
1514 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
,
1515 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0)
1517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_RSA
);
1525 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1526 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
1529 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
,EVP_dss1(), NULL
);
1530 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1531 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1532 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1533 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
1534 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_DSA
);
1544 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1545 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
1547 /* let's do ECDSA */
1548 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL
);
1549 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1550 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1551 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1552 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
1553 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
1555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_ECDSA
);
1564 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1565 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
1571 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
1574 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1580 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
1581 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1582 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1584 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1587 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1588 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1590 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1594 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
1596 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1598 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
=NULL
;
1602 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
)
1606 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4]);
1608 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1610 n
=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
,p
);
1619 sk
=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
1623 for (i
=0; i
<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++)
1625 name
=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
,i
);
1626 j
=i2d_X509_NAME(name
,NULL
);
1627 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,4+n
+j
+2))
1629 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
1632 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+n
]);
1633 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
))
1636 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
1643 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
1644 j
-=2; s2n(j
,d
); j
+=2;
1650 /* else no CA names */
1651 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+off
]);
1654 d
=(unsigned char *)buf
->data
;
1655 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
1658 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1663 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1664 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ s
->init_num
;
1667 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1674 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
;
1677 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1678 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1683 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1689 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1691 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
1693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1699 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1702 EC_KEY
*srvr_ecdh
= NULL
;
1703 EVP_PKEY
*clnt_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
1704 EC_POINT
*clnt_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1705 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1708 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1709 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
1710 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
1711 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1715 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
1716 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1718 l
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
;
1720 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1723 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1724 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
)
1726 if ((s
->cert
!= NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
!= NULL
))
1727 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
;
1728 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1729 * be sent already */
1732 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY
);
1740 pkey
=s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
;
1741 if ( (pkey
== NULL
) ||
1742 (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
) ||
1743 (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
))
1745 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
1752 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */
1753 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&&
1754 s
->client_version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
1759 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
))
1761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
1771 i
=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n
,p
,p
,rsa
,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
1775 if (i
!= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
1777 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1778 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1781 if ((al
== -1) && !((p
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
1783 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1784 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1785 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1786 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1787 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1789 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1790 if (!((s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) &&
1791 (p
[0] == (s
->version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->version
& 0xff))))
1793 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1794 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1796 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1797 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1798 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1799 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1800 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1801 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1802 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1808 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1809 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1810 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1812 i
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
1813 p
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
1814 p
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
1815 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
+2, i
-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1819 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
1820 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
1821 s
->session
->master_key
,
1823 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
1827 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1828 if (l
& (SSL_kEDH
|SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
))
1833 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
))
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
1845 if (n
== 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1847 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS
);
1853 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
== NULL
)
1855 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1860 dh_srvr
=s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
;
1863 pub
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
);
1866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
1870 i
=DH_compute_key(p
,pub
,dh_srvr
);
1874 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1878 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
1883 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
1884 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
1885 s
->session
->master_key
,p
,i
);
1886 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
1890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1893 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
1894 krb5_data enc_ticket
;
1895 krb5_data authenticator
;
1897 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
1898 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
1899 EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
1900 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
1901 unsigned char pms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1902 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
];
1904 krb5_timestamp authtime
= 0;
1905 krb5_ticket_times ttimes
;
1907 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
1909 if (!kssl_ctx
) kssl_ctx
= kssl_ctx_new();
1912 enc_ticket
.length
= i
;
1914 if (n
< (int)enc_ticket
.length
+ 6)
1916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1917 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1921 enc_ticket
.data
= (char *)p
;
1922 p
+=enc_ticket
.length
;
1925 authenticator
.length
= i
;
1927 if (n
< (int)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
) + 6)
1929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1930 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1934 authenticator
.data
= (char *)p
;
1935 p
+=authenticator
.length
;
1939 enc_pms
.data
= (char *)p
;
1942 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
1945 if(enc_pms
.length
> sizeof pms
)
1947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1948 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1952 if (n
!= (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+
1953 enc_pms
.length
+ 6))
1955 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1956 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1960 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, &ttimes
,
1964 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
1965 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
1967 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
1968 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1974 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
1975 ** but will return authtime == 0.
