usched: Allow process to change self cpu affinity

[dragonfly.git] / lib / libdmsg / crypto.c

/*
 * Copyright (c) 2011-2012 The DragonFly Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * This code is derived from software contributed to The DragonFly Project
 * by Matthew Dillon <dillon@dragonflybsd.org>
 * by Venkatesh Srinivas <vsrinivas@dragonflybsd.org>
 * by Alex Hornung <alexh@dragonflybsd.org>
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 *
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
 *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
 *    distribution.
 * 3. Neither the name of The DragonFly Project nor the names of its
 *    contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
 *    from this software without specific, prior written permission.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
 * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
 * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
 * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
 * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING,
 * BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED
 * AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
 * OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT
 * OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 * SUCH DAMAGE.
 */

#include "dmsg_local.h"

/*
 * Setup crypto for pthreads
 */
static pthread_mutex_t *crypto_locks;
int crypto_count;

static int dmsg_crypto_gcm_init(dmsg_ioq_t *, char *, int, char *, int, int);
static int dmsg_crypto_gcm_encrypt_chunk(dmsg_ioq_t *, char *, char *, int, int *);
static int dmsg_crypto_gcm_decrypt_chunk(dmsg_ioq_t *, char *, char *, int, int *);

/*
 * NOTE: the order of this table needs to match the DMSG_CRYPTO_ALGO_*_IDX
 *       defines in network.h.
 */
static struct crypto_algo crypto_algos[] = {
        {
                .name      = "aes-256-gcm",
                .keylen    = DMSG_CRYPTO_GCM_KEY_SIZE,
                .taglen    = DMSG_CRYPTO_GCM_TAG_SIZE,
                .init      = dmsg_crypto_gcm_init,
                .enc_chunk = dmsg_crypto_gcm_encrypt_chunk,
                .dec_chunk = dmsg_crypto_gcm_decrypt_chunk
        },
        { NULL, 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL }
};

static
unsigned long
dmsg_crypto_id_callback(void)
{
        return ((unsigned long)(uintptr_t)pthread_self());
}

static
void
dmsg_crypto_locking_callback(int mode, int type,
                                const char *file __unused, int line __unused)
{
        assert(type >= 0 && type < crypto_count);
        if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
                pthread_mutex_lock(&crypto_locks[type]);
        } else {
                pthread_mutex_unlock(&crypto_locks[type]);
        }
}

void
dmsg_crypto_setup(void)
{
        crypto_count = CRYPTO_num_locks();
        crypto_locks = calloc(crypto_count, sizeof(crypto_locks[0]));
        CRYPTO_set_id_callback(dmsg_crypto_id_callback);
        CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(dmsg_crypto_locking_callback);
}

static
int
dmsg_crypto_gcm_init(dmsg_ioq_t *ioq, char *key, int klen,
                        char *iv_fixed, int ivlen, int enc)
{
        int i, ok;

        if (klen < DMSG_CRYPTO_GCM_KEY_SIZE ||
            ivlen < DMSG_CRYPTO_GCM_IV_FIXED_SIZE) {
                dm_printf(1, "%s\n", "Not enough key or iv material");
                return -1;
        }

        dm_printf(6, "%s key: ", enc ? "Encryption" : "Decryption");
        for (i = 0; i < DMSG_CRYPTO_GCM_KEY_SIZE; ++i)
                dmx_printf(6, "%02x", (unsigned char)key[i]);
        dmx_printf(6, "%s\n", "");

        dm_printf(6, "%s iv:  ", enc ? "Encryption" : "Decryption");
        for (i = 0; i < DMSG_CRYPTO_GCM_IV_FIXED_SIZE; ++i)
                dmx_printf(6, "%02x", (unsigned char)iv_fixed[i]);
        dmx_printf(6, "%s\n", " (fixed part only)");

        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ioq->ctx);

        if (enc)
                ok = EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ioq->ctx, EVP_aes_256_gcm(), NULL,
                                        key, NULL);
        else
                ok = EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ioq->ctx, EVP_aes_256_gcm(), NULL,
                                        key, NULL);
        if (!ok)
                goto fail;

