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Now it works.
[cbs-scheduler.git] / kernel / auditsc.c
blobbac40d0a73495f82e415b50816f89cf83f5c7994
1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
3 *
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
7 * All Rights Reserved.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
22 *
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
24 *
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
27 *
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
31 *
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
33 * 2006.
34 *
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
37 *
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
40 *
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
43 */
44
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <asm/atomic.h>
48 #include <linux/fs.h>
49 #include <linux/namei.h>
50 #include <linux/mm.h>
51 #include <linux/module.h>
52 #include <linux/mount.h>
53 #include <linux/socket.h>
54 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
55 #include <linux/audit.h>
56 #include <linux/personality.h>
57 #include <linux/time.h>
58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
59 #include <linux/compiler.h>
60 #include <asm/unistd.h>
61 #include <linux/security.h>
62 #include <linux/list.h>
63 #include <linux/tty.h>
64 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
65 #include <linux/highmem.h>
66 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
67 #include <linux/inotify.h>
68 #include <linux/capability.h>
69
70 #include "audit.h"
71
72 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
73 * for saving names from getname(). */
74 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
75
76 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
77 #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
78
79 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
80 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
81
82 /* number of audit rules */
83 int audit_n_rules;
84
85 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
86 int audit_signals;
87
88 struct audit_cap_data {
89 kernel_cap_t permitted;
90 kernel_cap_t inheritable;
91 union {
92 unsigned int fE; /* effective bit of a file capability */
93 kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of a process */
94 };
95 };
96
97 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
98 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
99 * pointers at syscall exit time).
100 *
101 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
102 struct audit_names {
103 const char *name;
104 int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
105 unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
106 unsigned long ino;
107 dev_t dev;
108 umode_t mode;
109 uid_t uid;
110 gid_t gid;
111 dev_t rdev;
112 u32 osid;
113 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
114 unsigned int fcap_ver;
115 };
116
117 struct audit_aux_data {
118 struct audit_aux_data *next;
119 int type;
120 };
121
122 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
123
124 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
125 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
126
127 struct audit_aux_data_execve {
128 struct audit_aux_data d;
129 int argc;
130 int envc;
131 struct mm_struct *mm;
132 };
133
134 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
135 struct audit_aux_data d;
136 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
137 uid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
138 uid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
139 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
140 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
141 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
142 int pid_count;
143 };
144
145 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
146 struct audit_aux_data d;
147 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
148 unsigned int fcap_ver;
149 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
150 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
151 };
152
153 struct audit_aux_data_capset {
154 struct audit_aux_data d;
155 pid_t pid;
156 struct audit_cap_data cap;
157 };
158
159 struct audit_tree_refs {
160 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
161 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
162 };
163
164 /* The per-task audit context. */
165 struct audit_context {
166 int dummy; /* must be the first element */
167 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
168 enum audit_state state, current_state;
169 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
170 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
171 int major; /* syscall number */
172 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
173 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
174 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
175 u64 prio;
176 int name_count;
177 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
178 char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
179 struct path pwd;
180 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
181 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
182 struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
183 struct sockaddr_storage *sockaddr;
184 size_t sockaddr_len;
185 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
186 pid_t pid, ppid;
187 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
188 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
189 unsigned long personality;
190 int arch;
191
192 pid_t target_pid;
193 uid_t target_auid;
194 uid_t target_uid;
195 unsigned int target_sessionid;
196 u32 target_sid;
197 char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
198
199 struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
200 int tree_count;
201
202 int type;
203 union {
204 struct {
205 int nargs;
206 long args[6];
207 } socketcall;
208 struct {
209 uid_t uid;
210 gid_t gid;
211 mode_t mode;
212 u32 osid;
213 int has_perm;
214 uid_t perm_uid;
215 gid_t perm_gid;
216 mode_t perm_mode;
217 unsigned long qbytes;
218 } ipc;
219 struct {
220 mqd_t mqdes;
221 struct mq_attr mqstat;
222 } mq_getsetattr;
223 struct {
224 mqd_t mqdes;
225 int sigev_signo;
226 } mq_notify;
227 struct {
228 mqd_t mqdes;
229 size_t msg_len;
230 unsigned int msg_prio;
231 struct timespec abs_timeout;
232 } mq_sendrecv;
233 struct {
234 int oflag;
235 mode_t mode;
236 struct mq_attr attr;
237 } mq_open;
238 struct {
239 pid_t pid;
240 struct audit_cap_data cap;
241 } capset;
242 };
243 int fds[2];
244
245 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
246 int put_count;
247 int ino_count;
248 #endif
249 };
250
251 #define ACC_MODE(x) ("\004\002\006\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
252 static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
253 {
254 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
255 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
256 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
257 return n & mask;
258 }
259
260 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
261 {
262 unsigned n;
263 if (unlikely(!ctx))
264 return 0;
265 n = ctx->major;
266
267 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
268 case 0: /* native */
269 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
270 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
271 return 1;
272 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
273 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
274 return 1;
275 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
276 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
277 return 1;
278 return 0;
279 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
280 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
281 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
282 return 1;
283 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
284 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
285 return 1;
286 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
287 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
288 return 1;
289 return 0;
290 case 2: /* open */
291 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
292 case 3: /* openat */
293 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
294 case 4: /* socketcall */
295 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
296 case 5: /* execve */