1977 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx
, &authenticator
,
1978 &authtime
, &kssl_err
)) != 0)
1981 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
1982 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
1984 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
1985 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1986 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1991 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_validate_times(authtime
, &ttimes
)) != 0)
1993 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, krb5rc
);
1998 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx
);
1999 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2001 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2005 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2007 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
,enc
,NULL
,kssl_ctx
->key
,iv
))
2009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2010 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2013 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, pms
,&outl
,
2014 (unsigned char *)enc_pms
.data
, enc_pms
.length
))
2016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2017 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2020 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2022 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2023 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2026 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
,&(pms
[outl
]),&padl
))
2028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2029 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2033 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2036 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2039 if (!((pms
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (pms
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2041 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2042 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2043 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2044 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2045 * the protocol version.
2046 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2047 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2049 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
))
2051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2052 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2057 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2059 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2060 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2061 s
->session
->master_key
, pms
, outl
);
2063 if (kssl_ctx
->client_princ
)
2065 size_t len
= strlen(kssl_ctx
->client_princ
);
2066 if ( len
< SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH
)
2068 s
->session
->krb5_client_princ_len
= len
;
2069 memcpy(s
->session
->krb5_client_princ
,kssl_ctx
->client_princ
,len
);
2074 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2075 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2076 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2077 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2081 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2084 if ((l
& SSL_kECDH
) || (l
& SSL_kECDHE
))
2089 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
2090 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2092 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2093 if ((srvr_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
)
2095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2096 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2100 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2103 /* use the certificate */
2104 tkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2108 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2109 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2111 tkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
;
2114 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2115 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2117 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh
, group
) ||
2118 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh
, priv_key
))
2120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2125 /* Let's get client's public key */
2126 if ((clnt_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
)
2128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2129 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2135 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2139 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2143 if (((clnt_pub_pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
))
2145 (clnt_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
))
2147 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2148 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2149 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2150 * never executed. When that support is
2151 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2152 * received in the certificate is
2153 * authorized for key agreement.
2154 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2155 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2158 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2160 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS
);
2164 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint
,
2165 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) == 0)
2167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2171 ret
= 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2175 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2176 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2178 if ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
2180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2181 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2185 /* Get encoded point length */
2188 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
,
2189 clnt_ecpoint
, p
, i
, bn_ctx
) == 0)
2191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2195 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2196 * currently, so set it to the start
2198 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2201 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2202 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
);
2203 if (field_size
<= 0)
2205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2209 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
, NULL
);
2212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2217 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2218 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2219 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2220 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2221 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2223 /* Compute the master secret */
2224 s
->session
->master_key_length
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
-> \
2225 generate_master_secret(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, p
, i
);
2227 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2233 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2235 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2241 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2242 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2246 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2247 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2248 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2249 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2250 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2255 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
)
2257 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
2264 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2265 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
,
2266 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
,
2271 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2273 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
2275 peer
=s
->session
->peer
;
2276 pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(peer
);
2277 type
=X509_certificate_type(peer
,pkey
);
2285 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
)
2287 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
2288 if ((peer
!= NULL
) && (type
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
2290 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE
);
2300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED
);
2301 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2305 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
2307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
2308 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2312 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
2314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
2315 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2319 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2320 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2326 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2330 j
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2331 if ((i
> j
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0))
2333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
2334 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2339 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2341 i
=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
2342 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
,
2346 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
2352 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE
);
2359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2360 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
2362 j
=DSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
2363 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
2364 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.dsa