        /*
         * According to the original Galois/Counter Mode of Operation (GCM)
         * proposal, only IVs that are exactly 96 bits get used without any
         * further processing. Other IV sizes cause the GHASH() operation
         * to be applied to the IV, which is more costly.
         *
         * The NIST SP 800-38D also recommends using a 96 bit IV for the same
         * reasons. We actually follow the deterministic construction
         * recommended in NIST SP 800-38D with a 64 bit invocation field as an
         * integer counter and a random, session-specific fixed field.
         *
         * This means that we can essentially use the same session key and
         * IV fixed field for up to 2^64 invocations of the authenticated
         * encryption or decryption.
         *
         * With a chunk size of 64 bytes, this adds up to 1 zettabyte of
         * traffic.
         */
        ok = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&ioq->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN,
                                 DMSG_CRYPTO_GCM_IV_SIZE, NULL);
        if (!ok)
                goto fail;

        memset(ioq->iv, 0, DMSG_CRYPTO_GCM_IV_SIZE);
        memcpy(ioq->iv, iv_fixed, DMSG_CRYPTO_GCM_IV_FIXED_SIZE);

        /*
         * Strictly speaking, padding is irrelevant with a counter mode
         * encryption.
         *
         * However, setting padding to 0, even if using a counter mode such
         * as GCM, will cause an error in _finish if the pt/ct size is not
         * a multiple of the cipher block size.
         */
        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&ioq->ctx, 0);

        return 0;

fail:
        dm_printf(1, "%s\n", "Error during _gcm_init");
        return -1;
}

static
int
_gcm_iv_increment(char *iv)
{
        /*
         * Deterministic construction according to NIST SP 800-38D, with
         * 64 bit invocation field as integer counter.
         *
         * In other words, our 96 bit IV consists of a 32 bit fixed field
         * unique to the session and a 64 bit integer counter.
         */

        uint64_t *c = (uint64_t *)(&iv[DMSG_CRYPTO_GCM_IV_FIXED_SIZE]);

        /* Increment invocation field integer counter */
        *c = htobe64(be64toh(*c)+1);

        /*
         * Detect wrap-around, which means it is time to renegotiate
         * the session to get a new key and/or fixed field.
         */
        return (*c == 0) ? 0 : 1;
}

static
int
dmsg_crypto_gcm_encrypt_chunk(dmsg_ioq_t *ioq, char *ct, char *pt,
                                 int in_size, int *out_size)
{
        int ok;
        int u_len, f_len;

        *out_size = 0;

        /* Re-initialize with new IV (but without redoing the key schedule) */
        ok = EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ioq->ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, ioq->iv);
        if (!ok)
                goto fail;

        u_len = 0;      /* safety */
        ok = EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ioq->ctx, ct, &u_len, pt, in_size);
        if (!ok)
                goto fail;

        f_len = 0;      /* safety */
        ok = EVP_EncryptFinal(&ioq->ctx, ct + u_len, &f_len);
        if (!ok)
                goto fail;

        /* Retrieve auth tag */
        ok = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&ioq->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG,
                                 DMSG_CRYPTO_GCM_TAG_SIZE,
                                 ct + u_len + f_len);
        if (!ok)
                goto fail;

        ok = _gcm_iv_increment(ioq->iv);
        if (!ok) {
                ioq->error = DMSG_IOQ_ERROR_IVWRAP;
                goto fail_out;
        }

        *out_size = u_len + f_len + DMSG_CRYPTO_GCM_TAG_SIZE;

        return 0;

fail:
        ioq->error = DMSG_IOQ_ERROR_ALGO;
fail_out:
        dm_printf(1, "%s\n", "error during encrypt_chunk");
        return -1;
}

static
int
dmsg_crypto_gcm_decrypt_chunk(dmsg_ioq_t *ioq, char *ct, char *pt,
                                 int out_size, int *consume_size)
{
        int ok;
        int u_len, f_len;

