3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/evp.h>
121 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
122 #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
123 #include <openssl/rand.h>
125 static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL
*s
, int type
, unsigned char *buf
,
127 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL
*s
, DTLS1_BITMAP
*bitmap
,
129 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL
*s
, DTLS1_BITMAP
*bitmap
);
130 static DTLS1_BITMAP
*dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL
*s
, SSL3_RECORD
*rr
,
131 unsigned int *is_next_epoch
);
133 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL
*s
, SSL3_RECORD
*rr
,
134 unsigned short *priority
, unsigned long *offset
);
136 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL
*s
, record_pqueue
*q
,
138 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL
*s
);
139 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER
140 static PQ_64BIT
bytes_to_long_long(unsigned char *bytes
, PQ_64BIT
*num
);
142 static void dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL
*s
);
144 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
146 dtls1_copy_record(SSL
*s
, pitem
*item
)
148 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
*rdata
;
150 rdata
= (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
*)item
->data
;
152 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.buf
!= NULL
)
153 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->rbuf
.buf
);
155 s
->packet
= rdata
->packet
;
156 s
->packet_length
= rdata
->packet_length
;
157 memcpy(&(s
->s3
->rbuf
), &(rdata
->rbuf
), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER
));
158 memcpy(&(s
->s3
->rrec
), &(rdata
->rrec
), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD
));
165 dtls1_buffer_record(SSL
*s
, record_pqueue
*queue
, PQ_64BIT priority
)
167 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
*rdata
;
170 rdata
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
));
171 item
= pitem_new(priority
, rdata
);
172 if (rdata
== NULL
|| item
== NULL
)
174 if (rdata
!= NULL
) OPENSSL_free(rdata
);
175 if (item
!= NULL
) pitem_free(item
);
177 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
181 rdata
->packet
= s
->packet
;
182 rdata
->packet_length
= s
->packet_length
;
183 memcpy(&(rdata
->rbuf
), &(s
->s3
->rbuf
), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER
));
184 memcpy(&(rdata
->rrec
), &(s
->s3
->rrec
), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD
));
188 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
189 if (pqueue_insert(queue
->q
, item
) == NULL
)
197 s
->packet_length
= 0;
198 memset(&(s
->s3
->rbuf
), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER
));
199 memset(&(s
->s3
->rrec
), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD
));
201 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
))
203 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
214 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL
*s
, record_pqueue
*queue
)
218 item
= pqueue_pop(queue
->q
);
221 dtls1_copy_record(s
, item
);
223 OPENSSL_free(item
->data
);
233 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed
235 #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
236 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
237 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
239 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */
240 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
241 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
242 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
245 dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL
*s
)
249 item
= pqueue_peek(s
->d1
->unprocessed_rcds
.q
);
252 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
*rdata
;
253 rdata
= (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
*)item
->data
;
255 /* Check if epoch is current. */
256 if (s
->d1
->unprocessed_rcds
.epoch
!= s
->d1
->r_epoch
)
257 return(1); /* Nothing to do. */
259 /* Process all the records. */
260 while (pqueue_peek(s
->d1
->unprocessed_rcds
.q
))
262 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s
);
263 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s
))
265 dtls1_buffer_record(s
, &(s
->d1
->processed_rcds
),
266 s
->s3
->rrec
.seq_num
);
270 /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
271 * have been processed */
272 s
->d1
->processed_rcds
.epoch
= s
->d1
->r_epoch
;
273 s
->d1
->unprocessed_rcds
.epoch
= s
->d1
->r_epoch
+ 1;
282 dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL
*s
)
286 (((PQ_64BIT
)s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
) << 32) |
287 ((PQ_64BIT
)s
->d1
->r_msg_hdr
.frag_off
);
289 if ( ! SSL_in_init(s
)) /* if we're not (re)negotiating,
294 item
= pqueue_peek(s
->d1
->rcvd_records
);
295 if (item
&& item
->priority
== priority
)
297 /* Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be
298 * a handshake record, since data records as passed up without
300 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
*rdata
;
301 item
= pqueue_pop(s
->d1
->rcvd_records
);
302 rdata
= (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
*)item
->data
;
304 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.buf
!= NULL
)
305 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->rbuf
.buf
);
307 s
->packet
= rdata
->packet
;
308 s
->packet_length
= rdata
->packet_length
;
309 memcpy(&(s
->s3
->rbuf
), &(rdata
->rbuf
), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER
));
310 memcpy(&(s
->s3
->rrec
), &(rdata
->rrec
), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD
));
312 OPENSSL_free(item
->data
);
315 /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
325 dtls1_process_record(SSL
*s
)
332 unsigned int mac_size
;
333 unsigned char md
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
339 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
340 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
342 rr
->input
= &(s
->packet
[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
]);
344 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
345 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
346 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
347 * the decryption or by the decompression
348 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
349 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
351 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
352 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
354 /* check is not needed I believe */
355 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH
)
357 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
358 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD
,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
362 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
365 enc_err
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
,0);
