1 /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
63 #include <openssl/rand.h>
65 #if !defined(RSA_NULL) && !defined(OPENSSL_FIPS)
67 static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen
, const unsigned char *from
,
68 unsigned char *to
, RSA
*rsa
,int padding
);
69 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen
, const unsigned char *from
,
70 unsigned char *to
, RSA
*rsa
,int padding
);
71 static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen
, const unsigned char *from
,
72 unsigned char *to
, RSA
*rsa
,int padding
);
73 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen
, const unsigned char *from
,
74 unsigned char *to
, RSA
*rsa
,int padding
);
75 static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM
*r0
, const BIGNUM
*i
, RSA
*rsa
);
76 static int RSA_eay_init(RSA
*rsa
);
77 static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA
*rsa
);
78 static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth
={
79 "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
80 RSA_eay_public_encrypt
,
81 RSA_eay_public_decrypt
, /* signature verification */
82 RSA_eay_private_encrypt
, /* signing */
83 RSA_eay_private_decrypt
,
85 BN_mod_exp_mont
, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
94 const RSA_METHOD
*RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
96 return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth
);
99 static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen
, const unsigned char *from
,
100 unsigned char *to
, RSA
*rsa
, int padding
)
103 int i
,j
,k
,num
=0,r
= -1;
104 unsigned char *buf
=NULL
;
109 if ((ctx
=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
) goto err
;
110 num
=BN_num_bytes(rsa
->n
);
111 if ((buf
=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num
)) == NULL
)
113 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
119 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
:
120 i
=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf
,num
,from
,flen
);
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
123 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING
:
124 i
=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf
,num
,from
,flen
,NULL
,0);
127 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING
:
128 i
=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf
,num
,from
,flen
);
131 i
=RSA_padding_add_none(buf
,num
,from
,flen
);
134 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT
,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE
);
137 if (i
<= 0) goto err
;
139 if (BN_bin2bn(buf
,num
,&f
) == NULL
) goto err
;
141 if (BN_ucmp(&f
, rsa
->n
) >= 0)
143 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
144 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT
,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS
);
148 if ((rsa
->_method_mod_n
== NULL
) && (rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC
))
150 BN_MONT_CTX
* bn_mont_ctx
;
151 if ((bn_mont_ctx
=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
153 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx
,rsa
->n
,ctx
))
155 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx
);
158 if (rsa
->_method_mod_n
== NULL
) /* other thread may have finished first */
160 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA
);
161 if (rsa
->_method_mod_n
== NULL
)
163 rsa
->_method_mod_n
= bn_mont_ctx
;
166 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA
);
169 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx
);
172 if (!rsa
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(&ret
,&f
,rsa
->e
,rsa
->n
,ctx
,
173 rsa
->_method_mod_n
)) goto err
;
175 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
176 * length of the modulus */
177 j
=BN_num_bytes(&ret
);
178 i
=BN_bn2bin(&ret
,&(to
[num
-j
]));
179 for (k
=0; k
<(num
-i
); k
++)
184 if (ctx
!= NULL
) BN_CTX_free(ctx
);
189 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf
,num
);
195 static int rsa_eay_blinding(RSA
*rsa
, BN_CTX
*ctx
)
198 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA
);
199 /* Check again inside the lock - the macro's check is racey */
200 if(rsa
->blinding
== NULL
)
201 ret
= RSA_blinding_on(rsa
, ctx
);
202 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA
);
206 #define BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, err_instr) \
208 if((!((rsa)->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) && \
209 ((rsa)->blinding == NULL) && \
210 !rsa_eay_blinding(rsa, ctx)) \
214 static BN_BLINDING
*setup_blinding(RSA
*rsa
, BN_CTX
*ctx
)
217 BN_BLINDING
*ret
= NULL
;
219 /* added in OpenSSL 0.9.6j and 0.9.7b */
221 /* NB: similar code appears in RSA_blinding_on (rsa_lib.c);
222 * this should be placed in a new function of its own, but for reasons
223 * of binary compatibility can't */
227 if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa
->d
!= NULL
&& rsa
->d
->d
!= NULL
)
229 /* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret exponent as unpredictable seed */
230 RAND_add(rsa
->d
->d
, rsa
->d
->dmax
* sizeof rsa
->d
->d
[0], 0);
231 if (!BN_pseudo_rand_range(A
,rsa
->n
)) goto err
;
235 if (!BN_rand_range(A
,rsa
->n
)) goto err
;
237 if ((Ai
=BN_mod_inverse(NULL
,A
,rsa
->n
,ctx
)) == NULL
) goto err
;
239 if (!rsa
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(A
,A
,rsa
->e
,rsa
->n
,ctx
,rsa
->_method_mod_n
))
241 ret
= BN_BLINDING_new(A
,Ai
,rsa
->n
);
249 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen
, const unsigned char *from
,
250 unsigned char *to
, RSA
*rsa
, int padding
)
253 int i
,j
,k
,num
=0,r
= -1;
254 unsigned char *buf
=NULL
;
256 int local_blinding
= 0;
257 BN_BLINDING
*blinding
= NULL
;
262 if ((ctx
=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
) goto err
;
263 num
=BN_num_bytes(rsa
->n
);
264 if ((buf
=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num
)) == NULL
)
266 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
272 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
:
273 i
=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf
,num
,from
,flen
);
276 i
=RSA_padding_add_none(buf
,num
,from
,flen
);
278 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING
:
280 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT
,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE
);
283 if (i
<= 0) goto err
;
285 if (BN_bin2bn(buf
,num
,&f
) == NULL
) goto err
;
287 if (BN_ucmp(&f
, rsa
->n
) >= 0)
289 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
290 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT
,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS
);
294 BLINDING_HELPER(rsa
, ctx
, goto err
;);
295 blinding
= rsa
->blinding
;
297 /* Now unless blinding is disabled, 'blinding' is non-NULL.