        *consume_size = 0;

        /* Re-initialize with new IV (but without redoing the key schedule) */
        ok = EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ioq->ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, ioq->iv);
        if (!ok) {
                ioq->error = DMSG_IOQ_ERROR_ALGO;
                goto fail_out;
        }

        ok = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&ioq->ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG,
                                 DMSG_CRYPTO_GCM_TAG_SIZE,
                                 ct + out_size);
        if (!ok) {
                ioq->error = DMSG_IOQ_ERROR_ALGO;
                goto fail_out;
        }

        ok = EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ioq->ctx, pt, &u_len, ct, out_size);
        if (!ok)
                goto fail;

        ok = EVP_DecryptFinal(&ioq->ctx, pt + u_len, &f_len);
        if (!ok)
                goto fail;

        ok = _gcm_iv_increment(ioq->iv);
        if (!ok) {
                ioq->error = DMSG_IOQ_ERROR_IVWRAP;
                goto fail_out;
        }

        *consume_size = u_len + f_len + DMSG_CRYPTO_GCM_TAG_SIZE;

        return 0;

fail:
        ioq->error = DMSG_IOQ_ERROR_MACFAIL;
fail_out:
        dm_printf(1, "%s\n",
                  "error during decrypt_chunk "
                  "(likely authentication error)");
        return -1;
}

/*
 * Synchronously negotiate crypto for a new session.  This must occur
 * within 10 seconds or the connection is error'd out.
 *
 * We work off the IP address and/or reverse DNS.  The IP address is
 * checked first, followed by the IP address at various levels of granularity,
 * followed by the full domain name and domain names at various levels of
 * granularity.
 *
 *      /etc/hammer2/remote/<name>.pub  - Contains a public key
 *      /etc/hammer2/remote/<name>.none - Indicates no encryption (empty file)
 *                                        (e.g. localhost.none).
 *
 * We first attempt to locate a public key file based on the peer address or
 * peer FQDN.
 *
 *      <name>.none     - No further negotiation is needed.  We simply return.
 *                        All communication proceeds without encryption.
 *                        No public key handshake occurs in this situation.
 *                        (both ends must match).
 *
 *      <name>.pub      - We have located the public key for the peer.  Both
 *                        sides transmit a block encrypted with their private
 *                        keys and the peer's public key.
 *
 *                        Both sides receive a block and decrypt it.
 *
 *                        Both sides formulate a reply using the decrypted
 *                        block and transmit it.
 *
 *                        communication proceeds with the negotiated session
 *                        key (typically AES-256-CBC).
 *
 * If we fail to locate the appropriate file and no floating.db exists the
 * connection is terminated without further action.
 *
 * If floating.db exists the connection proceeds with a floating negotiation.
 */
typedef union {
        struct sockaddr sa;
        struct sockaddr_in sa_in;
        struct sockaddr_in6 sa_in6;
} sockaddr_any_t;

void
dmsg_crypto_negotiate(dmsg_iocom_t *iocom)
{
        sockaddr_any_t sa;
        socklen_t salen = sizeof(sa);
        char peername[128];
        char realname[128];
        dmsg_handshake_t handtx;
        dmsg_handshake_t handrx;
        char buf1[sizeof(handtx)];
        char buf2[sizeof(handtx)];
        char *ptr;
        char *path;
        struct stat st;
        FILE *fp;
        RSA *keys[3] = { NULL, NULL, NULL };
        size_t i;
        size_t blksize;
        size_t blkmask;
        ssize_t n;
        int fd;
        int error;