369 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
372 /* otherwise enc_err == -1 */
373 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac
;
377 printf("dec %d\n",rr
->length
);
378 { unsigned int z
; for (z
=0; z
<rr
->length
; z
++) printf("%02X%c",rr
->data
[z
],((z
+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
382 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
383 if ( (sess
== NULL
) ||
384 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
) ||
385 (s
->read_hash
== NULL
))
390 mac_size
=EVP_MD_size(s
->read_hash
);
392 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
+mac_size
)
394 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
395 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
396 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD
,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
399 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac
;
402 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
403 if (rr
->length
< mac_size
)
405 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
406 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
407 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD
,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
410 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac
;
413 rr
->length
-=mac_size
;
414 i
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
,md
,0);
415 if (memcmp(md
,&(rr
->data
[rr
->length
]),mac_size
) != 0)
417 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac
;
421 /* r->length is now just compressed */
422 if (s
->expand
!= NULL
)
424 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
)
426 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
427 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD
,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
430 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s
))
432 al
=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE
;
433 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD
,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION
);
438 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)
440 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
441 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD
,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
446 /* So at this point the following is true
447 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
448 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
449 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
450 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
454 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
456 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s
, &(s
->d1
->bitmap
));/* Mark receipt of record. */
459 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac
:
460 /* Separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
461 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
462 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
463 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
464 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via logfile) */
465 al
=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC
;
466 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC
);
468 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
474 /* Call this to get a new input record.
475 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
476 * or non-blocking IO.
477 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
478 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
479 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
480 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
482 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
483 int dtls1_get_record(SSL
*s
)
485 int ssl_major
,ssl_minor
,al
;
490 unsigned short version
;
491 DTLS1_BITMAP
*bitmap
;
492 unsigned int is_next_epoch
;
497 /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
498 * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
499 if ( ! dtls1_process_buffered_records(s
))
502 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
503 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s
))
506 /* get something from the wire */
508 /* check if we have the header */
509 if ( (s
->rstate
!= SSL_ST_READ_BODY
) ||
510 (s
->packet_length
< DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
))
512 n
=ssl3_read_n(s
, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
->s3
->rbuf
.len
, 0);
513 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
514 if (n
<= 0) return(n
); /* error or non-blocking */
516 OPENSSL_assert(s
->packet_length
== DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
);
518 s
->rstate
=SSL_ST_READ_BODY
;
522 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
526 version
=(ssl_major
<<8)|ssl_minor
;
528 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
531 memcpy(&(s
->s3
->read_sequence
[2]), p
, 6);
536 /* Lets check version */
537 if (!s
->first_packet
)
539 if (version
!= s
->version
&& version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
541 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
542 /* Send back error using their
543 * version number :-) */
545 al
=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
550 if ((version
& 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION
& 0xff00) &&
551 (version
& 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER
& 0xff00))
553 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
557 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH
)
559 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
560 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
564 s
->client_version
= version
;
565 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
568 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
570 if (rr
->length
> s
->packet_length
-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
)
572 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
574 n
=ssl3_read_n(s
,i
,i
,1);
575 if (n
<= 0) return(n
); /* error or non-blocking io */
577 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
580 s
->packet_length
= 0;
584 /* now n == rr->length,
585 * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
587 s
->rstate
=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
; /* set state for later operations */
589 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
590 bitmap
= dtls1_get_bitmap(s
, rr
, &is_next_epoch
);
593 s
->packet_length
= 0; /* dump this record */
594 goto again
; /* get another record */
597 /* check whether this is a repeat, or aged record */
598 if ( ! dtls1_record_replay_check(s
, bitmap
, &(rr
->seq_num
)))
600 s
->packet_length
=0; /* dump this record */
601 goto again
; /* get another record */
604 /* just read a 0 length packet */
605 if (rr
->length
== 0) goto again
;
607 /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), buffer it
608 * since it cannot be processed at this time.