297 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
298 default:
299 return 0;
300 }
301 }
302
303 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int which)
304 {
305 unsigned index = which & ~S_IFMT;
306 mode_t mode = which & S_IFMT;
307
308 if (unlikely(!ctx))
309 return 0;
310
311 if (index >= ctx->name_count)
312 return 0;
313 if (ctx->names[index].ino == -1)
314 return 0;
315 if ((ctx->names[index].mode ^ mode) & S_IFMT)
316 return 0;
317 return 1;
318 }
319
320 /*
321 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
322 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
323 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
324 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
325 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
326 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
327 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
328 */
329
330 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
331 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
332 {
333 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
334 int left = ctx->tree_count;
335 if (likely(left)) {
336 p->c[--left] = chunk;
337 ctx->tree_count = left;
338 return 1;
339 }
340 if (!p)
341 return 0;
342 p = p->next;
343 if (p) {
344 p->c[30] = chunk;
345 ctx->trees = p;
346 ctx->tree_count = 30;
347 return 1;
348 }
349 return 0;
350 }
351
352 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
353 {
354 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
355 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
356 if (!ctx->trees) {
357 ctx->trees = p;
358 return 0;
359 }
360 if (p)
361 p->next = ctx->trees;
362 else
363 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
364 ctx->tree_count = 31;
365 return 1;
366 }
367 #endif
368
369 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
370 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
371 {
372 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
373 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
374 int n;
375 if (!p) {
376 /* we started with empty chain */
377 p = ctx->first_trees;
378 count = 31;
379 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
380 if (!p)
381 return;
382 }
383 n = count;
384 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
385 while (n--) {
386 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
387 q->c[n] = NULL;
388 }
389 }
390 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
391 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
392 q->c[n] = NULL;
393 }
394 ctx->trees = p;
395 ctx->tree_count = count;
396 #endif
397 }
398
399 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
400 {
401 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
402 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
403 q = p->next;
404 kfree(p);
405 }
406 }
407
408 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
409 {
410 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
411 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
412 int n;
413 if (!tree)
414 return 0;
415 /* full ones */
416 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
417 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
418 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
419 return 1;
420 }
421 /* partial */
422 if (p) {
423 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
424 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
425 return 1;
426 }
427 #endif
428 return 0;
429 }
430
431 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
432 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
433 * otherwise. */
434 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
435 struct audit_krule *rule,
436 struct audit_context *ctx,
437 struct audit_names *name,
438 enum audit_state *state)
439 {
440 const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
441 int i, j, need_sid = 1;
442 u32 sid;
443
444 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
445 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
446 int result = 0;
447
448 switch (f->type) {
449 case AUDIT_PID:
450 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
451 break;
452 case AUDIT_PPID:
453 if (ctx) {
454 if (!ctx->ppid)
455 ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
456 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
457 }
458 break;
459 case AUDIT_UID:
460 result = audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->val);
461 break;
462 case AUDIT_EUID:
463 result = audit_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->val);
464 break;
465 case AUDIT_SUID:
466 result = audit_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->val);
467 break;
468 case AUDIT_FSUID:
469 result = audit_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
470 break;
471 case AUDIT_GID:
472 result = audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->val);
473 break;
474 case AUDIT_EGID:
475 result = audit_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->val);
476 break;
477 case AUDIT_SGID:
478 result = audit_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->val);
479 break;
480 case AUDIT_FSGID:
481 result = audit_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
482 break;
483 case AUDIT_PERS:
484 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
485 break;
486 case AUDIT_ARCH:
487 if (ctx)
488 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
489 break;
490
491 case AUDIT_EXIT:
492 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
493 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
494 break;
495 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
496 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
497 if (f->val)
498 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
499 else
500 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
501 }
502 break;
503 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
504 if (name)
505 result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev),
506 f->op, f->val);
507 else if (ctx) {
508 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
509 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
510 ++result;
511 break;
512 }
513 }
514 }
515 break;
516 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
517 if (name)
518 result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev),
519 f->op, f->val);
520 else if (ctx) {
521 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
522 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
523 ++result;
524 break;
525 }
526 }
527 }
528 break;
529 case AUDIT_INODE:
530 if (name)
531 result = (name->ino == f->val);
532 else if (ctx) {
533 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
534 if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) {
535 ++result;
536 break;
537 }
538 }
539 }
540 break;
541 case AUDIT_WATCH:
542 if (name && rule->watch->ino != (unsigned long)-1)
543 result = (name->dev == rule->watch->dev &&
544 name->ino == rule->watch->ino);
545 break;
546 case AUDIT_DIR:
547 if (ctx)
548 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
549 break;
550 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
551 result = 0;
552 if (ctx)
553 result = audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
554 break;
555 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
556 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
557 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
558 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
559 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
560 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
561 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
562 match for now to avoid losing information that
563 may be wanted. An error message will also be
564 logged upon error */
565 if (f->lsm_rule) {
566 if (need_sid) {
567 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
568 need_sid = 0;
569 }
570 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
571 f->op,
572 f->lsm_rule,
573 ctx);
574 }
575 break;
576 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
577 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
578 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
579 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
580 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
581 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
582 also applies here */
583 if (f->lsm_rule) {
584 /* Find files that match */
585 if (name) {