        /*
         * Get the peer IP address for the connection as a string.
         */
        if (getpeername(iocom->sock_fd, &sa.sa, &salen) < 0) {
                iocom->ioq_rx.error = DMSG_IOQ_ERROR_NOPEER;
                atomic_set_int(&iocom->flags, DMSG_IOCOMF_EOF);
                dm_printf(1, "%s\n", "accept: getpeername() failed");
                goto done;
        }
        if (getnameinfo(&sa.sa, salen, peername, sizeof(peername),
                        NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) < 0) {
                iocom->ioq_rx.error = DMSG_IOQ_ERROR_NOPEER;
                atomic_set_int(&iocom->flags, DMSG_IOCOMF_EOF);
                dm_printf(1, "%s\n", "accept: cannot decode sockaddr");
                goto done;
        }
        if (DMsgDebugOpt) {
                if (realhostname_sa(realname, sizeof(realname),
                                    &sa.sa, salen) == HOSTNAME_FOUND) {
                        dm_printf(1, "accept from %s (%s)\n",
                                  peername, realname);
                } else {
                        dm_printf(1, "accept from %s\n", peername);
                }
        }

        /*
         * Find the remote host's public key
         *
         * If the link is not to be encrypted (<ip>.none located) we shortcut
         * the handshake entirely.  No buffers are exchanged.
         */
        asprintf(&path, "%s/%s.pub", DMSG_PATH_REMOTE, peername);
        if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) {
                free(path);
                asprintf(&path, "%s/%s.none",
                         DMSG_PATH_REMOTE, peername);
                if (stat(path, &st) < 0) {
                        iocom->ioq_rx.error = DMSG_IOQ_ERROR_NORKEY;
                        atomic_set_int(&iocom->flags, DMSG_IOCOMF_EOF);
                        dm_printf(1, "%s\n", "auth failure: unknown host");
                        goto done;
                }
                dm_printf(1, "%s\n", "auth succeeded, unencrypted link");
                goto done;
        }
        if (fp) {
                keys[0] = PEM_read_RSA_PUBKEY(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
                fclose(fp);
                if (keys[0] == NULL) {
                        iocom->ioq_rx.error = DMSG_IOQ_ERROR_KEYFMT;
                        atomic_set_int(&iocom->flags, DMSG_IOCOMF_EOF);
                        dm_printf(1, "%s\n", "auth failure: bad key format");
                        goto done;
                }
        }

        /*
         * Get our public and private keys
         */
        free(path);
        asprintf(&path, DMSG_DEFAULT_DIR "/rsa.pub");
        if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) {
                iocom->ioq_rx.error = DMSG_IOQ_ERROR_NOLKEY;
                atomic_set_int(&iocom->flags, DMSG_IOCOMF_EOF);
                goto done;
        }
        keys[1] = PEM_read_RSA_PUBKEY(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
        fclose(fp);
        if (keys[1] == NULL) {
                iocom->ioq_rx.error = DMSG_IOQ_ERROR_KEYFMT;
                atomic_set_int(&iocom->flags, DMSG_IOCOMF_EOF);
                dm_printf(1, "%s\n", "auth failure: bad host key format");
                goto done;
        }

        free(path);
        asprintf(&path, DMSG_DEFAULT_DIR "/rsa.prv");
        if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) {
                iocom->ioq_rx.error = DMSG_IOQ_ERROR_NOLKEY;
                atomic_set_int(&iocom->flags, DMSG_IOCOMF_EOF);
                dm_printf(1, "%s\n", "auth failure: bad host key format");
                goto done;
        }
        keys[2] = PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
        fclose(fp);
        if (keys[2] == NULL) {
                iocom->ioq_rx.error = DMSG_IOQ_ERROR_KEYFMT;
                atomic_set_int(&iocom->flags, DMSG_IOCOMF_EOF);
                dm_printf(1, "%s\n", "auth failure: bad host key format");
                goto done;
        }
        free(path);
        path = NULL;

        /*
         * public key encrypt/decrypt block size.
         */
        if (keys[0]) {
                blksize = (size_t)RSA_size(keys[0]);
                if (blksize != (size_t)RSA_size(keys[1]) ||
                    blksize != (size_t)RSA_size(keys[2]) ||
                    sizeof(handtx) % blksize != 0) {
                        iocom->ioq_rx.error = DMSG_IOQ_ERROR_KEYFMT;
                        atomic_set_int(&iocom->flags, DMSG_IOCOMF_EOF);
                        dm_printf(1, "%s\n",
                                  "auth failure: key size mismatch");
                        goto done;
                }
        } else {
                blksize = sizeof(handtx);
        }
        blkmask = blksize - 1;

        bzero(&handrx, sizeof(handrx));
        bzero(&handtx, sizeof(handtx));