609 * Records from the next epoch are marked as received even though they are
610 * not processed, so as to prevent any potential resource DoS attack */
613 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s
, bitmap
);
614 dtls1_buffer_record(s
, &(s
->d1
->unprocessed_rcds
), rr
->seq_num
);
615 s
->packet_length
= 0;
619 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s
))
622 dtls1_clear_timeouts(s
); /* done waiting */
626 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
631 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
632 * 'type' is one of the following:
634 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
635 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
636 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
638 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
639 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
641 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
642 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
643 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
644 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
645 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
646 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
647 * Change cipher spec protocol
648 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
650 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
652 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
653 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
654 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
655 * Application data protocol
656 * none of our business
658 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, unsigned char *buf
, int len
, int peek
)
663 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type2
,int val
)=NULL
;
665 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.buf
== NULL
) /* Not initialized yet */
666 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
))
669 /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
670 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
671 (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && type
) ||
672 (peek
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)))
674 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
678 /* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
679 if ( (ret
= have_handshake_fragment(s
, type
, buf
, len
, peek
)))
682 /* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
684 if (!s
->in_handshake
&& SSL_in_init(s
))
686 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
687 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
688 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
691 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
697 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
699 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
700 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
701 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
702 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
705 /* get new packet if necessary */
706 if ((rr
->length
== 0) || (s
->rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
))
708 ret
=dtls1_get_record(s
);
711 ret
= dtls1_read_failed(s
, ret
);
712 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
720 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
722 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
723 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
724 && (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
))
726 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
727 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
731 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
732 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
733 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
)
736 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
741 if (type
== rr
->type
) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
743 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
744 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
745 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
746 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
))
748 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
749 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
753 if (len
<= 0) return(len
);
755 if ((unsigned int)len
> rr
->length
)
758 n
= (unsigned int)len
;
760 memcpy(buf
,&(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]),n
);
767 s
->rstate
=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
775 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
776 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
778 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
779 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
782 unsigned int k
, dest_maxlen
= 0;
783 unsigned char *dest
= NULL
;
784 unsigned int *dest_len
= NULL
;
786 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
788 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
;
789 dest
= s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
;
790 dest_len
= &s
->d1
->handshake_fragment_len
;
792 else if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
)
794 dest_maxlen
= sizeof(s
->d1
->alert_fragment
);
795 dest
= s
->d1
->alert_fragment
;
796 dest_len
= &s
->d1
->alert_fragment_len
;
798 /* else it's a CCS message, or it's wrong */
799 else if (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
)
801 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
802 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
803 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
810 /* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
811 * may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
812 if ( rr
->length
< dest_maxlen
)
814 s
->rstate
=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
819 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
820 for ( k
= 0; k
< dest_maxlen
; k
++)
822 dest
[k
] = rr
->data
[rr
->off
++];
825 *dest_len
= dest_maxlen
;
829 /* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
830 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
831 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
833 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
835 (s
->d1
->handshake_fragment_len
>= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) &&
836 (s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) &&
837 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
))
839 s
->d1
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
841 if ((s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
[1] != 0) ||
842 (s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
[2] != 0) ||
843 (s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
[3] != 0))
845 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
846 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST
);
850 /* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
853 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
854 s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
, 4, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
856 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
857 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