298 * But the BN_BLINDING object may be owned by some other thread
299 * (we don't want to keep it constant and we don't want to use
300 * lots of locking to avoid race conditions, so only a single
301 * thread can use it; other threads have to use local blinding
303 if (!(rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING
))
305 if (blinding
== NULL
)
307 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
312 if (blinding
!= NULL
)
314 if (blinding
->thread_id
!= CRYPTO_thread_id())
316 /* we need a local one-time blinding factor */
318 blinding
= setup_blinding(rsa
, ctx
);
319 if (blinding
== NULL
)
326 if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f
, blinding
, ctx
)) goto err
;
328 if ( (rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY
) ||
331 (rsa
->dmp1
!= NULL
) &&
332 (rsa
->dmq1
!= NULL
) &&
333 (rsa
->iqmp
!= NULL
)) )
334 { if (!rsa
->meth
->rsa_mod_exp(&ret
,&f
,rsa
)) goto err
; }
337 if (!rsa
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(&ret
,&f
,rsa
->d
,rsa
->n
,ctx
,NULL
)) goto err
;
341 if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret
, blinding
, ctx
)) goto err
;
343 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
344 * length of the modulus */
345 j
=BN_num_bytes(&ret
);
346 i
=BN_bn2bin(&ret
,&(to
[num
-j
]));
347 for (k
=0; k
<(num
-i
); k
++)
352 if (ctx
!= NULL
) BN_CTX_free(ctx
);
356 BN_BLINDING_free(blinding
);
359 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf
,num
);
365 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen
, const unsigned char *from
,
366 unsigned char *to
, RSA
*rsa
, int padding
)
371 unsigned char *buf
=NULL
;
373 int local_blinding
= 0;
374 BN_BLINDING
*blinding
= NULL
;
379 if (ctx
== NULL
) goto err
;
381 num
=BN_num_bytes(rsa
->n
);
383 if ((buf
=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num
)) == NULL
)
385 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
389 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
390 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
393 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT
,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN
);
397 /* make data into a big number */
398 if (BN_bin2bn(from
,(int)flen
,&f
) == NULL
) goto err
;
400 if (BN_ucmp(&f
, rsa
->n
) >= 0)
402 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT
,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS
);
406 BLINDING_HELPER(rsa
, ctx
, goto err
;);
407 blinding
= rsa
->blinding
;
409 /* Now unless blinding is disabled, 'blinding' is non-NULL.
410 * But the BN_BLINDING object may be owned by some other thread
411 * (we don't want to keep it constant and we don't want to use
412 * lots of locking to avoid race conditions, so only a single
413 * thread can use it; other threads have to use local blinding
415 if (!(rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING
))
417 if (blinding
== NULL
)
419 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
424 if (blinding
!= NULL
)
426 if (blinding
->thread_id
!= CRYPTO_thread_id())
428 /* we need a local one-time blinding factor */
430 blinding
= setup_blinding(rsa
, ctx
);
431 if (blinding
== NULL
)
438 if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f
, blinding
, ctx
)) goto err
;
441 if ( (rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY
) ||
444 (rsa
->dmp1
!= NULL
) &&
445 (rsa
->dmq1
!= NULL
) &&
446 (rsa
->iqmp
!= NULL
)) )
447 { if (!rsa
->meth
->rsa_mod_exp(&ret
,&f
,rsa
)) goto err
; }
450 if (!rsa
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(&ret
,&f
,rsa
->d
,rsa
->n
,ctx
,NULL
))
455 if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret
, blinding
, ctx
)) goto err
;
458 j
=BN_bn2bin(&ret
,p
); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
462 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
:
463 r
=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to
,num
,buf
,j
,num
);
465 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
466 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING
:
467 r
=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to
,num
,buf
,j
,num
,NULL
,0);
470 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING
:
471 r
=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to
,num
,buf
,j
,num
);
474 r
=RSA_padding_check_none(to
,num
,buf
,j
,num
);
477 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT
,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE
);
481 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT
,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED
);
484 if (ctx
!= NULL
) BN_CTX_free(ctx
);
488 BN_BLINDING_free(blinding
);
491 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf
,num
);
497 /* signature verification */
498 static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen
, const unsigned char *from
,
499 unsigned char *to
, RSA
*rsa
, int padding
)
504 unsigned char *buf
=NULL
;
510 if (ctx
== NULL
) goto err
;
512 num
=BN_num_bytes(rsa
->n
);
513 buf
=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num
);
516 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
520 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
521 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
524 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT
,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN
);
528 if (BN_bin2bn(from
,flen
,&f
) == NULL
) goto err
;
530 if (BN_ucmp(&f
, rsa
->n
) >= 0)
532 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT
,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS
);
537 if ((rsa
->_method_mod_n
== NULL
) && (rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC
))
539 BN_MONT_CTX
* bn_mont_ctx
;
540 if ((bn_mont_ctx
=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
542 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx
,rsa
->n
,ctx
))
544 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx
);
547 if (rsa
->_method_mod_n
== NULL
) /* other thread may have finished first */
549 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA
);
550 if (rsa
->_method_mod_n
== NULL
)
552 rsa
->_method_mod_n
= bn_mont_ctx
;
555 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA
);
558 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx
);
561 if (!rsa
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(&ret
,&f
,rsa
->e
,rsa
->n
,ctx
,
562 rsa
->_method_mod_n
)) goto err
;
569 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
:
570 r
=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to
,num
,buf
,i
,num
);
573 r
=RSA_padding_check_none(to
,num
,buf
,i
,num
);
576 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT
,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE
);
580 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT
,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED
);
583 if (ctx
!= NULL
) BN_CTX_free(ctx
);
588 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf
,num
);
594 static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM
*r0
, const BIGNUM
*I
, RSA
*rsa
)
603 if ((ctx
=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
) goto err
;
605 if (rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE
)
607 if (rsa
->_method_mod_p
== NULL
)
609 BN_MONT_CTX
* bn_mont_ctx
;
610 if ((bn_mont_ctx
=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
612 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx
,rsa
->p
,ctx
))
614 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx
);
617 if (rsa
->_method_mod_p
== NULL
) /* other thread may have finished first */
619 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA
);
620 if (rsa
->_method_mod_p
== NULL
)
622 rsa
->_method_mod_p
= bn_mont_ctx
;
625 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA
);
628 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx
);
631 if (rsa
->_method_mod_q
== NULL
)
633 BN_MONT_CTX
* bn_mont_ctx
;
634 if ((bn_mont_ctx
=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
636 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx
,rsa
->q
,ctx
))
638 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx
);
641 if (rsa
->_method_mod_q
== NULL
) /* other thread may have finished first */
643 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA
);
644 if (rsa
->_method_mod_q
== NULL
)
646 rsa
->_method_mod_q
= bn_mont_ctx
;
649 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA
);
652 BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx
);
656 if (!BN_mod(&r1
,I
,rsa
->q
,ctx
)) goto err
;
657 if (!rsa
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(&m1
,&r1
,rsa
->dmq1
,rsa
->q
,ctx
,
658 rsa
->_method_mod_q
)) goto err
;
660 if (!BN_mod(&r1
,I
,rsa
->p
,ctx
)) goto err
;
661 if (!rsa
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(r0
,&r1
,rsa
->dmp1
,rsa
->p
,ctx
,
662 rsa
->_method_mod_p
)) goto err
;
664 if (!BN_sub(r0
,r0
,&m1
)) goto err
;
665 /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
666 * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
668 if (!BN_add(r0
,r0
,rsa
->p
)) goto err
;
670 if (!BN_mul(&r1
,r0
,rsa
->iqmp
,ctx
)) goto err
;
671 if (!BN_mod(r0
,&r1
,rsa
->p
,ctx
)) goto err
;
672 /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
673 * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
674 * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
675 * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
676 * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
677 * they ensure p > q [steve]
680 if (!BN_add(r0
,r0
,rsa
->p
)) goto err
;
681 if (!BN_mul(&r1
,r0
,rsa
->q
,ctx
)) goto err
;
682 if (!BN_add(r0
,&r1
,&m1
)) goto err
;
684 if (rsa
->e
&& rsa
->n
)
686 if (!rsa
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy
,r0
,rsa
->e
,rsa
->n
,ctx
,NULL
)) goto err
;
687 /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
688 * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
689 * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
690 * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
691 if (!BN_sub(&vrfy
, &vrfy
, I
)) goto err
;
692 if (!BN_mod(&vrfy
, &vrfy
, rsa
->n
, ctx
)) goto err
;
694 if (!BN_add(&vrfy
, &vrfy
, rsa
->n
)) goto err
;
695 if (!BN_is_zero(&vrfy
))
696 /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
697 * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
698 * mod_exp and return that instead. */
699 if (!rsa
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(r0
,I
,rsa
->d
,rsa
->n
,ctx
,NULL
)) goto err
;
705 BN_clear_free(&vrfy
);
710 static int RSA_eay_init(RSA
*rsa
)
712 rsa
->flags
|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC
|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE
;
716 static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA
*rsa
)
718 if (rsa
->_method_mod_n
!= NULL
)
719 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa
->_method_mod_n
);
720 if (rsa
->_method_mod_p
!= NULL
)
721 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa
->_method_mod_p
);
722 if (rsa
->_method_mod_q
!= NULL
)
723 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa
->_method_mod_q
);