        /*
         * Fill all unused fields (particular all junk fields) with random
         * data, and also set the session key.
         */
        fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
        if (fd < 0 ||
            fstat(fd, &st) < 0 ||       /* something wrong */
            S_ISREG(st.st_mode) ||      /* supposed to be a RNG dev! */
            read(fd, &handtx, sizeof(handtx)) != sizeof(handtx)) {
urandfail:
                if (fd >= 0)
                        close(fd);
                iocom->ioq_rx.error = DMSG_IOQ_ERROR_BADURANDOM;
                atomic_set_int(&iocom->flags, DMSG_IOCOMF_EOF);
                dm_printf(1, "%s\n", "auth failure: bad rng");
                goto done;
        }
        if (bcmp(&handrx, &handtx, sizeof(handtx)) == 0)
                goto urandfail;                 /* read all zeros */
        close(fd);
        /* ERR_load_crypto_strings(); openssl debugging */

        /*
         * Handshake with the remote.
         *
         *      Encrypt with my private and remote's public
         *      Decrypt with my private and remote's public
         *
         * When encrypting we have to make sure our buffer fits within the
         * modulus, which typically requires bit 7 o the first byte to be
         * zero.  To be safe make sure that bit 7 and bit 6 is zero.
         */
        snprintf(handtx.quickmsg, sizeof(handtx.quickmsg), "Testing 1 2 3");
        handtx.magic = DMSG_HDR_MAGIC;
        handtx.version = 1;
        handtx.flags = 0;
        assert(sizeof(handtx.verf) * 4 == sizeof(handtx.sess));
        bzero(handtx.verf, sizeof(handtx.verf));

        handtx.pad1[0] &= 0x3f; /* message must fit within modulus */
        handtx.pad2[0] &= 0x3f; /* message must fit within modulus */

        for (i = 0; i < sizeof(handtx.sess); ++i)
                handtx.verf[i / 4] ^= handtx.sess[i];

        /*
         * Write handshake buffer to remote
         */
        for (i = 0; i < sizeof(handtx); i += blksize) {
                ptr = (char *)&handtx + i;
                if (keys[0]) {
                        /*
                         * Since we are double-encrypting we have to make
                         * sure that the result of the first stage does
                         * not blow out the modulus for the second stage.
                         *
                         * The pointer is pointing to the pad*[] area so
                         * we can mess with that until the first stage
                         * is legal.
                         */
                        do {
                                ++*(int *)(ptr + 4);
                                if (RSA_private_encrypt(blksize, ptr, buf1,
                                            keys[2], RSA_NO_PADDING) < 0) {
                                        iocom->ioq_rx.error =
                                                DMSG_IOQ_ERROR_KEYXCHGFAIL;
                                }
                        } while (buf1[0] & 0xC0);

                        if (RSA_public_encrypt(blksize, buf1, buf2,
                                            keys[0], RSA_NO_PADDING) < 0) {
                                iocom->ioq_rx.error =
                                        DMSG_IOQ_ERROR_KEYXCHGFAIL;
                        }
                }
                if (write(iocom->sock_fd, buf2, blksize) != (ssize_t)blksize) {
                        dmio_printf(iocom, 1, "%s\n", "WRITE ERROR");
                }
        }
        if (iocom->ioq_rx.error) {
                atomic_set_int(&iocom->flags, DMSG_IOCOMF_EOF);
                dmio_printf(iocom, 1, "%s\n",
                            "auth failure: key exchange failure "
                            "during encryption");
                goto done;
        }