586 result = security_audit_rule_match(
587 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
588 f->lsm_rule, ctx);
589 } else if (ctx) {
590 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
591 if (security_audit_rule_match(
592 ctx->names[j].osid,
593 f->type, f->op,
594 f->lsm_rule, ctx)) {
595 ++result;
596 break;
597 }
598 }
599 }
600 /* Find ipc objects that match */
601 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
602 break;
603 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
604 f->type, f->op,
605 f->lsm_rule, ctx))
606 ++result;
607 }
608 break;
609 case AUDIT_ARG0:
610 case AUDIT_ARG1:
611 case AUDIT_ARG2:
612 case AUDIT_ARG3:
613 if (ctx)
614 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
615 break;
616 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
617 /* ignore this field for filtering */
618 result = 1;
619 break;
620 case AUDIT_PERM:
621 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
622 break;
623 case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
624 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
625 break;
626 }
627
628 if (!result) {
629 put_cred(cred);
630 return 0;
631 }
632 }
633
634 if (ctx) {
635 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
636 return 0;
637 if (rule->filterkey) {
638 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
639 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
640 }
641 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
642 }
643 switch (rule->action) {
644 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
645 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
646 }
647 put_cred(cred);
648 return 1;
649 }
650
651 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
652 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
653 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
654 */
655 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
656 {
657 struct audit_entry *e;
658 enum audit_state state;
659
660 rcu_read_lock();
661 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
662 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) {
663 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
664 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
665 rcu_read_unlock();
666 return state;
667 }
668 }
669 rcu_read_unlock();
670 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
671 }
672
673 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
674 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
675 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
676 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
677 */
678 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
679 struct audit_context *ctx,
680 struct list_head *list)
681 {
682 struct audit_entry *e;
683 enum audit_state state;
684
685 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
686 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
687
688 rcu_read_lock();
689 if (!list_empty(list)) {
690 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
691 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
692
693 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
694 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
695 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
696 &state)) {
697 rcu_read_unlock();
698 ctx->current_state = state;
699 return state;
700 }
701 }
702 }
703 rcu_read_unlock();
704 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
705 }
706
707 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been
708 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
709 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[].
710 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
711 */
712 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
713 {
714 int i;
715 struct audit_entry *e;
716 enum audit_state state;
717
718 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
719 return;
720
721 rcu_read_lock();
722 for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) {
723 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
724 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
725 struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i];
726 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
727 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
728
729 if (list_empty(list))
730 continue;
731
732 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
733 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
734 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
735 rcu_read_unlock();
736 ctx->current_state = state;
737 return;
738 }
739 }
740 }
741 rcu_read_unlock();
742 }
743
744 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
745 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
746 {
747 if (!ctx->prio) {
748 ctx->prio = 1;
749 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
750 }
751 }
752 #endif
753
754 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
755 int return_valid,
756 int return_code)
757 {
758 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
759
760 if (likely(!context))
761 return NULL;
762 context->return_valid = return_valid;
763
764 /*
765 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
766 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
767 * signal handlers
768 *
769 * This is actually a test for:
770 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
771 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
772 *
773 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
774 */
775 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
776 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
777 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
778 context->return_code = -EINTR;
779 else
780 context->return_code = return_code;
781
782 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) {
783 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
784 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
785 }
786
787 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
788 return context;
789 }
790
791 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
792 {
793 int i;
794
795 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
796 if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
797 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
798 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
799 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
800 __FILE__, __LINE__,
801 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
802 context->name_count, context->put_count,
803 context->ino_count);
804 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
805 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
806 context->names[i].name,
807 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
808 }
809 dump_stack();
810 return;
811 }
812 #endif
813 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
814 context->put_count = 0;
815 context->ino_count = 0;
816 #endif
817
818 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
819 if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put)
820 __putname(context->names[i].name);
821 }
822 context->name_count = 0;
823 path_put(&context->pwd);
824 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
825 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
826 }
827
828 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
829 {
830 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
831
832 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
833 context->aux = aux->next;
834 kfree(aux);
835 }
836 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
837 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
838 kfree(aux);
839 }
840 }
841
842 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
843 enum audit_state state)
844 {
845 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
846 context->state = state;
847 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
848 }
849
850 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
851 {
852 struct audit_context *context;
853
854 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
855 return NULL;
856 audit_zero_context(context, state);
857 return context;
858 }
859
860 /**
861 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
862 * @tsk: task
863 *
864 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
865 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
866 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
867 * needed.