) &&
861 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
))
863 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
864 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
871 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
))
873 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
876 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
877 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
878 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
879 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
880 s
->rwstate
=SSL_READING
;
882 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
883 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
889 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
890 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
894 if (s
->d1
->alert_fragment_len
>= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH
)
896 int alert_level
= s
->d1
->alert_fragment
[0];
897 int alert_descr
= s
->d1
->alert_fragment
[1];
899 s
->d1
->alert_fragment_len
= 0;
902 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
,
903 s
->d1
->alert_fragment
, 2, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
905 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
907 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
908 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
912 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
913 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
916 if (alert_level
== 1) /* warning */
918 s
->s3
->warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
919 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
)
921 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
925 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
926 /* now check if it's a missing record */
927 if (alert_descr
== DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
)
930 unsigned int frag_off
;
931 unsigned char *p
= &(s
->d1
->alert_fragment
[2]);
936 dtls1_retransmit_message(s
, seq
, frag_off
, &found
);
937 if ( ! found
&& SSL_in_init(s
))
939 /* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */
940 /* requested a message not yet sent,
941 send an alert ourselves */
942 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_WARNING
,
943 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
);
948 else if (alert_level
== 2) /* fatal */
952 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
953 s
->s3
->fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
954 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
955 BIO_snprintf(tmp
,sizeof tmp
,"%d",alert_descr
);
956 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp
);
957 s
->shutdown
|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
958 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->ctx
,s
->session
);
963 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
964 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
971 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
973 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
978 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
)
980 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr
;
982 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr
->data
, &ccs_hdr
);
984 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
985 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
986 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
987 if ( (s
->client_version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
&& rr
->length
!= 3) ||
988 (s
->client_version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
&& rr
->length
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
) ||
989 (rr
->off
!= 0) || (rr
->data
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
))
991 i
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
999 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
1000 rr
->data
, 1, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1002 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
=1;
1003 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
))
1006 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1007 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
1009 if (s
->client_version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
1010 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
1015 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1016 if ((s
->d1
->handshake_fragment_len
>= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) &&
1019 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr
;
1021 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1022 dtls1_get_message_header(rr
->data
, &msg_hdr
);
1023 if( rr
->epoch
!= s
->d1
->r_epoch
)
1029 if (((s
->state
&SSL_ST_MASK
) == SSL_ST_OK
) &&
1030 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
))
1032 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1033 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1034 * protocol violations): */
1035 s
->state
=SSL_ST_BEFORE
|(s
->server
)
1039 s
->state
= s
->server
? SSL_ST_ACCEPT
: SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
1043 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
1044 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1051 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
))
1053 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1056 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1057 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1058 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1059 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1060 s
->rwstate
=SSL_READING
;
1061 bio
=SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1062 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1063 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1073 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1074 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1075 if (s
->version
== TLS1_VERSION
)
1081 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1082 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1084 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1086 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1087 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1088 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1089 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1090 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1093 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1094 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1095 * but have application data. If the library was
1096 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1097 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1098 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1099 * we will indulge it.
1101 if (s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
&&
1102 (s
->s3
->total_renegotiations
!= 0) &&
1104 (s
->state
& SSL_ST_CONNECT
) &&
1105 (s
->state
>= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
) &&
1106 (s
->state
<= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1108 (s
->state
& SSL_ST_ACCEPT
) &&
1109 (s
->state
<= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