        /*
         * Read handshake buffer from remote
         */
        i = 0;
        while (i < sizeof(handrx)) {
                ptr = (char *)&handrx + i;
                n = read(iocom->sock_fd, ptr, blksize - (i & blkmask));
                if (n <= 0)
                        break;
                ptr -= (i & blkmask);
                i += n;
                if (keys[0] && (i & blkmask) == 0) {
                        if (RSA_private_decrypt(blksize, ptr, buf1,
                                           keys[2], RSA_NO_PADDING) < 0)
                                iocom->ioq_rx.error =
                                                DMSG_IOQ_ERROR_KEYXCHGFAIL;
                        if (RSA_public_decrypt(blksize, buf1, ptr,
                                           keys[0], RSA_NO_PADDING) < 0)
                                iocom->ioq_rx.error =
                                                DMSG_IOQ_ERROR_KEYXCHGFAIL;
                }
        }
        if (iocom->ioq_rx.error) {
                atomic_set_int(&iocom->flags, DMSG_IOCOMF_EOF);
                dmio_printf(iocom, 1, "%s\n",
                            "auth failure: key exchange failure "
                            "during decryption");
                goto done;
        }

        /*
         * Validate the received data.  Try to make this a constant-time
         * algorithm.
         */
        if (i != sizeof(handrx)) {
keyxchgfail:
                iocom->ioq_rx.error = DMSG_IOQ_ERROR_KEYXCHGFAIL;
                atomic_set_int(&iocom->flags, DMSG_IOCOMF_EOF);
                dmio_printf(iocom, 1, "%s\n",
                            "auth failure: key exchange failure");
                goto done;
        }

        if (handrx.magic == DMSG_HDR_MAGIC_REV) {
                handrx.version = bswap16(handrx.version);
                handrx.flags = bswap32(handrx.flags);
        }
        for (i = 0; i < sizeof(handrx.sess); ++i)
                handrx.verf[i / 4] ^= handrx.sess[i];
        n = 0;
        for (i = 0; i < sizeof(handrx.verf); ++i)
                n += handrx.verf[i];
        if (handrx.version != 1)
                ++n;
        if (n != 0)
                goto keyxchgfail;

        /*
         * Use separate session keys and session fixed IVs for receive and
         * transmit.
         */
        error = crypto_algos[DMSG_CRYPTO_ALGO].init(&iocom->ioq_rx, handrx.sess,
            crypto_algos[DMSG_CRYPTO_ALGO].keylen,
            handrx.sess + crypto_algos[DMSG_CRYPTO_ALGO].keylen,
            sizeof(handrx.sess) - crypto_algos[DMSG_CRYPTO_ALGO].keylen,
            0 /* decryption */);
        if (error)
                goto keyxchgfail;

        error = crypto_algos[DMSG_CRYPTO_ALGO].init(&iocom->ioq_tx, handtx.sess,
            crypto_algos[DMSG_CRYPTO_ALGO].keylen,
            handtx.sess + crypto_algos[DMSG_CRYPTO_ALGO].keylen,
            sizeof(handtx.sess) - crypto_algos[DMSG_CRYPTO_ALGO].keylen,
            1 /* encryption */);
        if (error)
                goto keyxchgfail;

        atomic_set_int(&iocom->flags, DMSG_IOCOMF_CRYPTED);

        dmio_printf(iocom, 1, "auth success: %s\n", handrx.quickmsg);
done:
        if (path)
                free(path);
        if (keys[0])
                RSA_free(keys[0]);
        if (keys[1])
                RSA_free(keys[1]);
        if (keys[1])
                RSA_free(keys[2]);
}

/*
 * Decrypt pending data in the ioq's fifo.  The data is decrypted in-place.
 */
void
dmsg_crypto_decrypt(dmsg_iocom_t *iocom __unused, dmsg_ioq_t *ioq)
{
        int p_len;
        int used;
        __unused int error;     /* XXX */
        char buf[512];