868 */
869 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
870 {
871 struct audit_context *context;
872 enum audit_state state;
873 char *key = NULL;
874
875 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
876 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
877
878 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
879 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
880 return 0;
881
882 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
883 kfree(key);
884 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
885 return -ENOMEM;
886 }
887 context->filterkey = key;
888
889 tsk->audit_context = context;
890 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
891 return 0;
892 }
893
894 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
895 {
896 struct audit_context *previous;
897 int count = 0;
898
899 do {
900 previous = context->previous;
901 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
902 ++count;
903 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
904 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
905 context->serial, context->major,
906 context->name_count, count);
907 }
908 audit_free_names(context);
909 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
910 free_tree_refs(context);
911 audit_free_aux(context);
912 kfree(context->filterkey);
913 kfree(context->sockaddr);
914 kfree(context);
915 context = previous;
916 } while (context);
917 if (count >= 10)
918 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
919 }
920
921 void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
922 {
923 char *ctx = NULL;
924 unsigned len;
925 int error;
926 u32 sid;
927
928 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
929 if (!sid)
930 return;
931
932 error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
933 if (error) {
934 if (error != -EINVAL)
935 goto error_path;
936 return;
937 }
938
939 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
940 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
941 return;
942
943 error_path:
944 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
945 return;
946 }
947
948 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
949
950 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
951 {
952 char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
953 struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
954 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
955
956 /* tsk == current */
957
958 get_task_comm(name, tsk);
959 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
960 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
961
962 if (mm) {
963 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
964 vma = mm->mmap;
965 while (vma) {
966 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
967 vma->vm_file) {
968 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
969 &vma->vm_file->f_path);
970 break;
971 }
972 vma = vma->vm_next;
973 }
974 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
975 }
976 audit_log_task_context(ab);
977 }
978
979 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
980 uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
981 u32 sid, char *comm)
982 {
983 struct audit_buffer *ab;
984 char *ctx = NULL;
985 u32 len;
986 int rc = 0;
987
988 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
989 if (!ab)
990 return rc;
991
992 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid,
993 uid, sessionid);
994 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
995 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
996 rc = 1;
997 } else {
998 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
999 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1000 }
1001 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
1002 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
1003 audit_log_end(ab);
1004
1005 return rc;
1006 }
1007
1008 /*
1009 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
1010 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
1011 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundry)
1012 *
1013 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
1014 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
1015 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
1016 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
1017 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
1018 */
1019 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
1020 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1021 int arg_num,
1022 size_t *len_sent,
1023 const char __user *p,
1024 char *buf)
1025 {
1026 char arg_num_len_buf[12];
1027 const char __user *tmp_p = p;
1028 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 3 is the length of a=\n */
1029 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 3;
1030 size_t len, len_left, to_send;
1031 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1032 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
1033 int ret;
1034
1035 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1036 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1037
1038 /*
1039 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1040 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1041 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1042 * any.
1043 */
1044 if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
1045 WARN_ON(1);
1046 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1047 return -1;
1048 }
1049
1050 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1051 do {
1052 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
1053 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1054 else
1055 to_send = len_left;
1056 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
1057 /*
1058 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1059 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1060 * space yet.
1061 */
1062 if (ret) {
1063 WARN_ON(1);
1064 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1065 return -1;
1066 }
1067 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1068 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
1069 if (has_cntl) {
1070 /*
1071 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1072 * send half as much in each message
1073 */
1074 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
1075 break;
1076 }
1077 len_left -= to_send;
1078 tmp_p += to_send;
1079 } while (len_left > 0);
1080
1081 len_left = len;
1082
1083 if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
1084 too_long = 1;
1085
1086 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1087 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
1088 int room_left;
1089
1090 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
1091 to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
1092 else
1093 to_send = len_left;
1094
1095 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1096 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
1097 if (has_cntl)
1098 room_left -= (to_send * 2);
1099 else
1100 room_left -= to_send;
1101 if (room_left < 0) {
1102 *len_sent = 0;
1103 audit_log_end(*ab);
1104 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1105 if (!*ab)
1106 return 0;
1107 }
1108
1109 /*
1110 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1111 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1112 */
1113 if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
1114 audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d_len=%zu ", arg_num,
1115 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
1116
1117 /*
1118 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1119 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1120 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1121 */
1122 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
1123 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
1124 else
1125 ret = 0;
1126 if (ret) {
1127 WARN_ON(1);
1128 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1129 return -1;
1130 }
1131 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1132
1133 /* actually log it */
1134 audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d", arg_num);
1135 if (too_long)
1136 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
1137 audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
1138 if (has_cntl)
1139 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
1140 else
1141 audit_log_format(*ab, "\"%s\"", buf);
1142 audit_log_format(*ab, "\n");
1143
1144 p += to_send;
1145 len_left -= to_send;
1146 *len_sent += arg_num_len;
1147 if (has_cntl)
1148 *len_sent += to_send * 2;
1149 else
1150 *len_sent += to_send;
1151 }
1152 /* include the null we didn't log */
1153 return len + 1;
1154 }
1155
1156 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1157 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1158 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
1159 {
1160 int i;
1161 size_t len, len_sent = 0;
1162 const char __user *p;
1163 char *buf;
1164
1165 if (axi->mm != current->mm)
1166 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
1167
1168 p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
1169
1170 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d ", axi->argc);
1171
1172 /*
1173 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1174 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1175 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1176 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1177 */
1178 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1179 if (!buf) {
1180 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
1181 return;
1182 }
1183
1184 for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) {
1185 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
1186 &len_sent, p, buf);
1187 if (len <= 0)
1188 break;
1189 p += len;
1190 }
1191 kfree(buf);
1192 }
1193
1194 static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
1195 {
1196 int i;
1197
1198 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
1199 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
1200 audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]);
1201 }
1202 }
1203
1204 static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
1205 {
1206 kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted;
1207 kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable;
1208 int log = 0;
1209
1210 if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) {
1211 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm);
1212 log = 1;
1213 }
1214 if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) {
1215 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh);
1216 log = 1;
1217 }
1218
1219 if (log)
1220 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver);
1221 }
1222
1223 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1224 {
1225 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1226 int i;
1227
1228 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1229 if (!ab)
1230 return;
1231
1232 switch (context->type) {
1233 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1234 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1235 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1236 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1237 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1238 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1239 break; }
1240 case AUDIT_IPC: {
1241 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1242
1243 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1244 context->ipc.uid, context->ipc.gid, context->ipc.mode);
1245 if (osid) {
1246 char *ctx = NULL;
1247 u32 len;
1248 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1249 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1250 *call_panic = 1;
1251 } else {