) &&
1110 (s
->state
>= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
)
1114 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
=2;
1119 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1120 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1127 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1133 dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, int len
)
1138 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !s
->in_handshake
)
1140 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
1141 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1154 /* dtls1_write_bytes sends one record at a time, sized according to
1155 * the currently known MTU */
1156 i
= dtls1_write_bytes(s
, type
, buf_
, len
);
1157 if (i
<= 0) return i
;
1159 if ((i
== (int)n
) ||
1160 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
1161 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
)))
1163 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
1164 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
1165 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 0;
1177 /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1180 have_handshake_fragment(SSL
*s
, int type
, unsigned char *buf
,
1184 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->d1
->handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1185 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1187 unsigned char *src
= s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
;
1188 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
1193 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->d1
->handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1196 len
--; s
->d1
->handshake_fragment_len
--;
1199 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1200 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->d1
->handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
1201 s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
1211 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
1212 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1214 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, int len
)
1216 const unsigned char *buf
=buf_
;
1217 unsigned int tot
,n
,nw
;
1221 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
1226 /* handshake layer figures out MTU for itself, but data records
1227 * are also sent through this interface, so need to figure out MTU */
1229 mtu
= BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU
, 0, NULL
);
1230 mtu
+= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
; /* HM already inserted */
1234 if (mtu
> SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)
1235 mtu
= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1242 i
=do_dtls1_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), nw
, 0);
1249 if ( (int)s
->s3
->wnum
+ i
== len
)
1257 int do_dtls1_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
, unsigned int len
, int create_empty_fragment
)
1259 unsigned char *p
,*pseq
;
1260 int i
,mac_size
,clear
=0;
1267 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
1268 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
1269 if (s
->s3
->wbuf
.left
!= 0)
1271 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1272 return(ssl3_write_pending(s
,type
,buf
,len
));
1275 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1276 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
)
1278 i
=s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
1281 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1284 if (len
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
1291 if ( (sess
== NULL
) ||
1292 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) ||
1293 (s
->write_hash
== NULL
))
1299 mac_size
=EVP_MD_size(s
->write_hash
);
1301 /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
1303 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
1304 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
1305 && SSL_version(s
) != DTLS1_VERSION
)
1307 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
1308 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
1311 if (s
->s3
->need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
1313 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
1314 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
1315 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
1316 * together with the actual payload) */
1317 prefix_len
= s
->method
->do_ssl_write(s
, type
, buf
, 0, 1);
1318 if (prefix_len
<= 0)
1321 if (s
->s3
->wbuf
.len
< (size_t)prefix_len
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE
)
1323 /* insufficient space */
1324 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1329 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 1;
1333 p
= wb
->buf
+ prefix_len
;
1335 /* write the header */
1340 if (s
->client_version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
1341 *(p
++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER
>>8,
1342 *(p
++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER
&0xff;
1344 *(p
++)=(s
->version
>>8),
1345 *(p
++)=s
->version
&0xff;
1347 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1351 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1353 /* Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC.
1354 * (this is a bit of a boundary violation, but what the heck).
1356 if ( s
->enc_write_ctx
&&
1357 (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s
->enc_write_ctx
->cipher
) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
))
1358 bs
= EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s
->enc_write_ctx
->cipher
);
1362 wr
->data
=p
+ bs
; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1363 wr
->length
=(int)len
;
1364 wr
->input
=(unsigned char *)buf
;
1366 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1369 /* first we compress */
1370 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
)
1372 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
))
1374 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE
,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
1380 memcpy(wr
->data
,wr
->input
,wr
->length
);
1384 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1385 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1386 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1390 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
,&(p
[wr
->length
+ bs
]),1);
1391 wr
->length
+=mac_size
;
1394 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1399 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1400 if (bs
) /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
1402 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
,bs
);
1403 /* master IV and last CBC residue stand for
1404 * the rest of randomness */
1408 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
,1);
1410 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1411 /* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1412 (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */
1414 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1416 s2n(s
->d1
->w_epoch
, pseq
);
1420 s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */
1422 memcpy(pseq
, &(s
->s3
->write_sequence