        /*
         * fifo_beg to fifo_cdx is data already decrypted.
         * fifo_cdn to fifo_end is data not yet decrypted.
         */
        p_len = ioq->fifo_end - ioq->fifo_cdn; /* data not yet decrypted */

        if (p_len == 0)
                return;

        while (p_len >= crypto_algos[DMSG_CRYPTO_ALGO].taglen +
            DMSG_CRYPTO_CHUNK_SIZE) {
                bcopy(ioq->buf + ioq->fifo_cdn, buf,
                      crypto_algos[DMSG_CRYPTO_ALGO].taglen +
                      DMSG_CRYPTO_CHUNK_SIZE);
                error = crypto_algos[DMSG_CRYPTO_ALGO].dec_chunk(
                    ioq, buf,
                    ioq->buf + ioq->fifo_cdx,
                    DMSG_CRYPTO_CHUNK_SIZE,
                    &used);
#ifdef CRYPTO_DEBUG
                dmio_printf(iocom, 5,
                            "dec: p_len: %d, used: %d, "
                            "fifo_cdn: %ju, fifo_cdx: %ju\n",
                             p_len, used,
                             ioq->fifo_cdn, ioq->fifo_cdx);
#endif
                p_len -= used;
                ioq->fifo_cdn += used;
                ioq->fifo_cdx += DMSG_CRYPTO_CHUNK_SIZE;
#ifdef CRYPTO_DEBUG
                dmio_printf(iocom, 5,
                            "dec: p_len: %d, used: %d, "
                            "fifo_cdn: %ju, fifo_cdx: %ju\n",
                            p_len, used, ioq->fifo_cdn, ioq->fifo_cdx);
#endif
        }
}

/*
 * *nactp is set to the number of ORIGINAL bytes consumed by the encrypter.
 * The FIFO may contain more data.
 */
int
dmsg_crypto_encrypt(dmsg_iocom_t *iocom __unused, dmsg_ioq_t *ioq,
                    struct iovec *iov, int n, size_t *nactp)
{
        int p_len, used, ct_used;
        int i;
        __unused int error;     /* XXX */
        size_t nmax;

        nmax = sizeof(ioq->buf) - ioq->fifo_end;        /* max new bytes */

        *nactp = 0;
        for (i = 0; i < n && nmax; ++i) {
                used = 0;
                p_len = iov[i].iov_len;
                assert((p_len & DMSG_ALIGNMASK) == 0);

                while (p_len >= DMSG_CRYPTO_CHUNK_SIZE &&
                    nmax >= DMSG_CRYPTO_CHUNK_SIZE +
                    (size_t)crypto_algos[DMSG_CRYPTO_ALGO].taglen) {
                        error = crypto_algos[DMSG_CRYPTO_ALGO].enc_chunk(
                            ioq,
                            ioq->buf + ioq->fifo_cdx,
                            (char *)iov[i].iov_base + used,
                            DMSG_CRYPTO_CHUNK_SIZE, &ct_used);
#ifdef CRYPTO_DEBUG
                        dmio_printf(iocom, 5,
                                    "nactp: %ju, p_len: %d, "
                                    "ct_used: %d, used: %d, nmax: %ju\n",
                                    *nactp, p_len, ct_used, used, nmax);
#endif

                        *nactp += (size_t)DMSG_CRYPTO_CHUNK_SIZE;       /* plaintext count */
                        used += DMSG_CRYPTO_CHUNK_SIZE;
                        p_len -= DMSG_CRYPTO_CHUNK_SIZE;

                        /*
                         * NOTE: crypted count will eventually differ from
                         *       nmax, but for now we have not yet introduced
                         *       random armor.
                         */
                        ioq->fifo_cdx += (size_t)ct_used;
                        ioq->fifo_cdn += (size_t)ct_used;
                        ioq->fifo_end += (size_t)ct_used;
                        nmax -= (size_t)ct_used;
#ifdef CRYPTO_DEBUG
                        dmio_printf(iocom, 5,
                                    "nactp: %ju, p_len: %d, "
                                    "ct_used: %d, used: %d, nmax: %ju\n",
                                    *nactp, p_len, ct_used, used, nmax);
#endif
                }
        }
        iov[0].iov_base = ioq->buf + ioq->fifo_beg;
        iov[0].iov_len = ioq->fifo_cdx - ioq->fifo_beg;

        return (1);
}