1252 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1253 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1254 }
1255 }
1256 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1257 audit_log_end(ab);
1258 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1259 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1260 audit_log_format(ab,
1261 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1262 context->ipc.qbytes,
1263 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1264 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1265 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1266 if (!ab)
1267 return;
1268 }
1269 break; }
1270 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
1271 audit_log_format(ab,
1272 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1273 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1274 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1275 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1276 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1277 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1278 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1279 break; }
1280 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
1281 audit_log_format(ab,
1282 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1283 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1284 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1285 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1286 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1287 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1288 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1289 break; }
1290 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
1291 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1292 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1293 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1294 break; }
1295 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1296 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1297 audit_log_format(ab,
1298 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1299 "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
1300 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1301 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1302 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1303 break; }
1304 case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
1305 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1306 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1307 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1308 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1309 break; }
1310 }
1311 audit_log_end(ab);
1312 }
1313
1314 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
1315 {
1316 const struct cred *cred;
1317 int i, call_panic = 0;
1318 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1319 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1320 const char *tty;
1321
1322 /* tsk == current */
1323 context->pid = tsk->pid;
1324 if (!context->ppid)
1325 context->ppid = sys_getppid();
1326 cred = current_cred();
1327 context->uid = cred->uid;
1328 context->gid = cred->gid;
1329 context->euid = cred->euid;
1330 context->suid = cred->suid;
1331 context->fsuid = cred->fsuid;
1332 context->egid = cred->egid;
1333 context->sgid = cred->sgid;
1334 context->fsgid = cred->fsgid;
1335 context->personality = tsk->personality;
1336
1337 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1338 if (!ab)
1339 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1340 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1341 context->arch, context->major);
1342 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1343 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1344 if (context->return_valid)
1345 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1346 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1347 context->return_code);
1348
1349 spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
1350 if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
1351 tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
1352 else
1353 tty = "(none)";
1354 spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
1355
1356 audit_log_format(ab,
1357 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
1358 " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
1359 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
1360 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
1361 context->argv[0],
1362 context->argv[1],
1363 context->argv[2],
1364 context->argv[3],
1365 context->name_count,
1366 context->ppid,
1367 context->pid,
1368 tsk->loginuid,
1369 context->uid,
1370 context->gid,
1371 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
1372 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty,
1373 tsk->sessionid);
1374
1375
1376 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
1377 if (context->filterkey) {
1378 audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
1379 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->filterkey);
1380 } else
1381 audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
1382 audit_log_end(ab);
1383
1384 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1385
1386 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1387 if (!ab)
1388 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1389
1390 switch (aux->type) {
1391
1392 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
1393 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
1394 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi);
1395 break; }
1396
1397 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1398 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1399 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1400 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1401 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1402 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1403 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1404 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1405 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1406 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1407 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1408 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1409 break; }
1410
1411 }
1412 audit_log_end(ab);
1413 }
1414
1415 if (context->type)
1416 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1417
1418 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1419 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1420 if (ab) {
1421 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1422 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1423 audit_log_end(ab);
1424 }
1425 }
1426
1427 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1428 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1429 if (ab) {
1430 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1431 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1432 context->sockaddr_len);
1433 audit_log_end(ab);
1434 }
1435 }
1436
1437 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1438 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1439
1440 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1441 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1442 axs->target_auid[i],
1443 axs->target_uid[i],
1444 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1445 axs->target_sid[i],
1446 axs->target_comm[i]))
1447 call_panic = 1;
1448 }
1449
1450 if (context->target_pid &&
1451 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1452 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1453 context->target_sessionid,
1454 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1455 call_panic = 1;
1456
1457 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1458 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1459 if (ab) {
1460 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
1461 audit_log_end(ab);
1462 }
1463 }
1464 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
1465 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i];
1466
1467 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1468 if (!ab)
1469 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1470
1471 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
1472
1473 if (n->name) {
1474 switch(n->name_len) {
1475 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1476 /* log the full path */
1477 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1478 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
1479 break;
1480 case 0:
1481 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1482 * directory component is the cwd */
1483 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
1484 break;
1485 default:
1486 /* log the name's directory component */
1487 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1488 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name,
1489 n->name_len);
1490 }
1491 } else
1492 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1493
1494 if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
1495 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
1496 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
1497 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1498 n->ino,
1499 MAJOR(n->dev),
1500 MINOR(n->dev),
1501 n->mode,
1502 n->uid,
1503 n->gid,
1504 MAJOR(n->rdev),
1505 MINOR(n->rdev));
1506 }
1507 if (n->osid != 0) {
1508 char *ctx = NULL;
1509 u32 len;
1510 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1511 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1512 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1513 call_panic = 2;
1514 } else {
1515 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1516 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1517 }
1518 }
1519
1520 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
1521
1522 audit_log_end(ab);
1523 }
1524
1525 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1526 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1527 if (ab)
1528 audit_log_end(ab);
1529 if (call_panic)
1530 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1531 }
1532
1533 /**
1534 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1535 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1536 *
1537 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1538 */
1539 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1540 {
1541 struct audit_context *context;
1542
1543 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1544 if (likely(!context))
1545 return;
1546
1547 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1548 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1549 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1550 * in the context of the idle thread */
1551 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1552 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1553 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1554
1555 audit_free_context(context);
1556 }
1557
1558 /**
1559 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1560 * @arch: architecture type
1561 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1562 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1563 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1564 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1565 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1566 *
1567 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1568 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1569 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1570 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1571 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1572 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1573 * be written).