[2]), 6);
1424 s2n(wr
->length
,pseq
);
1426 /* we should now have
1427 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1428 * wr->length long */
1429 wr
->type
=type
; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1430 wr
->length
+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1432 #if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */
1433 /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
1434 if ( type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
|| type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
)
1435 dtls1_buffer_record(s
, wr
->data
, wr
->length
,
1436 *((PQ_64BIT
*)&(s
->s3
->write_sequence
[0])));
1439 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s
->s3
->write_sequence
[0]));
1441 if (create_empty_fragment
)
1443 /* we are in a recursive call;
1444 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1449 /* now let's set up wb */
1450 wb
->left
= prefix_len
+ wr
->length
;
1453 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1454 s
->s3
->wpend_tot
=len
;
1455 s
->s3
->wpend_buf
=buf
;
1456 s
->s3
->wpend_type
=type
;
1457 s
->s3
->wpend_ret
=len
;
1459 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1460 return ssl3_write_pending(s
,type
,buf
,len
);
1467 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL
*s
, DTLS1_BITMAP
*bitmap
,
1470 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER
1471 PQ_64BIT mask
= 0x0000000000000001L
;
1473 PQ_64BIT rcd_num
, tmp
;
1475 pq_64bit_init(&rcd_num
);
1476 pq_64bit_init(&tmp
);
1478 /* this is the sequence number for the record just read */
1479 pq_64bit_bin2num(&rcd_num
, s
->s3
->read_sequence
, 8);
1482 if (pq_64bit_gt(&rcd_num
, &(bitmap
->max_seq_num
)) ||
1483 pq_64bit_eq(&rcd_num
, &(bitmap
->max_seq_num
)))
1485 pq_64bit_assign(seq_num
, &rcd_num
);
1486 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num
);
1487 pq_64bit_free(&tmp
);
1488 return 1; /* this record is new */
1491 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp
, &(bitmap
->max_seq_num
), &rcd_num
);
1493 if ( pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp
) > bitmap
->length
)
1495 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num
);
1496 pq_64bit_free(&tmp
);
1497 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1500 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_BIGNUM
1503 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp
, &(bitmap
->max_seq_num
), &rcd_num
);
1504 pq_64bit_sub_word(&tmp
, 1);
1505 offset
= pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp
);
1506 if ( pq_64bit_is_bit_set(&(bitmap
->map
), offset
))
1508 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num
);
1509 pq_64bit_free(&tmp
);
1514 mask
<<= (bitmap
->max_seq_num
- rcd_num
- 1);
1515 if (bitmap
->map
& mask
)
1516 return 0; /* record previously received */
1519 pq_64bit_assign(seq_num
, &rcd_num
);
1520 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num
);
1521 pq_64bit_free(&tmp
);
1526 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL
*s
, DTLS1_BITMAP
*bitmap
)
1533 pq_64bit_init(&rcd_num
);
1534 pq_64bit_init(&tmp
);
1536 pq_64bit_bin2num(&rcd_num
, s
->s3
->read_sequence
, 8);
1538 /* unfortunate code complexity due to 64-bit manipulation support
1539 * on 32-bit machines */
1540 if ( pq_64bit_gt(&rcd_num
, &(bitmap
->max_seq_num
)) ||
1541 pq_64bit_eq(&rcd_num
, &(bitmap
->max_seq_num
)))
1543 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp
, &rcd_num
, &(bitmap
->max_seq_num
));
1544 pq_64bit_add_word(&tmp
, 1);
1546 shift
= (unsigned int)pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp
);
1548 pq_64bit_lshift(&(tmp
), &(bitmap
->map
), shift
);
1549 pq_64bit_assign(&(bitmap
->map
), &tmp
);
1551 pq_64bit_set_bit(&(bitmap
->map
), 0);
1552 pq_64bit_add_word(&rcd_num
, 1);
1553 pq_64bit_assign(&(bitmap
->max_seq_num
), &rcd_num
);
1555 pq_64bit_assign_word(&tmp
, 1);
1556 pq_64bit_lshift(&tmp
, &tmp
, bitmap
->length
);
1557 ctx
= pq_64bit_ctx_new(&ctx
);
1558 pq_64bit_mod(&(bitmap
->map
), &(bitmap
->map
), &tmp
, ctx
);
1559 pq_64bit_ctx_free(ctx
);
1563 pq_64bit_sub(&tmp
, &(bitmap
->max_seq_num
), &rcd_num
);
1564 pq_64bit_sub_word(&tmp
, 1);
1565 shift
= (unsigned int)pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp
);
1567 pq_64bit_set_bit(&(bitmap
->map
), shift
);
1570 pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num
);
1571 pq_64bit_free(&tmp
);
1575 int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL
*s
)
1578 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type
,int val
)=NULL
;
1579 unsigned char buf
[2 + 2 + 3]; /* alert level + alert desc + message seq +frag_off */
1580 unsigned char *ptr
= &buf
[0];
1582 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
=0;
1584 memset(buf
, 0x00, sizeof(buf
));
1585 *ptr
++ = s
->s3
->send_alert
[0];
1586 *ptr
++ = s
->s3
->send_alert
[1];
1588 if (s
->s3
->send_alert
[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
)
1590 s2n(s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
, ptr
);
1592 if ( s
->d1
->r_msg_hdr
.frag_off
== 0) /* waiting for a new msg */
1595 s2n(s
->d1
->r_msg_hdr
.seq
, ptr
); /* partial msg read */
1599 fprintf(stderr
, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
,s
->d1
->r_msg_hdr
.seq
);
1601 l2n3(s
->d1
->r_msg_hdr
.frag_off
, ptr
);
1604 i
= do_dtls1_write(s
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, &buf
[0], sizeof(buf
), 0);
1607 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
=1;
1608 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1612 if ( s
->s3
->send_alert
[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
||
1613 s
->s3
->send_alert
[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
)
1614 (void)BIO_flush(s
->wbio
);
1616 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1617 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, s
->s3
->send_alert
,
1618 2, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1620 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1621 cb
=s
->info_callback
;
1622 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1623 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1627 j
=(s
->s3
->send_alert
[0]<<8)|s
->s3
->send_alert
[1];
1628 cb(s
,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT
,j
);
1635 static DTLS1_BITMAP
*
1636 dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL
*s
, SSL3_RECORD
*rr
, unsigned int *is_next_epoch
)
1641 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1642 if (rr
->epoch
== s
->d1
->r_epoch
)
1643 return &s
->d1
->bitmap
;
1645 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1646 else if (rr
->epoch
== (unsigned long)(s
->d1
->r_epoch
+ 1) &&
1647 (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
||
1648 rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
))
1651 return &s
->d1
->next_bitmap
;
1659 dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL
*s
, SSL3_RECORD
*rr
, unsigned short *priority
,
1660 unsigned long *offset
)
1663 /* alerts are passed up immediately */
1664 if ( rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
||
1665 rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
)
1668 /* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway.