);
2368 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE
);
2375 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2376 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
2378 j
=ECDSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
2379 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
2380 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.ec
);
2384 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
2386 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
2393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2394 al
=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
2403 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2406 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2410 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2412 int i
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
2414 unsigned long l
,nc
,llen
,n
;
2415 const unsigned char *p
,*q
;
2417 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
=NULL
;
2419 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2426 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2428 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
)
2430 if ( (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
2431 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
2433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
2434 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2437 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2438 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
2440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
);
2441 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2444 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
2448 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
)
2450 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
2454 p
=d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2456 if ((sk
=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
)
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2465 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2469 for (nc
=0; nc
<llen
; )
2472 if ((l
+nc
+3) > llen
)
2474 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2480 x
=d2i_X509(NULL
,&p
,l
);
2483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2488 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2492 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
,x
))
2494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2501 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0)
2503 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2504 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
2506 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
2510 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2511 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
2512 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
2514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
2515 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2521 i
=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
,sk
);
2524 al
=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
2525 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED
);
2530 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) /* This should not be needed */
2531 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
2532 s
->session
->peer
=sk_X509_shift(sk
);
2533 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
2535 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2536 * when we arrive here. */
2537 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
2539 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
2540 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
2542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2546 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
!= NULL
)
2547 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
, X509_free
);
2548 s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
=sk
;
2549 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2550 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2558 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2561 if (x
!= NULL
) X509_free(x
);
2562 if (sk
!= NULL
) sk_X509_pop_free(sk
,X509_free
);
2566 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2571 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
)
2573 x
=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s
);
2575 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2576 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
2577 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK
|SSL_AUTH_MASK
))
2578 != (SSL_aKRB5
|SSL_kKRB5
))
2580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2584 l
=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,x
);
2585 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
;
2590 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2591 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
2595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2596 /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
2597 static int nid2curve_id(int nid
)
2599 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2600 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2602 case NID_sect163k1
: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2604 case NID_sect163r1
: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2606 case NID_sect163r2
: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2608 case NID_sect193r1
: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2610 case NID_sect193r2
: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2612 case NID_sect233k1
: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2614 case NID_sect233r1
: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2616 case NID_sect239k1
: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2618 case NID_sect283k1
: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2620 case NID_sect283r1
: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2622 case NID_sect409k1
: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2624 case NID_sect409r1
: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2626 case NID_sect571k1
: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2628 case NID_sect571r1
: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2630 case NID_secp160k1
: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2632 case NID_secp160r1
: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2634 case NID_secp160r2
: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2636 case NID_secp192k1
: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2638 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1
: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2640 case NID_secp224k1
: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2642 case NID_secp224r1
: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2644 case NID_secp256k1
: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2646 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1
: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2648 case NID_secp384r1
: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2650 case NID_secp521r1
: /* secp521r1 (25) */
2657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2658 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL
*s
)
2660 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
)
2662 unsigned char *p
, *senc
, *macstart
;
2668 /* get session encoding length */
2669 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
2670 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
2675 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2676 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
2677 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
2678 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
2679 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
2680 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
2682 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
2683 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+
2684 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
2686 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen
);
2690 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
);
2692 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2694 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
2695 /* Skip message length for now */
2697 l2n(s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
, p
);
2698 /* Skip ticket length for now */
2700 /* Output key name */
2702 memcpy(p
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16);
2704 /* Generate and output IV */
2705 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
, 16);
2706 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
2707 /* Encrypt session data */
2708 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
2709 s
->ctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, p
);
2711 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
);
2713 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx
, p
, &len
);
2715 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
2717 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx
);
2718 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
2719 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL
);
2720 HMAC_Update(&hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
);
2721 HMAC_Final(&hctx
, p
, &hlen
);
2722 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
2725 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
2727 len
= p
- (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2728 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ 1;
2729 l2n3(len
- 4, p
); /* Message length */
2731 s2n(len
- 10, p
); /* Ticket length */
2733 /* number of bytes to write */
2735 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
;
2740 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
2741 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));