1574 */
1575 void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
1576 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1577 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1578 {
1579 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1580 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1581 enum audit_state state;
1582
1583 if (unlikely(!context))
1584 return;
1585
1586 /*
1587 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
1588 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1589 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1590 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1591 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1592 *
1593 * i386 no
1594 * x86_64 no
1595 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
1596 *
1597 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1598 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1599 */
1600 if (context->in_syscall) {
1601 struct audit_context *newctx;
1602
1603 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1604 printk(KERN_ERR
1605 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1606 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1607 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
1608 #endif
1609 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
1610 if (newctx) {
1611 newctx->previous = context;
1612 context = newctx;
1613 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
1614 } else {
1615 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1616 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1617 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1618 * to abandon auditing. */
1619 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
1620 }
1621 }
1622 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1623
1624 if (!audit_enabled)
1625 return;
1626
1627 context->arch = arch;
1628 context->major = major;
1629 context->argv[0] = a1;
1630 context->argv[1] = a2;
1631 context->argv[2] = a3;
1632 context->argv[3] = a4;
1633
1634 state = context->state;
1635 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1636 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
1637 context->prio = 0;
1638 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1639 }
1640 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
1641 return;
1642
1643 context->serial = 0;
1644 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1645 context->in_syscall = 1;
1646 context->current_state = state;
1647 context->ppid = 0;
1648 }
1649
1650 void audit_finish_fork(struct task_struct *child)
1651 {
1652 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
1653 struct audit_context *p = child->audit_context;
1654 if (!p || !ctx)
1655 return;
1656 if (!ctx->in_syscall || ctx->current_state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1657 return;
1658 p->arch = ctx->arch;
1659 p->major = ctx->major;
1660 memcpy(p->argv, ctx->argv, sizeof(ctx->argv));
1661 p->ctime = ctx->ctime;
1662 p->dummy = ctx->dummy;
1663 p->in_syscall = ctx->in_syscall;
1664 p->filterkey = kstrdup(ctx->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL);
1665 p->ppid = current->pid;
1666 p->prio = ctx->prio;
1667 p->current_state = ctx->current_state;
1668 }
1669
1670 /**
1671 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1672 * @valid: success/failure flag
1673 * @return_code: syscall return value
1674 *
1675 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1676 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1677 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
1678 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1679 * free the names stored from getname().
1680 */
1681 void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
1682 {
1683 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1684 struct audit_context *context;
1685
1686 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
1687
1688 if (likely(!context))
1689 return;
1690
1691 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1692 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1693
1694 context->in_syscall = 0;
1695 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
1696
1697 if (context->previous) {
1698 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
1699 context->previous = NULL;
1700 audit_free_context(context);
1701 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
1702 } else {
1703 audit_free_names(context);
1704 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1705 audit_free_aux(context);
1706 context->aux = NULL;
1707 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1708 context->target_pid = 0;
1709 context->target_sid = 0;
1710 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
1711 context->type = 0;
1712 context->fds[0] = -1;
1713 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
1714 kfree(context->filterkey);
1715 context->filterkey = NULL;
1716 }
1717 tsk->audit_context = context;
1718 }
1719 }
1720
1721 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1722 {
1723 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1724 struct audit_context *context;
1725 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1726 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1727 int count;
1728 if (likely(list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches)))
1729 return;
1730 context = current->audit_context;
1731 p = context->trees;
1732 count = context->tree_count;
1733 rcu_read_lock();
1734 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1735 rcu_read_unlock();
1736 if (!chunk)
1737 return;
1738 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1739 return;
1740 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1741 printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1742 audit_set_auditable(context);
1743 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1744 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1745 return;
1746 }
1747 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1748 #endif
1749 }
1750
1751 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1752 {
1753 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1754 struct audit_context *context;
1755 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1756 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1757 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1758 unsigned long seq;
1759 int count;
1760
1761 context = current->audit_context;
1762 p = context->trees;
1763 count = context->tree_count;
1764 retry:
1765 drop = NULL;
1766 d = dentry;
1767 rcu_read_lock();
1768 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1769 for(;;) {
1770 struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
1771 if (inode && unlikely(!list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches))) {
1772 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1773 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1774 if (chunk) {
1775 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1776 drop = chunk;
1777 break;
1778 }
1779 }
1780 }
1781 parent = d->d_parent;
1782 if (parent == d)
1783 break;
1784 d = parent;
1785 }
1786 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1787 rcu_read_unlock();
1788 if (!drop) {
1789 /* just a race with rename */
1790 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1791 goto retry;
1792 }
1793 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1794 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1795 /* OK, got more space */
1796 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1797 goto retry;
1798 }
1799 /* too bad */
1800 printk(KERN_WARNING
1801 "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1802 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1803 audit_set_auditable(context);
1804 return;
1805 }
1806 rcu_read_unlock();
1807 #endif
1808 }
1809
1810 /**
1811 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1812 * @name: name to add
1813 *
1814 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1815 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1816 */
1817 void __audit_getname(const char *name)
1818 {
1819 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1820
1821 if (IS_ERR(name) || !name)
1822 return;
1823
1824 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1825 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1826 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1827 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1828 dump_stack();
1829 #endif
1830 return;
1831 }
1832 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
1833 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
1834 context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1835 context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1;
1836 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1837 context->names[context->name_count].osid = 0;
1838 ++context->name_count;
1839 if (!context->pwd.dentry) {
1840 read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
1841 context->pwd = current->fs->pwd;
1842 path_get(&current->fs->pwd);
1843 read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
1844 }
1845
1846 }
1847
1848 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1849 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1850 *