1669 * (this implies that Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up
1671 if ( SSL_in_init(s
))
1673 unsigned char *data
= rr
->data
;
1674 /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
1675 if ( rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
||
1676 rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
)
1678 unsigned short seq_num
;
1679 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr
;
1680 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr
;
1682 if ( rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
1684 dtls1_get_message_header(data
, &msg_hdr
);
1685 seq_num
= msg_hdr
.seq
;
1686 *offset
= msg_hdr
.frag_off
;
1690 dtls1_get_ccs_header(data
, &ccs_hdr
);
1691 seq_num
= ccs_hdr
.seq
;
1695 /* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a
1696 * retransmit of something we happened to previously
1697 * receive (higher layers will drop the repeat silently */
1698 if ( seq_num
< s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
)
1700 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&&
1701 seq_num
== s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
&&
1702 msg_hdr
.frag_off
< s
->d1
->r_msg_hdr
.frag_off
)
1704 else if ( seq_num
== s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
&&
1705 (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
||
1706 msg_hdr
.frag_off
== s
->d1
->r_msg_hdr
.frag_off
))
1710 *priority
= seq_num
;
1714 else /* unknown record type */
1723 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL
*s
, int rw
)
1726 unsigned int seq_bytes
= sizeof(s
->s3
->read_sequence
);
1728 if ( rw
& SSL3_CC_READ
)
1730 seq
= s
->s3
->read_sequence
;
1733 pq_64bit_assign(&(s
->d1
->bitmap
.map
), &(s
->d1
->next_bitmap
.map
));
1734 s
->d1
->bitmap
.length
= s
->d1
->next_bitmap
.length
;
1735 pq_64bit_assign(&(s
->d1
->bitmap
.max_seq_num
),
1736 &(s
->d1
->next_bitmap
.max_seq_num
));
1738 pq_64bit_free(&(s
->d1
->next_bitmap
.map
));
1739 pq_64bit_free(&(s
->d1
->next_bitmap
.max_seq_num
));
1740 memset(&(s
->d1
->next_bitmap
), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP
));
1741 pq_64bit_init(&(s
->d1
->next_bitmap
.map
));
1742 pq_64bit_init(&(s
->d1
->next_bitmap
.max_seq_num
));
1746 seq
= s
->s3
->write_sequence
;
1750 memset(seq
, 0x00, seq_bytes
);
1753 #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER
1755 bytes_to_long_long(unsigned char *bytes
, PQ_64BIT
*num
)
1759 _num
= (((PQ_64BIT
)bytes
[0]) << 56) |
1760 (((PQ_64BIT
)bytes
[1]) << 48) |
1761 (((PQ_64BIT
)bytes
[2]) << 40) |
1762 (((PQ_64BIT
)bytes
[3]) << 32) |
1763 (((PQ_64BIT
)bytes
[4]) << 24) |
1764 (((PQ_64BIT
)bytes
[5]) << 16) |
1765 (((PQ_64BIT
)bytes
[6]) << 8) |
1766 (((PQ_64BIT
)bytes
[7]) );
1775 dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL
*s
)
1777 memset(&(s
->d1
->timeout
), 0x00, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st
));