1851 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1852 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1853 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1854 */
1855 void audit_putname(const char *name)
1856 {
1857 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1858
1859 BUG_ON(!context);
1860 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1861 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1862 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1863 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1864 if (context->name_count) {
1865 int i;
1866 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
1867 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
1868 context->names[i].name,
1869 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
1870 }
1871 #endif
1872 __putname(name);
1873 }
1874 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1875 else {
1876 ++context->put_count;
1877 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1878 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1879 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1880 " put_count=%d\n",
1881 __FILE__, __LINE__,
1882 context->serial, context->major,
1883 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
1884 context->put_count);
1885 dump_stack();
1886 }
1887 }
1888 #endif
1889 }
1890
1891 static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context,
1892 const struct inode *inode)
1893 {
1894 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES) {
1895 if (inode)
1896 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data: "
1897 "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu\n",
1898 MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1899 MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1900 inode->i_ino);
1901
1902 else
1903 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data\n");
1904 return 1;
1905 }
1906 context->name_count++;
1907 #if AUDIT_DEBUG
1908 context->ino_count++;
1909 #endif
1910 return 0;
1911 }
1912
1913
1914 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
1915 {
1916 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
1917 int rc;
1918
1919 memset(&name->fcap.permitted, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
1920 memset(&name->fcap.inheritable, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
1921 name->fcap.fE = 0;
1922 name->fcap_ver = 0;
1923
1924 if (!dentry)
1925 return 0;
1926
1927 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
1928 if (rc)
1929 return rc;
1930
1931 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
1932 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
1933 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
1934 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
1935
1936 return 0;
1937 }
1938
1939
1940 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1941 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1942 const struct inode *inode)
1943 {
1944 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1945 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1946 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1947 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1948 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1949 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1950 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
1951 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
1952 }
1953
1954 /**
1955 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1956 * @name: name being audited
1957 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1958 *
1959 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
1960 */
1961 void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
1962 {
1963 int idx;
1964 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1965 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1966
1967 if (!context->in_syscall)
1968 return;
1969 if (context->name_count
1970 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
1971 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
1972 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1973 else if (context->name_count > 1
1974 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
1975 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
1976 idx = context->name_count - 2;
1977 else {
1978 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1979 * associated name? */
1980 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
1981 return;
1982 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1983 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1984 }
1985 handle_path(dentry);
1986 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], dentry, inode);
1987 }
1988
1989 /**
1990 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1991 * @dname: inode's dentry name
1992 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1993 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1994 *
1995 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1996 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1997 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1998 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1999 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
2000 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
2001 * unsuccessful attempts.
2002 */
2003 void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct dentry *dentry,
2004 const struct inode *parent)
2005 {
2006 int idx;
2007 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2008 const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
2009 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2010 int dirlen = 0;
2011
2012 if (!context->in_syscall)
2013 return;
2014
2015 if (inode)
2016 handle_one(inode);
2017 /* determine matching parent */
2018 if (!dname)
2019 goto add_names;
2020
2021 /* parent is more likely, look for it first */
2022 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
2023 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
2024
2025 if (!n->name)
2026 continue;
2027
2028 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
2029 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
2030 n->name_len = dirlen; /* update parent data in place */
2031 found_parent = n->name;
2032 goto add_names;
2033 }
2034 }
2035
2036 /* no matching parent, look for matching child */
2037 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
2038 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
2039
2040 if (!n->name)
2041 continue;
2042
2043 /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */
2044 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) ||
2045 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
2046 if (inode)
2047 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode);
2048 else
2049 n->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2050 found_child = n->name;
2051 goto add_names;
2052 }
2053 }
2054
2055 add_names:
2056 if (!found_parent) {
2057 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, parent))
2058 return;
2059 idx = context->name_count - 1;
2060 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
2061 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, parent);
2062 }
2063
2064 if (!found_child) {
2065 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
2066 return;
2067 idx = context->name_count - 1;
2068
2069 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2070 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2071 * audit_free_names() */
2072 if (found_parent) {
2073 context->names[idx].name = found_parent;
2074 context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2075 /* don't call __putname() */
2076 context->names[idx].name_put = 0;
2077 } else {
2078 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
2079 }
2080
2081 if (inode)
2082 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, inode);
2083 else
2084 context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2085 }
2086 }
2087 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
2088
2089 /**
2090 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2091 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2092 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
2093 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2094 *
2095 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2096 */
2097 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
2098 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
2099 {
2100 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
2101 return 0;
2102 if (!ctx->serial)
2103 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
2104 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2105 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2106 *serial = ctx->serial;
2107 if (!ctx->prio) {
2108 ctx->prio = 1;
2109 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
2110 }
2111 return 1;
2112 }
2113
2114 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
2115 static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
2116
2117 /**
2118 * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
2119 * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
2120 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2121 *
2122 * Returns 0.
2123 *
2124 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2125 */
2126 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
2127 {
2128 unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
2129 struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
2130
2131 if (context && context->in_syscall) {
2132 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2133
2134 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
2135 if (ab) {
2136 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
2137 "old auid=%u new auid=%u"
2138 " old ses=%u new ses=%u",
2139 task->pid, task_uid(task),
2140 task->loginuid, loginuid,
2141 task->sessionid, sessionid);
2142 audit_log_end(ab);
2143 }
2144 }
2145 task->sessionid = sessionid;
2146 task->loginuid = loginuid;
2147 return 0;
2148 }
2149
2150 /**
2151 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2152 * @oflag: open flag
2153 * @mode: mode bits
2154 * @u_attr: queue attributes
2155 *
2156 */
2157 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2158 {
2159 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2160
2161 if (attr)
2162 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2163 else
2164 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2165
2166 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2167 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2168
2169 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2170 }
2171
2172 /**
2173 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2174 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2175 * @msg_len: Message length
2176 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2177 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2178 *
2179 */
2180 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2181 const struct timespec *abs_timeout)
2182 {
2183 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2184 struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2185
2186 if (abs_timeout)
2187 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec));
2188 else
2189 memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec));
2190
2191 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2192 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2193 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2194
2195 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2196 }
2197
2198 /**
2199 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2200 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2201 * @u_notification: Notification event
2202 *
2203 */
2204
2205 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2206 {
2207 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2208
2209 if (notification)
2210 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2211 else
2212 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2213
2214 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2215 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2216 }
2217
2218 /**
2219 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2220 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2221 * @mqstat: MQ flags
2222 *
2223 */
2224 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2225 {
2226 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2227 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2228 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2229 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2230 }
2231
2232 /**
2233 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2234 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2235 *
2236 */
2237 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2238 {
2239 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2240 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2241 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2242 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2243 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2244 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2245 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2246 }
2247
2248 /**
2249 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2250 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2251 * @uid: msgq user id
2252 * @gid: msgq group id
2253 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2254 *
2255 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2256 */
2257 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
2258 {
2259 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2260
2261 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2262 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2263 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2264 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2265 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2266 }
2267
2268 int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2269 {
2270 struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
2271 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2272
2273 if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
2274 return 0;
2275
2276 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2277 if (!ax)
2278 return -ENOMEM;
2279
2280 ax->argc = bprm->argc;
2281 ax->envc = bprm->envc;
2282 ax->mm = bprm->mm;
2283 ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2284 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2285 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2286 return 0;
2287 }
2288
2289
2290 /**
2291 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2292 * @nargs: number of args
2293 * @args: args array
2294 *
2295 */
2296 void audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2297 {
2298 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2299
2300 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
2301 return;
2302
2303 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2304 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2305 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2306 }
2307
2308 /**
2309 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2310 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2311 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2312 *
2313 */
2314 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2315 {
2316 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2317 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2318 context->fds[1] = fd2;
2319 }
2320
2321 /**
2322 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2323 * @len: data length in user space
2324 * @a: data address in kernel space
2325 *
2326 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2327 */
2328 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2329 {
2330 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2331
2332 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
2333 return 0;
2334
2335 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2336 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2337 if (!p)
2338 return -ENOMEM;
2339 context->sockaddr = p;
2340 }
2341
2342 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2343 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2344 return 0;
2345 }
2346
2347 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2348 {
2349 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2350
2351 context->target_pid = t->pid;
2352 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2353 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2354 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2355 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2356 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2357 }
2358
2359 /**
2360 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2361 * @sig: signal value
2362 * @t: task being signaled
2363 *
2364 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2365 * and uid that is doing that.
2366 */
2367 int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
2368 {
2369 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2370 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
2371 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
2372 uid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t);
2373
2374 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
2375 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
2376 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
2377 if (tsk->loginuid != -1)
2378 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
2379 else
2380 audit_sig_uid = uid;
2381 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
2382 }
2383 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2384 return 0;
2385 }
2386
2387 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2388 * in audit_context */
2389 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2390 ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
2391 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2392 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2393 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2394 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2395 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2396 return 0;
2397 }
2398
2399 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2400 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2401 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2402 if (!axp)
2403 return -ENOMEM;
2404
2405 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2406 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2407 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2408 }
2409 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2410
2411 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
2412 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2413 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2414 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2415 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2416 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2417 axp->pid_count++;
2418
2419 return 0;
2420 }
2421
2422 /**
2423 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2424 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2425 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2426 * @old: the old credentials
2427 *
2428 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2429 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2430 *
2431 * -Eric
2432 */
2433 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2434 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2435 {
2436 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2437 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2438 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2439 struct dentry *dentry;
2440
2441 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2442 if (!ax)
2443 return -ENOMEM;
2444
2445 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2446 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2447 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2448
2449 dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
2450 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
2451 dput(dentry);
2452
2453 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2454 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2455 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2456 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2457
2458 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2459 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2460 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2461
2462 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2463 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2464 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2465 return 0;
2466 }
2467
2468 /**
2469 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2470 * @pid: target pid of the capset call
2471 * @new: the new credentials
2472 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2473 *
2474 * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2475 * audit system if applicable
2476 */
2477 void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid,
2478 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2479 {
2480 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2481 context->capset.pid = pid;
2482 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2483 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2484 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2485 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2486 }
2487
2488 /**
2489 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2490 * @signr: signal value
2491 *
2492 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2493 * should record the event for investigation.
2494 */
2495 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2496 {
2497 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2498 u32 sid;
2499 uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current), uid;
2500 gid_t gid;
2501 unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2502
2503 if (!audit_enabled)
2504 return;
2505
2506 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2507 return;
2508
2509 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2510 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2511 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2512 auid, uid, gid, sessionid);
2513 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
2514 if (sid) {
2515 char *ctx = NULL;
2516 u32 len;
2517
2518 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
2519 audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
2520 else {
2521 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
2522 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
2523 }
2524 }
2525 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
2526 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
2527 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
2528 audit_log_end(ab);
2529 }
A cbs scheduler for rt-kernel